For The Record  

FTR #450 9/11, Proxy War, and the Underground Reich: An Update

Recorded March 14, 2004
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This pro­gram sup­ple­ments ear­lier broad­casts about the Under­ground Reich’s use of the Mus­lim peo­ples of the “Earth Island” as proxy war­riors against the United States. (For more about this con­cept, see—among other programs—FTRs 395–400.) In par­tic­u­lar, the pro­gram high­lights the appar­ent role of Under­ground Reich–related ele­ments in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­ogy around the world. The con­tin­u­ing pro­lif­er­a­tion of nuclear tech­nol­ogy is par­tic­u­larly dis­turb­ing when one con­sid­ers that the war on ter­ror­ist financ­ing appears to be failing—in part from the Bush administration’s delib­er­ate pol­icy of going soft on the Saudis and partly because of a fail­ure of inter­na­tional coop­er­a­tion on the mat­ter. Sooner or later, the con­tin­u­ing flow of ter­ror­ist monies and the con­tin­u­ing avail­abil­ity of nuclear tech­nol­ogy will com­bine to pro­duce a cat­a­stro­phe. In addi­tion, the pro­gram high­lights evi­den­tiary trib­u­taries run­ning between 9/11 and neo-Nazi ele­ments around the world.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Dis­cus­sion of the role of the Degussa firm in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­ogy around the world; review of for­mer SS sci­en­tific offi­cer Alfred Boettcher’s role with the Degussa firm and his posi­tion as attache for the export of nuclear mate­r­ial with the West Ger­man gov­ern­ment; the role of Dubai in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­ogy; the fail­ure of the first Bush admin­is­tra­tion to take action to stem Pak­istani nuclear tech­nol­ogy and its global spread; the alleged role of Tariq Ramadan (son of Mus­lim Broth­er­hood king­pin Said Ramadan) in terrorist-related activ­i­ties; the fail­ure to inter­dict the oper­a­tions of Youssef Nada and the asso­ci­ated insti­tu­tions of Bank Al Taqwa; the sec­ond Bush administration’s block­ing of an inves­ti­ga­tion into Pak­istani nuclear smug­gling; the pos­si­bil­ity of a nuclear 9/11; Okla­homa City Bomb­ing sus­pect Andreas Strassmeir’s attempts to buy a Boe­ing 747 from Lufthansa; a pas­sage from The Turner Diaries that appears to fore­shadow the attacks on the World Trade Cen­ter on 9/11.

1. The admin­is­tra­tion of the first Pres­i­dent Bush turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear devel­op­ment, in order to help shield the Pak­istani role in the Afghan muja­hadeen war against the Sovi­ets. “Pak­istan warned the United States 14 years ago that it might give nuclear tech­nol­ogy to Iran, but the admin­is­tra­tion of Pres­i­dent Bush’s father did lit­tle to fol­low up, for­mer Pen­ta­gon offi­cials say. Word of the 1990 threat from Pakistan’s top gen­eral appar­ently was not passed along to the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion when it took office three years later, accord­ing to inter­views by the Asso­ci­ated Press. . . .” (“Pak­istan Threat­ened to Give Iran Nuclear Know-How in ’90″ by Matt Kel­ley [AP]; San Fran­cisco Chron­i­cle; 2/28/2004; p. A3.)

2. ” . . . But for­mer gov­ern­ment arms con­trol offi­cials and declas­si­fied doc­u­ments show the United States knew about Pakistan’s nuclear pro­cure­ment net­work since 1983 and sus­pected the trans­fers to Iran since the mid-1980’s. The United States had hints of the trans­fers to North Korea in the mid-1990’s, offi­cials say. The clear­est evi­dence of the Iran link came in Jan­u­ary 1990, when Pakistan’s army chief of staff con­veyed his threat to arm Iran to a top Pen­ta­gon offi­cial. Henry Rowen, at the time an assis­tant defense sec­re­tary, said Pak­istani Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg had issued the warn­ing in a face-to-face meet­ing in Pak­istan. . . .” (Idem.)

3. ” . . . Sokol­ski and Rowen said for­mer Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush’s admin­is­tra­tion had done lit­tle to fol­low up on Beg’s warn­ing. ‘In hind­sight, maybe before or after that they did make some trans­fers,’ Rowen said. . . .” (Idem.)

4. “While Islam­abad and Wash­ing­ton squab­bled about the evi­dence, the Khan net­work pro­vided sophis­ti­cated tech­nol­ogy to Libya, North Korea and Iran, three coun­tries the United States con­sid­ered among the most dan­ger­ous. A decade ear­lier, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion had looked the other way on Pakistan’s nuclear pro­gram, said Stephen Cohen, a State Depart­ment expert on the region from 1985 to 1987. Back then, Wash­ing­ton used Pak­istan as a con­duit for send­ing weapons and money to gueril­las fight­ing the Soviet inva­sion of Afghanistan. ‘They were cov­er­ing up our involve­ment in Afghanistan, pre­tend­ing we played no role in Afghanistan, so they expected us to cover up their role in procur­ing a weapons sys­tem they saw as vital to their sur­vival,’ said Cohen, now with the Brook­ings Insti­tu­tion.” (Idem.)

5. Next, the pro­gram turns to recent dis­clo­sures of a nuclear smug­gling ring, involv­ing Pakistan’s “father of the bomb” Dr. A.Q. Khan and the ele­ments who helped him smug­gle the nuclear tech­nol­ogy to other coun­tries. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion blocked inves­ti­ga­tion of this oper­a­tion, once again to pro­tect the Saudis, who were help­ing to finance the cre­ation of the so-called “Islamic Bomb.” “On November7, 2001, BBC TV and The Guardian of Lon­don reported that the Bush admin­is­tra­tion thwarted inves­ti­ga­tions of Dr. A.Q. Khan, who this week con­fessed sell­ing atomic secrets to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. The Bush Admin­is­tra­tion has expressed shock at the dis­clo­sures that Pak­istan, our ally in the war on ter­ror, has been run­ning a nuclear secrets bazaar. In fact, accord­ing to the British news team’s sources, Bush did not know of these facts because, shortly after his inau­gu­ra­tion, his National Secu­rity Agency (NSA) effec­tively stymied the probe of Khan Research Lab­o­ra­to­ries. CIA and other agents could not inves­ti­gate the spread of ‘Islamic Bombs’ through Pak­istan because fund­ing appeared to orig­i­nate in Saudi Ara­bia.” (“Khan Job: Bush Spiked Probe of Pakistan’s Dr. Strangelove, BBC Reported in 2001″ by Greg Palast; Gregpalast.com; 2/9/2004.)

6. “Accord­ing to both sources and doc­u­ments obtained by the BBC, the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion ‘Spike’ of the inves­ti­ga­tion of Dr. Khan’s Lab fol­lowed from a wider pol­icy of pro­tect­ing key Saudi Ara­bi­ans includ­ing the bin Laden Fam­ily. Despite these tan­ta­liz­ing facts, Abdul­lah and his oper­a­tions were A-OK with the FBI chiefs, if not their work­ing agents. Just a dumb SNAFU? Not accord­ing to a top-level CIA oper­a­tive who spoke with us on con­di­tion of anonymity. After Bush took office, he said, ‘there was a major pol­icy shift’ at the National Secu­rity Agency. Inves­ti­ga­tors were ordered to ‘back off’ from any inquiries into Saudi Ara­bian financ­ing of ter­ror net­works, espe­cially if they touched on Saudi roy­als and their retain­ers. That put the bin Ladens, a fam­ily worth a reported $12 bil­lion and a vir­tual arm of the Saudi royal house­hold, off lim­its for inves­ti­ga­tion. Osama was the excep­tion; he remained a wanted man, but agents could not look too closely at how he filled his piggy bank. The key rule of any inves­ti­ga­tion, ‘fol­low the money,’ was now vio­lated, and investigations—at least before Sep­tem­ber 11-began to die.” (Idem.)

7. “And there was a lot to investigate—or, in the case of the CIA and FBI under Bush—a lot to ignore. Through well-known inter­na­tional arms deal­ers (I’m sorry, but in this busi­ness, sin­ners are bet­ter sources than saints) our team was tipped off to a meet­ing of Saudi bil­lion­aires at the Hotel Royale Mon­ceau in Paris in May 1996 with the finan­cial rep­re­sen­ta­tive of Osama bin Laden’s net­work. The Saudis, includ­ing a key Saudi prince joined by Mus­lim and non-Muslim gun traf­fick­ers, met to deter­mine who would pay how much to Osama. This was not so much an act of sup­port but of protection—a pay-off to keep the mad bomber away from Saudi Ara­bia.” (Idem.)

8. “The cru­cial ques­tion here is that, if I could learn about this meet­ing, how did the CIA miss it? In fact, since the first edi­tion of this book [The Best Democ­racy Money Can Buy], other sources have dis­closed that the meet­ing was mon­i­tored by French intel­li­gence. Since U.S. intel­li­gence was thus likely informed, the ques­tion becomes why didn’t the gov­ern­ment imme­di­ately move against the Saudis?” (Idem.)

9. “I probed our CIA con­tact for specifics of inves­ti­ga­tions that were ham­pered by orders to back off of the Saudis. He told us that the Khan Lab­o­ra­to­ries inves­ti­ga­tion had been effec­tively on hold.” (Idem.)

10. Next, the pro­gram turns to the role of Euro­pean ele­ments in the Dr. A.Q. Khan net­work. “The Pak­istani sci­en­tist Abdul Qadeer Khan has been demo­nized in the West for sell­ing atomic secrets and equip­ment around the world, but the trade began in Europe, not Islam­abad, accord­ing to court doc­u­ments and experts who mon­i­tor pro­lif­er­a­tion. The records show that indus­try sci­en­tists and West­ern intel­li­gence agen­cies have known for decades that nuclear tech­nol­ogy ws pour­ing out of Europe despite national export con­trol efforts to con­tain it. Many of the names that have turned up among lists of sup­pli­ers and mid­dle­men who fed equip­ment, mate­ri­als and knowl­edge to nuclear pro­grams in Pak­istan and other aspir­ing nuclear nations are well-known play­ers in Europe’s ura­nium enrich­ment indus­try, a crit­i­cal part of many nuclear weapons pro­grams. Some have been con­victed of ille­gal exports before. . . . ”

11. ” . . . The prob­lem began with the 1970 Treaty of Almelo, under which Britain, Ger­many and the Nether­lands agreed to develop cen­trifuges to enrich ura­nium jointly, ensur­ing their nuclear power indus­try a fuel source inde­pen­dent of the United States. Ure­nco, or the Ura­nium Enrich­ment Com­pany, was estab­lished the next year with its pri­mary enrich­ment plant at Almelo, the Nether­lands.” (Ibid.; pp. 1–2.)

12. “Secu­rity at Ure­nco was by most accounts slip­shod. The con­sor­tium relied on a net­work of research cen­ters and sub­con­trac­tors to build its cen­trifuges, and top-secret blue­prints were passed out to com­pa­nies bid­ding on ten­ders, giv­ing engi­neers across Europe an oppor­tu­nity to appro­pri­ate designs. Dr. Khan, who worked for a Ure­nco Dutch sub­con­trac­tor, Physics Dynamic Research Lab­o­ra­tory, was given access to the most advanced designs, even though he came from Pak­istan, which has already known to har­bor nuclear ambi­tions. A 1980 report by the Dutch gov­ern­ment on his activ­i­ties said he vis­ited the Almelo fac­tory in May 1972 and by late 1974 had an office there. . . .” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

13. ” . . . That same year [1987], despite Amer­i­can warn­ings to Ger­many that such a sale was immi­nent, a Ger­man firm exported to Pak­istan a plant for the recov­ery of tri­tium, a volatile gas used to increase the power of nuclear bombs. The com­pany sim­ply called the plant some­thing else to obtain an export license. ‘The export con­trol office didn’t even inspect the goods,’ said Rein­hard Hueb­ner, the Ger­man pros­e­cu­tor who han­dled the sub­se­quent trial of the company’s chief, Rudolf Ort­may­ers, and Peter Finke, a Ger­man physi­cist who went to Pak­istan to train engi­neers there to oper­ate the equip­ment. Both men were sen­tenced to jail for vio­lat­ing export con­trol laws.” (Idem.)

14. The pro­gram notes that designs of nuclear facil­i­ties held by the Iraqis have not been fully accounted for in the wake of the war. “David Albright, a for­mer weapons inspec­tor for the Inter­na­tional Atomic Energy Agency, said he helped retrieve a full set of blue­prints from Iraq after the major com­bat oper­a­tions ended last year. United State inspec­tors have not found evi­dence that Mr. Hus­sein had restarted his nuclear pro­gram, but Mr. Albright said there were still draw­ings unac­counted for. ‘It’s an unnerv­ing issue,’ said Mr. Albright, who is pres­i­dent of the Insti­tute for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tional Secu­rity. ‘A lot of nuclear weapons design stuff could be miss­ing in Iraq.’” (Ibid.; pp. 2–3.)

15. “As recently as last year, Ger­man cus­toms agents seized high-tensile-strength alu­minum tubes made by a Ger­man com­pany and bound for North Korea. The tubes matched the spec­i­fi­ca­tions for the hous­ings of Urenco’s uranium-enriching cen­trifuges.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

16. This descrip­tion fea­tures a recap of infor­ma­tion about Karl –Heinz Schaab from FTR#395. The Schaab/Urenco/Khan con­nec­tion will be explored at greater length in a future pro­gram. “Steal­ing the Fire is an inves­tiga­tive film that pro­vides stag­ger­ing evi­dence show­ing how a Ger­man sci­en­tist, Karl Heinz Schaab, who helped develop the cen­trifuges nec­es­sary to extract weapons-grade Ura­nium 235, sold clas­si­fied doc­u­ments in the early 1990’s to Iraq.” (“Steal­ing the Fire;” Eye Spy; Issue 13; p. 18.)

17. It is inter­est­ing to note that the co-producer of the film dis­cov­ered the “clan­des­tine nuclear trail” while work­ing on a PBS show about the BCCI. The BCCI scan­dal is inex­tri­ca­bly linked with the sub­ject of Saudi Ara­bia and the events of 9/11. (For a sum­mary account of the sig­nif­i­cance of the BCCI scan­dal in the con­text of 9/11, see FTR#391 and the pro­grams ref­er­enced in that pro­gram.) ” . . . The inves­ti­ga­tion started many, many years ago. In 1992, Eric Nadler an inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ist, began research­ing mate­r­ial on the under­ground traf­fick­ing of nuclear weapons. Ten years later, he and co-producer, John S. Fried­man, the founder of the Doc­u­men­tary Cen­ter at Colom­bia Uni­ver­sity have released their find­ings. Nadler told Paper­clips mag­a­zine. ‘I was work­ing for Front­line on PBS, and I was doing a story about the BCCI scan­dal, which was a crooked bank based in Pak­istan. I was doing a story called ‘The Arm­ing of Saudi Ara­bia’ about the hid­den his­tory of United States/Saudi rela­tions. I got very dis­turbed about the hid­den his­tory, espe­cially about nuclear sto­ries that weren’t being cov­ered . . .” (Ibid.; pp. 18–19.)

18. Accord­ing to Mr. Nadler, Saudi Ara­bia was heav­ily involved in financ­ing Sad­dam Hussein’s quest for the bomb. Like the Saudis and the Bush fam­ily, Sad­dam Hussein’s own his­tory is inex­tri­ca­bly linked with that of the Third Reich. The For The Record series presents the view that Al Qaeda, the Wah­habi mil­i­tants, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the Iraqis and the PLO con­sti­tute “proxy war­riors” for the Under­ground Reich, against the USA, Britain and Israel. (For dis­cus­sion of the Saudi links to the Third Reich, see the dis­cus­sion and ref­er­ences in FTR#391.) “. . . And I pro­duced for Front­line some­thing that aired in 1992, in which our team got clas­si­fied CIA and DIA doc­u­ments, which said the fol­low­ing: ‘We know that Saudi Ara­bia has given $5 bil­lion to Sad­dam Hussein’s nuclear pro­gram for the express pur­pose of build­ing a nuclear bomb.’ My inves­tiga­tive team at Front­line got the banks, we got the dates, we got the money trans­fers, and we put this on Amer­i­can tele­vi­sion. [We showed] that America’s biggest ally in the Gulf had given $5 bil­lion to the Hitler of the Gulf to build nuclear weapons. And though USA Today put it on their tele­vi­sion page, it caused barely a rip­ple in the pop­u­lar cul­ture. I was inter­ested in secret nuclear sto­ries from that moment on . . .” (Ibid.; p. 19.)

19. In Steal­ing the Fire, the cen­tral fig­ure in the Iraqi/German nuclear con­nec­tion was one Karl Heinz Schaab. ” . . . He was fas­ci­nated by Iraq’s deter­mined efforts to cre­ate nuclear weapons. By exam­in­ing the inves­ti­ga­tion of the United Nations weapons inspec­tors, he came across a ‘mys­te­ri­ous man’-Karl Heinz Schaab. Nadler and Fried­man thought that by research­ing Schaab, this would open other doors and reveal the com­pa­nies behind the ‘covert nuclear trad­ing deals . . .’” (Idem.)

20. Schaab was a pro­tégé of Dr. Ger­not Zippe, one of the prin­ci­pal fig­ures involved with devel­op­ing the Third Reich’s nuclear pro­gram. “Schaab was a stu­dent of Dr. Ger­not Zippe, an Aus­trian physi­cist often referred to as the ‘father of the cen­trifuge.’ And Steal­ing the Fire is as much about the cen­trifuge as the di

rty deals done to get the tech­nol­ogy to Iraq. Nadler says the equip­ment orig­i­nated in the research lab­o­ra­to­ries of wartime Ger­many. Hence the infor­ma­tion sup­plied by Schaab in 1989 to the Iraqis basi­cally orig­i­nated from the failed Nazi atomic bomb pro­gram.” (Idem.)

21. After dis­cussing Zippe’s cap­ture by the Sovi­ets and his work for the U.S.S.R. on nuclear mat­ters, the pro­gram sets forth his return to Degussa, the firm which pro­duced the Zyk­lon B for the gas cham­bers in World War II. (For more on Degussa, see—among other programs—FTRs 87, 292, 294, 388.) “The nuclear sci­en­tist worked at the Uni­ver­sity of Vir­ginia for a while, and de-briefed the Pen­ta­gon on the Russ­ian cen­trifuge. How­ever, he got home­sick and soon returned to Ger­many and found work at Degussa.” (Idem.)

22. Zippe was not the only Third Reich alum­nus asso­ci­ated with Degussa’s nuclear export oper­a­tions. Boettcher was “nuclear export attache for the West Ger­man Gov­ern­ment.” [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.] “Dr. Alfred Boettcher was an SS sci­en­tific offi­cer who headed the pre­cious met­als divi­sion at Degussa in the post­war years. He later became nuclear export attache for the West Ger­man Gov­ern­ment. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.]” (Ibid.; p. 21.)

23. Degussa sub­sidiary NUKEM was the divi­sion involved with the traf­fick­ing of nuclear mate­r­ial to Iraq, as well as other coun­tries attempt­ing to man­u­fac­ture nuclear weapons. Boettcher and Zippe were joined by yet another Third Reich alum­nus in Germany’s work on behalf of Iraq’s nuclear efforts—Degussa chair­man Her­mann Schlosser. (For more on NUKEM, see Mis­cel­la­neous Archive Show M-8.) “Two trans­ac­tions that spring height­ened fears that Iraq intended to use the Osirak reac­tor to pro­duce bomb-grade plu­to­nium. An Ital­ian com­pany, in a semi-clandestine deal, sold Iraq six tons of depleted ura­nium pur­chased from the West Ger­man nuclear con­sor­tium NUKEM. Fear­ing that NUKEM might not deliver the ura­nium if they knew it was intended for Iraq, the Ital­ians claimed it was for domes­tic use in Italy. But they needn’t have wor­ried about NUKEM’s scru­ples. The con­sor­tium was a wholly owned sub­sidiary of the Ger­man chem­i­cals giant Degussa, which had invented and man­u­fac­tured Zyk­lon B, the pow­er­ful cyanide gas that streamed out of the show­er­heads in Hitler’s death camps, killing mil­lions of Euro­pean Jews. Degussa had also played a key role in the Nazi effort to build an atom bomb, stopped only when its Oranien­burg works near Berlin were flat­tened by U.S. bombers in 1945. That same year, the Third Reich was going up in flames, Degussa’s chair­man, Her­mann Schlosser, donated 45,000 reichs­marks to Hitler’s SS. Thirty-five years later Schlosser was still on the Degussa board, and in 1987 he was awarded the Ger­man Fed­eral Merit Cross for his ser­vices to indus­try. One of Schlosser’s ser­vices was ship­ping nuclear equip­ment and mate­ri­als to almost every devel­op­ing nation that was known to have a clan­des­tine bomb pro­gram. Another was open­ing the vast Iraqi mar­ket to Ger­man firms. His readi­ness to sup­ply nuclear mate­ri­als to both India and Pak­istan had impressed on Sad­dam Hus­sein that this was a man he could do busi­ness with.” (The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq; Ken­neth Tim­mer­man; Copy­right 1991 [HC]; Houghton Mif­flin Com­pany; p. 70.) (For more on the arm­ing of Iraq, see RFA-20, FTR s 16, 24, 31, 52, 87, 287, 295.)

24. “Nadler called Degussa ‘the worst com­pany ever.’ The inves­ti­ga­tor believes the direc­tors of the com­pany were ‘not pros­e­cuted because of their inter­na­tional con­nec­tions to sev­eral major US cor­po­ra­tions.’” (Eye Spy; Issue #13; p. 20.)

25. It is sig­nif­i­cant that, accord­ing to Nadler, the Iraqis received soft­ware, not hard­ware. This com­pli­cates the issue con­sid­er­ably. As will be noted in future pro­grams, just what hap­pened to this soft­ware is a source for con­cern. In the con­text of the Under­ground Reich (heav­ily involved with Latin Amer­ica as well as the Mid­dle East), it is worth not­ing that Schaab was also involved with deals with mem­bers of the Brazil­ian armed forces. “Schaab’s name was actu­ally found on doc­u­ments recov­ered by UN weapons inspec­tors in Iraq. He had been sell­ing the cen­trifuge secrets to Bagh­dad. Eye Spy asked Nadler just what exactly the Iraqis received for their money, ‘soft­ware not hard­ware,’ he said. He then con­firmed that with this data Iraq could eas­ily build a factory—a pro­duc­tion line-for nuclear bombs. The inves­ti­ga­tors tracked Schaab to Brazil, where he tem­porar­ily fled to avoid pros­e­cu­tion. Here also was the loca­tion of fur­ther obscure deals with high rank­ing offi­cials of the Brazil­ian armed forces.” (Ibid.; p. 20.)

26. Nadler notes the role of Ger­many as the great­est exporter of nuclear tech­nol­ogy in the post­war period. Bear in mind that for part of this time, the West Ger­man attache for nuclear export was Alfred Boettcher, a “for­mer” SS sci­en­tific offi­cer. (The Ger­man role in the devel­op­ment of the Pak­istani bomb is dis­cussed in FTR#336. There is doc­u­mented sym­pa­thy among some of the cre­ators of the Pak­istani bomb for the Tal­iban regime.) ” . . . .The investigator’s research tends to sup­port the British intel­li­gence brief on Iraq’s WMD, and high­lights a con­tro­ver­sial deal between a NATO coun­try and Iraq. Nadler said that between 1945 and 1990, Ger­many was the ‘great­est pro­lif­er­a­tor of nuclear weapons tech­nol­ogy in the world . . .’” (Idem.)

27. Schaab appears to have been oper­at­ing with the bless­ings of the Ger­man gov­ern­ment. (For more on the Ger­man government—and Under­ground Reich–connection to the Iraqi nuclear pro­gram, as well as the Brazil­ian and Latin Amer­i­can con­nec­tions to the Schaab oper­a­tion, see FTR#155.) ” . . . On the Ger­man Government’s light sen­tence for Schaab, and the sug­ges­tion other peo­ple might be involved, Nadler was diplo­matic: ‘Schaab had a story and he stuck to it. He said that two other men who are now dead were involved. But it’s quite clear that all this activ­ity had to be mon­i­tored and known by the Ger­mans. We can safely say that the case was woe­fully under-investigated, and, as one per­son says in our film, the Ger­man gov­ern­ment just wanted it to go away. . .’” (Idem.)

28. ” . . . Schaab took the secret plans of the cen­trifuge and sold hun­dreds of blue­prints to the Iraqis. And on a recent tele­vi­sion news pro­gram on Fox, Nadler said it is pos­si­ble that Iraq may have sold the plans to al-Qaeda. ‘The fact remains that the clas­si­fied plans for ura­nium enrich­ment tech­nol­ogy were stolen and sold to the Iraqis; what they do with it is a mys­tery. . . .”’ (Idem.)

29. Next, the pro­gram focuses on the piv­otal role of the nation of Dubai in nuclear export­ing from Ger­many to Third World coun­tries. Note the role of for­mer Nazi Alfred Hempel in the dis­cus­sion that fol­lows. Was he one of the peo­ple work­ing with Karl-Heinz Schaab? “. . . Why ship through Dubai? Because it may be the eas­i­est place in the world to mask the real des­ti­na­tion of cargo. Con­sider how the Malaysian gov­ern­ment is mak­ing the case for the inno­cence of its man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pany. ‘No doc­u­ment was traced that proved’ the com­pany ‘deliv­ered or exported the said com­po­nents to Libya,’ accord­ing to the country’s inspec­tor gen­eral of police. The real des­ti­na­tion, he said, ‘was out­side the knowl­edge’ of the pro­ducer. One can be cer­tain that if the Khan ring’s Euro­pean sup­pli­ers are ever tracked down, they will offer a sim­i­lar explanation.” (“Nukes ‘R’ Us” by Gary Mil­hollin and Kelly Motz; The New York Times; 3/4/2004; p. 2.)

30. “Dubai pro­vides com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ments a vital asset: auto­matic deni­a­bil­ity. Its cus­toms agency even brags that its pol­icy on re-exporting ‘enables traders to tran­sit their ship­ments through Dubai with­out any has­sles.’ Next to Dubai’s main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for free­wheel­ing inter­na­tional com­pa­nies. Our orga­ni­za­tion has d

ocu­mented 264 firms from Iran and 44 from rogue regimes like Syria and North Korea.” (Idem.)

31. “With the lax­ity of the emi­rates’ laws, there is sim­ply no way to know how many weapon com­po­nents have passed through. But con­sider some inci­dents that our orga­ni­za­tion has tallied—based on ship­ping records, gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tions, court doc­u­ments, intel­li­gence reports and other sources—over the last 20 years.” (Idem.)

32. Among the “for­mer” Nazis appear­ing on the Iraqi nuclear stage is Alfred Hempel. “In 1982, a Ger­man exporter and for­mer Nazi, Alfred Hempel, sent 70 tons of heavy water, a com­po­nent for nuclear reac­tors, from Sinochem in China to Dubai. The ship­ping labels were then changed to mask the trans­ac­tion and 60 tons of the heavy water were for­warded to India, where it enabled the gov­ern­ment to use its energy-producing reac­tors to cre­ate plu­to­nium for its atomic weapons pro­gram. The other 10 tons went to Argentina, which was inter­ested in atomic weapons at the time.” (Idem.)

33. “In 1983, Mr. Hempel sent 15 tons of heavy water from Norway’s Norsk Hydro, and 6.7 tons from Tech­snab­ex­port in the Soviet Union, through the emi­rates to India. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Hempel sent 12 more tons of Soviet heavy water to India that were used to start the Dhruva reac­tor, devoted to mak­ing plu­to­nium for atomic bombs. (The details of these trans­ac­tions come from Ger­man and Nor­we­gian gov­ern­ment audits, but Mr. Hempel, who died in 1989, was never con­victed of a crime. . . .” (Idem.)

34. Con­tem­plat­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ties of nuclear ter­ror­ism in the United States, the pro­gram exam­ines a pos­si­ble “nuclear 9/11″. “A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb (a pip­squeak in weapons terms) is smug­gled into Man­hat­tan and explodes at Grand Cen­tral. Some 500,000 peo­ple are killed, and the U.S. suf­fers $1 tril­lion in direct eco­nomic dam­age. That sce­nario, cited in a report last year from the John F. Kennedy School of Gov­ern­ment at Har­vard, could be a glimpse of our future. We urgently need to con­trol nuclear mate­ri­als to fore­stall that threat, but in this war on pro­lif­er­a­tion, we’re now slip­ping back­ward. Pres­i­dent Bush (after ignor­ing the issue before 9/11) now force­fully says the right things—but still doesn’t do enough. ‘We’re los­ing the war on pro­lif­er­a­tion,’ Andrew F. Kre­pinevich Jr., a mil­i­tary expert and exec­u­tive direc­tor of the Cen­ter for Strate­gic and Bud­getary Assess­ments, says bluntly. . . .” (“A Nuclear 9/11″ by Nicholas D. Kristof; The New York Times; 3/10/2004; p. 1; accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/10/opinion/10KRIS.html?ex=1079970740&ei=1&en=4c05b779b8f61534 .)

35. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion is not suc­ceed­ing at effec­tively com­bat­ing nuclear pro­lif­er­a­tion. [See Above.] As a result, the risks of such an event are increas­ing. ” . . . But all in all, the risks of a nuclear 9/11 are increas­ing. ‘I wouldn’t be at all sur­prised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years,’ said Bruce Blair, pres­i­dent of the Cen­ter for Defense Infor­ma­tion, ‘first and fore­most by a ter­ror­ist group that gets its hands on a Russ­ian nuclear weapon or a Pak­istani nuclear weapon.’” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

36. “One of our biggest set­backs is in North Korea. Thanks to the inep­ti­tude of hard-liners in Mr. Bush’s admin­is­tra­tion, and their refusal to engage in mean­ing­ful nego­ti­a­tions, North Korea is going all-out to make war­heads. It may have just made six new nuclear weapons. Then there’s Iran, which has sought nuclear weapons since the days of the shah, and whose nuclear pro­gram seems to have pub­lic sup­port. ‘I’m not sure there is a way to get an Iran­ian gov­ern­ment to give it up,’ a senior Amer­i­can offi­cial said.” (Idem.)

37. “Finally, there’s the real rogue nation of pro­lif­er­a­tion, Pak­istan. We know that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Islamist father of Pakistan’s bomb, ped­dled mate­ri­als to Libya and North Korea, and we don’t know who else. ‘It may be that A.Q. Khan & Asso­ciates already have passed bomb-grade nuclear fuel to the Qaeda, and we are in for the worst,’ warns Paul Lev­en­thal, found­ing pres­i­dent of the Nuclear Con­trol Insti­tute.” (Idem.)

38. “It’s mys­ti­fy­ing that the admin­is­tra­tion hasn’t leaned on Pak­istan to make Dr. Khan avail­able for inter­ro­ga­tion to ensure that his net­work is entirely closed. Sev­eral experts on Pak­istan told me they believe that the admin­is­tra­tion has been so restrained because its top pri­or­ity isn’t com­bat­ing nuclear proliferation—it’s get­ting Pres­i­dent Per­vez Musharraf’s help in arrest­ing Osama bin Laden before the Novem­ber elec­tion.” (Idem.)

39. “Another puz­zle is why an admin­is­tra­tion that spends hun­dreds of bil­lions of dol­lars in Iraq doesn’t try harder to secure ura­nium and plu­to­nium in Rus­sia and else­where. The bipar­ti­san pro­gram to secure weapons of mass destruc­tion is starved for funds—but Mr. Bush is propos­ing a $41 mil­lion cut in ‘coop­er­a­tive threat reduc­tion’ with Rus­sia.” (Idem.)

40. ” ‘We’re at this cru­cial point,’ warns Joseph Cir­in­cione of the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tional Peace. ‘And how we han­dle these sit­u­a­tions in the next cou­ple of years will tell us whether the nuclear threat shrinks or explodes. Per­haps lit­er­ally. . . .” (Idem.)

41. Turn­ing to the sub­ject of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the broad­cast exam­ines reports from Euro­pean intel­li­gence agen­cies that Tariq Ramadan, son of key Broth­er­hood patri­arch Said Ramadan, is not as far removed from oper­a­tional ter­ror­ist ele­ments as he claims. (For more about the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, see—among other programs—FTRs 343, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 371, 377, 378, 381, 382, 425, 433, 435, 439, 4423, 447.) Euro­pean intel­li­gence sources point to an alleged famil­ial rela­tion­ship between Ramadan and Omar Abdel Rah­man. It is also alleged by the same sources that Tariq is much more heav­ily involved with the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood than he claims. “For sev­eral weeks, a Fed­eral judge in the state of Wash­ing­ton has had on his desk reports from Euro­pean intel­li­gence ser­vices impli­cat­ing Tariq Ramadan in sev­eral inves­ti­ga­tions into the activ­i­ties of Al Qaeda. Accord­ing to our sources, these reports were obtained by lawyers act­ing on behalf of the fam­i­lies of the vic­tims of the attack on the World Trade Cen­ter of Sep­tem­ber 11, 2001. A law­suit is cur­rently being brought on behalf of 5,600 plain­tiffs seek­ing dam­ages and inter­est against the per­sons or groups sus­pected of hav­ing sup­ported Osama bin Laden’s orga­ni­za­tion. Accord­ing to Jean-Charles Bris­ard, for­mer mem­ber of the intel­li­gence ser­vices and now a pri­vate inves­ti­ga­tor hired by the vic­tims’ fam­i­lies, this inter­na­tional inves­ti­ga­tion has obtained the polit­i­cal and law-enforcement coop­er­a­tion of thirty coun­tries. Since the end of 2002, the Geneva Islamic Cen­ter, where Tariq Ramadan sits on the board of direc­tors, and of which brother Hani Ramadan is the direc­tor, appears among the orga­ni­za­tions under inves­ti­ga­tion.” (“Tariq Ramadan, Tar­get for Euro­pean Intel­li­gence Ser­vices” by Christophe Dubois; Le Parisien; 11/14/2003; accessed at: http://watch.windsofchange.net/themes_71.htm .)

42. “Sev­eral of the newer ele­ments of this inves­ti­ga­tion per­son­ally impli­cate the star preacher to young French Mus­lims. Accord­ing to doc­u­ments pro­vided to Amer­i­can law-enforcement offi­cials, Tariq Ramadan is allegedly the nephew of Omar Abdel Rah­man, the plan­ner of the first attack on the World Trade Cen­ter, sen­tenced to life in prison in the United States. Grand son of the founder of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, Has­san al-Banna, in 1993, Ramadan was allegedly put in charge of the Daawa (preach­ing for Europe by that Islamist orga­ni­za­tion. Ramadan denies the charges: ‘I am not related to Omar Abdel Rah­man and have no organic ties to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood.’” (Idem.)

43. “More­over, the name of the Mus­lim intel­lec­tual was cited in sev­eral anti-terrorist inves­ti­ga­tions. As part of an inves­ti­ga­tion into an Al-Qaeda cell in Spain, he was named as one of the ‘usual con­tacts’ for Ahmed

Brahim, con­sid­ered to be one of al-Qaeda’s trea­sur­ers indicted in April 2003 by mag­is­trate Gar­zon. In par­tic­u­lar, his name is men­tioned dur­ing a tele­phone con­ver­sa­tion of April 22, 1999, of which Le Parisien has a copy, between Ahmed Brahim and an offi­cial at the Tawhid book­store in Lyon, which pub­lished Ramadan’s books. The con­ver­sa­tion con­cerns the acqui­si­tion of blank audio cas­settes and the invi­ta­tion extended to young French cit­i­zens in Majorca to ‘work for the path of Allah.’ The Swiss intel­lec­tual is also named in the trial in France of a group sus­pected of hav­ing planned an attack against the US embassy. Dja­mal Beghal, con­sid­ered to be net­work leader, told the inves­ti­gat­ing mag­is­trate Jean-Louis Bruguiere on Octo­ber 1, 2001: ‘In 1994, I fol­lowed courses taught by Tarik Ramadan.’ The preacher’s response” ‘I do not know Ahmed Brahim. My name was sim­ply men­tioned over the course of two harm­less con­ver­sa­tions . . . . More­over, I didn’t begin teach­ing in Paris until 1997.’ Another charge against him: accord­ing to the inves­ti­ga­tions con­ducted by the lawyers act­ing on behalf of the fam­i­lies of the World Trade Cen­ter vic­tims, the Ramadan fam­ily address appears in a reg­is­ter at the Al Taqwa bank, which is on the Amer­i­can State department’s list of orga­ni­za­tions accused of sup­port­ing Islamist ter­ror­ism. . . .” (Idem.)

44. It is also alleged by the same Euroo­pean intel­li­gence sources that Ramadan was in oper­a­tional con­tact with Al Qaeda’s #2 man—Ayman al-Zawahiri. “The last item recorded by the intel­li­gence ser­vices: Tariq Ramadan and his brother allegedly orga­nized a 1991 meet­ing in a Geneva hotel at which both Ayman al-Zawahiri, cur­rent al-Qaeda num­ber 2, and Omar Abdel Rah­man were present. What of these ‘liaisons dan­gereuses’? ‘I have never met these peo­ple.’ So many denials that do not impress Jean-Charles Bris­ard: ‘To-day there is a real stack of evi­dence point­ing to Tariq Ramadan’s hav­ing had rela­tions with sev­eral ter­ror­ists,’ he says. ‘He has renounced the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood but he shares their her­itage. Under the cover of mod­er­a­tion, he is accu­mu­lat­ing a rad­i­cal­ism that may encour­age Jihad.’” (Idem.)

45. Numer­ous broad­casts have focused on the Bank Al Taqwa—the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood finan­cial hub oper­ated by for­mer Third Reich intel­li­gence oper­a­tive Youssef Nada. (For more about Al Taqwa, see—among other pro­grams.) FTRs 343, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 377, 378, 382, 423, 425, 432, 433, 435, 442, 447.) The broad­cast sets forth the fail­ure of the inter­na­tional inves­ti­ga­tion against Bank Al Taqwa. “An Egyptian-born businessman-accused more than two years ago by U.S. author­i­ties of financ­ing inter­na­tional ter­ror­ism from the heart of Europe—has evaded efforts to shut down his oper­a­tions and is con­tin­u­ing to con­duct busi­ness under new cor­po­rate iden­ti­ties accord­ing to Euro­pean and United Nations offi­cials.” (“ ‘Nobody’s Nagging’—Why the United States Is Los­ing the Bat­tle against Financiers of Inter­na­tional Ter­ror­ism” by Mark Hosen­ball and Michael Isikoff; Newsweek; 3/3/2004; p. 1; accessed at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4441187 .)

46. “The fal­ter­ing inves­ti­ga­tion of Youssef M. Nada, the noto­ri­ous for­mer head of a Swiss-and Bahamas-based Islamic finan­cial net­work called Al-Taqwa, is the lat­est exam­ple of how the Bush administration’s much-publicized cam­paign to dis­man­tle the financiers of inter­na­tional ter­ror­ism appears to be los­ing steam amid wan­ing sup­port from some for­eign gov­ern­ments, the offi­cials say.” (Idem.)

47. “Nada and sev­eral other direc­tors of Al-Taqwa and related com­pa­nies, includ­ing a mys­te­ri­ous Eritrean-born asso­ciate named Ahmed Idris Nasred­din, were for­mally des­ig­nated ter­ror­ist financiers and, in Novem­ber 2001, were placed on sanc­tions lists started by the U.S. Trea­sury Depart­ment after the Sep­tem­ber 11 ter­ror attacks. Although they have never pub­licly dis­closed much of their evi­dence against Nada, U.S. offi­cials have said they acted on the basis of intel­li­gence reports indi­cat­ing that he served as the cen­tral banker for the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, a secre­tive net­work of Islamic rad­i­cals that helped spawn Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda move­ment and other vio­lent Islamic jihadi net­works. Nada and his asso­ciates were also placed on sim­i­lar lists main­tained by the United Nations, sig­nal­ing what was sup­posed to be a coor­di­nated inter­na­tional effort to freeze his assets and close down his busi­nesses.” (Ibid.; pp. 1–2.)

48. “But today, offi­cials tell Newsweek, some of Nada’s var­i­ous busi­ness oper­a­tions appear to be very much alive. Swiss author­i­ties, who had raided Nada’s offices and opened up a major crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion, are on the verge of clos­ing down the case-apparently unable to develop enough evi­dence to bring nada to court, Euro­pean law-enforcement offi­cials say.” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

49. “In the mean­time, Nada has main­tained busi­ness inter­ests in Italy, Switzer­land and Liecht­en­stein. Nasred­din, his busi­ness part­ner, is believed to main­tain his inter­ests in lux­ury hotels in Milan, Italy. One way the two men have been able to con­tinue oper­at­ing is by exploit­ing loop­holes in the inter­na­tional sanc­tions regime. Nada, for exam­ple, was sup­posed to have been barred from trav­el­ing out­side his city of res­i­dence, a tiny enclave of Ital­ian ter­ri­tory called Cam­pi­one d’Italia that is sur­rounded on three sides by Switzer­land and by a lake on the fourth. But the U.N. reported last year that Nada had trav­eled to Liechtenstein—a jour­ney that he could only have made by tran­sit­ing through Swiss ter­ri­tory, from which he had been banned. Nada’s trip was focused on start­ing pro­ceed­ings to change the names of two of the com­pa­nies des­ig­nated by the U.N. and the United States as terrorist-financing enti­ties.” (Idem.)

50. “U.N. and Euro­pean law-enforcement sources said they could see no rea­son for Nada to seek to change the names of his com­pa­nies unless they were still actively engaged in busi­ness or con­trolled some valu­able assets and prop­erty. To try to find out what Nada was up to, author­i­ties in Liecht­en­stein attempted to wrest con­trol of one of the com­pa­nies from Nada by forcibly appoint­ing a for­mer Liecht­en­stein gov­ern­ment offi­cial as liq­uida­tor of the cor­po­ra­tion. But law-enforcement sources tell Newsweek that Liechtenstein’s plan to take over the com­pany failed, and Nada remains in charge of the oper­a­tion.” (Idem.)

51. “The Liecht­en­stein effort against Nada isn’t the only one that fiz­zled. Swiss author­i­ties last year served Nada with a for­mal notice that he can no longer enter Swiss ter­ri­tory, Newsweek has learned. The­o­ret­i­cally, because the Ital­ian enclave where Nada lives is vir­tu­ally sur­rounded by Switzer­land, the only way he can leave is either by boat or air. But author­i­ties acknowl­edge that Switzerland’s bor­ders with Cam­pi­one d’Italia are rarely if ever patrolled and that Nada has vir­tu­ally carte blanche to leave when he pleases.” (Idem.)

52. “In a tele­phone inter­view from Cam­pi­one d’Italia this week, Nada insisted that he had no finan­cial ties to ter­ror­ists and defi­antly seemed to mock the efforts to keep him bot­tled up in his home­town. ‘I never financed Osama bin Laden’s ter­ror­ist group,’ Nada said. ‘There is no way any­one ever had any evi­dence of that . I never broke any law in my life.’” (Idem.)

53. “As for the Swiss attempts to ban him from trav­el­ing through the country’s ter­ri­tory, Nada stated: ‘if any deci­sion [like that] is made, there must be a way to enforce it.’ He then point­edly noted there was ‘no bor­der con­trol’ between Cam­pi­one d’Italia and Switzer­land. Nasred­din could not be located for com­ment, though in the past his lawyers have emphat­i­cally denied that he had any involve­ment in the financ­ing of ter­ror­ism.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

54. “Vic­tor Com­ras, a for­mer U.S. gov­ern­ment sanc­tions expert and a mem­ber of a recently expired United Nations task force on inter­na­tional ter­ror­ism, said the Nada case is symp­to­matic of the loop­holes and weak­nesses in inter­na­tional ef

forts to shut down ter­ror­ist financiers. He said for­eign inter­est in the issue appears to be fading—as does United States lead­er­ship in push­ing for vig­or­ous action. ‘This is an issue which requires con­stant nag­ging,’ said Com­ras, and ‘nobody’s nag­ging.’” (Idem.)

55. “But there may be other issues at play, some inter­na­tional experts say. Much of the evi­dence against Nada and other accused ter­ror­ist financiers is still based on secret intel­li­gence that U.S. author­i­ties have been extremely reluc­tant to share with for­eign gov­ern­ments. U.S. trea­sury offi­cials have pushed those gov­ern­ments, in Europe and the Mid­dle East, to act on looser stan­dards, say­ing it is sim­ply unrea­son­able to expect judi­cial stan­dards of proof when deal­ing with the shad­owy world of ter­ror­ist financ­ing, said one for­mer U.S. offi­cial who was involved in the antiter­ror cam­paign. But gov­ern­ments in Europe and else­where have been reluc­tant to adopt the lower U.S. stan­dards, lead­ing to dia­logue in which the com­mu­ni­ca­tions are ‘lost in trans­la­tion,’ the for­mer offi­cial said.” (Idem.)

56. The pro­gram con­cludes with a look at infor­ma­tion sup­ple­ment­ing the exam­i­na­tion of neo-Nazi con­nec­tions to the events of 9/11. Specif­i­cally, the pro­gram devel­ops infor­ma­tion sup­ple­men­tal to FTR#443, detail­ing con­nec­tions between the 1993 World Trade Cen­ter bomb­ing, the Okla­homa City bomb­ing, and 9/11. Andreas Strass­meir, the alleged mas­ter­mind of the OKC bomb­ing and Tim­o­thy McVeigh’s alleged supe­rior in the oper­a­tional aspects of the attack is alleged in a 5/10/1995 FBI mem­o­ran­dum to have sought the pur­chase of a Boe­ing 747 from Lufthansa. The pos­si­bil­ity that this may be an indi­ca­tion that neo-Nazis and Islamists were coop­er­a­tively plot­ting attacks like 9/11 in the mid-1990’s is not one to be too read­ily dis­missed. ” . . . Extrem­ists resid­ing at Elo­him City received military-style train­ing from a num­ber of sources. One of the train­ers there was Andreas Carl Strass­meir of Ger­many, a neo-Nazi and the son of Guenter Strass­meir, a chief aide of dis­graced for­mer Ger­man chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Kohl. The elder Strass­meir is widely regarded as the archi­tect of Kohl’s reuni­fi­ca­tion plan that merged the for­mer East Ger­many with the Fed­eral Repub­lic in 1991. And Guenter’s father was one of the orig­i­nal mem­bers of the Nazi Party in the early 1920’s.” (“Al Qaeda’s Neo-Nazi Con­nec­tions” by William Grim; The Jew­ish Press; p. 3; accessed at: http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/news/infocus/?disp_feature=Ev2ztq.var .)

57. “Andreas Strass­meir is impor­tant to this story because he not only became a close friend and con­fi­dant of Tim­o­thy McVeigh, but also because he is regarded by many inves­ti­ga­tors as John Doe #2, the unknown per­son assist­ing McVeigh and Terry Nichols at the scene of the Okla­homa City bomb­ing who was seen by a num­ber of eye­wit­nesses.” (Ibid.; pp. 3–4.)

58. “In addi­tion to train­ing var­i­ous neo-Nazi and mili­tia groups, Strass­meir was involved in a num­ber of very curi­ous activ­i­ties. Accord­ing to an FBI report dated May 10, 1995, ‘Addi­tional doc­u­ments reveal that at one time Strass­meir was attempt­ing to pur­chase a 747 air­craft from Lufthansa; how­ever, the rea­son for the pur­chase is not reflected in the doc­u­ments.’ In 1995 it would not have been unrea­son­able for an FBI inves­ti­ga­tor to give Strassmeir’s aborted air­liner pur­chase gives one pause and raises the real pos­si­bil­ity that 9/11 type attacks were being planned as far back as 1995 by insid­ers in the neo-Nazi/Islamic ter­ror­ist net­work. . . .” (Ibid.; p. 4.)

59. A Ger­man paper on the neo-Nazi/Islamist con­nec­tion dis­cusses dia­logue writ­ten by Pierce in The Turner Diaries. The pro­tag­o­nist of this book (express­ing the views of William Pierce, the book’s author) rants about his desire to see the “100 floors of the sky­scraper fall.” The book also has an episode about a low-level, sui­cide aer­ial attack on the Pen­ta­gon. Note that Pierce fore­shad­owed the 9/11 attacks in 1998. See FTR#443.) “47 years later the Hitler wor­ship­per William Pierce (born 1933) tells in his right-wing ter­ror­ist novel “The Turner Diaries” of a right-wing extrem­ist Kamikaze-ing an air­plane into the Pen­ta­gon. In an apoc­a­lyp­tic scene Pierce rejoices over the destruc­tion of the cen­ter of the world capital-contaminated, Jewish-dominated New York. The neo-Nazi, writ­ing under the alias Andrew Mac­Don­ald, says he desires to see the ‘100 floors of the sky­scraper’ fall. Pierce’s book [The Turner Diaries] is a utopian fan­tasy, pro­moted as a neo-nazi Bible world-wide, as the pub­li­ca­tion of the diaries of the US-American right-wing extrem­ist Earl Turner found in the years 2091 dur­ing exca­va­tions of the ruins of Wash­ing­ton, 100 years after the national rev­o­lu­tion of 1991–93.” (“The Unholy Alliance Between the Swastika and the Cres­cent, Part I—Neo Nazis and Fun­da­men­tal­ist Islam” by Anton Maegerle; 12/12/2001; p. 2.)

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