Calmer voices drowned out by rhetoric
By Andrew Ward in Atlanta and Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Edward Alden in Washington
Published: February 22 2006 19:02 | Last updated: February 22 2006 19:02
Standing beneath towering cranes and rows of stacked containers on the docks of the Port of Miami, it is easy to see why the city should be concerned about maritime security.
The port is located on an island in Biscayne Bay just a few hundred metres from the gleaming blue-glass skyscrapers of Miami’s financial district and the apartment blocks of fashionable South Beach.
If terrorists wanted to smuggle a dirty bomb through a US port directly into a large and important population centre, Miami would be the ideal candidate.
Until this week, however, nobody seemed worried about the two foreign-controlled terminals that have been handling cargo at the port for years — one owned by Denmark’s Maersk Group, the other by UK-based P&O.
It was only after P&O shareholders accepted a GBP 3.9bn ($6.8bn, EU 5.7bn) take-over by Dubai Ports World last week that people started voicing alarm. On Tuesday, Manny Diaz, Miami’s mayor, wrote to President George W. Bush expressing “deep concern? that the deal could “jeopardise the security of our city and our nation”.
The letter was part of nationwide wave of protest against the Bush administration’s approval of the DP World deal, which will give the Middle Eastern company ownership of P&O facilities at six US ports. Critics fear the takeover will make ports more vulnerable to terrorism, even though DP World is based in the United Arab Emirates, a US ally.
Amid the deafening political rhetoric, however, those who know most about port security are striking a more sanguine tone.
Robert Bonner, the former US Customs commissioner who oversaw the tightening of port security following the 2001 terrorist attacks, believes critics have over-estimated the influence that terminal operators have over ports. “The security concerns here are greatly exaggerated,” he says. “The responsibility for the evaluation and inspection of anything coming into the US is not the responsibility of the port owner or the terminal operator. It’s the responsibility of the federal government.”
Contrary to the impression being given by many politicians, DP World will not gain “control” over any US ports. All of those affected — New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans and Miami — are owned by city or state authorities.
P&O’s role is to manage dockside terminals, usually alongside rival operators such as Maersk. This gives the company control over the containers that pass through its facilities but all cargo is subject to security checks by the US Coast Guard and Customs.
Critics fear that terrorists could infiltrate DP World and gain positions of influence inside ports. But Andrea Muniz, spokeswoman for the Port of Miami, says that would be difficult in her city because all dock workers, including those employed by terminal operators, are subject to stringent background checks by the port authority.
Chris Bonura, spokesman for the Port of New Orleans, says the nationality of a terminal owner has little impact on operations. “We don?t have lots of British people running around our port just because P&O is here. Americans run the terminal and the labour is local and unionised. That would not change.”
Stewart Baker, assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security, says DP World has been an ally in efforts to improve port security around the world and has agreed to deepen the co-operation as a condition of its takeover of P&O. “There are more safeguards in this transaction than in any past port transaction,” he says.
Supporters of DP World dismiss the opposition as populist grandstanding by politicians gearing up for midterm elections. But Rob Burton, director of Blue Water Partners, a security consultancy, says some concern is merited. “The Coast Guard and Customs may have oversight but, in reality, it is the people on the ground handling the cargo that have most effect on security and that is usually the terminal operators.”
Nobody disputes that port security has improved since 2001. Radiation detectors and X‑ray machines have been introduced to most large ports; importers are required to provide information on incoming shipments at least 24 hours before arrival; and international agreements have been struck to increase inspection of US-bound goods on foreign soil.
Despite the improvement, only about 5 per cent of the 9m containers that arrive in the US each year are inspected and detection devices are notoriously unreliable. False alarms are sometimes triggered by naturally occurring radiation while more threatening material encased in lead would go unnoticed.
James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, says ports remain a weak spot in security and deserve greater attention because of their economic importance in a world of global, just-in-time supply chains. “Our international trading system has become so efficient it is like a beautifully crafted Swiss watch,” he says. “It works fine as long as nothing disturbs its mechanism. But a dirty bomb brought through the port of Los Angeles could shut down whole industries within days.”
Henry Cooper, a former US arms control negotiator and nuclear weapons expert, warns against becoming too fixated on ports. “Terrorists are unlikely to choose to send a dirty bomb through a major transport artery because that’s where the greatest risk of detection and delay is,” he says. “They are more likely to use a recreational vessel through a marina or deliver a missile from offshore. Terrorists will choose the least predictable route with the greatest flexibility and control. Locking a bomb in a container does not fit those criteria.”
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