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FTR #556 Update on 9/11 and Related Matters

Record­ed June 11, 2006

Lis­ten: MP3  Side 1 [1]   Side 2 [2]

REALAUDIO [3]

[4]

Intro­duc­tion: This pro­gram sup­ple­ments pre­vi­ous pro­grams about the 9/11 inves­ti­ga­tions. Of pri­ma­ry sig­nif­i­cance is the fail­ure of the Unit­ed States to pro­vide Swiss author­i­ties with infor­ma­tion about the A.Q. Khan nuclear smug­gling net­work, as well as the fail­ure of the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to suc­cess­ful­ly inter­dict the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s net­work of off­shore companies—companies appar­ent­ly involved in ter­ror­ist financ­ing. One of the pos­si­ble rea­sons for the fail­ure of the U.S. to pro­vide the Swiss author­i­ties with infor­ma­tion about the Khan net­work may be the fact that the Safari Club—an “out­sourced” U.S. intel­li­gence net­work financed by the Saudis—helped pro­vide the net­work with some of its hard­ware and much of its fund­ing. Thus, the U.S. is impli­cat­ed in the A.Q. Khan network’s oper­a­tions! The pro­gram also notes that the com­plex net­work of off­shore com­pa­nies set up by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood has gone large­ly untouched, due to a vari­ety of fac­tors. (As was the case with the A.Q. Khan net­work, the Unit­ed States failed to pro­vide the Swiss author­i­ties with crit­i­cal infor­ma­tion nec­es­sary to pros­e­cute Youssef Nada and the Bank Al Taqwa. That infor­ma­tion is reviewed in this pro­gram.)

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Review of the strange death of Ali bin Mus­sal­im (who main­tained the Bank Al Taqwa account used to fund Al Qae­da); bin Mussalim’s crim­i­nal net­work­ing with the Hunt fam­i­ly of Texas; the inter­na­tion­al fas­cist net­work­ing engaged in by bin Mus­sal­im asso­ciate Nel­son Bunker Hunt.

1. The pro­gram begins with analy­sis of the Unit­ed States’ fail­ure to pro­vide Swiss author­i­ties with crit­i­cal infor­ma­tion for pros­e­cu­tion of par­tic­i­pants in the A.Q. Khan nuclear smug­gling ring. As will be seen below, a pos­si­ble rea­son for that is the fact that the Safari Club is impli­cat­ed in the gen­e­sis of the A.Q. Khan smug­gling ring and the Islam­ic bomb. The Safari Club was (is?) a Sau­di-financed out­sourc­ing of key U.S. intel­li­gence func­tions dur­ing the 1970’s and 1980’s. Evi­dence sug­gests that the polit­i­cal and nation­al secu­ri­ty rela­tion­ships devel­oped under the aus­pices of the Safari Club have con­tin­ued in the years since it was formed. (For more about the Safari Club, see FTR#522 [5]. For more about the Safari Club and the A.Q. Khan net­work, see FTR#524 [6].)

“Two years after the Unit­ed States helped dis­rupt a noto­ri­ous nuclear smug­gling ring, the Bush admin­is­tra­tion has hob­bled a Swiss effort to pros­e­cute three of the alleged lead­ers by fail­ing to share crit­i­cal infor­ma­tion, an Amer­i­can nuclear expert and Swiss law enforce­ment offi­cials said yes­ter­day. Switzer­land’s fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tor made at least four sep­a­rate appeals for U.S. help over the past year, ask­ing for access to doc­u­ments and oth­er evi­dence linked to the nuclear black mar­ket run by the Pak­istani sci­en­tist Abdul Qadeer Khan. In that time, the Swiss have received no assis­tance, or even a reply, a spokesman for the pros­e­cu­tor said. ‘Swiss author­i­ties are ask­ing for addi­tion­al assis­tance from U.S. author­i­ties, but we haven’t got­ten an answer so far,’ Mark Wied­mer, press sec­re­tary for the Swiss attor­ney gen­er­al’s office, said in response to a reporter’s inquiry. ‘We are con­fi­dent the Amer­i­can author­i­ties will pro­vide the infor­ma­tion we need.’”

(“U.S. Silence Imped­ing Swiss in Nuclear Case Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored” by Joby War­rick; Wash­ing­ton Post; 5/26/2006; p. A16) [7]

2. “The appeals were direct­ed to the Jus­tice Depart­ment, which has a bilat­er­al agree­ment with Switzer­land on shar­ing infor­ma­tion in inter­na­tion­al crim­i­nal cas­es, and to the State Depart­men­t’s under­sec­re­tary for arms con­trol and inter­na­tion­al secu­ri­ty, accord­ing to offi­cials knowl­edge­able about the requests. Calls to both agen­cies yes­ter­day were not returned. The prob­lem was brought to light yes­ter­day by a U.S. weapons expert who is advis­ing Swiss pros­e­cu­tors on the tech­ni­cal aspects of the Khan case. In tes­ti­mo­ny before a sub­com­mit­tee of the House Inter­na­tion­al Rela­tions Com­mit­tee, David Albright said the U.S. gov­ern­ment had ‘ignored mul­ti­ple requests for coop­er­a­tion’ in pros­e­cut­ing mem­bers of the Khan net­work. ‘The pros­e­cu­tors have not received a reply, or even a con­fir­ma­tion that the U.S. gov­ern­ment received the requests,’ Albright, a nuclear expert and pres­i­dent of the Insti­tute for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tion­al Secu­ri­ty, told the pan­el. He said the lack of assis­tance ‘need­less­ly com­pli­cates’ an inves­ti­ga­tion of great impor­tance to both coun­tries.” (Idem.)

3. “Swiss offi­cials are seek­ing to bring charges against three busi­ness­men who alleged­ly played piv­otal roles in Khan’s smug­gling scheme. Swiss author­i­ties have arrest­ed Friedrich Tin­ner, a Swiss mechan­i­cal engi­neer, and his two sons, Urs and Mar­co, who are sus­pect­ed of sup­ply­ing the net­work with tech­nol­o­gy and equip­ment used in enrich­ing ura­ni­um. Urs Tin­ner is also sus­pect­ed of help­ing Khan set up a secret Malaysian fac­to­ry that made thou­sands of com­po­nents for gas cen­trifuges, machines used in ura­ni­um enrich­ment. For­mal charges have not yet been brought against them. Some of the com­po­nents were en route to Libya by ship in Decem­ber 2003 when they were inter­cept­ed by Ger­man and Ital­ian offi­cials in a raid that brought the smug­gling ring to light. The Unit­ed States, which pro­vid­ed key intel­li­gence that led to the inter­cept, her­ald­ed the breakup of the Khan net­work as a major blow against nuclear pro­lif­er­a­tion. In July 2004, Pres­i­dent Bush viewed some of the com­po­nents sup­plied by the Tin­ners dur­ing a vis­it to the Ener­gy Depart­men­t’s Oak Ridge Nation­al Lab­o­ra­to­ry in east­ern Ten­nessee. Bush called the Khan net­work ‘one of the most dan­ger­ous sources of pro­lif­er­a­tion in the world’ and attrib­uted the suc­cess­ful breakup to the efforts of ‘allies, work­ing togeth­er.’ Albright, in his tes­ti­mo­ny to the sub­com­mit­tee on inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism and non­pro­lif­er­a­tion, said, ‘I find this lack of coop­er­a­tion frankly embar­rass­ing to the Unit­ed States and to those of us who believe that the Unit­ed States should take the lead in bring­ing mem­bers of the Khan net­work to jus­tice for arm­ing our ene­mies with nuclear weapons.’” (Idem.)

4. Next, the pro­gram reviews some of the infor­ma­tion about the Safari Club and the A.Q. Khan net­work. This infor­ma­tion was orig­i­nal­ly pre­sent­ed in FTR#524 [6]. Under­writ­ten by Sau­di Ara­bia, the Safari Club entailed the out­sourc­ing of U.S. intel­li­gence oper­a­tions to the Saud­is and oth­er coun­tries. It is in the con­text of the Safari Club that the Sau­di-fund­ed Islam­ic Devel­op­ment Bank under­took much of the financ­ing of the A.Q. Khan net­work and its devel­op­ment of the Islam­ic bomb. For more about the A.Q. Khan net­work, use the search func­tion.

“The same lead­er­ship that pro­mul­gat­ed the Safari Club—the Sau­di royals—also strong­ly fund­ed and sup­port­ed the Islam­ic Devel­op­ment Bank. Begun in 1973, the IDB now has 55 mem­ber states, with Sau­di Ara­bia dom­i­nat­ing, with 27.33 per­cent of the bank’s fund­ing. As a com­par­i­son, Egypt con­tributes 9.48% and Pak­istan just 3.41% of the bank’s total cap­i­tal. It was through the bank’s sci­en­tif­ic and eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment efforts that huge amounts were fun­neled into Pak­istan, which end­ed up in the hands of A.Q. Khan and his now-infa­mous nuclear bomb-build­ing syn­di­cate.”

(Pre­lude to Ter­ror; by Joseph Tren­to; Copy­right 2005 by Joseph J. Tren­to; Car­roll & Graf [HC]; ISBN 0–7867-1464–6; p. 313.) [8]

5. U.S. involve­ment with the A.Q. Khan network’s devel­op­ment of the Islam­ic bomb was a quid pro quo for Pak­istani coop­er­a­tion with the covert war against the Sovi­ets in Afghanistan—the same war that spawned Osama bin Laden.

“The effort that began pri­or to the Sovi­et inva­sion of Afghanistan—and that Pres­i­dent Carter’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advis­er warned was a seri­ous effort to build the first Islam­ic bomb—was delib­er­ate­ly ignored by Carter in order to secure Sau­di and Pak­istani coop­er­a­tion for the anti-Sovi­et effort in Afghanistan. Like almost every­thing about the anti-Sovi­et effort, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion expand­ed on it; and the CIA direct­ly assist­ed the Pak­istani nuclear effort by allow­ing Pak­istani nation­als to pro­cure hard­ware for the pro­gram in vio­la­tion of the Nuclear Non-Pro­lif­er­a­tion Treaty.”

(Idem.)

6. Out of the enor­mous amounts of mon­ey the Saud­is and the Safari Club chan­neled to the Afghan mujahideen sup­port effort, the Pak­ista­nis divert­ed a large sum in order to under­write the cost of their nuclear net­work.

“What many peo­ple do not know was that the Safari Club had made a deal with Pak­istan at the expense of the Afghan peo­ple. The Safari Club was run by the Saud­is. It was a club to serve their pur­pos­es through the CIA. Shack­ley and Wil­son were not mem­bers; only nations could belong. Shack­ley and Wil­son were men who served the club in exchange for pow­er, influ­ence, and mon­ey. Pak­istani Intel­li­gence would han­dle all the mon­ey going to facil­i­tate the proxy war against the Sovi­ets. That meant that hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars from the Unit­ed States and Sau­di Ara­bia were being run through Pak­istan with no account­abil­i­ty. ‘Unfor­tu­nate­ly,’ said Robert Crow­ley, ‘the Pak­ista­nis knew exact­ly where their cut of the mon­ey was to go.’ Where the mon­ey went was into an Islam­ic nuclear-weapons pro­gram sup­port­ed by Sau­di Ara­bia and accept­ed by the Unit­ed States.”

(Ibid.; p. 314.)

7. Despite U.S. claims to the con­trary, this coun­try did not inter­dict the A.Q. Khan net­work. On the con­trary, the U.S. blocked British attempts at inter­dict­ing A.Q. Khan’s oper­a­tions.

“Dur­ing the ear­ly 1990’s, British Cus­toms began look­ing close­ly at the Unit­ed States—Pakistan nuclear net­work. One of their top agents was an Ara­bic-speak­ing Mus­lim who trav­eled the world track­ing down A.Q. Khan’s net­work. The British soon learned that the Unit­ed States had no inter­est in shut­ting down the net­work, which had been oper­at­ing for years. The Mus­lim cus­toms agent, whose iden­ti­ty must be pro­tect­ed for his own safe­ty, was actu­al­ly con­front­ed by Khan in Dubai, where the agent had traced a num­ber of Khan’s front com­pa­nies. The agent tes­ti­fied in a tri­al involv­ing asso­ciates of Khan’s that the father of the Pak­istani bomb con­front­ed the Mus­lim cus­toms agent and called him ‘a trai­tor to Mus­lim peo­ple’ for uncov­er­ing the nuclear net­work that was sup­ply­ing weapons equip­ment to Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and North Korea. ‘A top French Intel­li­gence offi­cial, who asked that his name be with­held from pub­li­ca­tion, described the U.S.—Pakistani cov­er-up of the Khan net­work as hav­ing ‘an impor­tant prece­dent. Just as the U.S. allowed Israel to devel­op nuclear weapons, under pres­sure from the Saud­is, the U.S. allowed Pak­istan to be Sau­di Arabia’s proxy as the first Islam­ic nuclear state. The Saud­is put up the cash and have clean hands as Pak­istan builds the bomb for its sup­posed defense against India over Kash­mir . . . but my coun­try and the British received no coop­er­a­tion start­ing in the 1980’s when we dis­cov­ered traces of Khan’s net­work. The U.S. did not want to dis­cuss it.’’”

(Ibid.; pp. 314–315.)

8. The U.S. actu­al­ly shipped some of the hard­ware to A.Q. Khan’s oper­a­tion!

“A senior source in the British gov­ern­ment, who asks not to be named, con­firms that Khan ran the net­work and that parts for the nuclear-weapons pro­gram came from the Unit­ed States. Khan’s daugh­ter, attend­ing school in Eng­land, was being tutored, and at the ends of fax­es deal­ing with logis­tics for her edu­ca­tion, Khan would some­times write, in his own hand, items he need­ed for the nuclear pro­gram.”

(Ibid.; p. 315.)

9. Next, the pro­gram details some of the his­to­ry and back­ground of the Pak­istani nuclear effort:

“Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons had begun some fif­teen years ear­li­er. Short­ly after tak­ing office in 1972, Pak­istani Prime Min­is­ter Zul­fik­er Ali Bhut­to expressed his deter­mi­na­tion to devel­op a nuclear capa­bil­i­ty. His pur­pose was two fold: to off­set the inher­ent threat posed by Pakistan’s much larg­er neigh­bor and avowed ene­my, India; and to make his coun­try a leader of the Islam­ic world. After India det­o­nat­ed its first atom­ic weapon on the Pak­istani bor­der in 1974, Bhut­to pushed his nuclear pro­gram into high gear. To lead the effort, he tapped Abdul Qadeer Khan, an accom­plished met­al­lur­gist and busi­ness­man with a strong desire for wealth. To finance his ambi­tious pro­gram, Bhut­to turned to his country’s oil-rich ally, Sau­di Ara­bia, and to Libya. Chi­na also pledged assis­tance. By 1976, when George Bush served as CIA Direc­tor, U.S. intel­li­gence esti­mates report­ed, in a secret CIA report on Pak­istan, that Pak­istan was engaged in ‘a crash pro­gram to devel­op nuclear weapons.”

(Idem.)

10. As men­tioned above, the U.S. ‘signed on’ with the Pak­istani nuke pro­gram after the start of the Sovi­et inva­sion of Afghanistan.

“In 1979, while await­ing exe­cu­tion fol­low­ing his over­throw, Bhut­to wrote in his mem­oirs that his goal as prime min­is­ter had been to put the ‘Islam­ic Civ­i­liza­tion’ on an even foot­ing with ‘Chris­t­ian, Jew­ish and Hin­du Civ­i­liza­tions’ by cre­at­ing a ‘full nuclear capa­bil­i­ty’ for the Islam­ic world. The man who over­threw Bhut­to, Gen­er­al Muham­mad Zia ul Haq, car­ried on that effort. In April 1979, when Pres­i­dent Zia refused to halt work on the ‘Islam­ic Bomb,’ Pres­i­dent Jim­my Carter cut off Amer­i­can eco­nom­ic and mil­i­tary aid to Pak­istan. Just eight months lat­er, how­ev­er, fol­low­ing the Sovi­et Union’s inva­sion of Afghanistan, Carter struck the ulti­mate Faus­t­ian bar­gain in order to win Zia’s approval for using Pak­istan as a base of oper­a­tions for the mujahideen. Zia’s for­tunes fur­ther improved fol­low­ing the 1980 elec­tion of Ronald Rea­gan and George H.W. Bush.”

(Ibid.; pp. 315–316.)

11. “With the covert U.S. war in Afghanistan inten­si­fy­ing, the Pak­istani dic­ta­tor gained sig­nif­i­cant advan­tage and used it. In addi­tion to win­ning large eco­nom­ic and mil­i­tary-aid pack­ages for his coun­try, he extract­ed a promise from the Rea­gan-Bush admin­is­tra­tion that there would be no U.S. inter­fer­ence in Pakistan’s ‘inter­nal affairs.’ That meant no com­plaints about Zia’s dic­ta­to­r­i­al rule and no obstruc­tion of his efforts to build an Islam­ic Bomb. To keep up appear­ances, Zia pub­licly main­tained that he was not devel­op­ing nuclear weapons. How­ev­er, in 1983, a secret State Depart­ment brief­ing memo revealed that there was ‘unam­bigu­ous evi­dence’ that Pak­istan was ‘active­ly pur­su­ing a nuclear weapons devel­op­ment pro­gram’ and that Chi­na was pro­vid­ing tech­no­log­i­cal assis­tance. At the time, U.S. law pro­hib­it­ed pro­vid­ing assis­tance to any coun­try that was import­ing cer­tain nuclear-weapons tech­nol­o­gy. The Rea­gan-Bush admin­is­tra­tion sim­ply ignored the leg­is­la­tion, argu­ing that cut­ting off aid to Pak­istan would harm U.S. nation­al inter­ests.”

(Ibid.; p. 316.)

12. Amer­i­can com­plic­i­ty with the pro­gram was assist­ed by Pak­istani pres­i­dent Zia’s equiv­o­ca­tion about the goals of their nuclear pro­gram, which he main­tained were peace­ful.

“Zia con­tin­ued to deceive the Unit­ed States about his nuclear-weapons ambi­tions. In the mid-1980’s, he flat­ly told the U.S. Ambas­sador to the Unit­ed Nations, Ver­non Wal­ters, that Pak­istan was not build­ing a bomb. When senior State Depart­ment offi­cials lat­er con­front­ed him about the mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion, Zia told them, ‘It is per­mis­si­ble to lie for Islam.’ He even­tu­al­ly gave up the pre­tense, telling Time mag­a­zine in 1987 that ‘Pak­istan has the capa­bil­i­ty of build­ing the bomb.’’

(Ibid.; p. 317.)

13. “By 1985, the Sau­di roy­al fam­i­ly had suc­ceed­ed in draw­ing the Unit­ed States into an Islam­ic morass. Over the years, the Wah­habi sect, a rad­i­cal form of anti-West­ern Islam, had increas­ing­ly caused the high-liv­ing roy­al fam­i­ly polit­i­cal prob­lems at home. To deal with this, the roy­al fam­i­ly gave the Wah­habi lead­ers free rein and paid lip ser­vice to their dia­tribes against the West and Israel. But after the fall of the Pea­cock Throne in Iran, reli­gious divi­sions sur­faced with­in the roy­al fam­i­ly, con­tribut­ing to a schiz­o­phre­nia in Sau­di Arabia’s for­eign pol­i­cy: with one hand the Saud­is sup­port­ed the sec­u­lar Sad­dam Hus­sein against the Islam­ic regime in Iran, and with the oth­er they dis­patched Osama bin Laden and oth­ers as mem­bers of Sau­di Intel­li­gence to work with the most rad­i­cal Islam­ic ele­ments fight­ing to secure con­trol of Afghanistan. The anti-Com­mu­nist Rea­gan-Bush pol­i­cy mak­ers focused only on the goal of weak­en­ing the Sovi­et Union, ignor­ing the threat of rad­i­cal Islam.”

(Idem.)

14. The Pak­istani nuclear effort was sub­si­dized through the BCCI—a vehi­cle for much of the covert oper­at­ing of the 1980’s. For more about the BCCI and its pro­found con­nec­tions to the milieu of both the elder and younger George Bush, use the search func­tion. Cur­rent FBI direc­tor Robert Mueller led the offi­cial ‘inves­ti­ga­tion’ into BCCI, and cov­ered up much of what was there. (For more about Mueller and BCCI, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#’s 310 [9], 424 [10], 462 [11], 464 [12].)

“The efforts by the Saud­is, Rea­gan, Casey, and Bush to desta­bi­lize the Sovi­et Union through the war in Afghanistan car­ried a huge price in terms of both mon­ey and the num­ber of Afghan lives lost. Hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars poured into Pak­istani Intel­li­gence from the Unit­ed States, with almost no con­trol on how the funds were spent. The same BCCI bank accounts being used to fund the Afghan resis­tance were also used to fund the Pak­istani nuclear-bomb pro­gram, accord­ing to a Sen­ate report on BCCI.”

(Idem.)

15. “The Rea­gan-Bush pol­i­cy vio­lat­ed both Amer­i­can law and inter­na­tion­al non­pro­lif­er­a­tion treaties. But this type of vio­la­tion was not unprece­dent­ed: the Unit­ed States had allowed covert aid to Israel to help with their nuclear-weapons pro­gram in the late 1950’s and ear­ly 1960’s. In 1964, Lyn­don John­son had giv­en James Angle­ton per­mis­sion to assist Israel in fur­ther devel­op­ing its nuclear-weapons pro­gram. Now the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion was lev­el­ing the play­ing field. The Saud­is claimed that Israel had direct­ly aid­ed India in devel­op­ing its pro­gram and had thus cre­at­ed a dan­ger­ous imbal­ance in the region. Allow­ing Pak­istan to devel­op a weapon, but not to deploy it, seemed like a work­able com­pro­mise and, the Saud­is argued, the only solu­tion. The 1979 memo from Zbig­niew Brzezin­s­ki to Pres­i­dent Carter—had warned that the price of lur­ing the Sovi­ets might include aban­don­ing efforts to stop nuclear pro­lif­er­a­tion in Pak­istan. Just six years lat­er, the Rea­gan-Bush team played a huge role in mak­ing the first Islam­ic nuclear weapon pos­si­ble.”

(Ibid.; pp. 317–318.)

16. CIA Sovi­et ana­lyst Melvin Good­man was among those few Amer­i­can intel­li­gence ana­lysts who not­ed that we were back­ing the wrong Islam­ic groups in Afghanistan. Arms deal­er Sarkis Soghan­lian (deeply involved with the Bush-Rea­gan-Safari Club clan­des­tine oper­a­tions of the 1980’s) main­tains that the A.Q. Khan net­work was at all times direct­ed by the Saud­is.

“By the mid-1980’s, so much mon­ey was flow­ing through the Pak­istani ISI that the CIA did not have a han­dle on where it was going, accord­ing to Melvin Good­man, a for­mer CIA ana­lyst on the Sovi­et Union. ‘They were fund­ing the wrong Islam­ic groups . . . ‚’ said Good­man, ‘and had lit­tle idea where the mon­ey was going or how it was being spent.’ Sarkis Soghana­lian, who prof­it­ed from pro­vid­ing arms for the secret-aid pro­gram, put it blunt­ly: ‘As in Iraq, the U.S. did not want to get its hands dirty. So the Saud­is’ mon­ey and the U.S. mon­ey was han­dled by ISI. I can tell you that more than three quar­ters of the mon­ey was skimmed off the top. What went to buy weapons for the Afghan fight­ers was peanuts.’ Accord­ing to Soghana­lian, the funds were first laun­dered through var­i­ous BCCI accounts before being dis­bursed to ISI and into an elab­o­rate net­work run by A.Q. Khan. ‘Khan’s net­work was con­trolled by the Saud­is, not Khan and not Pak­istan,’ Soghana­lian said. [Empha­sis added.] ‘the Saud­is were in on every major deal includ­ing Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Malaysia.’”

(Ibid.; p. 318.)

17. Next, the pro­gram revis­its the ter­ror­ist financ­ing struc­ture of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and its pri­ma­ry finan­cial organ—the Bank Al Taqwa. (For more about the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#’s 454 [13], 455 [14], 456 [15], 473 [16], 537 [17], 540 [18]. For more about the inter­dic­tion of the ter­ror­ist mon­ey flow, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#462 [11], 464 [12], 495 [19], 500 [20], 513 [21], 514 [22]. For infor­ma­tion about the links between the Bank Al Taqwa, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the GOP, and the Bush admin­is­tra­tion, see FTR#’s 454 [13], 495 [19], 500 [20], 515 [23].) The Broth­er­hood has ben­e­fit­ed from the “off­shore” phe­nom­e­non that Lucy Komis­ar has dis­cussed at great length. For more about the bril­liant research of Ms. Komis­ar, uti­lize the search func­tion.)

“Almost from the incep­tion of the mod­ern Islam­ic bank­ing struc­ture (ear­ly 1980s), the inter­na­tion­al Mus­lim Broth­er­hood set up a par­al­lel and far-flung off­shore struc­ture that has become an inte­gral part of its abil­i­ty to hide and move mon­ey around the world. This net­work is lit­tle under­stood and has, so far, gar­nered lit­tle atten­tion from the intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment com­mu­ni­ties track­ing ter­ror­ist finan­cial struc­tures. The fun­da­men­tal premise of the Broth­er­hood in set­ting up this struc­ture was that it is nec­es­sary to build a clan­des­tine struc­ture that was hid­den from non-Mus­lims and even Mus­lims who do not share the Brotherhood’s fun­da­men­tal objec­tive of recre­at­ing the Islam­ic caliphate and spread­ing Islam, by force and per­sua­sion, across the globe.”

(“The Lit­tle Explored Off­shore Empire of the Inter­na­tion­al Mus­lim Broth­er­hood” by Dou­glas Farah; 4/18/2006.) [24]

18. “To this end, the Brotherhood’s strat­e­gy, includ­ing the con­struc­tion of its finan­cial net­work, is built on the pil­lars of ‘clan­des­tin­i­ty, duplic­i­ty, exclu­sion, vio­lence, prag­ma­tism and oppor­tunism.’ Among the lead­ers of the Brotherhood’s finan­cial efforts, based on ear­ly Broth­er­hood doc­u­ments and pub­lic records, are Ibrahim Kamel a founder of Dar al Maal al Isla­mi Bank (DMI ) and its off­shore struc­ture in Nas­sau, Bahamas; Yousef Nada, Ghal­ib Him­mat and Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Bank al Taqwa struc­ture, in Nas­sau; and Idriss Nasred­din, with Aki­da Bank Inter­na­tion­al in Nas­sau. Map­ping the net­work of bank, insur­ance (tako­fol) com­pa­nies and off­shore cor­po­ra­tions — which are often used as cov­ers to open bank accounts and move mon­ey in dif­fi­cult-to-trace paths pro­tect­ed by bank secre­cy laws — should be the focus of far more atten­tion because the net­work pro­vides a mech­a­nism for fund­ing the Brotherhood’s lic­it and illic­it activ­i­ties around the globe.”

(Idem.)

19. The dis­cus­sion high­lights the role of the Broth­er­hood in gen­er­at­ing Islamist ter­ror­ism.

“This is of fun­da­men­tal impor­tance because the Broth­er­hood has played a cen­tral role in ‘pro­vid­ing both the ide­o­log­i­cal and tech­ni­cal capac­i­ties for sup­port­ing ter­ror­ist finance on a glob­al basis… the Broth­er­hood has spread both the ide­ol­o­gy of mil­i­tant pan-Islam­i­cism and become the spine upon which the fund­ing oper­a­tions for mil­i­tant pan-Islam­i­cism was built, tak­ing funds large­ly gen­er­at­ed from wealthy Gulf state elites and dis­trib­ut­ing them for ter­ror­ist edu­ca­tion, recruit­ment and oper­a­tions wide­ly dis­persed through­out the world, espe­cial­ly in areas where Mus­lims hoped to dis­place non-Mus­lim or sec­u­lar gov­ern­ments.’ Almost every major Islamist group can trace its roots to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, found­ed in 1928 by the Has­san al-Ban­na, a pan-Islam­i­cist who opposed the sec­u­lar ten­den­cies in Islam­ic nations. Hamas is a direct off­shoot of the Broth­er­hood. Has­san al-Tura­bi, who offered sanc­tu­ary in Sudan to Osama bin Laden and his al Qae­da allies, is a leader of the Broth­er­hood. He also sat on the boards of sev­er­al of the most impor­tant Islam­ic finan­cial insti­tu­tions, such as DMI. Bin Laden’s men­tor Abdul­lah Azzam was a stal­wart of the Jor­dan­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. Ayman Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s chief strate­gist, was arrest­ed at age 15 in Egypt for belong­ing to the Broth­er­hood. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdul-Rah­man, and chief 9–11 hijack­er Mohamed Atta, were mem­bers of the Broth­er­hood.”

(Idem.)

20. In the pas­sage that fol­lows, for­mer coun­tert­er­ror expert Richard Clarke notes the shared fund­ing base in the Unit­ed States of three off­shoots of the Mus­lim Brotherhood—Al Qae­da, Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad and Hamas. The Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/20/2002 revealed the SAAR net­work and over­lap­ping Safa Trust—a pri­ma­ry exam­ple of this domes­tic over­lap. Do not fail to take stock of the fact that the SAAR network/Safa Trust net­work is inex­tri­ca­bly linked with the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and the GOP! The pro­gram descrip­tions cit­ed in para­graph 17 delin­eate that rela­tion­ship at con­sid­er­able length.

“There has been some under­stand­ing of the Brotherhood’s rela­tion­ship to Islamist groups, and of those ties even in the Unit­ed States. In 2003 Richard Clarke said ‘the issue of ter­ror­ist financ­ing in the Unit­ed States is a fun­da­men­tal exam­ple of the shared infra­struc­ture lev­ered by Hamas, Islam­ic Jihad and al Qae­da, all of which enjoy a sig­nif­i­cant degree of coop­er­a­tion and coor­di­na­tion with­in our bor­ders. The com­mon link here is the extrem­ist Mus­lim Brotherhood—all these orga­ni­za­tions are descen­dants of the mem­ber­ship and ide­ol­o­gy of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood.’ [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s]. How­ev­er, this under­stand­ing has not tak­en root in the intel­li­gence, law enforce­ment and pol­i­cy com­mu­ni­ties, nor has the finan­cial net­work of the Broth­er­hood come under intense scruti­ny. Pub­lic records show the Brotherhood’s finan­cial net­work of hold­ing com­pa­nies, sub­sidiaries, shell banks and real finan­cial insti­tu­tions stretch­es to Pana­ma, Liberia, British Vir­gin Islands, Cay­man Islands, Switzer­land, Cyprus, Nige­ria, Brazil, Argenti­na, Paraguay and beyond. Many of the enti­ties are in the names of indi­vid­u­als who, like Nada, Nasred­din, al-Qaradawi and Him­mat, have pub­licly iden­ti­fied them­selves as Broth­er­hood lead­ers.”

(Idem.)

21. Note the com­plex inter­lac­ing and over­lap­ping of indi­vid­u­als and insti­tu­tions that char­ac­ter­izes the Brotherhood’s finan­cial insti­tu­tions. This struc­tur­al con­fig­u­ra­tion is cen­tral to the Brotherhood’s abil­i­ty to evade scruti­ny and inter­dic­tion. This char­ac­ter­is­tic is present in the SAAR net­work and Safa Trust. (For more about the Safa Trust and the SAAR net­work, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#’s 356 [25], 357 [26], as well as the pro­grams about the sub­ver­sion of Oper­a­tion Green Quest not­ed in para­graph #17.)

“A senior U.S. gov­ern­ment offi­cial esti­mates the total assets of the inter­na­tion­al Broth­er­hood to be between $5 bil­lion and $10 bil­lion. It is a dif­fi­cult thing to assess because some indi­vid­ual mem­bers, such as Nada and Nasred­din, have great indi­vid­ual wealth. They also joint­ly own dozens of enter­pris­es, both real and off­shore, with Ghal­ib Him­mat and oth­er Broth­er­hood lead­ers. Dis­cern­ing what is per­son­al wealth, legit­i­mate busi­ness oper­a­tions, and Broth­er­hood wealth is dif­fi­cult if not impos­si­ble. It is clear not all the mon­ey is intend­ed to finance ter­ror or even rad­i­cal Islam. But it is equal­ly clear that this net­work pro­vides the ways and means to move sig­nif­i­cant sums of cash for those oper­a­tions. One indi­ca­tion of a com­pa­ny or cor­po­ra­tion being a Broth­er­hood activ­i­ty, rather than part of indi­vid­ual assets and wealth, is the over­lap of the same peo­ple on the direc­tor­ships of the finan­cial insti­tu­tions and com­pa­nies. For exam­ple, the Broth­er­hood net­work enti­ties estab­lished in Nas­sau, Bahamas, all reg­is­tered their address as that of the law firm –Arthur Han­na and Sons — which incor­po­rat­ed their busi­ness­es and bank­ing insti­tu­tions. Mem­bers of the Han­na fam­i­ly served on the boards of the banks and com­pa­nies, han­dled legal cor­re­spon­dence and rep­re­sent­ed the com­pa­nies in legal cas­es. Many of the direc­tors of the myr­i­ad com­pa­nies served as direc­tors of sev­er­al com­pa­nies simul­ta­ne­ous­ly. In turn, many of those same peo­ple served simul­ta­ne­ous­ly on the gov­ern­ing boards or sharia boards of DMI and oth­er impor­tant Broth­er­hood-dom­i­nat­ed finan­cial insti­tu­tions. The over­lap of direc­tor­ships and share­hold­ers strong­ly indi­cates the tight-knit nature of the orga­ni­za­tion and the inter-con­nect­ed­ness of the finan­cial net­work.”

(Idem.)

22. A prin­ci­pal ele­ment of the Al Taqwa off­shore net­work is its oper­a­tions in the Bahamas. And once again, one should not lose sight of the rela­tion­ship between the Broth­er­hood, the Safa net­work and the GOP.

“The most vis­i­ble part of the net­work, off­shore shell banks in the Bahamas, did mer­it some inves­ti­ga­tion imme­di­ate­ly after 9–11. The Trea­sury Depart­ment pub­licly stat­ed that Bank al Taqwa and Aki­da Bank Inter­na­tion­al were ‘involved in financ­ing rad­i­cal groups such as the Pales­tin­ian Hamas, Alge­ri­a’s Islam­ic Sal­va­tion Front and Armed Islam­ic Group, Tunisi­a’s An-Nah­da, and Usama bin Laden and his al-Qai­da orga­ni­za­tion.’ The pri­ma­ry share­hold­ers in al Taqwa Bank were Nada, Nasred­din, mem­bers of the Bin­laden fam­i­ly and dozens of oth­er Broth­er­hood lead­ers, includ­ing Yousef al-Qaradawi, the grand mufti of the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates. A clus­ter of char­i­ties based in Hern­don, Va., where many lead­ers had ties to Nada and his bank­ing activ­i­ties, is under active inves­ti­ga­tion by the FBI and the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty. Two of the lead­ers of the clus­ter, called the ‘Safa Group,’ incor­po­rat­ed the al Taqwa Bank in Nas­sau, and oth­er lead­ers worked for Nada’s banks and had exten­sive finan­cial deal­ing with him. Many of the Safa Group’s lead­ers are also mem­bers of the Broth­er­hood.”

(Idem.)

23. The dis­cus­sion high­lights the var­i­ous activ­i­ties in which Al Taqwa engaged on behalf of Al Qae­da.

“Unfor­tu­nate­ly, while the Trea­sury Depart­ment des­ig­nat­ed Bank al Taqwa and Aki­da Bank with great fan­fare in the imme­di­ate after­math of 9–11, it was large­ly the­ater. The gov­ern­ment of the Bahamas had already shut both banks down in April 2001. The inves­ti­ga­tions sub­se­quent to 9–11 revealed the ter­ror­ist ties that had been sus­pect­ed, but nev­er act­ed on. Ear­li­er intel­li­gence oper­a­tions by the CIA found Bank al-Taqwa and oth­er struc­tures of the busi­ness empire were used not only to fun­nel mon­ey to al Qae­da, but also pro­vid­ed the ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion with access to Inter­net ser­vices and encrypt­ed tele­phones, and helped arrange arms ship­ments. The Trea­sury Depart­ment, cit­ing intel­li­gence sources, said that ‘As of Octo­ber 2000, Bank Al Taqwa appeared to be pro­vid­ing a clan­des­tine line of cred­it to a close asso­ciate of Usama bin Laden and as of late Sep­tem­ber 2001, Usama bin Laden and his al-Qai­da orga­ni­za­tion received finan­cial assis­tance from Youssef M. Nada.’”

(Idem.)

24. The pas­sage that fol­lows sets forth Al Taqwa’s “off­shore” oper­a­tions and how—like the cor­po­rate oper­a­tions dis­cussed by Lucy Komisar—that struc­ture has frus­trat­ed attempts at inter­dict­ing its oper­a­tional activ­i­ties.

“The struc­ture of Bank al Taqwa and Aki­da Bank in Nas­sau fol­low the pat­tern of oth­er off­shore endeav­ors. The bank was a vir­tu­al bank, with only a hand­ful of employ­ees in Nas­sau man­ning com­put­ers and tele­phones. The bank was affil­i­at­ed with the al Taqwa Man­age­ment Orga­ni­za­tion, owned by anoth­er Nada enti­ty in Switzer­land. Nada owned a con­trol­ling inter­est in the bank, and Nasred­din was a direc­tor. At the same address, Nasreddin’s Aki­da Bank Pri­vate Ltd, oper­at­ed as a sub­sidiary of the Nasred­din Foun­da­tion. Nasred­din was the pres­i­dent, and Nada served on the board. The real bank­ing activ­i­ty, how­ev­er, was car­ried out through cor­re­spon­dent rela­tion­ships with Euro­pean banks. Nada and Nasred­din, along with their banks, were des­ig­nat­ed by the U.S. and the U.N. as ter­ror­ist financiers in Novem­ber 2001. In August 2002, the Unit­ed States and Italy joint­ly des­ig­nat­ed 14 more joint Nada/Nasreddin enti­ties for sup­port­ing ter­ror­ism. But that was not the end of the use of shell com­pa­nies and off-shore havens by the Nada/Nasreddin group. An exam­i­na­tion of these activ­i­ties point to seri­ous short­falls in the efforts to com­bat ter­ror­ist financ­ing.”

(Idem.)

25. The sophis­ti­cat­ed off­shore net­work of the Brotherhood’s finan­cial activ­i­ties has suc­cess­ful­ly frus­trat­ed attempts at shut­ting down its oper­a­tions. The fact that the Brotherhood’s finan­cial net­works uti­lize the same devices used by major cor­po­ra­tions to evade scruti­ny has helped to per­pet­u­ate its oper­a­tional con­ti­nu­ity. Until or unless the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty act deci­sive­ly to shut down the ille­gal off­shore struc­ture, it appears unlike­ly that the Brotherhood’s finan­cial net­work will be neu­tral­ized.

“Despite the clear and com­pelling evi­dence that the off­shore net­work of the Broth­er­hood pro­vid­ed vital finan­cial and logis­ti­cal sup­port to a vari­ety of Islam­ic ter­ror­ist oper­a­tions, the only action tak­en so far has been to freeze a few more of the com­pa­nies owned by Nada and Nasred­din. There has been lit­tle or no coor­di­nat­ed, con­cert­ed effort to map out, iden­ti­fy and under­stand the rest of the Broth­er­hood struc­ture. One pos­si­ble excep­tion is the NATO project on the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, which focused on the Brotherhood’s activ­i­ties in Europe and has sought to iden­ti­fy the dif­fer­ent Broth­er­hood enti­ties.”

(Idem.)

26. As dis­cussed in FTR#536 [27], Liecht­en­stein is a major epi­cen­ter of Broth­er­hood finan­cial activ­i­ty. The fol­low­ing pas­sage notes the rel­a­tive lack of suc­cess in neu­tral­iz­ing Nada and Al Taqwa. Note, also, that many of the 272 indi­vid­u­als named as ter­ror­ist financiers by the U.N. remain untouched.

“Many Broth­er­hood busi­ness­es were reg­is­tered as off­shore com­pa­nies through local trusts in Liecht­en­stein, where there is no require­ment to iden­ti­fy com­pa­nies’ own­ers, and no record is kept regard­ing activ­i­ties or trans­ac­tions. On Jan. 28, 2002, Nada, in vio­la­tion of the U.N. trav­el ban he is sub­ject to, trav­eled from his home in Cam­pi­one d’Italia, Switzer­land, to Vaduz, Liecht­en­stein. While in Vaduz, he sought to change the names of sev­er­al of the des­ig­nat­ed com­pa­nies. At the same time, he applied to put the new com­pa­nies in liq­ui­da­tion, and had him­self appoint­ed as liq­uida­tor. As off­shore enti­ties, the new­ly-named com­pa­nies main­tained no records in Liecht­en­stein. Attempts by des­ig­nat­ed ter­ror­ist financiers to switch com­pa­ny reg­is­tra­tions, or estab­lish new com­pa­nies with­out their vis­i­ble par­tic­i­pa­tion, is a pat­tern dis­cov­ered by U.N. and Euro­pean inves­ti­ga­tors. While some enti­ties have been detect­ed, many oth­ers are believed to have tran­spired with­out being detect­ed or blocked. The Unit­ed Nations Mon­i­tor­ing Group, which wrote a series of well-doc­u­ment­ed reports based on months of inves­ti­ga­tions around the world by a team of finan­cial experts, uncov­ered the Nada move­ments in Liecht­en­stein. The group con­clud­ed that ‘The Nada and Nasred­din exam­ples reflect con­tin­ued seri­ous weak­ness­es regard­ing the con­trol of busi­ness activ­i­ties and assets oth­er than bank accounts.’ The group cit­ed the dif­fi­cul­ties in iden­ti­fy­ing ben­e­fi­cial own­er­ships and shared assets, and the weak­ness of the trav­el ban. In fact, the pan­el found the where­abouts of the vast major­i­ty of the 272 indi­vid­u­als named as ter­ror­ist financiers by the Unit­ed Nations, remained unknown.”

(Idem.)

27. The shift­ing off­shore cor­po­rate land­scape of the Brotherhood’s front com­pa­nies con­tin­ues to elude the efforts of inves­ti­ga­tors.

“The modus operan­di of Nada and Nasred­din is vis­i­ble else­where. Dozens of com­pa­nies of des­ig­nat­ed indi­vid­u­als remain active despite the osten­si­ble inter­na­tion­al com­mit­ment to shut­ting them down. In some cas­es, such as Pana­ma, com­pa­nies under the names of des­ig­nat­ed indi­vid­u­als remain untouched. This does not include the many dozens of com­pa­nies and oth­er cor­po­rate enti­ties belong­ing to des­ig­nat­ed indi­vid­u­als, either out­right or through nom­i­nee share­hold­ers, reg­is­tered in the British Vir­gin Islands, Cay­man Islands and else­where in the Caribbean. While the Broth­er­hood reg­is­tered dozens of com­pa­nies in the 1980’s and 1990’s using Broth­er­hood lead­ers as iden­ti­fied direc­tors, this changed over time, mak­ing it more dif­fi­cult to trace the own­er­ship of the enti­ties. Begin­ning in the late 1990’s, per­haps in response to the few intel­li­gence probes that were car­ried out, many off­shore com­pa­nies have been shut down. Many appear to be re-opened under the direc­tion of nom­i­nee share­hold­ers, mak­ing the direct tie to the Broth­er­hood more dif­fi­cult to detect.”

(Idem.)

28. It is worth not­ing that the sanc­tions designed to inter­dict ter­ror­ist financ­ing have been open­ly flaunt­ed by some coun­tries, fur­ther imped­ing attempts at inter­rupt­ing the flow of ter­ror­ist monies.

“How­ev­er, it is often not nec­es­sary to take any pre­cau­tions at all because the inter­na­tion­al sanc­tions regime aimed at des­ig­nat­ed ter­ror­ist financiers is so weak. For exam­ple, Nige­ria is in fla­grant vio­la­tion of the UN sanc­tions regime by refus­ing to freeze the func­tion­ing busi­ness­es of Nasred­din. Nasred­din has done noth­ing to hide his own­er­ship of the enter­pris­es. The pri­ma­ry com­pa­ny is Nasco Invest­ment & Prop­er­ty Ltd., owned by Amana Hold­ings and Man­age­ment Inc., a still-func­tion­ing off­shore com­pa­ny reg­is­tered in Pana­ma. The com­pa­ny lists Nasred­din as its pres­i­dent. These issues — off­shore and shell com­pa­nies, front com­pa­nies and the inabil­i­ty to account for the vast major­i­ty of the des­ig­nat­ed al Qae­da financiers or their bil­lions — make it dif­fi­cult to ascer­tain how much of al Qaeda’s finan­cial flow has been impaired in the 4 1/2 years since 9–11. . . .”

(Idem.)

29. Next, the pro­gram reviews infor­ma­tion from FTR#513 [21]. One of the most impor­tant devel­op­ments in the cov­er-up of the 9/11 inves­tiga­tive trail is the sus­pen­sion of the Swiss inves­ti­ga­tion into Youssef Nada and the Bank al-Taqwa. (For more about Bank al-Taqwa and its con­nec­tions to the Third Reich, ele­ments of the US intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty and the GOP, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#’s 343 [28], 354 [29], 416, 454 [13], 455 [14], 456 [15], 462 [11], 464 [12], 473 [16], 514 [22], 515 [23].)

“Swiss pros­e­cu­tors sus­pend­ed one of the most cel­e­brat­ed inves­ti­ga­tions into alleged ter­ror­ist financ­ing, say­ing there is insuf­fi­cient evi­dence to bring the case to tri­al. Although the inves­ti­ga­tion wasn’t dropped and the sus­pects’ names weren’t cleared, it is a par­tial vin­di­ca­tion for Youssef Nada and Ghaleb Him­mat, who were accused by Wash­ing­ton of using Nada Man­age­ment Orga­ni­za­tion and their Bank al-Taqwa to sup­port al Qae­da and oth­er ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions. Short­ly after the Sept. 11, 2001 ter­ror­ist attacks in the U.S., the two men and three of their asso­ciates were placed on a ter­ror­ist-financ­ing list that was adopt­ed by the Unit­ed Nations, effec­tive­ly freez­ing their assets and mak­ing it impos­si­ble for them to trav­el. Those restric­tions remain in place. . . .”

(‘Swiss Won’t Bring Big Ter­ror-Finance Case to Trial“by Ian John­son; The Wall Street Jour­nal; 6/2/2005; P. A11.) [30]

30. The inves­ti­ga­tion was ham­pered by the fail­ure of the Bahamas Bank al-Taqwa to coop­er­ate with this inves­ti­ga­tion. The Saud­is also with­held crit­i­cal evi­dence. As we saw in FTR#514 [22], the U.S. author­i­ties also with­held crit­i­cal infor­ma­tion deemed essen­tial to the al-Taqwa inves­ti­ga­tion.

“ . . . Mr. Wied­mer said finan­cial author­i­ties in the Bahamas, where Bank al-Taqwa was reg­is­tered, refused to answer numer­ous requests for help. In addi­tion, the bank’s books were stashed at an undis­closed pri­vate address in Sau­di Ara­bia, he said, and with­out them, pros­e­cu­tors were stymied. He said Messrs. Nada and Him­mat weren’t oblig­ed to hand over the books. ‘This was the essen­tial gap in the chain of evi­dence,’ Mr. Wied­mer said. Offi­cials in the Bahamas attor­ney general’s office didn’t return phone calls request­ing com­ment. . . .”

(Idem.)

31. Mr. bin Mus­sal­im was found dead, a month after the Wolfe let­ter became pub­lic! A forth­com­ing book by Guil­laume Dasquie [31] (the co-author, along with Jean Charles Bris­ard, of For­bid­den Truth [32]) charges that bin Mus­sal­im had a Sau­di pass­port.

“A Swiss-based busi­ness­man accused by the US Trea­sury of pro­vid­ing finan­cial help to Osama bin Laden and al-Qae­da car­ried a Sau­di diplo­mat­ic pass­port, accord­ing to copies of doc­u­ments con­tained in a book pub­lished on Thurs­day in Paris. The doc­u­ments include a let­ter from the US Trea­sury to the Swiss author­i­ties, which says that al-Qae­da and its leader received finan­cial assis­tance from the busi­ness­man Ali bin Mus­sal­im ‘as of late Sep­tem­ber 2001’. They also include a copy of Mr. bin Mus­sal­im’s diplo­mat­ic pass­port. The dis­clo­sures, con­tained in Al-Qae­da Will Con­quer (Al-Qa’i­da Vain­cra [31]), by the author Guil­laume Dasquie, will be uncom­fort­able read­ing for the Sau­di gov­ern­ment, which has dis­put­ed any sug­ges­tions of offi­cial com­plic­i­ty in the attacks of Sep­tem­ber 11 2001.”

(‘Swiss-Based al-Qae­da Sus­pect Had Sau­di Pass­port’ by Stephen Fidler; Finan­cial Times; 4/27/2005; p. 1.) [33]

32. Could Mr. bin Mussalim’s death been the result of foul play?

“The Jan­u­ary 2002 let­ter from George Wolfe, then the US Trea­sury’s deputy gen­er­al coun­sel, says Mr. bin Mus­sal­im ‘has been pro­vid­ing indi­rect invest­ment ser­vices for al-Qae­da, invest­ing funds for bin Laden, and mak­ing cash deliv­er­ies on request to the al-Qae­da orga­ni­za­tion.’ The let­ter links him to the now defunct Bank al-Taqwa and its founder, Youssef Nada. Both have been named by the US and Unit­ed Nations as providers of ter­ror­ist finance. The exis­tence of the let­ter has been pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed by some news orga­ni­za­tions, but Mr. bin Mus­sal­im’s diplo­mat­ic sta­tus was not empha­sized. Accord­ing to the book, Mr. bin Mus­sal­im was found dead in his res­i­dence in Lau­sanne last June, a month after reports of the US Trea­sury let­ter first emerged. . . . [Empha­sis added.]”

(Idem.)

33. An intrigu­ing aspect of the late, unfor­tu­nate Mr. bin Mussalim’s career con­cerns his ille­gal activ­i­ties in the U.S. Those activ­i­ties involved col­lab­o­ra­tion in the attempt­ed cor­ner­ing of the sil­ver mar­ket. Prin­ci­pal fig­ures in that were the Saud­is and Nel­son Bunker Hunt, son and heir to the late H.L. Hunt. Bunker Hunt has been a promi­nent far-right activist for many years, most recent­ly rec­og­nized for his role in Oliv­er North’s off-the-shelf oper­a­tion to sup­port the Con­tra gueril­las in Nicaragua. Bank Al Taqwa and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood are net­worked with fas­cists and reac­tionar­ies from many oth­er cultures—part of the Under­ground Reich “vir­tu­al state” high­light­ed in FTR#’s 547, 548, 549, 550. (For more about the inter­na­tion­al fas­cist net­work­ing in which Nada, Bank Al Taqwa and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood are engaged, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#456.)

“ . . . Mr. bin Mussalim’s role in con­tro­ver­sial finan­cial deal­ings goes back to the ear­ly 1980s, when US pros­e­cu­tors accused him and oth­ers of attempts to cor­ner the sil­ver mar­ket. . . .”

(Ibid.; p. 2.)

34. More about the Hunt/Saudi col­lab­o­ra­tion in the attempt­ed cor­ner­ing of the sil­ver mar­ket.

“. . . DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s sources in Wash­ing­ton learn that before he left, Abdul­lah met the heads of the Dal­las-based Hunt Pri­vate Equi­ty Group to dis­cuss pri­vate invest­ments in the com­pa­ny. More than 20 years ago, Abdul­lah and oth­er Sau­di princes were heav­i­ly invest­ed with the group and suf­fered major loss­es when the price of sil­ver col­lapsed. [Empha­sis added.] His con­fer­ence with Hunt’s direc­tors aimed at dis­plac­ing some of these bad mem­o­ries with advan­ta­geous Sau­di invest­ments in the Unit­ed States. . . .”

(DEB­KA-Net-Week­ly Issue #204, 5/6/2005.) [34]

35. Author Dick Rus­sell dis­cussed the Hunt family’s attempt at cor­ner­ing the sil­ver mar­ket:

“ . . .The Hunts then pret­ty much dropped from notoriety—until 1988, when a fed­er­al jury in New York ruled that Bunker and Her­bert had con­spired in a rack­e­teer­ing scheme to cor­ner the world sil­ver mar­ket in 1979–80. . . .”

(The Man Who Knew Too Much; by Dick Rus­sell; Copy­right 1992 by Dick Rus­sell; Car­roll & Graf [HC]; ISBN 0–88184-900–6; p. 598.) [35]

36. The lat­ter part of the pro­gram sets forth some of the inter­na­tion­al net­work­ing in which Nel­son Bunker Hunt has engaged. Found­ed by Gen­er­al Charles Willough­by, the Ger­man-born, fas­cist ide­o­logue who served as Dou­glas MacArthur’s chief of intel­li­gence through­out World War II, the ICDCC brought togeth­er Amer­i­can reac­tionar­ies such as Hunt, Third Reich intel­li­gence vet­er­ans such as Her­mann Pun­der and SS war crim­i­nal Theodor Ober­lan­der and fas­cists from around the world. One of the fig­ures in the ICDCC (but not men­tioned here) is key Nazi banker Her­mann Abs. (For more about Abs and the ICDCC, see AFA#’s 15 [36], 37 [37], avail­able from Spit­fire.) Again, the infor­ma­tion about Hunt and the ICDCC should be con­sid­ered in the wider con­text of the inter­na­tion­al net­work­ing in which Al Taqwa, Nada and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood are involved. (For more about the inter­na­tion­al fas­cist net­work­ing in which Nada, Bank Al Taqwa and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood are engaged, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#456 [15].)

“His [Willoughby’s] Inter­na­tion­al Com­mit­tee for the Defense of Chris­t­ian Cul­ture (ICDCC) had two branch­es in Bonn, where its founder was an ex-Nazi turned anti-Com­mu­nist. The organization’s avowed pur­pose was ‘resis­tance against regimes and polit­i­cal con­cepts con­trary to its own.’ In this con­text in linked extrem­ists in Spain and Por­tu­gal togeth­er with Ger­many, and across the Atlantic to the Unit­ed States. One of the IDCC’s lead­ing lights was Walker’s ear­ly 1963 trav­el­ing com­pan­ion seg­re­ga­tion­ist preach­er [Bil­ly James] Har­gis, on whose Chris­t­ian Cru­sade Nation­al Advi­so­ry Com­mit­tee Willough­by like­wise presided. A major ICDCC fun­der was Nel­son Bunker Hunt, son of the oil bil­lion­aire. Willoughby’s friend­ship with H.L. Hunt dat­ed back at least to the ear­ly 1950’s, when the oil­man met reg­u­lar­ly with Willough­by and oth­er gen­er­als in New York in seek­ing to push a pres­i­den­tial bid by Gen­er­al MacArthur. . . . Willoughby’s ICDCC, about which lit­tle is known, pre­ferred behind-the-scenes maneu­ver­ing.”

(Ibid.; p. 322.)

37. More about the ICDCC—the inter­na­tion­al fas­cist net­work to which Nel­son Bunker Hunt belonged. Note the pres­ence in this milieu of peo­ple asso­ci­at­ed with the fas­cist Opus Dei Catholic orga­ni­za­tion and Theodor Ober­lan­der. Ober­lan­der is an SS offi­cer and war crim­i­nal. His oper­a­tions in con­junc­tion with the Nightin­gale orga­ni­za­tion are dis­cussed in AFA# 14 [38]. (To learn more about Ober­lan­der, Opus Dei, or any oth­er ele­ment dis­cussed in these broad­casts, use the search func­tion.)

“ . . . It was the annu­al con­gress of Charles Willoughby’s Inter­na­tion­al Com­mit­tee for the Defense of Chris­t­ian Cul­ture (ICDCC), and MacArthur’s for­mer intel­li­gence chief was speak­ing on what he called ‘an ‘old theme’: the Sorge espi­onage case.’ Pre­sid­ing at the Octo­ber 14–16 affair was Jose Solis Ruiz, a min­is­ter in the Span­ish cab­i­net of dic­ta­tor Fran­co and a lead­ing order of a secret Catholic order called Opus Dei. Among the speak­ers was Dr. Theodor Ober­lan­der, a for­mer Ger­man offi­cer who had led the Ukrain­ian Nightin­gales in World War II (See Chap­ter Ten). Ober­lan­der had served as West Germany’s min­is­ter of refugee affairs until 1960, when details of his wartime role became pub­lic and he was forced to resign. He was also a del­e­gate to the Asian people’s Anti-Com­mu­nist League. Her­man Pun­der, the ICDCC’s out­go­ing inter­na­tion­al pres­i­dent, was an ex-Nazi Abwehr agent. Both Pun­der and Ober­lan­der had direct con­nec­tions into the Munich-based news­pa­per that, the day after the assas­si­na­tion, would con­tact Gen­er­al Walker—and then some­how ‘scoop’ the world on the pre­vi­ous­ly unknown news that Oswald had fired on Walk­er in April.”

(Ibid.; p. 528.)