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FTR #782 All’s Well That’s Orwell, Part 2: The Ministry of Truth and the Ukrainian Crisis, Part 2 (Schmemann Uber Alles)

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash drive that can be obtained here. [1] (The flash drive includes the anti-fascist books avail­able on this site.)

Listen: MP3

Side 1 [2]  Side 2 [3]

[4]

Swoboda leader Oleh Tiahanybok salutes

Introduction: This pro­gram con­tin­ues analy­sis of the instal­la­tion in the Ukraine of a gov­ern­ment com­posed largely of polit­i­cal forces evolved from, and man­i­fest­ing ide­o­log­i­cal con­ti­nu­ity with, the fas­cist OUN/B.

Hav­ing staffed the 14th Waf­fen SS (Gali­cian) Divi­sion and the Ein­satz­grup­pen (mobile exe­cu­tion squads) in the Ukraine, the OUN/B was a piv­otal ele­ment in the post­war Gehlen spy out­fit in its CIA and BND incar­na­tions, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the GOP eth­nic out­reach organization.

OUN/B has been deeply involved with covert oper­a­tions and fig­ures in the inves­ti­ga­tion into the assas­si­na­tion of Pres­i­dent Kennedy, as well as the de-stabilization of the Soviet Union dur­ing the cli­mac­tic phase of the Cold War. With a pro­found pres­ence in the GOP’s eth­nic divi­sion, as well as the con­tem­po­rary Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal infra­struc­ture, the OUN/B is any­thing but an his­tor­i­cal relic. The devel­op­ment of the OUN/B in both the U.S. and the Ukraine is explained in great his­tor­i­cal depth in AFA #37 [5].

The Orwellian aspects of the Ukrainian crisis could not be exaggerated and are explored at greater length in this program.

(We have done five pro­grams to date about the Ukrain­ian cri­sis: FTR #‘s 777 [6]778 [7]779 [8]780 [9]781 [10].)

The pro­gram begins by reviewing some of the Yuschenko regime’s delib­er­ate and fun­da­men­tal [11] remak­ing of Ukrain­ian his­tory and ide­ol­ogy. Hav­ing lit­er­ally cre­ated an Orwellian “Min­istry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s gov­ern­ment paved the way for the polit­i­cal mid­wif­ing of the Swo­boda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.

Swinging the spotlight to this side of the Atlantic, the broadcast highlights the Orwellian nature of U.S. media coverage of the events in the Ukraine. In particular, the disgraceful behavior of The New York Timesthe CIA’s #1 propaganda asset [12]–is set forth here.

If Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavarov said that “2 + 2+4,” the Times would present it thusly: “In a joint press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavarov repeated their allegation that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Incessantly repeated by the Russian media since the secessionist vote in the Crimea was scheduled, this is a major theme of Russian mathematical propaganda.”

Accord­ing to The Min­istry of Truth (in this case The New York Times), Swoboda is now “moderate.” [13]  We guess that is what hap­pens when the leader of the group meets with the Sec­re­tary of State (John Kerry.) Swoboda’s mod­er­a­tion is indi­cated by their unwill­ing­ness to “openly” advo­cate throw­ing fire­bombs at the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment secu­rity forces.

The Times portrays as outlandish propaganda the [accu­rate] Russ­ian claim that the new gov­ern­ment of the Ukraine is com­posed of Nazis [14] to a con­sid­er­able extent. The Per Anders Rudling text excerpted above provides ample documentation of this.) The Gray Lady similarly portrays the Russian [accurate] claim that the current government is composed of political heirs to Stephan Bandera [15]. Again, that is a fact, NOT Russian propaganda.

A significant element of the discussion centers on the Times’ editorial board member Serge Schmemann [16]. Of White Russian extraction, his family background [17] and journalistic behavior raise the question of whether Schmemann might have links to the anti-communist axis emigre milieu.

Born in France dur­ing the clos­ing days of World War II, Schme­mann grew up speak­ing Russ­ian and came to the U.S. when his fam­ily moved here in 1951. We won­der if the Schme­mann fam­ily [18] and Serge, in par­tic­u­lar, may have had con­tact with anti-Soviet intel­li­gence and/or fas­cist net­works? Might they have had links to the Promethean League? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intel­li­gence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some ele­ment of CIA or other intel­li­gence agency?

IF so, might that account for the edi­to­r­ial bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrain­ian crisis?

Schme­mann wrote a badly slanted book review he wrote in 1988. He was dis­mis­sive of Christo­pher Simpson’s accu­rate assess­ment of the role of anti-Soviet Axis col­lab­o­ra­tors within the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion and their per­ma­nent, destruc­tive imprint on U.S. for­eign and national secu­rity policy. The political axis defined by Ykaterina [Chumachenko] Yuschenko and her husband and their role in realizing the Ukrainian Ministry of Truth, discussed in FTR #781 [10], bears ample witness to the accuracy of Simpson’s analysis, as does AFA #37 [5].

One of the ele­ments looming large in the Ukrainian crisis is the pan-Turkist move­ment. Allied with Nazi Ger­many in World War II and fas­cist in nature, the pan-Turkists had long sought to carve up the Soviet Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The program devotes considerable time to an excerpt from AFA #14 [19] (recorded in January of 1986.)

The focal point of the discussion is the Promethean League. An anti-Soviet network similar to the World Anti-Communist League, the Promethean League was established between the world wars. Subsidized by Marshall Pilsudski’s Polish intelligence apparatus, the group was physically based in Poland, but heavily supported by French intelligence and ideologists based in France. Featuring Pan-Turkist and Ukrainian elements, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and later to elements of Western intelligence and allied organizations.

Program Highlights Include: Swoboda leader Oleh Tyan­hy­bok, was hon­ored by vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS Divi­sion (Gali­cia); in April of 2011, Swo­boda returned the favor, hon­or­ing the vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS in Lvov; Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s support [20] for the Crimean Tatars; the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Hizb Ut-Tahrir [21] in the Crimea; the role of Theodor Oberlander in the mobilizing of Turkophone minorities on behalf of the Third Reich; Oberlander’s role as political officer of the Einsatzgruppe Nachtgall.

1. The pro­gram reviews some of the Yuschenko regime’s delib­er­ate and fun­da­men­tal remak­ing of Ukrain­ian his­tory and ide­ol­ogy. Hav­ing lit­er­ally cre­ated an Orwellian “Min­istry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s gov­ern­ment paved the way for the polit­i­cal mid­wif­ing of the Swo­boda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.

“The Return of the Ukrain­ian Far Right: The Case of VO Svo­boda,” by Per Anders Rudling;  Ana­lyz­ing Fas­cist Dis­course: Euro­pean Fas­cism in Talk and Text edited by Ruth Wodak and John E. Richardson;  Routledge [Lon­don and New York] 2013; pp. 228–255, more. [11]

Note that this book is in Google Books [22].

. . . . . Swept to power by the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, the third pres­i­dent of Ukraine,Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), put in sub­stan­tial efforts into the pro­duc­tion of his­tor­i­cal myths. He tasked a set of nation­al­is­ti­cally minded his­to­ri­ans to pro­duce and dis­sem­i­nate an edi­fy­ing national his­tory as well as a new set of national heroes. . . . .

. . . . . The OUN wings dis­agreed on strat­egy and ide­ol­ogy but shared a com­mit­ment to the man­u­fac­ture of a his­tor­i­cal past based on vic­tim­iza­tion and hero­ism. The émigrés devel­oped an entire lit­er­a­ture that denied the OUN’s fas­cism, its col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many, and its par­tic­i­pa­tion in atroc­i­ties, instead pre­sent­ing the orga­ni­za­tion as com­posed of democ­rats and plu­ral­ists who had res­cued Jews dur­ing the Holo­caust. The dias­pora nar­ra­tive was con­tra­dic­tory, com­bin­ing cel­e­bra­tions of the sup­pos­edly anti-Nazi resis­tance strug­gle of the OUN-UPA with cel­e­bra­tions of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien, a Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist for­ma­tion estab­lished by Hein­rich Himm­ler in 1943 (Rudling, 2011a, 2011c, 2012a). Thus, Ukrain­ian Waf­fen SS vet­er­ans could cel­e­brate the UPA as “anti-Nazi resis­tance fighters” while belong­ing to the same war vet­er­ans’ orga­ni­za­tions (Bairak, 1978). Unlike their coun­ter­parts in some other post-Soviet states, Ukrain­ian “nation­al­iz­ing” his­to­ri­ans did not have to invent new nation­al­ist myths but re-imported a nar­ra­tive devel­oped by the émigrés (Dietsch, 2006: 111–146; Rudling, 2011a: 751–753). . . . .

YUSHCHENKOISM

As pres­i­dent, Yushchenko ini­ti­ated sub­stan­tial gov­ern­ment pro­pa­ganda ini­tia­tives. In July 2005, he estab­lished an Insti­tute of National Mem­oryassigned the archives of the for­mer KGB (now the SBU, Sluzhba Bezpeki Ukrainy, the Ukrain­ian Secu­rity Ser­vice) for­mal pro­pa­gan­dis­tic duties and sup­ported the cre­ation of a “Museum of Soviet Occu­pa­tion” in Kyiv (Jilge, 2008: 174). Yushchenko appointed the young activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) direc­tor of the SBU archives. V’’iatrovych com­bined his posi­tion as government-appointed mem­ory man­ager with ultra-nationalist activism; he was simul­ta­ne­ously direc­tor of an OUN(b) front orga­ni­za­tion, the Cen­ter for the Study for the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment. State insti­tu­tions dis­sem­i­nated a san­i­tized, edi­fy­ingly patri­otic ver­sion of the his­tory of the “Ukrain­ian national lib­er­a­tion move­ment,” the lead­ers of which were pre­sented in icono­graphic form as heroic and saintly figures, mar­tyrs of the nation (Rasevych, 2010; Rudling, 2011c: 26–33, 2012b). . . .

. . . A recon­structed his­tor­i­cal mem­ory is cre­ated as ‘true mem­ory’ and then con­trasted with ‘false Soviet his­tory’ ”(Jilge, 2007:104–105). Thus, Valen­tyn Naly­vaichenko, SBU direc­tor under Yushchenko, described the task of his agency as being to dis­sem­i­nate “the his­tor­i­cal truth of the past of the Ukrain­ian peo­ple,” to “lib­er­ate Ukrain­ian his­tory from lies and falsifications and to work with truth­ful doc­u­ments only” (Jilge, 2008:179). Ignor­ing the OUN’s anti­semitism, deny­ing its par­tic­i­pa­tion in anti– Jew­ish vio­lence, and over­look­ing its fas­cist ide­ol­ogy, Naly­vaichenko and his agency pre­sented the OUN as democ­rats, plu­ral­ists, even right­eous res­cuers of Jews dur­ing the Holocaust. . . . 

. . . . On June 30, 2011, the 70th anniver­sary of the Ger­man inva­sion and Stetsko’s “renewal of Ukrain­ian state­hood” was re-enacted in Lviv as a pop­u­lar fes­ti­val, where par­ents with small chil­dren waved flags to re-enactors in SS uni­forms. . . .

. . . . Svoboda’s claims to the OUN legacy are based upon ide­o­log­i­cal con­ti­nu­ity, as well as orga­ni­za­tion and polit­i­cal cul­ture (Shekhovtsov, 2011b:13–14). Pre­sent­ing Svo­boda as the suc­ces­sor of Dontsov and the OUN, Tiah­ny­bok regards Svo­boda as “an Order-party which con­sti­tutes the true elite of the nation” (Tiah­ny­bok, 2011). Like those of many other far-right move­ments, Svoboda’s official pol­icy doc­u­ments are rel­a­tively cau­tious and dif­fer from its daily activ­i­ties and inter­nal jar­gon, which are much more rad­i­cal and racist (Olszan´ski, 2011). . . .

Fol­low­ing vio­lent clashes, the police detained more than 50 Svo­boda activists, armed with gas can­is­ters, smoke bombs and cat­a­pults. The Cherkasy branch of Svo­boda crit­i­cized the police for their alleged fail­ure “to stop and avert aggres­sion by Hasidic Jews to Ukraini­ans” (“Uman: Righ-twing activists detained,” 2011). Svoboda’s anti-Russian and anti-Jewish rhetoric is accom­pa­nied by an anti-Polish mes­sage. Svo­boda main­tains that Poland has played a neg­a­tive his­tor­i­cal role in Ukrain­ian lands. The party demands an official apol­ogy from Poland for five hun­dred years of Pol­o­niza­tion, from the 15th to the 20th cen­turies, and indem­ni­ties for “the Pol­ish ter­ror and occu­pa­tion of Ukrain­ian lands in the 20th cen­tury” (“Zaiava VO ‘Svo­boda’ shchodoproia­viv ukrain­o­fo­bii,” 2010). Focus­ing on divi­sive and sen­si­tive issues, Svo­boda provoca­tively denies any involve­ment of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien in atroc­i­ties against the Pol­ish minor­ity in Gali­cia. For instance, on the site of Huta Pieni­acka, Svo­boda has placed a huge bill­board deny­ing the con­clu­sion of both Pol­ish and Ukrain­ian his­tor­i­cal com­mis­sions that the fourth police reg­i­ment, which was later adjoined to the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien, burnt this Pol­ish vil­lage and slaugh­tered most of its res­i­dents on Feb­ru­ary 28, 1944. . . .

In Canada, in May 2010, Tiah­ny­bok received the golden cross “for his ser­vice to Ukraine” from the Broth­er­hood of the Vet­er­ans of the First Ukrain­ian Divi­sion of the Ukrain­ian National Army, as the vet­er­ans of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien call them­selves (“Esesovtsy nagradil lid­er­aukrain­skikh nat­sion­al­is­tov,” 2010). Fol­low­ing the con­vic­tion and sen­tenc­ing of the death camp guard John Dem­jan­juk to five years of jail for his role as an acces­sory to the mur­der of 27,900 peo­ple at the Sobibór death camp,Tiahnybok trav­eled to Ger­many and met up with Demjanjuk’s lawyer, Ulrich Busch, pre­sent­ing the death camp guard as a hero, a vic­tim of per­se­cu­tion, who is “fight­ing for truth” (“Oleh Tiah­ny­bok iz dvo­den­nym vizy­tomvid­vi­dav Nimechynu,” 2010). . . .

. . . . Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn (b. 1982), Tiahnybok’s adviser on ide­o­log­i­cal mat­ters, Svoboda’s top name in the elec­tion to the Lviv city coun­cil and its can­di­date for mayor in 2010, rep­re­sents a more rad­i­cal cur­rent in the move­ment.Proudly con­fess­ing him­self part of the fas­cist tra­di­tion, Mykhal’chyshyn rel­ishes the harsh­ness, extrem­ism and uncom­pro­mis­ing rad­i­cal­ism of his idols of the 1930s and 1940s. Con­stantly reit­er­at­ing that “We con­sider tol­er­ance a crime” and that “We value the truth of the spirit and blood over-all suc­cess and wealth” (Nasha Vatra , n.d.),Mykhal’chyshyn takes pride in the label “extrem­ist,” which he proudly shares with “Stepan Bandera,who cre­ated an under­ground terrorist-revolutionary army, the shadow of which still stirs up hor­ri­ble fear in the hearts of the ene­mies of our Nation”(Mykhal’chyshyn, “Ori­en­tyry”, n.d.). Mykhal’chyshyn serves as a link between VO Svo­boda and the so-called autonomous nation­al­ists. Mir­ror­ing the “autonomous anar­chists” of the extreme left, which they resem­ble in terms of dress code, lifestyle, aes­thet­ics, sym­bol­ism and orga­ni­za­tion, the “autonomous nation­al­ists” attract par­tic­u­larly mil­i­tant and extremely vio­lent “event-oriented” young fas­cists. . . . .

. . . . The glorification of street vio­lence is a key com­po­nent of this polit­i­cal sub­cul­ture: in an extra ses­sion with the Lviv regional Rada in front of the Ban­dera memo­r­ial in Lviv, Mykhal’chyshyn boasted that “Our Ban­derite army will cross the Dnipro and throw that blue-ass gang, which today usurps the power, out of Ukraine. . . . That will make those Asi­atic dogs shut their ugly mouths.” . . . .

. . . . Explic­itly endors­ing Hamas, Mykhal’chyshyn regards the Holo­caust as “a bright episode in Euro­pean civ­i­liza­tion” . . . .

. . . . We rec­og­nize the heavy empha­sis on heroes and hero­ism from the nar­ra­tive of the émigré OUN and from Yushchenko’s legit­imiz­ing his­to­ri­ans. The dif­fer­ence is that, unlike these two influences, Mykhal’chyshyn does not deny Ban­dera and Stets’ko’s fas­cism. On the con­trary, their fas­cist ide­ol­ogy con­sti­tutes the basis for his admi­ra­tion. . . .

. . . . Yushchenko left behind a legacy of myths which helped legit­imized Svoboda’s ide­ol­ogy. Svoboda’s appro­pri­a­tion of many rit­u­als in hon­our of “national heroes” from more mod­er­ate nation­al­ists is but one expres­sion of its increased polit­i­cal strength in post-Yushchenko West­ern Ukraine. . . .

. . . . On April 28, 2011, Svo­boda cel­e­brated the 68th anniver­sary of the estab­lish­ment of the Waf­fen SS Gal­izien. Octo­ge­nar­ian Waf­fen SS vet­er­ans were treated as heroes in a mass rally, orga­nized by Svo­boda and the “autonomous nation­al­ists.” Nearly 700 par­tic­i­pants (the orga­niz­ers claimed 2,000) marched down the streets of Lviv, from the mas­sive socialist–realist style Ban­dera mon­u­ment, to Prospekt Svo­body, the main street, shout­ing slo­gans like “One race, one nation, one fatherland!,” . . . .

. . . . The pro­ces­sion was led by Mykhal’chyshyn . . . .

2.  So, accord­ing to The Min­istry of Truth, Swo­boda is now “moderate.” We guess that is what hap­pens when the leader of the group meets with the Sec­re­tary of State (John Kerry.)

Notice that Swoboda’s mod­er­a­tion is indi­cated by their unwill­ing­ness to “openly” advo­cate throw­ing fire­bombs at the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment secu­rity forces. Hey, that sure sounds mod­er­ate to us!

In 2010, Oleh Tyan­hy­bok, the leader of the group was hon­ored by vet­er­ans of the 14th Waf­fen SS Divi­sion (Galicia). In April of 2011, Swoboda returned the favor, honoring the veterans of the 14th Waffen SS in Lvov.

“Front and Cen­ter in Ukraine Race, a Leader of the Far Right” by Andrew E. Kramer; The New York Times; 3/11/2014. [13]

. . . . Mr. Yarosh has hinted at a role for his group in bal­anc­ing the influ­ence of a long­time player in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, the for­mer prime min­is­ter who emerged from prison after the fall of the old gov­ern­ment with mem­bers of her polit­i­cal party, Father­land, already hold­ing the posi­tions of act­ing pres­i­dent and prime minister.

Before the protests, the nation­al­ist party Svo­boda had occu­pied the nation­al­ist niche to the right of Ms. Tymoshenko. But Svo­boda and Father­land are now allied. . . . [They were all along. Just check out FTR #779 [8]–D.E.)

The Svo­boda party, mean­while, has mod­er­ated, and did not openly [!–D.E.] endorse the tac­tic of throw­ing fire­bombs when street fight­ing began in Jan­u­ary. Svo­boda was founded in 1991 under the name the Socialist-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, with a sym­bol that resem­bled a swastika. Its leader, Oleg Tyag­ni­bok, met Sec­re­tary of State John Kerry on Tues­day . . . .

3. We note the deliberate slanting of coverage of the Ukrainian crisis in the New York Times. Note how the Times spins the [accurate] Russian claim that the new government of the Ukraine is composed of Nazis to a considerable extent. The earlier programs about the Ukrainian crisis should provide ample documentation of this.

“In Crimea’s Phantom War, Armed Men Face Unseen Foe” by Andrew Higgins and Alison Smale; The New York Times; 3/2/2014. [14]

. . . Russian media, a potent weapon in a battle to demoralize and divide what remains of Ukrainian state authority in Crimea, has announced a string of defections, some true, some not, and kept up a drumbeat with accounts of how Ukraine has slipped into the hands of extremists, terrorists and even Nazis. [They are–D.E.]. . .

4. Note how the Times subtly spins the accurate analysis of the new Ukrainian government as successors to Bandera’s OUN/B forces. It is not “Russian propaganda.”

“As Putin Orders Drills in Crimea, Protesters’ Clash Shows Region’s Divide” by Andrew Higgins and Steven Lee Myers; The New York Times; 2/26/2014. [15]

. . . . “I don’t want to live in a country run by fascists,” said Sergei Gaenko, a retired law enforcement official, echoing a widespread view here that Mr. Yanukovych’s ouster was engineered by the political descendants of militant Ukrainian nationalists who, during World War II, sometimes formed loose tactical alliances with Hitler’s invading army.

Crimea, he added, was “illegally given to Ukraine” by Nikita Khrushchev and he said it was time to “correct an historic injustice.” Like many Russians here, he scorned the new interim government as made up of “Banderovtsi,” a derogatory Soviet term used to describe followers of Stepan Bandera, a wartime Ukrainian nationalist leader vilified by Moscow as a pro-Nazi traitor. .

5a. The New York Times noted that Obama has not reacted to the “demo­c­ra­tic” devel­op­ments in the Ukraine in the way that George W. Bush reacted to the “Orange Revolution.” Note how the Gray Lady references Paula J. Dobriansky’s viewpoint. A member of the National Security Council under Ronald Reagan, Dobriansky was a Deputy Secretary of State under George W. Bush. The daughter of Lev Dobriansky, Paula is part and parcel to the OUN/B milieu in the United States.

“Wary Stance from Obama on Ukraine” by Peter Baker; The New York Times; 2/24/2014. [23]

Tele­vi­sions around the White House were aglow with pic­tures of Ukraini­ans in the streets, demand­ing to be heard and top­pling a gov­ern­ment aligned with Rus­sia. It was an invig­o­rat­ing moment, and it spurred a pres­i­dent already rethink­ing his approach to the world.

That was a dif­fer­ent decade and a dif­fer­ent pres­i­dent. While George W. Bush [24] was inspired by the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion of 2004 and weeks later vowed in his sec­ond inau­gural address [25] to pro­mote democ­racy, Barack Obama [26] has approached the rev­o­lu­tion of 2014 with a more clin­i­cal detach­ment aimed at avoid­ing instability.

 Rather than an oppor­tu­nity to spread free­dom in a part of the world long plagued by cor­rup­tion and oppres­sion, Mr. Obama sees Ukraine [27]’s cri­sis as a prob­lem to be man­aged, ide­ally with a min­i­mum of vio­lence or geopo­lit­i­cal upheaval. While cer­tainly sym­pa­thetic to the pro-Western pro­test­ers who pushed out Pres­i­dent Vik­tor F. Yanukovych [28] and hope­ful that they can estab­lish a rep­re­sen­ta­tively elected gov­ern­ment, Mr. Obama has not made global aspi­ra­tions of democ­racy the ani­mat­ing force of his presidency.

“I just think this pres­i­dent is not going to lean for­ward on his skis with regard to democ­racy pro­mo­tion,” said John Lewis Gad­dis, a Yale Uni­ver­sity his­to­rian who advised the Bush White House as speech­writ­ers worked on the for­mer president’s Jan­u­ary 2005 inau­gural address promis­ing to com­bat tyranny abroad. “If any­thing, he’s going to lean back and let nat­ural forces take us there, if they do.” . . . . “The administration’s Ukraine pol­icy is emblem­atic of a broader prob­lem with today’s for­eign pol­icy — absence of a strate­gic vision, dis­in­ter­est in democ­racy pro­mo­tion and an unwill­ing­ness to lead,” said Paula J. Dobri­an­sky, an under sec­re­tary of state for Mr. Bush. . . .

5b. Note that the rhetor­i­cal pres­sure on Obama com­ing from Paula Dobri­an­sky is com­ing from some­one con­nected to the OUN/B milieu and its par­tic­i­pa­tion in the GOP and Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion.

“Is the US Back­ing neo-Nazis in the Ukraine?” by Max Blu­men­thal [Alter­net]; Salon.com; 2/25/2014. [29]

. . . In Wash­ing­ton, the OUN-B recon­sti­tuted under the ban­ner of the Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­ica (UCCA), an umbrella orga­ni­za­tion com­prised of “com­plete OUN-B fronts,” accord­ing to Bel­lant. By the mid-1980’s, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion was hon­ey­combed with UCCA mem­bers, with the group’s chair­man Lev Dobri­an­sky, serv­ing as ambas­sador to the Bahamas, and his daugh­ter, Paula, sit­ting on the National Secu­rity Coun­cil. Rea­gan per­son­ally wel­comed Stet­sko, the Ban­derist leader who over­saw the mas­sacre of 7000 Jews in Lviv, into the White House in 1983.“Your strug­gle is our strug­gle,” Rea­gan told the for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tor. “Your dream is our dream.” . . .

6. A gentleman named Serge Schmemann is an important member of the Times’ editorial board. He was formerly the Times‘ Bonn bureau chief, when that city was the former West Germany’s capital. We haven’t seen many bi-lines featuring Mr. Schmemann’s recently. He has been featured in editorial musings in recent Sunday Times editions.

We remember Schmemann from a badly slanted book review he wrote in 1988. He was dismissive of Christopher Simpson’s accurate assessment of the role of anti-Soviet Axis collaborators within the Reagan administration and their permanent, destructive imprint on U.S. foreign and national security policy.

The role of Ms. Chumachenko/Yuschenko and her husband in remaking Ukrainian history and ideology to pave the way for the rise of Swoboda, Pravy Sektor and other OUN/B clones bears brutal testimony to the accuracy of Simpson’s analysis.

“Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Nazi Scientists” by Serge Schmemann; The New York Times; 5/8/1988. [16]

. . . .But Mr. Simpson argues further that the recruitment of East Europeans and other anti-Communists by the C.I.A. after the war served to keep Washington on a cold-war track to this day. He talks of ”the scars that secret emigre anti-Communist programs have left on life in the United States,” down to the survival of the ”liberationist cause” in the Reagan administration’s ”cold-war strategy.”

There are several problems here. Most seriously, Mr. Simpson’s logic has the effect of smearing anti-Communism with the taint of Nazism. ”Liberationism” may not be a uniquely Nazi idea, he writes, ”but the fact remains that ideas and theories have histories, just as nations do. . . . The true origins of liberationism as a coherent philosophy lie in Nazi Germany and in the Nazis’ political warfare campaign on the eastern front, and nowhere else.” Today ”liberation activists” may have a reasonably sophisticated agenda, he continues, but ”the one position they cling to above all . . . is an implacable paranoia toward the USSR that would permit no arms control treaties, no trade and indeed no East-West cooperation of any type, only relentless preparation for war.” That is a serious charge, and, in the light of the real case histories of Nazi mass murderers, it is patently unfair. . . .

. . . . Mr. Simpson claims that something called the Captive Nations movement, in which the C.I.A. had a hand, hindered Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon in their search for detente with the Soviet Union. Even if it did, is that really a ”blowback” from the recruitment of Nazis?

Mr. Simpson likewise seems to make a fairly heady leap from argument to conclusion in describing how clandestine operations to ”roll back Communism” backfired in Eastern Europe. In the case of the Ukraine, he claims, ”instead of rallying to the new ‘democratic’ movement, there is every indication that many of the ordinary people of the Ukraine gave increased credence to the Soviet government’s message that the United States, too, was really Nazi at heart and capable of using any sort of deceit and violence to achieve its ends.” . . .

7. Serge Schmemann has a White Russian background. Born in France during the closing days of World War II, Schmemann grew up speaking Russian and came to the U.S. when his family moved here in 1951. We wonder if the Schmemann family and Serge, in particular, may have had contact with anti-Soviet intelligence and/or fascist networks? Might they have had links to the Promethean League (see below for details)? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intelligence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some element of CIA or other intelligence agency?

IF so, might that account for the editorial bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrainian crisis?

“Serge Schmemann’: [30]Wikipedia.com [30]

Born in France [4/12/1945], the son of Alexander Schmemann and Juliana Ossorguine (a descendant of Juliana of Lazarevo, a Russian Orthodox Saint),[2] he moved to the United States as a child, in 1951. He grew up speaking Russian at home, but he visited his ancestral homeland for the first time only in 1980 when he arrived with his family as Moscow correspondent for the Associated Press. It was not until 1990 that the Soviet authorities allowed him to visit his grandparents’ home village near Kaluga. . . . .

. . . .Writing for The New York Times, he won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1991 for his coverage of the reunification of Germany,[1] . . .

8. Note that Serge’s father Alexander was the son of an emigre Czarist officer and resided in France during the period that the Promethean League was very active there. Alexander Schmemann was being educated in France during the course of the Nazi occupation of that country.

“Alexander Schmemann”; Wikipedia.com [18]

. . . . Alexander Schmemann was born on 13 September 1921 in Tallinn, Estonia, into a family of Russian White émigrés. His grandfather had been a senator and a member of the State Council and his father an officer of the Imperial Life-Guards. When he was a child his family moved to France, where he was educated in Russian schools and at a French lycee before becoming a student at the University of Paris (1940–1945) . . .

9. In the past, we have noted that the supposedly “moderate” [31] Islamist government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan [32] isn’t “moderate” [33] at all. Descended from the Al-Taqwa/Muslim Brotherhood [34] milieu, it is both Islamist and Pan-Turkist in its outlook. Erdogan and his foreign minister have been posturing in defense of the Crimean Tatars and–doing something he has become known for–conjuring [35] the Ottoman Empire in their political pronouncements [36].

“Turkey Moves to Protect Crimea’s Tatar Minority”; Middle East Online; 3/13/2014. [37]

Turkey, which has kept a low profile in the Ukraine crisis, is making moves to protect Crimea’s ethnic Tatar minority as the region prepares for a referendum on joining Russia this week.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pledged to support Crimea’s Turkish-speaking Tatar minority, which Ankara fears could be sidelined in a March 16 vote on switching over to Kremlin rule.

“Turkey has never left Crimean Tatars alone and will never do so,” he said, after a phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier this month.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu vowed to protect the “rights of our kinsmen” after meeting with Ukrainian officials and representatives of the Tatar community during an unscheduled visit to Kiev earlier this month. . . .

10. Of considerable importance in the context of the Crimean Tatar population of the Ukraine is the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir [38] has a cadre in that historically peaceful and ecumenical population group. Hizb ut-Tahrir [39] is both Islamist [40] and associated with Pan-Turkism. The group has networked [41] with the NPD, the top German neo-Nazi party.

“Crimean Tatars on Guard Against Joining Russia” by Noah Sneider; The New York Times; 3/14/2014. [21]

. . . . While the Tatars have a history of peaceful resistance, the potential for radicalization does exist. Tatar militants have fought alongside the opposition in Syria, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic group banned in several countries including Russia, has 1,000 members in Crimea, according to Fazil Amzayev, a spokesman for the group’s local chapter. . . .

11. One of the ele­ments looming large in the Ukrainian crisis is the pan-Turkist move­ment. Allied with Nazi Ger­many in World War II and fas­cist in nature, the pan-Turkists had long sought to carve up the Soviet Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The program devotes considerable time to an excerpt from AFA #14 [19] (recorded in January of 1986.)

The focal point of the discussion is the Promethean League. An anti-Soviet network similar to the World Anti-Communist League, the Promethean League was established between the world wars. Subsidized by Marshall Pilsudski’s Polish intelligence apparatus, the group was physically based in Poland, but heavily supported by French intelligence and ideologists based in France. Featuring Pan-Turkist and Ukrainian elements, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and later to elements of Western intelligence and allied organizations.