Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #527 Death Trap, Part II

Recorded September 18, 2005
See also FTR #471 Death Trap

In the run-up to the Iraq war, Mr. Emory suggested that the U.S. was falling into a trap laid by the Underground Reich, in which this country would find itself fighting a draining and (ultimately) annihilating war against the Muslim peoples of what the Third Reich’s geopoliticians called “The Earth Island.” The For The Record programs numbering in the late “390’s” and running up to number 400 discuss this scenario at length and in detail. In FTR#471 and FTR#502, we examined how the unfolding of the Iraqi misadventure appears to be bearing out these fears. In this program, we examine how the US invasion has helped bring about an Islamic fundamentalist government in Iraq—one aligned with Iran. After reviewing the Doomsday relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda, we examine the terrifying failure of the US to secure Saddam’s WMD scientists, thereby actually increasing the danger of WMD technology spreading beyond Iraq’s borders. This, of course, is precisely the scenario the U.S. was ultimately supposed to be going to war to prevent. Will this failure to secure Saddam’s WMD scientists actually accomplish what the war was ostensibly being fought to prevent—the dissemination of WMD technology to terrorists, al Qaeda in particular?! The program concludes with a look at Hitler’s projected use of the Muslim nations as proxy warriors for the Reich, as well as the recruiting boon that the war has been for al Qaeda and related elements.

Program Highlights Include: The story of Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, the developer of Saddam’s centrifuge program; the way in which the US invasion has actually scattered Saddam’s WMD scientists, most of whom are unaccounted for; the CIA’s foolish display of captured Iraqi nuclear technology on its website; the agreement between Saddam and bin Laden to share WMD information, so that bin Laden’s forces could act as a “back-up” for Saddam in the worst-case scenario of the U.S. removing him from power—a scenario which came true.

1. The program begins by presenting a column by Robert Scheer, which not only chronicles the extent to which the Iraq invasion has become a quagmire, but underscores the fact that that country is becoming an Islamic fundamentalist state with very close ties to Iran. It is worth noting that even though it is Shiite, Iran maintains very close ties to the Al Taqwa milieu. For more about the Iran/Al Taqwa ties, see—among other programs–FTR#’s 343, 352, 354, 371. Key Nazi operative Francois Genoud (discussed below in paragraph #36 and himself very close to the Al Taqwa milieu) paid for the Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile in France, as discussed in FTR#352. “WHO LOST Iraq? Someday, as a fragmented Iraq spirals further into religious madness, terrorism and civil war, there will be a bipartisan inquiry into this blundering intrusion into another people’s history.”
(“Iraq’s Fig-Leaf Constitution” by Robert Scheer; San Francisco Chronicle; 8/31/2005; P. B7.)

2. “The crucial question will be why a ‘preemptive’ American invasion — which has led to the deaths of nearly 2,000 Americans, roughly 10 times as many Iraqis, the expenditure of about $200 billion and incalculable damage to the United States’ global reputation — has had exactly the opposite effect predicted by its neoconservative sponsors. No amount of crowing over a fig leaf Iraqi constitution by President Bush can hide the fact that the hand of the region’s autocrats, theocrats and terrorists is stronger than ever.” (Idem.)

3. “ ‘The U.S. now has to recognize that [it] overthrew Saddam Hussein to replace him with a pro-Iranian state,’ said regional expert Peter W. Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to Croatia and an adviser to the Iraqi Kurds. And, he could have added, a pro-Iranian state that will be repressive and unstable.” (Idem.)

4. “Think this is an exaggeration? Consider that arguably the most powerful Shiite political party and militia in today’s Iraq, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and its affiliated paramilitary force, the Badr Brigade, was not only based in Iran but was set up by Washington’s old arch-foe, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It also fought on the side of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and was recog­nized by Tehran as the government in exile of Iraq.” (Idem.)

5. Note that Ahmad Chalabi—a probable double agent for Iran—approves of the Islamic fundamentalist constitution and is an important figure in the new government. In FTR#502, we examined disinformation presented by a Chalabi-selected agent nicknamed “Curveball” and nurtured by the BND (the German foreign intelligence service and the successor to the Reihard Gehlen Nazi spy outfit). That disinformation was the basis for the US claim that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction, as well as the rationale for the war itself. “Or that former exile Ahmad Chalabi is now one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers. The consummate political operator managed to maintain ties to Iran while gaining the devoted support of Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, charming and manipulating Beltway policymakers and leading U.S. journalists into believing that Iraq was armed with weapons of mass destruction. Chalabi is thrilled with the draft constitution, which, if passed, will probably exponentially increase tension and violence between Sunnis and Shiites. ‘It is an excellent document,’ said Chalabi, who has been accused by U.S. intelligence of being a spy for Iran, where he keeps a vacation home.” (Idem.)

6. “What an absurd outcome for a war designed to create a compliant, unified and stable client state that would be pro-American, laissez-faire capitalist and unallied with the hated Iran. Of course, Bush tells us again, this is ‘progress’ and ‘an inspiration.’ Yet his relentless spinning of manure into silk has worn thin on the American public and sent his approval ratings tumbling. Even supporters of the war are starting to realize that rather than strengthening the United States’ position in the world, the invasion and occupation have led to abject humiliation: from the Abu Ghraib scandal, to the guerrilla insurgency exposing the limits of military power, to an election in which ‘our guy’ — lyad Allawi — was defeated by radicals and religious extremists.” (Idem.)

7. “In a new low, the U.S. president felt obliged to call and plead with the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, Abdelaziz Hakim, to make con­cessions to gain Sunni support. Even worse, he was summarily rebuffed. Nevertheless, Bush had no choice but to eat crow and like it. ‘This is a document of which the Iraqis, and the rest of the world, can be proud,’ he said Sunday, through what must have been gritted teeth. After all, this docum

ent includes such democratic gems as ‘Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of legislation,’ and ‘No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam,’ as well as socialist-style pronouncements that work and a decent standard of living are a right guaranteed by the state. But the fact is, it could establish Khomeini’s ghost as the patron saint of Iraq and Bush would have little choice but to endorse it.” (Idem.)

8. “Even many in his own party are rebelling. ‘I think our involvement there has destabilized the Middle East. And the longer we stay there, I think the further destabilization will occur,’ said Nebraska Sen. Chuck Hagel last week, one of a growing number of Republicans who get that ‘we should start figuring out how we get out of there.’ Not that our ‘what-me-worry?’ president is the least bit troubled by all this adverse blowback from the huge, unnecessary gamble he took in invading the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds. ‘What is important is that the Iraqis are now ad­dressing these issues through debate and discussion, not at the barrel of a gun,’ Bush said.” (Idem.)

9. “Wrong again, George. It was the barrel of your gun that midwifed the new Iraq, which threatens to combine the instability of Lebanon with the religious fanaticism of Iran.” (Idem.)

10. Unfortunately, both the pro-war and anti-war sides have gotten it wrong with regard to Saddam’s relationship with Al Qaeda. Although there is no indication that Iraq or Saddam were involved with 9/11, the two entities did have a “doomsday back-up” arrangement. Saddam and bin Laden worked out an arrangement in which Iraq—in order to provide for a payback capability if the U.S. ousted the Baathist dictator—gave information about WMD’s to bin Laden’s people. Al Qaeda, in turn, was to act as a back-up unit for Saddam’s Iraq, striking at the United States if it knocked out Saddam. Of course, precisely that scenario has transpired. “It appears, however, that this version is the publicly admissible one, the one that can pass political muster. According to the same sources, there was another scenario more in keeping with the calculating mentality of Saddam Hussein and his secret services. In 1998, after declining all offers that had been made to them through official diplomatic channels, those services are reported to have established a secret operational ‘connection’ with bin Laden in Manila and in Kashmir. It was indeed difficult for Iraq to ignore an Arab like Osama bin Laden who so effectively humiliated the Americans.’ Colonel Khairallah al Takiriti, the brother of the head of Mukkhabarat, the intelligence services, is reported to have been named case officer for the connection. The arrest of two Morroccan associates of bin Laden in Rabat on November 11, 1998, made it possible to establish to establish the link with certainty. According to Western sources, the Iraqi services have sought to secure the assistance of bin Laden’s networks, in case Iraq were again to be attacked by the United States, in order to carry out attacks against American targets in Arab countries.”
(In the Name of Osama Bin Laden; by Roland Jacquard; Copyright 2002 [SC]; Duke University Press; ISBN 0-8223-2991-3; pp. 112-113.)

11. “According to Arab sources, in anticipation of a foreseeable reversal of alliances in Kabul, bin Laden had been in discreet contact since September 2000 with associates of Oudai Hussein, another of Saddam’s sons; the ground for agreement was the anti-Israeli and anti-American battle. Bin Laden and the Iraqis are said to have exchanged information about chemical and biological weapons, despite the opposition of some of the Baghdad leadership, including Tarik Aziz” (Ibid.;p. 113.)

12. In light of the “Doomsday back-up” arrangement mentioned above, it is particularly frightening to contemplate how the failure to secure Saddam’s WMD scientists has potentially exposed the U.S. to exactly the scenario Condoleeza Rice and company were using as a rationale for war—a “mushroom cloud” smoking-gun. Was this all due to incompetence, or (as Mr. Emory suspects) was incompetence manipulated by Underground Reich elements in order to put the U.S. in a position to be destroyed and/or subjugated?! A pivotally important article from Mother Jones magazine discusses the alarming failure to secure the scientists. The article revolves around the story of Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, the man in charge of the Iraqi nuclear centrifuge program. (In FTR#395, we saw how that program evolved from the Third Reich’s nuclear development program.) “I met the mastermind of Saddam Hussein’s former nuclear centrifuge program outside the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad a few days after U.S. troops took over the city in 2003. Despite the midday heat he was dressed in a sport coat and tie, which made him look incongruous amid a scruffy crowd of protesters gathered to shout slogans at the U.S. Marines guarding the hotel. He said his name was Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, and he showed me a printout of a prewar Washington Post story in which he was named as one of the Iraqi weapons scientists whom the U.S. government had very much wanted to interview. His eyes darted nervously back and forth between the protesters and the tense-looking Marines inside the cordon of concertina wire.”
(“In the Garden of Armageddon” by Kurt Pitzer; Mother Jones; Setptember/October/2005 [Vol. 30, Number 5.]; p. 42.)

13. “Minutes earlier he had approached a photographer friend of mine on the street, saying he wanted to reach out to Washington with some important information about Saddam’s nuclear program. It was a desperate move. He had tried contacting U.S. troops, but they had rebuffed him and threatened him with arrest if he showed up again. Now he wanted to know if I could use my satellite phone to help him. At first I didn’t know whether to believe him. But that night, at his urging, I dialed the Washington number of David Albright, a former American member of the United Nations weapons inspections team in Iraq. When I explained who had given me his name; the line went silent for a moment.” (Idem.)

14. “ ‘You are actually talking to Obeidi?’ Albright finally asked. ‘Where is he? What did he say?’ Albright had met Obeidi in Iraq in the 1990s, when the U.N. inspectors were dismantling Saddam’s WMD programs. Saddam had kept Obeidi’s identity secret longer than that of any other scientist, Albright said. If anyone could say for sure what had happened to Iraq’s nuclear program, it was him. The next day we dialed didn’t seem to have much of a plan for dealing with Saddam’s WMD scientists.” (Idem.)

15. Obeidi had buried critical documents about Saddam’s nuclear program in his back yard. “So we waited. A dapper 59-year-old, Obeidi arrived every day to greet me wearing an elegant abiyaa robe. When he felt especially nervous, we met in clandestine locations: by lamplight at my translator’s home or in the courtyard of an Iraqi acquaintance. At other times, we sat on plastic lawn chairs in his garden, trying to figure out how he could avoid arrest by U.S. troops, as his wife and daughters served us cookies and tea. Every now and again, he would drop hints about the secrets he wanted to reveal. Then one day, he gestured toward a spot in the garden. Buried under the lotus tree next to his rosebushes a few feet from whe

re we sat, he said, was the core of Saddam’s nuclear quest: blueprints and prototype pieces for building centrifuges to enrich uranium to bomb grade. Twelve years earlier, he had buried them on orders from Saddam’s son Qusay-presumably, he said, to use them to restart a bomb program someday.” (Idem.)

16. Obeidi also had some of the hardware stored in his buried cache of blueprints—together with the drawings, they comprised a critical cache of knowledge. “Obeidi dug up the cache a few days later. When he showed me the four prototypes, his hands shook. The machine parts looked alien, like pieces of a futuristic motorcycle, most of them small enough to fit inside a briefcase. He explained that these components and the three-foot-high stack of diagrams were still immensely valuable—and immensely dangerous. They represented the core knowledge it would take to jump-start a covert bomb program, anywhere in the world. This was why Obeidi was so anxious. On any given day he might be arrested by U.S. forces who would consider him a ‘bad guy,’ or killed by Saddam loyalists who would see him as a collaborator, or kidnapped by some other country interested in what he knew. The decision to come forward had been a hard one.” (Ibid.; pp. 42-43.)

17. Obeidi asked why the Americans were not more interested in securing the documents and the many Iraqi scientists who possessed crucial know-how about WMD’s. Indeed, why aren’t they?! “The news from Albright over the satellite phone was discouraging. U.S. intelligence on the ground was hopelessly disorganized, and there was no guarantee that American troops wouldn’t imprison Obeidi even if he offered to help them. As the days wore on he felt the clock ticking, and sometimes his fear and exasperation would show through. ‘Why aren’t they more interested in finding out what I have to offer?’ he once asked in the textbook English he had learned as a student at the Colorado School of Mines in the 1960s. ‘I can answer many of their questions. Surely for a great nation like the United States, it is no big deal to offer me security in exchange for everything I want to divulge. Why don’t they want to help me?’” (Ibid.; p 43.)

18. “I didn’t have an answer. Just weeks earlier, before the invasion, President Bush had railed against Saddam for intimidating his WMD scientists and hiding them from inspectors. Colin Powell had appeared before the United Nations Security Council and warned that Obeidi’s centrifuge program posed a threat to the world. It was hard to explain why, having gone to war ostensibly to get control of Iraq’s dangerous knowledge, the United States was now doing so little to follow through. It’s not as if the administration hasn’t talked about the danger posed by Saddam’s WMD scientists. Whether Iraq had actual weapons or just ‘capabilities’ it didn’t matter, it has long argued: Even mere capabilities could leak out to terrorist groups or the states that support them. During the presidential campaign, John Kerry and President Bush reached a rare point of agreement when both named the spread of nuclear weapons as the No. 1 danger facing the United States.” (Idem.)

19. “As it happens, Saddam’s nuclear centrifuge program during the late 1980s was one of the most efficient covert nuclear efforts the world has ever seen. The scientists who pulled it off are very gifted men and women, many of whom are now out of work. Their names are still being kept secret by the international agencies familiar with their work. But a source close to one of those agencies recently said that of the 200-some scientists at the top of its nuclear list, all but three remain unaccounted for. In a country with porous borders, where everyone—but especially those associated with the former regime—is in danger every day, many experts say at least some scientists are bound to be tempted to sell their knowledge to the highest bidder. And as the Pakistani network exposed last year shows, the nuclear black market is alive and well.” (Idem.)

20. Analyst Anne Harrington framed the critical issue concerning Saddam’s WMD scientists: “ ‘Weapons don’t make themselves, says Anne Harrington, director of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academies. ‘Somebody has to interpret how to take military doctrine and intent and make it real. Materials, particularly nuclear materials, are not something you scoop out of the dirt. The human element is critical in all of this.’” (Ibid.; pp. 43-45.)

21. As noted by former CIA analyst Ray McGovern, the war may actually have increased the possibility of nuclear technology proliferating beyond Iraq. Was this intended by the Underground Reich from the beginning? “Nobody knows how many Iraqi scientists may have been lured over the borders into Iran, Syria, or beyond. Nobody knows because no one is keeping tabs. But several observers agree that so little attention is being paid to Iraq’s scientists, the war may actually have increased the chances of nuclear capabilities proliferating beyond the country’s borders. Between its unemployed scientists and the disappearance of large amounts of WMD-related materials from former weapons sites, Iraq now poses a nightmare scenario, according to Ray McGovern, who spent 27 years analyzing intelligence for the CIA and afterward co-founded Veteran Intellingence Professionals for Sanity. ‘The danger is much more acute, both from the proliferation side and the terrorism side,’ McGovern says. ‘Before we invaded, there was no evidence that Iraq had any plan or incentive to proliferate. They didn’t even have a current plan to develop WMD’s. They just hadn’t been doing it. Now, my God, we have a magnet attracting all manner of foreign jihadists to a place where the WMD expertise is suddenly unprotected. It just boggles the mind.’ [Emphasis added.]”

22. “Iraqi scientists have good reason to fear what might happen if they offer to cooperate with the United States.’ Obeidi’s former boss and Saddam’s top science adviser, General Amer al-Saadi, turned himself in to U.S. authorities just before I met Obeidi. He was promptly jailed and kept in custody for at least two years; a military spokesman told the Associated Press last year that the U.S. was also detaining up to a dozen other scientists. The chemist Mohammed Munim al-Izmerly— also said to have worked on Iraq’s former WMD programs—was taken into custody for questioning in April 2003. Ten months later his body was dropped off in a U.S. body bag at a Baghdad hospital. He had been killed by a blow to the head.” (Idem.)

23. “In the weeks after the invasion, I got to know Obeidi quite well. He was no Dr. Strangelove. He loved science and the pure logic of an engineering challenge, and his eyes would light up when we talked about early Mesopotamian art or American history. He said he detested Saddam and lamented how the Baathists had turned the best minds of his generation toward destructive ends. What he cared about more than anything was the welfare of his wife and four grown children. But as the U.S. occupation wore on, that seemed an increasingly elusive goal.” (Idem.)

24. “More than a month after our first meeting, our satellite phone calls had failed to produce any kind of safe-haven offer from Washington. Operatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency as well as the CIA had tracked Obeidi down through third parties, summoned him to their respective headquarters, and demanded that he surrender all he knew. The DIA agents threatened to imprison him, he told me, and then asked that he not speak to anyone at the CIA; soon afterward, the CIA sent armed agents to his home and took away a sample of his documents; promising to safeguard his family. Then, early on the morning of June 3, 2003, more than a dozen soldiers jumped over Obeidi’s garden wall, kicked in his front door, and put him and his family facedown on thei

r living room floor at gunpoint. Obeidi’s wife and children watched as he was handcuffed and put in a Humvee. Evidently, the Army had finally caught wind of Obeidi’s significance—and, just as evidently, the troops knew nothing of their own intelligence agencies’ contacts with him.” (Idem.)

25. “Obeidi escaped the fate of his former boss when the CIA intervened with the Army and got him released. Knowing that he was a marked man, he decided that his only hope was to go public. He consented to an interview with CNN, and soon afterward the CIA whisked him and his family off to Kuwait, where he underwent weeks of interrogations.” (Idem.)

26. Note that the CIA posted information on its website that could prove “incredibly useful” to anyone seeking to develop WMD’s. “On June 26, the CIA posted a press release about Obeidi’s cache—the most valuable WMD evidence the U.S. has yet obtained in Iraq—on its official website. It also put up digital photos of the components and even one of the key centrifuge diagrams. The pictures, which Albright says could be ‘incredibly useful’ to any regime trying to start a covert nuclear program, were online for almost a week-long enough to be downloaded and made freely available on the Internet—before the agency took them down. Literally buried for 12 years, some of Saddam’s hoard of nuclear knowledge got out because of the U.S. government, not in spite of it. [Emphasis added.]” (Idem.)

27. “Obeidi now lives with eight family members in a U.S. city that he asked me not to name. His son and three daughters are learning English and looking for jobs, and he occasionally gives talks to groups of government officials. He seems more relaxed than he did when I first met him, as though he is finally able to shed some of the fear and pressure of life in Baghdad. But the thought of his former colleagues still weighs heavily on his mind. One day as we were eating falafel from plastic plates in the food court near his new American home, sitting anonymously among the shoppers, he asked me why he was still the only Iraqi scientist whom the United States had seen fit to take out of harm’s way.” (Ibid.; p. 46.)

28. “ ‘There are a number of people who could be brought here, at least temporarily, and make positive contributions to this society,’ he said. ‘These are very educated and skill-full scientists. Surely this great nation could, absorb a few more talented people.’” (Idem.)

29. “During the 1990s, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other watchdog groups compiled lists of key participants in Saddam’s WMD programs. The IAEA roll call alone included about 2,000 names. One of the few that has been made public is that of Dr. Paris Abdul Aziz, a mild-mannered engineer who oversaw a staff of more than 200 working on the nuclear centrifuge program. I met him in Obeidi’s garden, and he told me that in the days after the invasion, he had gone to Saddam’s former Republican Palace to offer cooperation to the U.S. military on behalf of himself and other top nuclear scientists. But U.S. officials only wanted to know if he knew where Saddam was hiding and where they might find WMD stockpiles. They never asked him back for another interview. Today, no one seems to know where he is. ‘We’ve been trying to get in touch with these guys for months,’ Albright says. ‘But by now they’re probably so jaded and suspicious that they want nothing to do with the U.S.’” (Idem.)

30. “An even greater concern is the flight risk posed by scientists one level down: the technicians who have precise, hands-on knowledge of how to manufacture WMD com­ponents. Their expertise is priceless, especially to a covert program looking for engineers who know how to put the pieces together. A source with close ties to intelligence on the issue recently told me of the case of a female scientist who worked in Saddam’s centrifuge program, most likely Dr. Widad Hattam al-Jabbouri. In the 1980s, Jabbouri had mastered one of the most troublesome aspects of the uranium-enriching machine: the magnetic upper bearing that holds the centrifuge rotor as it spins at supersonic speeds. Her expertise on classified magnet technology was deep, and extremely valuable. ‘From what we have learned she has ended up at a university in Syria,’ the source said. ‘Apparently the Syrians basically set up a refuge for senior scientists, especially those with Baathist connections, who couldn’t get any work in Iraq.’” (Idem.)

31. “This does not necessarily mean that Jabbouri is working on a weapons program in Damascus. The Syrian govern­ment has stated that it has no nuclear program, despite the suspicions of many international experts. But her move to Syria underscores how loose a grasp the U.S. has on Iraq’s WMD knowledge. ‘The proliferation risk is higher than it was before, and a chaotic situation means this technology is going to spread,’ says Robert Baer, who spent 21 years as a case officer with the CIA in the Middle East. If the administration had been serious about neutralizing Saddam’s weapons program, he says, ‘the troops would have been securing equipment at weapons sites as they invaded, and they would have been looking for scientists…. It tells you that this war had nothing to do with WMDs.’” (Idem.)

32. “Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, Anne Harrington, then the deputy director of the Proliferation Threat Reduction Office of the State Department’s Non-Proliferation Bureau, began planning a trip to Iraq to meet former WMD scientists and help them get to work on rebuilding the country. Harrington had a legendary track record of working with scientists from the former Soviet Union. In 1997, she had cut through the red tape of diplomacy and sent an email directly to the head of the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology in Siberia. The contact led to increased U.S. government funds to help former Soviet bioweapons scientists apply for civilian projects at home rather than sell their expertise on the black market. Anne believed this was the most important thing to do,’ says Carl Phillips, a biological weapons expert from Texas Tech University who signed on to help Harrington in Iraq. ‘She believed in going over and putting our boots on the ground to find these people, and she was fearless.’” (Ibid.; pp. 46-47.)

33. “Harrington and Phillips proposed a $20 million plan to reach out to scientists in Baghdad. Their plan didn’t go over well with the Pentagon, which at that point controlled the interim government of Iraq; Phillips remembers being fold that as a condition for going, they had to agree not to make a formal request for the $20 million. Once they got to Baghdad, Harrington was aghast at the scale of the looting. Her $20 million would be a mere drop in the bucket. ‘You can’t just put somebody in a lab,’ she notes. ‘Not when they don’t have a microscope.’” (Ibid.; p. 47.)

34. Note that current U.S. ambassador to the U.N. was responsible for derailing Harrington’s project—an extremely modest one when considered against the backdrop of the billions of dollars in graft that have gone down the tubes in Iraq. “In the end, even Harrington’s drop in the bucket evapo­rated—never mind that the State Department had made an official announcement allocating the $20 million—and Harrington and Phillips had to make do with $2 million scraped together from emergency funds. Albright says re­sponsibility for the reversal lies with John Bolton, then the State Department’s undersecretary for arms control and international security. ‘All of this was going to land on Bolton’s desk,’ he notes. ‘And he was in the camp that thinks all these scientists are criminals.’ Other programs to help Iraqi scientists—including a Department of Energy program coordinated through Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico—have also come up short. ‘There are tens of thousands of scientists and engineers in need of
a job,’ says Dr. Arian Pregenzer, a senior scientist at Sandia’s Cooperative Monitoring Center. ‘We estimated it would be a $50-million-a-year project. That money has not materialized from anyplace.’” (Idem.)

35. “Phillips ended up working on his own in Iraq, traveling in a civilian car to make contact with any WMD scientists he could find; so far, he’s been able to set up a small center that employs eight former weapons researchers. Harrington, for her part, resigned from the State Department this past spring, partly in frustration over the lack of funds. ‘When the most we could squeeze out of the system was two $2 million grants,’ she says, ‘it made us sit back and scratch our heads a little bit and say, ‘Didn’t we go to war because they had people who could produce weap­ons of mass destruction?’ It’s a little difficult to square that circle.’” (Idem.)

36. In his last will and testament, Hitler saw alliance with the Muslim world as a key to future Nazi world domination. Note, in particular, the way in which he foresaw the “collective political will” of the Muslim nations as a significant factor. The Fuehrer felt that a transgression against one Muslim country is perceived as a transgression against all. Evaluate the accuracy of his remarks against the background of the information contained in paragraph #37, below. Note also that this political will and testament was bequeathed to Francois Genoud. Although he died in 1996, Genoud’s name crops up significantly in a number of important respects in the context of the events of 9/11. For an overview of Genoud’s career, see FTR#453. For more information about Genoud and 9/11, see—among other programs—FTR#’s 343, 354, 371, 456, 498, 499. “Adolf Hitler declared in his ‘Testament’, reported by Martin Bormann: ‘All of Islam vibrates at announcement of our victories. […]. What can we do to help them […], how can it be to our interest and our duty? The presence next to us of the Italians […] creates a malaise among our friends of Islam, […] it hinders us from playing one of our better cards: to support the countries oppressed by the British. Such a policy would excite enthusiasm throughout Islam. It is, in effect, a particularity of the Muslim world that what touches one, whether good or ill, is felt by all the others. […] The people ruled by Islam will always be nearer to us than France, in spite of the kinship of blood’…”
(Testament of Hitler, Headquarters of the Fuhrer, February 4 to April 2, 1945, preface by Francois Genoud; noted as Footnote #8 in: “The Reds, The Browns and the Greens” by Alexandre Del Valle; Occidentalis; 12/13/04; p. 10.)

37. Echoing the views of Hitler on the collective behavior of the Muslim nations, it appears that sentiment for bin Laden and al Qaeda has increased since the U.S. invaded Iraq, falling into the “Deathtrap” that Saddam had arranged with Osama. Whether some of Saddam’s WMD expertise does indeed find its way into the hands of al Qaeda or related elements remains to be seen. “The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has accelerated the of bin Laden’s anti-Americanism among once local Islamic militant movements, increasing danger to the United States as the al Qaeda network is becoming less able to mount attacks, according to senior intelligence officials at the CIA and the State Department. At the same time, the Sunni Triangle has become a training ground for foreign Islamic jihadists who are slipping into Iraq to join former Saddam Hussein loyalists to test themselves against U.S. and coalition forces, these officials say. . . .”
(“Spread of Bin Laden Ideology Cited” by Walter Pincus; Washington Post; 4/4/2004; p. 1.)


3 comments for “FTR #527 Death Trap, Part II”

  1. Awwww, it looks like somebody misses being the Big Kahuna. LOL:

    Cheney: Obama Wanted To Take U.S. ‘Down A Peg’ (VIDEO)
    Tom Kludt 8:22 AM EST, Tuesday February 12, 2013

    Slamming President Obama’s “fundamentally different” worldview, former Vice President Dick Cheney said in an interview that aired Tuesday that Obama entered office with the intention of reducing the United States’ influence around the world and bringing the country “down a peg.”

    Asked by Charlie Rose on “CBS This Morning” if the Obama administration could make a case that the U.S. was nursing a weak reputation abroad when Cheney and former President George W. Bush left office, the former powerful vice president was dismissive.

    “I think the President came to power with a worldview that’s fundamentally different than mine,” Cheney said. “The sense that he wanted to reduce U.S. influence in the world. He wanted to take us down a peg.”

    And speaking of people trying to take the US down a peg…

    New Study Finds Koch Bros. Tried to Start Tea Party Movement in 2002
    By: Kevin Grandia Monday February 11, 2013 11:11 am

    Shattering the public perception that the Tea Party is a spontaneous popular citizens movement, a new academic paper provides evidence that an organization founded by David and Charles Koch, attempted to launch the Tea Party movement in 2002.

    The peer-reviewed study appearing in the academic journal, Tobacco Control and titled, ‘To quarterback behind the scenes, third party efforts’: the tobacco industry and the Tea Party,‘ shows that the group Citizens for a Sound Economy launched a Tea Party movement website, http://www.usteaparty.com, that went live in 2002.

    According to the website DeSmogBlog.com, who broke this story earlier today, CSE was founded in 1984 by the infamous Koch Brothers, David and Charles Koch in 1984. David Koch sat on the board of CSE for many years and the group’s first president, Richard Fink, went on to become a senior VP at Koch Industries.

    The common public understanding of the origins of the Tea Party is that it is a popular grassroots uprising that began with anti-tax protests in 2009.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | February 12, 2013, 10:02 am
  2. Rummy has a new known unknown:

    Talking Points Memo
    Rumsfeld ‘Can’t Tell’ If Obama Has Switched Sides In War On Terror (VIDEO)
    Tom Kludt 2:42 PM EDT, Tuesday June 4, 2013

    Speaking at a conservative gathering late last month, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he didn’t know if President Barack Obama had switched sides in the War on Terror.

    The video below — mined by Democratic opposition researcher James Carter IV — shows Rumsfeld answering a question from a man off-screen at an event hosted by the David Horowtiz Freedom Center on May 21 in the Los Angeles area.

    “As you go around the country, do you have any sense or the same sort of sinking feeling that the rest of us have that [Obama has] actually switched sides in the War on Terror?” the man asked, drawing a smattering of applause from the audience.

    “You know, I just don’t feel competent to answer,” Rumsfeld said. “I can’t tell.”

    Rumsfeld added, “It bothers me greatly that he’s unwilling to identify the enemy. I don’t see how you win if you don’t.”

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 4, 2013, 11:44 am
  3. Just a note, I think “researcher” James Carter IV, is the grandson of the former president, and a very political animal.


    Posted by Vanfield | June 4, 2013, 9:13 pm

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