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FTR #1009 The Deep Politics of Habsburg Redux and The Russia-Gate Psy-Op

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This broad­cast was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment [5]

 

[6]

William “Wild Bill” Dono­van

[7]Intro­duc­tion: In recent pro­grams, we exam­ined com­plex inter­ac­tions between a group of Euro­pean politi­cians dubbed “The Haps­burg Group,” for­mer Trump cam­paign manager/ for­mer advis­er to for­mer Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovuyuch and prob­a­ble U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cer Paul Man­afort, and the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment. In turn, mem­bers of the Hab­s­burg family–the Roy­al House of the for­mer Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an Empire–have been active through­out Europe and in their for­mer prin­ci­pal­i­ty of Ukraine.

In this pro­gram, we exam­ine the deep pol­i­tics man­i­fest­ing in the Ukraine/Habsburg redux/Liechtenstein dynam­ic.

Before delv­ing into the devel­op­ment of this pow­er polit­i­cal rela­tion­ship, we review the involve­ment of the Hab­s­burgs in Euro­pean inte­gra­tion and the incor­po­ra­tion of Ukraine into the West­ern orbit:

[16]

Allen Dulles

[17]

Wal­ter Schel­len­berg

The foun­da­tion [18] of the U.S. intelligence/Hapsburg/Underground Reich con­cate­na­tion dates to the peri­od imme­di­ate­ly after World War I: ” . . . .  . . . . The Haps­burgs would desert Ger­many in return for an Amer­i­can com­mit­ment. Sub­si­dized by the Unit­ed States—which brought over to Europe the Pres­i­den­t’s close advis­er Pro­fes­sor George D. Her­ron to impart Wilson’s vital impri­matur—this updat­ed Haps­burg sov­er­eign­ty must com­mit in advance to erad­i­cat­ing the Bol­she­viks. A revi­tal­ized Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an buffer zone to fend off Sovi­et pen­e­tra­tion of the Balka­ns turned into a life­long chimera for Dulles, and spurred his devo­tion over the many years to some man­ner of ‘Danu­bian Fed­er­a­tion.’ . . . .”

This rela­tion­ship gained momen­tum dur­ing the Sec­ond World War, with approach­es by the Third Reich to Allied as a Nazi defeat began to take shape.

One of the con­cepts cen­tral to under­stand­ing an exten­sion of the U.S. intelligence/Hapsburg anti-Com­mu­nist alliance is the con­cept of “The Chris­t­ian West”–explained in the descrip­tion for AFA #37 [19]: ” . . . . When it became clear that the armies of the Third Reich were going to be defeat­ed, it opened secret nego­ti­a­tions with rep­re­sen­ta­tives from the West­ern Allies. Rep­re­sen­ta­tives on both sides belonged to the transat­lantic finan­cial and indus­tri­al fra­ter­ni­ty that had active­ly sup­port­ed fas­cism. The thrust of these nego­ti­a­tions was the estab­lish­ment of The Chris­t­ian West. Viewed by the Nazis as a vehi­cle for sur­viv­ing mil­i­tary defeat, ‘The Chris­t­ian West’ involved a Hitler-less Reich join­ing with the U.S., Britain, France and oth­er Euro­pean nations in a transat­lantic, pan-Euro­pean anti-Sovi­et alliance. In fact, The Chris­t­ian West became a real­i­ty only after the ces­sa­tion of hos­til­i­ties. The de-Naz­i­fi­ca­tion of Ger­many was abort­ed. Although a few of the more obvi­ous and obnox­ious ele­ments of Nazism were removed, Nazis were returned to pow­er at vir­tu­al­ly every lev­el and in almost every capac­i­ty in the Fed­er­al Repub­lic of Ger­many. . . .”

Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance [18]for our pur­pos­es is a “Chris­t­ian West­er” acco­mo­da­tion appar­ent­ly involv­ing Prince Egon Max von Hohen­loe, who mar­ried into the Hab­s­burg fam­i­ly. Oper­at­ing out of Licht­en­stein and trav­el­ing on a Licht­en­stein pass­port, von Hohen­loe served as an inter­me­di­ary between U.S. intel­li­gence and Wal­ter Schel­len­berg, in charge of over­seas intel­li­gence for the SS. (Schel­len­berg was also on the board of direc­tors of Inter­na­tion­al Tele­phone and Tele­graph and became a key oper­a­tive for the post­war Gehlen orga­ni­za­tion.)

[20]

The wed­ding of Prince Max Egon von Hohen­loe-Lan­gen­burg

Allen Dulles’s strate­gic out­look embraced and shaped much of what appears to under­lie the Habsburg/OUN/Western intel­li­gence [18] activ­i­ty with regard to Ukraine: ” . . . Pro­nounce­ments alter­nat­ed with rich meals in a Liecht­en­stein chateau; Hohen­lo­he bit by bit exposed his qua­si-offi­cial sta­tus as a spokesman for SS ele­ments with in the Ger­man gov­ern­ment who now looked beyond the ‘wild men’ in con­trol. What casts a longer shad­ow is the out­line of Allen’s geopo­lit­i­cal ideas. The peace he has in mind, Dulles indi­cates, must avoid the excess­es of Ver­sailles and per­mit the expand­ed Ger­man poli­ty to sur­vive, Aus­tria includ­ed and pos­si­bly at least a sec­tion of Czecho­slo­va­kia, while exclud­ing all thought of ‘vic­tors and van­quished . . . . as a fac­tor of order and progress.’ . . . . The resul­tant ‘Greater Ger­many’ would back­stop the ‘for­ma­tion of a cor­don san­i­taire against Bol­she­vism and pan-Slav­ism through the east­ward enlarge­ment of Poland and the preser­va­tion of a strong Hun­gary.’ This ‘Fed­er­al Greater Ger­many (sim­i­lar to the Unit­ed States), with an asso­ci­at­ed Danube Con­fed­er­a­tion, would be the best guar­an­tee of order and progress in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe.’ . . . . ”

[21]

Admi­ral Wil­helm Canaris

A for­mer Abwehr offi­cer alleges [18] that he attend­ed a meet­ing in Spain between Abwehr head Wil­helm Canaris, Dono­van and Stew­art Men­zies, chief of MI6–British Intel­li­gence. ” . . . . . . . . An Abwehr offi­cer, F. Jus­tus von Einem, lat­er claimed to have sat in on a care­ful­ly pre­pared meet­ing at San­tander in Spain in the sum­mer of 1943 dur­ing which both Men­zies and Dono­van agreed to Chris­t­ian West­er terms as  reca­pit­u­lat­ed by Canaris per­son­al­ly. If this exchange occurred, Dono­van kept it qui­et. . . .”

[22]Inter­est­ing per­spec­tive on why Dono­van would have “kept it qui­et” can be gleaned  from the account of the fre­quent­ly lethal attempts by four dif­fer­ent authors to write the account of the OSS from the orga­ni­za­tion’s micro­filmed files. We remind lis­ten­ers, in this con­text, that major intel­li­gence ser­vices have pos­sessed tox­ins that will kill with­out leav­ing a trace for a very long time. ” . . . . Pro­fes­sor Cony­ers Read, the Har­vard his­to­ri­an, pro­duced many draft chap­ters before Dono­van him­self asked him to stop work, because he felt the direc­tor’s papers were still too sen­si­tive. Read did not resume his work, for death inter­vened. [#1–D.E.] One of Dono­van’s wartime majors, Corey Ford, then began work on the project in the mid-1950’s, pro­duc­ing a draft man­u­script of what was real­ly a bio­graph­i­cal his­to­ry of Dono­van and the OSS, but again death inter­vened before Ford could com­plete his vol­ume. [#2–D.E.]

After Dono­van’s death in 1959, the project was tak­en over by Whit­ney Shep­ard­son, Dono­van’s chief of secret intel­li­gence dur­ing World War II. For the third time, the author died before com­plet­ing the work. [#3–D.E.] Then came the fourth attempt, this time by Cor­nelius Ryan, the author of The Longest Day. . . .  the work was stopped before it real­ly began; a mid­dle-rank offi­cial at the CIA man­aged to stop the project because he believed the book con­tem­plat­ed by Ryan would be too con­tro­ver­sial. When he found him­self denied access to the direc­tor’s files, Ryan was com­pelled to aban­don the project tem­porar­i­ly. Then he, too died before it was pos­si­ble to resume work. [#4–D.E.]. . .”

Pro­gram High­lights Include:

  1. A 1923 busi­ness lun­cheon meet­ing between William Dono­van and Adolf Hitler: ” . . . . As ear­ly as 1923, he [Dono­van] mate­ri­al­ized in Bercht­es­gaden to share a beer in the Gastz­im­mer of a mod­est pen­sion with Adolf Hitler. The clam­my young rab­ble-rouser rant­ed to the sym­pa­thet­ic attor­ney that he, unlike the fam­i­ly dog, could not be beat­en by his mis­er­able father until he wet the car­pet. . . . .”
  2. Dono­van’s role pro­vid­ing polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic intel­li­gence to J.P. Mor­gan to facil­i­tate Amer­i­can invest­ment bankers’ $2 bil­lion invest­ment in Euro­pean infra­struc­ture. [23] ” . . . . He was qui­et­ly approached by rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the pre­em­i­nent firm of J.P. Mor­gan and Sons. The coun­try’s most influ­en­tial invest­ment bankers were recon­noi­ter­ing the mar­ket for a $2 bil­lion pack­age of secu­ri­ties around Cen­tral and East­ern Europe. . . .
  3. Com­par­i­son between the func­tion­al role of key Wall Street lawyers who “grad­u­at­ed” to assum­ing deci­sive posts in U.S. intel­li­gence and their sub­se­quent espi­onage activ­i­ties. ” . . . . Dono­van’s pro­fes­sion was rel­e­vant, and it is equal­ly no acci­dent that all three load-bear­ing pro­tag­o­nists through­out this work—Bill Dono­van, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner—achieved sta­tus in Amer­i­ca by way of impor­tant Wall Street part­ner­ships. In many ways, a trust­ed cor­po­rate attor­ney accom­plish­es sub­stan­tial­ly for his clients what today’s one-stop nation­al intel­li­gence fac­to­ry goes after for its patron: he puts the  deals togeth­er, he damps down crises and flaps, he keeps the process as con­fi­den­tial as pos­si­ble. He finds out every­thing he an and resorts to every means imag­in­able to shape the out­come. He pro­ceeds by the case sys­tem, and prefer­ably one emer­gency at a time. Fur­ther­more, an intel­li­gence ser­vice con­coct­ed by lawyers—men accus­tomed not mere­ly  to spot­ting the prob­lems but also to defin­ing them to their clients and rec­om­mend­ing appro­pri­ate action—is far more like­ly than a tra­di­tion­al mil­i­tary intel­li­gence staff to reach in and con­di­tion pol­i­cy. Attor­neys have a seduc­tive way of sub­or­di­nat­ing their clients, of insin­u­at­ing their leg­erde­main until they become the strate­gic entan­gle­ments. And thus it devel­ops that in many strate­gic entan­gle­ments the lawyers have at least as much con­trol over the out­come as elect­ed offi­cials. . . .”

1a. In his intro­duc­tion to The Old Boys, author Bur­ton Hersh notes the Wall Street legal back­grounds of William “Wild Bill” Dono­van, Allen Dulles and Frank Wis­ner, and opines that the method­ol­o­gy of an intel­li­gence ser­vice is like that of a Wall Street law firm.

The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; p. 3. [18]

 . . . . Dono­van’s pro­fes­sion was rel­e­vant, and it is equal­ly no acci­dent that all three load-bear­ing pro­tag­o­nists through­out this work—Bill Dono­van, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner—achieved sta­tus in Amer­i­ca by way of impor­tant Wall Street part­ner­ships. In many ways, a trust­ed cor­po­rate attor­ney accom­plish­es sub­stan­tial­ly for his clients what today’s one-stop nation­al intel­li­gence fac­to­ry goes after for its patron: he puts the  deals togeth­er, he damps down crises and flaps, he keeps the process as con­fi­den­tial as pos­si­ble. He finds out every­thing he can and resorts to every means imag­in­able to shape the out­come. He pro­ceeds by the case sys­tem, and prefer­ably one emer­gency at a time.

 Fur­ther­more, an intel­li­gence ser­vice con­coct­ed by lawyers—men accus­tomed not mere­ly  to spot­ting the prob­lems but also to defin­ing them to their clients and rec­om­mend­ing appro­pri­ate action—is far more like­ly than a tra­di­tion­al mil­i­tary intel­li­gence staff to reach in and con­di­tion pol­i­cy. Attor­neys have a seduc­tive way of sub­or­di­nat­ing their clients, of insin­u­at­ing their leg­erde­main until they become the strate­gic entan­gle­ments. And thus it devel­ops that in many strate­gic entan­gle­ments the lawyers have at least as much con­trol over the out­come as elect­ed offi­cials. . . .

1b. Car­ry­ing his obser­va­tions fur­ther, Hersh ana­lyzes the find­ings of the Church Com­mit­tee inves­ti­gat­ing CIA abus­es, see­ing those abus­es as stem­ming from the opaque machi­na­tions of a Wall Street law firm act­ing on behalf of a cor­po­rate client.

 The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; p. 291. [18]

 . . . . “Pol­i­cy direc­tion,” the Church Com­mit­tee experts con­clud­ed, “took the form of con­don­ing and fos­ter­ing activ­i­ty with­out pro­vid­ing scruti­ny and con­trol” or “estab­lish­ing firm guide­lines for approval.” Wis­ner built his covert-action fac­to­ry around pro­ce­dures anal­o­gous to those which pre­vailed in the impor­tant law firms, where high-pow­ered busi­ness get­ters eas­i­ly cor­nered the lucra­tive part­ner­ships, brought in pre­ferred clients, raked off con­tin­gency fees and skirt­ed the more con­tro­ver­sial details when delin­eat­ing touchy cas­es in front of staid senior fig­ures. The key was breadth, inter­nal veloc­i­ty, com­pound­ing bill­able hours. The  impact on soci­ety, like the ethics of the client, appeared beside the point. . . .

2. In numer­ous pro­grams, we not­ed the Amer­i­can invest­ments in Weimar and Nazi Ger­many and the deci­sive effect that cap­i­tal had on Ger­man soci­ety. Dono­van went to Europe and an obvi­ous­ly polit­i­cal­ly-tinged mis­sion to obtain intel­li­gence on devel­op­ments there. J.P. Mor­gan enlist­ed Dono­van to devel­op infor­ma­tion ahead of invest­ing $2 bil­lion in Europe. (A  $ bil­lion was worth far more in the ear­ly 1920’s than today.)

The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; p. 34. [18]

 . . . . Bare­ly returned from Siberia, Ruth Dono­van was dis­heart­ened in Feb­ru­ary 1920 to hear that her hus­band had picked up yet anoth­er excuse to trav­el. He was qui­et­ly approached by rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the pre­em­i­nent firm of J.P. Mor­gan and Sons. The coun­try’s most influ­en­tial invest­ment bankers were recon­noi­ter­ing the mar­ket for a $2 bil­lion pack­age of secu­ri­ties around Cen­tral and East­ern Europe. . . .

. . . . This jun­ket in and of itself amount­ed to a kind of one-man intel­li­gence sweep, an effort to assim­i­late, inter­pret, and ulti­mate­ly project as a fin­ished report infor­ma­tion on which both judg­ments and pre­dic­tions might rea­son­ably be based. Dono­van’s notes would amount to a rudi­men­ta­ry ver­sion of what lat­er espi­onage ser­vices would title a nation­al intel­li­gence esti­mate. . . .

3. A “sym­pa­thet­ic” Dono­van met with Adolf Hitler in 1923. This must have been ear­li­er than Novem­ber 9th of 1923, the date of the Beer Hall Putsch. Hitler would have been in Lands­berg Prison after that.

The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; p. 55. [18]

. . . . These ear­ly fact-find­ing mis­sions had left the agile, ener­getic attor­ney eager to track events. Months at a time—and nor­mal­ly with­out Ruth—would find him pop­ping up abroad, fre­quent­ly near some polit­i­cal trou­ble-spot. As ear­ly as 1923, he mate­ri­al­ized in Bercht­es­gaden to share a beer in the Gastz­im­mer of a mod­est pen­sion with Adolf Hitler. The clam­my young rab­ble-rouser rant­ed to the sym­pa­thet­ic attor­ney that he, unlike the fam­i­ly dog, could not be beat­en by his mis­er­able father until he wet the car­pet. . . . .

4. The foun­da­tion of the U.S. intelligence/Hapsburg/Underground Reich dates to the peri­od imme­di­ate­ly after World War I: ” . . . .  . . . . The Haps­burgs would desert Ger­many in return for an Amer­i­can com­mit­ment. Sub­si­dized by the Unit­ed States—which brought over to Europe the Pres­i­den­t’s close advis­er Pro­fes­sor George D. Her­ron to impart Wilson’s vital impri­matur—this updat­ed Haps­burg sov­er­eign­ty must com­mit in advance to erad­i­cat­ing the Bol­she­viks. A revi­tal­ized Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an buffer zone to fend off Sovi­et pen­e­tra­tion of the Balka­ns turned into a life­long chimera for Dulles, and spurred his devo­tion over the many years to some man­ner of “Danu­bian Fed­er­a­tion.” . . . .”

The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; p. 27. [18]

 . . . . The Haps­burgs would desert Ger­many in return for an Amer­i­can com­mit­ment. Sub­si­dized by the Unit­ed States—which brought over to Europe the Pres­i­den­t’s close advis­er Pro­fes­sor George D. Her­ron to impart Wilson’s vital impri­matur—this updat­ed Haps­burg sov­er­eign­ty must com­mit in advance to erad­i­cat­ing the Bol­she­viks. A revi­tal­ized Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an buffer zone to fend off Sovi­et pen­e­tra­tion of the Balka­ns turned into a life­long chimera for Dulles, and spurred his devo­tion over the many years to some man­ner of “Danu­bian Fed­er­a­tion.” . . .

[17]

Wal­ter Schel­len­berg

5. One of the con­cepts cen­tral to under­stand­ing an exten­sion of the U.S. intelligence/Hapsburg anti-Com­mu­nist alliance is the con­cept of “The Chris­t­ian West”–explained in the descrip­tion for AFA #37 [19]: ” . . . . When it became clear that the armies of the Third Reich were going to be defeat­ed, it opened secret nego­ti­a­tions with rep­re­sen­ta­tives from the West­ern Allies. Rep­re­sen­ta­tives on both sides belonged to the transat­lantic finan­cial and indus­tri­al fra­ter­ni­ty that had active­ly sup­port­ed fas­cism. The thrust of these nego­ti­a­tions was the estab­lish­ment of The Chris­t­ian West. Viewed by the Nazis as a vehi­cle for sur­viv­ing mil­i­tary defeat, ‘The Chris­t­ian West’ involved a Hitler-less Reich join­ing with the U.S., Britain, France and oth­er Euro­pean nations in a transat­lantic, pan-Euro­pean anti-Sovi­et alliance. In fact, The Chris­t­ian West became a real­i­ty only after the ces­sa­tion of hos­til­i­ties.

The de-Naz­i­fi­ca­tion of Ger­many was abort­ed. Although a few of the more obvi­ous and obnox­ious ele­ments of Nazism were removed, Nazis were returned to pow­er at vir­tu­al­ly every lev­el and in almost every capac­i­ty in the Fed­er­al Repub­lic of Ger­many. . . .”

Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance for our pur­pos­es is a “Chris­t­ian West­er” acco­mo­da­tion appar­ent­ly involv­ing Prince Egon Max von Hohen­loe, who mar­ried into the Hab­s­burg fam­i­ly. Oper­at­ing out of Licht­en­stein and trav­el­ing on a Licht­en­stein pass­port, von Hohen­loe served as an inter­me­di­ary between U.S. intel­li­gence and Wal­ter Schel­len­berg, in charge of over­seas intel­li­gence for the SS. (Schel­len­berg was also on the board of direc­tors of Inter­na­tion­al Tele­phone and Tele­graph and became a key oper­a­tive for the post­war Gehlen orga­ni­za­tion.)

Chief among the Amer­i­can nego­tia­tors was Allen Dulles. Dono­van also appears to have played a sig­nif­i­cant part.

The Old Boys: The Amer­i­can Elite and the Ori­gins of The CIA by Bur­ton Hersh; Charles Scrib­n­er’s Sons [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Bur­ton Hersh; ISBN 0–684-19348–5; pp. 102—104. [18]

 . . . . As ear­ly as win­ter of 1942, Schel­len­berg hint­ed to the uneasy Himm­ler that he now intend­ed to launch dis­creet sound­ings. These ranged from Abram Stevens Hewitt in Stock­holm to Theodore Morde, a Read­er’s Digest cor­re­spon­dent in Ankara. Inevitably, Schel­len­berg dis­cov­ered a go-between with lines to Allen Dulles, and ear­ly in 1943 a series of dis­cus­sions ensued.

Thus opened the con­test­ed exchanges between “Mr. Bull” (Dulles) and “Mr. Pauls” (prince Egon zu Hohen­lo­he-Lan­gen­burg). Max Hohen­lo­he had long been an inter­na­tion­al-set acquain­tance of Dulles, a bustling, pol­ished socialite from the Sude­ten­land whose sta­tus as a minor roy­al drew cus­tomers for muni­tions from the Sko­da works, a con­ces­sion Schel­len­berg helped him snag. Hohen­lo­he already bestowed over vast land­ed prop­er­ties in Spain after mar­ry­ing into the Haps­burg fam­i­ly; he was cur­rent­ly hedg­ing his polit­i­cal future by trav­el­ing on a Licht­en­stein pass­port.

 A Canaris famil­iar, Prince Hohen­lo­he caught Schel­len­berg’s atten­tion ear­ly in 1942 by send­ing the ris­ing SD offi­cial his own jaun­diced appraisal of prospects in Europe. With the all-see­ing SD Com­man­der Rein­hard Hey­drich assas­si­nat­ed at the end of May, pos­si­bil­i­ties had obvi­ous­ly widened for the oppor­tunis­tic Schel­len­berg. Bare­ly thir­ty, scarce­ly beyond his baby fat, the Amt VI chief­tain resem­bled an SS doll decked out in death’s-head cam­paign hat and tai­lored parade uni­form.

[20]

The wed­ding of Prince Max Egon von Hohen­loe-Lan­gen­burg

With Schel­len­berg’s cau­tious spon­sor­ship, Max Hohen­lo­he trot­ted out a line of pro­vi­sion­al peace pro­pos­als, first with the British Ambas­sador Sir Samuel Hoare—always a soft touch—and the sym­pa­thet­ic Amer­i­can Coun­selor of Embassy Wlliam Wal­ton But­ter­worth (an inti­mate of George Ken­nan’s since Prince­ton), with Vat­i­can sym­pa­thiz­ers, with Fritz Klein, (a friend of both the Dulles broth­ers), and—evidently at the rec­om­men­da­tion of Amer­i­can nego­tia­tors in Lis­bon, where Ken­nan and Colonel Sol­borg were sta­tioned—with Allen Dulles him­self toward the mid­dle of Feb­ru­ary 1943.

 Exact­ly what was agreed upon has become a mat­ter of dis­pute, large­ly because the SS sum­ma­tions of the exchanges appear to have passed through Russ­ian hands on their way to the archives, after which the USSR News Ser­vices wait­ed until 1948 and the upheavals of the Cold War to put them out as dis­patch­es. Nev­er­the­less, much of their thrust is borne out by relat­ed RSHA paper­work, pri­vate jour­nals, and intel­li­gence files from a vari­ety of sources.

What seemed most scan­dalous at the time was Dulles’s report­ed pique with “out­dat­ed politi­cians, emi­gres, and prej­u­diced Jews.” The hope in Amer­i­ca was that these mal­con­tents could be reset­tled, per­haps in “Africa.” As one in close touch with Vat­i­can cir­cles, Dulles main­tained, he strong­ly urged the “Ger­man bish­ops” to “plead Ger­many’s cause” in Amer­i­ca, keep­ing in mind that “it had been the Amer­i­can Catholics who forced the Jew­ish-Amer­i­ca papers to stop their bait­ing of Fran­co Spain.”

This has the look of crumbs spread upon the water. Pro­nounce­ments alter­nat­ed with rich meals in a Liecht­en­stein chateau; Hohen­lo­he bit by bit exposed his qua­si-offi­cial sta­tus as a spokesman for SS ele­ments with­in the Ger­man gov­ern­ment who now looked beyond the “wild men” in con­trol.

What casts a longer shad­ow is the out­line of Allen’s geopo­lit­i­cal ideas. The peace he has in mind, Dulles indi­cates, must avoid the excess­es of Ver­sailles and per­mit the expand­ed Ger­man poli­ty to sur­vive, Aus­tria includ­ed and pos­si­bly at least a sec­tion of Czecho­slo­va­kia, while exclud­ing all thought of “vic­tors and van­quished . . . . as a fac­tor of order and progress.” With­in this decen­tral­ized nation, the impor­tance of Prus­sia must be reduced, to ward off for the future—Dulles is quot­ed direct­ly here—the “inward­ly unbal­anced, infe­ri­or­i­ty-com­plex-rid­den Pruss­ian mil­i­tarism.”

The resul­tant “Greater Ger­many” would back­stop the “for­ma­tion of a cor­don san­i­taire against Bol­she­vism and pan-Slav­ism through the east­ward enlarge­ment of Poland and the preser­va­tion of a strong Hun­gary.” This “Fed­er­al Greater Ger­many (sim­i­lar to the Unit­ed States), with an asso­ci­at­ed Danube Con­fed­er­a­tion, would be the best guar­an­tee of order and progress in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe.” . . . . 

. . . . An Abwehr offi­cer, F. Jus­tus von Einem, lat­er claimed to have sat in on a care­ful­ly pre­pared meet­ing at San­tander in Spain in the sum­mer of 1943 dur­ing which both Men­zies and Dono­van agreed to Chris­t­ian West­er terms as  reca­pit­u­lat­ed by Canaris per­son­al­ly. If this exchange occurred, Dono­van kept it qui­et.

Such explorato­ry talks point­ed well beyond the uproar of the moment. “I have known Max Hohen­lo­he since the days of the war,” Dulles assured a lawyer at Sul­li­van and Cromwell in 1965, apro­pos a legal favor request­ed by the aging prince, “when he worked with me on some rather dif­fi­cult and del­i­cate prob­lems.” The exchanges in Liecht­en­stein amount­ed to a recon­noi­ter­ing. . . .

6. Inter­est­ing per­spec­tive on the Hapsburg/U.S./Underground Reich alliance and the sen­si­tive nature of the deal­ings of OSS/Wall Street oper­a­tives like Dono­van and Dulles can be gleaned by the account of the fre­quent­ly lethal attempts by four dif­fer­ent authors to write the account of the OSS from the orga­ni­za­tion’s micro­filmed files.

When for­mer Lieu­tenant Edwin J. Putzell fell seri­ous­ly ill, he destroyed his copy of the micro­filmed files.

We remind lis­ten­ers, in this con­text, that major intel­li­gence ser­vices have pos­sessed tox­ins that will kill with­out leav­ing a trace for a very long time.

The Last Hero by Antho­ny Cave Brown; New York Times Books [HC]; Copy­right 1982 by Antho­ny Cave Brown; ISBN 0–8129-1021–4; pp. xi-xii. [24]

 In what was his last act of World War II, Major Gen­er­al William J. Dono­van, direc­tor of the Office of Strate­gic Ser­vices, the first Amer­i­can secret intel­li­gence and spe­cial oper­a­tions ser­vice and the orga­ni­za­tion from which sprang the CIA, spent sev­er­al nights at OSS head­quar­ters in Wash­ing­ton, D.C., with his exec­u­tive offi­cer, Lieu­tenant Edwin J. Putzell, Jr., micro­film­ing the direc­tor’s files. Doing the work them­selves because of the polit­i­cal sen­si­tiv­i­ty of the doc­u­men­ta­tion, they pro­duced two copies; Dono­van took pos­ses­sion of one, Putzell the oth­er. The pur­pose of this large oper­a­tion was to pro­vide the basis of his­to­ry of Dono­van’s incum­ben­cy when that became polit­i­cal­ly pos­si­ble.

Sev­er­al starts were made on the work. Pro­fes­sor Cony­ers Read, the Har­vard his­to­ri­an, pro­duced many draft chap­ters before Dono­van him­self asked him to stop work, because he felt the direc­tor’s papers were still too sen­si­tive. Read did not resume his work, for death inter­vened. One of Dono­van’s wartime majors, Corey Ford, then began work on the project in the mid-1950’s, pro­duc­ing a draft man­u­script of what was real­ly a bio­graph­i­cal his­to­ry of Dono­van and the OSS, but again death inter­vened before Ford could com­plete his vol­ume.

After Dono­van’s death in 1959, the project was tak­en over by Whit­ney Shep­ard­son, Dono­van’s chief of secret intel­li­gence dur­ing World War II. For the third time, the author died before com­plet­ing the work. Then came the fourth attempt, this time by Cor­nelius Ryan, the author of The Longest Day. How­ev­er, although Ryan had the sup­port of Dono­van’s friends Pres­i­dent Dwight D. Eisen­how­er and Allen W. Dulles, then direc­tor of cen­tral intel­li­gence, the work was stopped before it real­ly began; a mid­dle-rank offi­cial at the CIA man­aged to stop the project because he believed the book con­tem­plat­ed by Ryan would be too con­tro­ver­sial. When he found him­self denied access to the direc­tor’s files, Ryan was com­pelled to aban­don the project tem­porar­i­ly. Then he, too died before it was pos­si­ble to resume work.

 In all these attempt none of the authors saw the micro­film, except Read, who saw two or three reels hav­ing to do with the OSS’s for­ma­tion. Dur­ing this time Putzell had been tak­en so seri­ous­ly ill that he burned his copy of micro­film rather than leave it unguard­ed in his estate should die. Hap­pi­ly, Putzell did not die; nonethe­less, the only copy of the micro­film out­side the CIA (where in 1982 it was still clas­si­fied) was Dono­van’s. . . .