For The Record

FTR #524 The Safari Club and the ‘Islamic Bomb’

Recorded August 28, 2005
REALAUDIO

Since 9/11, there has been a height­ened level of dis­cus­sion on the pos­si­bil­ity of nuclear ter­ror­ism, par­tic­u­larly in light of the A.Q. Khan net­work and the smug­gling of nuclear tech­nol­ogy from Pak­istan to a num­ber of other coun­tries. This broad­cast sets forth infor­ma­tion that demon­strates the com­plic­ity of the Safari Club in the devel­op­ment of the “Islamic Bomb.” An out­sourc­ing of U.S. intel­li­gence func­tions to Saudi Ara­bia and (to a lesser extent) Pak­istan, the net­work was the prin­ci­pal ele­ment in the CIA’s sup­port net­work for the Mus­lim mujahideen that drove the Sovi­ets out of Afghanistan. Of course, it was that con­flict that spawned Osama bin Laden as a war­rior. In this pro­gram, the devel­op­ment of the Pak­istani “Islamic Bomb” by the A.Q. Khan net­work is seen as a quid pro quo for Pak­istani and Saudi help in fight­ing the Sovi­ets. In addi­tion to the fact that the Saudis were in effec­tive to con­trol of the A.Q. Khan network’s oper­a­tions, the show demon­strates that CIA assets asso­ci­ated with that net­work were allowed to oper­ate in the United States until well after 9/11!

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The impor­tant role of the BCCI in the financ­ing of the A.Q. Khan network’s oper­a­tions (the BCCI milieu is deeply involved in the events in, and around, 9/11); U.S. pres­sure on British inves­ti­ga­tors to aban­don their inves­ti­ga­tion of the A.Q. Khan net­work; the oper­a­tions of Nazir Ahmed Vaid, an appar­ent CIA asset whose oper­a­tions on behalf of the A.Q. Khan net­work con­tin­ued in the United States until after 9/11; the George W. Bush administration’s relax­ing of sanc­tions imposed on Pak­istan by the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion because of its efforts at pro­mot­ing the spread of nuclear tech­nol­ogy; the par­tic­i­pa­tion by the Theodor Shackley/Thomas Clines/Edwin Wil­son net­work in the Afghan Mujahideen sup­port effort.

1. The broad­cast begins by pre­sent­ing back­ground infor­ma­tion on the Safari Club. That infor­ma­tion is con­tained in FTR#522. Under­writ­ten by Saudi Ara­bia, the Safari Club entailed the out­sourc­ing of U.S. intel­li­gence oper­a­tions to the Saudis and other coun­tries. It is in the con­text of the Safari Club that the Saudi-funded Islamic Devel­op­ment Bank under­took much of the financ­ing of the A.Q. Khan net­work and its devel­op­ment of the Islamic bomb.

“The same lead­er­ship that pro­mul­gated the Safari Club—the Saudi royals—also strongly funded and sup­ported the Islamic Devel­op­ment Bank. Begun in 1973, the IDB now has 55 mem­ber states, with Saudi Ara­bia dom­i­nat­ing, with 27.33 per­cent of the bank’s fund­ing. As a com­par­i­son, Egypt con­tributes 9.48% and Pak­istan just 3.41% of the bank’s total cap­i­tal. It was through the bank’s sci­en­tific and eco­nomic devel­op­ment efforts that huge amounts were fun­neled into Pak­istan, which ended up in the hands of A.Q. Khan and his now-infamous nuclear bomb-building syndicate.”

(Pre­lude to Ter­ror; by Joseph Trento; Copy­right 2005 by Joseph J. Trento; Car­roll & Graf [HC]; ISBN 0–7867-1464–6; p. 313.)

2. U.S. involve­ment with the A.Q. Khan network’s devel­op­ment of the Islamic bomb was a quid pro quo for Pak­istani coop­er­a­tion with the covert war against the Sovi­ets in Afghanistan—the same war that spawned Osama bin Laden.

“The effort that began prior to the Soviet inva­sion of Afghanistan—and that Pres­i­dent Carter’s National Secu­rity Adviser warned was a seri­ous effort to build the first Islamic bomb—was delib­er­ately ignored by Carter in order to secure Saudi and Pak­istani coop­er­a­tion for the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan. Like almost every­thing about the anti-Soviet effort, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion expanded on it; and the CIA directly assisted the Pak­istani nuclear effort by allow­ing Pak­istani nation­als to pro­cure hard­ware for the pro­gram in vio­la­tion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

(Idem.)

3. In RFA’s 4, 29, 30—avail­able from Spitfire—we exam­ined the pri­va­tized intel­li­gence net­work devel­oped to extend U.S. intel­li­gence oper­a­tions beyond the over­sight of Con­gress. Uti­liz­ing the tal­ents of Edwin Wil­son and Frank Ter­pil, this net­work was oper­ated prin­ci­pally by Theodore Shack­ley and Thomas Clines, two of the lead­ing fig­ures in CIA covert oper­a­tions through­out much of the agency’s exis­tence. This net­work was deeply involved with the Afghan sup­port effort. It should be noted that the elder George Bush was deeply involved with the Wilson-Shackley-Clines oper­a­tions, as well as the Safari Club. As we saw in FTR#522, the Safari Club, in turn, sub­sumed the oper­a­tions of the Wilson-Shackley-Clines net­work to a con­sid­er­able extent.

“ ‘There was noth­ing more impor­tant than prop­ping up a free Afghanistan. One of the things I did was try to get the Afghan king, then liv­ing in exile in Italy, to come back to Afghanistan so we could build a new gov­ern­ment,’ Tom Clines recalled. Although he was out of the CIA and offi­cially retired, ‘I was try­ing to do my part in keep­ing Afghanistan in our col­umn. . . .Shack­ley was work­ing with the Royal fam­i­lies in the Gulf . . . all were con­tribut­ing to the effort in the early 1980’s.’”

(Idem.)

4.

“Clines con­ceded that the off-the-books intel­li­gence oper­a­tions had been melded into the Afghan war effort. ‘We worked for who was help­ing the United States the most. The Saudis worked very closely with us.’ Clines recalled how Bernard Houghton, who had run Nugan Hand Bank in Saudi Ara­bia until it ran out of money, played a key role, work­ing with Prince Turki and the Saudi GID.”

(Idem.)

5. Out of the enor­mous amounts of money the Saudis and the Safari Club chan­neled to the Afghan mujahideen sup­port effort, the Pak­ista­nis diverted a large sum in order to under­write the cost of their nuclear network.

“What many peo­ple do not know was that the Safari Club had made a deal with Pak­istan at the expense of the Afghan peo­ple. The Safari Club was run by the Saudis. It was a club to serve their pur­poses through the CIA. Shack­ley and Wil­son were not mem­bers; only nations could belong. Shack­ley and Wil­son were men who served the club in exchange for power, influ­ence, and money. Pak­istani Intel­li­gence would han­dle all the money going to facil­i­tate the proxy war against the Sovi­ets. That meant that hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars from the United States and Saudi Ara­bia were being run through Pak­istan with no account­abil­ity. ‘Unfor­tu­nately,’ said Robert Crow­ley, ‘the Pak­ista­nis knew exactly where their cut of the money was to go.’ Where the money went was into an Islamic nuclear-weapons pro­gram sup­ported by Saudi Ara­bia and accepted by the United States.”

(Ibid.; p. 314.)

6. Despite U.S. claims to the con­trary, this coun­try did not inter­dict the A.Q. Khan net­work. On the con­trary, the U.S. blocked British attempts at inter­dict­ing A.Q. Khan’s operations

“Dur­ing the early 1990’s, British Cus­toms began look­ing closely at the United States—Pakistan nuclear net­work. One of their top agents was an Arabic-speaking Mus­lim who trav­eled the world track­ing down A.Q. Khan’s net­work. The British soon learned that the United States had no inter­est in shut­ting down the net­work, which had been oper­at­ing for years. The Mus­lim cus­toms agent, whose iden­tity must be pro­tected for his own safety, was actu­ally con­fronted by Khan in Dubai, where the agent had traced a num­ber of Khan’s front com­pa­nies. The agent tes­ti­fied in a trial involv­ing asso­ciates of Khan’s that the father of the Pak­istani bomb con­fronted the Mus­lim cus­toms agent and called him ‘a trai­tor to Mus­lim peo­ple’ for uncov­er­ing the nuclear net­work that was sup­ply­ing weapons equip­ment to Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and North Korea.”

(Idem.)

7.

“A top French Intel­li­gence offi­cial, who asked that his name be with­held from pub­li­ca­tion, described the U.S.—Pakistani cover-up of the Khan net­work as hav­ing ‘an impor­tant prece­dent. Just as the U.S. allowed Israel to develop nuclear weapons, under pres­sure from the Saudis, the U.S. allowed Pak­istan to be Saudi Arabia’s proxy as the first Islamic nuclear state. The Saudis put up the cash and have clean hands as Pak­istan builds the bomb for its sup­posed defense against India over Kash­mir . . . but my coun­try and the British received no coop­er­a­tion start­ing in the 1980’s when we dis­cov­ered traces of Khan’s net­work. The U.S. did not want to dis­cuss it.’”

(Ibid.; pp. 314–315.)

8. The U.S. actu­ally shipped some of the hard­ware to A.Q. Khan’s operation!

“A senior source in the British gov­ern­ment, who asks not to be named, con­firms that Khan ran the net­work and that parts for the nuclear-weapons pro­gram came from the United States. Khan’s daugh­ter, attend­ing school in Eng­land, was being tutored, and at the ends of faxes deal­ing with logis­tics for her edu­ca­tion, Khan would some­times write, in his own hand, items he needed for the nuclear program.”

(Ibid.; p. 315.)

9. Next, the pro­gram details some of the his­tory and back­ground of the Pak­istani nuclear effort:

“Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons had begun some fif­teen years ear­lier. Shortly after tak­ing office in 1972, Pak­istani Prime Min­is­ter Zul­fiker Ali Bhutto expressed his deter­mi­na­tion to develop a nuclear capa­bil­ity. His pur­pose was two fold: to off­set the inher­ent threat posed by Pakistan’s much larger neigh­bor and avowed enemy, India; and to make his coun­try a leader of the Islamic world. After India det­o­nated its first atomic weapon on the Pak­istani bor­der in 1974, Bhutto pushed his nuclear pro­gram into high gear. To lead the effort, he tapped Abdul Qadeer Khan, an accom­plished met­al­lur­gist and busi­ness­man with a strong desire for wealth. To finance his ambi­tious pro­gram, Bhutto turned to his country’s oil-rich ally, Saudi Ara­bia, and to Libya. China also pledged assis­tance. By 1976, when George Bush served as CIA Direc­tor, U.S. intel­li­gence esti­mates reported, in a secret CIA report on Pak­istan, that Pak­istan was engaged in ‘a crash pro­gram to develop nuclear weapons.’”

(Idem.)

10. As men­tioned above, the U.S. “signed on” with the Pak­istani nuke pro­gram after the start of the Soviet inva­sion of Afghanistan.

“In 1979, while await­ing exe­cu­tion fol­low­ing his over­throw, Bhutto wrote in his mem­oirs that his goal as prime min­is­ter had been to put the ‘Islamic Civ­i­liza­tion’ on an even foot­ing with ‘Chris­t­ian, Jew­ish and Hindu Civ­i­liza­tions’ by cre­at­ing a ‘full nuclear capa­bil­ity’ for the Islamic world. The man who over­threw Bhutto, Gen­eral Muham­mad Zia ul Haq, car­ried on that effort. In April 1979, when Pres­i­dent Zia refused to halt work on the ‘Islamic Bomb,’ Pres­i­dent Jimmy Carter cut off Amer­i­can eco­nomic and mil­i­tary aid to Pak­istan. Just eight months later, how­ever, fol­low­ing the Soviet Union’s inva­sion of Afghanistan, Carter struck the ulti­mate Faus­t­ian bar­gain in order to win Zia’s approval for using Pak­istan as a base of oper­a­tions for the mujahideen. Zia’s for­tunes fur­ther improved fol­low­ing the 1980 elec­tion of Ronald Rea­gan and George H.W. Bush.”

(Ibid.; pp. 315–316.)

11.

“With the covert U.S. war in Afghanistan inten­si­fy­ing, the Pak­istani dic­ta­tor gained sig­nif­i­cant advan­tage and used it. In addi­tion to win­ning large eco­nomic and military-aid pack­ages for his coun­try, he extracted a promise from the Reagan-Bush admin­is­tra­tion that there would be no U.S. inter­fer­ence in Pakistan’s ‘inter­nal affairs.’ That meant no com­plaints about Zia’s dic­ta­to­r­ial rule and no obstruc­tion of his efforts to build an Islamic Bomb. To keep up appear­ances, Zia pub­licly main­tained that he was not devel­op­ing nuclear weapons. How­ever, in 1983, a secret State Depart­ment brief­ing memo revealed that there was ‘unam­bigu­ous evi­dence’ that Pak­istan was ‘actively pur­su­ing a nuclear weapons devel­op­ment pro­gram’ and that China was pro­vid­ing tech­no­log­i­cal assis­tance. At the time, U.S. law pro­hib­ited pro­vid­ing assis­tance to any coun­try that was import­ing cer­tain nuclear-weapons tech­nol­ogy. The Reagan-Bush admin­is­tra­tion sim­ply ignored the leg­is­la­tion, argu­ing that cut­ting off aid to Pak­istan would harm U.S. national interests.”

(Ibid.; p. 316.)

12. Texas Con­gress­man Char­lie Wil­son was a major backer of the Afghan mujahideen and actively encour­aged the Pak­ista­nis to con­tinue to develop their nuclear program.

“Through­out the 1980’s, Con­gress­man Char­lie Wil­son, the for­mer Ed Wil­son asso­ciate, act­ing in con­cert with the CIA, repeat­edly blocked Con­gres­sional efforts to halt Amer­i­can fund­ing of Pak­istan in order to pro­tect a key ally in the covert Afghan war. Wil­son went so far as to tell Zia, ‘Mr. Pres­i­dent, as far as I’m con­cerned you can make all the bombs you want.’ Zia pri­vately assured the con­gress­man that Pakistan’s nuclear pro­gram was peace­ful and that it would never build a deliv­ery sys­tem. ‘The truth was the Amer­i­cans had lit­tle choice,’ [Dawud] Salahud­din said. ‘Zia was wor­shipped by the mujahideen. He was the only for­eign leader who attracted uni­ver­sal admi­ra­tion amongst them, even though they were well aware that his ISI [Inter Ser­vice Intel­li­gence] guys were tak­ing what the Afghans fig­ured was a 60-percent cut on all that was being sent to them. None of that took any glow off Zia’s halo. He was the only one to open his coun­try to the Afghan resis­tance, allowed train­ing camps, and there were always more Afghan refugees in Pak­istan than in Iran. The Ira­ni­ans did noth­ing of the sort or the scale in the mil­i­tary sphere. . . .The guy was almost saint-like for the resistance.’”

(Ibid.; pp. 316–317.)

13. Amer­i­can com­plic­ity with the pro­gram was assisted by Pak­istani pres­i­dent Zia’s equiv­o­ca­tion about the goals of their nuclear pro­gram, which he main­tained were peaceful.

“Zia con­tin­ued to deceive the United States about his nuclear-weapons ambi­tions. In the mid-1980’s, he flatly told the U.S. Ambas­sador to the United Nations, Ver­non Wal­ters, that Pak­istan was not build­ing a bomb. When senior State Depart­ment offi­cials later con­fronted him about the mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion, Zia told them, ‘It is per­mis­si­ble to lie for Islam.’ He even­tu­ally gave up the pre­tense, telling Time mag­a­zine in 1987 that ‘Pak­istan has the capa­bil­ity of build­ing the bomb.’”

(Ibid.; p. 317.)

14.

“By 1985, the Saudi royal fam­ily had suc­ceeded in draw­ing the United States into an Islamic morass. Over the years, the Wah­habi sect, a rad­i­cal form of anti-Western Islam, had increas­ingly caused the high-living royal fam­ily polit­i­cal prob­lems at home. To deal with this, the royal fam­ily gave the Wah­habi lead­ers free rein and paid lip ser­vice to their dia­tribes against the West and Israel. But after the fall of the Pea­cock Throne in Iran, reli­gious divi­sions sur­faced within the royal fam­ily, con­tribut­ing to a schiz­o­phre­nia in Saudi Arabia’s for­eign pol­icy: with one hand the Saudis sup­ported the sec­u­lar Sad­dam Hus­sein against the Islamic regime in Iran, and with the other they dis­patched Osama bin Laden and oth­ers as mem­bers of Saudi Intel­li­gence to work with the most rad­i­cal Islamic ele­ments fight­ing to secure con­trol of Afghanistan. The anti-Communist Reagan-Bush pol­icy mak­ers focused only on the goal of weak­en­ing the Soviet Union, ignor­ing the threat of rad­i­cal Islam.”

(Idem.)

15. The Pak­istani nuclear effort was sub­si­dized through the BCCI—a vehi­cle for much of the covert oper­at­ing of the 1980s. Cur­rent FBI direc­tor Robert Mueller led the offi­cial “inves­ti­ga­tion” into BCCI, and cov­ered up much of what was there to be discovered.

“The efforts by the Saudis, Rea­gan, Casey, and Bush to desta­bi­lize the Soviet Union through the war in Afghanistan car­ried a huge price in terms of both money and the num­ber of Afghan lives lost. Hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars poured into Pak­istani Intel­li­gence from the United States, with almost no con­trol on how the funds were spent. The same BCCI bank accounts being used to fund the Afghan resis­tance were also used to fund the Pak­istani nuclear-bomb pro­gram, accord­ing to a Sen­ate report on BCCI.”

(Idem.)

16.

“The Reagan-Bush pol­icy vio­lated both Amer­i­can law and inter­na­tional non­pro­lif­er­a­tion treaties. But this type of vio­la­tion was not unprece­dented: the United States had allowed covert aid to Israel to help with their nuclear-weapons pro­gram in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In 1964, Lyn­don John­son had given James Angle­ton per­mis­sion to assist Israel in fur­ther devel­op­ing its nuclear-weapons pro­gram. Now the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion was lev­el­ing the play­ing field. The Saudis claimed that Israel had directly aided India in devel­op­ing its pro­gram and had thus cre­ated a dan­ger­ous imbal­ance in the region. Allow­ing Pak­istan to develop a weapon, but not to deploy it, seemed like a work­able com­pro­mise and, the Saudis argued, the only solu­tion. The 1979 memo from Zbig­niew Brzezin­ski to Pres­i­dent Carter—had warned that the price of lur­ing the Sovi­ets might include aban­don­ing efforts to stop nuclear pro­lif­er­a­tion in Pak­istan. Just six years later, the Reagan-Bush team played a huge role in mak­ing the first Islamic nuclear weapon possible.”

(Ibid.; pp. 317–318.)

17. CIA Soviet ana­lyst Melvin Good­man was among those few Amer­i­can intel­li­gence ana­lysts who noted that we were back­ing the wrong Islamic groups in Afghanistan. Arms dealer Sarkis Soghan­lian (deeply involved with the Bush-Reagan-Safari Club clan­des­tine oper­a­tions of the 1980’s) main­tains that the A.Q. Khan net­work was at all times directed by the Saudis.

“By the mid-1980’s, so much money was flow­ing through the Pak­istani ISI that the CIA did not have a han­dle on where it ws going, accord­ing to Melvin Good­man, a for­mer CIA ana­lyst on the Soviet Union. ‘They were fund­ing the wrong Islamic groups . . . ‚’ said Good­man, ‘and had lit­tle idea where the money was going or how it was being spent.’ Sarkis Soghana­lian, who prof­ited from pro­vid­ing arms for the secret-aid pro­gram, put it bluntly: ‘As in Iraq, the U.S. did not want to get its hands dirty. So the Saudis’ money and the U.S. money was han­dled by ISI. I can tell you that more than three quar­ters of the money was skimmed off the top. What went to buy weapons for the Afghan fight­ers was peanuts.’ Accord­ing to Soghana­lian, the funds were first laun­dered through var­i­ous BCCI accounts before being dis­bursed to ISI and into an elab­o­rate net­work run by A.Q. Khan. ‘Khan’s net­work was con­trolled by the Saudis, not Khan and not Pak­istan,’ Soghana­lian said. [Empha­sis added.] ‘The Saudis were in on every major deal includ­ing Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Malaysia.’”

(Ibid.; p. 318.)

18.

“After two decades of silence on Pakistan’s nuclear-proliferation net­work, the CIA went pub­lic in 2004, tak­ing credit for uncov­er­ing the net­work. After A.Q. Khan’s bizarre con­fes­sion, apol­ogy, and sub­se­quent par­don (‘There was never any kind of autho­riza­tion for these activ­i­ties by the gov­ern­ment,’ Khan said on Pak­istani tele­vi­sion. ‘I take full respon­si­bil­ity for my actions and seek your par­don’), the CIA claimed it had suc­cess­fully exposed Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. In fact, Khan’s net­work was only the tip of a huge nuclear-technology iceberg.”

(Ibid.; pp. 318–319.)

19. Recent claims by the CIA that they had “uncov­ered” and “inter­dicted” the A.Q. Khan net­work are as disin­gen­u­ous as Khan’s pre­pos­ter­ous pub­lic procla­ma­tion that he alone—and not the Pak­istani government—was respon­si­ble for the oper­a­tion. That’s right, A.Q. Khan was a “lone nut!”

“The truth of how much the CIA and the pri­vate intel­li­gence net­work knew in the 1980’s and what their actual role might have been is sug­gested by a pair of crim­i­nal cases—one in Lon­don and one in Hous­ton. In each case, the defen­dant received very kind treat­ment from author­i­ties, who allowed the nuclear-proliferation net­work to con­tinue operating.”

(Ibid.; p. 319.)

20. Much of the rest of the pro­gram is devoted to a chill­ing dis­cus­sion of the myr­iad oper­a­tions of Nazir Ahmed Vaid, one of the A.Q. Khan network’s prin­ci­pal oper­a­tives. In addi­tion to the fact that Vaid’s oper­a­tions appear to have been con­ducted while he func­tioned as a CIA asset, it is vitally impor­tant to note that his U.S.-based activ­i­ties were allowed to con­tinue after 9/11!! The George W. Bush admin­is­tra­tion turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear efforts as yet another quid pro quo—this one in exchange for Pakistan’s “coop­er­a­tion” in “the war on ter­ror.” As was the case with much of the rest of the Khan network’s efforts, Vaid’s activ­i­ties were also con­ducted through the BCCI, to a cer­tain extent.

“In June 1984, the U.S. fed­eral agents arrested Nazir Ahmed Vaid, a thirty-three-year-old Pak­istani, as he attempted to smug­gle out of Hous­ton fifty high-speed elec­tronic switches of a kind used to trig­ger nuclear bombs. At the time of the arrest, U.S. Cus­toms agents seized sev­eral let­ters directly link­ing Vaid to S.A. Butt, the direc­tor of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Com­mis­sion. Butt was already well known to U.S. and Euro­pean arms con­trol offi­cials as ‘they key oper­a­tive in Pakistan’s suc­cess­ful attempts in Europe in the 1970’s to obtain the tech­nol­ogy and resources for the enrich­ment of ura­nium and the repro­cess­ing of plu­to­nium.’ Vaid report­edly offered to pay for the switches in gold, later deter­mined to have been sup­plied by BCCI. U.S. fed­eral offi­cials, how­ever, never informed the pros­e­cu­tors that the let­ters con­nected Vaid to the Pak­istani bomb pro­gram. Instead, a very spe­cial deal was worked out.”

(Idem.)

21. Note the evi­dence of U.S. com­plic­ity in Vaid’s activities!!

“Vaid ulti­mately pleaded guilty to one count of ille­gally attempt­ing to export the switches, known as kry­trons, with­out a license. U.S. Dis­trict Judge James DeAnda sen­tenced Vaid to five years’ pro­ba­tion, the min­i­mum pos­si­ble sen­tence. At Vaid’s sen­tenc­ing, both Judge DeAnda and the pros­e­cu­tor agreed that Vaid was not a for­eign agent. DeAnda described him sim­ply as a busi­ness­man ‘try­ing to expe­dite what he thought was a busi­ness deal.’ Just three weeks later, Vaid was deported. Accord­ing to reporter Sey­mour Hersh, Arnold Raphel, who served as the U.S. Ambas­sador to Pak­istan, later revealed that there had been a ‘fix in’ on the Vaid case and that the CIA had arranged for the mat­ter to be han­dled quietly.”

(Ibid.; pp. 319–320.)

22.

“Because of his con­vic­tion and depor­ta­tion, Vaid was pro­hib­ited from return­ing to the United States. His name appears on a U.S. Bureau of Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment (ICE) data­base of banned indi­vid­u­als. Nev­er­the­less, accord­ing to an ICE spokesman, Vaid has entered the coun­try more than a half dozen times dur­ing the past sev­eral years. By sim­ply drop­ping his last name and becom­ing ‘Nazir Ahmed,’ Vaid ‘fraud­u­lently’ obtained mul­ti­ple visas from the U.S. State Depart­ment, accord­ing to ICE.”

(Ibid.; p. 320.)

23.

“Dur­ing his recent visits—some after the Sep­tem­ber 11, 2001, attacks—Vaid has estab­lished, in Texas, a string of com­pa­nies with for­eign affil­i­a­tions. Three in par­tic­u­lar stand out. On July 22, 2002, Vaid, using the name Nazir Ahmed, and his brother, Mohammed Iqbal Vaid, incor­po­rated Najood Trad­ing, Inc., and Idafa Invest­ments, Inc. The sole share­holder in Majood is a com­pany of the same name based in Dubai, United Arab Emi­rates. The Emi­rates are known to have been used as a trans­ship­ment point by the Khan net­work. The Dubai com­pany iden­ti­fies itself as being engaged in, among other things, ‘Build­ing Ser­vice Mate­ri­als Trad­ing, Con­struc­tion Mate­ri­als Trad­ing, Roof­ing Mate­ri­als & Acces­sories.’ The direc­tors of the Texas com­pany are ‘Nazir Ahmed’ and Ahmed Ali, whose address is the same as that of the Dubai par­ent company.”

(Idem.)

24.

“The sole share­holder in Idafa Invest­ments is an Islamic invest­ment firm of the same name based in Mum­bai, India. The Web site for the par­ent com­pany iden­ti­fies it as a broad-based invest­ment advi­sory and man­age­ment firm that oper­ates on Quranic prin­ci­ples. The founder of the Indian com­pany is listed as Ashraf Abdul-Haq Moham­edy. One of the direc­tors of the Texas com­pany is Ashraf Abdul­hak [sic] Moham­edy. The oth­ers are Mohamed Ashraf Abdul­hak Moham­edy, Moham­mad [sic] Vaid, and ‘Nazir Ahmed.’ The Indian company’s Web site pro­vides a link to Islamic Quest, an orga­ni­za­tion ‘estab­lished to present the cor­rect posi­tion of Islam to Non-Muslims.’ The con­tact per­son for Islamic Quest is listed as Ashraf Abdul­haq Mohemedy.”

(Idem.)

25.

“Mohammed Vaid signed the incor­po­ra­tion papers for both Majood and Idafa on the same day, July 19, 2002, and before the same notary pub­lic. On that same day, and before the same notary. ‘Nazir Ahmed’ signed the incor­po­ra­tion papers for yet another com­pany, MEC Enter­prises (USA), Inc. (The sig­na­ture above the printed words ‘Nazir Ahmed’ appears to read sim­ply ‘Vaid.’) The sole share­holder in the com­pany is MEC Engi­neer­ing is a met­als machin­ing and man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pany. Its many ‘func­tions,’ as listed on its Web site, include: ‘Tanks Ves­sels & Shells,’ ‘Phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal Machiner­ies & Equip­ment,’ ‘Waste Water Treat­ment,’ and ‘Engi­neer­ing Pipeline Con­struc­tion.’ The own­ers of MEC Engi­neer­ing are Abdul Qavi Qureshi and Abdul Majid Qureshi. The direc­tors of the Texas sub­sidiary, MEC Enter­prises, are ‘Nazir Ahmed’ and Mohammed Aslam Qureshi of Karachi.”

(Ibid.; p. 321.)

26.

“As recently revealed, Khan’s mid­dle­man, B.S.A. Tahir, helped estab­lish a sub­sidiary of a Malaysian metal machin­ing com­pany and used it to man­u­fac­ture parts for high-speed cen­trifuges for enrich­ing ura­nium. The parts were trans­shipped through Tahir’s Dubai-based front com­pa­nies to end users such as Libya.”

(Idem.)

27.

“The first known U.S. com­pany the Vaids set up fol­low­ing Nazir’s depor­ta­tion was Fina­tra Com­mu­ni­ca­tions, Inc. The com­pany was incor­po­rated by a third party, Ameen M. Ali of Hous­ton, in August 1996. The share­hold­ers were Mohammed Vaid, 20 per­cent, and ‘Nazir Ahmed,’ 80 per­cent. Both listed res­i­den­tial addresses in Hous­ton. In 1999, the Vaids changed the name of the com­pany to Fina­tra Group of Companies.”

(Idem.)

28.

“Nazir Vaid also oper­ates a branch of Fina­tra in Pak­istan. A 1997 arti­cle in Pak­istan & Gulf Econ­o­mist refers to ‘Nazir Ahmed Vaid’ as the chief exec­u­tive of Finatra’s Cyber­cafe in Karachi, report­edly the first such estab­lish­ment in Pak­istan. The par­ent of the Cyber-café is the Fina­tra Group of Com­pa­nies, also based in Karachi. Fina­tra Group con­trols sev­eral busi­nesses, includ­ing a Web-hosting ser­vice, and energy-generation com­pany, phone and cell-phone men­tal agen­cies, and a pre­paid call­ing card dealer called Fina­tra Com­mu­ni­ca­tions Pri­vate Lim­ited. In 1998, Fina­tra Com­mu­ni­ca­tions signed a con­tract with Pakistan’s offi­cial phone com­pany, Pak­istan Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions Com­pany Ltd., to pro­vide pre­paid phone-card ser­vice in Pak­istan. The ser­vice also allows direct inter­na­tional dial­ing. All of these busi­nesses could be use­ful to an intel­li­gence ser­vice or a ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion. In 2004, U.S. Cus­toms was plan­ning to detain Vaid on his next trip to the United States after being warned by a reporter that Vaid was trav­el­ing freely between the U.S. and Pak­istan. In the fall of 2004, a U.S. Cus­toms agent inex­plic­a­bly told Vaid’s son that there was a deten­tion order out on his father. That inci­dent raises major ques­tions about Vaid’s rela­tion­ship with the United States government—and about secu­rity in the Cus­toms Service.”

(Ibid.; pp. 321–322.)

29. Again, note that Vaid was able to func­tion in the U.S. after 9/11!

“Accord­ing to an ICE spokesman, Vaid last left the United States on Novem­ber 1, 2002. More than one CIA source said that Nazir Vaid is a CIA ‘asset.’ In a tele­phone inter­view, Vaid flatly denied work­ing for U.S. or Pak­istani Intel­li­gence. He also insists he is not engaged in the trade or ship­ment of nuclear technology.”

(Ibid.; p. 322.)

30. The George W. Bush admin­is­tra­tion was “shocked, shocked!” to learn of Pakistan’s Islamic bomb pro­gram. Note that the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion had imposed sanc­tions on Pak­istan because of its nuclear activ­i­ties. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion lifted those sanc­tions two weeks after 9/11!

“The George W. Bush admin­is­tra­tion expresses shock at the fact that Pakistan’s declared Islamic Bomb pro­gram became just that—a pan-Islamic nuclear-weapons super­mar­ket. This is the same Bush admin­is­tra­tion that, in an eerily famil­iar move—just two weeks after the ter­ror­ist attacks on Sep­tem­ber 11, 2001—lifted the sanc­tions that had been imposed by the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion on Pak­istan because of its nuclear-weapons activ­i­ties. The Bush change was to win Islamabad’s assis­tance in the new war in Afghanistan—the ‘war on ter­ror­ism.’ This is also the same admin­is­tra­tion that—publicly, at least—accepts A.Q. Khan’s absurd con­fes­sion that he is respon­si­ble personally—and not as an agent of the Pak­istani government—for dis­sem­i­nat­ing nuclear weapons know-how to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.”

(Idem.)

31.

“The fact that the United States had pro­tected the Islamic Bomb pro­gram also emerged in the Edwin Wil­son case. Dur­ing the time Wil­son was fugi­tive, the for­mer CIA front man sent the Rea­gan White House and the CIA detailed infor­ma­tion about the Libyan nuclear pro­gram. The mem­o­ran­dum went from Wil­son in Libya, through his lawyers, to Ted Shack­ley and the National Secu­rity Adviser. Wil­son would later say he was never asked or ques­tioned about what he had learned about the Libyan nuclear program. . . .”

(Ibid.; pp. 322–323.)

Discussion

No comments for “FTR #524 The Safari Club and the ‘Islamic Bomb’”

Post a comment