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Alarming Insight on GMO’s and Biological Warfare

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained HERE [1]. The new dri­ve is a 32-giga­byte dri­ve that is cur­rent as of the pro­grams and arti­cles post­ed by the fall of of 2017. WFMU-FM is pod­cast­ing For The Record–You can sub­scribe to the pod­cast HERE [2].

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[5]COMMENT: In AFA #39 [6], we returned to the issue of AIDS [7] as a genet­i­cal­ly-engi­neered, bina­ry bio­log­i­cal weapon [8]. In that con­text, we high­light­ed Bay­er’s pur­chase of Mon­san­to. [9]

Ken Alibek, for­mer­ly a key researcher in the Sovi­et Union’s bio­log­i­cal weapons pro­gram, has not­ed a stun­ning phenomenon–the unwillingness/inability of U.S. “experts” to acknowl­edge that genet­i­cal­ly mod­i­fy­ing a microor­gan­ism car­ries risk. Fur­ther­more, genet­i­cal­ly mod­i­fy­ing a path­o­gen­ic (dis­ease-caus­ing) organ­ism can cre­ate a much more dan­ger­ous enti­ty.

Alibek’s expe­ri­ence has been that U.S. “experts” are in a state of pro­found denial about the dan­gers of rDNA (recom­bi­nant DNA).

Altered Genes, Twist­ed Truth [10]by Steven M. Druk­er; Clear Riv­er Press [SC]; Copright 2015 by Steven M. Druk­er; ISBN 978–0‑9856190–0‑8; pp. 19–20. [10]

. . . . Among U.S. mol­e­c­u­lar biol­o­gists, the denial of the risks of gene-splic­ing was so deeply seat­ed that many main­tained it could not cause harm even if pur­pose­ly employed to do so. Ken Alibek, who played an impor­tant role in the Sovi­et Union’s bio-weapon­ry pro­gram before emi­grat­ing to the US, says he encoun­tered “an alarm­ing lev­el of igno­rance” about bio­log­i­cal weapons with­in the expert com­mu­ni­ty of his adopt­ed coun­try. He reports: “Some of the best sci­en­tists I’ve met in the West say it isn’t pos­si­ble to alter virus­es genet­i­cal­ly to make reli­able weapons. . . . My knowl­edge and expe­ri­ence tell me that they are wrong.”

Regal con­firms Alibek’s obser­va­tion. “I had long heard the same naïve opin­ions from lead­ing Amer­i­can biotech advo­cates. . . . My sense is that many of them had talked them­selves into sin­cere­ly believ­ing that rDNA had no weapons poten­tial because they felt con­stant­ly on the defense [sic] and expe­ri­enced a need to pro­tect the image of biotechnology—and to sus­tain their own faith in the ful­ly benign nature of their manip­u­la­tions. These argu­ments spread and took hold as ‘com­mon wis­dom’ among Amer­i­can biotech­nol­gists, despite their dis­so­nance with real­i­ty.” . . . . .