Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #474 Fifth Column Part V

Recorded August 22, 2004

NB: This stream contains both FTR #s 473 and 474 in sequence. Each is a 30 minute broadcast.

Continuing discussion of a Fifth Column that Mr. Emory believes facilitated the 9/11 attacks, the program examines a number of possible manifestations of such subversion. (The program is a follow-up to FTR#’s 405, 433, 462, 464, 467.) It is Mr. Emory’s belief that the Bush administration is the primary element in this Fifth Column and that the administrations’ loyalties are to the Underground Reich, not to the U.S. Constitution. After setting forth the FBI’s suppression of investigations into operational links between Islamist and white-supremacist groups, the program highlights information indicating that al-Qaeda is indeed seeking to utilize non-Arabs for executing operations. Much of the program focuses on the disclosure of the identity of an al-Qaeda mole. This disclosure permitted a number of al-Qaeda suspects to escape. Was this disclosure a blunder or an act of deliberate sabotage by the Fifth Column?

Program Highlights Include: Discussion of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades and their threat to unleash “earthquakes” if Italy did not withdraw from Iraq; the possibility that the al-Masri Brigades’ threat may indicate that (as has been forecast) terrorist groups have gained access to Tesla weaponry (see FTR#69); the arrest of Michael Wagner (a convicted felon); Wagner’s claim to have knowledge of planned al-Qaeda attacks in the San Diego area; claims by numerous intelligence experts that the disclosure of (al-Qaeda mole) Mr. Noor Khan’s identity was extraordinarily (perhaps suspiciously) foolish; the remarkable level of confusion on the part of both the FAA and NORAD on 9/11; the possibility that Ptech software may have accounted for the strange behavior of air defense unites and the FAA on 9/11.

1. The program begins with an expose of the FBI’s suppression of a veteran agent’s revelations about developing cooperation between Islamist terrorists and homegrown white supremacist/militia types. (For more about Islamist/neo-Nazi cooperation in the execution of terrorist acts, see—among other programs—FTR#’s 330, 443, 456, 457. For more about the FBI’s suppression of information that could lead to the apprehension of terrorists and/or the interdiction of their operations, see—among other programs—FTR#’s 349, 454, 462, 464, 467.) Why is the bureau suppressing this type of investigation?! “As a veteran agent chasing home-grown terrorist suspects for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mike German always had a knack for worming his way into places few other agents could go. In the early 1990’s, he infiltrated a group of white supremacist skinheads plotting to blow up a black church in Los Angeles. A few years later, he joined a militia in Washington State that talked of attacking government buildings. Known to his fellow militia members as Rock, he tricked them into handcuffing themselves in a supposed training exercise so the authorities could arrest them.”
(“Another F.B.I. Employee Blows Whistle on Agency” by Eric Lichtblau; The New York Times; 8/2/2004; p.1.)

2. “So in early 2002, when Mr. German got word that a group of Americans might be plotting support for an overseas Islamic terrorist group, he proposed to his bosses what he thought was an obvious plan: go undercover and infiltrate the group. But Mr. German says F.B.I. officials sat on his request, botched the investigation, falsified documents to discredit their own sources, then froze him out and made him a ‘pariah.’ He left the bureau in mid-June after 16 years and is now going public for the first time—the latest in a string of F.B.I. whistle-blowers who claim they were retaliated against after voicing concerns about how management problems had impeded terrorism investigations since the Sept. 11 attacks.” (Idem.)

3. “ ‘What’s so frustrating for me,’ Mr. German said in an interview, a copy of the Sept. 11 commission report at his side,’ is that what I hear the F.B.I. saying every day on TV when I get home, about how it’s remaking itself to fight terrorism, is not the reality of what I saw every day in the field.’ Mr. German refused to discuss details of the 2002 terrorism investigation, saying the information was classified.” (Idem.)

4. Among the groups seen by officials as probable collaborators of al-Qaeda or other Islamist groups are white supremacist groups within the correctional system. “But officials with knowledge of the case said the investigation took place in the Tampa, Fla. area, where a domestic militia-type group and a major but unidentified Islamic terrorist organization, were considering joining forces. A tape recording of the meeting appeared to lend credence to the report, one official said. Law enforcement officials have become increasingly concerned that militant domestic groups could seek to collaborate with foreign-based terrorist groups like Al Qaeda because of a shared hatred of the American government. This has become a particular concern in prisons.” (Idem.)

5. “The Tampa case is not known to have produced any arrests. But Mr. German, in an April 29 letter to several members of Congress, warned that ‘the investigations involved in my complaint concern very active terrorist groups that currently pose significant threats to national security.’” (Idem.)

6. “He also wrote ‘Opportunities to initiate proactive investigations involved in my complaint concern very active terrorist groups that currently pose significant threats to national security.’ He also wrote, ‘Opportunities to initiate proactive investigations that might prevent terrorist acts before they occur, which is purported to be the F.B.I.’s number one priority, continue to be lost, yet no one is held accountable.’” (Idem.)

7. “ . . . Mr. German, in his letter to lawmakers, cited ‘a continuing failure in the F.B.I’s counterterrorism program,’ which he said was ‘not the result of a lack of intelligence, but a lack of action.’ Officials said Mr. German also complained internally about a second case in the Portland, Ore., area in 2002 in which he said he was blocked from going undercover to pursue a domestic terrorism lead. That case was also thought to center on a militia group suspected of plotting violence.” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

8. “In the Tampa case, officials said Mr. German complained that F.B.I. officials had mishandled evidence concerning a suspected domestic terrorist group and failed to act for months on his request in early 2002 to conduct an undercover operation. That failure, he said, allowed the investigation to ‘die on the vine.’ While Mr. German would not confirm the location of the investigation, he said in an interview at the office of his Washington lawyer, Lynne Bernabei, that his problems intensified after he complained about the management of the case in September 2002. He said F.B.I. officials whom he would not name backdated documents in the case, falsified evidence and falsely discredited witnesses in an apparent effort to justify their approach to the investigation. [Emphasis added.] He cited institutional inertia, even after Sept

. 11.” (Ibid.; pp. 2-3.)

9. “ ‘Trying to get approval for an operation like this is a bureaucratic nightmare at the F.B.I.,’ he said. Mr. German said that beginning in late 2002, he took his concerns to his supervisors at the F.B.I. and to officials at headquarters in Washington, including Mr. Mueller himself in an e-mail message that he said went unanswered. He also went to the Justice Department’s inspector general and, frustrated by what he saw as a languishing investigation, brought his concerns this spring to several members of Congress and the Sept. 11 commission.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

10. “In the meantime, Mr. German said, his career at the F.B.I. stalled, despite what he said was an ‘unblemished’ record and an award for his work in the Los Angeles skinhead case. Soon after raising his complaints about the 2002 terrorism investigation, he was removed from the case. And, he said, F.B.I. officials wrongly accused him of conducting unauthorized travel, stopped using him to train agents in ‘proactive techniques’ and shut him out of important domestic terrorism assignments.” (Idem.)

11. “ ‘The phone just stopped ringing, and I became a persona non grata,’ he said. ‘Because I wouldn’t let this go away, I became the problem.’ For now he has no job and is uncertain of his future. ‘My entire career has been ruined, all because I thought I was doing the right thing here,’ he said.” (Idem.)

12. Next, the program examines the arrest of one Michael Wagner for possessing devices proscribed to a convicted felon. Wagner claims he has knowledge of al-Qaeda plans for terrorist acts inside the U.S. Who is Michael Wagner? Is he a white supremacist? Is he associated with a prison white-supremacist gang? [See paragraph #4.] Is Wagner representative of the type of individual that Agent German was trying to interdict? “A driver stopped on an Iowa highway this month was found with flight-training manuals, Arabic documents and night-vision goggles, and he told troopers he knew of terrorist plans to shoot up trains in San Diego, according to court papers.”
(“Driver Says He Knows of Terrorist Plans” [Mercury News wire service story]; San Jose Mercury News; 7/28/2004; p. 4A.)

13. “Michael Wagner, 44, of San Diego said he had knowledge of terrorist activities and people and groups tied to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Wagner also said he knew about things in the Muslim communities in San Diego that would interest federal authorities. Federal prosecutors declined comment. Wagner pleaded not guilty Tuesday in U.S. District Court to being a felon in possession of body armor and weapons.” (Idem.)

14. Apparently, al-Qaeda is looking for non-Arabs to carry out missions. The possibility that the pattern of cooperation between Islamists and neo-Nazis cited in programs above may facilitate al-Qaeda’s goals is not one to be too readily discarded. “Al-Qaeda allies are believed to be scouting U.S. targets, and the terror organization is using non-Arab recruits to avoid detection, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials say. The FBI has counterterrosim investigations in virtually all 56 of its field offices but has not broken up a known surveillance cell, either because agents are tailing suspects who have not committed crimes or because they have descriptions but not identities. . . .”
(“Non-Arab recruits scout for Al-Qaeda” by John Diamond and Toni Locy; USA Today; 8/16/2004; p. 1A.)

15. Next, the program highlights an obscure Islamist group that claims affinity with al-Qaeda. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (as discussed in FTR#443) has made claims in the past that dovetail with some of the activities set forth in the neo-Nazi tract Serpent’s Walk. Their threat to bring “earthquakes” to Italy may well be nothing more than a rhetorical flourish, with the word “earthquakes” being a metaphor. Among the possibilities to be evaluated, however, is the possibility that some of the Tesla-based technology discussed in FTR#69 might be in the possession of the group. Time will tell. “An al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terror group gave Italy another 15 days to withdraw its troops from Iraq before sending ‘waves of earthquakes to erase your country,’ according to a statement sent to an Arabic newspaper Sunday. It was the fourth threat in two weeks against the country. The statement was by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades and sent to the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper via e-mail. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has that Italian troops would stay in Iraq until democracy takes hold. The brigade has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on Western targets, including the train bombings in Madrid on March 11.”
(“Group Gives Italians 15 Days to Leave Iraq” by Smita P. Nordwall with wire reports; USA Today; 8/2/2004; p. 9A.)

16. Next, the program sets forth several articles discussing the public disclosure of the identity of a mole in the ranks of al-Qaeda. Although one cannot dismiss the possibility that the disclosure was simply incompetence born of over-politicization in this campaign season, one wonders if the disclosure may be the work of Fifth Columnists, seeking to undermine U.S. security. Whatever the reason, the publication of Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan’s identity permitted other al-Qaeda suspects to escape, and eliminated Khan’s future utility as a tool against al-Qaeda. “President Gen. Pervez Musharraf says Pakistan has been ’90 percent successful in arresting suspects behind a series of high-profile terror attacks, including against key government leaders. Yet senior officials said Tuesday that some al-Qaeda fugitives escaped after news reports revealed the arrest of a computer expert for Osama bin Laden’s network who was cooperating with investigators. Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, a 25-year-old Pakistani, was nabbed in a July 13 raid in the eastern city of Lahore. His capture was a signal victory for Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. He led authorities to a key al-Qaeda figure and sent e-mails to terrorists so investigators could trace their locations. . . .”
(“Leak allowed al-Qaida Suspects to Escape” by Matthew Pennington [AP]; Yahoo.com; 8/10/2004; p. 1.)

17. “ . . . But on Tuesday, two senior officials expressed dismay that the arrest of Khan made it into the media too soon—reported first in American newspapers on Aug. 2 after it was disclosed to journalists by U.S. officials in Washington. ‘Let me say that this intelligence leak jeopardized our plan and some al-Qaeda suspects ran away,’ one of the Pakistani officials said on condition of anonymity. . . .” (Idem.)

18. More about the disclosure of Khan’s identity: “The revelation that a mole within al-Qaeda was exposed
after Washington launched its ‘orange alert’ this month has shocked security experts, who say the outing of the source may have set back the war on terror. Reuters learned from Pakistani intelligence sources on Friday that computer expert Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan, arrested secretly in July, was working under cover to help the authorities track down al-Qaeda militants in Britain and the United States when his name appeared in U.S. newspapers.”
(“Unmasking of Qaeda Mole a U.S. Security Blunder-Experts” by Peter Graff [Reuters]; 8/1/2004; p. 1.)

19. “ ‘After his capture he admitted being an al-Qaeda member and agreed to send e-mails and received encoded replies. He’s a great hacker and even the U.S. agents said he was a computer whiz.’ Last Sunday, U.S. officials told reporters that someone held secretly by Pakistan was the source of the bulk of the information justifying the alert. The New York Times obtained Khan’s name independently, and U.S. officials confirmed it when it appeared in the paper the next morning.” (Idem.)

20. “None of those reports mentioned at the time that Khan had been under cover helping the authorities catch al-Qaeda suspects, and that his value in that regard was destroyed by making his name public. A day later, Britain hastily rounded up terrorism suspects, some of whom are believed to have been in contact with Khan while he was under cover. Washington has portrayed those arrests as a major success, saying one of the suspects, named Abu Musa al-Hindi or Abu Eissa al-Hindi, was a senior al-Qaeda figure.” (Idem.)

21. “But British police have acknowledged the raids were carried out in a rush. Suspects were dragged out of shops in daylight and caught in a high speed car chase, instead of the usual procedure of catching them at home in the early morning while they can offer less resistance. Security experts contacted by Reuters said they were shocked by the revelations that the source whose information led to the alert was identified within days, and that U.S. officials had confirmed his name.” (Idem.)

22. An expert with Jane’s defense publications has taken stock of the possibility that something “worse” than incompetence may underlie the disclosure of Khan’s identity: “ ‘The whole thing smacks of either incompetence or worse,’ said Tim Ripley, a security expert who writes for Jane’s defense publications. [Emphasis added.] ‘You have to ask: what are they doing compromising a deep mole within al-Qaeda, when it’s so difficult to get these guys in there in the first place? ‘It goes against all the rules of counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, running agents and so forth. [Emphasis added.] It’s not exactly cloak and dagger undercover work if it’s on the front pages every time there is a development, is it?’” (Idem.)

23. “A source such as Khan—cooperating with the authorities while staying in active contact with trusting al-Qaeda agents—would be among the most prized assets imaginable, he said. ‘Running agents within a terrorist organization is the Holy Grail of intelligence agencies. And to have it blown is a major setback which negates months and years of work, which may be difficult to recover.’” (Idem.)

24. “Rolf Tophoven, head of the Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy in Essen Germany, said allowing Khan’s name to become public was ‘very unclever. If it is correct, then I would say it’s another debacle of the American intelligence community. Maybe other serious sources could have been detected or guys could have been captured in the future’ if Khan’s identity had been protected, he said. . . .” (Idem.)

25. “Heightened terror alerts and high-profile arrests of suspected Islamic extremists have international security experts and officials concerned that the Bush administration’s actions could jeopardize investigations into the al-Qaeda network. European terrorism analysts acknowledge that the U.S. and its allies are under threat by al-Qaeda, but some suggest that the White House is unnecessarily adding to public anxiety with vague and dated intelligence about possible attacks. Some in Western Europe suspect the administration is using fear to improve its chances in the November election.”
(“White House Has Some Terror Experts Worried” by Jeffrey Fleishman [Los Angeles Times]; Los Angeles Times; 8/11/2004; p. 1; accessed at: http://www.latimes.com .)

26. “Terrorism experts say too much publicity about possible plots and raids of Islamic extremist networks, including the arrest of 13 suspects in Britain last week, could hurt wider investigations. American politicians have called for an examination of that contention. Officials in Pakistan reportedly said Tuesday that Washington’s recent disclosure of the arrest of a suspected Al Qaeda operative, Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, allowed other extremists under surveillance to disappear.” (Idem.)

27. “ ‘It causes a problem. There’s no doubt about that,’ said Charles Heyman, editor of Jane’s World Armies. ‘The moment you make any announcement, you tell the other side what you know. As a rule of thumb, you should keep quiet about what you know.’ British security officials are angry over recent U.S. revelations of terrorist threats and arrests, said Paul Beaver, an international defense analyst based in London. He said the attitude among some British intelligence officials was that the ‘Americans have a very strange way of thanking their friends, by revealing names of agents, details of plots and operations.’” (Idem.)

28. In FTR#’s 462, 464, 467, we examined the links between al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, the bank al-Taqwa and the Ptech firm. Ptech manufactured key threat assessment software for both the FAA and Air Force. A careful examination of the behavior of air defense units and the FAA on 9/11 suggests that there was a fundamental disruption of the U.S. air defense networks—more widespread than anything that a military order could have engendered. Some critics have attributed the failure to interdict the hijacked planes to a “stand-down order” issued by the military. Such an order would not have affected the civilian institutions, such as the FAA. Could a Fifth Column within the U.S. have used Ptech to disrupt U.S. air defenses? “At long last, one member of the U.S. Senate has spoken out about the 9/11 report. Last Friday, during a Governmental Affairs committee meeting, Mark Dayton, a Democrat from Minnesota, directly attacked the government for distorting facts and covering up what happened that day. Highlights of his narrative: Referring to the period between the first hijacking, at 8:14 a.m. and the crash of the fourth plane, at 10:03 a.m., Dayton said: ‘During those entire 109 minutes, to my reading of this report, this country and its citizens were completely undefended.’”
(“The Dayton Discord” by James Ridgeway; The Village Voice; 8/2/2004; p. 1.)

29. “ ‘According to [the 9/11 Commission’s] findings, FAA authorities failed to inform military command, NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, about three of the f

our hijackings until after the planes had crashed into their targets at the second World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the ground in Pennsylvania, which was not their target. NORAD then scrambled one of only two sets of fighter planes on alert in the entire eastern third of the country, one in Massachusetts and one in Virginia, but it didn’t know where to send them—because the hijackers had turned off the plane’s transponder so NORAD couldn’t locate them on their radar, and they were still looking for it when it exploded into its target at 8:46 a.m.’” (Idem.)

30. “ ‘The second hijacking began, according to [the commission’s] report, one minute later. NORAD wasn’t notified until the same minute the same plane struck the second World Trade tower. It was five more minutes before NORAD’s mission commander learned about that explosion—which was five minutes after thousands of Americans saw it on live television. By this time, the third plane’s transponder was off. Communication had been severed, yet it was 15 minutes before the flight controller decided to notify the regional FAA center, which in turn did not inform FAA headquarters for another 15 minutes.’” (Idem.)

31. “At 9:25 a.m. on September 11, Dayton said, ‘FAA’s National Command Center knew that there were two hijacked planes that had crashed into the two World Trade Centers, and a third plane had stopped communicating and disappeared from its primary radar, yet no one in FAA headquarters asked for military assistance with that plane, either. NORAD was unaware that the plane had even been hijacked until after it crashed into the Pentagon at 9:34.’” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

32. “ ‘The NORAD mission commander ordered his only three other planes on alert in Virginia to scramble and fly north to Baltimore. Minutes later, when he was told that a plane was approaching Washington, he learned that the planes were flying east over the Atlantic Ocean, away from Baltimore and Washington, so that when the third plane struck the Pentagon, NORAD’s fighters were 150 miles away—farther than they were before they took off.’” (Idem.)

33. “ ‘By then, FAA’s command center had learned of the fourth hijacking and called FAA headquarters, specifically asking that they contact the military, at 9:36 a.m. At 9:46 a.m., the FAA command center updated FAA headquarters that United flight 93 was ‘29 minutes out of Washington, D.C.’ Three minutes later, [the commission’s] document records this following conversation between the command center and FAA headquarters: ‘Command center: ‘Uh, do we want to, uh, think about scrambling aircraft?’ ‘FAA headquarters: ‘Oh God, I don’t know.’ ‘Command center: ‘Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s going to have to make probably in the next 10 minutes.’ ‘FAA headquarters: ‘uh, yeah, you know, everybody just left the room.’” (Idem.)


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