Dave Emory’s entire lifetime of work is available on a flash drive that can be obtained HERE . The new drive is a 32-gigabyte drive that is current as of the programs and articles posted by the fall of of 2017. WFMU-FM is podcasting For The Record–You can subscribe to the podcast HERE .
You can subscribe to e‑mail alerts from Spitfirelist.com HERE .
You can subscribe to RSS feed from Spitfirelist.com HERE .
You can subscribe to the comments made on programs and posts–an excellent source of information in, and of, itself HERE 
COMMENT: In AFA #39 , we returned to the issue of AIDS  as a genetically-engineered, binary biological weapon . In that context, we highlighted Bayer’s purchase of Monsanto. 
Ken Alibek, formerly a key researcher in the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program, has noted a stunning phenomenon–the unwillingness/inability of U.S. “experts” to acknowledge that genetically modifying a microorganism carries risk. Furthermore, genetically modifying a pathogenic (disease-causing) organism can create a much more dangerous entity.
Alibek’s experience has been that U.S. “experts” are in a state of profound denial about the dangers of rDNA (recombinant DNA).
. . . . Among U.S. molecular biologists, the denial of the risks of gene-splicing was so deeply seated that many maintained it could not cause harm even if purposely employed to do so. Ken Alibek, who played an important role in the Soviet Union’s bio-weaponry program before emigrating to the US, says he encountered “an alarming level of ignorance” about biological weapons within the expert community of his adopted country. He reports: “Some of the best scientists I’ve met in the West say it isn’t possible to alter viruses genetically to make reliable weapons. . . . My knowledge and experience tell me that they are wrong.”
Regal confirms Alibek’s observation. “I had long heard the same naïve opinions from leading American biotech advocates. . . . My sense is that many of them had talked themselves into sincerely believing that rDNA had no weapons potential because they felt constantly on the defense [sic] and experienced a need to protect the image of biotechnology—and to sustain their own faith in the fully benign nature of their manipulations. These arguments spread and took hold as ‘common wisdom’ among American biotechnolgists, despite their dissonance with reality.” . . . . .