1. The first side of the program (and the first part of the second) consists of the reading of two documents from John Loftus concerning the role of Enron as a broker on behalf of U.S. energy companies negotiating with the Taliban for a proposed pipeline across Afghanistan. The documents are self-explanatory. In the context of Mr. Loftus’ analysis, recall some points concerning the compromising of U.S. intelligence in connection with the attacks. (This should not be misunderstood as constituting an endorsement by Mr. Loftus for the working hypothesis presented in For The Record programs concerning 9/11.) The lawsuit referred to in the Loftus pieces is discussed in FTR 357.
2. The first article is titled “What Congress Does not Know about Enron and 9/11.”
3. The second article is titled “The Enron Pipeline Connection to 9/11.” Note the role in this situation of the late John O’Neill, and recall reflections made upon his career in earlier broadcasts.
4. Next, the program highlights ex-CIA officer Robert Baer’s allegations concerning the unwillingness of the authorities to move on Bin Laden’s organization. (See No Evil; by Robert Baer; Copyright 2002 [HC]; Crown Publishers; ISBN 0–609-60987–4.)
5. Baer alleges that Khaldi Shaykh Mohammed (believed to be the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks) could have been apprehended. It appears from Baer’s account that he had been tipped off. “When he [Baer] had been working as chief of police in his government, he had become aware that his government was harboring an Osama bin Laden cell. The two main members of the cell, he said, were Shawqi Islambuli, whose brother had assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981, and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, whose area of expertise was airplane hijackings. The prince went on to tell us that when the FBI attempted to arrest Muhammad and Islambuli, his government had equipped them with alias passports and spirited them out of the country; both eventually settled in Prague. Getting out of the spy business proved a lot harder than I thought it would be. As if I’d never left, I passed everything I had learned from the ex-police chief back to the CIA in early 1998. Not surprisingly, there was no follow-up. No response.” (Ibid.; p. 270)
6. Saudi Arabia’s culpability in the attacks is highlighted by Baer’s description of his attempts to warn about 9/11. “It wasn’t until three years later, in the early summer of 2001, that an associate of my prince, a military officer still working for his government, informed me he was aware of a spectacular operation about to occur. He also claimed to possess the name of Osama bin Laden operatives in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. He provided us with a computer record of hundreds of secret bin Laden operatives in the Gulf. In August 2001, at the military officer’s request, I met with an aide to the Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan bin’Abd-al’Aziz. The aide refused to look at the list or to pass them on to Sultan.” (Ibid.; pp. 270–271)
7. A spate of recent articles report that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is suspected of masterminding the 9/11 attacks. (“Key 9/11 Planner Is Named” by Josh Meyer; Los Angeles Times; 6/5/2002; p. A1.)
8. “‘It looks like he’s the man, quite honestly,’ one Bush administration official said of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a key lieutenant to Osama bin Laden.” (Idem.)
9. In the context of the Loftus articles on Enron and 9/11, it is interesting to contemplate the timing of Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling’s decision to resign. It was on August 14, 2001. It was in August of 2001 that the Taliban negotiations collapsed. (“Greed and Fear Return;” by Andrew Hill; Financial Times; 6/8/2002; p. 8.)