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FTR #787 The Muslim Brotherhood Spring (I Told You So)

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash drive that can be obtained here. [1] (The flash drive includes the anti-fascist books avail­able on this site.)

Listen: MP3

Side 1 [2]  Side 2 [3]


Hamas (Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood) Soldiers Saluting


The Real Mohamed Morsi Emerged

Introduction: We are in a posi­tion to take stock of the events of the last three years in the countries affected by the so-called “Arab Spring.” We call it “The Muslim Brotherhood Spring.”

We recall the tsunami of praise, Hosannas and Hal­lelu­jahs gush­ing forth from the world’s media and polit­i­cal pun­ditry. Hail­ing the “Arab Spring” as the dawn­ing of a new enlight­en­ment in that part of the world, they missed the boat–-fundamentally.

We, on the other hand, were warn­ing that this phe­nom­e­non was an Underground Reich oper­a­tion. Hav­ing been ini­ti­ated by pow­er­ful cor­po­rate, intelligence and political forces in the sec­ond admin­is­tra­tion of George W. Bush [6], it had its trig­ger with the Wik­iLeaks milieu–-itself a far-right, Nazi-linked entity, as we demon­strated  in FTR’s 732 [7]745 [8] and 755 [9]. (The Arab Spring operation, overlapping the WikiLeaks “op,” is covered at length and in detail, in FTR #’s 733 [10]  through 739 [11]In addi­tion to the doc­u­men­ta­tion in the orig­i­nal WikiLeaks/Arab Spring series, see the arti­cles excerpted below.)

An excel­lent overview of recent events in Egypt was pro­vided in an English-language blog by a cit­i­zen of that tor­tured coun­try. The con­tra­dic­tions and deadly under­cur­rents of unfold­ing events were elo­quently summed up by Mah­moud Salem in “Imag­ine.” [12]

A major theme of the so-called “Arab Spring” was the belief that by allow­ing the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood unfet­tered access to the reins of polit­i­cal power, the result­ing regimes would resem­ble the “mod­ern,” “demo­c­ra­tic” gov­ern­ment of Tayyip Erdo­gan in Turkey.

In FTR #‘s 737 [13]738 [14]739 [11], we noted that Erdogan’s gov­ern­ment was a direct out­growth of the Bank Al-Taqwa com­plex and an exten­sion of the Islamic fas­cism of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. In addi­tion, Erdogan’s regime has strong links to euro-fascists and the Under­ground Reich [15]. We have doc­u­mented this in numer­ous posts [16] and broad­casts [13].

The Erdo­gan gov­ern­ment appears to be an Islamic, Under­ground Reich entity [15], ulti­mately directed at the core of the Earth Island.


Tayyip Erdogan

As civ [18]ic  [18]unrest [18] stem­ming from pop­u­lar dis­sat­is­fac­tion with Erdogan’s gov­er­nance have spread, he has responded with tac­tics and rhetoric pre­cisely and eerily echo­ing the rhetoric of clas­sic fas­cism. Bor­row­ing from the rhetor­i­cal arse­nal of Hitler and Mus­solini, Erdo­gan has staged mass ral­lies of rabid sup­port­ers, used ver­biage con­flat­ing the state and “the peo­ple” with him­self, accused the oppo­si­tion of being part of an amor­phous con­spir­acy involv­ing “for­eign inter­ests,” “spec­u­la­tors,” and the media–translation “Da Joos.”

With roots in the Bank Al-Taqwa [19] milieu, it should come as no sur­prise [20] that this gov­ern­ment has played out in the fash­ion that it has. Although elected (so were the Nazis in Ger­many), Erdogan’s gov­ern­ment is demon­strat­ing a dis­tinct, total­i­tar­ian bent, as evi­denced by the results of what Paul Krug­man [21] termed “A show trial on the bosporus.”

Recent judi­cial rul­ings have given fur­ther evi­dence [22] of the real nature of Erdogan’s gov­er­nance [23].

Program Highlights Include: 

1a. Con­sid­er­able insight into the machi­na­tions under­ly­ing the Arab Spring ooperation can be gleaned from a New York Times pro­file of Gene Sharp. (The Arab Spring operation, overlapping the WikiLeaks “op,” is covered at length and in detail, in FTR #’s 733 [10]  through 739 [11], as well as FTR #745 [8].)

“Shy U.S. Intel­lec­tual Cre­ated Play­book Used in a Rev­o­lu­tion” by Sheryl Gay Stol­berg; The New York Times; 2/16/2011. [35]

. . . . When the non­par­ti­san Inter­na­tional Cen­ter on Non­vi­o­lent Con­flict, which trains democ­racy activists, slipped into Cairo sev­eral years ago to con­duct a work­shop, among the papers it dis­trib­uted was Mr. Sharp’s “198 Meth­ods of Non­vi­o­lent Action,” a list of tac­tics that range from hunger strikes to “protest dis­rob­ing” to “dis­clos­ing iden­ti­ties of secret agents.”

Dalia Ziada, an Egypt­ian blog­ger and activist who attended the work­shop and later orga­nized sim­i­lar ses­sions on her own, said trainees were active in both the Tunisia and Egypt revolts. She said that some activists trans­lated excerpts of Mr. Sharp’s work into Ara­bic, and that his mes­sage of “attack­ing weak­nesses of dic­ta­tors” stuck with them.

Peter Ack­er­man, a one­time stu­dent of Mr. Sharp who founded the non­vi­o­lence cen­ter and ran the Cairo work­shop, cites his for­mer men­tor as proof that “ideas have power.”

Mr. Sharp . . . . has had no con­tact with the Egypt­ian pro­test­ers, he said, although he recently learned that the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood had “From Dic­ta­tor­ship to Democ­racy” posted on its Web site. . . .

. . . . Mr. Ack­er­man, who became wealthy as an invest­ment banker after study­ing under Mr. Sharp, con­tributed mil­lions of dol­lars and kept it afloat for years. But about a decade ago, Mr. Ack­er­man wanted to dis­sem­i­nate Mr. Sharp’s ideas more aggres­sively, as well as his own. He put his money into his own cen­ter, which also pro­duces movies and even a video game to train dis­si­dents. An annu­ity he pur­chased still helps pay Mr. Sharp’s salary. . .

1b. Sharp has enjoyed appoint­ments at Har­vard University’s Cen­ter for Inter­na­tional Studies.

“Gene Sharp”; wikipedia.org [30]

. . . . . Sharp has been a pro­fes­sor of polit­i­cal sci­ence at the Uni­ver­sity of Mass­a­chu­setts Dart­mouth since 1972. He simul­ta­ne­ously held research appoint­ments at Har­vard University’s Cen­ter for Inter­na­tional Affairs since 1965.[1] . . . .

1c. The Har­vard Cen­ter for Inter­na­tional Stud­ies was founded by Robert R. Bowie, an indi­vid­ual with numer­ous con­nec­tions to the intel­li­gence community.

“Robert R. Bowie”; wikipedia.org. [36]

Robert R. Bowie (born August 24, 1909) is an Amer­i­can diplo­mat and scholar who served as CIA Deputy Direc­tor from 1977–1979. . . .

. . . . .  The youngest pro­fes­sor of the school, he was a trusted con­fi­dant to John J. McCloy the “unof­fi­cial chair­man of the Amer­i­can estab­lish­ment”. Dur­ing peri­ods of leave from Har­vard between 1950 and 1952 Bowie worked for McCloy as one of his legal advis­ers in Germany.[1]

He served as Direc­tor of Pol­icy Plan­ning from 1953–1957; co-founder of Harvard’s Cen­ter for Inter­na­tional Affairs (1958); Coun­selor for the State Depart­ment from 1966–1968. He is a mem­ber of the Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­tions, the Tri­lat­eral Com­mis­sion, and the Amer­i­can Acad­emy of Diplo­macy. He is a recip­i­ent of the Legion of Merit and the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Fed­eral Repub­lic of Germany. . . .

1d. Ack­er­man has served as an advi­sor to the United States Insti­tute of Peace, whose Mus­lim World Ini­tia­tive [37] has  been cited by crit­ics as a the­ater of Islamic extrem­ist pen­e­tra­tion and activity.

“United States Insti­tute of Peace”; Source­watch. [38]

Peter Ack­er­man is on “the U.S. Advi­sory Coun­cil of the United States Insti­tute of Peace.” [4]

1e.  Ackerman’s resume is inter­est­ing, for a pro­moter of social justice.

“Peter Ack­er­man”; Source­watch. [39]

. . . . After his grad­u­a­tion he joined the junk-bond deal­ers, Drexel Burn­ham Lam­bert, and for most of the next fif­teen years, he was the right-hand man to Michael Milken the “Junk-Bond King”. He became the key deal-maker and strate­gist for the com­pany, and his inno­v­a­tive approach to deal-making, together with his unusual aca­d­e­mic qual­i­fi­ca­tions, earned him the nick­name “the absent­minded pro­fes­sor”. But the record shows that he was far from absent minded. . . .

1f. Gene Sharp’s ideological jottings played a key role in the “Orange Revolution.” His ideology also was utilized elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, co-habiting that political and ideological landscape with the fascists of the Free Congress Foundation.

“Gene Sharp”; Wikipedia [30]

. . . . Sharp’s 1993 handbook From Dictatorship to Democracy [40][29] [41] was first published in Burma, fourth edition in 2010. It has since been translated into at least 31 other languages.[30] [42] It has served as a basis for the campaigns of Serbia [43]‘s Otpor [44] (who were also directly trained by the Albert Einstein Institute [45]), Georgia [46]‘s Kmara [47]Ukraine [48]‘s Pora [49]Kyrgyzstan [50]‘s KelKel [51] and Belarus [52]‘ Zubr [53]Pora [49]‘s Oleh Kyriyenko said in a 2004 interview with Radio Netherlands,

“The bible of Pora has been the book of Gene Sharp, also used by Otpor [44], it’s called: From Dictatorship to Democracy [40]. Pora activists have translated it by themselves. We have written to Mr Sharp and to the Albert Einstein Institute in the United States, and he became very sympathetic towards our initiative, and the Institution provided funding to print over 12,000 copies of this book for free.”[31] [54]

Sharp’s writings on “Civilian-Based Defense”[32] [55] were used by the Lithuanian [56]Latvian [57], and Estonian [58] governments during their separation from the Soviet Union [59] in 1991. Lithuanian Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius declared at the time, “I would rather have this book than the nuclear bomb”.[16] [60] . . . .

 1g. After review­ing infor­ma­tion about non­vi­o­lent the­o­reti­cian Gene Sharp, the pro­gram notes that the PORA move­ment in the Ukraine was one of the insti­tu­tions that took their cues from Sharp’s writ­ings [30]. Ini­tially a big sup­porter of Vladimir Yuschenko, PORA turned against him.

As noted in FTR #529 [61], Yuschenko mar­ried the for­mer Yka­te­rina Chu­machenko, the point per­son for the OUN/B. Later, Yuschenko named Ban­dera [62] a hero of the Ukraine and reshaped the Ukrainian political landscape to accommodate the OUN/B.

It now appears that the Pirate Bay/Pirate Party/Anonymous milieu will turn out to be sim­i­larly, cyn­i­cally manip­u­lated in the case of the Piggy-Back Coup in the Mid­dle East. Youth­ful ide­al­ists, that milieu helped install the fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood in power in Egypt and  else­where in the Mid­dle East.

“Is PORA Turn­ing Against Yuschenko”; The Kiev Ukraine News Blog; 9/24/2005. [63]

PORA, the non-governmental orga­ni­za­tion that played a deci­sive role in Ukraine’s Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, has adopted a highly crit­i­cal stance towards the ten-point mem­o­ran­dum signed last week by Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yushchenko and the leader of the Party of Regions, for­mer prime min­is­ter Vik­tor Yanukovych. . . .

2. An article in The Daily News Egypt provides us with an accurate summation of the events in Egypt that led to the coup by the Egyptian army in the summer of 2013.

“Imag­ine” by Mah­moud Salem; Daily News Egypt; 12/10/2012. [12]

Imagine sit­ting at a friend’s house, watch­ing the pres­i­dent address the nation after a week long cri­sis, with his sup­port­ers just the night before open­ing fire on civil­ian pro­test­ers in Heliopo­lis in hor­ri­fy­ing clashes that spanned the whole day. Imag­ine find­ing out that he issued the ille­gal con­sti­tu­tional dec­la­ra­tion that enflamed and divided the entire coun­try, because– and I quote– one of the sus­pects in the Camel inci­dents, who was declared inno­cent by the courts, had a meet­ing with 3 other unnamed peo­ple in his office.

The pres­i­dent that has under him state secu­rity, gen­eral intel­li­gence, mil­i­tary intel­li­gence, the Min­istry of Jus­tice, the police and the gen­eral prosecutor’s office declar­ing that he had no choice but to issue this dec­la­ra­tion because four peo­ple had a meet­ing. And then, as he swipes the page of his speech on his IPad, he instinc­tively licks his fin­ger first as if he is turn­ing a paper page. Imagine.

Imag­ine that this pres­i­dent saw that the sit­u­a­tion was so urgent, he called for a national dia­logue meet­ing with the oppo­si­tion in two days to resolve the cri­sis, one that all of his allies and none of the oppo­si­tion attend, and he walks in, talks for 5 min­utes, then leaves the dia­logue he called for imme­di­ately, telling peo­ple to talk to his VP and that he is leav­ing to guar­an­tee the “neu­tral­ity of the dialogue”.

Imag­ine that his group’s uber-intellectual, Fahmy Howeidy, shortly after also leaves because he had another impor­tant meet­ing to attend, and that this group of clowns come with a solu­tion after mid­night that isn’t a solu­tion, drafted by ex-presidential can­di­date Selim Al-Aawa, who wrote the Sudanese con­sti­tu­tion that even­tu­ally led to Sudan get­ting divided into two coun­tries. They fronted that guy. Just Imagine.

Imag­ine that the next day, you are no longer greeted with the president’s face, but with those of the Supreme Guide of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, and his sec­ond man Khairat El-Shater, who both hold press con­fer­ences defend­ing the pres­i­dent in hid­ing, while the army builds walls around the Pres­i­den­tial Palace.

Imag­ine watch­ing the Supreme Guide claim­ing that all who died in the clashes are Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, despite there being dead Chris­tians in the clashes, and El-Shater talk­ing about how hard it is to get invest­ment into this coun­try and blam­ing the whole cri­sis on the Chris­tians and the Church. Imag­ine know­ing that those are the peo­ple who run the Order that is run­ning your coun­try at the moment. Imagine.

Imag­ine know­ing that your pres­i­dent, the first civil­ian demo­c­ra­t­i­cally elected post-revolution pres­i­dent is a pup­pet for that group, and his pup­peteer is the sec­ond man in this order, and not even the first. Imag­ine that this group has its peo­ple, for two weeks, won­der­ing openly on TV talk shows about why the peo­ple, after a rev­o­lu­tion, can­not tol­er­ate hav­ing a tem­po­rary dic­ta­tor­ship for a few months, since they endured it under Mubarak for 30 years.

Imag­ine them being unable to com­pre­hend that because you sim­ply won an elec­tion by 1%, you can’t just do any­thing you damn please in the name of democ­racy because you are the major­ity. Imag­ine them openly stat­ing that this con­sti­tu­tion, since it sup­ports Shari’a, will have 90% sup­port in terms of votes and that the oppo­si­tion are all Chris­tians and agents and no more than 40,000 in the entire coun­try and want to repeat the con­sti­tu­tion writ­ing process to allow gay mar­riage. Imagine.Imagine that this group is still push­ing for a ref­er­en­dum over a con­sti­tu­tional draft that is cre­ated by an ille­gal Con­stituent Assem­bly that a third of its mem­bers with­drew, while an entire coun­try goes in flames over it, with hun­dreds of thou­sands of Egyp­tians in the gov­er­norates are protest­ing and clash­ing with this group’s supporters.

Imag­ine that with this ref­er­en­dum being 4 days away, and the pres­i­dency has no judges to super­vise it, doesn’t have the schools to host it, did not open the door for jour­nal­ists or observers to go in and observe the process, and gave no way for the vot­ers to find out where they are sup­posed to vote. Your country’s con­sti­tu­tion. Imagine.

Imag­ine that the sec­u­lar side is the major­ity for the first time, with peo­ple in the streets all over Egypt view­ing this as a ref­er­en­dum on the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and Morsy and want to vote No on both and teach them a lesson.

Imag­ine them finally ral­ly­ing behind a uni­fied oppo­si­tion front, called the National Sal­va­tion coun­cil, who just yes­ter­day issued that they will boy­cott the first ref­er­en­dum they actu­ally have a great shot of win­ning, because they think it’s an ille­git­i­mate ref­er­en­dum and we shouldn’t dig­nify it with our votes, despite it being the country’s con­sti­tu­tion and everything. . . .

3. A CNN story further underscores the fascist nature of the Morsi government.

“Bloody Clashes around Egypt­ian Pres­i­den­tial Palace” by Hasan Amin; CNN; 12/5/12. [24]

. . . . Haunted by Islamic Fascist

After the huge peace­ful protest yes­ter­day against Morsi, today it turned to a bloody bat­tle between the pro­test­ers and Morsi sup­port­ers (Islamists and Pro-Islamists mainly) . . . .

. . . . Islamists thugs beat the pro­test­ers who said “No” [to the] Morsi dic­ta­to­r­ial decree–exactly what hap­pened dur­ing the Egypt­ian rev­o­lu­tion, when Mubarak sent his thugs to attack the pro­test­ers in Tahrir Sq.

Now, Morsi is a text­book Islamic fas­cist, who elim­i­nates the oppo­si­tion or unleashes his thugs to attack them. [Ital­ics added.]

It’s remark­able that no one in the police or the army was involved in this bat­tle, it’s sus­pi­cious, the absence of secu­rity forces in this crit­i­cal area (the pres­i­den­tial palace diameter.)

The sit­u­a­tion in Egypt is get­ting uglier with time. . . .

4. Some features of the Draft Constitution that helped to precipitate the coup in the summer of 2013.

“High­lights from Egypt’s Draft Con­sti­tu­tion”; Asso­ci­ated Press; 12/01/2012. [25]

An Islamist-dominated panel is vot­ing on Egypt’s draft con­sti­tu­tion, the country’s first char­ter after the upris­ing that top­pled Hosni Mubarak. The draft largely reflects the con­ser­v­a­tive vision of the Islamists, with arti­cles that rights activists, lib­er­als and Chris­tians fear will lead to restric­tions on the rights of women and minori­ties and civil lib­er­ties in general.

Omis­sions of cer­tain arti­cles, such as bans on slav­ery or promises to adhere to inter­na­tional rights treaties, were equally wor­ry­ing to crit­ics of the new draft, who pulled out from the panel before the vote. [This pas­sage was omit­ted from sub­se­quent ver­sions of the post.]

Here are some of the dis­puted articles:

– As in past con­sti­tu­tions, the new draft says that the “prin­ci­ples of Islamic law” will be the basis of law. Pre­vi­ously, the term “prin­ci­ples” allowed wide lee­way in inter­pret­ing Shariah. But in the draft, a sep­a­rate new arti­cle is added that seeks to define “prin­ci­ples” by point­ing to par­tic­u­lar the­o­log­i­cal doc­trines and their rules. That could give Islamists the tool for insist­ing on stricter imple­men­ta­tion of rul­ings of Shariah.

– A new arti­cle states that Egypt’s most respected Islamic insti­tu­tion, Al-Azhar, must be con­sulted on any mat­ters related to Shariah, a mea­sure crit­ics fear will lead to over­sight of leg­is­la­tion by clerics.

– An arti­cle under­lines that the state will pro­tect “the true nature of the Egypt­ian fam­ily … and pro­mote its morals and val­ues,” phras­ing that is vague and sug­gests state con­trol over the con­tents of such arts forms as books and films.

– The draft con­tains no arti­cle specif­i­cally estab­lish­ing equal­ity between men and women because of dis­putes over the phras­ing. How­ever, it main­tains that a woman must bal­ance her duties toward fam­ily and out­side work, sug­gest­ing that she can be held account­able if her pub­lic role con­flicts with her fam­ily duties. No such arti­cle is men­tioned for men.

– An arti­cle bans insult­ing or defam­ing the prophet and mes­sen­gers, but is vague about what con­sti­tutes an insult, rais­ing con­cerns of restric­tions to free­dom of expression.

– An arti­cle seek­ing to ensure people’s dig­nity bans “insult­ing humans”, a vague phras­ing that rights activists say con­tra­dicts free­dom of expression.

– An arti­cle main­tains that the state sup­ports the arts, sci­ence and lit­er­a­ture and works to imple­ment them in a way that serves soci­ety. That has raised con­cerns that some arts deemed not in the ser­vice of soci­ety may be restricted or censored.

– An arti­cle pre­serves the right of the mil­i­tary to try civil­ians before mil­i­tary tri­bunals in cases for crimes that harm the armed forces with­out restric­tions, despite an out­cry from activists who were call­ing for the abol­ish­ing of such tri­bunals. More than 11,000 civil­ians were tried before mil­i­tary tri­bunals dur­ing the post-Mubarak tran­si­tion over­seen by the military. . . .

5a. An Egyptian newspaper published what were said to be intercepted recordings of Morsi communicating conspiratorially with Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al-Qaeda. Much of this checks out with information that is already on the public record. Note the networking of GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham with Khairat El-Shater of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood while he was in prison, as well as the alleged links between the Egyptian Brotherhood and the cells involved in attacking the U.S. Embassy in Libya.

The Egyptian government recently sentenced more than 500 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the resounding condemnation of Western countries, including the U.S. What we were not told was why. THIS appears to be why.

“Exposed: The Muslim Brotherhood/Al Qaeda Connection” by Raymond Ibrahim; Raymond Ibrahim: Islam Translated; 2/4/2014. [31]

. . . . Concerning some of the more severe allegations, one of Egypt’s most widely distributed and read newspapers, Al Watan, recently [64] published [65] what it said were recorded conversations between Morsi and Muhammad Zawahiri, al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri’s brother.

In these reports, Watan repeatedly asserts that Egyptian security and intelligence agencies confirmed (or perhaps leaked out) the recordings.

Much of the substance of the alleged conversations is further corroborated by events that occurred during Morsi’s one-year-rule, most of which were reported by a variety of Arabic media outlets, though not by Western media.

In what follows, I relay, summarize, and translate some of the more significant portions of the Watan reports (verbatim statements are in quotation marks).  In between, I comment on various anecdotes and events—many of which were first broken [66] on my website [67]—that now, in light of these phone conversations, make perfect sense and independently help confirm the authenticity of the recordings.


The first recorded call  between Muhammad Morsi  and  Muhammad Zawahiri lasted for 59 seconds. Morsi congratulated Zawahiri on his release from prison, where he had been incarcerated for jihadi/terrorist activities against Egypt, and assured him that he would not be followed or observed by any Egyptian authorities, and that he, Morsi, was planning on meeting with him soon.  Prior to this first call, Refa’ al-Tahtawy, then Chief of Staff, mediated and arranged matters.

The presidential palace continued to communicate regularly with Muhammad Zawahiri, and sources confirm that he was the link between the Egyptian presidency and his brother, Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born leader of al-Qaeda [68].

It should be noted that, once released, the previously little-known Muhammad Zawahiri did become very visible and vocal in Egypt [69], at times spearheading the Islamist movement.

The next recording between Morsi and Zawahiri lasted for 2 minutes and 56 seconds and took place one month after Morsi became president.  Morsi informed Zawahiri that the Muslim Brotherhood supports the mujahidin (jihadis) and that the mujahidin should support the Brotherhood in order for them both, and the Islamist agenda, to prevail in Egypt.

This makes sense in the context that, soon after Morsi came to power, the general public did become increasingly critical of him and his policies, including the fact that he was placing only Brotherhood members in Egypt’s most important posts, trying quickly to push through a pro-Islamist constitution, and, as Egyptians called it, trying in general to “Brotherhoodize” Egypt [70].

This second phone call being longer than the first, Zawahiri took it as an opportunity to congratulate Morsi on his recent presidential victory—which, incidentally, from the start, was portrayed by some as fraudulent [71]—and expressed his joy that Morsi’s presidency could only mean that “all secular infidels would be removed from Egypt.”

Then Zawahiri told Morsi: “Rule according to the Sharia of Allah [or “Islamic law”], and we will stand next to you.  Know that, from the start, there is no so-called democracy, so get rid of your opposition.”

This assertion comports extremely well with his brother Ayman Zawahiri’s views.  A former Muslim Brotherhood member himself, some thirty years ago, the al-Qaeda leader wrote Al Hissad Al Murr (“The Bitter Harvest”), a scathing book condemning the Brotherhood for “taking advantage of the Muslim youths’ fervor by … steer[ing] their onetime passionate, Islamic zeal for jihad to conferences and elections.” An entire section dedicated to showing that Islamic Sharia cannot coexist with democracy even appears in Ayman Zawahiri’s book (see “Sharia and Democracy,” The Al Qaeda Reader [72], pgs. 116-136).

The call ended in agreement that al-Qaeda would support the Brotherhood, including its international branches, under the understanding that Morsi would soon implement full Sharia in Egypt.  After this, Muhammad Zawahiri and Khairat al-Shater, the number-two man of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, reportedly met regularly.

It is interesting to note here that, prior to these revelations, U.S. ambassador Anne Patterson was seen visiting with Khairat al-Shater [73]—even though he held no position in the Morsi government—and after the ousting and imprisonment of Morsi and leading Brotherhood members, Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham made it a point to visit the civilian Shater [74] in his prison cell and urged the Egyptian government to release him.

The next call, recorded roughly six weeks after this last one, again revolved around the theme of solidifying common cooperation between the Egyptian presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and al-Qaeda and its jihadi offshoots on the other, specifically in the context of creating jihadi cells inside Egypt devoted to protecting the increasingly unpopular Brotherhood-dominated government.

As I reported back in December 2012 [75], Egyptian media were saying that foreign jihadi fighters were appearing in large numbers—one said 3,000 fighters—especially in Sinai.  And, since the overthrow of the Brotherhood and the military crackdown on its supporters, many of those detained have been exposed speaking non-Egyptian dialects of Arabic.

During this same call, Zawahiri was also critical of the Morsi government for still not applying Islamic Sharia throughout Egypt, which, as mentioned, was one of the prerequisites for al-Qaeda support.

Morsi responded by saying “We are currently in the stage of consolidating power and need the help of all parties—and we cannot at this time apply the Iranian model or Taliban rule in Egypt; it is impossible to do so now.”

In fact, while the Brotherhood has repeatedly declared its aspirations [76] for world domination, from its origins, it has always relied on a “gradual” approach, moving only in stages [77], with the idea of culminating its full vision only when enough power has been consolidated.

In response, Zawahiri told Morsi that, as a show of good will, he must “at least release the mujahidin who were imprisoned during the Mubarak era as well as all Islamists, as an assurance and pact of cooperation and proof that the old page has turned to a new one.”

After that call, and as confirmed by a governmental source, Morsi received a list from Zawahiri containing the names of the most dangerous terrorists in Egyptian jails, some of whom were on death row due to the enormity of their crimes.

In fact, as I reported back in August 2012 [78], many imprisoned terrorists, including from Egypt’s notorious Islamic Jihad organization—which was once led by Ayman Zawahiri—were released under Morsi.

One year later, in August 2013 [79], soon after the removal of Morsi, Egypt’s Interior Ministry announced that Egypt was “preparing to cancel any presidential pardons issued during Morsi’s era to terrorists or criminals.”

During this same call, and in the context of pardons, Morsi said he would do his best to facilitate the return of Muhammad’s infamous brother and al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Zawahiri, back to Egypt—“with his head held high,” in accordance with Islamist wishes—as well as urge the U.S. to release the “Blind Sheikh” and terrorist mastermind, Omar Abdul Rahman.

In March 2013 [80], I wrote about how Morsi, during his Pakistan visit, had reportedly met with Ayman Zawahiri  and made arrangements to smuggle him back to Sinai.  According to a Pakistan source, the meeting was “facilitated by elements of Pakistani intelligence [ISI] and influential members of the International Organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.”

The gist of the next two calls between Morsi and Muhammad Zawahiri was that, so long as the former is president, he would see to it that all released jihadis and al-Qaeda operatives are allowed to move freely throughout Egypt and the Sinai, and that the presidential palace would remain in constant contact with Zawahiri, to make sure everything is moving to the satisfaction of both parties.

Zawahiri further requested that Morsi allow them to develop training camps in Sinai in order to support the Brotherhood through trained militants. Along with saying that the Brotherhood intended to form a “revolutionary guard” to protect him against any coup, Morsi added that, in return for al-Qaeda’s and its affiliates’ support, not only would he allow them to have such training camps, but he would facilitate their development in Sinai and give them four facilities to use along the Egyptian-Libyan border.

That Libya is mentioned is interesting.  According to a Libyan Arabic report [81] I translated back in June 2013, those who attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, killing Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, were from jihadi cells that had been formed in Libya through Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood support.  Those interrogated named Morsi and other top Brotherhood leadership as accomplices.

More evidence [82]—including some that implicates the U.S. administration—has mounted since then.

Next, Watan makes several more assertions, all of which are preceded by “according to security/intelligence agencies.”  They are:

  • That Morsi did indeed as he promised, and that he facilitated the establishment of four jihadi training camps.  Morsi was then Chief in Command of Egypt’s Armed Forces, and through his power of authority, stopped the military from launching any operations including in the by now al-Qaeda overrun Sinai.
  • That, after Morsi reached Pakistan, he had a one-and-a-half hour meeting with an associate of Ayman Zawahiri in a hotel and possibly spoke with him.
  • That, after Morsi returned to Egypt from his trip to Pakistan, he issued another  list containing the names of 20 more convicted terrorists considered dangerous to the national security of Egypt, giving them all presidential pardons—despite the fact that national security and intelligence strongly recommended that they not be released on grounds of the threat they posed.
  • That the Muslim Brotherhood’s international wing, including through the agency of Khairat al-Shater, had provided $50 million to al-Qaeda in part to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

One of the longer conversations between Morsi and Zawahiri reported by Watan is especially telling of al-Qaeda’s enmity for secularist Muslims and Coptic Christians—whose churches, some 80 [83], were attacked, burned, and destroyed, some with the al-Qaeda flag furled above them [84], soon after the ousting of Morsi.  I translate portions below:

Zawahiri: “The teachings of Allah need to be applied and enforced; the secularists have stopped the Islamic Sharia, and the response must be a stop to the building of churches.” (An odd assertion considering how difficult it already is for Copts to acquire a repair permit for their churches in Egypt.)

Zawahiri also added that “All those who reject the Sharia must be executed, and all those belonging to the secular media which work to disseminate debauchery and help deviants and Christians to violate the Sharia, must be executed.”

Morsi reportedly replied: “We have taken deterrent measures to combat those few, and new legislative measures to limit their media, and in the near future, we will shut down these media stations and launch large Islamic media outlets.  We are even planning a big budget from the [Brotherhood] International Group  to launch Islamic and jihadi satellite stations  to urge on the jihad. There will be a channel for you and the men of al-Qaeda, and it can be broadcast from Afghanistan.”

Undeterred, Zawahiri responded by saying, “This [is a] Christian media—and some of the media personnel are paid by the [Coptic] Church and they work with those who oppose the Sharia… secularist forces are allied with Christian forces, among them Naguib Sawiris, the Christian-Jew [85].”

Morsi: “Soon we will uphold our promises to you.”

In fact, there was a period of time when the secular media in Egypt—which was constantly exposing Brotherhood machinations—were under severe attack by the Brotherhood and Islamists of all stripes (comedian Bassem Youssef was the tip of the iceberg).  In one instance, which I noted back in August 2012 [86], six major media stations were attacked by Brotherhood supporters, their employees severely beat.

The last call recorded between Muhammad Morsi and Muhammad Zawahiri took place on the dawn of June 30, 2013 (the date of the June 30 Revolution that ousted Morsi and the Brotherhood).  Morsi made the call to Zawahiri in the presence of Asad al-Sheikha, Deputy Chief of Presidential Staff, Refa’ al-Tahtawy, Chief of Presidential Staff, and his personal security.

During this last call, Morsi incited Zawahiri to rise against the Egyptian military in Sinai and asked Zawahiri to compel all jihadi and loyalist elements everywhere to come to the aid of the Muslim Brotherhood and neutralize its opponents.

Zawahiri reportedly responded by saying “We will fight the military and the police, and we will set the Sinai aflame.

True enough, as I reported [87] on July 4, quoting from an Arabic report: “Al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Muhammad Zawahiri, is currently planning reprisal operations by which to attack the army and the Morsi-opposition all around the Republic [of Egypt].”  The report added that, right before the deposing of Morsi, Zawahiri had been arrested and was being interrogated—only to be ordered released by yet another presidential order, and that he  had since fled to the Sinai.

Also on that same first day of the revolution, Khairat al-Shater, Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood, had a meeting with a delegate of jihadi fighters and reiterated Morsi’s request that all jihadis come to the aid of the presidency and the Brotherhood.


As Morsi’s trial continues, it’s only a matter of time before the truth of these allegations—and their implications for the U.S.—is known.  But one thing is certain: most of them comport incredibly well with incidents and events that took place under Morsi’s government.

5b.Morsi’s Islamic fas­cist regime appointed a vet­eran of the Al Gamaa al-Islamiya group to be a regional gov­er­nor. That orga­ni­za­tion per­pe­trated the Luxor massacre. In FTR #‘s 455 [32]457 [33]402 [34], we dis­cussed the Luxor mas­sacre, the “Gamaa’s” links to Al-Qaeda, the bin Laden fam­ily and Saudi money men. With the dependence of Egypt’s economy on tourism, this may well have been the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak.

“Egypt’s Morsi Tight­ens Islamist Grip with Gov­er­nor Appoint­ments” [Reuters]; townhall.com; 6/16/2013. [88]

Egypt­ian Pres­i­dent Mohamed Mursi named a mem­ber of an Islamist group remem­bered for a bloody attack on West­ern tourists in the ancient city of Luxor over a decade ago as gov­er­nor of that province on Sunday.

It was one of 17 guber­na­to­r­ial appoint­ments that put Islamist allies in key posi­tions across the coun­try as Mursi braces for protests on the first anniver­sary of his inau­gu­ra­tion at the end of the month.

Seven of the new gov­er­nors listed by the state news agency are mem­bers of the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s Free­dom and Jus­tice Party, which backed Mursi in elec­tions that fol­lowed the over­throw of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, pro­pelling him to power last year.

The newly appointed Luxor gov­er­nor, Adel Mohamed al-Khayat, is a mem­ber of the Build­ing and Devel­op­ment party. The party was estab­lished by Al Gamaa al-Islamiya, an Islamist group that was involved in attacks in Luxor that killed around 60 tourists in the late 90s, but later renounced violence. . . .

6a. Supposedly a model for the “moderate” Islamic forces that were supposed to assume power in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, Turkey’s Erdogan [89] has turned out [18] to be precisely the type [18] of Islamic fascist that we said he was [15].

“Turkey Moves to Silence Dis­senters, but with One Eye on Its Image Abroad” by Tim Arango and Cey­lan Yeginsu; The New York Times; 11/15/2013. [22]

They came away with a ten­ta­tive agree­ment, but it was never accepted by the rank-and-file pro­test­ers, and so the move­ment was later crushed by the water can­nons and tear gas of Mr. Erdogan’s police force.

Then last month, one of those lead­ers, Eyup Muhcu, was sum­moned by a local pros­e­cu­tor and inter­ro­gated as part of a spread­ing inves­ti­ga­tion of those who led the protests. “There is no con­crete charge, yet we were called in to give offi­cial state­ments,” said Mr. Muhcu, an archi­tect and a mem­ber of the Tak­sim Sol­i­dar­ity Plat­form, a group of activists that played a cen­tral role in the demonstrations.

“For what?”

For the gov­ern­ment, the answer seems clear, Mr. Muhcu said: to silence the opposition.

“It has come to a point where mem­bers can’t even tweet with­out fear of being inves­ti­gated for their thoughts,” said Mr. Muhcu, one of the few activists still will­ing to offer a pub­lic cri­tique of the government.

As the mem­ory begins to fade of those sweep­ing protests, which began to save Gezi Park in cen­tral Istan­bul from being razed and became the most seri­ous chal­lenge to Mr. Erdogan’s decade in power, the gov­ern­ment has moved aggres­sively against its per­ceived adver­saries. More than a thou­sand stu­dents, teach­ers, doc­tors and activists — even mosque imams — have been hauled in for ques­tion­ing for their role in the civic unrest.

Dozens of jour­nal­ists have lost their jobs for report­ing on the demon­stra­tions, and one of Turkey’s wealth­i­est fam­i­lies now has an army of tax inspec­tors dig­ging through its accounts, appar­ently for giv­ing refuge in a fancy hotel it owns to demon­stra­tors escap­ing clouds of tear gas last sum­mer. . . .

. . . . Turkey’s sec­u­lar oppo­si­tion, the Repub­li­can People’s Party, recently cir­cu­lated a doc­u­ment titled, “Turk­ish government’s retal­i­a­tion to Gezi,” in which it equated Mr. Erdo­gan to Machi­avelli, and wrote, “the one-man gov­ern­ment has ini­ti­ated a ruth­less cam­paign for retal­i­a­tion against the per­sons involved in the Gezi move­ment.” Inside is a list of 77 jour­nal­ists who were either fired or forced to resign, includ­ing Yavuz Bay­dar, who had been the ombuds­man for the pro-government news­pa­per Sabah. . . .

. . . . Some crit­ics and ana­lysts say they have seen some­thing more sin­is­ter: a rise in anti-Semitism, in a coun­try with strained rela­tions with Israel. In his fiery speeches dur­ing the protests, Mr. Erdo­gan blamed an assort­ment of for­eign actors for the unrest, includ­ing the “inter­est rate lobby” — what many regarded as code for Jews — and “Zion­ists.” Some of Turkey’s Jews, a com­mu­nity of roughly 15,000, are emi­grat­ing because, accord­ing to a recent report in an English-language Turk­ish news­pa­per, Hur­riyet Daily News, of “anti-Semitism, trig­gered by harsh state­ments from the Turk­ish government.”

Steven A. Cook, a fel­low at the Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­tions and a long­time com­men­ta­tor on Turk­ish affairs, recently wrote, “Turk­ish polit­i­cal dis­course is darker and the attacks on for­eign observers of Turk­ish pol­i­tics have become relentless.”

6b. Max Hastings has noted the similarity of the rhetoric being used by Erdogan to that used by Hitler and Mussolini.

“Tyran­nies across the World Are Crush­ing Dis­sent. In Britain Con­tempt for the Polit­i­cal Class is Grow­ing. Is It Pos­si­ble that Democ­racy Is Dying?” by Max Hast­ings; Daily Mail; 6/21/2013. [90]

. . . . Naive Euro­peans hailed the 2010 ‘Arab Spring’ as promis­ing a new era in the Mid­dle East. Yet it seems more likely that those nations — Tunisia, Egypt and Libya — will merely be ruled by new autocrats.

The truth is that democ­racy is ail­ing — not least here in Britain. Many peo­ple despise and dis­trust politicians. . . .

. . . . Ear­lier this month, Turkey’s prime min­is­ter, Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan, adopted one of the noto­ri­ous phrases of the old fas­cist dic­ta­tors: ‘My patience is exhausted.’

He then com­mit­ted thou­sands of riot police with batons and tear gas to remove peace­ful pro­test­ers from Istanbul’s Tak­sim Square.

Erdo­gan has said that democ­racy is an instru­ment to be exploited only as long as it is use­ful. He is thought to aspire to chang­ing Turkey’s con­sti­tu­tion to make him­self an elected dictator.

7. Rather like democratically-minded people in Egypt, the Turkish political opposition has been referring to Erdogan’s government as fascist.

“‘Unite Against Fas­cism’: Anti-Government Pro­test­ers Clash with Turk­ish Police” by Evrim Ergin, Humeyra Pamuk and Can Sezer; NBC News; 6/1/2013. [23]

. . . Crowds of pro­test­ers chant­ing “shoul­der to shoul­der against fas­cism” and “gov­ern­ment resign” marched on Tak­sim, where hun­dreds were injured in clashes the day before. . . .