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For The Record  

FTR #1098, FTR #1099, FTR #1100 and FTR #1101– Fascism: 2019 World Tour, Part 8 (The Intermarium Concept), Fascism: 2019 World Tour, Part 9 (Intermarium Redux: “Will the National Socialist Revolution Begin in Ukraine?”), Fascism: 2019 World Tour, Part 10–The Intermarium Continuity, Fascism: 2019 World Tour, Part 11–The Intermarium Continuity, Part 2 (Reflections on The Pivot Point)

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FTR #1098: This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR #1099: This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR #1100: This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR #1101: This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Cel­e­bra­tion of the 75th Anniver­sary of the 14th Waf­fen SS Divi­sion in Lviv, Ukraine

Intro­duc­tion: In these pro­grams, we con­tin­ue dis­cus­sion of the Azov milieu and its “Inter­mar­i­um” out­reach, in the con­text of Ukraine as a “piv­ot point” cen­tral to con­trol of the World Island or Earth Island. The evo­lu­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept is fun­da­men­tal to analy­sis of this phe­nom­e­non.

Ukraine’s sig­nif­i­cance as a glob­al epi­cen­ter of bur­geon­ing fas­cism extends to the region’s online, ide­o­log­i­cal and icon­ic man­i­fes­ta­tion. Two recent Cana­di­an teens–Kam McLeod and Bry­er Schmegelsky–who appar­ent­ly killed three peo­ple in cold blood were influ­enced by Nazi cul­ture and Azov Bat­tal­ion man­i­fes­ta­tion in par­tic­u­lar. ” . . . . A Steam user con­firmed to The Globe and Mail that he talked to Mr. Schmegel­sky reg­u­lar­ly online. He recalled Mr. McLeod join­ing their chats as well. The user, whom The Globe is not iden­ti­fy­ing, pro­vid­ed pho­tos sent by an account believed to be owned by Mr. Schmegel­sky, show­ing him in mil­i­tary fatigues, bran­dish­ing what appears to be an air­soft rifle – which fires plas­tic pel­lets. Anoth­er pho­to shows a swasti­ka arm­band, and yet anoth­er fea­tures Mr. Schmegel­sky in a gas mask. The pho­tos were report­ed­ly sent in the fall of 2018, but the user said he stopped play­ing online games with Mr. Schmegel­sky ear­li­er this year after he con­tin­ued to praise Hitler’s Ger­manyOne account con­nect­ed to the teens uses the logo of the Azov Bat­tal­ion, a far-right Ukrain­ian mili­tia that has been accused of har­bour­ing sym­pa­thies to neo-Nazis. . . .”

Dis­cussing Zbig­niew Brzezin­ski’s doc­trine of con­trol­ling Eura­sia by con­trol­ling the “piv­ot point” of Ukraine. Fun­da­men­tal to this analy­sis is the con­cept of the Earth Island or World Island as it is some­times known.

Brzezin­s­ki, in turn, draws on the geopo­lit­i­cal the­o­ries of Sir Hal­ford Mackinder, and, lat­er con­tem­po­rary Inter­mar­i­um adov­cates such as Alexan­dros Petersen. (For more about Petersen, see below.)

Stretch­ing from the Straits of Gibral­tar, all across Europe, most of the Mid­dle East, Eura­sia, Rus­sia, Chi­na and India, that stretch of land: com­pris­es most of the world’s land mass; con­tains most of the world’s pop­u­la­tion and most of the world’s nat­ur­al resources (includ­ing oil and nat­ur­al gas.) Geopoliti­cians have long seen con­trol­ling that land mass as the key to world dom­i­na­tion.

Com­bat hel­mets of the Azov Bat­tal­ion.

Most of the four pro­grams high­light­ing the evo­lu­tion and appli­ca­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept con­sist of read­ing and analy­sis of a long aca­d­e­m­ic paper by Mar­lene Laru­elle and Ellen Rivera. Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance in this dis­cus­sion is the piv­otal role of Ukrain­ian fas­cist orga­ni­za­tions in the Inter­mar­i­um and close­ly con­nect­ed Promethean net­works, from the post World War I peri­od, through the time between the World Wars, through the Cold War and up to and includ­ing the Maid­an coup.

Mil­i­tary, eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal net­work­ing has employed the Inter­mar­i­um idea, with what the paper terms the “ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings” stem­ming from the evo­lu­tion of the Ukrain­ian fas­cist milieu in the twen­ti­eth and twen­ty-first cen­turies. Some of the most impor­tant U.S. think tanks and asso­ci­at­ed mil­i­tary indi­vid­u­als and insti­tu­tions embody this con­ti­nu­ity: ” . . . . The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival. . . .”

Azov Bat­tal­ion Spin Off Nation­al Mili­tia, served as elec­tion mon­i­tors in Ukraine.

Think tanks man­i­fest­ing the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept include: Strat­for, The Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics, The Cen­ter for a New Amer­i­can Secu­ri­ty, The Cen­ter for Euro­pean Pol­i­cy Analy­sis and the Atlantic Coun­cil.

Exem­pli­fy­ing the man­i­fes­ta­tion of fas­cist lega­cy in the Western/U.S. think tanks is the Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics’ Marek Jan Chodakiewicz. ” . . . . In a long dossier, SPLC revealed Chodakiewicz to be a fre­quent com­men­ta­tor on right-wing Pol­ish media, such as the week­ly Najwyzszy Czas!, ‘the mag­a­zine of the Real Pol­i­tics Union par­ty, a fringe, pro-life, anti-gay mar­riage, pro-prop­er­ty rights, anti-income tax group,’ and the far-right Pol­ish web­site Fronda.pl.[101] In July 2008, Chodakiewicz was among those who accused Barack Oba­ma of hav­ing been a Mus­lim and a com­mu­nist asso­ciate. . . .”

We present key excerpts of the paper to under­score dom­i­nant fea­tures of this evo­lu­tion­ary con­ti­nu­ity:

  1. A key play­er in the events that brought the OUN suc­ces­sor orga­ni­za­tions to pow­er in Ukraine has been the Atlantic Coun­cil. It receives back­ing from NATO, the State Depart­ment, Lithua­nia and Ukrain­ian oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk. The think tank also receives major fund­ing from the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress, which evolved from the OUN. . . . . In 1967, the World Con­gress of Free Ukraini­ans was found­ed in New York City by sup­port­ers of Andriy Mel­nyk. [The head of the OUN‑M, also allied with Nazi Germany.–D.E.] It was renamed the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress in 1993. In 2003, the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress was rec­og­nized by the Unit­ed Nations Eco­nom­ic and Social Coun­cil as an NGO with spe­cial con­sul­ta­tive sta­tus. It now appears as a spon­sor of the Atlantic Coun­cil . . . . The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival. . . .”
  2. Ukrain­ian pro­to-fas­cist forces were at the core of Josef Pil­sud­ski’s Pol­ish-led Inter­mar­i­um and over­lap­ping Promethean orga­ni­za­tions. Those forces coa­lesced into the OUN. ” . . . . Accord­ing to the British schol­ar and jour­nal­ist Stephen Dor­ril, the Promethean League served as an anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion for anti-Sovi­et exiles dis­placed after the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment of Simon Petlu­ra (1879–1926) gave up the fight against the Sovi­ets in 1922.[12]  . . . . as Dor­ril affirms, ‘the real lead­er­ship and latent pow­er with­in the Promethean League emanat­ed from the Petlu­ra-dom­i­nat­ed Ukrain­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic in exile and its Pol­ish spon­sors. The Poles ben­e­fit­ed direct­ly from this arrange­ment, as Promethean mil­i­tary assets were absorbed into the Pol­ish army, with Ukrain­ian, Geor­gian and Armen­ian con­tract offi­cers not uncom­mon in the ranks.’[13] The alliance between Pił­sud­s­ki and Petlu­ra became very unpop­u­lar among many West­ern Ukraini­ans, as it result­ed in Pol­ish dom­i­na­tion of their lands. This oppo­si­tion joined the insur­gent Ukrain­ian Mil­i­tary Orga­ni­za­tion (Ukrain­s­ka viisko­va orh­a­nizat­si­ia, UVO—founded 1920), which lat­er trans­formed into the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (Orh­a­nizat­si­ia ukrain­skykh nat­sion­al­is­tiv, OUN). . . .”
  3. Accord­ing to for­mer Army intel­li­gence offi­cer William Gowen (a source used and trust­ed by John Lof­tus and Mark Aarons) the Inter­mar­i­um and Promethean net­work assets were used by Third Reich intel­li­gence dur­ing World War II. ” . . .  . Based on Gowen’s reports, such authors as Christo­pher Simp­son, Stephen Dor­ril, Mark Aarons, and John Lof­tus have sug­gest­ed that the net­works of the Promethean League and the Inter­mar­i­um were uti­lized by Ger­man intel­li­gence. . . .”
  4. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the Intermarium/Promethean milieu appears to have been cen­tral­ly involved in the Nazi escape net­works, the Vat­i­can-assist­ed “Rat­lines,” in par­tic­u­lar. ” . . . . Amer­i­can intel­li­gence began to take notice of the Inter­mar­i­um net­work in August 1946[42] in the frame­work of Oper­a­tion Cir­cle, a Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Corps (CIC) project the orig­i­nal goal of which was to deter­mine how net­works inside the Vat­i­can had spir­it­ed away so many Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors, most­ly to South Amer­i­ca.[43] Among the group of CIC offi­cers involved in the oper­a­tion was Levy’s source William Gowen. Then a young offi­cer based in Rome, Gowen sus­pect­ed the Inter­mar­i­um net­work to be behind Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors’ exten­sive escape routes from Europe. . . .”
  5. It comes as no sur­prise, as well, that U.S. intel­li­gence absorbed the Intermarium/Promethean  net­works after the war. ” . . . . Accord­ing to Aarons and Lof­tus, although he had ini­tial­ly been thor­ough­ly opposed to this course of action, by ‘ear­ly July 1947, Gowen was strong­ly advo­cat­ing that Amer­i­can intel­li­gence should take over Inter­mar­i­um; before long, the CIC offi­cer was no longer hunt­ing for Nazis, but recruit­ing them.’[49] . . . .”
  6. One of the main com­po­nents of  the “Inter­mar­i­um con­ti­nu­ity” is the ABN—the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations. The OUN and asso­ci­at­ed ele­ments con­sti­tute the most impor­tant ele­ment of the ABN. ” . . . . a vast num­ber of anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions were formed in the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od and sup­port­ed by the US.[57] They con­sti­tute one of the main com­po­nents of the Inter­mar­i­um ‘genealog­i­cal tree,’ in the sense that they revived the mem­o­ry of Piłsudski’s attempts to uni­fy Cen­tral and East­ern Europe against Sovi­et Rus­sia and gave them new life, but blend­ed this mem­o­ry with far-right tones inspired by col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many.[58] The most impor­tant of the Euro­pean anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions was the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN). . . . Because fas­cist move­ments were, in the 1930s, the first to orga­nize them­selves against the Sovi­et Union, the ABN recruit­ed mas­sive­ly among their ranks and served as an umbrel­la for many for­mer col­lab­o­ra­tionist para­mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tions in exile, amongst them the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nationalists—Bandera (OUN‑B), the Croa­t­ian Ustaše, the Roman­ian Iron Guard, and the Slo­va­kian Hlin­ka Guard.[59] It thus con­tributed to guar­an­tee­ing the sur­vival of their lega­cies at least until the end of the Cold War. Accord­ing to the lib­er­al Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies think tank, cre­at­ed by two for­mer aides to Kennedy advi­sors, the ABN was the ‘largest and most impor­tant umbrel­la for for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors in the world.’ . . . .”
  7. In addi­tion to the OUN/Ukrainian fas­cist milieu, the Croa­t­ian Ustashe fas­cists became a dom­i­nant ele­ment. This is fun­da­men­tal to the Azov Bat­tal­ion’s Inter­mar­i­um project, dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097. ” . . . . The most active groups with­in the ABN became the Ukrain­ian and Croa­t­ian orga­ni­za­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly the Ukrain­ian OUN.[61] The OUN, under the lead­er­ship of Andriy Mel­nyk (1890–1964), col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Nazi occu­piers from the latter’s inva­sion of Poland in Sep­tem­ber 1939. The Gestapo trained Myko­la Lebed and the adher­ents of Melnyk’s younger com­peti­tor, Stepan Ban­dera (1909–1959), in sab­o­tage, guer­ril­la war­fare, and assas­si­na­tions. The OUN’s 1941 split into the so-called OUN‑B, fol­low­ing Stepan Ban­dera, and OUN‑M, fol­low­ing Andriy Mel­nyk,[62] did not keep both fac­tions from con­tin­u­ing to col­lab­o­rate with the Ger­mans. . . .”
  8. For­mer SS and Abwehr offi­cer Theodor Oberlaender–the “polit­i­cal offi­cer” (read “com­man­der”) of the Nachti­gall Bat­tal­ion in the Lviv pogram of 1941–became the Ger­man Min­is­ter of Expellees and was vital to the ascent of the OUN in the ABN. ” . . . .While in Sovi­et Ukraine the UPA kept on fight­ing against Moscow until the ear­ly 1950s, their capac­i­ties were exhaust­ed. . . . As Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for Dis­placed Per­sons, Refugees, and the War-Dam­aged dur­ing the Ade­nauer gov­ern­ment, Ober­län­der played a cru­cial role in the rise of the ABN and allowed Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionists to take the lead in it. Yaroslav Stet­sko (1912–1986), who presided over the Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist gov­ern­ment in Lviv from as ear­ly as 30 June 1941, led the ABN from its cre­ation in 1946 until his death in 1986. . . .”
  9. The Army’s Counter Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC) con­firmed the pri­ma­cy of the OUN/B with­in the ABN: ” . . . . CIC con­firmed that by 1948 both the ‘Inter­mar­i­um’ and the UPA (Ukrain­ian par­ti­san com­mand) report­ed to the ABN pres­i­dent, Yaroslav Stet­sko. The UPA in turn had con­sol­i­dat­ed all the anti-Sovi­et par­ti­sans under its umbrel­la. Yaroslav Stet­sko was also Sec­re­tary of OUN/B and sec­ond in com­mand to Ban­dera, who had the largest remain­ing par­ti­san group behind Sovi­et lines under his direct com­mand. Thus, OUN/B had achieved the lead­er­ship role among the anti-Com­mu­nist exiles and was ascen­dant by 1950 . . . .”
  10. Con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is the focal point of the rein­car­nat­ed Inter­mar­i­um con­cept. ” . . . . The most recent rein­car­na­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um has tak­en form in Ukraine, espe­cial­ly among the Ukrain­ian far right, which has re-appro­pri­at­ed the con­cept by cap­i­tal­iz­ing on the sol­id ide­o­log­i­cal and per­son­al con­ti­nu­ity between actors of the Ukrain­ian far right in the inter­war and Cold War peri­ods and their heirs today. . . .”
  11. The con­ti­nu­ity of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept as man­i­fest­ed in con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is epit­o­mized by the role of Yarosla­va Stet­sko (Yaroslav’s wid­ow and suc­ces­sor as a deci­sive ABN and OUN leader). Note the net­work­ing between her Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists and Svo­bo­da. “. . . . This con­ti­nu­ity is exem­pli­fied by the wife of long-time ABN leader Yaroslav Stet­sko, Yarosla­va Stet­sko (1920–2003), a promi­nent fig­ure in the Ukrain­ian post-Sec­ond World War émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty who became direct­ly involved in post-Sovi­et Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. Hav­ing joined the OUN at the age of 18, she became an indis­pens­able sup­port­er of the ABN after the war . . . . In July 1991, she returned to Ukraine, and in the fol­low­ing year formed the Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (CUN), a new polit­i­cal par­ty estab­lished on the basis of the OUN, pre­sid­ing over both.[129] Although the CUN nev­er achieved high elec­tion results, it coop­er­at­ed with the Social-Nation­al Par­ty of Ukraine (SNPU), which lat­er changed its name to Svo­bo­da, the far-right Ukrain­ian par­ty that con­tin­ues to exist. . . .”
  12. Yarosla­va Stet­sko’s CUN was co-found­ed by her hus­band’s for­mer sec­re­tary in the 1980s, Roman Svarych. Min­is­ter of Jus­tice in the Vik­tor Yuschenko gov­ern­ment (as well as both Tim­o­shenko gov­ern­ments), Svarych became the spokesman and a major recruiter for the Azov Bat­tal­ion. ” . . . . The co-founder of the CUN and for­mer­ly Yaroslav Stetsko’s pri­vate sec­re­tary, the U.S.-born Roman Zvarych (1953), rep­re­sents a younger gen­er­a­tion of the Ukrain­ian émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty active dur­ing the Cold War and a direct link from the ABN to the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . . Zvarych par­tic­i­pat­ed in the activ­i­ties of the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations in the 1980s. . . . In Feb­ru­ary 2005, after Vik­tor Yushchenko’s elec­tion, Zvarych was appoint­ed Min­is­ter of Jus­tice. . . . Accord­ing to Andriy Bilet­sky, the first com­man­der of the Azov bat­tal­ion, a civ­il para­mil­i­tary unit cre­at­ed in the wake of the Euro­maid­an, Zvarych was head of the head­quar­ters of the Azov Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in 2015 and sup­port­ed the Azov bat­tal­ion with ‘vol­un­teers’ and polit­i­cal advice through his Zvarych Foun­da­tion. . . .”
  13. The “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is inex­tri­ca­ble with the his­tor­i­cal revi­sion­ism about the roles of the OUN and UPA in World War II. That revi­sion­ism is insti­tion­al­ized in the Insti­tute of Nation­al Remem­brance. ” . . . .The rein­tro­duc­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um notion in Ukraine is close­ly con­nect­ed to the broad reha­bil­i­ta­tion of the OUN and UPA, as well as of their main hero, Stepan Ban­dera. . . . Dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010), and par­tic­u­lar­ly through the cre­ation of the Insti­tute for Nation­al Remem­brance,  Vik­tor Yushchenko built the image of Ban­dera as a sim­ple Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist fight­ing for his country’s inde­pen­dence . . . .”
  14. As dis­cussed in numer­ous pro­grams, anoth­er key ele­ment in the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is Katery­na Chu­machenko, an OUN oper­a­tive who served in the State Depart­ment and Ronald Rea­gan’s admin­is­tra­tion. She mar­ried Vik­tor Yuschenko. ” . . . . It is not unlike­ly Yushchenko’s readi­ness dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010) to open up to right-wing ten­den­cies of the Ukrain­ian exile leads back to his wife, who had con­nec­tions to the ABN. Katery­na Chu­machenko [Yushchenko], born 1961 in Chica­go, was socialised there in the Ukrain­ian exile youth organ­i­sa­tion SUM (Spilka Ukra­jin­sko­ji Molo­di, Ukrain­ian Youth Organ­i­sa­tion) in the spir­it of the OUN. Via the lob­by asso­ci­a­tion Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­i­ca (UCCA) she obtained a post as  ‘spe­cial assis­tant’ in the U.S. State Depart­ment in 1986, and was from 1988 to 1989 employed by the Office of Pub­lic Liai­son in the White House. . . .”
  15. Embody­ing the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” are the lus­tra­tion laws, which make it a crim­i­nal offense to tell the truth about the OUN and UPA’s roles in World War II. Note Volodymyr Via­tro­vy­ch’s posi­tion as min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion. ” . . . . This reha­bil­i­ta­tion trend accel­er­at­ed after the Euro­Maid­an. In 2015, just before the sev­en­ti­eth anniver­sary of Vic­to­ry Day, Volodymyr Via­tro­vych, min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion and long-time direc­tor of the Insti­tute for the Study of the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment, an orga­ni­za­tion found­ed to pro­mote the hero­ic nar­ra­tive of the OUN–UPA, called on the par­lia­ment to vote for a set of four laws that cod­i­fied the new, post-Maid­an his­to­ri­og­ra­phy. Two of them are par­tic­u­lar­ly influ­en­tial in the ongo­ing mem­o­ry war with Rus­sia. One decrees that OUN and UPA mem­bers are to be con­sid­ered ‘fight­ers for Ukrain­ian inde­pen­dence in the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry,’ mak­ing pub­lic denial of this unlaw­ful. . . .”
  16. As high­light­ed in a Nation arti­cle in FTR #1072” . . . . With­in sev­er­al years, an entire gen­er­a­tion will be indoc­tri­nat­ed to wor­ship Holo­caust per­pe­tra­tors as nation­al heroes. . . .”
  17. As dis­cussed dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097, the Azov Bat­tal­ion is in the lead­er­ship of the revival of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept.” . . . . In this con­text of reha­bil­i­ta­tion of inter­war heroes, ten­sions with Rus­sia, and dis­il­lu­sion with Europe over its per­ceived lack of sup­port against Moscow, the geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um could only pros­per. It has found its most active pro­mot­ers on the far right of the polit­i­cal spec­trum, among the lead­er­ship of the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . .”
  18. Azov’s Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group has held three net­work­ing con­fer­ences to date, bring­ing togeth­er key fig­ures of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” orga­ni­za­tions. In addi­tion to focus­ing on the devel­op­ment of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions, the con­fer­ence is stress­ing mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tion and pre­pared­ness: ” . . . . In 2016, Bilet­sky cre­at­ed the Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group (ISG),[152] intro­duc­ing the con­cept to poten­tial com­rades-in-arms from the Baltic-Black Sea region.[153] The first day of the found­ing con­fer­ence was reserved for lec­tures and dis­cus­sions by senior rep­re­sen­ta­tives of var­i­ous sym­pa­thet­ic orga­ni­za­tions, the sec­ond day to ‘the lead­ers of youth branch­es of polit­i­cal par­ties and nation­al­ist move­ments of the Baltic-Black Sea area.’ . . . . It also includ­ed ‘mil­i­tary attach­es of diplo­mat­ic mis­sions from the key coun­tries in the region (Poland, Hun­gary, Roma­nia and Lithua­nia). . . .”
  19. Azov’s third ISG con­fer­ence con­tin­ued to advance the mil­i­tary net­work­ing char­ac­ter­is­tics of the ear­li­er gath­er­ings, includ­ing the neces­si­ty of giv­ing mil­i­tary train­ing to what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions: ” . . . . On Octo­ber 13, 2018, the ISG orga­nized its third con­gress. Besides the Ukrain­ian hosts, a large share of the for­eign speak­ers from Poland, Lithua­nia, and Croa­t­ia had a (para-)military back­ground, among them advi­sor to the Pol­ish Defence Min­is­ter Jerzy Tar­gal­s­ki and retired Brigadier Gen­er­al of the Croa­t­ian Armed Forces Bruno Zor­i­ca.[156] Among the talk­ing points of Pol­ish mil­i­tary edu­ca­tor Damien Duda were ‘meth­ods of the prepa­ra­tion of a mil­i­tary reserve in youth orga­ni­za­tions” and the “impor­tance of para­mil­i­tary struc­tures with­in the frame­work of the defence com­plex of a mod­ern state.’ . . . .”

Of crit­i­cal impor­tance in com­pre­hend­ing this con­ti­nu­ity is the over­lap­ping con­ti­nu­ity between the Gehlen orga­ni­za­tion and the Cru­sade For Free­dom, which spawned the GOP’s Eth­nic Her­itage Out­reach Coun­cil, for all intents and pur­pos­es, a Nazi branch of the Repub­li­can Par­ty. In “The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt,” Carl Ogles­by notes the pres­ence of the OUN/B and relat­ed Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean fas­cist groups that coa­lesced as the ABN in the Gehlen “Org.” 

Ogles­by notes: ” . . . . Gehlen became chief of the Third Reich’s For­eign Armies East (FHO), on April 1, 1942. He was thus respon­si­ble for Ger­many’s mil­i­tary intel­li­gence oper­a­tions through­out East­ern Europe and the Sovi­et Union. His FHO was con­nect­ed in this role with a num­ber of secret fas­cist orga­ni­za­tions in the coun­tries to Ger­many’s east. These includ­ed Stepan Ban­der­a’s “B Fac­tion” of the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (OUN/B),15 Roma­ni­a’s Iron Guard,16 the Ustachis of Yugoslavia,17 the Vanagis of Latvia18 and, after the sum­mer of 1942, “Vlassov’s Army,“19 the band of defec­tors from Sovi­et Com­mu­nism march­ing behind for­mer Red hero Gen­er­al Andrey Vlassov. Lat­er on in the war, Gehlen placed one of his top men in con­trol of For­eign Armies West, which broad­ened his pow­er; and then after Admi­ral Wil­helm Canaris was purged and his Abwehr intel­li­gence ser­vice can­ni­bal­ized by the SS, Gehlen became in effect Nazi Ger­many’s over-all top intel­li­gence chief. . . .”

Beyond that, the Gehlen “Org” con­sti­tut­ed an exten­sion of the Third Reich’s nation­al secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment into our own intel­li­gence and polit­i­cal estab­lish­ments. 

As Ogles­by notes: . . . . Indeed, a part­ly declas­si­fied CIA doc­u­ment reca­pit­u­lat­ed this sto­ry in the ear­ly 1970s, not­ing at this time:  Gehlen met with Admi­ral Karl Doenitz, who had been appoint­ed by Hitler as his suc­ces­sor dur­ing the last days of the Third Reich. Gehlen and the Admi­ral were now in a U.S. Army VIP prison camp in Wies­baden; Gehlen sought and received approval from Doenitz too!44 . . . . 47. As Gehlen was about to leave for the Unit­ed States, he left a mes­sage for Baun with anoth­er of his top aides, Ger­hard Wes­sel: “I am to tell you from Gehlen that he has dis­cussed with [Hitler’s suc­ces­sor Admi­ral Karl] Doenitz and [Gehlen’s supe­ri­or and chief of staff Gen­er­al Franz] Halder the ques­tion of con­tin­u­ing his work with the Amer­i­cans. Both were in agree­ment.” Hohne and Zolling, op. cit., n. 14, p. 61. In oth­er words, the Ger­man chain of com­mand was still in effect, and it approved of what Gehlen was doing with the Amer­i­cans. . . . And the whole con­cept of the deal he was about to offer his con­querors had been approved by a Nazi chain of com­mand that was still func­tion­ing despite what the world thought and still does think was the Nazis’ uncon­di­tion­al sur­ren­der. . . .”

The straight line from the Fuhrer Bunker to Lan­g­ley con­tin­ues through Wash­ing­ton D.C. itself and the GOP pres­ence there.

It was the Cru­sade For Free­dom, heav­i­ly over­lapped with the Gehlen Org, the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations and the GOP that extend­ed that straight line.

The brain­child of Allen Dulles, over­seen by his pro­tege Richard Nixon, CFF embraced most of the GOP’s lead­ing fig­ures:

. . . . Frus­tra­tion over Truman’s 1948 elec­tion vic­to­ry over Dewey (which they blamed on the “Jew­ish vote”) impelled Dulles and his pro­tégé Richard Nixon to work toward the real­iza­tion of the fas­cist free­dom fight­er pres­ence in the Repub­li­can Party’s eth­nic out­reach orga­ni­za­tion. As a young con­gress­man, Nixon had been Allen Dulles’s con­fi­dant. They both blamed Gov­er­nor Dewey’s razor-thin loss to Tru­man in the 1948 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion on the Jew­ish vote. When he became Eisenhower’s vice pres­i­dent in 1952, Nixon was deter­mined to build his own eth­nic base. . . .

. . . . Vice Pres­i­dent Nixon’s secret polit­i­cal war of Nazis against Jews in Amer­i­can pol­i­tics was nev­er inves­ti­gat­ed at the time. The for­eign lan­guage-speak­ing Croa­t­ians and oth­er Fas­cist émi­gré groups had a ready-made net­work for con­tact­ing and mobi­liz­ing the East­ern Euro­pean eth­nic bloc. There is a very high cor­re­la­tion between CIA domes­tic sub­si­dies to Fas­cist ‘free­dom fight­ers’ dur­ing the 1950’s and the lead­er­ship of the Repub­li­can Party’s eth­nic cam­paign groups. The motive for the under-the-table financ­ing was clear: Nixon used Nazis to off­set the Jew­ish vote for the Democ­rats. . . .

. . . . In 1952, Nixon had formed an Eth­nic Divi­sion with­in the Repub­li­can Nation­al Com­mit­tee. Dis­placed fas­cists, hop­ing to be returned to pow­er by an Eisen­how­er-Nixon ‘lib­er­a­tion’ pol­i­cy signed on with the com­mit­tee. In 1953, when Repub­li­cans were in office, the immi­gra­tion laws were changed to admit Nazis, even mem­bers of the SS. They flood­ed into the coun­try. Nixon him­self over­saw the new immi­gra­tion pro­gram. As Vice Pres­i­dent, he even received East­ern Euro­pean Fas­cists in the White House. . . .

. . . . As a young movie actor in the ear­ly 1950s, Rea­gan was employed as the pub­lic spokesper­son for an OPC front named the ‘Cru­sade for Free­dom.’ Rea­gan may not have known it, but 99 per­cent for the Crusade’s funds came from clan­des­tine accounts, which were then laun­dered through the Cru­sade to var­i­ous orga­ni­za­tions such as Radio Lib­er­ty, which employed Dulles’s Fas­cists. Bill Casey, who lat­er became CIA direc­tor under Ronald Rea­gan, also worked in Ger­many after World War II on Dulles’ Nazi ‘free­dom fight­ers’ pro­gram. When he returned to New York, Casey head­ed up anoth­er OPC front, the Inter­na­tion­al Res­cue Com­mit­tee, which spon­sored the immi­gra­tion of these Fas­cists to the Unit­ed States. Casey’s com­mit­tee replaced the Inter­na­tion­al Red Cross as the spon­sor for Dulles’s recruits. Con­fi­den­tial inter­views, for­mer mem­bers, OPC; for­mer mem­bers, British for­eign and Com­mon­wealth Office. . . .

. . . . . It was Bush who ful­filled Nixon’s promise to make the ‘eth­nic emi­gres’ a per­ma­nent part of Repub­li­can pol­i­tics. In 1972, Nixon’s State Depart­ment spokesman con­firmed to his Aus­tralian coun­ter­part that the eth­nic groups were very use­ful to get out the vote in sev­er­al key states. Bush’s tenure as head of the Repub­li­can Nation­al Com­mit­tee exact­ly coin­cid­ed with Las­z­lo Pasztor’s 1972 dri­ve to trans­form the Her­itage Groups Coun­cil into the party’s offi­cial eth­nic arm. The groups Pasz­tor chose as Bush’s cam­paign allies were the émi­gré Fas­cists whom Dulles had brought to the Unit­ed States. . . . 

In FTR #778, among oth­er pro­grams, we not­ed that the CFF/ABN/OUN/B milieu was pro­ject­ed back into East­ern Europe and the for­mer Sovi­et Union.

We should not fail to note that the Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity and its com­po­nent ele­ments derive in con­sid­er­able mea­sure from Allen Dulles and William Dono­van’s wartime trea­son, nego­ti­at­ing with the Third Reich and the Nazi SS to pool their resources for the upcom­ing Cold War.

In FTR #‘s 1058, 1059, 1060, we revis­it­ed the con­cept of “The Chris­t­ian West”: ” . . . . When it became clear that the armies of the Third Reich were going to be defeat­ed, it opened secret nego­ti­a­tions with rep­re­sen­ta­tives from the West­ern Allies. Rep­re­sen­ta­tives on both sides belonged to the transat­lantic finan­cial and indus­tri­al fra­ter­ni­ty that had active­ly sup­port­ed fas­cism. The thrust of these nego­ti­a­tions was the estab­lish­ment of The Chris­t­ian West. Viewed by the Nazis as a vehi­cle for sur­viv­ing mil­i­tary defeat, ‘The Chris­t­ian West’ involved a Hitler-less Reich join­ing with the U.S., Britain, France and oth­er Euro­pean nations in a transat­lantic, pan-Euro­pean anti-Sovi­et alliance. In fact, The Chris­t­ian West became a real­i­ty only after the ces­sa­tion of hos­til­i­ties. The de-Naz­i­fi­ca­tion of Ger­many was abort­ed. Although a few of the more obvi­ous and obnox­ious ele­ments of Nazism were removed, Nazis were returned to pow­er at vir­tu­al­ly every lev­el and in almost every capac­i­ty in the Fed­er­al Repub­lic of Ger­many. . . .”

In FTR #1009, we detailed “Chris­t­ian West” nego­ti­a­tions to have a Hitler-less Third Reich join with the West­ern Allies, under­tak­en by OSS rep­re­sen­ta­tives Allen Dulles and William Dono­van, net­work­ing with Prince Max Egon von Hohen­lo­he, a proxy for SD offi­cer Wal­ter Schel­len­berg.

In in his 1985 vol­ume Amer­i­can Swasti­ka, the late author Charles High­am pro­vides us with insight into the Chris­t­ian West con­cept, reveal­ing the extent to which these SS/OSS nego­ti­a­tions set the tem­plate for the post-World War II world, as well as the degree of res­o­nance that key Amer­i­cans, such as Allen Dulles, had with Nazi ide­ol­o­gy, anti-Semi­tism in par­tic­u­lar.

The post­war polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic real­i­ties of the Dulles, Hohen­lo­he, Schel­len­berg meet­ings were fur­ther solid­i­fied when William (Wild Bill) Dono­van entered into his “M” Project. Impor­tant to note in this con­text, is the dom­i­nant role in world affairs played by car­tels, the fun­da­men­tal ele­ment in the indus­tri­al and finan­cial axis that was essen­tial to the cre­ation and per­pet­u­a­tion of fas­cism.

Much of the Third Reich’s mil­i­tary indus­tri­al com­plex, the pri­ma­cy of Ger­many in the post­war EU, as well as the cor­re­la­tion between post­war Europe as con­struct­ed in the Chris­t­ian West nego­ti­a­tions and long-stand­ing Ger­man plans for Euro­pean dom­i­na­tion are deriv­a­tive of the pow­er of car­tels. The Chris­t­ian West and “M” Projects:

  1. Revealed that Allen Dulles’ views res­onat­ed with Third Reich anti-Semi­tism, and that his opin­ions were shared by oth­er, like-mind­ed Amer­i­can pow­er bro­kers: ” . . . . He said that it would be unbear­able for any decent Euro­pean to think that the Jews might return some­day, and that there must be no tol­er­a­tion of a return of the Jew­ish pow­er posi­tions. . . . He made the curi­ous asser­tion that the Amer­i­cans were only con­tin­u­ing the war to get rid of the Jews and that there were peo­ple in Amer­i­ca who were intend­ing to send the Jews to Africa. . . .”
  2. Set the tem­plate for the post­war Fed­er­al Repub­lic of Ger­many and the EU: ” . . . . He [Dulles] reit­er­at­ed his desire for a greater Euro­pean polit­i­cal federation–and fore­saw the fed­er­al Ger­many that in fact took place. . . . Ger­many would be set up as the dom­i­nat­ing force in indus­try and agri­cul­ture in con­ti­nen­tal Europe, at the heart of a con­ti­nen­tal state run by Ger­many, the U.S.A., and Great Britain as a focus of trade. . . .”
  3. Were the vehi­cle for Allen Dulles to betray much of the Allied mil­i­tary plans for South­ern Europe to the Third Reich: “. . . . Dulles now pro­ceed­ed to sup­ply Hohen­lo­he with dol­lops of secret intel­li­gence, announc­ing that the U.S. Army would not land in Spain but, after con­quer­ing Tunisia, would advance from Africa toward the Ploesti oil fields to cut off the Ger­man oil sup­plies. He said it was like­ly the Allies would land in Sici­ly to cut off Rom­mel and con­trol Italy from there, and thus secure the advance in the Balka­ns. Hav­ing giv­en vir­tu­al­ly the entire bat­tle plan for Europe, top secret at the time, to one of Ger­many’s agents, Allen Dulles pro­ceed­ed to the almost unnec­es­sary rid­er that he had very good rela­tions with the Vat­i­can. . . .”
  4. Direct­ly fore­shad­owed the con­fronta­tion between the U.S. and the Sovi­et Union which became the Cold War.  “. . . . In oth­er meet­ings, Dulles . . . . pre­dict­ed that ‘the next world war would be between the U.S.A. and the Sovi­et Union.’ . . . .”
  5. Were the occa­sion for Dulles to laud the “genius” of Nazi pro­pa­gan­da min­is­ter Joseph Goebbels: “He . . . . described a recent speech by Dr. Goebbels as ‘a work of genius; I have rarely read a speech with such ratio­nal plea­sure.’ . . . .”

 Amer­i­can Swasti­ka by Charles High­am; Dou­ble­day & Co. [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by Charles High­am; ISBN 0–385-17874–3; pp. 191–194.

. . . . Dulles pressed ahead. He said that it would be unbear­able for any decent Euro­pean to think that the Jews might return some­day, and that there must be no tol­er­a­tion of a return of the Jew­ish pow­er posi­tions. He reit­er­at­ed his desire for a greater Euro­pean polit­i­cal federation–and fore­saw the fed­er­al Ger­many that in fact took place. . . . He made the curi­ous asser­tion that the Amer­i­cans were only con­tin­u­ing the war to get rid of the Jews and that there were peo­ple in Amer­i­ca who were intend­ing to send the Jews to Africa. This was Hitler’s dream of course: that the Jews would go to Mada­gas­car and stay there. . . . . . . . Dulles now pro­ceed­ed to sup­ply Hohen­lo­he with dol­lops of secret intel­li­gence, announc­ing that the U.S. Army would not land in Spain but, after con­quer­ing Tunisia, would advance from Africa toward the Ploesti oil fields to cut off the Ger­man oil sup­plies. He said it was like­ly the Allies would land in Sici­ly to cut off Rom­mel and con­trol Italy from there, and thus secure the advance in the Balka­ns. Hav­ing giv­en vir­tu­al­ly the entire bat­tle plan for Europe, top secret at the time, to one of Ger­many’s agents, Allen Dulles pro­ceed­ed to the almost unnec­es­sary rid­er that he had very good rela­tions with the Vat­i­can. . . . . . . . In oth­er meet­ings, Dulles . . . . pre­dict­ed that “the next world war would be between the U.S.A. and the Sovi­et Union.” . . . . Dulles obtained a great deal of infor­ma­tion relat­ing to Ger­many and plans for its recon­struc­tion after the war. He . . . . described a recent speech by Dr. Goebbels as “a work of genius; I have rarely read a speech with such ratio­nal plea­sure.” . . . . . . . . In July, [OSS chief William] Dono­van and the OSS began to take mat­ters into their own hands. No doubt inspired by the invig­o­rat­ing meet­ing in Switzer­land, Dono­van embarked on the so-called “M” project. . . . . . . . By now, the Ger­man [Franz Von Papen] had read the details of the peace pro­pos­al on micro­film and learned that it was more or less on the same lines as the Dulles pro­pos­als. Ger­many would be set up as the dom­i­nat­ing force in indus­try and agri­cul­ture in con­ti­nen­tal Europe, at the heart of a con­ti­nen­tal state run by Ger­many, the U.S.A., and Great Britain as a focus of trade. . . .  

While World War II was still under­way, the re-insti­tu­tion of the fas­cists in post-war Japan and the fus­ing of the Bor­mann flight cap­i­tal orga­ni­za­tion were cement­ed. At the  core of this was the for­ma­tion of the Black Eagle Trust, which set in motion fun­da­men­tals of the Cold War and the post­war eco­nom­ic order.

This–in tan­dem with the Chris­t­ian West formulation–locked in the post-World War II order.

Gold Warriors—America’s Secret Recov­ery of Yamashita’s Gold; by Ster­ling Sea­grave and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; pp. 3–4.

. . . . The treasure–gold, plat­inum, and bar­rels of loose gems–was com­bined with Axis loot recov­ered in Europe to cre­ate a world­wide covert polit­i­cal action fund to fight com­mu­nism. This ‘black gold’ gave the Tru­man Admin­is­tra­tion access to vir­tu­al­ly lim­it­less unvouchered funds for covert oper­a­tions. It also pro­vid­ed an asset base that wa used by Wash­ing­ton to rein­force the trea­suries of its allies, to bribe polit­i­cal lead­ers, and to manip­u­late elec­tions in for­eign coun­tries. . . .

. . . . Dur­ing the war [Sec­re­tary of War Hen­ry] Stim­son had a brain­trust think­ing hard about Axis plun­der and how it should be han­dled when peace came. . . .

. . . . Stimson’s spe­cial assis­tants on this top­ic were his deputies John J. McCloy and Robert Lovett, and con­sul­tant Robert B. Ander­son, all clever men with out­stand­ing careers in pub­lic ser­vice and bank­ing. McCloy lat­er became head of the World Bank, Lovett sec­re­tary of defense, Ander­son sec­re­tary of the Trea­sury. Their solu­tion was to set up what is infor­mal­ly called the Black Eagle Trust. The idea was first dis­cussed with America’s allies in secret dur­ing July 1944, when forty-four nations met at Bret­ton Woods, New Hamp­shire, to plan the post­war world econ­o­my. . . .

The sig­nif­i­cance of Ukraine as key to the World Island–what Mackinder and lat­er Brzezin­s­ki termed “the piv­ot point”–is fun­da­men­tal to the geopo­lit­i­cal pow­er pol­i­tics that dom­i­nat­ed the last cen­tu­ry and this one, to date.

It was this cen­tu­ry-dom­i­nat­ing, geopo­lit­i­cal dynam­ic that Trump was cross­ing when he attempt­ed to with­hold mil­i­tary  aid to Ukraine. 

THIS is why he faces the impeach­ment pro­ceed­ings.

“For Pres­i­dent, Case of Pol­i­cy Vs. Obses­sion” by David E. Sanger; The New York Times; 11/15/2019 [West­ern Edi­tion]

. . . . In an oth­er­wise divid­ed Wash­ing­ton, one of the few issues of bipar­ti­san agree­ment for the past six years has been coun­ter­ing the Russ­ian pres­i­dent Vladimir V. Putin’s broad plan of dis­rup­tion. That effort starts in Ukraine,. where a hot war has been under­way in the east for five years, and a cyber­war under­way in the cap­i­tal, Kiev.

It is exact­ly that pol­i­cy that Mr. Trump ap[p[ears top have been dis­card­ing when he made clear, in the haunt­ing words attrib­uted to Gor­don D. Sond­land, who par­layed polit­i­cal dona­tions into the ambas­sador­ship to the Euro­pean Unionk that “Pres­i­dent Trump cares more about the inves­ti­ga­tion of Biden” than about Ukraine’s con­fronta­tion with Mr. Putin’s forces. . . .

1a. Ukraine’s sig­nif­i­cance as a glob­al epi­cen­ter of bur­geon­ing fas­cism extends to the region’s online, ide­o­log­i­cal and icon­ic man­i­fes­ta­tion. Two recent Cana­di­an teens–Kam McLeod and Bry­er Schmegelsky–who appar­ent­ly killed three peo­ple in cold blood were influ­enced by Nazi cul­ture and Azov Bat­tal­ion man­i­fes­ta­tion in par­tic­u­lar. ” . . . . A Steam user con­firmed to The Globe and Mail that he talked to Mr. Schmegel­sky reg­u­lar­ly online. He recalled Mr. McLeod join­ing their chats as well. The user, whom The Globe is not iden­ti­fy­ing, pro­vid­ed pho­tos sent by an account believed to be owned by Mr. Schmegel­sky, show­ing him in mil­i­tary fatigues, bran­dish­ing what appears to be an air­soft rifle – which fires plas­tic pel­lets. Anoth­er pho­to shows a swasti­ka arm­band, and yet anoth­er fea­tures Mr. Schmegel­sky in a gas mask. The pho­tos were report­ed­ly sent in the fall of 2018, but the user said he stopped play­ing online games with Mr. Schmegel­sky ear­li­er this year after he con­tin­ued to praise Hitler’s Ger­manyOne account con­nect­ed to the teens uses the logo of the Azov Bat­tal­ion, a far-right Ukrain­ian mili­tia that has been accused of har­bour­ing sym­pa­thies to neo-Nazis. . . .”

“RCMP con­tin­ue search for sus­pects in three B.C. slay­ings” by Ian Bai­ley, Mike Hager and Justin Ling, The Globe and Mail, 07/23/2019.

Two teens miss­ing after the road­side slay­ings of three peo­ple in North­ern British Colum­bia over the past week have now been named sus­pects and are believed to be on the run through West­ern Cana­da.

RCMP say the pair have been spot­ted in North­ern Saskatchewan and Man­i­to­ba, and inves­ti­ga­tors are cau­tion­ing the pub­lic that the fugi­tives are armed and should not be approached.

A flood of tips since Mon­day has pro­pelled the inves­ti­ga­tion into the road­side killings of a trav­el­ling cou­ple and, more than 500 kilo­me­tres away, the body of a man police have not iden­ti­fied. The teens, Kam McLeod, 19, and Bry­er Schmegel­sky, 18, were orig­i­nal­ly report­ed miss­ing after their burned-out camper truck was found on Fri­day, but police have changed that assess­ment.

Mr. Schmegelsky’s Insta­gram page shows the two pos­ing for a pho­to, with Mr. Schmegelsky’s arm slung over Mr. McLeod.The teens have Face­book pages under their own names and both are linked to an account called “Illu­sive Game­ing.” That user­name, com­plete with the mis­spelling, also shows up on YouTube, as well as video-game net­works Twitch and Steam. The accounts share sim­i­lar imagery and themes, includ­ing the Com­mu­nist icon, far-right pol­i­tics, sex­u­al­ized Japan­ese ani­me and the sur­vival­ist video game Rust.

The ban­ner image for the Illu­sive Game­ing YouTube account fea­tures a mod­i­fied Sovi­et flag, but its pro­file pic­ture is the heraldic eagle of Hitler’s Ger­many. The page was active as of six months ago.

Steam accounts linked to Mr. Schmegel­sky and Mr. McLeod were last active a week before their pick­up truck was found on fire on B.C.’s High­way 37.

A Steam user con­firmed to The Globe and Mail that he talked to Mr. Schmegel­sky reg­u­lar­ly online. He recalled Mr. McLeod join­ing their chats as well.

The user, whom The Globe is not iden­ti­fy­ing, pro­vid­ed pho­tos sent by an account believed to be owned by Mr. Schmegel­sky, show­ing him in mil­i­tary fatigues, bran­dish­ing what appears to be an air­soft rifle – which fires plas­tic pel­lets. Anoth­er pho­to shows a swasti­ka arm­band, and yet anoth­er fea­tures Mr. Schmegel­sky in a gas mask. The pho­tos were report­ed­ly sent in the fall of 2018, but the user said he stopped play­ing online games with Mr. Schmegel­sky ear­li­er this year after he con­tin­ued to praise Hitler’s Ger­many.

One account con­nect­ed to the teens uses the logo of the Azov Bat­tal­ion, a far-right Ukrain­ian mili­tia that has been accused of har­bour­ing sym­pa­thies to neo-Nazis. Anoth­er account claims to be locat­ed in Rus­sia, near Moscow, and belongs to sev­er­al groups for fans of sex­u­al­ized Japan­ese ani­ma­tion. That account also used the heraldic eagle of the Nazis. . . .

1b. Dis­cussing Zbig­niew Brzezin­ski’s doc­trine of con­trol­ling Eura­sia by con­trol­ling the “piv­ot point” of Ukraine. Fun­da­men­tal to this analy­sis is the con­cept of the Earth Island or World Island as it is some­times known.

Brzezin­s­ki, in turn, draws on the geopo­lit­i­cal the­o­ries of Sir Hal­ford Mackinder, and, lat­er con­tem­po­rary Inter­mar­i­um adov­cates such as Alexan­dros Petersen. (For more about Petersen, see below.)

Stretch­ing from the Straits of Gibral­tar, all across Europe, most of the Mid­dle East, Eura­sia, Rus­sia, Chi­na and India, that stretch of land: com­pris­es most of the world’s land mass; con­tains most of the world’s pop­u­la­tion and most of the world’s nat­ur­al resources (includ­ing oil and nat­ur­al gas.) Geopoliti­cians have long seen con­trol­ling that land mass as the key to world dom­i­na­tion.  

“Amer­i­ca Piv­ots to Brzezinski’s Delu­sion of Eurasian Con­quest” by Paul Fitzger­ald and Eliz­a­beth Gould; OpE­d­News; 6/4/2015.

Rus­sia his­to­ri­an Stephen Cohen points to the neo­con­ser­v­a­tive estab­lish­ment for Amer­i­ca’s lat­est out­break of what can only be referred to as late-stage impe­r­i­al demen­tia. Neo­cons Robert Kagan and wife Vic­to­ria Nuland have cer­tain­ly done the heavy lift­ing to make Ukraine the stag­ing ground for what appears to be a NATO blitzkrieg on Moscow. But what­ev­er the deter­mi­na­tion of the neo­con plot, they are only the bark­ing dogs of mas­ter impe­ri­al­ist Zbig­niew Brzezin­s­ki, whose grand design has been creep­ing over the globe since he stepped into the Oval office as Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor to Pres­i­dent Jim­my Carter in 1977.

Brzezin­s­ki stands apart as the inspi­ra­tion for the Ukraine cri­sis. His 1997 book The Grand Chess­board: Amer­i­can Pri­ma­cy and its Geostrate­gic Imper­a­tives lays out the blue­print for how Amer­i­can pri­macists should feel towards draw­ing Ukraine away from Rus­sia because, “With­out Ukraine, Rus­sia ceas­es to be a Eurasian empire.”

Brzezin­ski’s obses­sion derives from British geo­g­ra­ph­er Sir Hal­ford Mackinder’s 1904 def­i­n­i­tion of the Cen­tral-East­ern nations of Europe as the “Piv­ot Area”, whose geo­graph­ic posi­tion made them “the vital spring­boards for the attain­ment of con­ti­nen­tal dom­i­na­tion.” Whether any­one real­izes it, the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion’s cur­rent cam­paign against Rus­sia in Ukraine is of Mackinder’s design brought for­ward by Brzezin­s­ki. . . .

2. Most of the four pro­grams high­light­ing the evo­lu­tion and appli­ca­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept con­sist of read­ing and analy­sis of a long aca­d­e­m­ic paper by Mar­lene Laru­elle and Ellen Rivera. Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance in this dis­cus­sion is the piv­otal role of Ukrain­ian fas­cist orga­ni­za­tions in the Inter­mar­i­um and close­ly con­nect­ed Promethean net­works, from the post World War I peri­od, through the time between the World Wars, through the Cold War and up to and includ­ing the Maid­an coup.

Mil­i­tary, eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal net­work­ing has employed the Inter­mar­i­um idea, with what the paper terms the “ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings” stem­ming from the evo­lu­tion of the Ukrain­ian fas­cist milieu in the twen­ti­eth and twen­ty-first cen­turies. Some of the most impor­tant U.S. think tanks and asso­ci­at­ed mil­i­tary indi­vid­u­als and insti­tu­tions embody this con­ti­nu­ity: ” . . . . The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival. . . .”

We present key excerpts of the paper to under­score dom­i­nant fea­tures of this evo­lu­tion­ary con­ti­nu­ity:

  1. A key play­er in the events that brought the OUN suc­ces­sor orga­ni­za­tions to pow­er in Ukraine has been the Atlantic Coun­cil. It receives back­ing from NATO, the State Depart­ment, Lithua­nia and Ukrain­ian Oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk. The think tank also receives major fund­ing from the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress, which evolved from the OUN. . . . . In 1967, the World Con­gress of Free Ukraini­ans was found­ed in New York City by sup­port­ers of Andriy Mel­nyk. [The head of the OUN‑M, also allied with Nazi Germany.–D.E.] It was renamed the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress in 1993. In 2003, the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress was rec­og­nized by the Unit­ed Nations Eco­nom­ic and Social Coun­cil as an NGO with spe­cial con­sul­ta­tive sta­tus. It now appears as a spon­sor of the Atlantic Coun­cil . . . . The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival. . . .”
  2. Ukrain­ian pro­to-fas­cist forces were at the core of Josef Pil­sud­ski’s Pol­ish-led Inter­mar­i­um and over­lap­ping Promethean orga­ni­za­tions. Those forces coa­lesced into the OUN. ” . . . . Accord­ing to the British schol­ar and jour­nal­ist Stephen Dor­ril, the Promethean League served as an anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion for anti-Sovi­et exiles dis­placed after the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment of Simon Petlu­ra (1879–1926) gave up the fight against the Sovi­ets in 1922.[12]  . . . . as Dor­ril affirms, ‘the real lead­er­ship and latent pow­er with­in the Promethean League emanat­ed from the Petlu­ra-dom­i­nat­ed Ukrain­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic in exile and its Pol­ish spon­sors. The Poles ben­e­fit­ed direct­ly from this arrange­ment, as Promethean mil­i­tary assets were absorbed into the Pol­ish army, with Ukrain­ian, Geor­gian and Armen­ian con­tract offi­cers not uncom­mon in the ranks.’[13] The alliance between Pił­sud­s­ki and Petlu­ra became very unpop­u­lar among many West­ern Ukraini­ans, as it result­ed in Pol­ish dom­i­na­tion of their lands. This oppo­si­tion joined the insur­gent Ukrain­ian Mil­i­tary Orga­ni­za­tion (Ukrain­s­ka viisko­va orh­a­nizat­si­ia, UVO—founded 1920), which lat­er trans­formed into the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (Orh­a­nizat­si­ia ukrain­skykh nat­sion­al­is­tiv, OUN). . . .”
  3. Accord­ing to for­mer Army intel­li­gence offi­cer William Gowen (a source used and trust­ed by John Lof­tus and Mark Aarons) the Inter­mar­i­um and Promethean net­work assets were used by Third Reich intel­li­gence dur­ing World War II. ” . . .  . Based on Gowen’s reports, such authors as Christo­pher Simp­son, Stephen Dor­ril, Mark Aarons, and John Lof­tus have sug­gest­ed that the net­works of the Promethean League and the Inter­mar­i­um were uti­lized by Ger­man intel­li­gence. . . .”
  4. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the Intermarium/Promethean milieu appears to have been cen­tral­ly involved in the Nazi escape net­works, the Vat­i­can-assist­ed “Rat­lines,” in par­tic­u­lar. ” . . . . Amer­i­can intel­li­gence began to take notice of the Inter­mar­i­um net­work in August 1946[42] in the frame­work of Oper­a­tion Cir­cle, a Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Corps (CIC) project the orig­i­nal goal of which was to deter­mine how net­works inside the Vat­i­can had spir­it­ed away so many Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors, most­ly to South Amer­i­ca.[43] Among the group of CIC offi­cers involved in the oper­a­tion was Levy’s source William Gowen. Then a young offi­cer based in Rome, Gowen sus­pect­ed the Inter­mar­i­um net­work to be behind Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors’ exten­sive escape routes from Europe. . . .”
  5. It comes as no sur­prise, as well, that U.S. intel­li­gence absorbed the Intermarium/Promethean  net­works after the war. ” . . . . Accord­ing to Aarons and Lof­tus, although he had ini­tial­ly been thor­ough­ly opposed to this course of action, by ‘ear­ly July 1947, Gowen was strong­ly advo­cat­ing that Amer­i­can intel­li­gence should take over Inter­mar­i­um; before long, the CIC offi­cer was no longer hunt­ing for Nazis, but recruit­ing them.’[49] . . . .”
  6. One of the main com­po­nents of  the “Inter­mar­i­um con­ti­nu­ity” is the ABN—the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations. The OUN and asso­ci­at­ed ele­ments con­sti­tute the most impor­tant ele­ment of the ABN. ” . . . . a vast num­ber of anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions were formed in the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od and sup­port­ed by the US.[57] They con­sti­tute one of the main com­po­nents of the Inter­mar­i­um ‘genealog­i­cal tree,’ in the sense that they revived the mem­o­ry of Piłsudski’s attempts to uni­fy Cen­tral and East­ern Europe against Sovi­et Rus­sia and gave them new life, but blend­ed this mem­o­ry with far-right tones inspired by col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many.[58] The most impor­tant of the Euro­pean anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions was the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN). . . . Because fas­cist move­ments were, in the 1930s, the first to orga­nize them­selves against the Sovi­et Union, the ABN recruit­ed mas­sive­ly among their ranks and served as an umbrel­la for many for­mer col­lab­o­ra­tionist para­mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tions in exile, amongst them the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nationalists—Bandera (OUN‑B), the Croa­t­ian Ustaše, the Roman­ian Iron Guard, and the Slo­va­kian Hlin­ka Guard.[59] It thus con­tributed to guar­an­tee­ing the sur­vival of their lega­cies at least until the end of the Cold War. Accord­ing to the lib­er­al Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies think tank, cre­at­ed by two for­mer aides to Kennedy advi­sors, the ABN was the ‘largest and most impor­tant umbrel­la for for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors in the world.’ . . . .”
  7. In addi­tion to the OUN/Ukrainian fas­cist milieu, the Croa­t­ian Ustashe fas­cists became a dom­i­nant ele­ment. This is fun­da­men­tal to the Azov Bat­tal­ion’s Inter­mar­i­um project, dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097. ” . . . . The most active groups with­in the ABN became the Ukrain­ian and Croa­t­ian orga­ni­za­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly the Ukrain­ian OUN.[61] The OUN, under the lead­er­ship of Andriy Mel­nyk (1890–1964), col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Nazi occu­piers from the latter’s inva­sion of Poland in Sep­tem­ber 1939. The Gestapo trained Myko­la Lebed and the adher­ents of Melnyk’s younger com­peti­tor, Stepan Ban­dera (1909–1959), in sab­o­tage, guer­ril­la war­fare, and assas­si­na­tions. The OUN’s 1941 split into the so-called OUN‑B, fol­low­ing Stepan Ban­dera, and OUN‑M, fol­low­ing Andriy Mel­nyk,[62] did not keep both fac­tions from con­tin­u­ing to col­lab­o­rate with the Ger­mans. . . .”
  8. For­mer SS and Abwehr offi­cer Theodor Oberlaender–the polit­i­cal offi­cer for the UPA and the Nachti­gall Bat­tal­ion dur­ing the Lviv Pogrom of June 1941–was vital to the con­ti­nu­ity of the OUN and UPA and thus, the Inter­mar­i­um” . . . .While in Sovi­et Ukraine the UPA kept on fight­ing against Moscow until the ear­ly 1950s, their capac­i­ties were exhaust­ed. . . . As Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for Dis­placed Per­sons, Refugees, and the War-Dam­aged dur­ing the Ade­nauer gov­ern­ment, Ober­län­der played a cru­cial role in the rise of the ABN and allowed Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionists to take the lead in it. Yaroslav Stet­sko (1912–1986), who presided over the Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist gov­ern­ment in Lviv from as ear­ly as 30 June 1941, led the ABN from its cre­ation in 1946 until his death in 1986. . . .”
  9. The Army’s Counter Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC) con­firmed the pri­ma­cy of the OUN/B with­in the ABN. Note the con­ti­nu­ity of OUN and UPA gueril­la war­fare in Ukraine, begun under third Reich aus­pices and enjoy­ing post World War II sup­port from CIA, and OPC. This has been cov­ered in AFA #1 and FTR #777.) : ” . . . . CIC con­firmed that by 1948 both the ‘Inter­mar­i­um’ and the UPA (Ukrain­ian par­ti­san com­mand) report­ed to the ABN pres­i­dent, Yaroslav Stet­sko. The UPA in turn had con­sol­i­dat­ed all the anti-Sovi­et par­ti­sans under its umbrel­la. Yaroslav Stet­sko was also Sec­re­tary of OUN/B and sec­ond in com­mand to Ban­dera, who had the largest remain­ing par­ti­san group behind Sovi­et lines under his direct com­mand. Thus, OUN/B had achieved the lead­er­ship role among the anti-Com­mu­nist exiles and was ascen­dant by 1950 . . . .”
  10. Con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is the focal point of the rein­car­nat­ed Inter­mar­i­um con­cept. ” . . . . The most recent rein­car­na­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um has tak­en form in Ukraine, espe­cial­ly among the Ukrain­ian far right, which has re-appro­pri­at­ed the con­cept by cap­i­tal­iz­ing on the sol­id ide­o­log­i­cal and per­son­al con­ti­nu­ity between actors of the Ukrain­ian far right in the inter­war and Cold War peri­ods and their heirs today. . . .”
  11. The con­ti­nu­ity of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept as man­i­fest­ed in con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is epit­o­mized by the role of Yarosla­va Stet­sko (Yaroslav’s wid­ow and suc­ces­sor as a deci­sive ABN and OUN leader). Note the net­work­ing between her Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists and Svo­bo­da. “. . . . This con­ti­nu­ity is exem­pli­fied by the wife of long-time ABN leader Yaroslav Stet­sko, Yarosla­va Stet­sko (1920–2003), a promi­nent fig­ure in the Ukrain­ian post-Sec­ond World War émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty who became direct­ly involved in post-Sovi­et Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. Hav­ing joined the OUN at the age of 18, she became an indis­pens­able sup­port­er of the ABN after the war . . . . In July 1991, she returned to Ukraine, and in the fol­low­ing year formed the Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (CUN), a new polit­i­cal par­ty estab­lished on the basis of the OUN, pre­sid­ing over both.[129] Although the CUN nev­er achieved high elec­tion results, it coop­er­at­ed with the Social-Nation­al Par­ty of Ukraine (SNPU), which lat­er changed its name to Svo­bo­da, the far-right Ukrain­ian par­ty that con­tin­ues to exist. . . .”
  12. Yarosla­va Stet­sko’s CUN was co-found­ed by her hus­band’s for­mer sec­re­tary in the 1980s, Roman Svarych. Min­is­ter of Jus­tice in the Vik­tor Yuschenko gov­ern­ment (as well as both Tim­o­shenko gov­ern­ments), Svarych became the spokesman and a major recruiter for the Azov Bat­tal­ion. ” . . . . The co-founder of the CUN and for­mer­ly Yaroslav Stetsko’s pri­vate sec­re­tary, the U.S.-born Roman Zvarych (1953), rep­re­sents a younger gen­er­a­tion of the Ukrain­ian émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty active dur­ing the Cold War and a direct link from the ABN to the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . . Zvarych par­tic­i­pat­ed in the activ­i­ties of the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations in the 1980s. . . . In Feb­ru­ary 2005, after Vik­tor Yushchenko’s elec­tion, Zvarych was appoint­ed Min­is­ter of Jus­tice. . . . Accord­ing to Andriy Bilet­sky, the first com­man­der of the Azov bat­tal­ion, a civ­il para­mil­i­tary unit cre­at­ed in the wake of the Euro­maid­an, Zvarych was head of the head­quar­ters of the Azov Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in 2015 and sup­port­ed the Azov bat­tal­ion with ‘vol­un­teers’ and polit­i­cal advice through his Zvarych Foun­da­tion. . . .”
  13. The “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is inex­tri­ca­ble with the his­tor­i­cal revi­sion­ism about the roles of the OUN and UPA in World War II. That revi­sion­ism is insti­tion­al­ized in the Insti­tute of Nation­al Remem­brance. ” . . . .The rein­tro­duc­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um notion in Ukraine is close­ly con­nect­ed to the broad reha­bil­i­ta­tion of the OUN and UPA, as well as of their main hero, Stepan Ban­dera. . . . Dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010), and par­tic­u­lar­ly through the cre­ation of the Insti­tute for Nation­al Remem­brance,  Vik­tor Yushchenko built the image of Ban­dera as a sim­ple Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist fight­ing for his country’s inde­pen­dence . . . .”
  14. As dis­cussed in numer­ous pro­grams, anoth­er key ele­ment in the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is Katery­na Chu­machenko, an OUN oper­a­tive who served in the State Depart­ment and Ronald Rea­gan’s admin­is­tra­tion. She mar­ried Vik­tor Yuschenko. ” . . . . It is not unlike­ly Yushchenko’s readi­ness dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010) to open up to right-wing ten­den­cies of the Ukrain­ian exile leads back to his wife, who had con­nec­tions to the ABN. Katery­na Chu­machenko [Yushchenko], born 1961 in Chica­go, was socialised there in the Ukrain­ian exile youth organ­i­sa­tion SUM (Spilka Ukra­jin­sko­ji Molo­di, Ukrain­ian Youth Organ­i­sa­tion) in the spir­it of the OUN. Via the lob­by asso­ci­a­tion Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­i­ca (UCCA) she obtained a post as  ‘spe­cial assis­tant’ in the U.S. State Depart­ment in 1986, and was from 1988 to 1989 employed by the Office of Pub­lic Liai­son in the White House. . . .”
  15. Embody­ing the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” are the lus­tra­tion laws, which make it a crim­i­nal offence to tell the truth about the OUN and UPA’s roles in World War II. Note Volodymyr Via­tro­vy­ch’s posi­tion as min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion. ” . . . . This reha­bil­i­ta­tion trend accel­er­at­ed after the Euro­Maid­an. In 2015, just before the sev­en­ti­eth anniver­sary of Vic­to­ry Day, Volodymyr Via­tro­vych, min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion and long-time direc­tor of the Insti­tute for the Study of the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment, an orga­ni­za­tion found­ed to pro­mote the hero­ic nar­ra­tive of the OUN–UPA, called on the par­lia­ment to vote for a set of four laws that cod­i­fied the new, post-Maid­an his­to­ri­og­ra­phy. Two of them are par­tic­u­lar­ly influ­en­tial in the ongo­ing mem­o­ry war with Rus­sia. One decrees that OUN and UPA mem­bers are to be con­sid­ered ‘fight­ers for Ukrain­ian inde­pen­dence in the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry,’ mak­ing pub­lic denial of this unlaw­ful. . . .”
  16. As dis­cussed dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097, the Azov Bat­tal­ion is in the lead­er­ship of the revival of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept.” . . . . In this con­text of reha­bil­i­ta­tion of inter­war heroes, ten­sions with Rus­sia, and dis­il­lu­sion with Europe over its per­ceived lack of sup­port against Moscow, the geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um could only pros­per. It has found its most active pro­mot­ers on the far right of the polit­i­cal spec­trum, among the lead­er­ship of the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . .”
  17. Azov’s Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group has held three net­work­ing con­fer­ences to date, bring­ing togeth­er key fig­ures of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” orga­ni­za­tions. In addi­tion to focus­ing on the devel­op­ment of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions, the con­fer­ence is stress­ing mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tion and pre­pared­ness: ” . . . . In 2016, Bilet­sky cre­at­ed the Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group (ISG),[152] intro­duc­ing the con­cept to poten­tial com­rades-in-arms from the Baltic-Black Sea region.[153] The first day of the found­ing con­fer­ence was reserved for lec­tures and dis­cus­sions by senior rep­re­sen­ta­tives of var­i­ous sym­pa­thet­ic orga­ni­za­tions, the sec­ond day to ‘the lead­ers of youth branch­es of polit­i­cal par­ties and nation­al­ist move­ments of the Baltic-Black Sea area.’ . . . . It also includ­ed ‘mil­i­tary attach­es of diplo­mat­ic mis­sions from the key coun­tries in the region (Poland, Hun­gary, Roma­nia and Lithua­nia). . . .”
  18. Azov’s third ISG con­fer­ence con­tin­ued to advance the mil­i­tary net­work­ing char­ac­ter­is­tics of the ear­li­er gath­er­ings, includ­ing the neces­si­ty of giv­ing mil­i­tary train­ing to what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions. Note the con­tin­ued man­i­fes­ta­tion in the “new” Croa­t­ia of Ustachi polit­i­cal cul­ture. ” . . . . On Octo­ber 13, 2018, the ISG orga­nized its third con­gress. Besides the Ukrain­ian hosts, a large share of the for­eign speak­ers from Poland, Lithua­nia, and Croa­t­ia had a (para-)military back­ground, among them advi­sor to the Pol­ish Defence Min­is­ter Jerzy Tar­gal­s­ki and retired Brigadier Gen­er­al of the Croa­t­ian Armed Forces Bruno Zor­i­ca.[156] Among the talk­ing points of Pol­ish mil­i­tary edu­ca­tor Damien Duda were ‘meth­ods of the prepa­ra­tion of a mil­i­tary reserve in youth orga­ni­za­tions” and the “impor­tance of para­mil­i­tary struc­tures with­in the frame­work of the defence com­plex of a mod­ern state.’ . . . .”

“Imag­ined Geo­gra­phies of Cen­tral and East­ern Europe: The Con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um” by Mar­lene Laru­elle and Ellen Rivera; Covert Action Mag­a­zine; 3/23/2019.

[This arti­cle—orig­i­nal­ly pub­lished as a paper for the Insti­tute for Euro­pean, Russ­ian and Eurasian Stud­ies (IERES)—is the first in our series of in-depth analy­ses focus­ing on the activ­i­ties of the far-right and its var­i­ous con­tem­po­ra­ne­ous and his­tor­i­cal liaisons with intel­li­gence agen­cies. The pres­i­den­cy of Don­ald Trump has accel­er­at­ed an ambigu­ous rela­tion­ship to Europe, in the hope of shift­ing Europe’s—and par­tic­u­lar­ly NATO’s—center of grav­i­ty from the Paris-Berlin axis to a more Cen­tral and East­ern Europe hub; a hub which sees itself as the “oth­er” Europe—that is, opposed to the Euro­pean Union and its so-called “lib­er­al” social-wel­fare pro­grams and val­ues.

 After the Russ­ian Rev­o­lu­tion, the West backed first a mil­i­tary inva­sion and then the White armies against the new Sovi­et state.  When these efforts failed, the West then backed Pol­ish leader Joseph Pil­sud­sky and Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist Simon Petlyura’s Rus­so-Pol­ish war based on the dual con­cepts of Inter­mar­i­um and the Prometheus project. Once again, now led by the U.S., rightwing anti-Rus­sia forces are look­ing to Poland and its ultra-anti-Russ­ian allies to lead an increas­ing­ly aggres­sive front against Rus­sia.  The U.S. has been pour­ing weapons into East­ern Europe, backed up by an aggres­sive pro­gram of mil­i­tary train­ing and mil­i­tary exer­cis­es. An aggres­sive sys­tem of bilat­er­al mil­i­tary agree­ments between the U.S. and its East Euro­pean allies threat­en to pull West­ern Europe into a mul­ti­lat­er­al con­flict with Rus­sia via Arti­cle 5 of the NATO char­ter.

The authors trace these his­tor­i­cal devel­op­ments as a res­ur­rec­tion of the Intermarium—a geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept that envis­aged an alliance of coun­tries reach­ing from the Baltic Sea over the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea that would serve as a alter­na­tive pow­er bloc between Ger­many and Rus­sia. Mar­lene Laru­elle, Ph.D., is an Asso­ciate Direc­tor and Research Pro­fes­sor at the Insti­tute for Euro­pean, Russ­ian and Eurasian Stud­ies, Elliott School of Inter­na­tion­al Affairs. Ellen Rivera is an inde­pen­dent researcher spe­cial­ized in the post-war Ger­man far-right, with a par­tic­u­lar focus on post-war anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions. – Edi­tors]

Like the prover­bial cat, some con­cepts have sev­er­al lives. Or, like the mytho­log­i­cal phoenix, they can be reborn from the ash­es. This is cer­tain­ly the case of the Inter­mar­i­um, a geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept that envis­aged an alliance of coun­tries reach­ing from the Baltic Sea over the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea that would serve as a third pow­er bloc between Ger­many and Rus­sia. The Inter­mar­i­um belongs to the long geneal­o­gy of geopo­lit­i­cal con­cepts look­ing for and pro­mot­ing a Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean uni­ty: sand­wiched between a Mit­teleu­ropaunder Ger­man lead­er­ship in the nine­teenth cen­tu­ry and a Near Abroadunder Moscow’s super­vi­sion after 1991, the “mid­dle of Europe” or the “land between the seas” has been search­ing for his­tor­i­cal mod­els in every­thing from the Jag­el­lon­ian dynasty and the Pol­ish-Lithuan­ian Rzecz­pospoli­ta to the Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an empire.

Launched by Pol­ish state leader Józef Pił­sud­s­ki in the 1920s, the idea of a Między­morze (the Land between the Seas, latinized as Inter­mar­i­um) has since been reg­u­lar­ly revived in evolv­ing con­texts and finds itself reac­ti­vat­ed today. In its cur­rent form, it refers to the Cen­tral and East­ern “new Europe” dear to George Bush, Don­ald Rums­feld and now Don­ald Trump, cel­e­brat­ed for being more pro-Atlanti­cist than the West­ern “old Europe,” which is seen as being too con­cil­ia­to­ry with Rus­sia. The Inter­mar­i­um has also, grad­u­al­ly, come to com­prise a con­ser­v­a­tive Cen­tral and East­ern Europe that sees itself as the “oth­er” Europe—that is, opposed to the Euro­pean Union—and advances a con­ser­v­a­tive agen­da some­times per­me­able, as we see in the Ukrain­ian case, to far-right ide­o­log­i­cal schemes. 

The Inter­mar­i­um has also, grad­u­al­ly, come to com­prise a con­ser­v­a­tive Cen­tral and East­ern Europe that sees itself as the “oth­er” Europe—that is, opposed to the Euro­pean Union—and advances a con­ser­v­a­tive agen­da some­times per­me­able, as we see in the Ukrain­ian case, to far-right ide­o­log­i­cal schemes.

While the ear­ly his­to­ry of the Inter­mar­i­um has received lit­tle atten­tion from schol­ars, with the only exam­ple of such research being a doc­tor­al dis­ser­ta­tion by polit­i­cal sci­en­tist and attor­ney mem­ber of the Inter­na­tion­al Crim­i­nal Court Bar Jonathan Levy,[1] even less aca­d­e­m­ic atten­tion has been paid to the revival of the term since the 2000s. Yet it was deployed by for­mer Unit­ed States Army Europe (USAREUR) com­man­der Gen­er­al Ben Hodges to describe the U.S. strat­e­gy for Cen­tral and East­ern Europe,[2] before being revived on a much broad­er scale by the Pol­ish Par­ty of Law and Jus­tice as well as by Ukrain­ian far-right move­ments in the wake of the Euro­maid­an.[3]

To under­stand the many lives of this con­cept, one has to think of it as an “imag­ined geography”—a con­cept famous­ly launched by Edward Said to inter­pret the notion of Orient—or a geopo­lit­i­cal imag­i­nary in Ger­ard Toal’s perspective—a set of shared rep­re­sen­ta­tions of pow­er rela­tions and geog­ra­phy that may impact pol­i­cy deci­sions and pop­u­lar per­cep­tions of the world order.[4] We pro­pose here to fol­low Felix Beren­skoet­ter in his approach to con­cept analy­sis and see this Inter­mar­i­um geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept as hav­ing a cog­ni­tive func­tion which can be bro­ken in four dimen­sions: socio-polit­i­cal (for­ma­tion of the con­cept with­in a polit­i­cal sys­tem, its use among dif­fer­ent actors and its con­tes­ta­tion), tem­po­ral (his­toric­i­ty of a con­cept), mate­r­i­al (how the con­cept man­i­fests itself, and its agency), and the­o­ret­i­cal (how the con­cept is sit­u­at­ed in a broad­er ideation­al realm).[5]

We pro­pose here to fol­low Felix Beren­skoet­ter in his approach to con­cept analy­sis and see this Inter­mar­i­um geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept as hav­ing a cog­ni­tive func­tion which can be bro­ken in four dimen­sions: 

  1. socio-polit­i­cal (for­ma­tion of the con­cept with­in a polit­i­cal sys­tem, its use among dif­fer­ent actors and its con­tes­ta­tion),
  2. tem­po­ral (his­toric­i­ty of a con­cept),
  3. mate­r­i­al (how the con­cept man­i­fests itself, and its agency), and
  4. the­o­ret­i­cal (how the con­cept is sit­u­at­ed in a broad­er ideation­al realm).

Intermarium 1: Which Central Europe after the Empires?

The idea of the cre­ation of a third pow­er bloc between West­ern Europe, par­tic­u­lar­ly Ger­many, and Rus­sia, which came to be known as Inter­mar­i­um, emerged from the peri­od in which the Aus­tro-Hun­gar­i­an Empire was being dis­mem­bered in line with the Treaty of Ver­sailles that brought an end to the First World War. In 1919, Sir Hal­ford Mackinder, dis­cussing the oppo­si­tion between the “Heart­land” (con­ti­nen­tal pow­ers) and “sea pow­ers” (UK at that time), was already men­tion­ing the need for a “Mid­dle Tier of East Europe” going from the Baltic Sea to the Adri­at­ic to fed­er­ate in order to resist to both Ger­many and Rus­sia: “Per­haps the Small­er Pow­ers (…) will set about fed­er­at­ing among them­selves. A Scan­di­na­vian group, a group of the Mid­dle Tier of East Europe (Poland to Jugo-Slavia), and a Span­ish South Amer­i­can group (if not also includ­ing Brazil) may all, per­haps, be attain­able.”[6]

But the most well-known pro­po­nent of this Inter­mar­i­um con­cept in its first iter­a­tion was the Pol­ish leader Józef Pił­sud­s­ki (1867–1935), who, at the begin­ning of the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry, had attempt­ed to cre­ate para­mil­i­tary units (the Com­bat Orga­ni­za­tion of the Pol­ish Social­ist Par­ty) to free Poland from the yoke of the three encroach­ing empires: Ger­many, Aus­tria-Hun­gary, and Rus­sia. His return to Poland after the defeat of the Cen­tral Pow­ers gave rise to the procla­ma­tion of the inde­pen­dent Sec­ond Pol­ish Repub­lic (1918–1939), of which he became head of state from 1918 to 1922, a peri­od that large­ly coin­cid­ed with the Pol­ish-Sovi­et war (1919–1921). 

As Poland became inde­pen­dent in 1918 after 123 years of for­eign con­trol, Pił­sud­s­ki envi­sioned a fed­er­a­tion of East­ern Euro­pean states that would, togeth­er, be strong enough to fend off poten­tial­ly bel­liger­ent neigh­bours, par­tic­u­lar­ly a down­sized Ger­many offend­ed by the loss of East­ern Prus­sia and a ris­ing Sovi­et Union. These ear­ly unsuc­cess­ful plans for an “East­ern Euro­pean Federation”—a Pol­ish-Lithuan­ian com­mon­wealth accom­pa­nied by a cur­ren­cy and cus­toms union with Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia—roughly par­al­leled the Jagiel­lon­ian com­mon­wealth of the Rzecz­pospoli­ta, which exist­ed from the six­teenth cen­tu­ry until Poland’s third dis­mem­ber­ment in 1795.[7]

While still in Ver­sailles, August Zales­ki, who would lat­er become Pol­ish for­eign min­is­ter, led talks with rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Lithua­nia and Ukraine about form­ing a fed­er­a­tion.[8] Short­ly there­after, in 1919–1920 Pił­sud­s­ki recon­cep­tu­al­ized the fed­er­a­tion as a broad­er “East­ern Euro­pean League of Nations.” Poland and Lithua­nia would again form a fed­er­al state in the East, with Belarus being grant­ed spe­cial auton­o­my. Ukraine and Roma­nia would enter into a mil­i­tary and polit­i­cal con­fed­er­a­cy with Poland. Fin­land and the Baltic states were to form a “Baltic Bloc,” while Azer­bai­jan, Geor­gia, and Arme­nia would com­prise a “Fed­er­al State of Cau­cau­sia.” These ear­ly plans for an East­ern Euro­pean fed­er­a­tion did not come to fruition: no new state want­ed to find itself under Pol­ish lead­er­ship. Instead, Belarus and Ukraine (re)integrated into the Sovi­et Union, while Lithua­nia became an inde­pen­dent coun­try. The nev­er-rat­i­fied War­saw Con­tract of March 1922 was, accord­ing to the Ger­man his­to­ri­an Hubert Leschnik, “the last seri­ous effort by Pol­ish diplo­ma­cy to estab­lish an Inter­mar­i­um, and dur­ing the term of for­eign min­is­ter Alek­sander Skrzyńs­ki (1924–1926) the MSZ [Pol­ish For­eign Min­istry] ulti­mate­ly bowed out of all ‘Inter­mar­i­um con­cep­tions.’”[9]

Dur­ing his sec­ond stint as de fac­to state leader (1926–1935), Piłsudski’s pri­ma­ry focus was on ensur­ing that the pro­vi­sions of the Treaty of Ver­sailles were upheld.[10] Nev­er­the­less, the peri­od also saw the estab­lish­ment of the Promethean League (Prom­e­te­js­ka Liga), a semi-clan­des­tine net­work that envi­sioned coop­er­a­tion between a group of nations fight­ing against the Sovi­et Union.[11] The Promethean League had its ide­o­log­i­cal roots in Piłsudski’s long-time geopo­lit­i­cal strat­e­gy, “Prometheanism,” i.e., the idea that any great pow­er would col­lapse if its eth­nic minori­ties were empow­ered, just as the Greek Prometheus helped mankind emerge from the shad­ow of the gods when he was giv­en fire. Accord­ing to the British schol­ar and jour­nal­ist Stephen Dor­ril, the Promethean League served as an anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion for anti-Sovi­et exiles dis­placed after the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment of Simon Petlu­ra (1879–1926) gave up the fight against the Sovi­ets in 1922.[12] It was estab­lished by the Ukrain­ian émi­gré Roman Smal-Stocky and based in War­saw, but, as Dor­ril affirms, “the real lead­er­ship and latent pow­er with­in the Promethean League emanat­ed from the Petlu­ra-dom­i­nat­ed Ukrain­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic in exile and its Pol­ish spon­sors. The Poles ben­e­fit­ed direct­ly from this arrange­ment, as Promethean mil­i­tary assets were absorbed into the Pol­ish army, with Ukrain­ian, Geor­gian and Armen­ian con­tract offi­cers not uncom­mon in the ranks.”[13] The alliance between Pił­sud­s­ki and Petlu­ra became very unpop­u­lar among many West­ern Ukraini­ans, as it result­ed in Pol­ish dom­i­na­tion of their lands. This oppo­si­tion joined the insur­gent Ukrain­ian Mil­i­tary Orga­ni­za­tion (Ukrain­s­ka viisko­va orh­a­nizat­si­ia, UVO—founded 1920), which lat­er trans­formed into the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (Orh­a­nizat­si­ia ukrain­skykh nat­sion­al­is­tiv, OUN).[14]

Piłsudski’s ear­ly Inter­mar­i­um plans and lat­er the Promethean project were clan­des­tine­ly sup­port­ed by French and British intel­li­gence.

Piłsudski’s ear­ly Inter­mar­i­um plans and lat­er the Promethean project were clan­des­tine­ly sup­port­ed by French and British intel­li­gence.[15] These links dat­ed back to the First World War, when France sup­port­ed Piłsudski’s troops in the hope of defeat­ing the Sovi­ets. In Feb­ru­ary 1921, Pił­sud­s­ki trav­elled to Paris, where, dur­ing nego­ti­a­tions with French Pres­i­dent Alexan­dre Millerand, the foun­da­tions for the Fran­co-Pol­ish Mil­i­tary Alliance were laid. The most exhaus­tive study of sup­port for the Inter­mar­i­um project by French and British intel­li­gence was made by Jonathan Levy, based in part on three inter­views with for­mer Amer­i­can intel­li­gence agent William Gowen, the son of senior State Depart­ment offi­cer Franklin Gowen, who had been an assis­tant to Myron Tay­lor, Roosevelt’s per­son­al rep­re­sen­ta­tive to the Holy See under Pope Pius XII. Gowen described the Inter­mar­i­um “as a pre­war British-French spon­sored asso­ci­a­tion that would be use­ful in coun­ter­ing both Sovi­et and Ger­man ambi­tions in East­ern Cen­tral Europe. The orig­i­nal mem­bers, accord­ing to Gowen, were anti-Ger­man, anti-Hab­s­burg elites who also opposed social­ism and communism…Gowen named three promi­nent pre­war Inter­mar­i­um lead­ers: Vlatko Macek (Croa­t­ian Peas­ant Par­ty leader and Yugoslav Vice Pre­mier), Miha Krek (Catholic Slovene Peo­ples Par­ty leader and also Yugoslav Vice Pre­mier), and Gre­gorij Gafen­cu (Roman­ian For­eign Min­is­ter 1938–1941).”[16] All three would become West­ern intel­li­gence assets after the Sec­ond World War.[17]

A sec­ond, more seri­ous attempt to estab­lish an Inter­mar­i­um occurred dur­ing Colonel Józef Beck’s tenure as Poland’s for­eign min­is­ter (1932–1939). Fol­low­ing Poland’s two non-aggres­sion pacts signed with the USSR and the Ger­man Reich, Beck had been instruct­ed by Pił­sud­s­ki to find new solu­tions to guar­an­tee­ing Poland’s secu­ri­ty, since France was no longer con­sid­ered a trust­wor­thy ally.[18] Beck elab­o­rat­ed such solu­tions as a “poli­tique d’équilibre” aim­ing at an equal dis­tanc­ing from both Ger­many and Sovi­et Rus­sia; an “Inter­mar­i­um” as a third pow­er bloc between Ger­many and Rus­sia; and lat­er the con­cept of a “Third Europe,” an offen­sive alliance with the aim of fur­ther­ing the polit­i­cal influ­ence of Poland with­in Europe.[19] Beck made con­sid­er­able efforts to approach poten­tial fed­er­a­tion part­ners, but the only ones inter­est­ed appear to have been Hun­gary, Latvia, and Esto­nia. Beyond these three, his ideas appar­ent­ly fell on deaf ears.[20]

Intermarium 2: Central European Unity between Collaboration with the Nazis and Support from the Allies

Although all attempts to uni­fy the states of Cen­tral and East­ern Europe failed in the 1920s and 1930s, the new bal­ance of pow­ers that emerged dur­ing the Sec­ond World War helped to reopen some space for the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept. Declas­si­fied Amer­i­can intel­li­gence doc­u­ments indi­cate that the project con­tin­ued to receive sup­port from Pol­ish, British, and French intel­li­gence until the incor­po­ra­tion of Poland, Czecho­slo­va­kia, and Yugoslavia into the Axis, where­upon the estab­lished net­works were either “absorbed or sup­pressed by Ger­man mil­i­tary intel­li­gence.”[21] Based on Gowen’s reports, such authors as Christo­pher Simp­son, Stephen Dor­ril, Mark Aarons, and John Lof­tus have sug­gest­ed that the net­works of the Promethean League and the Inter­mar­i­um were uti­lized by Ger­man intel­li­gence.[22] But Levy argues that such an absorp­tion of pre-war Inter­mar­i­um net­works into Nazi intel­li­gence is unlike­ly giv­en Germany’s plans for Poland, and a clos­er look at the fates of these net­works’ lead­ers seems to indi­cate that, even if many shared the fas­cist Zeit­geist, they sought sup­port more from the Allies than from the Axis pow­ers. One of the three, the Roman­ian Grig­ore Gafen­cu, col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Ger­mans until the Nazi inva­sion of the Sovi­et Union on 22 June 1941, then looked for British and French sup­port. By the end of 1944, some of the old Inter­mar­i­um liaisons appear to have been reac­ti­vat­ed by MI6[23] and French Intel­li­gence.[24] Levy states: 

Even while the war was still rag­ing and enter­ing its final stages, MI6 offi­cers had made secret con­tact with pro-fas­cist ele­ments among the cen­tral and east­ern Euro­pean nation­al­ist groups. British Intel­li­gence saw the poten­tial val­ue of their pre-war con­nec­tions with organ­i­sa­tions such as the Promethean League, Inter­mar­i­um and the Ukrain­ian OUN‑B in again mount­ing anti-Sovi­et espi­onage oper­a­tions. (….) It was MI6, the British Secret Intel­li­gence Ser­vice, that rein­vig­o­rat­ed the east cen­tral Euro­pean fed­er­al move­ment by recon­sti­tut­ing the for­mer­ly Pol­ish spon­sored clan­des­tine pre-war orga­ni­za­tions: the Promethean League and the Inter­mar­i­um under the lead­er­ship of what was now called the Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al Club.[25]

The Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al Club (CEFC), which appro­pri­at­ed the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept, was estab­lished around 1940 in Britain as a plat­form for exiled anti-com­mu­nists and sup­port­ers of Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean fed­er­al­ism, some of whom had ties to the pre-war Inter­mar­i­um. The CEFC grew into a world­wide net­work, with offices in New York, Paris, Rome, Brus­sels,[26] Chica­go,[27] Jerusalem, and Beirut.[28] At the heart of the CEFC was the exiled for­mer col­lab­o­ra­tionist Czech mil­i­tary offi­cer Lev Prcha­la (1892–1963).[29] Upon reach­ing Eng­land, Prcha­la became an impor­tant fig­ure in the Czecho­slo­va­kian exile com­mu­ni­ty in Lon­don, head­ing the Czechoslo­vak Nation­al Coun­cil and lat­er the Czech Nation­al Com­mit­tee.[30] Prcha­la served as chair of the CEFC in 1951, accord­ing to a doc­u­ment in his rather lengthy CIA file,[31] and would lat­er become vice pres­i­dent of the Pre­sid­i­um of the People’s Coun­cil of the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations, which suc­ceed­ed the CEFC.[32]

From the moment of its incep­tion, the CEFC was active in the inter­na­tion­al are­na. On 25 April 1945, for instance, the CEFC appealed to the U.S. Con­gress, ask­ing for “aid and sup­port” for its ini­tia­tives in the face of Sovi­et aggres­sion: “The world must awake to the real­i­ty of the sit­u­a­tion and rec­og­nize that it is essen­tial to guar­an­tee equal free­dom and inde­pen­dence to all nations sit­u­at­ed between Ger­many and Rus­sia.”[33] That same year, the CEFC pub­lished the “Free Inter­mar­i­um Char­ter,” sub­ti­tled “The Inter­mar­i­um future is the fate of 160,000,000 Euro­peans.”[34] In 1946, a Con­gress of Del­e­gates of the Oppressed Euro­pean Nations was con­voked by the Scot­tish League for Euro­pean Free­dom with the assis­tance of the CEFC.[35]

Much of the CEFC’s activ­i­ty cen­tred around its Rome office, which start­ed to pub­lish the Inter­mar­i­um Bul­letin.[36] Accord­ing to a declas­si­fied U.S. Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Group doc­u­ment from 1946, the pres­i­dent of the CEFC Rome branch was Miha Krek.[37] Krek (1897–1969), named by Gowen as one of the three most promi­nent pre-war Inter­mar­i­um sup­port­ers, was a Sloven­ian lawyer and politi­cian who became an impor­tant rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Yugoslav gov­ern­ment-in-exile in Lon­don and sub­se­quent­ly a British intel­li­gence asset. In 1944, he moved to Rome, where he orga­nized the anti-com­mu­nist Sloven­ian Nation­al Coun­cil Abroad. While there, he also estab­lished the Sloven­ian Wel­fare Soci­ety net­work, which helped sev­er­al thou­sand Slovenes emi­grate, espe­cial­ly to Argenti­na and the Unit­ed States.[38] The Sloven­ian Wel­fare Soci­ety is men­tioned in a CIA doc­u­ment from 1948 called “Orga­ni­za­tions for the Assis­tance of Refugees in Italy”[39] that lists sev­er­al of the now-infa­mous “rat­lines,”[40] such as the one set up by the Croa­t­ian priest Krunoslav Draganovic, who was said to be a “promi­nent mem­ber of the Inter­mar­i­um” and in close con­tact with Krek.[41] In 1947, Krek moved to the Unit­ed States and was offi­cial­ly elect­ed as pres­i­dent of the Slovene People’s Par­ty in Exile.

Amer­i­can intel­li­gence began to take notice of the Inter­mar­i­um net­work in August 1946[42] in the frame­work of Oper­a­tion Cir­cle, a Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Corps (CIC) project the orig­i­nal goal of which was to deter­mine how net­works inside the Vat­i­can had spir­it­ed away so many Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors, most­ly to South Amer­i­ca.[43] Among the group of CIC offi­cers involved in the oper­a­tion was Levy’s source William Gowen. Then a young offi­cer based in Rome, Gowen sus­pect­ed the Inter­mar­i­um net­work to be behind Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors’ exten­sive escape routes from Europe. To pur­sue this hunch, he secured as an asset the Hun­gar­i­an Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tor Fer­enc Vaj­ta (who worked with the Ger­man Abwehr as a mem­ber of the col­lab­o­ra­tionist Hun­gar­i­an Arrow Cross[44]), whose “Hun­gar­i­an Pop­u­lar Front” seems to have been admit­ted into the CEFC/Intermarium[45] and who was in con­tact with French intel­li­gence.[46]

The CIA archives con­tain about 20 doc­u­ments that include the term Inter­mar­i­um,[47] most of which ref­er­ence Vajta’s files.[48] Accord­ing to Aarons and Lof­tus, although he had ini­tial­ly been thor­ough­ly opposed to this course of action, by “ear­ly July 1947, Gowen was strong­ly advo­cat­ing that Amer­i­can intel­li­gence should take over Inter­mar­i­um; before long, the CIC offi­cer was no longer hunt­ing for Nazis, but recruit­ing them.”[49] Oth­er declas­si­fied files describe how Vaj­ta and Gowen lat­er pledged U.S. sup­port for a new orga­ni­za­tion, a “Con­ti­nen­tal Union”[50] that would—unlike the French-British-Vat­i­can-sup­port­ed Intermarium—be under U.S. con­trol.[51] Upon being tracked down in the Unit­ed States in 1949, Vaj­ta became one of only two Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors to be deport­ed from the coun­try on the basis of their Nazi past since the end of the Sec­ond World War.[52]

That post-war intel­li­gence activ­i­ties in Rome were of great impor­tance to wary Sovi­et espi­onage is indi­cat­ed by the fact that no less than the infa­mous dou­ble agent Kim Phil­by, head of the SIS/MI6 anti-Sovi­et sec­tion since 1944, “infil­trat­ed the Ustashe rat­line and Vat­i­can Inter­mar­i­um with Sovi­et spies, while Angle­ton and Dulles chose to ignore the ultra-Fas­cist lean­ings of their Croa­t­ian assets.”[53] Accord­ing to a FOIA doc­u­ment, the British ceased to finan­cial­ly sup­port the Inter­mar­i­um net­work in June 1947[54] as part of an effort to prune the num­ber of cost­ly Churchill-sup­port­ed intel­li­gence projects and there­by relieve the strain on an overex­tend­ed British bud­get. By 1948, the Inter­mar­i­um net­work seems to have been super­seded by the anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN), found­ed in 1946 and sup­port­ed until its dis­so­lu­tion in the mid-1990s by the British, Amer­i­can, and Ger­man secret ser­vices.[55]

Intermarium 3: Central Europe as the Anti-Communist Front

In the frame­work of the Amer­i­can “Lib­er­a­tion Policy”—which John Dulles for­mu­lat­ed in 1953 as being direct­ed toward the lib­er­a­tion of Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean nations from Sovi­et dom­i­na­tion and the whole of Europe from Com­mu­nist influence—a vast num­ber of anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions were formed in the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od and sup­port­ed by the U.S.

In the frame­work of the Amer­i­can “Lib­er­a­tion Policy”—which John Dulles for­mu­lat­ed in 1953 as being direct­ed toward the lib­er­a­tion of Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean nations from Sovi­et dom­i­na­tion and the whole of Europe from Com­mu­nist influ­ence[56] —a vast num­ber of anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions were formed in the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od and sup­port­ed by the US.[57] They con­sti­tute one of the main com­po­nents of the Inter­mar­i­um “genealog­i­cal tree,” in the sense that they revived the mem­o­ry of Piłsudski’s attempts to uni­fy Cen­tral and East­ern Europe against Sovi­et Rus­sia and gave them new life, but blend­ed this mem­o­ry with far-right tones inspired by col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many.[58]

The most impor­tant of the Euro­pean anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions was the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN). Offi­cial­ly found­ed on 16 April 1946, and head­quar­tered in Munich, it served as a coor­di­nat­ing cen­tre for anti-Com­mu­nist émi­gré polit­i­cal orga­ni­za­tions from the Sovi­et Union and neigh­bour­ing social­ist coun­tries. Because fas­cist move­ments were, in the 1930s, the first to orga­nize them­selves against the Sovi­et Union, the ABN recruit­ed mas­sive­ly among their ranks and served as an umbrel­la for many for­mer col­lab­o­ra­tionist para­mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tions in exile, amongst them the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nationalists—Bandera (OUN‑B), the Croa­t­ian Ustaše, the Roman­ian Iron Guard, and the Slo­va­kian Hlin­ka Guard.[59] It thus con­tributed to guar­an­tee­ing the sur­vival of their lega­cies at least until the end of the Cold War. Accord­ing to the lib­er­al Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies think tank, cre­at­ed by two for­mer aides to Kennedy advi­sors, the ABN was the “largest and most impor­tant umbrel­la for for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors in the world.”[60]

The head­quar­ters and cells of the ABN orga­nized anti-Sovi­et ral­lies and demon­stra­tions, inter­na­tion­al con­fer­ences and con­gress­es, and the dis­tri­b­u­tion of var­i­ous anti-com­mu­nist pro­pa­gan­da pub­li­ca­tions. The ABN coop­er­at­ed close­ly with the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League (WACL) and the Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil (EFC). The most active groups with­in the ABN became the Ukrain­ian and Croa­t­ian orga­ni­za­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly the Ukrain­ian OUN.[61] The OUN, under the lead­er­ship of Andriy Mel­nyk (1890–1964), col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Nazi occu­piers from the latter’s inva­sion of Poland in Sep­tem­ber 1939. The Gestapo trained Myko­la Lebed and the adher­ents of Melnyk’s younger com­peti­tor, Stepan Ban­dera (1909–1959), in sab­o­tage, guer­ril­la war­fare, and assas­si­na­tions. The OUN’s 1941 split into the so-called OUN‑B, fol­low­ing Stepan Ban­dera, and OUN‑M, fol­low­ing Andriy Mel­nyk,[62] did not keep both fac­tions from con­tin­u­ing to col­lab­o­rate with the Ger­mans.[63]

OUN‑B leader Stepan Ban­dera held meet­ings with the heads of Ger­man intel­li­gence regard­ing the for­ma­tion of a Ukrain­ian army. In Feb­ru­ary 1941, fol­low­ing nego­ti­a­tions with the leader of the Ger­man Abwehr, Wil­helm Canaris, Ban­dera received two and a half mil­lion marks to form the corps of the future inde­pen­dent army of Ukraine.[64] In April 1941, this “Legion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists,” com­posed of 600 Ban­derites[65] incor­po­rat­ed into the Roland and Nightin­gale bat­tal­ions, both equipped by the Abwehr, was cre­at­ed ad hoc with the aim of fight­ing the Sovi­ets on behalf of the Third Reich. Sup­port­ers of both OUN fac­tions were recruit­ed into the infa­mous Ukrain­ian SS divi­sion Gal­izia, estab­lished by Hein­rich Himm­ler.[66] The OUN‑B lead­er­ship, upon its release from pref­er­en­tial deten­tion in a rather com­fort­able block in the con­cen­tra­tion camp Sach­sen­hausen in 1944, also agreed to coop­er­ate fur­ther with the Ger­mans.[67]

An impor­tant con­tact for the Ukraini­ans around the time of the Ger­man inva­sion of the Sovi­et Union, who would become deci­sive after the war, was the Abwehr offi­cer Theodor Ober­län­der (1905–1998). Ober­län­der became deputy com­man­der of the col­lab­o­ra­tionist Ukrain­ian “Nightin­gale Bat­tal­ion” (Nakhti­gal’ legion), estab­lished under Ger­man super­vi­sion and known for its utter bru­tal­i­ty.[68] Its com­man­der, Roman Shukhe­vich (1907–1950), a mil­i­tary leader of the OUN‑B who also served as Haupt­mann of a local Ger­man aux­il­iary police bat­tal­ion, was one of the orga­niz­ers of the Halych-Vol­hyn Mas­sacre, in which 40,000–60,000 eth­nic Poles were mur­dered.[69] “The OUN‑B and UPA alone had between 1943 and 1944 mur­dered more than 90,000 Poles and sev­er­al thou­sand Jews in the frame­work of ‘eth­nic cleans­ing.’”[70] OUN mem­bers sub­se­quent­ly assist­ed the Ger­man SS in mur­der­ing approx­i­mate­ly 200,000 Vol­hyn­ian Jews.[71]

The con­nec­tion with Ober­län­der would become cen­tral for Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist groups after the war. While in Sovi­et Ukraine the UPA kept on fight­ing against Moscow until the ear­ly 1950s, their capac­i­ties were exhaust­ed. Most of the OUN‑B cadres had tak­en refuge in the Dis­placed Per­son (DP) camps in Bavaria under Amer­i­can occu­pa­tion, where they re-orga­nized with the help of the occu­py­ing author­i­ties.[72] As Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for Dis­placed Per­sons, Refugees, and the War-Dam­aged dur­ing the Ade­nauer gov­ern­ment, Ober­län­der played a cru­cial role in the rise of the ABN and allowed Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionists to take the lead in it. Yaroslav Stet­sko (1912–1986), who presided over the Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist gov­ern­ment in Lviv from as ear­ly as 30 June 1941, led the ABN from its cre­ation in 1946 until his death in 1986.[73] Apply­ing bru­tal intim­i­da­tion tac­tics learned dur­ing the war years,[74] the OUN‑B won the upper hand with­in the ABN, which con­sol­i­dat­ed its pow­er over rival anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tions. A report from the CIC, the pre­cur­sor to the Unit­ed States Army Intel­li­gence and Secu­ri­ty Com­mand (INSCOM), described the sit­u­a­tion as fol­lows: 

CIC con­firmed that by 1948 both the “Inter­mar­i­um” and the UPA (Ukrain­ian par­ti­san com­mand) report­ed to the ABN pres­i­dent, Yaroslav Stet­sko. The UPA in turn had con­sol­i­dat­ed all the anti-Sovi­et par­ti­sans under its umbrel­la. Yaroslav Stet­sko was also Sec­re­tary of OUN/B and sec­ond in com­mand to Ban­dera, who had the largest remain­ing par­ti­san group behind Sovi­et lines under his direct com­mand. Thus, OUN/B had achieved the lead­er­ship role among the anti-Com­mu­nist exiles and was ascen­dant by 1950, while the more mod­er­ate and Madis­on­ian-ori­ent­ed plat­forms and groups, the Prometheans, Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al Club and the oth­ers, had been fused with the ABN or aban­doned.[75]

In 1966, the ABN inte­grat­ed into the new­ly estab­lished World Anti-Com­mu­nist League. It nev­er­the­less remained head­quar­tered in Munich under an address that was also used by the Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil, found­ed by Stet­sko and Ober­län­der in 1967[76] and whose main aims were “to coor­di­nate and inten­si­fy anti-Com­mu­nist activ­i­ty in Europe and to give sup­port to the cause of the subjugat­ed peo­ples in the Sovi­et Rus­sian empire.”[77] The same address was giv­en as the con­tact for ABN Cor­re­spon­dence, a fierce­ly anti-com­mu­nist and his­tor­i­cal revi­sion­ist mag­a­zine pub­lished from 1949 to 2000, at var­i­ous times in Eng­lish, Ger­man, and French.[78]

The ABN could count on last­ing sup­port from West­ern intel­li­gence ser­vices until it was dis­band­ed after the Berlin Wall col­lapsed. While the British ceased their sup­port of Bandera’s net­work in 1954, once any hope of guer­ril­la war­fare on the Sovi­et ter­ri­to­ry itself had dis­ap­peared, the ABN received back­ing from the Gehlen Orga­ni­za­tion (1946–1956) and lat­er from its suc­ces­sor, the Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vice Bun­desnachrich­t­en­di­enst (BND). U.S. intel­li­gence like­wise con­tin­ued to sup­port the orga­ni­za­tion and appears to have recruit­ed many CIA assets from amongst the Mel­nyk fac­tion of the OUN.[79] For exam­ple, in the con­text of project AERODYNAMIC (1949–70; lat­er renamed QRPLUMB, 1970–91),[80] the CIA pro­vid­ed sup­port for the For­eign Rep­re­sen­ta­tion of the Ukrain­ian Supreme Lib­er­a­tion Coun­cil ZP/UHVR, a Ukrain­ian émi­gré orga­ni­za­tion estab­lished in 1949 of which Myko­la Lebed was elect­ed Min­is­ter of For­eign Affairs.[81] Accord­ing to declas­si­fied CIA doc­u­ments, QRPLUMB’s “oper­a­tional activ­i­ty con­cen­trat­ed on pro­pa­gan­da and con­tact oper­a­tions.”[82] Fur­ther­more, the “CIA helped to estab­lish in New York City the Pro­log Research and Pub­lish­ing Com­pa­ny in 1953 as ZP/UHVR’s pub­lish­ing and research arm.” Through a Munich-based affil­i­ate, the so-called Ukrain­ian Soci­ety for For­eign Stud­ies (CIA Cryptonyms: QRTERRACE, AETERRACE), Pro­log “pub­lished peri­od­i­cals and select­ed books and pam­phlets which sought to exploit and increase dis­si­dent nation­al­ist ten­den­cies in Sovi­et Ukraine.”[83]

In 1967, the World Con­gress of Free Ukraini­ans was found­ed in New York City by sup­port­ers of Andriy Mel­nyk. It was renamed the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress in 1993. In 2003, the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress was rec­og­nized by the Unit­ed Nations Eco­nom­ic and Social Coun­cil as an NGO with spe­cial con­sul­ta­tive sta­tus. It now appears as a spon­sor of the Atlantic Coun­cil, in the dona­tion brack­et of $250,000–$999,999 in 2015 and $100,000–$249,000 in 2016.[84] The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival.

Intermarium 4: Central Europe as the Pro‑U.S. “New Europe”

After hav­ing been dilut­ed by the broad­er anti-com­mu­nist fight in the course of the Cold War, the con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um once again began to make the rounds in some West­ern strate­gic cir­cles in the late 2000s. The late Alexan­dros Petersen, in his book The World Island: Eurasian Geopol­i­tics and the Fate of the West(2011), inspired by Hal­ford Mackinder’s notion of the Heart­land and then by Brzezinski’s attempts to avoid the balka­niza­tion of Cen­tral and East­ern Europe, explained: “West­ern pol­i­cy-mak­ers must there­fore reac­quaint them­selves with Piłsudski’s con­cepts, espe­cial­ly that of Promethe­ism, in order to move beyond a con­tain­ment strat­e­gy and make the strate­gic inroads to Eura­sia that will pre­vent that crit­i­cal region from com­ing under the sway of author­i­tar­i­an orga­niz­ers, about which Mackinder warned.”[85]

This new usage of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept has been revived by Strat­for, a pri­vate intel­li­gence think tank whose cus­tomers include large cor­po­ra­tions as well as gov­ern­ment agen­cies such as the U.S. Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty, the Marines, and the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency. The ear­li­est Strat­for email men­tion­ing the notion of Inter­mar­i­um dates from 2009 and advanced the con­cept in the con­text of Poland’s sol­i­dar­i­ty with Geor­gia fol­low­ing the August 2008 war with Rus­sia.[86] A total of 394 Strat­for emails up to Decem­ber 2011 (leaked by Wik­ileaks) con­tain the term “Inter­mar­i­um.”[87] Since around 2012, Strat­for has also used the term pub­licly. In 2012, the Hun­gar­i­an-born geopo­lit­i­cal ana­lyst and advi­sor George Fried­man, founder of Strat­for and still at the time its head, was vocal­ly pro­mot­ing an Inter­mar­i­um project in which Poland should dis­tance itself from the EU and form a bloc with oth­er Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean coun­tries between Ger­many and Rus­sia. In a video from the Euro­pean Forum of New Ideas in Octo­ber of that year, he stat­ed:

Poland must now depend on itself. Why? It’s a nation of 38 mil­lion, it has a vibrant econ­o­my, it has high­ly intel­li­gent edu­cat­ed peo­ple, and it is ris­ing. I will put a more rad­i­cal idea for­ward to you, which I think is a fun­da­men­tal one that we get from Gen­er­al Pił­sud­s­ki, the Inter­mar­i­um, [which] basi­cal­ly says we are caught between Ger­many and Rus­sia, and that stinks […][88]

In 2015, Strat­for rec­og­nized in its Geopo­lit­i­cal Diary web project that “it has been dis­cussing an alliance sys­tem called the Inter­mar­i­um for quite a while” and referred to Piłsudski’s orig­i­nal project:[89]

We have been argu­ing that, giv­en the re-emer­gence of Russ­ian pow­er, the idea of the Intermarium—supported not by France, but by the Unit­ed States, and focused on Russia—would become inevitable. [For­mer Unit­ed States Army Europe (USAREUR) com­man­der Gen­er­al Ben] Hodges’ state­ments on pre-posi­tion­ing essen­tial­ly announced the Inter­mar­i­um, or its small begin­ning. The area in which the equip­ment would be pre-posi­tioned stretch­es from the Baltic states through Poland and then skips to Roma­nia and Bul­gar­ia on the Black Sea. It sig­nals to the Rus­sians that what­ev­er hap­pens in Ukraine, the next line of coun­tries is the line that trig­gers the alliance.[90]

In 2017, Fried­man returned to the idea, stat­ing “The Inter­mar­i­um is a concept—really, an eventuality—that I have spo­ken about for near­ly a decade.” Boost­ed by the cur­rent U.S.-Russia ten­sions, he has advanced a more pre­cise vision of what this union is meant to be: he sees Poland and Romania—the two clos­est mil­i­tary allies of the U.S. in the region— as the “two foun­da­tions of the Inter­mar­i­um” and does not hes­i­tate to hope that the Inter­mar­i­um would chal­lenge the “hege­mo­ny of the 1950s-style cor­po­ra­tions that dom­i­nate Euro­pean eco­nom­ics” and pro­mote an eco­nom­ic mod­el that would be “more entre­pre­neur­ial, more close­ly resem­bling the Unit­ed States.”[91]

The con­cept has been sup­port­ed by oth­er pro-NATO think tanks such as the Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics,[92] a nation­al secu­ri­ty and inter­na­tion­al affairs grad­u­ate school found­ed in 1990. Look­ing at its board of trustees, one can find, for exam­ple, William H. Web­ster, for­mer Direc­tor of the FBI and CIA.[93][94] Its founder, John Lenc­zows­ki, worked in the State Depart­ment in the Bureau of Euro­pean Affairs and as Spe­cial Advi­sor to the Under Sec­re­tary for Polit­i­cal Affairs in the ear­ly 1980s. From 1983 to 1987, he was Direc­tor of Euro­pean and Sovi­et Affairs at the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil and served as prin­ci­pal Sovi­et affairs advis­er to Ronald Rea­gan.[95] One of the IWP’s most impor­tant advo­cates of the Inter­mar­i­um is Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, who, besides hav­ing authored a book on the sub­ject,[96] has spo­ken on the top­ic at sev­er­al IWP con­fer­ences.[97] Chodakiewicz holds the Koś­ciuszko Chair in Pol­ish Stud­ies at the IWP and directs the Cen­ter for Inter­mar­i­um Stud­ies, whose mis­sion is:

to cham­pi­on the con­ti­nu­ity of Trans-Atlantic rela­tion­ships to re-stim­u­late US-Euro­pean ami­ty, and to recon­firm America’s com­mit­ment to Europe—a Europe that includes the Inter­mar­i­um. This is par­tic­u­lar­ly cru­cial in the ear that needs remind­ing that America’s sys­temic arrange­ments, insti­tu­tions, law, and cul­ture were trans­plant­ed from the Old Con­ti­nent and the Mediter­ranean Basin. The spir­it of Jerusalem-Athens-Rome via Lon­don arrived in the New World to forge a new nation.[98]

In 2015, IWP host­ed in Pen­ta­gon City a con­fer­ence enti­tled “Between Rus­sia and NATO: Secu­ri­ty Chal­lenges in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe,” fea­tur­ing, among oth­ers, Chodakiewicz:

At this year’s con­fer­ence, his [Chodakiewicz’s] talk focused on the his­to­ry of the Inter­mar­i­um, a region stretch­ing from the Baltic Sea, to the Black Sea, to the Adri­at­ic coast. He explained that, after the dis­so­lu­tion of the Hab­s­burg, Hohen­zollern, and Romanov dynas­ties in the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry, the region expe­ri­enced a peri­od of dis­in­te­gra­tion and pet­ty bick­er­ing in stark con­trast with the har­mo­ny that pre­vailed dur­ing the Pol­ish-Lithuan­ian Com­mon­wealth, last­ing from the six­teenth to the mid-eigh­teenth cen­turies. As the ancient nations of Poland and Hun­gary sought to secure their lost ter­ri­to­ries, eth­no-nation­al­ist states, like Latvia and Slo­va­kia, attempt­ed to dis­tance them­selves from their for­mer rulers. Con­flict­ing irre­den­tist claims and the pre­car­i­ous egos of the fledg­ling Cen­tral Euro­pean nation-states pre­clud­ed the sort of region­al sol­i­dar­i­ty nec­es­sary to defend the clus­ter of states from Ger­many and the USSR. The events and after­math of World War II demon­strat­ed once and for all the fool­ish­ness of region­al bick­er­ing in light of very real exis­ten­tial threats brew­ing at the thresh­olds of Cen­tral Europe: if the region hopes to avoid repeat­ing his­to­ry, Pro­fes­sor Chodakiewicz con­clud­ed, region­al sol­i­dar­i­ty must trump pet­ty intra-region­al con­cerns.[99]

Chodakiewicz had been appoint­ed by for­mer U.S. Pres­i­dent George W. Bush to serve as pres­i­dent of the Unit­ed States Holo­caust Memo­r­i­al Coun­cil for a five-year term. His appoint­ment was crit­i­cized at the time by var­i­ous orga­ni­za­tions, such as the South­ern Pover­ty Law Cen­tre (SPLC), which sum­ma­rized alle­ga­tions that he held anti-Semit­ic views.[100] In a long dossier, SPLC revealed Chodakiewicz to be a fre­quent com­men­ta­tor on right-wing Pol­ish media, such as the week­ly Najwyzszy Czas!, “the mag­a­zine of the Real Pol­i­tics Union par­ty, a fringe, pro-life, anti-gay mar­riage, pro-prop­er­ty rights, anti-income tax group,” and the far-right Pol­ish web­site Fronda.pl.[101] In July 2008, Chodakiewicz was among those who accused Barack Oba­ma of hav­ing been a Mus­lim and a com­mu­nist asso­ciate.[102]

Anoth­er impor­tant fig­ure in the D.C. think tank world, Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fel­low at the Cen­ter for a New Amer­i­can Secu­ri­ty, chief geopo­lit­i­cal ana­lyst at Strat­for for some years, and mem­ber of the Defense Pol­i­cy Board at the Pen­ta­gon while Robert Gates was Sec­re­tary of Defense, has like­wise used the notion of “Greater Inter­mar­i­um” to define the region and invite the U.S. to take a more active lead­er­ship role in Europe lest the con­ti­nent be frac­tured.[103] The same agen­da is advanced by the Wash­ing­ton-based Cen­ter for Euro­pean Pol­i­cy Analy­sis (CEPA), whose mis­sion is to pro­mote the “strate­gic the­ater encom­pass­ing the region between Berlin to Moscow, and from the Bar­ents Sea to the Black Sea, [as] represent[ing] an area vital of strate­gic inter­est to the Unit­ed States. (…) From Wil­son and Masaryk to Rea­gan, Hav­el and Wałęsa, CEPA works to pre­serve and extend the shared lega­cy of fight­ing for free­dom, and America’s essen­tial role in Europe, among a new gen­er­a­tion of Atlanti­cists.”[104] Based in Kyiv, the Insti­tute for Euro-Atlantic Coop­er­a­tion has been, too, nur­tur­ing the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept, with Kos­tiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland propos­ing some con­crete ideas for the Inter­mar­i­um treaty that could address the con­tra­dic­tions of hav­ing some of its mem­bers inside EU and NATO, and some out­side.[105]

The Inter­mar­i­um con­cept thus seems to have grad­u­al­ly tak­en root among a group of U.S. pol­i­cy experts and deci­sion-mak­ers who sup­port strength­en­ing NATO’s pres­ence in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe. NATO’s expan­sion into East­ern Europe has been a fun­da­men­tal and endur­ing point of con­tention in East–West rela­tions, with Russ­ian lead­ers accus­ing the Unit­ed States of non-com­pli­ance with the oral com­mit­ment James Bak­er made to Gor­bachev that NATO would not move clos­er to Russ­ian bor­ders.[106] While nei­ther Geor­gia nor Ukraine has yet suc­ceed­ed in con­vinc­ing NATO to allow their acces­sion, sev­er­al oth­er ini­tia­tives have been deployed in the region. The turn­ing point was the July 2016 NATO sum­mit in War­saw, at which it was decid­ed to deter Rus­sia by strength­en­ing the Alliance’s mil­i­tary pres­ence on its east­ern flank. By 2017, there were four NATO bat­tal­ions in the region, sta­tioned in Poland, Esto­nia, Latvia, and Lithua­nia on a rota­tion­al basis. Each of these bat­tal­ions was pro­vid­ed by a NATO country—the Unit­ed States, Cana­da, Ger­many, or Britain. The 2016 sum­mit also inau­gu­rat­ed NATO’s Bal­lis­tic Mis­sile Defense, putting a base in Roma­nia. The stat­ed pur­pose is to counter the threats posed by Iran and North Korea, but Rus­sia believes it is also a tar­get. Mon­tene­gro was invit­ed to become NATO’s twen­ty-ninth mem­ber and dis­cus­sions on the sta­tus of Geor­gia and Ukraine were held, anger­ing Moscow.[107] NATO also launched a “Strate­gic Com­mu­ni­ca­tion Cen­ter” in Latvia and opened a train­ing cen­ter in Geor­gia.[108]

The Inter­mar­i­um con­cept fits into this geopo­lit­i­cal and mil­i­tary con­text quite well, offer­ing the miss­ing ide­o­log­i­cal and his­tor­i­cal legit­i­ma­tion of U.S. pol­i­cy for Cen­tral and East­ern Europe. . . . 

Intermarium 5: Central Europe Unity Revived through Regional Economic Cooperation

. . . . Simul­ta­ne­ous­ly with its pro­mo­tion by some Amer­i­can think tanks, the con­cept expe­ri­enced a revival in Cen­tral Europe, espe­cial­ly Poland. There, the mem­o­ry of Piłsudski’s project had nev­er total­ly dis­ap­peared but sim­ply trans­formed in line with the new geopo­lit­i­cal real­i­ties. The Paris-based émi­gré jour­nal Kul­tura—the main Pol­ish cul­tur­al jour­nal pub­lished in emi­gra­tion, led by Jerzy Giedroyć (1906–2000)—played a key role in refor­mu­lat­ing Poland’s East­ern strat­e­gy. . . .

. . . . Kul­tura’s “ULB” doc­trine was appro­pri­at­ed, and giv­en a more vir­u­lent­ly anti-Russ­ian tone, by the Con­fed­er­a­tion of Inde­pen­dent Poland (Kon­fed­er­ac­ja Pol­s­ki Niepodległej), clan­des­tine­ly launched from 1979by Leszek Moczul­s­ki (1930–1997), an admir­er of Pił­sud­s­ki who led some small far-right move­ments after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1994, the Con­fed­er­a­tion co-found­ed the League of Lands of Między­morze, which orga­nized three con­ven­tions in sub­se­quent years.[110] The term was also seized upon by some mem­bers of Sol­i­darność, who inte­grat­ed this “East­ern strat­e­gy” into their pro­gram­mat­ic dec­la­ra­tion at the movement’s First Con­fer­ence in Sep­tem­ber 1981.[111]

. . . . It was only dur­ing the next decade that the notion [of the Inter­mar­i­um] returned to promi­nence on the Pol­ish polit­i­cal land­scape, advanced by the con­ser­v­a­tive Law and Jus­tice Par­ty (PiS). The Kaczyńs­ki broth­ers, Lech and Jarosław, seized upon the term dur­ing their vic­to­ri­ous pres­i­den­tial cam­paign in 2005 and used it wide­ly up until Lech’s death in the Smolen­sk plane crash in 2010.[112] They asso­ci­at­ed it with Poland’s increased activism toward both the Viseg­rad group and the “East­ern Part­ner­ship” countries—including Lech’s sym­bol­ic trip to Tbil­isi dur­ing the 2008 Russ­ian war with Geor­gia along­side the pres­i­dents of Esto­nia, Lithua­nia, and Ukraine and the Lat­vian prime min­is­ter, intend­ed as a mes­sage of sup­port for Geor­gian sov­er­eign­ty. For­mer Deputy Min­is­ter of For­eign Affairs (1998–2001) and Min­is­ter of Nation­al Defense (2005–2007) Radoslaw Siko­rs­ki was like­wise a fer­vent sup­port­er of so-called Jagiel­lon­ian pol­i­tics.[113]

Around this time, the idea of a spe­cif­ic secu­ri­ty coali­tion for the Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean coun­tries was cham­pi­oned by the Lithuan­ian pres­i­dent, Algir­das Brazauskas, and his prime min­is­ter, Casimir Prun­skienė. At a 2006 sum­mit in Vil­nius devot­ed to “Com­mon Vision for Com­mon Neigh­bor­hood,” Prun­skienė declared: I have not lost hope that the Baltic-Black Sea alliance is not only our his­tor­i­cal past from the time of the Grand Duchy of Lithua­nia. Cer­tain his­tor­i­cal moti­va­tions have remained until now.”[114]

How­ev­er, it was Poland that became the dri­ving force behind more active region­al inte­gra­tion, this time more eco­nom­ic than polit­i­cal or mil­i­tary.[115] Under the men­tor­ship of Jarosław Kaczyńs­ki, the new Pol­ish pres­i­dent, Andrzej Duda, elect­ed in 2015, relaunched the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance on the eve of his inau­gu­ra­tion under the label of “Three Seas Ini­tia­tive” (TSI). Orig­i­nal­ly, the project grew out of a debate sparked by a report co-pub­lished by the Atlantic Coun­cil and the EU ener­gy lob­by group Cen­tral Europe Ener­gy Part­ners (CEEP) with the goal of pro­mot­ing big Cen­tral Euro­pean com­pa­nies’ inter­ests in the EU.[116] The report, enti­tled Com­plet­ing Europe—From the North-South Cor­ri­dor to Ener­gy, Trans­porta­tion, and Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions Union, was co-edit­ed by Gen­er­al James L. Jones, Jr., for­mer Supreme Allied Com­man­der of NATO, U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor, and chair­man of the Atlantic Coun­cil, and Pawel Olech­now­icz, CEO of the Pol­ish oil and gas giant Gru­pa Lotos.[117] It “called for the accel­er­at­ed con­struc­tion of a North-South Cor­ri­dor of ener­gy, trans­porta­tion, and com­mu­ni­ca­tions links stretch­ing from the Baltic Sea to the Adri­at­ic and Black Seas,” which at the time was still referred to as the “Adri­at­ic-Baltic-Black Sea Ini­tia­tive.”[118] The report was pre­sent­ed in Brus­sels in March 2015, where, accord­ing to Fred­er­ick Kempe, pres­i­dent and CEO of the Atlantic Coun­cil, it “gen­er­at­ed a huge amount of excite­ment.”[119]

In August 2016, the Dubrovnik meet­ing led to the for­mal cre­ation of the “Three Sea Ini­tia­tive.” The meet­ing was attend­ed by Pol­ish pres­i­dent Andrzej Duda, Roman­ian pres­i­dent Klaus Iohan­nis, and Bul­gar­i­an pres­i­dent Rosen Plevneliev. In addi­tion to this, “Hun­gary, Slo­va­kia, Lithua­nia, Latvia and Esto­nia dis­patched min­is­ters of for­eign affairs, where­as Aus­tria, Slove­nia and the Czech Repub­lic were rep­re­sent­ed on a low­er lev­el. The meet­ing was also attend­ed by rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Atlantic Coun­cil think tank.”[120] Since that Dubrovnik meet­ing, both Duda and Croa­t­ian Pres­i­dent Kolin­da Grabar-Kitarović have been staunch sup­port­ers of a part­ner bloc of Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean coun­tries. U.S. pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump vis­it­ed the TSI’s sec­ond sum­mit in July 2017 in War­saw,[121] with Marek Jan Chodakiewicz of the IWP help­ing to draft his speech.[122] In a Wash­ing­ton Post arti­cle report­ing on the meet­ing, jour­nal­ist Adam Tay­lor not­ed the pres­ence of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept in TSI dis­cus­sions: “[Head of the War­saw office of the Euro­pean Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­tions Piotr] Buras not­ed that some in the Pol­ish Law and Jus­tice par­ty even refer to it as ‘Inter­mar­i­um’… which draws upon a Pol­ish for­eign pol­i­cy con­cept in the ’30s of the 20th cen­tu­ry which was open­ly direct­ed against the Ger­man dom­i­nance at that time.”[123]

At the lat­est TSI sum­mit in Bucharest in Sep­tem­ber 2018, Duda insist­ed on the need for a region­al part­ner­ship between the 12 coun­tries involved, but also wel­comed Ger­many and the U.S. as clos­est part­ners. He declared, “We want to be, and in real­i­ty we are, polit­i­cal prac­ti­tion­ers, the co-cre­ators of an effec­tive and active Cen­tral Europe, on a glob­al scale.”[124] Poland works close­ly with the Wash­ing­ton-based Cen­ter for Euro­pean Pol­i­cy Analy­sis (CEPA) men­tioned ear­li­er to advance this “Atlanti­cist” agen­da. . . .

Intermarium 6: Central Europe As Dreamed by the Ukrainian Far Right

. . . . The most recent rein­car­na­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um has tak­en form in Ukraine, espe­cial­ly among the Ukrain­ian far right, which has re-appro­pri­at­ed the con­cept by cap­i­tal­iz­ing on the sol­id ide­o­log­i­cal and per­son­al con­ti­nu­ity between actors of the Ukrain­ian far right in the inter­war and Cold War peri­ods and their heirs today.

This con­ti­nu­ity is exem­pli­fied by the wife of long-time ABN leader Yaroslav Stet­sko, Yarosla­va Stet­sko (1920–2003), a promi­nent fig­ure in the Ukrain­ian post-Sec­ond World War émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty who became direct­ly involved in post-Sovi­et Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. Hav­ing joined the OUN at the age of 18, she became an indis­pens­able sup­port­er of the ABN after the war, first in its press bureau and from 1957 as edi­tor of its pub­li­ca­tion, the ABN Cor­re­spon­dence.[127] After her husband’s death in 1986, she suc­ceed­ed him as the ABN’s pres­i­dent and became a mem­ber of the pre­sid­i­um of the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League.[128] In July 1991, she returned to Ukraine, and in the fol­low­ing year formed the Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (CUN), a new polit­i­cal par­ty estab­lished on the basis of the OUN, pre­sid­ing over both.[129] Although the CUN nev­er achieved high elec­tion results, it coop­er­at­ed with the Social-Nation­al Par­ty of Ukraine (SNPU), which lat­er changed its name to Svo­bo­da, the far-right Ukrain­ian par­ty that con­tin­ues to exist.[130]

The co-founder of the CUN and for­mer­ly Yaroslav Stetsko’s pri­vate sec­re­tary, the U.S.-born Roman Zvarych (1953), rep­re­sents a younger gen­er­a­tion of the Ukrain­ian émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty active dur­ing the Cold War and a direct link from the ABN to the Azov Bat­tal­ion. In an inter­view, he declared that at age fif­teen he swore an oath to “achieve Ukrain­ian state­hood or … die fight­ing for it.”[131] Zvarych par­tic­i­pat­ed in the activ­i­ties of the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations in the 1980s.[132] In the frame­work of the for­ti­eth-anniver­sary com­mem­o­ra­tion of the Ukrain­ian Insur­gent Army (UPA), head­ed by Yaroslav Stet­sko, he rep­re­sent­ed the World Fed­er­a­tion of Ukrain­ian Stu­dents (CeSUS).[133] This put him on a list of par­tic­i­pants that includ­ed, among oth­ers, Sen­a­tor Bar­ry Gold­wa­ter, for­mer DIA Direc­tor Gen­er­al Daniel O. Gra­ham, for­mer SAC com­man­der-in-chief Gen­er­al Bruce K. Hol­loway, founder of the U.S. WACL chap­ter John K. Singlaub, Lev Dobri­an­sky, and Otto von Hab­s­burg.[134] In an inter­view pub­lished by the BBC Mon­i­tor­ing Kiev Unit in 2005, he stat­ed that he had met his future wife Svet­lana in 1983 in the con­text of a secret mis­sion for Stet­sko in Poland, where he was recruit­ing assets “for work in Ukraine.”[135] He served as a mem­ber of the Par­lia­men­tary Assem­bly of the Coun­cil of Europe from 1998 to 2005, and again from 2008 to 2013.[136]

In Feb­ru­ary 2005, after Vik­tor Yushchenko’s elec­tion, Zvarych was appoint­ed Min­is­ter of Jus­tice. His name appears on Wik­ileaks doc­u­ments in var­i­ous con­texts, includ­ing the leaked Strat­for emails and the so-called “Cable­gate” of around 250,000 U.S. clas­si­fied diplo­mat­ic cables.[137] Accord­ing to those emails, Zvarych seemed to have had fre­quent con­sul­ta­tions with the U.S. ambas­sador to Ukraine between 2006 and 2009. Accord­ing to Andriy Bilet­sky, the first com­man­der of the Azov bat­tal­ion, a civ­il para­mil­i­tary unit cre­at­ed in the wake of the Euro­maid­an, Zvarych was head of the head­quar­ters of the Azov Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in 2015 and sup­port­ed the Azov bat­tal­ion with “vol­un­teers” and polit­i­cal advice through his Zvarych Foun­da­tion.[138] Zvarych returned to par­lia­ment in March 2018.

The rein­tro­duc­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um notion in Ukraine is close­ly con­nect­ed to the broad reha­bil­i­ta­tion of the OUN and UPA, as well as of their main hero, Stepan Ban­dera. After Ukraine’s inde­pen­dence in late 1991, Ban­dera was pro­gres­sive­ly rein­tro­duced as a nation­al hero, first in West­ern Ukraine, where the mem­o­ry of hun­dreds of thou­sands of civil­ians deport­ed to Sovi­et camps was still vivid, then across the whole coun­try and in the new his­to­ry text­books com­mis­sioned after the Orange rev­o­lu­tion.[139] Dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010), and par­tic­u­lar­ly through the cre­ation of the Insti­tute for Nation­al Remem­brance,  Vik­tor Yushchenko built the image of Ban­dera as a sim­ple Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist fight­ing for his country’s inde­pen­dence, first in the 1930s against Poland, then in the ear­ly 1940s against the Sovi­et Union. His trou­bling bio­graph­i­cal elements—he twice col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Nazi regime, adhered to many nation­al social­ist prin­ci­ples, called for an eth­ni­cal­ly pure Ukrain­ian nation, and demon­strat­ed a fierce anti-Semi­tism in line with the Nazis’ geno­ci­dal policy—have often been ignored in the new offi­cial Ukrain­ian his­to­ri­og­ra­phy.[140] In 2009, the gov­ern­ment hon­oured Ban­dera with a postage stamp for his one-hun­dredth birth­day, and the fol­low­ing year he was posthu­mous­ly giv­en the offi­cial title of “Hero of Ukraine.”[141] This hon­our pro­voked out­rage in East­ern Ukraine and Europe, how­ev­er, and was even­tu­al­ly revoked.

The his­to­ri­an Ste­fanie Birk­holz, who wrote the most exhaus­tive study of the ABN to date, reminds us of Yushchenko’s spouse’s role in this strat­e­gy:

It is not unlike­ly Yushchenko’s readi­ness dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010) to open up to right-wing ten­den­cies of the Ukrain­ian exile leads back to his wife, who had con­nec­tions to the ABN. Katery­na Chu­machenko [Yushchenko], born 1961 in Chica­go, was socialised there in the Ukrain­ian exile youth organ­i­sa­tion SUM (Spilka Ukra­jin­sko­ji Molo­di, Ukrain­ian Youth Organ­i­sa­tion) in the spir­it of the OUN. Via the lob­by asso­ci­a­tion Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­i­ca (UCCA) she obtained a post as “spe­cial assis­tant” in the U.S. State Depart­ment in 1986, and was from 1988 to 1989 employed by the Office of Pub­lic Liai­son in the White House. In 1991, like oth­er activists of the Ukrain­ian exile, she moved back to Ukraine. A pho­to­graph from 1983 shows Chu­machenko as direc­tor of the Ukrain­ian Nation­al Infor­ma­tion Ser­vice in con­ver­sa­tion with U.S. ambas­sador to the UN Jeane J. Kirk­patrick and Yaroslav Stet­sko.[142]

This reha­bil­i­ta­tion trend accel­er­at­ed after the Euro­Maid­an. In 2015, just before the sev­en­ti­eth anniver­sary of Vic­to­ry Day, Volodymyr Via­tro­vych, min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion and long-time direc­tor of the Insti­tute for the Study of the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment, an orga­ni­za­tion found­ed to pro­mote the hero­ic nar­ra­tive of the OUN–UPA, called on the par­lia­ment to vote for a set of four laws that cod­i­fied the new, post-Maid­an his­to­ri­og­ra­phy. Two of them are par­tic­u­lar­ly influ­en­tial in the ongo­ing mem­o­ry war with Rus­sia. One decrees that OUN and UPA mem­bers are to be con­sid­ered “fight­ers for Ukrain­ian inde­pen­dence in the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry,” mak­ing pub­lic denial of this unlaw­ful. The sec­ond, “Con­demn­ing Com­mu­nist and Nation­al Social­ist (Nazi) Total­i­tar­i­an Regimes and Pro­hibit­ing the Pro­pa­gan­da of their Sym­bols,” for­mal­ly crim­i­nal­izes the entire Sovi­et regime in Ukraine, order­ing the removal of any Sovi­et-era sym­bols and mak­ing any breach pun­ish­able by up to ten years in prison.[143]

These decom­mu­niza­tion laws, adopt­ed with­out any pub­lic debate and which do not seem to have major­i­ty sup­port,[144] have been extreme­ly con­tro­ver­sial: the his­to­ri­an com­mu­ni­ty expressed appre­hen­sion about being told how to think “cor­rect­ly,”[145] and the joint inter­im opin­ion from the Coun­cil of Europe’s Venice Com­mis­sion and the OSCE/ODIHR found that the sec­ond law infringed on people’s rights to free­dom of expres­sion and asso­ci­a­tion. In 2017, Vya­tro­vych, already accused of “white­wash­ing” Ukrain­ian his­to­ry by plac­ing Sovi­et-era state archives under the juris­dic­tion of the Insti­tute for Nation­al Remem­brance,[146] stat­ed that dis­play­ing the Waf­fen-SS Gali­cia Divi­sion sym­bols did not fall under the 2015 law.[147] The most recent evi­dence of this trend is the Decem­ber 2018 deci­sion to declare Jan­u­ary 1 a nation­al day of com­mem­o­ra­tion of Stepan Ban­dera.[148]

In this con­text of reha­bil­i­ta­tion of inter­war heroes, ten­sions with Rus­sia, and dis­il­lu­sion with Europe over its per­ceived lack of sup­port against Moscow, the geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um could only pros­per. It has found its most active pro­mot­ers on the far right of the polit­i­cal spec­trum, among the lead­er­ship of the Azov Bat­tal­ion.

This is the case, for instance, of Andriy Bilet­sky (1979), a Ukrain­ian mem­ber of par­lia­ment, lieu­tenant colonel of the police, and uni­ver­si­ty instruc­tor. From his youth, Bilet­sky was active in neo-Nazi cir­cles. He took the lead­er­ship of the neo-Nazi orga­ni­za­tion Patri­ot of Ukraine (Patri­ot Ukrainy) (1996–2014), which became a para­mil­i­tary wing of the Social-Nation­al Assem­bly (SNA).[149] In late Novem­ber 2013, the SNA and Patri­ot of Ukraine cre­at­ed Pravyi Sek­tor, joined by oth­er neo-Nazi groups such as White Ham­mer and C14, the neo-Nazi youth wing of Svo­bo­da. When in April 2014 Min­is­ter of Inter­nal Affairs Arsen Avakov autho­rized the cre­ation of civ­il para­mil­i­tary units to help a weak Ukrain­ian army fight against seces­sion­ism in the Don­bas region, the Asov Bat­tal­ion was offi­cial­ly formed, with Bilet­sky as its co-founder and first com­man­der.[150] The Kyiv gov­ern­ment began to pro­vide it with arms and a few month lat­ers incor­po­rat­ed it into the Nation­al Guard of Ukraine.[151] In 2015, the SNA trans­formed into the polit­i­cal youth orga­ni­za­tion Azov Civ­il Corps (Tsivil’nyi kor­pus Azov) and then, in Octo­ber 2016, into the Nation­al Corps polit­i­cal par­ty (Natsional’nyi kor­pus), of which Bilet­sky is the cur­rent leader.

In 2016, Bilet­sky cre­at­ed the Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group (ISG),[152] intro­duc­ing the con­cept to poten­tial com­rades-in-arms from the Baltic-Black Sea region.[153] The first day of the found­ing con­fer­ence was reserved for lec­tures and dis­cus­sions by senior rep­re­sen­ta­tives of var­i­ous sym­pa­thet­ic orga­ni­za­tions, the sec­ond day to “the lead­ers of youth branch­es of polit­i­cal par­ties and nation­al­ist move­ments of the Baltic-Black Sea area.”[154] The senior del­e­gates were from Belarus (Zmici­er Mick­iewicz, Belarus Secu­ri­ty Blog); Croa­t­ia (Leo Mar­ić, jour­nal­ist); Esto­nia (Vaba Ukraina, or “Free Ukraine”); Geor­gia (Gior­gi Kuparashvili, head of the Mil­i­tary School of Colonel Yevhen Kono­valets); Lithua­nia (Gin­tarė Narke­vičiūtė, Inter­na­tion­al Sec­re­tary of the Home­land Union – Lithuan­ian Chris­t­ian Democ­rats Par­ty); Poland (Mar­iusz Patey, direc­tor of the Insti­tute of Pro­fes­sor Roman Rybars­ki); Slo­va­kia (Sloven­ská pospoli­tosť, or “Slo­vak Broth­er­hood”); and Swe­den. It also includ­ed “mil­i­tary attach­es of diplo­mat­ic mis­sions from the key coun­tries in the region (Poland, Hun­gary, Roma­nia and Lithua­nia).”[155] On Octo­ber 13, 2018, the ISG orga­nized its third con­gress. Besides the Ukrain­ian hosts, a large share of the for­eign speak­ers from Poland, Lithua­nia, and Croa­t­ia had a (para-)military back­ground, among them advi­sor to the Pol­ish Defence Min­is­ter Jerzy Tar­gal­s­ki and retired Brigadier Gen­er­al of the Croa­t­ian Armed Forces Bruno Zor­i­ca.[156] Among the talk­ing points of Pol­ish mil­i­tary edu­ca­tor Damien Duda were “meth­ods of the prepa­ra­tion of a mil­i­tary reserve in youth orga­ni­za­tions” and the “impor­tance of para­mil­i­tary struc­tures with­in the frame­work of the defence com­plex of a mod­ern state.”[157]

Anoth­er promi­nent face of the Ukrain­ian neo-Nazi scene, who appears in both the Asov and the ISG con­text, has been Ole­na Semenya­ka. In a 2015 inter­view with Oleg Odnorozhenko, then the deputy com­man­der of the Azov reg­i­ment, pub­lished on the “Ukrain­ian Tra­di­tion­al­ist Club” web­site, Semenya­ka is pre­sent­ed as “coor­di­na­tor of the Depart­ment of Inter­na­tion­al Rela­tions of the ‘Azov’ reg­i­ment “Azov Recon­quista.’”[158] Lit­tle is known about the Recon­quista move­ment. It emerged some­time around 2015 in Ukraine,[159] and now has estab­lished groups in sev­er­al Euro­pean coun­tries, such as France,[160] Switzer­land,[161] and Fin­land.[162] When rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Euro­pean Recon­quista groups met in the frame­work of the First Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence in Kyiv in April 2017, a con­fer­ence report described the Recon­quista project as fol­lows: “the Recon­quista Move­ment aim­ing at build­ing the Paneu­ro­pean con­fed­er­a­tion of sov­er­eign Euro­pean nations, or sim­ply Paneu­ropa, remains on the posi­tions of the clas­sic Third Way (the so-called third polit­i­cal the­o­ry) in the vein of Julius Evola, Ernst Jünger, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Oswald Mosley and Dominique Ven­ner.”[163] The Ukrain­ian Recon­quista net­work had a web­site active between 2015 and 2017 avail­able in nine lan­guages,[164] and still has a func­tion­ing YouTube chan­nel.[165]

The sec­ond Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence was orga­nized in Kyiv on Octo­ber 15, 2018. Under the Recon­quista ban­ner, it host­ed along­side Semenya­ka speak­ers from West­ern Euro­pean far-right orga­ni­za­tions, among them Bjørn Chris­t­ian Rødal (Alliansen—Alternativ for Norge, Nor­way); Alber­to Pal­ladi­no (for­eign cor­re­spon­dent of Casa Pound Italia, Italy); Julian Ben­der (West Ger­many area leader of Der III. Weg, Ger­many); Maik Schmidt (leader of the Bran­den­burg branch of NPD’s JN, Ger­many); Yuri Noievyi (All-Ukrain­ian Svo­bo­da Asso­ci­a­tion, Ukraine); Anton Bady­da (Karpats­ka Sich, Ukraine); Greg John­son (rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the U.S. Alt-Right, edi­tor-in-chief of Counter-Cur­rents); and Mar­cus Follin (Swedish Pan-Euro­pean Nation­al­ist, Iden­ti­tar­i­an, Swe­den).[166] All the groups present, as well as the authors men­tioned above and the notion of “Third Way,” set the tone: they belong to the new Iden­ti­tar­i­an move­ments attempt­ing to reha­bil­i­tate fas­cist the­o­ries under a nar­ra­tive adapt­ed to our times of a white Europe fight­ing against both immi­grants and cos­mopoli­tan elites.

Semenya­ka her­self appears well inte­grat­ed into neo-Nazi coun­ter­cul­tur­al cir­cles. Since its incep­tion in 2016, she has spo­ken at every “Pact of Steel” (Stalevyi Pakt) con­fer­ence in Kyiv, an event that takes place in the frame­work of the neo-Nazi Black Met­al “Asgard­srei Fes­ti­val.” In 2016, her talk was on the top­ic of “Aris­toc­ra­cy of the Spir­it and the Great Euro­pean Recon­quista,” while in 2017 it was titled “Wotan, Pan, Diony­sus: At the Gates of the Grand Euro­pean Sol­stice”[167] —a nepa­gan rhetoric clas­sic for neo-Nazis coun­ter­cul­tur­al groups. For­mer­ly a fol­low­er of the Russ­ian far-right neo-Eurasian­ist ide­o­logue Alexan­der Dug­in,[168] who pro­pos­es a fed­er­a­tion “from Lis­bon to Vladi­vos­tok,” Semenya­ka turned into a Dug­in crit­ic with the Maid­an events but con­tin­ues to embrace the same rad­i­cal neo-pagan­ism in which Dug­in is root­ed.[169]  

Semenya­ka has been pro­mot­ing this new Inter­mar­i­um project on Face­book,[170] as well as through exten­sive trav­els in Europe to meet with var­i­ous local far-right pro­po­nents. In Feb­ru­ary 2018 she appeared in Tallinn at the Annu­al Eth­no­fu­tur Con­fer­ence orga­nized by Sinine Ära­tus, the youth wing of the Eston­ian nation­al­ist par­ty Blue Awak­en­ing, where she spoke on the “Inter­mar­i­um as a Lab­o­ra­to­ry of Euro­pean Arche­o­fu­tur­ism,” “and par­tic­i­pat­ed in the torch­light march on the occa­sion of the cen­te­nary of Estonia’s inde­pen­dence.”[171] In May 2018 she attend­ed the Euro­pean Con­gress of the “Young Nation­al­ists” (Junge Nation­al­is­ten), the youth wing of the Ger­man Nation­al Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty NPD,  in Riesa, Ger­many, giv­ing a lec­ture enti­tled “Beyond the ‘Wall of Time’: Ernst Jünger and Mar­tin Hei­deg­ger on the New Meta­physics”[172] —here too, two major philo­soph­i­cal ref­er­ences of today’s rad­i­cal right. On June 8, 2018, she appeared at the Iden­ti­tar­i­an Club house Kon­trakul­tur in Halle, Ger­many, which held an “Ukrain­ian Evening” where she spoke on the top­ic of “iden­ti­ty, geopol­i­tics, per­spec­tives” and, accord­ing to infor­ma­tion from the Iden­ti­tar­i­ans, intro­duced the con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um to the audi­ence.[173]

In Lieu of Conclusion: Intermarium’s four conceptual dimensions

. . . . The mate­r­i­al dimen­sion of the con­cept man­i­fests itself through some per­son­al and insti­tu­tion­al fil­i­a­tions: a geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept can­not be advanced with­out some agency. In the Inter­mar­i­um case, its agents have been groups and fig­ures for who the sup­port of the Unit­ed States to the region was/is the only guar­an­tee of secu­ri­ty against Rus­sia and a West­ern Europe accused of lack­ing sol­i­dar­i­ty toward its Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean neigh­bors. Some shared genealo­gies can be found between those who fought against ear­ly Com­mu­nism in the inter­war and war peri­ods, were involved into anti-Com­mu­nist struc­tures dur­ing the Cold War, and were reha­bil­i­tat­ed, direct­ly or indi­rect­ly, in today’s pol­i­tics against Putin’s Rus­sia. . . .

. . . . The socio-polit­i­cal dimen­sion of the con­cept posi­tions it inside the clas­sic con­ser­v­a­tive and/or far right repertoires—depending of coun­tries and peri­od of history—with almost no com­pe­ti­tion for mean­ing com­ing from more main­stream or from left­ist groups. Today’s revival should there­fore be under­stood not only as a geopo­lit­i­cal con­struc­tion against Rus­sia but as part of a wider con­cep­tu­al arse­nal inspired by con­ser­v­a­tive and/or far right ideas in tune with the cur­rent illib­er­al atmos­phere. While many West­ern Euro­pean far right groups are pro-Russ­ian, Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean far right tends to be more anti-Russ­ian, a posi­tion reac­ti­vat­ed by the 2014 Ukrain­ian cri­sis. The Pol­ish Law and Jus­tice Par­ty per­son­i­fies this illib­er­al stance: anti-Russ­ian and pro-US, but maybe even more mold­ed by an anti-lib­er­al pos­ture, and a vivid cri­tique of the Euro­pean con­struc­tion. The cur­rent ten­sions between the Viseg­rad coun­tries and the Euro­pean Union institutions—around the refugee cri­sis but also Brus­sels’ heavy crit­i­cisms of Hungary’s and Poland’s laws on media and jus­tice in particular—integrate the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept into the ide­o­log­i­cal toolk­it assert­ing the legit­i­ma­cy of Cen­tral and East­ern Europe’s right to an iden­ti­ty dis­so­ci­at­ed from West­ern Europe and claim­ing rep­re­sent­ing the “real” Europe.  Krzysztof Szcz­er­s­ki, chief of the Pol­ish president’s Cab­i­net and an advi­sor for inter­na­tion­al affairs, for instance, described for instance the Inter­mar­i­um as a Pol­ish answer to the cur­rent cri­sis fac­ing the EU in his recent book The Euro­pean Utopia: Inte­gra­tion Cri­sis and Pol­ish Ini­tia­tive of Rem­e­dy(2017). . . . .[174]

 


Mar­lene Laru­elle, Ph.D., is an Asso­ciate Direc­tor and Research Pro­fes­sor at the Insti­tute for Euro­pean, Russ­ian and Eurasian Stud­ies (IERES), Elliott School of Inter­na­tion­al Affairs, The George Wash­ing­ton Uni­ver­si­ty. Dr. Laru­elle is also a Co-Direc­tor of PONARS (Pro­gram on New Approach­es to Research and Secu­ri­ty in Eura­sia) and Direc­tor of GW’s Cen­tral Asia Pro­gram. Dr.Laruelle received her Ph.D. in his­to­ry from the Nation­al Insti­tute of Ori­en­tal Lan­guages and Cul­tures (INALCO) and her “Habil­i­ta­tion” at Sci­ences-PoinParis. Dr. Laru­elle recent­ly authored Russ­ian Nation­al­ism: Imag­i­nar­ies, Doc­trines, and Polit­i­cal Bat­tle­fields (Rout­ledge, 2018) and edit­ed Entan­gled Far Rights: A Russ­ian-Euro­pean Intel­lec­tu­al Romance in the 20th Cen­tu­ry (Pitts­burgh Uni­ver­si­ty Press2018), as well as Eurasian­ism and the Euro­pean Far Right: Reshap­ing the Rus­sia-Europe Rela­tion­ship(Lexington,2015).

Ellen­Rivera is an inde­pen­dent researcher spe­cial­ized in the post-war Ger­man far-right, with a par­tic­u­lar focus on post-war anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions. In the frame­work of her research pro­vid­ed by the George Wash­ing­ton University’s Insti­tute of Euro­pean, Russ­ian, and Eurasian Stud­ies (IERES) she has been study­ing the cur­rent links between pro­po­nents of the Ger­man and the Russ­ian far right, most­ly by means of exten­sive social net­work analy­ses and media mon­i­tor­ing.

The paper was first pub­lished as an IERES Occa­sion­al Papers series, March 2019.

Foot­notes:

Jonathan Levy, ‘The Inter­mar­i­um: Wil­son, Madi­son, & East Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al­ism’ (PhD dis­ser­ta­tion, Uni­ver­si­ty of Cincin­nati, 2006), https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ucin1147397806&disposition=attachment. The fol­low­ing authors have ded­i­cat­ed either a chap­ter or longer sec­tions to the ear­ly his­to­ry of Iner­mar­i­um: Stephen Dor­ril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intel­li­gence Ser­vice (New York: Free Press, 2000); Mark Aarons and John Lof­tus, Rat­lines: How the Vatican’s Nazi Net­works Betrayed West­ern Intel­li­gence to the Sovi­ets (Lon­don: William Heine­mann, 1991); Mark Aarons and John Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty: The Vat­i­can, the Nazis, and Sovi­et Intel­li­gence (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 

[2]‘Wash­ing­ton Returns to a Cold War Strat­e­gy,’ Strat­for World­view, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/washington-returns-cold-war-strategy.

[3]Alexan­dra Wishart, ‘How the Ukrain­ian Far-Right Has Become One of the Biggest Pro­po­nents of Inter­mar­i­um,’ New East­ern Europe, 25 Sep­tem­ber 2018, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/09/25/ukrainian-far-right-become-one-biggest-proponents-intermarium/; Matthew Kott, ‘A Far Right Hijack of Inter­mar­i­um,’ New East­ern Europe, 26 May 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/05/26/a‑far-right-hijack-of-intermarium/.

[4]Ger­ard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), Crit­i­cal Geopol­i­tics (Lon­don: Rout­ledge, 1996). 

[5]Felix Beren­skoet­ter, “Approach­es to Con­cept Analy­sis,” Mil­len­ni­um: Jour­nal of Inter­na­tion­al Stud­ies 45, no. 2 (2017): 151–173.

[6]Hal­ford J. Mackinder, Demo­c­ra­t­ic Ideals and Real­i­ty. A Study in the Pol­i­tics of Recon­struc­tion (Lon­don: Con­sta­ble and Co, 1919), 269.

[7]Janko Bek­ić and Mari­na Fun­duk, ‘The Adri­at­ic-Baltic-Black Sea Ini­tia­tive as the Revival of ‘Inter­mar­i­um,’” Insti­tute for Devel­op­ment and Inter­na­tion­al Rela­tions Brief, Feb­ru­ary 2016, www.irmo.hr/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IRMO-Brief‑2–2016.pdf; Hubert Leschnik, Die Außen­poli­tik der Zweit­en pol­nis­chen Repub­lik: “Inter­mar­i­um” und “Drittes Europa” also Konzepte der pol­nis­chen Außen­poli­tik unter Außen­min­is­ter Józef Beck von 1932 bis 1939 (Saar­brück­en: Ver­lag Dr. Müller, 2010), p. 21; Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 165.

[8]Leschnik, Die Außen­poli­tik der Zweit­en pol­nis­chen Repub­lik, op. cit., p. 29.

[9]Ibid., p. 32.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., 165.

[12]Ibid., p. 168–169.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 170.

[15]Ibid.p. 184.

[16]Ibid., p. 180.

[17]Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency, ‘Paper Mills and Fab­ri­ca­tions,’ Feb­ru­ary 1952, p. 39 and p. 42, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/519697e4993294098d50b909; declas­si­fied files per­tain­ing to Miha Krek, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/miha%20krek; declas­si­fied files per­tain­ing to Grig­ore Gafen­cu, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/gafencu.

[18]Pił­sud­s­ki is report­ed to have said, “France will aban­don us, France will betray us.” Stanis­law Sier­pows­ki, Poli­ty­ka zagranicz­na Pol­s­ki, 31, quot­ed in Leschnik, Die Außen­poli­tik der Zweit­en pol­nis­chen Repub­lik,op. cit., p. 66.

[19]Leschnik, Die Außen­poli­tik der Zweit­en pol­nis­chen Repub­lik, op. cit., p. 4.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 180 and p. 184.

[22]Ibid.p. 179.

[23]Dor­ril, op. cit.,p. 17 and p. 113.

[24]Aarons and Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty, op. cit., p. 52.

[25]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 26.

[26]A. T. Lane, Europe on the Move: The Impact of East­ern Enlarge­ment on the Euro­pean Union (Mün­ster: LIT Ver­lag, 2005), p. 125.

[27]Pauli Heikkilä, ‘Baltic Pro­pos­als for Euro­pean Uni­fi­ca­tion dur­ing World War II,’ Research Paper, Uni­ver­si­ty of Tar­tu, Esto­nia, 2014, p. 76, https://www.lvi.lu.lv/lv/LVIZ_2014_files/2.numurs/P_Heikila_Baltic_Proposals_LVIZ_2014_2(91).pdf.

[28]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 258.

[29]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment ‘Gen­er­al Prcha­la and Asso­ciates,’ 19 Novem­ber 1951, https://ia801305.us.archive.org/12/items/PRCHALALEV-0115/PRCHALA%2C%20LEV_0115.pdf; Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment ‘Back­ground and Present Sta­tus of the Prcha­la Move­ment,’ 28 May 1951, https://archive.org/details/PRCHALALEV-0100.

[30]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment ‘The Prcha­la Move­ment,’ 7 (?) Decem­ber 1951, https://archive.org/details/PEKELSKYVLADIMIRVOL1-0054.

[31]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ments per­tain­ing to Lev Prcha­la, https://archive.org/search.php?query=“prchala%2C+lev”; declas­si­fied doc­u­ment, 19 March 1951, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/PRCHALA%2C%20LEV_0091.pdf.

[32]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment, ‘LETTER TO JAROSLAW STETZKO FROM (San­i­tized),’ 13 Sep­tem­ber 1958. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r003900010031‑7.

[33]Pro­ceed­ings and debates of the 79th Con­gress, 25 April 1945.

[34]The Free Inter­mar­i­um Char­ter: The Inter­mar­i­um Future is the Fate of 160,000,000 Euro­peans! (Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al Club, 1945); Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 233.

[35]‘Con­gress of Del­e­gates of the Oppressed Euro­pean Nations, Con­voked under the Aus­pices of the Scot­tish League for Euro­pean Free­dom with the Assis­tance of the Cen­tral Euro­pean Fed­er­al Club, Lon­don, Held on June 24th and 25th, 1946 in Edin­burgh, Scot­land’ [Report of pro­ceed­ings], https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000811070.

[36]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um,op. cit., p. 249 ff.

[37]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment, Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Group, ‘Sovi­et Pen­e­tra­tion of and Use of the ABN and Cen­tral Euro­pean Club,’ 31 Octo­ber 1946, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r000100790001‑7.

[38]Declas­si­fied doc­u­ment, ‘Orga­ni­za­tions for the Assis­tance of Refugees in Italy,’ 2 Octo­ber 1948, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r002200350003‑0. See also FOIA doc­u­ment, ‘Sloven­ian Immi­grants in Argenti­na,’ 31 March 1949, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdhttps://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r002200350003‑0. See also Zlatko Skr­biš, Long-Dis­tance Nation­al­ism: Dias­po­ras, Home­lands and Iden­ti­ties (Abing­don: Tay­lor and Fran­cis, 2017), p. 32.

[39]‘Orga­ni­za­tions for the Assis­tance of Refugees in Italy,’ op. cit.

[40]The term “rat­line,” which orig­i­nal­ly denot­ed a rope lad­der reach­ing the top mast of a sail­ing boat, was lat­er used as “a gener­ic intel­li­gence term for an evac­u­a­tion net­work,” specif­i­cal­ly the escape routes estab­lished after the Sec­ond World War to help Nazis and Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors flee Europe in order to escape per­se­cu­tion as war crim­i­nals. See Aarons and Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty, op. cit., chap­ter XI. The var­i­ous rat­lines are amply described in Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: How Perón Brought the Nazi War Crim­i­nals to Argenti­na (Lon­don: Gran­ta, 2002), and in Aarons and Lof­tus, Rat­lines, op. cit.

[41]Aarons and Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty, op. cit., pp. 57–58.

[42]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 254.

[43]Aarons and Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty, op. cit., p. 48.

[44]Infor­ma­tion Con­trol, Office of Spe­cial Oper­a­tions, ‘Fer­enc Vaj­ta,’ 25 Novem­ber (no year giv­en, prob­a­bly 1947), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/VAJTA%2C%20FERENC_0021.pdf.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid.

[47]FOIA doc­u­ments match­ing the search term “Inter­mar­i­um,” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/intermarium.

[48]FOIA doc­u­ments per­tain­ing to Fer­enc Vaj­ta, https://archive.org/search.php?query=ferenc+vajta&page=2.

[49]Aarons and Lof­tus, Unholy Trin­i­ty, op. cit., pp. 61–62.

[50]FOIA doc­u­ment, “Infor­mal and Unof­fi­cial Con­ver­sa­tion with For­mer East­ern Euro­pean Diplo­mats Con­cern­ing the Pro­ject­ed Estab­lish­ment in Madrid of an ‘East­ern Euro­pean anti-Com­mu­nist Cen­ter,’” 3 Novem­ber 1947, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/VAJTA%2C%20FERENC_0019.pdf.

[51]Vaj­ta “claimed that the Inter­mar­i­um was anti-Amer­i­can in its make­up and poli­cies. He stat­ed that he had gath­ered this impres­sion from the peri­od when he was Hun­gar­i­an Con­sul Gen­er­al in Vien­na and worked with the French Gen­er­al Staff and the 2eme Bureau on Hun­gar­i­an emi­gre prob­lems, he added that his sub­se­quent rela­tions with Hun­gar­i­an and oth­er East­ern Euro­pean per­son­al­i­ties in the Inter­mar­i­um in Rome of this year con­firmed this belief. The British and French Gen­er­al Staffs, Mr. VAJTA remarked, are attempt­ing to ‘shut the U.S. out’ of East­ern Euro­pean affairs. Like­wise it was his belief that the entry of monar­chist ele­ments rep­re­sent­ing Otto of Hab­s­burg into the ranks of the Inter­mar­i­um, gave it an anti-Amer­i­can bent.” (‘Infor­mal and Unof­fi­cial Con­ver­sa­tion…,’ op. cit.)

[52]‘Office of Spe­cial Inves­ti­ga­tions,’ U.S. State’s Attorney’s Bul­letin, 54: 1 (Jan­u­ary 2016), p. 2, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-hrsp/legacy/2011/02/04/01–06USABulletin.pdf.

[53]Jonathan Levy, ‘The Law­suit Against the Vat­i­can and the CIA,’ News Insid­er, 17 Jan­u­ary 2001, http://www.newsinsider.org/editorials/Vatican_CIA.html. On Draganovic, see also Goñi, op. cit.

[54]‘Infor­mal and Unof­fi­cial Con­ver­sa­tion…,’ op. cit.

[55]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 319.

[56]J. Dulles, ‘State­ment on Lib­er­a­tion Pol­i­cy,’ Teach­ing Amer­i­can His­to­ry, 15 Jan­u­ary 1953, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/statement-on-liberation-policy/.

[57]Birk­holz, “Die stärk­sten Ver­bün­de­ten des West­ens:” Der Anti­bolschewis­tis­che Block der Natio­nen 1946–1996. Geschichte, Organ­i­sa­tion und Arbeitsweise eines … Zer­schla­gung der Sow­je­tu­nion (Ham­burg: KVV Konkret Ver­lag, 2017), p. 21.

[58]Richard L. Rashke, Use­ful Ene­mies: America’s Open-Door Pol­i­cy for Nazi War Crim­i­nals (New York: Del­phini­um Books, 2015).

[59]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.38.

[60]‘World Anti-Com­mu­nist League,’ Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies, 9 Jan­u­ary 1990. Archived ver­sion of 3 March 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160303235651/http://rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/World_Anti-Communist_League.

[61]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 170.

[62]Alexan­der Motyl (ed.), Ency­clo­pe­dia of Nation­al­ism, Vol­ume 2 (Cam­bridge, MA: Aca­d­e­m­ic Press, 2000), p. 40. 

[63]John M. Mer­ri­man, Ency­clo­pe­dia of Mod­ern Europe: Europe Since 1914: Ency­clo­pe­dia of the Age of War and Recon­struc­tion (Farm­ing­ton Hills, MI: Thom­son Gale, 2006), https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ounupa.

[64]Orga­ni­zat­si­ia ukrains’kikh nat­sion­al­is­tiv i Ukrains’ka povstans’ka armi­ia [Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists and the Ukrain­ian Insur­gent Army] (Insti­tute of His­to­ry of Ukraine of the Nation­al Acad­e­my of Sci­ences of Ukraine, 2004), pp. 17–30, http://www.history.org.ua/LiberUA/Book/Upa/1.pdf.

[65]Motyl, op. cit., p. 40.

[66]Per Anders Rudling, ‘The OUN, the UPA and the Holo­caust: A Study in Man­u­fac­tur­ing of His­tor­i­cal Myth,’ The Carl Beck Papers in Russ­ian and East Euro­pean Stud­ies 2107 (2011), http://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/cbp/article/view/164.

[67]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.33–34.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Tim­o­thy Sny­der, The Recon­struc­tion of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithua­nia, Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2003), p. 164, p. 168, p. 170, p.176.

[70]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.43. See also Grze­gorz Rossolin­s­ki-Liebe, Stepan Ban­dera: The Life and After­life of a Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ist: Fas­cism, Geno­cide, and Cult (Stuttgart: Ibi­dem, 2014), p. 324.

[71]‘Nazi War Crimes in Ukraine,’ Ency­clo­pe­dia of Ukraine, http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages\N\A\NaziwarcrimesinUkraine.htm.

[72]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.37; see also Rudling, op. cit.

[73]The chair­men of the ABN Peo­ples’ Coun­cil includ­ed V. Bērz­iņš, V. Kajum-Khan, F. Ďurčan­ský, F. Farkas de Kis­bar­nak, and R. Ostrows­ki. The long-time gen­er­al sec­re­taries were Dr. Niko Nakashidze and C. Poko­rný.

[74]Levy, The Inter­mar­i­um, op. cit., p. 318.

[75]Ibid. 

[76]Ivan Mat­teo Lom­bar­do (Pres­i­dent, Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil), ‘Aide Mem­oire. Euro­pean Cap­tive Nations and Free World’s Demands for Peace and Secu­ri­ty in Europe,’ ABN Cor­re­spon­dence25: 3 (1974), pp. 34–28, http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/13975/file.pdf. Quot­ed in Birk­holz, op. cit., p., 62.

[77]‘Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil Formed at Munich Meet­ing,’ Svo­bo­da, 15 July 1967, http://ukrweekly.com/archive/pdf2/1967/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1967-27.pdf.

[78]ABN Kor­re­spon­denz (Ger­man) (1949–1969), https://www.worldcat.org/title/abn-korrespondenz-monatl-informationsblatt-des-antibolschewistischen-blocks-der-nationen-erscheint-in-dt-engl-u-franz-sprache/oclc/183212035&referer=brief_results;ABN Cor­re­spon­dence(Eng­lish) (1950–2000), http://diasporiana.org.ua/?s=ABN+Correspondence; ABN Cor­re­spon­dence (French) (1952–1954); ABN Cor­re­spon­dence, Vol. XI, No.1, Jan­u­ary-Feb­ru­ary 1960, http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/13903/file.pdf; ABN Cor­re­spon­dence, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, Jan­u­ary-Feb­ru­ary 1988. http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/14113/file.pdf.

[79]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.85. 

[80]Nation­al Archives and Records Admin­is­tra­tion, ‘Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declas­si­fied CIA Files Nazi War Crimes and Japan­ese Impe­r­i­al Gov­ern­ment Records Dis­clo­sure Acts,’ June 2007, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/second-release-lexicon.pdf; declas­si­fied CIA-files about Project AERODYNAMIC, https://archive.org/details/AERODYNAMICand https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/Aerodynamic; Declas­si­fied CIA files about Project QRPLUMB, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/qrplumb; declas­si­fied CIA file ‘Project AERODYNAMIC,’ 15 Feb­ru­ary 1967, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20VOL.%205%20%20(DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS)_0004.pdf.

[81]David C.S. Albanese, In Search of a Less­er Evil: Anti-Sovi­et Nation­al­ism and the Cold War (PhD dis­ser­ta­tion, North­east­ern Uni­ver­si­ty, 2015), 213 ff., https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/neu:rx915s212.

[82]Nation­al Archives and Records Admin­is­tra­tion, ‘Research Aid,’ op. cit.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Atlantic Coun­cil, ‘Hon­or Roll of Con­trib­u­tors,’ 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20170517122607/http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/support/supporters; Atlantic Coun­cil, ‘Hon­or Roll of Con­trib­u­tors,’ 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20180519083222/http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/support/supporters.

[85]Alexan­dros Petersen, The World Island: Eurasian Geopol­i­tics and the Fate of the West (San­ta Bar­bara, CA: Praeger, 2011), p. 153.

[86]‘Rus­sia Pro­file Week­ly Experts Pan­el: Russia’s Stake in Ukrain­ian Elec­tions,’ Wik­ileaks, 28 Novem­ber 2009, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/65/656190_-eurasia-utf-8-q-russia_profile_weekly_experts_panel.html.

[87]Leaked Strat­for emails con­tain­ing the term “Inter­mar­i­um” on Wik­ileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/?q=intermarium&mfrom=&mto=&title=&notitle=&date=&nofrom=&noto=&count=50&sort=1&file=&docid=&relid=0#searchresult.

[88]‘Lec­ture by George Fried­man “Beyond the Euro­pean Union: Europe in the Mid­dle of the 21st Cen­tu­ry,”’ YouTube video, 1:15:26, post­ed by “EFNI 2012” (Europe­jskie Forum Nowych Idei [Euro­pean Forum of New Ideas]), Octo­ber 25, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2858&v=ywrjTZrEgF4, time stamp [47:48]. 

[89]‘Wash­ing­ton Returns to a Cold War Strat­e­gy,’ Strat­for World­view, 27 Jan­u­ary 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/washington-returns-cold-war-strategy.

[90]Ibid.

[91]George Fried­man, “From the Inter­mar­i­um to the Three Seas,” Geopo­lit­i­cal Futures, 7 July 2017, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/intermarium-three-seas/.

[92]Insti­tute for World Pol­i­tics web­site, https://www.iwp.edu/.

[93]Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics, ‘Board of Trustees,’ https://www.iwp.edu/about/page/board-of-trustees.

[94]‘U.S. For­eign Pol­i­cy Options: Secu­ri­ty Chal­lenges in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe,’ YouTube video, 59:24, post­ed by “The Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics,” May 6, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3Fy3Y4lsUI.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Inter­mar­i­um: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas (New Brunswick: Trans­ac­tion Pub­lish­ers, 2012).   

[97]A num­ber of Chodakiewicz’ speech­es on the top­ic are avail­able on YouTube, as a quick search shows: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=chodakiewicz+intermarium.

[98]Insti­tute of World Pol­i­tics, ‘Cen­ter for Inter­mar­i­um Stud­ies,’ https://www.iwp.edu/programs/page/center-for-intermarium-studies.

[99]Pol­ish Amer­i­can Con­gress, ‘Notes from the Fifth Annu­al IWP Kosciuszko Chair Spring Sym­po­sium, “Between Rus­sia and NATO: Secu­ri­ty Chal­lenges in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe,”’ 25 April 2015, http://www.paclongisland.org/website_conference__4-25–15_reflections.pdf. Archived ver­sion: https://archive.fo/ApaDZ.

[100]Lar­ry Keller, ‘His­to­ri­an Marek Jan Chodakiewicz with Con­tro­ver­sial Views Serves on Holo­caust Muse­um Board,’ South­ern Pover­ty Law Cen­ter, 29 Novem­ber 2009, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2009/historian-marek-jan-chodakiewicz-controversial-views-serves-holocaust-museum-board.

[101]Ibid.; arti­cles by Jan Marek Chodakiewicz on fronda.pl, http://www.fronda.pl/szukaj?cx=partner-pub-3000582343842169%3A1778531132&ie=UTF‑8&q=Chodakiewicz; arti­cles by Jan Marek Chodakiewicz on Najwyzszy Czas!https://nczas.com/?s=chodakiewicz.

[102]Keller, op. cit.; Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, ‘Lus­trowanie Obamy,’ Salon24, 18 July 2008, https://www.salon24.pl/u/chodakiewicz/80994,lustrowanie-obamy.

[103]Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Europe’s New Medieval Map,’ Wall Street Jour­nal,19 Jan­u­ary 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-new-medieval-map-1452875514.

[104]See the Center’s web­site, https://www.cepa.org/about.

[105]Kon­s­tiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland, “How to solve Ukrain’s secu­ri­ty dilem­ma? The idea of an Inter­mar­i­um coali­tion in East-Cen­tral Europe,” War on the Rock, August 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/

[106]Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘A Bro­ken Promise? What the West Real­ly Told Moscow About NATO Expan­sion,’ For­eign Affairs, Sep­tem­ber-Octo­ber 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014–08-11/broken-promise.

[107]Richard Sokol­sky, ‘Not Qui­et on NATO’s East­ern Front,’ Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace, 29 June 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/29/not-quiet-on-nato-s-eastern-front-pub-63984.

[108]‘Rus­sia Sus­pends Joint Con­sul­ta­tions on Treaty on Con­ven­tion­al Armed Forces in Europe,’ ITAR-TASS, 10 March 2015, http://tass.com/russia/781973; ‘NATO Strate­gic Com­mu­ni­ca­tions Cen­ter Unveiled in Riga,’ Lat­vian Pub­lic Broad­cast­ing, 20 August 2015, http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/societ/society/nato-strategic-communications-center-unveiled-in-riga.a142243/; ‘NATO Opens Train­ing Cen­ter In Geor­gia,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty, 27 August 2015, http://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-nato-training-center/27212128.html.

[109]Pauline Joris, ‘La revue Kul­tura : au cœur de la dis­si­dence polon­aise’ [The Jour­nal Kul­tura: At the Heart of Pol­ish Dis­si­dence], Nou­velle Europe (blog), 5 Octo­ber 2009, http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/la-revue-kultura-au-c-ur-de-la-dissidence-polonaise.

[110]Robert Bulińs­ki, ‘Międzymorze—polska ułu­da czy real­ność’ [Intermarium—Polish Illu­sion or Real­i­ty], Tygod­nik Sol­i­darność2 (1414), 8 Jan­u­ary 2016, pp. 28–29.

[111]Sarah Struk, ‘La diplo­matie polon­aise: de la doc­trine “ULB” au Parte­nar­i­at Ori­en­tal’ [Pol­ish Diplo­ma­cy: From the ‘ULB’ Doc­trine to the East­ern Part­ner­ship], Nou­velle Europe (blog), 23 August 2010, http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/la-diplomatie-polonaise-de-la-doctrine-ulb-au-partenariat-oriental.

[112]Lech Wyszczel­s­ki, Pol­s­ka mocarst­wowa : wiz­je i kon­cepc­je obozów poli­ty­cznych II Rzeczy­pospo­litej : Między­morze, fed­er­al­izm, prom­e­teizm, kolonie i inne dro­gi do wielkoś­ci [Pol­ish Super­pow­er: Visions and Con­cepts of Polit­i­cal Camps of the Sec­ond Pol­ish Repub­lic: Inter­mar­i­um, Fed­er­al­ism, Prometheanism, Colonies, and Oth­er Routes to Size] (War­saw: Bel­lona, 2015).

[113]Bulińs­ki, op. cit., pp. 28–29.

[114]Olek­siy Volovych, ‘The Baltic-Black Sea Union: Prospects of Real­iza­tion (Part 1),’ Borys­fen Intel, 30 May 2016, http://bintel.com.ua/en/article/volodich-balto/.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Cen­tral Euro­pean Ener­gy Part­ners, ‘About Us,’ https://www.ceep.be/about-us/.

[117]‘#1826 Gru­pa Lotos,’ Forbes, as of May 1, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/companies/grupa-lotos/.

[118]Atlantic Coun­cil, ‘Com­plet­ing Europe and the Three Seas Ini­tia­tive,’ pub­lished on the web­site of the Ukrain­ian Employ­ers Asso­ci­a­tion, https://www.hup.hr/EasyEdit/UserFiles/Completing%20Europe%20and%20the%20Three%20Seas%20Initiative.pdf; Bek­ić and Fun­duk, op. cit.

[119]“Pre­sen­ta­tion of the ‘Com­plet­ing Europe—from the North-South Cor­ri­dor to Ener­gy, Trans­porta­tion and Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions Union’ Report to the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion,” Cen­tral Europe Ener­gy Part­ners, 2 March 2015, https://www.ceep.be/events/conference-presentation-of-the-completing-europe-from-the-north-south-corridor-to-energy-transportation-and-telecommunications-union-report-to-the-european-commission/; ‘Com­plet­ing Europe: From the North-South Cor­ri­dor to Ener­gy, Trans­porta­tion, and Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions,’ YouTube, 54:15, post­ed by “Atlantic­Coun­cil,” April 8, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fayDnmf6rLg.

[120]‘Dubrovnik Forum Adopts Dec­la­ra­tion Called “The Three Seas Ini­tia­tive,”’ EBL News, 25 August 2016, https://eblnews.com/news/croatia/dubrovnik-forum-adopts-declaration-called-three-seas-initiative-34593; Bek­ićand Fun­duk, op. cit.

[121]‘Trump Trip to Poland Forces 3 Seas Sum­mit Change,’ Fox News, 13 June 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/trump-trip-to-poland-forces-3-seas-summit-change; ‘FACT­BOX-Three Seas Ini­tia­tive Sum­mit in War­saw,’ CNBC, 4 July 2017. Archived ver­sion: https://web.archive.org/web/20170708155139/https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/04/reuters-america-factbox-three-seas-initiative-summit-in-warsaw.html.

[122]Tom Porter, ‘Did a Pol­ish Far Right Activist Help Don­ald Trump Write His Speech in War­saw?’ Newsweek, 7 June 2017, https://www.newsweek.com/poland-trump-anti-semitism-632702.

[123]Adam Tay­lor, ‘Trump’s Vis­it to Poland Seen as a Snub to the E.U. and Ger­many,’ The Wash­ing­ton Post, 5 July 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/05/trumps-visit-to-poland-seen-as-a-snub-to-the-e-u-and-germany/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e5027159d076.

[124]‘Pres­i­dent Andrzej Duda on the Three Seas Initiative’s Sum­mit,’ Pres­i­dent of Poland, 17 Sep­tem­ber 2018, http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,844,president-andrzej-duda-on-the-three-seas-initiatives-summit.html.

[125]Kosciuszko Chair and Cen­ter for Inter­mar­i­um Stud­ies, ‘Belarus Ref­er­en­dum and the Inter­mar­i­um,’ The Insti­tute for World Pol­i­tics, 12 April 2012, https://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/belarus-referendum-and-the-intermarium.

[126]See Char­ter 97’s report on the meet­ing: ‘Inter­mar­i­um Concept—Response To The Russ­ian Threat,’ Char­ter 97, 1 Octo­ber 2016, https://charter97.org/en/news/2016/10/1/225146/.

[127]Birkholz,op. cit., p.48–49; see also Jörg Kro­nauer, ‘Ukraine über alles!’ Ein Expan­sion­spro­jekt des West­ens (Ham­burg: KVV Konkret Ver­lag, 2014).

[128]Yarosla­va Stet­sko appeared on the list of del­e­gates of the high­ly secre­tive 16th WACL Con­fer­ence in Lux­em­bourg (held 20–23 Sep­tem­ber, 1983), togeth­er with Roman Zvarych, Cather­ine Chu­machenko, Theodor Ober­län­der, Gen­er­al John K. Singlaub, Daniel O. Gra­ham, and oth­ers.

[129]Roman Woronowycz, ‘Sla­va Stet­sko, Nation­al­ist Leader, Verk­hov­na Rada Deputy, Dies at Age 83,’ The Ukrain­ian Week­ly, 16 March 2003, http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2003/110302.shtml; Birk­holz, op. cit., p.52.

[130]The Social-Nation­al Par­ty of Ukraine is a far-right Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ty found­ed in 1991. In 2004, after Oleh Tyah­ny­bok became par­ty leader, the par­ty rebrand­ed itself, changed its name to Svo­bo­da, and dropped the Wolf­san­gel sym­bol. How­ev­er, it remains asso­ci­at­ed with the neo-Nazi scene and became part of the Social-Nation­al­ist Assem­bly set up in 2008. In 2013, Svo­bo­da par­tic­i­pat­ed in the pro-Euro­pean Union protests to influ­ence regime change but was sur­passed in pop­u­lar­i­ty by oth­er far-right move­ments, such as Pravyi Sek­tor. 

[131]Zenon Zawa­da, “Zvarych Sees Cam­paign to Force His Res­ig­na­tion, Sus­pects Dias­po­ra, Oth­ers,” The Ukrain­ian Week­ly, May 15, 2005, http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2005/200502.shtml.

[132]ABN Cor­re­spon­dence XXXII: 3/4 (May–August 1981), 10, http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/14107/file.pdf; ABN Cor­re­spon­dence XXXII: 2 (March-April 1981), 92, http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/14107/file.pdf.

[133]The Ukrain­ian ReviewXXX: 4 (Win­ter 1982), 92, http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/14392/file.pdf.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Accord­ing to an inter­view with Zvarich pub­lished in Russ­ian in the 25 March 2005 issue of Fak­ty i kom­men­tarii [Facts and Com­men­tary] and repub­lished by the Kiev office of BBC Mon­i­tor­ing World­wide with the head­line “Ukrain­ian Jus­tice Min­is­ter Shares Per­son­al Sto­ry” on March 28, 2005.

[136]Coun­cil of Europe Par­lia­men­tary Assem­bly, ‘Roman Zvarych,’ archived on 18 April 2013 at https://web.archive.org/web/20130418093645/http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/AssemblyList/AL_MemberDetails.asp?MemberID=4100.

[137]Files on Wik­ileaks match­ing the search term “Roman Zvarych,” https://search.wikileaks.org/advanced?q=%22roman+zvarych%22.

[138]Mar­i­ana Pit­sukh, “Andriy Bilet­sky: Avakov Is a Per­son of the Sys­tem, and I Con­sid­er This Sys­tem To Be Extreme­ly Neg­a­tive,” Ukrayin­s­ka Prav­da, 18 Octo­ber 2016, http://pda.pravda.com.ua/articles/id_7123983/.

[139]Wil­fred Jilge, ‘Com­pet­ing Vic­tim­hoods: Post-Sovi­et Ukrain­ian Nar­ra­tives on World War II’ in Ekazar Barkan, Eliz­a­beth A. Cole, and Kai Struve (eds) Shared His­to­ry, Divid­ed Mem­o­ry: Jews and Oth­ers in Sovi­et-Occu­pied Poland, 1939-1941 (Leipzig: Leipzig Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2007).

[140]Tim­o­thy Sny­der, ‘A Fas­cist Hero in Demo­c­ra­t­ic Kiev,’ The New York Review of Books, 24 Feb­ru­ary 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2010/02/24/a‑fascist-hero-in-democratic-kiev/.

[141]‘Ukaz Prezi­den­ta Ukrainy No. 46/2010: O prisvoenii S. Ban­dere zvani­ia Geroi Ukrainy’ [Decree of the Pres­i­dent of Ukraine No. 46/2010: On con­fer­ring the title of Hero of Ukraine to S. Ban­dera], Offi­cial Web­site of the Pres­i­dent of Ukraine, 20 Sep­tem­ber 2010, http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/10353.html. Archived ver­sion from Jan­u­ary 25, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100125175510/http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/10353.html.

[142]Birk­holz, op. cit., p.54. See also Kro­nauer, op. cit. Dur­ing her tenure in the White House, Chu­machenko worked close­ly with Paula Dobri­an­sky. Dobriansky’s father, U.S. Ambas­sador Lev Dobri­an­sky, was a lead­ing fig­ure in the UCCA and served on the board of the Amer­i­can branch of the World Anti Com­mu­nist League (WACL) in the ear­ly 1980s.

[143]Lily Hyde, ‘Ukraine to Rewrite Sovi­et His­to­ry with Con­tro­ver­sial “Decom­mu­ni­sa­tion” Laws,’ The Guardian, 20 April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/ukraine-decommunisation-law-soviet.

[144]‘The Major­i­ty of Ukraini­ans Demon­strate Lack of Trust towards the Gov­ernem­nt, Decom­mu­niza­tion Reform and Media,’ Lviv Media Forum, 6 Octo­ber 2015, http://lvivmediaforum.com/en/news/bilshist-ukrajintsiv-uperedzheni-do-vlady-dekomunizatsiji-ta-zmi/.

[145]See Georgii Kasyanov’s com­ments on Aksin’ia Kuri­na, ‘Istorik Georgii Kas’ianov: Sposo­bi zdi­is­nen­ni­ia deko­mu­nizat­sii nagaduiut’ komu­nis­tich­ni prak­ti­ki’ [His­to­ri­an Geor­gy Kasyanov: Meth­ods of Decom­mu­niza­tion are Rem­i­nis­cent of Com­mu­nist Prac­tices], Ukrains’ka Prav­da, 7 May 2017, http://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2016/05/7/211912/.

[146]Josh Cohen, ‘The His­to­ri­an White­wash­ing Ukraine’s Past,’ For­eign Pol­i­cy, 2 May 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/02/the-historian-whitewashing-ukraines-past-volodymyr-viatrovych/.

[147]‘Kiev ne priz­nal simvo­liku SS Galichiny Nat­sist­skoi’ [Kiev Does Not Rec­og­nize SS Gali­cia Divi­sion Sym­bols as Nazi], Kor­re­spon­dent, 18 May 2017, http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3853155-kyev-ne-pryznal-symvolyku-ss-halychyny-natsystskoi.

[148]JTA and Cnaan Liphshiz, “Ukraine Des­ig­nates Nation­al Hol­i­day to Com­mem­o­rate Nazi Col­lab­o­ra­tor,” Haaretz, 27 Decem­ber 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/ukraine-designates-national-holiday-to-commemorate-nazi-collaborator‑1.6787201.

[149]In Novem­ber 2008, Bilet­sky cre­at­ed the Social Nation­al Assem­bly (SNA), which includ­ed four oth­er orga­ni­za­tions: Spad­shchy­na (Her­itage), Patri­ot of Ukraine (2005), Revoli­ut­siya i Derzha­va (RiD, Rev­o­lu­tion and State), and Sla­va i Chest (SiCh, Glo­ry and Hon­or). 

[150]‘Dlia ure­g­ulirovani­ia sit­u­at­si­ia na Iugo-Vos­toke MVD soz­daet spet­spo­drazde­leni­ia po okhrane obshch­est­benno­go pori­ad­ka’ [To Resolve the Sit­u­a­tion in the South-East, the Min­istry of Inter­nal Affairs Cre­ates Spe­cial Divi­sions for the Pro­tec­tion of Pub­lic Order], Arena.in.ua, 15 April 2014, http://arena.in.ua/politka/186488-Dlya-uregulirovaniya-situaciya-na-YUgo-Vostoke-MVD-sozdaet-specpodrazdeleniya-po-ohrane-obshestvennogo-poryadka.html; ‘Azov Reg­i­ment Announces Cre­ation of Own Par­ty,’ UNIAN, 16 Sep­tem­ber 2016. Archived from the orig­i­nal on 17 Sep­tem­ber 2016, https://www.unian.info/politics/1526119-azov-regiment-announces-creation-of-own-party.html.

[151]‘Roz’iasnennia shodo sta­tusu spet­spidrozdilu “Azov”’ [Clar­i­fi­ca­tion As to the Sta­tus of the ‘Azov’ Spe­cial Forces], ngu.gov.ua, 23 April 2015. Archived from the orig­i­nal on 9 July 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150709162323/http://ngu.gov.ua/ua/news/rozyasnennya-shchodo-statusu-specpidrozdilu-azov.

[152]“2nd Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence Was Held in Kyiv,” Ukrain­ian Tra­di­tion­al­ist Club, 3 Novem­ber 2018, http://uktk.org/2nd-paneuropa-conference-was-held-in-kyiv/.

[153]‘The AZOV Move­ment Held the Inau­gur­al Con­fer­ence of the Inter­mar­i­um Devel­op­ment Assis­tance Group,’ Inter­mar­i­um, n.d, http://intermariumnc.org/?p=224.

[154]Ibid.

[155]Ibid.

[156]Post on the Face­book page of ‘Inter­mar­i­um-Inter­reg­num,’ June 2, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/pg/intermariumsupportgroup/photos/?tab=album&album_id=247919152567343.

[157]Ibid.

[158]‘Azov Recon­quista: Inter­view with Oleg Odnorozhenko,’ Ukrain­ian Tra­di­tion­al­ist Club, June 9, 2015, uktk.org/azov-reconquista-interview-with-oleg-odnorozhenko-text-photo-video/; “Inter­view with Oleg Odnorozhenko. Part 1,” YouTube video, 5:44, post­ed by “Recon­quista,” May 9, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBtp6DLgIck.

[159]Dur­ing a speech by the head of Nation­al Corps’ pro­pa­gan­da depart­ment, Myko­la Kravchenko, in the frame­work of the 1st Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence the lat­ter “reflect­ed on the for­mat of the Recon­quista project as a result of two years of devel­op­ment,” point­ing out that the move­ment exist­ed as of 2015. ‘1st Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence Report,’ Recon­quista Europe, 15 June 2017, archived ver­sion from 13 June 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180613133924/http://reconquista-europe.tumblr.com/post/161847863121/1st-paneuropa-conference-report-the-1st-paneuropa.

[160]Accord­ing to French his­to­ri­an Nico­las Lebourg, in 2017 “the GUD in Lyon and New-Right mem­ber Pas­cal Lasalle … were involved in cre­at­ing the [French] Recon­quista, a ‘pan-Euro­pean’ move­ment (with an unashamed­ly pro-Nazi style) that oppos­es ‘Putin’s anti-nation­al regime,’ which it con­sid­ers divides Euro­pean peo­ples. Recon­quista wants to con­struct the ‘Inter­mar­i­um,’ mean­ing a Europe with fron­tiers at the Adri­at­ic, the Baltic, and the Black Seas.” Nico­las Lebourg, ‘The French Far Right in Russia’s Orbit,’ Carnegie Coun­cil for Ethics in Inter­na­tion­al Affairs, 15 May 2018, p. 33, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/the-french-far-right-in-russias-orbit/_res/id=Attachments/index=1/Lebourg-EN%20revised%203.pdf.

[161]Recon­quista Europe, op. cit.

[162]Face­book page of “Recon­quista Suo­mi,” https://www.facebook.com/Reconquista-Suomi-651228365227266.

[163]Recon­quista Europe, op. cit.

[164]The web­site was acces­si­ble via whitereconquista.com and reconquista.co, and also offered a Recon­quista app. Archived ver­sion of whitereconquista.com from Feb­ru­ary 11, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170211052338/http://en.whitereconquista.com:80/. See also “The Recon­quista App on Google Play Was Updat­ed for Android Plat­form,” Recon­quista, 20 August 2015, archived ver­sion from 4 Novem­ber 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20151104205741/http://en.whitereconquista.com/the-reconquista-app-on-google-play-was-updated-for-android-platform.

[165]The YouTube chan­nel can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCxlVysfTOEy3yyPGWVR9G‑Q.

[166]‘The Sec­ond Paneu­ropa Con­fer­ence in Kyiv,’ Face­book event cre­at­ed by the Plomin and Inter­reg­num-Inter­mar­i­um Face­book pages, 15 Octo­ber 2018, https://www.facebook.com/events/308172699997826/permalink/310511609763935.

[167]Ole­na Semenyaka’s 2016 speech, “Aris­toc­ra­cy of the Spir­it and the Great Euro­pean Recon­quista,” is avail­able at “Pact of Steel | Stale­vii Pakt | Stal’noi Pakt,” YouTube video, 53:30, post­ed by “Recon­quista Ukraina,” Feb­ru­ary 14, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsV8tA4rxy4, time stamps [23:36–45:20]. Her 2017 speech, “Wotan, Pan, Diony­sus: At the Gates of the Grand Euro­pean Sol­stice,” is avail­able at “Pact of Steel II | Stale­vii Pakt II | Stal’noi Pakt II,” YouTube video, 1:47:07, post­ed by “Recon­quista Ukraina,” Novem­ber 28, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R14Ej-VWaLU, time stamps [57:24 – 01:47:07]. Her wel­com­ing speech to the Pact of Steel III con­fer­ence in Decem­ber 2018 is avail­able at “Pact of Steel III | Stale­vii Pakt III | Stal’noi Pakt III,” YouTube video, 2:17:01, post­ed by “Recon­quista Ukraina,” Decem­ber 24, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7nlqtnmyu4, time stamps [0:00 – 7:49].

[168]Mark Sedg­wick, ‘Evola in the Ukrain­ian Par­lia­ment,’ Tra­di­tion­al­ists (blog), 6 July 2017, https://traditionalistblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/evola-in-ukrainian-parliament.html.

[169]‘Ole­na Semenya­ka: Hori­zons of Ukrain­ian Rev­o­lu­tion,’ Sergey Sergien­ko (blog), 17 March 2014, http://un3position.blogspot.com/2014/03/olena-semenyaka-horizons-of-ukrainian.html.

[170]‘Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group’ Face­book page, http://www.facebook.com/intermariumsupportgroup/; ‘Inter­reg­num-Inter­mar­i­um’ face­book page, https://www.facebook.com/interregnum.intermarium/.

[171]‘Lat­vian Legion Day,’ Recon­quista Europe (blog), archived ver­sion from 12 April 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180412180924/http://reconquista-europe.tumblr.com/.

[172]Pic­ture of Ole­na Semenya­ka on the Face­book page of ‘3. JN Europakongress—REgeneration.EUROPA,’ 12 May 2018, https://www.facebook.com/871677009659302/photos/pcb.991910794302589/991909937636008/?type=3&theater; Maik Müller, ‘Report from 3rd JN Euro­pean Con­gress in Riesa,’ The Spear, 1 Novem­ber 2018, https://spear-national.org/maik-muller-report-from-3rd-jn-european-congress-in-riesa/.

[173]‘Vor­trag im IB-Haus­pro­jekt: Das Reg­i­ment Asow zu Gast in Halle,’ Sach­sen-Anhalt Recht­saussen, 13 June 2018, https://lsa-rechtsaussen.net/das-regiment-asow-zu-gast-in-halle/.

[174]Krzysztof Szcz­er­s­ki, Utopia europe­js­ka: kryzys inte­gracji i pol­s­ka inic­jaty­wa naprawy[The Euro­pean Utopia: Inte­gra­tion Cri­sis and Pol­ish Ini­tia­tive of Rem­e­dy] (Krakow: Bialy Kruk, 2017).

[175]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/02/12/le-groupe-de-visegrad-allie-de-donald-trump-en-europe_5422389_3210.html#xtor=AL-32280270

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