- Spitfire List - https://spitfirelist.com -

FTR #341 Ties That Bind, Part II

Lis­ten:
MP3 Side 1 [1] | Side 2 [2]
RealAu­dio [3]

Fea­tur­ing more dis­cus­sion of the events in (and around) the events of 9/11/2001, this broad­cast sup­ple­ments pre­vi­ous pro­grams on the sub­ject. This pro­gram dis­cuss­es some of the con­nec­tions that per­mit­ted the con­spir­a­tors to real­ize their goals, hence the title.

1. Begin­ning with the hypo­thet­i­cal betray­al of the late John P. O’Neill (in charge of the FBI’s inves­ti­ga­tion into the Bin Laden orga­ni­za­tion and killed in the attack on the World Trade Cen­ter), the broad­cast high­lights a park­ing tick­et received by Mohammed Atta. (“Atta Was in N.Y. as Ear­ly as June of ‘00” by Pat Mil­ton [AP]; San Jose Mer­cury News; 12/9/2001; p. 8A.) This tick­et was received in Brook­lyn in the spring of 2000, a fact that must have alert­ed the ter­ror­ist that he might be com­pro­mised. The theft of a brief­case from Mr. O’Neill in the sum­mer of 2000 may have been for the pur­pose of deter­min­ing whether the FBI was mon­i­tor­ing the con­spir­a­tors.

2. In that con­text, the pro­gram sets forth the reluc­tance of the FBI to accept the help of retired agents desir­ing to assist in the inves­ti­ga­tion, all the more curi­ous in light of the fact that the Bureau’s resources are stretched thin, under the cir­cum­stances. (“FBI turns Down Hun­dreds of Ex-Agents Offer­ing Help” by Eric Licht­blau; Los Ange­les Times; 11/6/2001; p. A1.)

3. Turn­ing to an exam­i­na­tion of the type of insti­tu­tion­al rela­tion­ship that has per­mit­ted the exe­cu­tion­ers of the 9/11 attacks to evade scruti­ny and jus­tice, the broad­cast touch­es on the pow­er­ful Car­lyle group. (“CalPERS, Car­lyle Prof­it from Afghan War” by David Lazarus; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 12/2/2001; p. G1.) The Car­lyle group is one of the busi­ness rela­tion­ships that con­nects the Bush fam­i­ly to the Bin Laden fam­i­ly. (The dis­cus­sion should not be mis­in­ter­pret­ed as impli­cat­ing CalPERS in the events of 9/11. Rather, the busi­ness con­nec­tions that cement the con­struc­tion indus­try activ­i­ties of the Sau­di-based Bin Ladens to the Bush fam­i­ly petro­le­um inter­ests are illus­tra­tive of the medi­um through which many ter­ror­ists oper­ate with impuni­ty.)

4. Much of the first half of the pro­gram is devot­ed to a par­tial pre­sen­ta­tion of an arti­cle that ana­lyzes the pres­ence and activ­i­ties of Osama Bin Laden in Sudan. Attempts by the Sudanese gov­ern­ment to share intel­li­gence about Bin Laden with the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion were rebuffed, in part because of active decep­tion by the CIA. (“The Osama Files” by David Rose; Van­i­ty Fair; Jan­u­ary 2002; p. 67.) It should not be for­got­ten that the elder George Bush (for whom CIA head­quar­ters is named) was defeat­ed for reelec­tion by Clin­ton in 1992.

5. The FBI (and appar­ent­ly the late Mr. O’Neill) opposed this obstruc­tion. (Idem.) Far from being “in hid­ing” in Sudan, Bin Laden was heav­i­ly involved in con­struc­tion projects in that coun­try, some of them financed by the Saud­is. (Idem.)

6. It was dur­ing his Sudanese sojourn that Bin Laden and Al Qae­da made con­tact with Mr. Al Zawahiri and oth­er Egypt­ian fun­da­men­tal­ist ter­ror­ists. (Idem.) (One of Bin Laden’s most impor­tant aides, Al Zawahiri is viewed by some as the real head of Al Qae­da.)

7. Illus­trat­ing “the ties that bind,” the broad­cast sets forth Bin Laden’s work as the Sudanese agent for Hunt­ing Ser­vices, engaged in assist­ing Sudan to devel­op its petro­le­um resources. (Ibid.; p. 68.)

8. The man­u­fac­tur­er of a fifth of the West­’s Tri­dent mis­siles, Hunt­ing Ser­vices also assist­ed in the arrest of Car­los the Jack­al in Sudan. (Idem.) (Car­los the Jack­al was alleged­ly trained by the Ed Wilson/Frank Ter­pil ele­ment in U.S. intel­li­gence.)

9. Inter­est­ing­ly (and per­haps sig­nif­i­cant­ly), the recent­ly indict­ed alleged Al Qae­da oper­a­tive Zac­cha­rias Mous­saoui is being rep­re­sent­ed in France by Isabelle Con­stant-Peyre, “who is well known for rep­re­sent­ing-and lat­er promis­ing to mar­ry-Illych Ramirez Sanchez, bet­ter known as Car­los the Jack­al.” (“‘It’s As If He Had Died,’ Moth­er of Sus­pect Says” by David Zucchi­no; Los Ange­les Times; 12/13/2001; p. A5.) A long-time friend of (and defend­er of) Car­los the Jack­al is the Swiss-based Nazi oper­a­tive Fran­cois Genoud. Genoud is an inti­mate of the fas­cist, Mid­dle East­ern and extreme left ter­ror­ist milieu that Mr. Emory believes is impli­cat­ed in the 9/11 attacks.

10. In that con­text, it is impor­tant to note that Genoud; “became direct­ly involved in help­ing Car­los after the Jack­al was arrest­ed in the Sudan by French agents on August 15, 1994. . . .After his arrest, Genoud pub­licly expressed his great admi­ra­tion for Car­los, whom Genoud con­sid­ered one of the ‘heroes’ of the Pales­tin­ian cause.” (Dream­er of the Day: Fran­cis Park­er Yock­ey and the Post­war Fas­cist Inter­na­tion­al; by Kevin Coogan; Autono­me­dia Inc.; Copy­right 1999 [SC]; ISBN 1–57027-039–2; p. 589.)

11. The heir to the lit­er­ary works of Adolf Hitler, Mar­tin Bor­mann and Joseph Goebbels, Genoud was a pri­ma­ry oper­a­tive for the Third Reich, both in its above ground and post­war under­ground phase. (Dream­er of the Day: Fran­cis Park­er Yock­ey and the Post­war Fas­cist Inter­na­tion­al; pp. 584–5.)

12. Mous­saoui’s Amer­i­can co-coun­sel is a for­mer fundrais­er for the Bush cam­paign. (“Ter­ror­ist Sus­pec­t’s Attor­neys Face a Unique, Daunt­ing Chal­lenge” by Hen­ry Wein­stein and David Sav­age; Los Ange­les Times; 12/13/2001; p. A4.)

13. In addi­tion, one of the go-betweens used by the Sudanese to try to give the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion infor­ma­tion on Bin Laden had worked “at the White House under George H.W. Bush.” (“The Osama Files” by David Rose; Van­i­ty Fair; Jan­u­ary 2002; p. 70.)

14. French intel­li­gence appar­ent­ly got wind of Mous­saoui’s involve­ment with Al Qae­da when his name appeared in the address book of a fight­er killed in Bosnia. (“‘It’s As If He Had Died,’ Moth­er of Sus­pect Says” by David Zucchi­no; Los Ange­les Times; 12/13/2001; p. A5.)

15. The afore­men­tioned Mr. Al Zawahiri stat­ed in a recent­ly pub­lished book that the Afghan war served as the gen­e­sis for muja­hadeen that were lat­er engaged in Bosnia, Chech­nya and Kash­mir. (“Smug­gled Book Sets Out Sto­ry of Ter­ror” by Heba Saleh; Finan­cial Times; 12/10/2001; p. 3.)

16. Inter­est­ing­ly (and, per­haps, sig­nif­i­cant­ly), Al Zawahiri said that it was in Afghanistan that the young recruits “received a deep­er under­stand­ing of the con­spir­a­cy that was pre­pared [against the Islam­ic World].” (Idem.) That the Egypt­ian was refer­ring to the Islam­o­fas­cist pro­pa­gan­diz­ing gen­er­at­ed by the milieu of Johann von Leers, Ahmed Huber and their asso­ciates and suc­ces­sors is not a pos­si­bil­i­ty to be too read­i­ly dis­card­ed.

17. Recent­ly, NATO and Unit­ed Nations per­son­nel raid­ed a Pristi­na (Yugoslavia/Kosovo) branch of an alleged Al Qae­da fund­ing con­duit. (“2 U.S.-Based Char­i­ties’ Funds Held” by Lkisa Get­ter, Josh Mey­er and Chuck Neubauer; Los Ange­les Times; 12/15/2001; p. A5.)

18. An Aus­tralian nation­al was recent­ly arrest­ed in Afghanistan, and that he had pre­vi­ous­ly fought for the Koso­vo Lib­er­a­tion Army. (“Alliance Cap­tures Aus­tralian Man Fight­ing for the Tal­iban” by Dou­glas Frantz; New York Times; 12/13/2001; pp. A1-A10.)

19. It should be recalled that, Bosn­ian pres­i­dent Ali­ja Izetbe­gov­ic served in the 13th Waf­fen SS divi­sion (“Han­jar”), recruit­ed by the Grand Mufti.

20. It is impor­tant to note in that con­text that, after Izetbe­gov­ic became head of the new­ly inde­pen­dent state of Bosnia, he estab­lished an elite divi­sion named Han­jar, and pat­terned after the 13th Waf­fen SS. (Some Call It Peace: Wait­ing for War in the Balka­ns; by Joseph Bodan­sky; Copy­right 1996 [HC]; The Inter­na­tion­al Media Cor­po­ra­tion.)

21. The unit func­tioned as the per­son­al guard unit of the Bosn­ian polit­i­cal lead­er­ship and also as a “spe­cial forces” unit that was deployed in sup­port of oth­er mil­i­tary for­ma­tions. (Idem.)

22. Com­posed pri­mar­i­ly of non-Bosn­ian Balkan Mus­lims (includ­ing eth­nic Alba­ni­ans), the unit was trained and led by Arab and Pak­istani vet­er­ans of the Afghan con­flict. (Idem.)

23. In 1993, U.N. observers not­ed that the re-cre­at­ed Han­jar was engaged in force pro­jec­tion into Koso­vo and Mace­do­nia and they fore­cast that con­flict would break out in those areas. (Idem.) Their pre­dic­tion proved to be accu­rate.

24. In addi­tion to the 13th Waf­fen SS, there was anoth­er Balkan Waf­fen SS divi­sion, the 21st or Skan­der­beg Divi­sion. (The name is mis­pro­nounced “Skan­der­berg” in the pro­gram.) The 21st Waf­fen SS Divi­sion was com­posed pri­mar­i­ly of Koso­var Alba­ni­ans, and the bulk of the fight­ers in the Koso­vo Lib­er­a­tion Army are the sons and grand­sons of men who had fought in the pro-Axis Alban­ian mil­i­tary for­ma­tions in World War II-includ­ing the Skan­der­beg Divi­sion. (“Kosovo’s Next Mas­ters” by Chris Hedges; For­eign Affairs; May-June/ 1999 [Vol­ume 78, #3].)

25. The pro­gram con­cludes with dis­cus­sion of Wah­habi activ­i­ty in areas of the for­mer Sovi­et Union. The broad­cast reca­pit­u­lates the efforts by the Grand Mufti to recruit Mus­lims from, among oth­er areas, Tatarstan and oth­er parts of the Cau­ca­sus to the Third Reich cause. (The Patri­ot­ic Trai­tors: Col­lab­o­ra­tion in Nazi-Occu­pied Europe 1940–45; by David Lit­tle­john; Copy­right [HC]; Dou­ble­day & Com­pa­ny, 1972.) It should be not­ed in that con­text that the Cau­ca­sus is a pri­ma­ry oil-pro­duc­ing area of the for­mer USSR– the tar­get of Von Paulus’ Sixth Army, sur­round­ed and destroyed at Stal­in­grad.

26. The Cau­ca­sus is still a major focal point of Wah­habi (and Sau­di) activ­i­ty. (“Rus­si­a’s Mus­lims Unchained, but Still Chaf­ing” by Amy Wald­man; New York Times; 11/9/2001; pp. A1-A10.)

27. The broad­cast con­cludes with dis­cus­sion of Al Qae­da and Wah­habi activ­i­ty in Chech­nya. (“War on Ter­ror Casts Chechen Con­flict in a New Light” by Michael Wines; New York Times; 12/9/2001; p. A4.) Observers and par­tic­i­pants in the con­flict there report con­sid­er­able par­tic­i­pa­tion by for­eign nation­als in the fight­ing, includ­ing Ukraini­ans and Lithua­ni­ans. (Idem.) As is the case with the Aus­tralian Tal­iban who fought with the KLA, one won­ders whether these for­eign com­bat­ants are mer­ce­nar­ies or fas­cist ide­o­logues man­i­fest­ing a “Third Posi­tion” stance.