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FTR #737 Taqqiya Sunrise, Part II: Turkish Taffy (More on the Rolling Coups in the Middle East)

Achmed Huber: Liai­son between Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and West­ern fascists

Lis­ten:
MP3 Side 1 | Side 2

Intro­duc­tion: Con­tin­u­ing analy­sis of the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and related, domes­tic polit­i­cal devel­op­ments, the broad­cast syn­op­sizes major points of this com­plex, ongo­ing series of events.

The title refers to the candy called Turk­ish Taffy. A sug­ared con­fec­tion, it might be said to resem­ble the deliberately-sweetened ver­sion of the Mus­lim Brotherhood-affiliated Turk­ish AK Party.

The latter’s much-ballyhooed “mod­er­a­tion” is said to be the pro­jected polit­i­cal stance of the newly resus­ci­tated Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, as well as the rea­son why we should not fear that organization’s ascent.

Le Pen: A “Mod­er­ate” like any other

In fact, the polit­i­cal under­pin­nings of the AK Party are inex­tri­ca­bly linked with a fas­cist milieu cement­ing the Islamic fas­cists of the Broth­er­hood with Euro-fascists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Major ele­ments of the analy­sis in this com­plex series include:

  • Wik­iLeaks appears to have played a role in the events, with a pur­ported “leaked” State Depart­ment memo hav­ing helped spur the upris­ing in Tunisia which, in turn, helped to gal­va­nize events in Egypt. Far from being the “pro­gres­sive,” “whistle-blowing” entity it pur­ports to be, Wik­iLeaks is a far-right, Nazi-influenced pro­pa­ganda and data min­ing operation.
  • Karl Rove’s dom­i­nant pres­ence in Swe­den may well have much to do with the “leak­ing” of State Depart­ment cables from the Obama admin­is­tra­tion that are undoubt­edly mak­ing the suc­cess­ful exe­cu­tion of state­craft even more dif­fi­cult under the circumstances.
  • Far from being a spon­ta­neous event, the Mid­dle East upris­ings appear to have stemmed, in part at least, from a covert oper­a­tion begun under the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and con­tin­ued under Obama’s tenure. (Obama may well have been set up to take the fall for neg­a­tive con­se­quences of the event. It is unclear just how “on top of it” his admin­is­tra­tion is. In this regard, the event is very much like the Bay of Pigs oper­a­tion, begun under Eisenhower’s admin­is­tra­tion and con­tin­ued under JFK.)
  • The oper­a­tion may well be intended to desta­bi­lize the Obama admin­is­tra­tion, paving the way for the ascent of the GOP in the United States. In this respect, it is very much like what has come to be known as the Octo­ber Surprise.
  • Cour­tesy of Wik­iLeaks, the operation’s exis­tence was “blown”–con­tacts between U.S. Embassy per­son­nel in Cairo and lead­ers of the April 6 move­ment dur­ing the last months of the Bush admin­is­tra­tion came to light cour­tesy of more allegedly “leaked” State Depart­ment memos made pub­lic by Wik­Leaks. Pre­vi­ously, the U.S. embassy in Cairo had been in con­tact with lead­ers of the Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood.
  • Loom­ing large in the unfold­ing sce­nario are the the­o­ries of non-violent the­o­reti­cian Gene Sharp, who held posi­tions asso­ci­ated with the “lib­eral” ele­ment of the U.S. intel­li­gence appa­ra­tus.
  • Sharp’s activ­i­ties have been under­writ­ten by junk bond king Michael Milken’s for­mer right-hand man Peter Ack­er­man, who has served as an advi­sor to the United States Insti­tute of Peace, an agency of the U.S. government.
  • The United States Insti­tute of Peace’s Mus­lim World Ini­tia­tive–charged by crit­ics with legit­imiz­ing jihadists–may well have been the ini­ti­at­ing ele­ment in these developments.
  • High tech firms with links to the U.S. intel­li­gence estab­lish­ment appear to have facil­i­tated the Piggy-Back Coup.
  • The Mus­lim Brotherhood’s free-market eco­nomic per­spec­tive has endeared it to laissez-faire the­o­reti­cians around the world. Amer­i­can Uni­ver­sity in Cairo, at which Broth­er­hood affil­i­ated the­o­reti­cians hold forth, is an epi­cen­ter of the eco­nomic phi­los­o­phy of Ibn Khal­dun, the Ikhwan’s eco­nomic godfather.
  • Despite assur­ances from many “expert” sources, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood seems poised to ben­e­fit the most from the unfold­ing events in the Mid­dle East.
  • The Mus­lim Brotherhood-controlled Al Jazeera net­work has also had much to do with the uprisings.
  • The youth­ful ide­al­ists of the Anonymous/Pirate Bay/Pirate Party milieu appear to have been cyn­i­cally deceived and manip­u­lated into sup­port­ing an oper­a­tion that fig­ures to empower some truly dark forces. Those dark forces are fun­da­men­tally opposed to the Utopian val­ues dear to the Anonymous/Pirate Bay folks.
  • Those same reas­sur­ing voices have told us that the Broth­er­hood aspires to a polit­i­cal agenda to the “mod­er­ate” agenda of the Turk­ish AK party. That party is closely affil­i­ated with the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. The “mod­er­a­tion” of the AK Party may be weighed in the dis­cus­sion below.
  • Pre­cip­i­tat­ing the ascent of the fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood in the Mid­dle East may well be an attempt at using the Mus­lim pop­u­la­tion of the Earth Island as a proxy force against Rus­sia and China. The goal, ulti­mately, is to peel away strate­gic, resource-rich areas such, as the petroleum-rich areas of the Cau­ca­sus and Xin­jiang province.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The PORA movement’s reliance on Sharp’s the­o­ries to aid Mr. Yuschenko in  the Ukraine; PORA’s sub­se­quent dis­il­lu­sion­ment with  Yuschenko, whose regime appears to have been lit­tle more than a cat’s paw for the Ukrain­ian fas­cists of the OUN/B; The New York Times’ pre­sen­ta­tion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood as “mod­er­ate;” Hosni Mubarak’s alleged treat­ment for can­cer; review of the GOP’s links to the terror-funding appa­ra­tus busted by the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/30/2002; review of the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s links with Grover Norquest, the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and Karl Rove; the Turk­ish AK Party’s links with Achmed Huber and the milieu of the Bank al-Taqwa.

1. Note that the Turk­ish AK Party is being seen as a role model for “mod­er­ate” Islamist par­ties poised to assume a por­tion of power in Egypt and else­where through­out the Mid­dle East. We begin by look­ing at a Ger­man Islamist group affil­i­ated with the Refah Party (the Turk­ish branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood). The pro­gram high­lights con­nec­tions between that party and the AK party cur­rently gov­ern­ing Turkey.

“Milli Gorus, Germany’s largest Islamic asso­ci­a­tion, recently gained the offi­cial sup­port of the Turk­ish gov­ern­ment, despite being watched by Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vices due to alleged extrem­ist lean­ings. On April 19, Turkey’s religious-conservative gov­ern­ment ordered its embassies to offer the Islamis­che Gemein­schaft Milli Gorus (IGMG) their sup­port. The group, formed in 1985 in Cologne to sup­port Turk­ish nation­al­ism and oppose the sep­a­ra­tion of state and reli­gion, has long been crit­i­cized by Ger­man offi­cials as being anti-Semitic and against lib­eral West­ern values.”

(“Turkey Offers Sup­port for Con­tro­ver­sial Islamic Group”; Deutsche Welle; 4/23/2003; p. 1.)

2. More on the rela­tion­ship between Milli Gorus and the “mod­er­ate” AK party.

“Turk­ish For­eign Min­is­ter Abdul­lah Gul on Sat­ur­day refused to dis­cuss his spe­cific direc­tions to diplo­mats regard­ing Milli Gorus, say­ing only the gov­ern­ment ‘has for some time tried to strengthen the ties between our coun­try and our cit­i­zens over­seas.’ The deci­sion comes only two weeks after an agree­ment between Ger­many and Turkey on com­bat­ing orga­nized crime incensed many mem­bers of Turkey’s rul­ing AK party because it included Milli Gorus with groups like the Kur­dish ter­ror­ist out­fit PKK. Since many Ak mem­bers have ties to Islamic reli­gious groups, Gul was com­pelled to say he did not con­sider Milli Gorus a ter­ror organization.”

(Idem.)

3. The AK party appears to be lit­tle more than a “mod­er­ate” rework­ing of the Refah party, which is lit­tle more than a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood front orga­ni­za­tion. Erbakan of the Refah was the men­tor of Erdo­gan, who pre­sides over the “mod­er­ate” AK party.

“Some observers say the attempt to reform its pub­lic image could be at least partly linked to the rise of Turk­ish Prime Min­is­ter Tayyip Erdo­gan and his AK party. Com­ing to power in a land­slide vic­tory last year, Erdo­gan styles his party as a mod­ern con­ser­v­a­tive group based on Mus­lim val­ues. He has dis­tanced him­self from for­mer men­tor Necmet­tin Erbakan, who founded the Islamic-influenced Wel­fare Party. Erbakan’s nephew, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, was IGMG chair­man until he left office after allegedly hav­ing an extra-marital affair.”

(Ibid.; p. 2.)

4. Flesh­ing out dis­cus­sion of Necmet­tin Erbakan, his Refah party and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the pro­gram high­lights Erbakan’s rela­tion­ship with Ahmed Huber and the man­ner in which that rela­tion­ship pre­cip­i­tated Huber’s ascen­sion to his posi­tion as a direc­tor of Al Taqwa.

Closely asso­ci­ated with the AK Party’s pre­de­ces­sor Refah orga­ni­za­tion, Huber’s con­cept of “mod­er­a­tion” might be gleaned from the pho­tographs of some of the “mod­er­ates” he admires.

Speak­ing of the décor of Huber’s residence:

“A sec­ond pho­to­graph, in which Hitler is talk­ing with Himm­ler, hangs next to those of Necmet­tin Erbakan and Jean-Marie Le Pen [leader of the fas­cist National Front]. Erbakan, head of the Turk­ish Islamist party, Refah, turned to Achmed Huber for an intro­duc­tion to the chief of the French party of the far right. Exit­ing from the meet­ing (which took place in Sep­tem­ber 1995) Huber’s two friends sup­pos­edly stated that they ‘share the same view of the world’ and expressed ‘their com­mon desire to work together to remove the last racist obsta­cles that still pre­vent the union of the Islamist move­ment with the national right of Europe.’”

(Dol­lars for Ter­ror: The United States and Islam; by Richard Labeviere; Copy­right 2000 [SC]; Algora Pub­lish­ing; ISBN 1–892941-06–6; p. 142.)

5. Note that Erbakan, Huber et al are part of an inter­na­tional  fas­cist milieu.

“Lastly, above the desk is dis­played a poster of the imam Khome­ini; the meet­ing ‘changed my life,’ Huber says, with stars in his eyes. For years, after the Fed­eral Palace in Bern, Ahmed Huber pub­lished a Euro­pean press review for the Iran­ian lead­ers, then for the Turk­ish Refah. Since the for­mer lacked finan­cial means, Huber chose to put his efforts to the ser­vice of the lat­ter. An out­post of the Turk­ish Mus­lim Broth­ers, Refah thus became Huber’s prin­ci­pal employer; and it was through the inter­me­di­ary of the Turk­ish Islamist party that this for­mer par­lia­men­tary cor­re­spon­dent became a share­holder in the bank Al Taqwa.”

(Idem.)

6. The Turk­ish AKP Party (touted as a role model for the Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood) has a strong eco­nomic rela­tion­ship with Ger­many and other Euro­pean eco­nomic players.

. . . . The focus is on two par­tic­u­lar aspects of Turk­ish pol­icy. The first is that over the past few years, polit­i­cal Islam in Turkey has proven to be very coop­er­a­tive with the EU. This is due to the eco­nomic rise of the con­ser­v­a­tive sec­tors of the Ana­to­lian hin­ter­land, which is orga­nized within the Adelet ve Kalk­inma Par­tisi (AKP), the party of Prime Min­is­ter Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan and rul­ing party in Ankara since 2002. The AKP has a clearly Islamic ori­en­ta­tion. The Ana­to­lian enter­prises form­ing the back­bone of the party have close eco­nomic ties in EU coun­tries. It is on this basis that the AKP has estab­lished inten­sive ties to West­ern Europe, and incor­po­rated into its brand of polit­i­cal Islam a reori­en­ta­tion favor­able to the EU. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[2]) The party has since stood as a model for the pos­si­bil­ity of Islamism hav­ing a pro-western char­ac­ter. In fact, over the past few years, sev­eral North African Islamic forces — includ­ing sec­tors of the influ­en­tial Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood — have been ori­ent­ing them­selves on the AKP. Accord­ing to a recent study, co-financed by the SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Foun­da­tion, nearly two-thirds of the pop­u­la­tions in seven Arab nations, includ­ing Egypt, would be in favor of their coun­tries’ adopt­ing the Turk­ish model.[3] A pro-western ori­en­ta­tion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, implicit in such a model, would be appre­ci­ated in west­ern capitals. . . .

“The Turk­ish Model”; german-foreign-policy.com; 2/18/2011.

7.After review­ing infor­ma­tion about Karl Rove, Grover Norquist, Talat Oth­man and their links to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood  and the terror-funding appa­ra­tus busted by the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids  of 3/20/2002, the pro­gram syn­op­sizes the gen­e­sis of the GOP/Brotherhood/terror-funding relationship.

Once again, it is to be  noted that con­ser­v­a­tives appear to be the only ones who will crit­i­cize the GOP/Brotherhood/terrorist link.

. . . In 1998 [Abdu­rah­man Alam­oudi] pro­vided at least $20,000  in checks enabling Repub­li­can activist Grover Norqauist toestab­lish what would become a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood front orga­ni­za­tion tar­geted at pen­e­trat­ing GOP cir­cles and the pres­i­den­tial cam­paign of then-Governor George W. Bush. The new entity was called the Islamic Free Mar­ket Insti­tute (bet­ter known at the Islamic Insi­tute or II). Alam­oudi also detailed his long-time deputy, Khaled Saf­furi, to serve as II’s first exec­u­tive director,with Norquist as the Chair­man of the Board.

As a result of these con­nec­tions, Alam­oudi was among a group of Mus­lim Broth­er­hood oper­a­tives who were invited on May 1, 2000, to meet with Bush in Texas governor’s man­sion. Saf­furi was des­ig­nated the Bush campaign’s Mus­lim out­reach  coor­di­na­tor and Norquist assisted another promi­nent Ikhwan oper­a­tive, Sami al-Arian, to obtain a com­mit­ment from can­di­date
Bush that, if elected, he would pro­hibit the use of clas­si­fied intel­li­gence evi­dence in depor­ta­tion pro­ceed­ings against for­eign­ers sus­pected of ter­ror­ist ties. This was a pri­or­ity for al-Arian since his brother-in-law was being held at the time by fed­eral immi­gra­tion author­i­ties on the basis of such evidence.

After the elec­tion, a mem­ber of the Islamic Institute’s board of direc­tors with myr­iad and long­stand­ing con­nec­tions to other Mus­lim Broth­er­hood orga­ni­za­tions, Suhail Khan, was appointed to be the gate­keeper for the Mus­lim com­mu­nity in the White House Office of Pub­lic Liai­son. [The below-mentioned Yka­te­rina Chu­machenko was deputy direc­tor of the White House Office of Pub­lic Liai­son under Ronald Reagan!–D.E.] Such rela­tion­ships and place­ments afforded the  Ikhwan unprece­dented oppor­tu­ni­ties for influ­ence oper­a­tions against the U.S. gov­ern­ment, espe­cially after 9/11.

Unfor­tu­nately for Alam­oudi, his own abil­ity directly to exploit such oppor­tu­ni­ties had by that time been irrepara­bly dam­aged by his appear­ance at an anti-Israel rally out­side th White Hosue in Octo­ber 2000. On that occa­sion, he care­lessly gave the game away, when he  declared on video: ‘I have been labeled as being a sup­porter of Hamas. Any­body sup­port­ers of Hamas here? [Roars of approval from the crowd.] We are all sup­port­ers of Hamas. [more roars.] I wish they added that I am also a sup­porter of Hezbol­lah. [More roars.]

Then, in 2003, Alam­oudi was arrested at Heathrow Air­port (UK) on his way back from Libya with $340.000 in cash given to him by Libyan Pres­i­dent Muam­mar Kaddafi for jihad. The money was to be used to kill Crown Prince (now King) Abdul­lah of Saudi Ara­bia. Alam­oudi was extra­dited to the United States where, in the East­ern Dis­trict of Vir­ginia, he pled guilty to and was con­victed of terrorism-related charges. He was proven to be a senior al Qaeda financier, who moved at least $1 mil­lion dol­lars to the ter­ror­ist organization. . . .

Sharia: The Threat to Amer­ica [“Team B”]; Cen­ter for Secu­rity Pol­icy Press [SC]; Copy­right 2010 Cen­ter for Secu­rity Pol­icy; ISBN 978–0-9822947–6-5; pp. 128–129.

8. After review­ing infor­ma­tion about non­vi­o­lent the­o­reti­cian Gene Sharp, the pro­gram notes that the PORA move­ment in the Ukraine was one of the insti­tu­tions that took their cues from Sharp’s writ­ings. Ini­tially a big sup­porter of Vladimir Yuschenko, PORA turned against him.

As noted in FTR #529, Yuschenko mar­ried the for­mer Yka­te­rina Chu­machenko, the point per­son for the OUN/B. Later, Yuschenko named Ban­dera a hero of the Ukraine.

One won­ders if the Pirate Bay/Pirate Party/Anonymous milieu will turn out to be sim­i­larly, cyn­i­cally manip­u­lated in the case of the Piggy-Back Coup in the Mid­dle East. Youth­ful ide­al­ists, that milieu may well have helped install the fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood in power in Egypt and  else­where in the Mid­dle East.

PORA, the non-governmental orga­ni­za­tion that played a deci­sive role in Ukraine’s Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, has adopted a highly crit­i­cal stance towards the ten-point mem­o­ran­dum signed last week by Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yushchenko and the leader of the Party of Regions, for­mer prime min­is­ter Vik­tor Yanukovych. . . .

“Is PORA Turn­ing Against Yuschenko”; The Kiev Ukraine News Blog; 9/24/2005.

9. In our dis­cus­sion with Fara Man­soor, we exam­ined his con­tention that U.S. intel­li­gence had learned that the Shah of Iran had can­cer long before it became pub­lic and decided to replace that staunch, anti-communist ally with the  Islamic fun­da­men­tal­ists of Khomeini.

Reports out of the Mid­dle East sug­gest that Mubarak is being treated for can­cer. Is one U.S. sup­ported auto­crat in that strate­gic part of the world being replaced by a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood dom­i­nated coalition?

Spec­u­la­tion that for­mer Pres­i­dent Hosni Mubarak had departed Egypt for Saudi Ara­bia height­ened Wednes­day with a government-owned news­pa­per say­ing that he had gone late last week to a spe­cial Saudi mil­i­tary com­plex at Tabuk for chemother­apy treat­ment by his usual Ger­man doc­tors. He is suf­fer­ing from pan­cre­atic and colon can­cer, it said.

There was no offi­cial con­fir­ma­tion of the report.

“Paper in Egypt Says Mubarak Is at Saudi Site Receiv­ing Care” by Neil Mac­far­quhar; The New York Times; 3/2/2011.

Discussion

8 comments for “FTR #737 Taqqiya Sunrise, Part II: Turkish Taffy (More on the Rolling Coups in the Middle East)”

  1. Ter­rific series of shows. There is enough mate­r­ial for hours and hours of analy­sis. The num­ber of con­nec­tions range now in the hun­dreds, if not in thou­sands. That is why the use of this site is so impor­tant, as you say.

    First, let me say that I a wor­ried about the con­nec­tion that you exposed here between Achmed Huber, Erbakan and Jean-Marie Le Pen. As you know, his daugh­ter, Marine Le Pen,is gain­ing momen­tum in France with the same Front National. Does she rep­re­sent sim­ply the con­tin­u­a­tion of her father’s ide­ol­ogy or some­thing more mod­er­ate? I don’t know but if pre­vi­ous exam­ples of fam­ily busi­ness are any indi­ca­tions, that is a bad sign. She pub­licly stated that the French should defend France against Islamism. Was it just PR? What does that mean?

    Sec­ond, you quoted an extract from the doc­u­ment of the Cen­ter for Secu­rity Pol­icy, titled Sharia(...)I agree with you that it con­tains a fair amount of pro­pa­ganda, like other sim­i­lar exer­ci­ces such as the Ira­nium movie. How­ever, you are right to point out that Frank Gaffney seems to be get­ting out of the lot, sin­cere in what he does. In fact he is, I think, what a con­ser­v­a­tive should be: not a fas­cist in dis­guise but some­one who tries to avoid the dis­in­te­gra­tion of his soci­ety. His activism against Islamism is, I think, an expres­sion of that.

    And last, I just want to clar­ify the com­ment I made on the Fran­cis Parker Yockey’s post. By no means I wanted to down­play the impor­tance of the books you sug­gest to lis­ten­ers. Each one of these books is essen­tiel for the com­pre­hen­sion of our predica­ment and Kevin Coogan’s cer­tainly is as well. My point was to show a his­tor­i­cal antecedent of the col­lab­o­ra­tion between the Left and the Right, the Third Posi­tion. I wanted to stress that if such a col­lab­o­ra­tion proved to be effec­tive and work­ing, although cir­cum­stan­tial and tem­po­rary in the case of Germany’s ‘20s and ‘30s, then it could very well work again after WWII. Con­sid­er­ing the under­groud phase of the Reich, to cut deals behind the scenes with com­mu­nists should have been even more easy.

    Keep on the good work and don’t let your­self be dis­cour­aged. At least we have our pride and sat­is­fac­tion to fight back for the just cause.

    Have a great day.

    Posted by Claude | April 5, 2011, 9:25 am
  2. I rec­om­mend “Ger­many Rebuffs U.S. Calls to Shut Iran Bank” by David Craw­ford in WSJ Online April 12. Touches on Ger­man Eco­nomic inter­est with Iran­ian Banking.

    Posted by chago | April 11, 2011, 7:46 pm
  3. [...] FTR #737 [...]

    Posted by Addendum on the piggy-back coups in the Middle East: the Turking Taffy series | lys-dor.com | April 19, 2011, 9:42 am
  4. I don’t know the time frame here, but accord­ing to this doc­u­men­tary, Al-Arian is in jail as a US polit­i­cal pris­oner. Are these two dif­fer­ent peo­ple? http://www.snagfilms.com/films/title/usa_vs_al_arian/

    Posted by Michael Reust | June 17, 2011, 10:30 pm
  5. Look­ing back at this arti­cle, this is some rather decent infor­ma­tion, but I’m afraid I have to break some bad news to you: The Chi­nese are def­i­nitely amongst the bad guys, and are allies of the world crime net­work, per­haps even with the Under­ground Reich(with the Uyghur sep­a­ratists being the dupes and use­ful pawns of both). How else to explain things like the cor­po­ratist crooks tak­ing jobs away from Amer­i­cans and send­ing them to China?
    On the other hand, it does seem that Rus­sia may soon become an actual enemy of the elite, as they were dur­ing the Khrushchev and Gor­bachev admin­is­tra­tions in the Soviet era. You may have heard about the recent anti-Putin protests, and if A Just Rus­sia or any other of non-corrupt par­ties were to gain power in Rus­sia, I strongly sus­pect the Under­ground Reich and the branches of the world elite would prob­a­bly have one hell of a panic attack.
    One scary sce­nario to keep in mind is this might help lead to a sec­ond Russo-Chinese war. The world crime net­work are start­ing to run out of time, and move­ments to hijack. Peo­ple are wak­ing up, and fast.

    Posted by Steven L. | January 20, 2012, 6:23 am
  6. [...] FTR #737 Taqqiya Sun­rise, Part II: Turk­ish Taffy (More on the Rolling Coups in the Mid­dle East) [...]

    Posted by Interview with Diana West on Secure Freedom Radio: Bogus « democratic » revolutions, civilization jihad and the subversion of western societies | Lys-d'Or | April 8, 2012, 12:15 pm
  7. I’d be tempted to call this a ‘Putin-league’ manuever but it looks like Erodogan is on the cusp of some­thing even big­ger. Erodogan is fac­ing con­sti­tu­tional term lim­its at the end of his term in 2015 but that doesn’t appear to be a prob­lem for an extended Erdo­gan rule. That’s because Turkey is about to adopt a new con­sti­tu­tion. There’s been an expec­ta­tion that the Turkey would adopt a new con­sti­tu­tion for the last decade but now it looks like the new con­sti­tu­tion is finally going to be adopted. And one of the new con­sti­tu­tional fea­tures will pos­si­bly include a strong shift towards a pow­er­ful, inde­pen­dent pres­i­den­tial office. For a Prime Min­is­ter fac­ing term lim­its, a new con­sti­tu­tion with a fancy new pres­i­den­tial office must sound like a grand idea. That might be one of the rea­sons why Erdo­gan is now call­ing for the cre­ation a new pow­er­ful pres­i­den­tial office as part of the upcom­ing con­sti­tu­tional shakeup:

    Erdo­gan deputy calls for pres­i­den­tial sys­tem in Turkey
    Reuters, 07/05 18:02 CET

    ISTANBUL (Reuters) — A deputy to Prime Min­is­ter Tayyip Erdo­gan called on Mon­day for Turkey to move to a pres­i­den­tial form of gov­ern­ment, herald­ing widely expected pro­pos­als for con­sti­tu­tional changes that would allow Erdo­gan to become even more pow­er­ful as pres­i­dent.

    Since his Islamist-rooted AK Party swept to power in 2001, Erdo­gan has dom­i­nated the polit­i­cal land­scape, deliv­er­ing rapid eco­nomic growth, trounc­ing the oppo­si­tion in three elec­tions, while pass­ing reforms to bring a staunchly sec­u­lar mil­i­tary to heel.

    Under party rules, how­ever, Erdo­gan can­not have another term as prime min­is­ter, and before the last elec­tion it became an open secret in the media that he would like to switch to the pres­i­dency before his term ends in 2015.

    Oppo­nents fear Erdogan’s dom­i­neer­ing style would become even more pro­nounced if he had pres­i­den­tial pow­ers with­out a par­lia­ment strong enough to rein him in.

    The judiciary’s inde­pen­dence was reduced by reforms pushed through two years ago, and press free­dom has also suf­fered under Erdo­gan, crit­ics say.

    Since last year’s elec­tion, the poten­tial switch to a pres­i­den­tial form of gov­ern­ment had lain dor­mant, but at a par­lia­men­tary sym­po­sium on Mon­day, just a week after par­lia­ment began work­ing on a new con­sti­tu­tion, Bekir Bozdag, one of Erdogan’s four deputy prime min­is­ters, put the issue squarely on the agenda.

    ...

    At the open­ing of par­lia­ment last Octo­ber, Pres­i­dent Abdul­lah Gul urged law­mak­ers to search for con­sen­sus on a new lib­eral con­sti­tu­tion so it would be representative.

    Erdogan’s AK Party won a third con­sec­u­tive term in June last year and had set a tar­get of draft­ing a new con­sti­tu­tion within the first half of this year.

    Party rules pre­vent Erdo­gan from serv­ing as prime min­is­ter for more than three terms, but there has long been spec­u­la­tion that he intended to switch to an empow­ered pres­i­dency in order to extend his rule.

    ...

    So Turkey already appears to be about to for­mal­ize Erdogan’s long-term rule while, at the same time, one of the middle-east’s older dynas­ties is on the verge of col­lapse next door in Syria. It’s an out­come Erdogan’s been cham­pi­oning too with open calls for the end top al-Assad’s rule. While there’s no doubt a wide vari­ety of strate­gic rea­sons Ero­gan wouldn’t mind see­ing the col­lapse of a neigh­bor­ing regime, it’s safe to say that Erdogan’s enthu­si­asm for the Syr­ian rebels has prob­a­bly been boosted by the quiet takeover of the Syr­ian oppo­si­tion by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood:

    Syria’s Mus­lim Broth­er­hood rise from the ashes
    May 06, 2012|Khaled Yacoub Oweis | Reuters

    ISTANBUL (Reuters) — At a meet­ing of Syria’s oppo­si­tion, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood offi­cials gather round Marx­ists col­leagues, nudg­ing them to pro­duce pol­icy state­ments for the Syr­ian National Coun­cil, the main polit­i­cal group chal­leng­ing Pres­i­dent Bashar al-Assad.

    With many liv­ing in the West, and some ditch­ing their trade­mark beards, it is hard to dif­fer­en­ti­ate Broth­er­hood from left­ists. But there is lit­tle dis­pute about who calls the shots.

    From anni­hi­la­tion at home 30 years ago when they chal­lenged the iron-fisted rule of Hafez al-Assad, the Broth­er­hood has recov­ered to become the dom­i­nant force of the exile oppo­si­tion in the 14-month-old revolt against his son Bashar.

    Care­ful not to under­mine the council’s dis­parate sup­port­ers, the Broth­er­hood has played down its grow­ing influ­ence within the Syr­ian National Coun­cil (SNC), whose pub­lic face is the sec­u­lar Paris-based pro­fes­sor Bourhan Ghalioun.

    “We chose this face, accepted by the West and by the inside. We don’t want the regime to take advan­tage if an Islamist becomes the Syr­ian National Council’s head,” for­mer Broth­er­hood leader Ali Sadred­dine al-Bayanouni told sup­port­ers in a video.

    The footage is now being cir­cu­lated by Broth­er­hood oppo­nents, seek­ing to high­light its unde­clared power.

    ...

    Mind­ful of inter­na­tional fears of Islamists tak­ing power, and of the wor­ries of Syria’s eth­nic and reli­gious minori­ties, the Syr­ian Broth­er­hood por­trays itself as espous­ing a mod­er­ate, Turkish-style Islamist agenda. It unveiled a man­i­festo last month that did not men­tion the word Islam and con­tained pledges to respect indi­vid­ual rights.

    With back­ing from Ankara, and fol­low­ing the polit­i­cal ascen­dancy of the Broth­er­hood in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya since Arab Spring revolts broke out two years ago, the group is poised to be at the top of any new gov­ern­ing sys­tem in Syria.

    Extend­ing the loose Broth­er­hood umbrella to Syria will raise pres­sure on the U.S.-backed Hashemite monar­chy in Jor­dan, where the local Broth­er­hood has been side­lined by laws that favor tribal politi­cians allied with the secu­rity apparatus.

    Iraq’s Shi’ite rulers could also find they have a hard­line Sunni gov­ern­ment as their neigh­bor, and Lebanon’s Shi’ite guer­rilla group Hezbol­lah would lose its main Arab backer.

    EYEING VICTORY

    Work­ing qui­etly, the Broth­er­hood has been financ­ing Free Syr­ian Army defec­tors based in Turkey and chan­nel­ing money and sup­plies to Syria, reviv­ing their base among small Sunni farm­ers and mid­dle class Syr­i­ans, oppo­si­tion sources say.

    “We bicker while the Broth­er­hood works,” said Fawaz al-Tello, a vet­eran oppo­si­tion fig­ure who is a pious Mus­lim while being on the lib­eral end of the Syr­ian polit­i­cal spectrum.

    “They have gained con­trol of the SNC’s aid divi­sion and the mil­i­tary bureau, its only impor­tant com­po­nents,” said Tello, a for­mer polit­i­cal pris­oner who fled Syria four months ago.

    “But they still have to work more do to get sup­port on the inside. Lots of cler­ics, activists and rebels do not want to be linked to them.”

    ...

    With a num­ber of gulf states now openly financ­ing the Syr­ian oppo­si­tion and Erdo­gan call­ing for an inter­na­tional inter­ven­tion even over Russ­ian and Chi­nese oppo­si­tion it’s look­ing more and more like the MB is going to be in con­trol when, not if, the al-Assad dynasty falls in Syria. And who knows when that could hap­pen but Erdo­gan just declared that he has ‘lost hope’ in a peace­ful solu­tion in Syria and Kofi Annan is warn­ing the world of a region cat­a­stro­phe if the vio­lence in Syria erupts into a larger civil war.

    Between Egypt poten­tially look­ing at social chaos, Greece fac­ing a gov­ern­men­tal cri­sis on top of its finan­cial peril, Israel and Iran fac­ing off over nukes, and Syria on the verge of a fullscale civil war, this is look­ing like it’s going to be one crazy sum­mer in Mr. Erdogan’s Neighborhood.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 9, 2012, 8:05 pm
  8. @Pterrafractyl: Inter­est­ing stuff as usual. Though hon­estly, I have long sus­pected that the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and Assad’s regime, while opposed on the out­side, are, on the inside, truly just the two sides of a stained and smelly Reichsmark.

    I do hope that the Syr­ian peo­ple will wake up and real­ize that their movement’s been hijacked. Unfor­tu­nately, it may be too late to stop the future blood­shed which is sure to occur once they DO find out the MB’s true agenda.

    Posted by Steve L. | May 9, 2012, 8:52 pm

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