Lis­ten: Side 1 | Side 2

With ten­sions flar­ing anew in the Balkans, this pro­gram reviews and sup­ple­ments pre­vi­ous pro­grams on the dis­in­te­gra­tion of the for­mer Yugoslavia, with par­tic­u­lar empha­sis on the piv­otal role of Ger­many and what Mr. Emory calls “the Under­ground Reich” in the breakup of that country.

1. The pro­gram begins with dis­cus­sion of renewed Croa­t­ian nation­al­ism and unrest in Bosnia/Herzegovina. The Croa­t­ian pop­u­la­tion in Bosnia has been agi­tat­ing for inde­pen­dence from the newly cre­ated state. “The inter­na­tional admin­is­tra­tion in Bosnia, which with 20,000 peace­keep­ers has spent five years try­ing to res­ur­rect this dam­aged and bit­terly divided town, is now itself under attack . . . .The sit­u­a­tion, already tense, turned explo­sive nine days ago, when the inter­na­tional admin­is­tra­tion, which was put in place after the 1995 peace accord that ended the war, ordered raids on Herze­go­v­acka Bank here and nine of its branches. The move was aimed at break­ing the hold of increas­ingly unco­op­er­a­tive Bosn­ian Croat nation­al­ists and at smash­ing their monop­oly on eco­nomic and polit­i­cal power by cut­ting off a life­line through the banks. But the inter­na­tional admin­is­tra­tion appears to have under­es­ti­mated the response to the raid, which ended in riots that forced [U.N. admin­is­tra­tor Colin] Munro and his staff to aban­don their offices and leave under jeers and curses from an angry mob.” (“Nation­al­ist Fires, Fanned by Croats, Singe Sara­jevo Again” by Car­lotta Gall; New York Times; 4/16/2001; p. A3.)

2. Much of the first side con­sists of an excerpt from FTR-154, detail­ing the deci­sive influ­ence of Ger­many in pre­cip­i­tat­ing the dis­so­lu­tion of the Yugosla­vian nation. That broad­cast, in turn, refers to a white paper pre­sented at a sym­po­sium on the Balkans war that was held in Chicago on August 31 and Sep­tem­ber 1, 1995. Authored by T.W. “Bill” Carr, the paper is enti­tled “Ger­man and US Involve­ment in the Balkans: A Care­ful Coin­ci­dence of National Poli­cies?” The excerpts high­light Germany’s shep­herd­ing of the seces­sion of Slove­nia and Croa­tia from Yugoslavia. It was the seces­sion of those states that dis­solved Yugoslavia.

3. The Carr paper ana­lyzes the Ger­man role in the Balkans dur­ing World War II, with par­tic­u­lar empha­sis on the Third Reich pup­pet state of Croa­tia. (For more on Croa­tia under Nazi occu­pa­tion, see RFA-17.) The Croa­t­ian Ustachi were allied with Hitler and closely sup­ported by the Vat­i­can. The Ustachi regime bru­tally per­se­cuted Serbs, killing more than 500,000. Croa­t­ian pres­i­dent Franjo Tudj­man vis­ited Ger­many in 1987, appar­ently mak­ing clan­des­tine arrange­ments for the seces­sion of Croa­tia from the Yugoslav fed­er­a­tion. (Idem.)

4. It should be noted that Croa­tia received a $2 bil­lion, interest-free loan from the Knights of Malta, while still part of Yugoslavia. (The Sov­er­eign Mil­i­tary Order of Malta is an elite order of Vat­i­can knights with strong con­nec­tions to the cen­ters of power in the U.S. and Ger­many.( (Idem.)

5. The Ger­man and Vat­i­can assis­tance helped fan the flames of Croa­t­ian nation­al­ism, which cul­mi­nated in the seces­sion of Croa­tia (along with Slove­nia) from Yugoslavia. The seces­sion­ist Croat regime began imme­di­ately reca­pit­u­lat­ing key aspects of the Ustachi ter­ror. The ban­ners, anthems and ide­ol­ogy of the Ustachi were recre­ated. More impor­tantly, Serbs were required to carry doc­u­men­ta­tion that per­mit­ted Croat secu­rity forces to iden­tify them as Serbs. Croa­t­ian Catholic Bish­ops blessed the Croa­t­ian secu­rity forces as they marched out into the coun­try­side to con­duct eth­nic cleans­ing. (More than 200,000 Serbs were “eth­ni­cally cleansed” in Croa­tia in 1991 alone.) (Idem.)

6. In addi­tion to its vital diplo­matic sup­port, Ger­many equipped the fledg­ling Croa­t­ian army with sophis­ti­cated Soviet-manufactured weaponry that the Fed­eral Repub­lic had inher­ited from the for­mer East Ger­many. (Idem.)

7. Ger­many took the lead in pres­sur­ing the EU to rec­og­nize the inde­pen­dence of Croa­tia and Slove­nia. Ini­tially, the EU voted 11 to 1 to main­tain the integrity of Yugoslavia. Ger­many, how­ever, pres­sured the EU to accede to its view­point and even­tu­ally the EU agreed to rec­og­nize the inde­pen­dence of the break­away republics. In effect, the Maas­tricht Treaty and Euro­pean unity were held hostage to Ger­man desires to frag­ment Yugoslavia. Ger­many was the first Euro­pean nation to rec­og­nize Croa­t­ian and Sloven­ian inde­pen­dence, fol­lowed soon after by Vat­i­can diplo­matic recog­ni­tion. (Idem.)

8. Among the most vocif­er­ous advo­cates for Croa­t­ian and Sloven­ian inde­pen­dence was Otto von Haps­burg, the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. (Cre­ated after World War I, Yugoslavia had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.) Haps­burg, him­self, has overt fas­cist sym­pa­thies. “The final esca­la­tion was reserved for Otto von Haps­burg, a CSU del­e­gate to the Euro­pean par­lia­ment and the son of the last Aus­trian emperor; since 1973 he has also been pres­i­dent of the ultra-right Pan-Europa Union and a mem­ber of the Free­dom for Rudolf Hess Com­mit­tee.” (The New Reich: Vio­lent Extrem­ism in Uni­fied Ger­many and Beyond; Michael Schmidt; Copy­right 1993 [HC]; Pan­theon Books; ISBN 0–679-42578–0; p. 137.)

9. Otto’s son Karl von Haps­burg mar­ried Francesca Thyssen-Bornemisza, the daugh­ter of Hein­rich Thyssen Borne­misza. (avail­able at a genealog­i­cal web site http://members.aol.com/eurostamm/thysen.html.)

10. Hein­rich Thyssen Borne­misza is an heir to the Thyssen inter­ests, in turn, a prin­ci­pal ele­ment of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion. The eco­nomic and polit­i­cal com­po­nent of a Third Reich gone under­ground, the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion con­trols cor­po­rate Ger­many and much of the rest of the world. Cre­ated and run by Mar­tin Bor­mann, the orga­ni­za­tional genius who was the “the power behind the throne” in Nazi Ger­many, the Bor­mann group is a pri­mary ele­ment of the analy­sis pre­sented in the For the Record programs.

11. “Hein­rich Thyssen-Bornemisza runs his pri­vate Dutch-based invest­ment group from Lugano, Switzer­land, and his cousin Count Fed­erico Zichy-Thyssen, grand­son of old Fritz Thyssen, exer­cises con­trol over Thyssen A.G. from his base in Buenos Aires.” (Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; P. 237.)

12. Inter­est­ingly (and per­haps sig­nif­i­cantly), the Hapsburg/Thyssen-Bornemisza wed­ding took place in Zagreb, the capi­tol of Croa­tia. The sig­nif­i­cance of the Hapsburg/Thyssen is not one to be underestimated.

13. The sec­ond half of the pro­gram begins with dis­cus­sion of renewed ten­sions between the eth­nic Alban­ian minor­ity in Mace­do­nia and that country’s Slavic major­ity. Fight­ing between the rebels and gov­ern­ment forces has threat­ened the region’s sta­bil­ity. “Eth­nic Alba­ni­ans fight­ing in Mace­do­nia are a mot­ley group rep­re­sent­ing diverg­ing inter­ests. Thought to num­ber no more than 1,000, they can cause havoc and have the poten­tial to desta­bi­lize the repub­lic . . . . The fund­ing, con­trol and arm­ing of the rebels remains unclear. In Switzer­land, home to more than 100,000 Kosovo Alba­ni­ans and with Ger­many a cen­ter of the eth­nic Alban­ian dias­pora, offi­cials said they were mon­i­tor­ing fundrais­ing by Alban­ian groups . . . . From Pristina, the Kosovo cap­i­tal, it is not clear what kind of rela­tion­ship the new armed Mace­don­ian Alba­ni­ans might have with other rad­i­cal armed Alban­ian orga­ni­za­tions oper­at­ing in Kosovo and Pre­sevo val­ley in south­ern Ser­bia . . . . There is lit­tle doubt that the GSZ has been used by smug­glers. Intel­li­gence sources say they have no doubt weapons and money are being chan­neled to the KLA from eth­nic Alban­ian groups in Ger­many, Bel­gium and Switzer­land.” (“Mot­ley Band of Rebels and Smug­glers” by Judy Dempsey; Finan­cial Times; 3/22/2001; p. 3.)

14. In order to pro­vide his­tor­i­cal back­ground to the eth­nic Alban­ian unrest, the broad­cast sets forth insti­tu­tional and oper­a­tional links between two Mus­lim Waf­fen SS divi­sions cre­ated dur­ing World War II and Mus­lim and Alban­ian com­bat­ants in the Balkans today.

15. Excerpt­ing FTR#161, the pro­gram high­lights the 13th Waf­fen SS (Han­jar) Divi­sion. Com­posed of Balkan Mus­lims, the unit wore fezzes with the tra­di­tional Waf­fen SS uni­forms. This divi­sion was assem­bled with the assis­tance of Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the so-called Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. A major in the SS, Al-Husseini was a key Ger­man spy dur­ing World War II, as well as a major oper­a­tive on behalf of what Mr. Emory calls “the Under­ground Reich.” As a young man, Bosn­ian pres­i­dent Alija Izetbe­govic was a mem­ber of and recruiter for the Han­jar Divi­sion! (From a let­ter to David Binder of The New York Times, writ­ten by Milan Bula­jic, a Ser­bian expert on war crimes com­mit­ted in the Balkans by Axis forces dur­ing World War II. Bula­jic could be thought of as the Ser­bian Simon Weisen­thal. The let­ter quotes ver­ba­tim from the tran­script of Izetbegovic’s trial.)

16. Izetbe­govic did not deny the charges of hav­ing worked for Hus­seini and the Han­jar Divi­sion, but merely excused his actions on the basis of hav­ing been very young at the time. He was sen­tenced to three years in prison. (Ibid.)

17. It is impor­tant to note in that con­text that after Izetbe­govic became head of the newly inde­pen­dent state of Bosnia, he estab­lished an elite divi­sion named Han­jar, and pat­terned after the 13th Waf­fen SS. (Some Call It Peace: Wait­ing for War in the Balkans; by Joseph Bodan­sky; Copy­right 1996 [HC]; The Inter­na­tional Media Corporation.)

18. The unit func­tioned as the per­sonal guard unit of the Bosn­ian polit­i­cal lead­er­ship and also as a “spe­cial forces” unit that was deployed in sup­port of other mil­i­tary for­ma­tions. (Idem.)

19. Com­posed pri­mar­ily of non-Bosnian Balkans (includ­ing eth­nic Alba­ni­ans), the unit was trained and led by Arab and Pak­istani vet­er­ans of the Afghan con­flict. (Idem.)

20. In 1993, U.N. observers noted that the re-created Han­jar was engaged in force pro­jec­tion into Kosovo and Mace­do­nia and they fore­cast that con­flict would break out in those areas. (Idem.) Their pre­dic­tion proved to be accurate.

21. Next, the pro­gram reca­pit­u­lates another seg­ment of FTR#161. In addi­tion to the 13th Waf­fen SS, there was another Balkan Waf­fen SS divi­sion, the 21st or Skan­der­beg Divi­sion. (The name is mis­pro­nounced “Skan­der­berg” in the pro­gram.) The 21st Waf­fen SS Divi­sion was com­posed pri­mar­ily of Koso­var Alba­ni­ans, and the bulk of the fight­ers in the Kosovo Lib­er­a­tion Army are the sons and grand­sons of men who had fought in the pro-Axis Alban­ian mil­i­tary for­ma­tions in World War II — espe­cially the Skan­der­beg Divi­sion. (“Kosovo’s Next Mas­ters” by Chris Hedges; For­eign Affairs; May-June/ 1999 [Vol­ume 78, #3].)

22. The broad­cast also reviews infor­ma­tion about mil­i­tary sup­port for the KLA ren­dered by Ger­man intel­li­gence. (Ger­many Alert; 11/9/98.)

23. Weapons were chan­neled to the Alban­ian mil­i­tary and, through them, to the KLA. (Idem.)

24. Next, the broad­cast reca­pit­u­lates an excerpt of FTR-184. The com­man­der of the inter­na­tional peace keep­ing force in Kosovo was Ger­man Gen­eral Klaus Rein­hardt, the son of Fritz Rein­hardt, the Deputy Min­is­ter of Finance dur­ing the Third Reich. (“Geno­cide and the Ter­ri­ble Nazi Secret of the Ger­man Who Leads British Troops” by Christo­pher Evans; The Daily Mail; 10/2/99.)

25. The elder Rein­hardt had func­tioned as the pri­mary offi­cial in the Finance Min­istry under Count Lutz Schw­erin von Krosigk, whose duties were largely per­func­tory. (Idem.) (For more about von Krosigk, see RFA-1.)

26. The plun­der­ing of Pol­ish Jewry (prior to their exter­mi­na­tion) was named “Oper­a­tion Rein­hardt” after Fritz. (Idem.)

27. The pro­gram under­scores the fact that, as the prin­ci­pal offi­cial of the Nazi Finance Min­istry until the end of the war, the elder Rein­hardt must have worked closely with Mar­tin Bor­mann in the flight cap­i­tal pro­gram. In addi­tion (as noted in FTR-155), the lead­ers of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion are the sons (and in some cases, daugh­ters) of key Third Reich offi­cials and mil­i­tary offi­cers. It seems prob­a­ble, under the cir­cum­stances, that the younger Rein­hardt works for the Bor­mann group.

28. The broad­cast con­cludes with spec­u­la­tion by Mr. Emory that, if the ten­sions in Mace­do­nia con­tinue, Ger­many will fill the mil­i­tary vac­uum that appears cer­tain to result from the Bush administration’s stated intent to dis­tance the United States from fur­ther mil­i­tary involve­ment in the region. (FTRs 273 and 278 set forth infor­ma­tion indi­cat­ing that the Bush admin­is­tra­tion may be an exten­sion of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion.) Ger­many has beefed up its mil­i­tary com­mit­ment in Kosovo in response to the fight­ing in Mace­do­nia. “Ger­many said it was send­ing para­troop­ers to Kosovo to add to its peace­keep­ing con­tin­gent, which patrols the Kosovo’s south­ern bor­der with Mace­do­nia around the Tetovo region. It also has 1,000 troops in Mace­do­nia pro­vid­ing backup for the peace­keep­ers in Kosovo, some of whom are based in Tetovo, right next to a Mace­don­ian Army base.” (“Mace­do­nia Uses Heli­copters against Rebels for First Time” by Car­lotta Gall; New York Times; 3/25/2001; p. 8.)