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FTR #782 All’s Well That’s Orwell, Part 2: The Ministry of Truth and the Ukrainian Crisis, Part 2 (Schmemann Uber Alles)

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. [1] (The flash dri­ve includes the anti-fas­cist books avail­able on this site.)

Lis­ten: MP3

Side 1 [2]  Side 2 [3]

[4]

Swo­bo­da leader Oleh Tia­hany­bok salutes

Intro­duc­tion: This pro­gram con­tin­ues analy­sis of the instal­la­tion in the Ukraine of a gov­ern­ment com­posed large­ly of polit­i­cal forces evolved from, and man­i­fest­ing ide­o­log­i­cal con­ti­nu­ity with, the fas­cist OUN/B.

Hav­ing staffed the 14th Waf­fen SS (Gali­cian) Divi­sion and the Ein­satz­grup­pen (mobile exe­cu­tion squads) in the Ukraine, the OUN/B was a piv­otal ele­ment in the post­war Gehlen spy out­fit in its CIA and BND incar­na­tions, the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations and the GOP eth­nic out­reach orga­ni­za­tion.

OUN/B has been deeply involved with covert oper­a­tions and fig­ures in the inves­ti­ga­tion into the assas­si­na­tion of Pres­i­dent Kennedy, as well as the de-sta­bi­liza­tion of the Sovi­et Union dur­ing the cli­mac­tic phase of the Cold War. With a pro­found pres­ence in the GOP’s eth­nic divi­sion, as well as the con­tem­po­rary Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal infra­struc­ture, the OUN/B is any­thing but an his­tor­i­cal rel­ic. The devel­op­ment of the OUN/B in both the U.S. and the Ukraine is explained in great his­tor­i­cal depth in AFA #37 [5].

The Orwellian aspects of the Ukrain­ian cri­sis could not be exag­ger­at­ed and are explored at greater length in this pro­gram.

(We have done five pro­grams to date about the Ukrain­ian cri­sis: FTR #‘s 777 [6]778 [7]779 [8]780 [9]781 [10].)

The pro­gram begins by review­ing some of the Yuschenko regime’s delib­er­ate and fun­da­men­tal [11] remak­ing of Ukrain­ian his­tory and ide­ol­ogy. Hav­ing lit­er­ally cre­ated an Orwellian “Min­istry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s gov­ern­ment paved the way for the polit­i­cal mid­wif­ing of the Swo­boda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.

Swing­ing the spot­light to this side of the Atlantic, the broad­cast high­lights the Orwellian nature of U.S. media cov­er­age of the events in the Ukraine. In par­tic­u­lar, the dis­grace­ful behav­ior of The New York Timesthe CIA’s #1 pro­pa­gan­da asset [12]–is set forth here.

If Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin and For­eign Min­is­ter Sergei Lavarov said that “2 + 2+4,” the Times would present it thus­ly: “In a joint press con­fer­ence, Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin and For­eign Min­is­ter Sergei Lavarov repeat­ed their alle­ga­tion that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Inces­sant­ly repeat­ed by the Russ­ian media since the seces­sion­ist vote in the Crimea was sched­uled, this is a major theme of Russ­ian math­e­mat­i­cal pro­pa­gan­da.”

Accord­ing to The Min­istry of Truth (in this case The New York Times), Swo­bo­da is now “mod­er­ate.” [13]  We guess that is what hap­pens when the leader of the group meets with the Sec­re­tary of State (John Ker­ry.) Swoboda’s mod­er­a­tion is indi­cated by their unwill­ing­ness to “open­ly” advo­cate throw­ing fire­bombs at the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment secu­rity forces.

The Times por­trays as out­landish pro­pa­gan­da the [accu­rate] Russ­ian claim that the new gov­ern­ment of the Ukraine is com­posed of Nazis [14] to a con­sid­er­able extent. The Per Anders Rudling text excerpt­ed above pro­vides ample doc­u­men­ta­tion of this.) The Gray Lady sim­i­lar­ly por­trays the Russ­ian [accu­rate] claim that the cur­rent gov­ern­ment is com­posed of polit­i­cal heirs to Stephan Ban­dera [15]. Again, that is a fact, NOT Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da.

A sig­nif­i­cant ele­ment of the dis­cus­sion cen­ters on the Times’ edi­to­r­i­al board mem­ber Serge Schme­mann [16]. Of White Russ­ian extrac­tion, his fam­i­ly back­ground [17] and jour­nal­is­tic behav­ior raise the ques­tion of whether Schme­mann might have links to the anti-com­mu­nist axis emi­gre milieu.

Born in France dur­ing the clos­ing days of World War II, Schme­mann grew up speak­ing Russ­ian and came to the U.S. when his fam­ily moved here in 1951. We won­der if the Schme­mann fam­ily [18] and Serge, in par­tic­u­lar, may have had con­tact with anti-Sovi­et intel­li­gence and/or fas­cist net­works? Might they have had links to the Promethean League? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intel­li­gence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some ele­ment of CIA or oth­er intel­li­gence agency?

IF so, might that account for the edi­to­r­ial bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrain­ian cri­sis?

Schme­mann wrote a bad­ly slant­ed book review he wrote in 1988. He was dis­mis­sive of Christo­pher Simpson’s accu­rate assess­ment of the role of anti-Sovi­et Axis col­lab­o­ra­tors with­in the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion and their per­ma­nent, destruc­tive imprint on U.S. for­eign and nation­al secu­rity pol­i­cy. The polit­i­cal axis defined by Yka­te­ri­na [Chu­machenko] Yuschenko and her hus­band and their role in real­iz­ing the Ukrain­ian Min­istry of Truth, dis­cussed in FTR #781 [10], bears ample wit­ness to the accu­ra­cy of Simp­son’s analy­sis, as does AFA #37 [5].

One of the ele­ments loom­ing large in the Ukrain­ian cri­sis is the pan-Turk­ist move­ment. Allied with Nazi Ger­many in World War II and fas­cist in nature, the pan-Turk­ists had long sought to carve up the Sovi­et Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The pro­gram devotes con­sid­er­able time to an excerpt from AFA #14 [19] (record­ed in Jan­u­ary of 1986.)

The focal point of the dis­cus­sion is the Promethean League. An anti-Sovi­et net­work sim­i­lar to the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League, the Promethean League was estab­lished between the world wars. Sub­si­dized by Mar­shall Pil­sud­ski’s Pol­ish intel­li­gence appa­ra­tus, the group was phys­i­cal­ly based in Poland, but heav­i­ly sup­port­ed by French intel­li­gence and ide­ol­o­gists based in France. Fea­tur­ing Pan-Turk­ist and Ukrain­ian ele­ments, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and lat­er to ele­ments of West­ern intel­li­gence and allied orga­ni­za­tions.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Swo­bo­da leader Oleh Tyan­hy­bok, was hon­ored by vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS Divi­sion (Gali­cia); in April of 2011, Swo­boda returned the favor, hon­or­ing the vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS in Lvov; Turk­ish Prime Min­is­ter Erdo­gan’s sup­port [20] for the Crimean Tatars; the pres­ence of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate Hizb Ut-Tahrir [21] in the Crimea; the role of Theodor Ober­lan­der in the mobi­liz­ing of Turko­phone minori­ties on behalf of the Third Reich; Ober­lan­der’s role as polit­i­cal offi­cer of the Ein­satz­gruppe Nacht­gall.

1. The pro­gram reviews some of the Yuschenko regime’s delib­er­ate and fun­da­men­tal remak­ing of Ukrain­ian his­tory and ide­ol­ogy. Hav­ing lit­er­ally cre­ated an Orwellian “Min­istry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s gov­ern­ment paved the way for the polit­i­cal mid­wif­ing of the Swo­boda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.

“The Return of the Ukrain­ian Far Right: The Case of VO Svo­boda,” by Per Anders Rudling;  Ana­lyz­ing Fas­cist Dis­course: Euro­pean Fas­cism in Talk and Text edit­ed by Ruth Wodak and John E. Richard­son;  Rout­ledge [Lon­don and New York] 2013; pp. 228–255, more. [11]

Note that this book is in Google Books [22].

. . . . . Swept to pow­er by the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, the third pres­i­dent of Ukraine,Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), put in sub­stan­tial efforts into the pro­duc­tion of his­tor­i­cal myths. He tasked a set of nation­al­is­ti­cally mind­ed his­to­ri­ans to pro­duce and dis­sem­i­nate an edi­fy­ing nation­al his­tory as well as a new set of nation­al heroes. . . . .

. . . . . The OUN wings dis­agreed on strat­egy and ide­ol­ogy but shared a com­mit­ment to the man­u­fac­ture of a his­tor­i­cal past based on vic­tim­iza­tion and hero­ism. The émi­grés devel­oped an entire lit­er­a­ture that denied the OUN’s fas­cism, its col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many, and its par­tic­i­pa­tion in atroc­i­ties, instead pre­sent­ing the orga­ni­za­tion as com­posed of democ­rats and plu­ral­ists who had res­cued Jews dur­ing the Holo­caust. The dias­pora nar­ra­tive was con­tra­dic­tory, com­bin­ing cel­e­bra­tions of the sup­pos­edly anti-Nazi resis­tance strug­gle of the OUN-UPA with cel­e­bra­tions of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien, a Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist for­ma­tion estab­lished by Hein­rich Himm­ler in 1943 (Rudling, 2011a, 2011c, 2012a). Thus, Ukrain­ian Waf­fen SS vet­er­ans could cel­e­brate the UPA as “anti-Nazi resis­tance fighters” while belong­ing to the same war vet­er­ans’ orga­ni­za­tions (Bairak, 1978). Unlike their coun­ter­parts in some oth­er post-Sovi­et states, Ukrain­ian “nation­al­iz­ing” his­to­ri­ans did not have to invent new nation­al­ist myths but re-import­ed a nar­ra­tive devel­oped by the émi­grés (Dietsch, 2006: 111–146; Rudling, 2011a: 751–753). . . . .

YUSHCHENKOISM

As pres­i­dent, Yushchenko ini­ti­ated sub­stan­tial gov­ern­ment pro­pa­ganda ini­tia­tives. In July 2005, he estab­lished an Insti­tute of Nation­al Mem­oryassigned the archives of the for­mer KGB (now the SBU, Sluzh­ba Bezpe­ki Ukrainy, the Ukrain­ian Secu­rity Ser­vice) for­mal pro­pa­gan­dis­tic duties and sup­ported the cre­ation of a “Muse­um of Sovi­et Occu­pa­tion” in Kyiv (Jilge, 2008: 174). Yushchenko appoint­ed the young activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) direc­tor of the SBU archives. V’’iatrovych com­bined his posi­tion as gov­ern­ment-appoint­ed mem­ory man­ager with ultra-nation­al­ist activism; he was simul­ta­ne­ously direc­tor of an OUN(b) front orga­ni­za­tion, the Cen­ter for the Study for the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment. State insti­tu­tions dis­sem­i­nated a san­i­tized, edi­fy­ingly patri­otic ver­sion of the his­tory of the “Ukrain­ian nation­al lib­er­a­tion move­ment,” the lead­ers of which were pre­sented in icono­graphic form as hero­ic and saint­ly figures, mar­tyrs of the nation (Rasevych, 2010; Rudling, 2011c: 26–33, 2012b). . . .

. . . A recon­structed his­tor­i­cal mem­ory is cre­ated as ‘true mem­ory’ and then con­trasted with ‘false Sovi­et his­tory’ ”(Jilge, 2007:104–105). Thus, Valen­tyn Naly­vaichenko, SBU direc­tor under Yushchenko, described the task of his agency as being to dis­sem­i­nate “the his­tor­i­cal truth of the past of the Ukrain­ian peo­ple,” to “lib­er­ate Ukrain­ian his­tory from lies and fal­sifi­ca­tions and to work with truth­ful doc­u­ments only” (Jilge, 2008:179). Ignor­ing the OUN’s anti­semitism, deny­ing its par­tic­i­pa­tion in anti– Jew­ish vio­lence, and over­look­ing its fas­cist ide­ol­ogy, Naly­vaichenko and his agency pre­sented the OUN as democ­rats, plu­ral­ists, even right­eous res­cuers of Jews dur­ing the Holo­caust. . . . 

. . . . On June 30, 2011, the 70th anniver­sary of the Ger­man inva­sion and Stetsko’s “renew­al of Ukrain­ian state­hood” was re-enact­ed in Lviv as a pop­u­lar fes­ti­val, where par­ents with small chil­dren waved flags to re-enac­tors in SS uni­forms. . . .

. . . . Svoboda’s claims to the OUN lega­cy are based upon ide­o­log­i­cal con­ti­nu­ity, as well as orga­ni­za­tion and polit­i­cal cul­ture (Shekhovtsov, 2011b:13–14). Pre­sent­ing Svo­boda as the suc­ces­sor of Dontsov and the OUN, Tiah­ny­bok regards Svo­boda as “an Order-par­ty which con­sti­tutes the true elite of the nation” (Tiah­ny­bok, 2011). Like those of many oth­er far-right move­ments, Svoboda’s offi­cial pol­icy doc­u­ments are rel­a­tively cau­tious and dif­fer from its dai­ly activ­i­ties and inter­nal jar­gon, which are much more rad­i­cal and racist (Olszan´ski, 2011). . . .

Fol­low­ing vio­lent clash­es, the police detained more than 50 Svo­boda activists, armed with gas can­is­ters, smoke bombs and cat­a­pults. The Cherkasy branch of Svo­boda crit­i­cized the police for their alleged fail­ure “to stop and avert aggres­sion by Hasidic Jews to Ukraini­ans” (“Uman: Righ-twing activists detained,” 2011). Svoboda’s anti-Russ­ian and anti-Jew­ish rhetoric is accom­pa­nied by an anti-Pol­ish mes­sage. Svo­boda main­tains that Poland has played a neg­a­tive his­tor­i­cal role in Ukrain­ian lands. The par­ty demands an offi­cial apol­ogy from Poland for five hun­dred years of Pol­o­niza­tion, from the 15th to the 20th cen­turies, and indem­ni­ties for “the Pol­ish ter­ror and occu­pa­tion of Ukrain­ian lands in the 20th cen­tury” (“Zaia­va VO ‘Svo­boda’ shchodoproia­viv ukrain­o­fo­bii,” 2010). Focus­ing on divi­sive and sen­si­tive issues, Svo­boda provoca­tively denies any involve­ment of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien in atroc­i­ties against the Pol­ish minor­ity in Gali­cia. For instance, on the site of Huta Pieni­acka, Svo­boda has placed a huge bill­board deny­ing the con­clu­sion of both Pol­ish and Ukrain­ian his­tor­i­cal com­mis­sions that the fourth police reg­i­ment, which was lat­er adjoined to the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien, burnt this Pol­ish vil­lage and slaugh­tered most of its res­i­dents on Feb­ru­ary 28, 1944. . . .

In Cana­da, in May 2010, Tiah­ny­bok received the gold­en cross “for his ser­vice to Ukraine” from the Broth­er­hood of the Vet­er­ans of the First Ukrain­ian Divi­sion of the Ukrain­ian Nation­al Army, as the vet­er­ans of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien call them­selves (“Esesovt­sy nagradil lid­er­aukrain­skikh nat­sion­al­is­tov,” 2010). Fol­low­ing the con­vic­tion and sen­tenc­ing of the death camp guard John Dem­jan­juk to five years of jail for his role as an acces­sory to the mur­der of 27,900 peo­ple at the Sobibór death camp,Tiahnybok trav­eled to Ger­many and met up with Demjanjuk’s lawyer, Ulrich Busch, pre­sent­ing the death camp guard as a hero, a vic­tim of per­se­cu­tion, who is “fight­ing for truth” (“Oleh Tiah­ny­bok iz dvo­den­nym vizy­tomvid­vi­dav Nimechynu,” 2010). . . .

. . . . Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn (b. 1982), Tiahnybok’s advis­er on ide­o­log­i­cal mat­ters, Svoboda’s top name in the elec­tion to the Lviv city coun­cil and its can­di­date for may­or in 2010, rep­re­sents a more rad­i­cal cur­rent in the move­ment.Proud­ly con­fess­ing him­self part of the fas­cist tra­di­tion, Mykhal’chyshyn rel­ishes the harsh­ness, extrem­ism and uncom­pro­mis­ing rad­i­cal­ism of his idols of the 1930s and 1940s. Con­stantly reit­er­at­ing that “We con­sider tol­er­ance a crime” and that “We val­ue the truth of the spir­it and blood over-all suc­cess and wealth” (Nasha Vatra , n.d.),Mykhal’chyshyn takes pride in the label “extrem­ist,” which he proud­ly shares with “Stepan Bandera,who cre­ated an under­ground ter­ror­ist-rev­o­lu­tion­ary army, the shad­ow of which still stirs up hor­ri­ble fear in the hearts of the ene­mies of our Nation”(Mykhal’chyshyn, “Ori­en­tyry”, n.d.). Mykhal’chyshyn serves as a link between VO Svo­boda and the so-called autonomous nation­al­ists. Mir­ror­ing the “autonomous anar­chists” of the extreme left, which they resem­ble in terms of dress code, lifestyle, aes­thet­ics, sym­bol­ism and orga­ni­za­tion, the “autonomous nation­al­ists” attract par­tic­u­larly mil­i­tant and extreme­ly vio­lent “event-ori­ent­ed” young fas­cists. . . . .

. . . . The glo­rifi­ca­tion of street vio­lence is a key com­po­nent of this polit­i­cal sub­cul­ture: in an extra ses­sion with the Lviv region­al Rada in front of the Ban­dera memo­r­ial in Lviv, Mykhal’chyshyn boast­ed that “Our Ban­derite army will cross the Dnipro and throw that blue-ass gang, which today usurps the pow­er, out of Ukraine. . . . That will make those Asi­atic dogs shut their ugly mouths.” . . . .

. . . . Explic­itly endors­ing Hamas, Mykhal’chyshyn regards the Holo­caust as “a bright episode in Euro­pean civ­i­liza­tion” . . . .

. . . . We rec­og­nize the heavy empha­sis on heroes and hero­ism from the nar­ra­tive of the émi­gré OUN and from Yushchenko’s legit­imiz­ing his­to­ri­ans. The dif­fer­ence is that, unlike these two influences, Mykhal’chyshyn does not deny Ban­dera and Stets’ko’s fas­cism. On the con­trary, their fas­cist ide­ol­ogy con­sti­tutes the basis for his admi­ra­tion. . . .

. . . . Yushchenko left behind a lega­cy of myths which helped legit­imized Svoboda’s ide­ol­ogy. Svoboda’s appro­pri­a­tion of many rit­u­als in hon­our of “nation­al heroes” from more mod­er­ate nation­al­ists is but one expres­sion of its increased polit­i­cal strength in post-Yushchenko West­ern Ukraine. . . .

. . . . On April 28, 2011, Svo­boda cel­e­brated the 68th anniver­sary of the estab­lish­ment of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien. Octo­ge­nar­ian Waf­fen SS vet­er­ans were treat­ed as heroes in a mass ral­ly, orga­nized by Svo­boda and the “autonomous nation­al­ists.” Near­ly 700 par­tic­i­pants (the orga­niz­ers claimed 2,000) marched down the streets of Lviv, from the mas­sive socialist–realist style Ban­dera mon­u­ment, to Prospekt Svo­body, the main street, shout­ing slo­gans like “One race, one nation, one father­land!,” . . . .

. . . . The pro­ces­sion was led by Mykhal’chyshyn . . . .

2.  So, accord­ing to The Min­istry of Truth, Swo­boda is now “mod­er­ate.” We guess that is what hap­pens when the leader of the group meets with the Sec­re­tary of State (John Ker­ry.)

Notice that Swoboda’s mod­er­a­tion is indi­cated by their unwill­ing­ness to “open­ly” advo­cate throw­ing fire­bombs at the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment secu­rity forces. Hey, that sure sounds mod­er­ate to us!

In 2010, Oleh Tyan­hy­bok, the leader of the group was hon­ored by vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS Divi­sion (Gali­cia). In April of 2011, Swo­bo­da returned the favor, hon­or­ing the vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS in Lvov.

“Front and Cen­ter in Ukraine Race, a Leader of the Far Right” by Andrew E. Kramer; The New York Times; 3/11/2014. [13]

. . . . Mr. Yarosh has hint­ed at a role for his group in bal­anc­ing the influ­ence of a long­time play­er in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, the for­mer prime min­is­ter who emerged from prison after the fall of the old gov­ern­ment with mem­bers of her polit­i­cal par­ty, Father­land, already hold­ing the posi­tions of act­ing pres­i­dent and prime min­is­ter.

Before the protests, the nation­al­ist par­ty Svo­boda had occu­pied the nation­al­ist niche to the right of Ms. Tymoshenko. But Svo­boda and Father­land are now allied. . . . [They were all along. Just check out FTR #779 [8]–D.E.)

The Svo­boda par­ty, mean­while, has mod­er­ated, and did not open­ly [!–D.E.] endorse the tac­tic of throw­ing fire­bombs when street fight­ing began in Jan­u­ary. Svo­boda was found­ed in 1991 under the name the Social­ist-Nation­al­ist Par­ty of Ukraine, with a sym­bol that resem­bled a swasti­ka. Its leader, Oleg Tyag­ni­bok, met Sec­re­tary of State John Ker­ry on Tues­day . . . .

3. We note the delib­er­ate slant­i­ng of cov­er­age of the Ukrain­ian cri­sis in the New York Times. Note how the Times spins the [accu­rate] Russ­ian claim that the new gov­ern­ment of the Ukraine is com­posed of Nazis to a con­sid­er­able extent. The ear­li­er pro­grams about the Ukrain­ian cri­sis should pro­vide ample doc­u­men­ta­tion of this.

“In Crimea’s Phan­tom War, Armed Men Face Unseen Foe” by Andrew Hig­gins and Ali­son Smale; The New York Times; 3/2/2014. [14]

. . . Russ­ian media, a potent weapon in a bat­tle to demor­al­ize and divide what remains of Ukrain­ian state author­i­ty in Crimea, has announced a string of defec­tions, some true, some not, and kept up a drum­beat with accounts of how Ukraine has slipped into the hands of extrem­ists, ter­ror­ists and even Nazis. [They are–D.E.]. . .

4. Note how the Times sub­tly spins the accu­rate analy­sis of the new Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment as suc­ces­sors to Ban­der­a’s OUN/B forces. It is not “Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da.”

“As Putin Orders Drills in Crimea, Pro­test­ers’ Clash Shows Region’s Divide” by Andrew Hig­gins and Steven Lee Myers; The New York Times; 2/26/2014. [15]

. . . . “I don’t want to live in a coun­try run by fas­cists,” said Sergei Gaenko, a retired law enforce­ment offi­cial, echo­ing a wide­spread view here that Mr. Yanukovych’s ouster was engi­neered by the polit­i­cal descen­dants of mil­i­tant Ukrain­ian nation­al­ists who, dur­ing World War II, some­times formed loose tac­ti­cal alliances with Hitler’s invad­ing army.

Crimea, he added, was “ille­gal­ly giv­en to Ukraine” by Niki­ta Khrushchev and he said it was time to “cor­rect an his­toric injus­tice.” Like many Rus­sians here, he scorned the new inter­im gov­ern­ment as made up of “Ban­derovt­si,” a deroga­to­ry Sovi­et term used to describe fol­low­ers of Stepan Ban­dera, a wartime Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist leader vil­i­fied by Moscow as a pro-Nazi trai­tor. .

5a. The New York Times not­ed that Oba­ma has not react­ed to the “demo­c­ra­tic” devel­op­ments in the Ukraine in the way that George W. Bush react­ed to the “Orange Rev­o­lu­tion.” Note how the Gray Lady ref­er­ences Paula J. Dobri­an­sky’s view­point. A mem­ber of the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil under Ronald Rea­gan, Dobri­an­sky was a Deputy Sec­re­tary of State under George W. Bush. The daugh­ter of Lev Dobri­an­sky, Paula is part and par­cel to the OUN/B milieu in the Unit­ed States.

“Wary Stance from Oba­ma on Ukraine” by Peter Bak­er; The New York Times; 2/24/2014. [23]

Tele­vi­sions around the White House were aglow with pic­tures of Ukraini­ans in the streets, demand­ing to be heard and top­pling a gov­ern­ment aligned with Rus­sia. It was an invig­o­rat­ing moment, and it spurred a pres­i­dent already rethink­ing his approach to the world.

That was a dif­fer­ent decade and a dif­fer­ent pres­i­dent. While George W. Bush [24] was inspired by the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion of 2004 and weeks lat­er vowed in his sec­ond inau­gural address [25] to pro­mote democ­racy, Barack Oba­ma [26] has approached the rev­o­lu­tion of 2014 with a more clin­i­cal detach­ment aimed at avoid­ing insta­bil­i­ty.

 Rather than an oppor­tu­nity to spread free­dom in a part of the world long plagued by cor­rup­tion and oppres­sion, Mr. Oba­ma sees Ukraine [27]’s cri­sis as a prob­lem to be man­aged, ide­ally with a min­i­mum of vio­lence or geopo­lit­i­cal upheaval. While cer­tainly sym­pa­thetic to the pro-West­ern pro­test­ers who pushed out Pres­i­dent Vik­tor F. Yanukovych [28] and hope­ful that they can estab­lish a rep­re­sen­ta­tively elect­ed gov­ern­ment, Mr. Oba­ma has not made glob­al aspi­ra­tions of democ­racy the ani­mat­ing force of his pres­i­den­cy.

“I just think this pres­i­dent is not going to lean for­ward on his skis with regard to democ­racy pro­mo­tion,” said John Lewis Gad­dis, a Yale Uni­ver­sity his­to­rian who advised the Bush White House as speech­writ­ers worked on the for­mer president’s Jan­u­ary 2005 inau­gural address promis­ing to com­bat tyran­ny abroad. “If any­thing, he’s going to lean back and let nat­ural forces take us there, if they do.” . . . . “The administration’s Ukraine pol­icy is emblem­atic of a broad­er prob­lem with today’s for­eign pol­icy — absence of a strate­gic vision, dis­in­ter­est in democ­racy pro­mo­tion and an unwill­ing­ness to lead,” said Paula J. Dobri­an­sky, an under sec­re­tary of state for Mr. Bush. . . .

5b. Note that the rhetor­i­cal pres­sure on Oba­ma com­ing from Paula Dobri­an­sky is com­ing from some­one con­nected to the OUN/B milieu and its par­tic­i­pa­tion in the GOP and Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion.

“Is the US Back­ing neo-Nazis in the Ukraine?” by Max Blu­men­thal [Alter­net]; Salon.com; 2/25/2014. [29]

. . . In Wash­ing­ton, the OUN‑B recon­sti­tuted under the ban­ner of the Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­ica (UCCA), an umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion com­prised of “com­plete OUN‑B fronts,” accord­ing to Bel­lant. By the mid-1980’s, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion was hon­ey­combed with UCCA mem­bers, with the group’s chair­man Lev Dobri­an­sky, serv­ing as ambas­sador to the Bahamas, and his daugh­ter, Paula, sit­ting on the Nation­al Secu­rity Coun­cil. Rea­gan per­son­ally wel­comed Stet­sko, the Ban­derist leader who over­saw the mas­sacre of 7000 Jews in Lviv, into the White House in 1983.“Your strug­gle is our strug­gle,” Rea­gan told the for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tor. “Your dream is our dream.” . . .

6. A gen­tle­man named Serge Schme­mann is an impor­tant mem­ber of the Times’ edi­to­r­i­al board. He was for­mer­ly the Times’ Bonn bureau chief, when that city was the for­mer West Ger­many’s cap­i­tal. We haven’t seen many bi-lines fea­tur­ing Mr. Schme­man­n’s recent­ly. He has been fea­tured in edi­to­r­i­al mus­ings in recent Sun­day Times edi­tions.

We remem­ber Schme­mann from a bad­ly slant­ed book review he wrote in 1988. He was dis­mis­sive of Christo­pher Simp­son’s accu­rate assess­ment of the role of anti-Sovi­et Axis col­lab­o­ra­tors with­in the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion and their per­ma­nent, destruc­tive imprint on U.S. for­eign and nation­al secu­ri­ty pol­i­cy.

The role of Ms. Chumachenko/Yuschenko and her hus­band in remak­ing Ukrain­ian his­to­ry and ide­ol­o­gy to pave the way for the rise of Swo­bo­da, Pravy Sek­tor and oth­er OUN/B clones bears bru­tal tes­ti­mo­ny to the accu­ra­cy of Simp­son’s analy­sis.

“Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Nazi Sci­en­tists” by Serge Schme­mann; The New York Times; 5/8/1988. [16]

. . . .But Mr. Simp­son argues fur­ther that the recruit­ment of East Euro­peans and oth­er anti-Com­mu­nists by the C.I.A. after the war served to keep Wash­ing­ton on a cold-war track to this day. He talks of ”the scars that secret emi­gre anti-Com­mu­nist pro­grams have left on life in the Unit­ed States,” down to the sur­vival of the ”lib­er­a­tionist cause” in the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion’s ”cold-war strat­e­gy.”

There are sev­er­al prob­lems here. Most seri­ous­ly, Mr. Simp­son’s log­ic has the effect of smear­ing anti-Com­mu­nism with the taint of Nazism. ”Lib­er­a­tionism” may not be a unique­ly Nazi idea, he writes, ”but the fact remains that ideas and the­o­ries have his­to­ries, just as nations do. . . . The true ori­gins of lib­er­a­tionism as a coher­ent phi­los­o­phy lie in Nazi Ger­many and in the Nazis’ polit­i­cal war­fare cam­paign on the east­ern front, and nowhere else.” Today ”lib­er­a­tion activists” may have a rea­son­ably sophis­ti­cat­ed agen­da, he con­tin­ues, but ”the one posi­tion they cling to above all . . . is an implaca­ble para­noia toward the USSR that would per­mit no arms con­trol treaties, no trade and indeed no East-West coop­er­a­tion of any type, only relent­less prepa­ra­tion for war.” That is a seri­ous charge, and, in the light of the real case his­to­ries of Nazi mass mur­der­ers, it is patent­ly unfair. . . .

. . . . Mr. Simp­son claims that some­thing called the Cap­tive Nations move­ment, in which the C.I.A. had a hand, hin­dered Pres­i­dents Kennedy, John­son and Nixon in their search for detente with the Sovi­et Union. Even if it did, is that real­ly a ”blow­back” from the recruit­ment of Nazis?

Mr. Simp­son like­wise seems to make a fair­ly heady leap from argu­ment to con­clu­sion in describ­ing how clan­des­tine oper­a­tions to ”roll back Com­mu­nism” back­fired in East­ern Europe. In the case of the Ukraine, he claims, ”instead of ral­ly­ing to the new ‘demo­c­ra­t­ic’ move­ment, there is every indi­ca­tion that many of the ordi­nary peo­ple of the Ukraine gave increased cre­dence to the Sovi­et gov­ern­men­t’s mes­sage that the Unit­ed States, too, was real­ly Nazi at heart and capa­ble of using any sort of deceit and vio­lence to achieve its ends.” . . .

7. Serge Schme­mann has a White Russ­ian back­ground. Born in France dur­ing the clos­ing days of World War II, Schme­mann grew up speak­ing Russ­ian and came to the U.S. when his fam­i­ly moved here in 1951. We won­der if the Schme­mann fam­i­ly and Serge, in par­tic­u­lar, may have had con­tact with anti-Sovi­et intel­li­gence and/or fas­cist net­works? Might they have had links to the Promethean League (see below for details)? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intel­li­gence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some ele­ment of CIA or oth­er intel­li­gence agency?

IF so, might that account for the edi­to­r­i­al bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrain­ian cri­sis?

“Serge Schme­mann’: [30]Wikipedia.com [30]

Born in France [4/12/1945], the son of Alexan­der Schme­mann and Juliana Ossorguine (a descen­dant of Juliana of Lazare­vo, a Russ­ian Ortho­dox Saint),[2] he moved to the Unit­ed States as a child, in 1951. He grew up speak­ing Russ­ian at home, but he vis­it­ed his ances­tral home­land for the first time only in 1980 when he arrived with his fam­i­ly as Moscow cor­re­spon­dent for the Asso­ci­at­ed Press. It was not until 1990 that the Sovi­et author­i­ties allowed him to vis­it his grand­par­ents’ home vil­lage near Kalu­ga. . . . .

. . . .Writ­ing for The New York Times, he won the Pulitzer Prize for Inter­na­tion­al Report­ing in 1991 for his cov­er­age of the reuni­fi­ca­tion of Germany,[1] . . .

8. Note that Serge’s father Alexan­der was the son of an emi­gre Czarist offi­cer and resided in France dur­ing the peri­od that the Promethean League was very active there. Alexan­der Schme­mann was being edu­cat­ed in France dur­ing the course of the Nazi occu­pa­tion of that coun­try.

“Alexan­der Schme­mann”; Wikipedia.com [18]

. . . . Alexan­der Schme­mann was born on 13 Sep­tem­ber 1921 in Tallinn, Esto­nia, into a fam­i­ly of Russ­ian White émi­grés. His grand­fa­ther had been a sen­a­tor and a mem­ber of the State Coun­cil and his father an offi­cer of the Impe­r­i­al Life-Guards. When he was a child his fam­i­ly moved to France, where he was edu­cat­ed in Russ­ian schools and at a French lycee before becom­ing a stu­dent at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Paris (1940–1945) . . .

9. In the past, we have not­ed that the sup­pos­ed­ly “mod­er­ate” [31] Islamist gov­ern­ment of Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan [32] isn’t “mod­er­ate” [33] at all. Descend­ed from the Al-Taqwa/­Mus­lim Broth­er­hood [34] milieu, it is both Islamist and Pan-Turk­ist in its out­look. Erdo­gan and his for­eign min­is­ter have been pos­tur­ing in defense of the Crimean Tatars and–doing some­thing he has become known for–con­jur­ing [35] the Ottoman Empire in their polit­i­cal pro­nounce­ments [36].

“Turkey Moves to Pro­tect Crimea’s Tatar Minor­i­ty”; Mid­dle East Online; 3/13/2014. [37]

Turkey, which has kept a low pro­file in the Ukraine cri­sis, is mak­ing moves to pro­tect Crimea’s eth­nic Tatar minor­i­ty as the region pre­pares for a ref­er­en­dum on join­ing Rus­sia this week.

Turk­ish Prime Min­is­ter Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan has pledged to sup­port Crimea’s Turk­ish-speak­ing Tatar minor­i­ty, which Ankara fears could be side­lined in a March 16 vote on switch­ing over to Krem­lin rule.

“Turkey has nev­er left Crimean Tatars alone and will nev­er do so,” he said, after a phone call to Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin ear­li­er this month.

Turkey’s For­eign Min­is­ter Ahmet Davu­to­glu vowed to pro­tect the “rights of our kins­men” after meet­ing with Ukrain­ian offi­cials and rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Tatar com­mu­ni­ty dur­ing an unsched­uled vis­it to Kiev ear­li­er this month. . . .

10. Of con­sid­er­able impor­tance in the con­text of the Crimean Tatar pop­u­la­tion of the Ukraine is the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir [38] has a cadre in that his­tor­i­cal­ly peace­ful and ecu­meni­cal pop­u­la­tion group. Hizb ut-Tahrir [39] is both Islamist [40] and asso­ci­at­ed with Pan-Turk­ism. The group has net­worked [41] with the NPD, the top Ger­man neo-Nazi par­ty.

“Crimean Tatars on Guard Against Join­ing Rus­sia” by Noah Snei­der; The New York Times; 3/14/2014. [21]

. . . . While the Tatars have a his­to­ry of peace­ful resis­tance, the poten­tial for rad­i­cal­iza­tion does exist. Tatar mil­i­tants have fought along­side the oppo­si­tion in Syr­ia, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islam­ic group banned in sev­er­al coun­tries includ­ing Rus­sia, has 1,000 mem­bers in Crimea, accord­ing to Fazil Amza­yev, a spokesman for the group’s local chap­ter. . . .

11. One of the ele­ments loom­ing large in the Ukrain­ian cri­sis is the pan-Turk­ist move­ment. Allied with Nazi Ger­many in World War II and fas­cist in nature, the pan-Turk­ists had long sought to carve up the Sovi­et Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The pro­gram devotes con­sid­er­able time to an excerpt from AFA #14 [19] (record­ed in Jan­u­ary of 1986.)

The focal point of the dis­cus­sion is the Promethean League. An anti-Sovi­et net­work sim­i­lar to the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League, the Promethean League was estab­lished between the world wars. Sub­si­dized by Mar­shall Pil­sud­ski’s Pol­ish intel­li­gence appa­ra­tus, the group was phys­i­cal­ly based in Poland, but heav­i­ly sup­port­ed by French intel­li­gence and ide­ol­o­gists based in France. Fea­tur­ing Pan-Turk­ist and Ukrain­ian ele­ments, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and lat­er to ele­ments of West­ern intel­li­gence and allied orga­ni­za­tions.