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“Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Erdogan!” (and “Ein Morsi, too”)

Tayyip Erdo­gan

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash drive that can be obtained here. (The flash drive includes the anti-fascist books avail­able on this site.)

COMMENT: The far-right, Nazi-linked Wik­iLeaks is back in the news, with the same coterie of front-runners cel­e­brat­ing their actions.

When we last saw Our Heroes, the Wik­iLeaks crowd (Pirate Bay/Pirate Party/Anonymous) were in the process of being uti­lized to fur­ther the covert oper­a­tion pop­u­larly known as “The Arab Spring,” aimed at bring­ing “cor­po­ratism” (as Mus­solini termed his sys­tem) to the Mid­dle East and Mus­lim worlds.

Never ones for learn­ing from expe­ri­ence, the Wik­iLeaks crowd is cel­e­brat­ing the actions of Eddie the Friendly Spook [Snow­den]. “Snowden’s Ride” has all the ear­marks of a U-2 Incident-style desta­bi­liza­tion of Obama, and beyond that, the U.S. and U.K.

Under the cir­cum­stances, it may prove instruc­tive to revisit “The Mus­lim Broth­er­hood Spring,” as we call it.

A major theme of the so-called “Arab Spring” was the belief that by allow­ing the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood unfet­tered access to the reins of polit­i­cal power, the result­ing regimes would resem­ble the “mod­ern,” “demo­c­ra­tic” gov­ern­ment of Tayyip Erdo­gan in Turkey.

(The For The Record series on the “Mus­lim Broth­er­hood Spring” runs from FTR #733 through FTR #739.)

 In FTR #‘s 737, 738, 739, we noted that Erdogan’s gov­ern­ment was a direct out­growth of the Bank Al-Taqwa com­plex and an exten­sion of the Islamic fas­cism of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. In addi­tion, Erdogan’s regime has strong links to euro-fascists and the Under­ground Reich.

As civic unrest stem­ming from pop­u­lar dis­sat­is­fac­tion with Erdogan’s gov­er­nance have spread, he has responded with tac­tics and rhetoric pre­cisely and eerily echo­ing the rhetoric of clas­sic fas­cism. Bor­row­ing from the rhetor­i­cal arse­nal of Hitler and Mus­solini, Erdo­gan has staged mass ral­lies of rabid sup­port­ers, used ver­biage con­flat­ing the state and “the peo­ple” with him­self, accused the oppo­si­tion of being part of an amor­phous con­spir­acy involv­ing “for­eign inter­ests,” “spec­u­la­tors,” and the media–translation “Da Joos.”

Morsi has responded to oppo­si­tion in a sim­i­lar fash­ion, both tac­ti­cally and rhetorically.

In a bru­tally ironic way, the “Arab Spring” oper­a­tion has indeed resulted in the real­iza­tion of Erdogan-style gov­er­nance in the Mid­dle East.

“Turkey Expands Vio­lent Reac­tion to Street Unrest” by Tim Arango, Seb­nem Arsu and Cey­lan Yeginsu; The New York Times; 6/17/2013; pp. A1-A7.

EXCERPT: The Turk­ish author­i­ties widened their crack­down on the antigov­ern­ment protest move­ment on Sun­day, tak­ing aim not just at the demon­stra­tors them­selves, but also at the medics who treat their injuries, the busi­ness own­ers who shel­ter them and the for­eign news media flock­ing here to cover a grow­ing polit­i­cal cri­sis threat­en­ing to par­a­lyze the gov­ern­ment of Prime Min­is­ter Tayyip Erdogan.

After an intense night of street clashes that rep­re­sented the worst vio­lence in nearly three weeks of protests, Mr. Erdo­gan ral­lied hun­dreds of thou­sands of his sup­port­ers on Sunday–many of them trav­el­ing on city buses and fer­ries that the gov­ern­ment had mobi­lized for the event–at an out­door arena on the shores of the Sea of Mar­mara. . . .

. . . . In at least two strong­holds of sup­port for Mr. Erdo­gan, the nature of the con­fronta­tion seemed to take more dan­ger­ous turn, as antigov­ern­ment pro­test­ers clashed with his civil­ian back­ers. In Mr. Erdogan’s child­hood neigh­bor hood in Istan­bul, a group of gov­ern­ment sup­port­ers joined the police with sticks and fought against pro­test­ers, accord­ing to one wit­ness. . . .

. . . Even before Mr. Erdo­gan took the stage to deliver his nearly two-hour-long speech, the mas­ter of cer­e­monies had bashed the for­eign news media, which the prime min­is­ter has sug­gested is part of a for­eign plot, along with finan­cial spec­u­la­tors and ter­ror­ists, to top­ple his government.

“CNN Inter­na­tional, are you ready for this?” shouted the announcer to the sea of peo­ple wav­ing flags bear­ing Mr. Erdogan’s face and the yel­low and white logo of his Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Party, known by its Turk­ish ini­tials as A.K.P.

Mr. Erdo­gan then sin­gled out BBC, CNN and Reuters, say­ing, “for days, you fab­ri­cated news.”

“You por­trayed Turkey dif­fer­ently to the world,” he con­tin­ued. “You are left alone with your lies. This nation is not the one that you mis­rep­re­sented to the world.”

At least 400 peo­ple were detained on Sun­day, accord­ing to the Istan­bul Bar Asso­ci­a­tion, with local news reports say­ing that some jour­nal­ists had been among them. One for­eign pho­tog­ra­pher doc­u­ment­ing the clashes Sat­ur­day night said a police offi­cer had torn his gas mask off him while in a cloud of tear gas, and forced him to clear his mem­ory card of photographs.

Some doc­tors and nurses who treated pro­test­ers were detained by secu­rity forces on Sun­day, accord­ing to the legal offices of the Istan­bul Cham­ber of Doc­tors. Lawyers have been held by the author­i­ties in recent days. Mr. Erdo­gan said Sun­day that even the own­ers of lux­ury hotels near Tak­sim Square who had pro­vided refuge to pro­test­ers flee­ing the chaos of the police raid were linked to terrorism.

“We know very well the ones that shel­tered in the hotels those who coop­er­ated with ter­ror,” he said at the rally. “Will they not be held account­able? If we do not hold them account­able, then the nation will hold us account­able.” . . . .

. . . . At Mr. Erdogan’s rally on the seashore, near the walls of the ancient city, enthu­si­as­tic gov­ern­ment sup­port­ers voiced anger at its oppo­nents. Walk­ing up to the rally grounds, peo­ple chanted, “Go gas them, Cap­tain! Break their hands!” A heli­copter over­head to pro­vide panoramic footage for state tele­vi­sion. . . .

“Tyran­nies across the World Are Crush­ing Dis­sent. In Britain Con­tempt for the Polit­i­cal Class is Grow­ing. Is It Pos­si­ble that Democ­racy Is Dying?” by Max Hast­ings; Daily Mail; 6/21/2013.

EXCERPT: . . . . Naive Euro­peans hailed the 2010 ‘Arab Spring’ as promis­ing a new era in the Mid­dle East. Yet it seems more likely that those nations — Tunisia, Egypt and Libya — will merely be ruled by new autocrats.

The truth is that democ­racy is ail­ing — not least here in Britain. Many peo­ple despise and dis­trust politicians. . . .

. . . . Ear­lier this month, Turkey’s prime min­is­ter, Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan, adopted one of the noto­ri­ous phrases of the old fas­cist dic­ta­tors: ‘My patience is exhausted.’

He then com­mit­ted thou­sands of riot police with batons and tear gas to remove peace­ful pro­test­ers from Istanbul’s Tak­sim Square.

Erdo­gan has said that democ­racy is an instru­ment to be exploited only as long as it is use­ful. He is thought to aspire to chang­ing Turkey’s con­sti­tu­tion to make him­self an elected dictator.

Most edu­cated urban Turks are appalled by his desire to break with the country’s century-old tra­di­tion of sec­u­lar­ism and to once more put Islam at the heart of law.

He has restricted alco­hol sales and attempted to crim­i­nalise adul­tery. More jour­nal­ists are in prison in Turkey than in China.

Erdo­gan has been able to act despot­i­cally because as prime min­is­ter, he has deliv­ered eco­nomic growth. He has won three elec­tions through the votes of the small busi­ness class and rural peas­antry, who value sta­bil­ity and tra­di­tional val­ues far above per­sonal freedom.

He can claim pop­u­lar sup­port, even though his style of rule is a trav­esty of democ­racy. Turkey is only the lat­est exam­ple of a nation bent on rolling back per­sonal free­doms or resist­ing demands for it. . . .


2 comments for ““Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Erdogan!” (and “Ein Morsi, too”)”

  1. Well this is pre­dictably depress­ing: The Brazil­ian right-wing is try­ing to take over the protests:

    Brazil’s left and right strug­gle for own­er­ship of protests

    Rival groups split on the polit­i­cal direc­tion of the protests, with claims two organ­i­sa­tions back mil­i­tary rule

    Jonathan Watts in Rio de Janeiro
    The Guardian, Wednes­day 26 June 2013 14.52 EDT

    Rival organ­i­sa­tions behind Brazil’s huge street demon­stra­tions are strug­gling for con­trol amid con­flict­ing views about the polit­i­cal direc­tion the move­ment should take.

    With fur­ther action planned for Wednes­day evening, the left­wing groups who ini­ti­ated the marches sus­pect oppo­si­tion par­ties are try­ing to hijack the protests and use them as a plat­form to chal­lenge pres­i­dent Dilma Rousseff’s gov­ern­ment before next year’s pres­i­den­tial election.

    The pro­test­ers have proved a for­mi­da­ble polit­i­cal force, notch­ing up vic­tory after vic­tory in the past week and forc­ing Rousseff’s Work­ers’ Party and regional lead­ers into a series of con­ces­sions. But the scale has ebbed in recent days. Although demon­stra­tions con­tinue on a daily basis in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and dozens of other cities, they are on a smaller scale than last Thursday’s march of more than a million.

    The vast major­ity of marches have been uni­fied, but there have been a few shout­ing matches between rival groups com­pet­ing to set the ide­o­log­i­cal direc­tion of the protests. Some would like a stronger focus on inequal­ity and improv­ing con­di­tions in fave­las. Oth­ers are push­ing for tax cuts and a crack­down on cor­rupt officials.

    In online chat rooms and microblogs, there is spec­u­la­tion that police are using agents provo­ca­teurs to stir up vio­lence and pave the way for a coup. Evi­dence for that is scant, but dif­fer­ences have become more appar­ent. Groups such as Anony­mous are call­ing for a period of reflec­tion, and arranged work­shops and pub­lic meet­ings in Rio this week to dis­cuss where to go next.

    But sev­eral organ­i­sa­tions that are closer to the right pressed ahead with smaller gath­er­ings on Mon­day and urged more on Thurs­day. Two of them, Organ­i­sa­tion Opposed to Cor­rup­tion and Online Rev­o­lu­tion, advo­cate the return of mil­i­tarism, accord­ing to an arti­cle on the Estado de São Paulo web­site. This fol­lowed ten­sion in São Paulo dur­ing last Thursday’s march when some groups burned the flags of the Work­ers Party.

    “We live in a democ­racy and this reac­tion is a kind of nation­al­ism taken to an extreme. I fear this may be hid­den fas­cism,” said Talita Saito, a 21-year-old law stu­dent at the protest.

    Such inci­dents have so far been on the fringes. More pos­i­tive is the sign of a new polit­i­cal debate that has been stirred up by for­merly apa­thetic mul­ti­tudes who are turn­ing out in vast num­bers to peace­fully back the protests.

    But those who ini­ti­ated the protests in sup­port of cheap pub­lic trans­port are uneasy that part of the move­ment has mor­phed towards a cam­paign for lower taxes.

    A major rea­son for the suc­cess of last week’s marches was that the organ­is­ers rejected affil­i­a­tion with polit­i­cal par­ties. The amor­phous move­ment embraced frus­tra­tions felt across the polit­i­cal spec­trum, many of them brought into relief by the Con­fed­er­a­tions Cup.

    About 50,000 peo­ple joined a demon­stra­tion on Wednes­day out­side a sta­dium in Belo Hor­i­zonte, where Brazil were play­ing Uruguay in a Con­fed­er­a­tions Cup semi-final. Police fired tear gas and pro­test­ers threw stones. In Brasilia, where the other semi-final was tak­ing place, police shut down traf­fic in the city cen­tre in expec­ta­tion of unrest.

    After last Thursday’s march, the huge range of moti­va­tions was evi­dent in the hand-written plac­ards pinned on to the walls – “Schools not Sta­di­ums”, “70bn in Cor­rup­tion”, “End Police Vio­lence”, “Stop PEC 37″ (a bill that would weaken the power of the pub­lic min­is­ter to inves­ti­gate offi­cial wrong­do­ing) and “No to the Gay Cure” (a ref­er­ence to evan­gel­i­cal politi­cian Marco Feliciano’s call for Brazil’s med­ical estab­lish­ment to treat homo­sex­u­al­ity as a disease.

    In recent days, Rouss­eff – a for­mer stu­dent rad­i­cal – has talked to organ­is­ers and responded to some of their con­cerns. On Mon­day, she promised a ref­er­en­dum on polit­i­cal reform, tighter penal­ties for cor­rup­tion, a 50bn real (£15bn) pro­gramme for pub­lic trans­port and more sup­port for health­care and edu­ca­tion. Another con­ces­sion was won from leg­is­la­tors, who dropped the PEC 37 bill.The groups behind the protests say Rousseff’s promises are too vague and fall short of demands they have regard­ing evic­tions of res­i­dents for mega-events, exces­sive police vio­lence (seen on Tues­day in a raid on the Maré favela in Rio that left at least nine peo­ple dead) and wider issues of inequal­ity and envi­ron­men­tal destruction.

    A state­ment by the Passe Libre group said the gov­ern­ment has to do more to rein in para­mil­i­tary police, who have shot pro­test­ers with rub­ber bul­lets and used tear­gas indis­crim­i­nately. “There is an urgent need to demil­i­tarise the police and put in place a national pol­icy to reg­u­late less lethal weapons, which are banned in many coun­tries and con­demned by inter­na­tional bod­ies,” the group said.

    Alan Fragoso, one of the organ­is­ers of the Fórum de Lutas group that ini­ti­ated the protests, said the demon­stra­tions would con­tinue. “Even if the pro­test­ers do not have full polit­i­cal con­scious­ness we must seize the moment to pro­mote the inclu­sion of polit­i­cal debate in the daily life of Brazil­ians,” he said.

    In response to Rousseff’s promises and con­cerns about the van­dal­ism that fol­lowed clashes with police, the organ­is­ers plan to set new guide­lines for the protests.


    And now Bul­ge­ria appears to have a grow­ing anti-oligarch/anti-corruption move­ment. A big focus of the protest is the recent appoint­ment of a politi­cian with a his­tory of cor­rup­tion to a newly empow­ered “secu­rity czar” post. The new secu­rity czar is also a mem­ber of the eth­nic Turk­ish party and a fre­quent tar­get of the far-right nation­al­ist Ataka party. Ataka is of the “anti-capitalist”/“anti-corruption” strain of the far-right uni­verse and has seen its pop­u­lar­ity surge in the last year. So let’s hope the far-right stays far away from this one:

    The spirit of protest in Brazil and Turkey has now swept into Bulgaria

    Tens of thou­sands of Bul­gar­i­ans are voic­ing their anger over polit­i­cal cor­rup­tion, abuse of power and eco­nomic hardship

    John O’Brennan
    guardian.co.uk, Tues­day 25 June 2013 13.02 EDT

    In recent weeks the world has been trans­fixed by protests in Turkey and Brazil. Fewer media out­lets have reported on the anti-government protests in Bul­garia, now well into their sec­ond week. But make no mis­take about it: Bul­garia is under­go­ing a pro­found cri­sis of representation.

    Every night for more than a week up to 10,000 peo­ple have taken to the streets of Sofia, ini­tially protest­ing against the appoint­ment on 14 June of the media oli­garch Delyan Peev­ski as Bulgaria’s “secu­rity tsar”, the head of the State Agency for National Secu­rity (Dans), the Bul­gar­ian CIA.

    Peev­ski, who is 32, comes from a well-connected fam­ily that owns Bulgaria’s largest news­pa­per and tele­vi­sion group (it con­trols 80% of print media in the coun­try) and has no expe­ri­ence in the secu­rity sec­tor. In 2007 he was sacked from his post as deputy min­is­ter and inves­ti­gated for attempted black­mail. He is an MP for the eth­nic Turk­ish party, the Move­ment for Rights and Free­doms (MRF), which sup­ports the prime min­is­ter Pla­men Oresharski’s gov­ern­ing coali­tion, led by the Bul­gar­ian Social­ist party (BSP). His appoint­ment took place with­out a debate in the National Assembly.

    Dans is the agency respon­si­ble both for Bulgaria’s inter­nal and exter­nal secu­rity. Its role was ele­vated sig­nif­i­cantly in the wake of the ter­ror­ist attack on Bur­gas air­port in July 2012 (attrib­uted to Hezbol­lah) which killed five Israeli tourists and their Bul­gar­ian bus dri­ver. This exec­u­tive role has been strength­ened even fur­ther recently after con­tro­ver­sial amend­ments in the Dans leg­is­la­tion were signed giv­ing the organ­i­sa­tion respon­si­bil­ity for deal­ing with organ­ised crime.

    Bul­gar­i­ans are protest­ing against far-reaching and sys­tem­atic cor­rup­tion and the “cap­ture” of the state by rent-seeking oli­garchic net­works. Ore­sharski was appointed by the BSP to head a so-called “expert” gov­ern­ment, after a gen­eral elec­tion in April pro­duced a tight out­come. The tech­no­cratic gov­ern­ment came about because the lead­ing fig­ures within the two largest polit­i­cal par­ties, the BSP and the centre-right Gerb (Cit­i­zens for Euro­pean Devel­op­ment of Bul­garia) were widely dis­cred­ited. And although the prime min­is­ter has now with­drawn the appoint­ment of Peev­ski, for pro­test­ers the episode sug­gested that even respected fig­ures like Ore­sharski are inca­pable of shak­ing off the shad­owy world of oli­garchic power in Bulgaria.

    In Bul­garia it is often impos­si­ble to know where organ­ised crime ends and legit­i­mate busi­ness begins. The nexus between the two is char­ac­terised by com­plex bureau­cratic struc­tures, opaque cor­po­rate account­ing and a maze of off­shore accounts. In Varna, Bulgaria’s third largest city, the protests have taken direct aim at TIM, a busi­ness con­glom­er­ate allied to Gerb and long the real power in the region. Some esti­mates sug­gest that it con­trols up to 70% of Varna’s econ­omy, includ­ing most of the tourist infra­struc­ture. When pro­test­ers in Varna yell “M-A-F-I-A” they are auto­mat­i­cally col­laps­ing busi­ness into pol­i­tics and impli­cat­ing local munic­i­pal offi­cials as the agents of this pow­er­ful oli­garchic network.

    Varna per­fectly illus­trates why the cur­rent protests are largely non-party-policitical and anti-politics in tone: the defin­i­tive divi­sion in today’s Bul­garia is no longer between right and left, but between the cit­i­zens and the mafia. This is a world where the guilty don’t just go unpun­ished; they ascend to the high­est citadels of power.

    Although cor­rup­tion and the abuse of power are the cen­tral themes of this protest, eco­nomic hard­ship also plays a role. New data from the EU demon­strates that Bul­gar­i­ans have the low­est stan­dard of liv­ing in the Euro­pean Union, at around 50% of the EU aver­age. Even Croa­tia, which will accede to the EU on 1 July, is sig­nif­i­cantly more pros­per­ous than Bulgaria.

    The irony here is not lost on Bul­gar­i­ans. At the onset of the EU finan­cial cri­sis in 2008, Bul­garia had one of the low­est lev­els of pub­lic debt in Europe at 15% of GDP. Its bud­get deficit was below 3%. And yet the gov­ern­ment of Boyko Borissov embarked on a fool­ish pro­gramme of aus­ter­ity mea­sures, the logic of which was almost entirely pred­i­cated on demon­strat­ing to Brus­sels what a good pupil Bul­garia now was. Reduc­tions in pub­lic spend­ing cou­pled with large increases in the price of elec­tric­ity and other util­i­ties brought peo­ple out on to the streets in Feb­ru­ary. But, like Turkey, what began as a protest against a spe­cific appoint­ment has quickly mutated into a gen­eral oppo­si­tion to the government.

    Ore­sharski also has to grap­ple with increas­ing eth­nic ten­sions in the coun­try. Many Bul­gar­i­ans resent the influ­ence of the junior coali­tion party, the MRF which rep­re­sents mainly the Turk­ish minor­ity (about 10% of the pop­u­la­tion). The far-right party Ataka, which won 23 seats and 7.3% of the vote in the recent par­lia­men­tary elec­tion, has sought to exploit this sen­ti­ment at every oppor­tu­nity. Its leader, Volen Siderov, con­tin­ues to stoke the flames of hatred against both the eth­nic Turks and the Roma population.


    Note that while we should hope Ataka stays far away from the protest move­ment, that’s sort of hope­less hope given the nature of the move­ment. But at least it looks like Bul­gar­i­ans are gen­er­ally wary of these guys and appear to be striv­ing to avoid vio­lence alto­gether...despite Ataka’s attempts:

    The Con­ver­sa­tion
    Protests in Bul­garia: the Unno­ticed Upris­ing
    by Anna Plyushteva

    As in Istan­bul, recent protests in Sofia began with a sin­gle, spe­cific issue. In Bul­garia, it was the appoint­ment of Delyan Peev­ski as head of the country’s national secu­rity agency. At just 32 years of age, Peev­ski owns var­i­ous large busi­nesses, includ­ing TV chan­nels and other media outlets.

    So when he was hastily appointed to one of the top jobs in the coun­try, on June 14, tens of thou­sands of peo­ple took to the streets within hours. Daily demon­stra­tions have con­tin­ued for more than a week with no sign of abat­ing. But why are they so per­sis­tent, in a coun­try where pub­lic life is usu­ally described as polit­i­cally apathetic?

    In another par­al­lel with Gezi Park and Brazil, protests have gone on even after offi­cials backed down on the orig­i­nal cause for the out­rage. On June 19, Peevski’s appoint­ment was with­drawn, as politi­cians mut­tered state­ments about admit­ting mis­takes and the wise voice of the peo­ple. “Keep your apolo­gies, give us your res­ig­na­tions,” chanted the crowds, and the ral­lies raged on.

    A brief overview of the devel­op­ments in the days since can begin to shed light on the ques­tions of why, why now, and why the near-complete absence of inter­na­tional coverage?

    The lack of vio­lent clashes goes some way towards explain­ing the silence of major news out­lets – not only are num­bers in Sofia much smaller than in Istan­bul or Rio, but also the Bul­gar­ian police union declared offi­cial sup­port for the protests. So no riot gear, no tear gas, and not a sin­gle smashed win­dow. Despite the angry picket signs, the daily demos have been described by some as “a bit of a lifestyle event”, com­plete with dogs, young chil­dren, and plenty of cold beer.


    On this occa­sion, Bul­gar­i­ans are not revolt­ing about income lev­els or detri­men­tal health­care reforms. The June 2013 slo­gans are about dig­nity, absur­dity, and the feel­ing of being ridiculed by those paid to rep­re­sent you.

    Attempts to turn the protests into a clash of party ide­olo­gies have so far failed: the nation­al­ist ATAKA party (a baf­fling coali­tion part­ner in a Socialist-led gov­ern­ment) mobilised a few hun­dred of its sup­port­ers for a counter-protest. The mass demon­stra­tion was instantly re-routed to bypass the ATAKA head­quar­ters, thus man­ag­ing to avoid open confrontation.

    Another blow to the plan of the extreme right came when the pub­lic TV chan­nel broad­cast an under­cover report on their counter-demo. Ear­lier that day, ATAKA had recruited “sup­port­ers” in local gyms, on the promise of a 30 leva (£13) fee and a sup­ply of free pizza. Hav­ing enthu­si­as­ti­cally shared the story online, eco­nomic con­ser­v­a­tives, anar­chists, LGBT and envi­ron­men­tal activists have con­tin­ued to gather (for free, their signs proudly pro­claim) daily to picket the rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the sta­tus quo.

    The Bul­gar­ian demon­stra­tions seem increas­ingly likely to top­ple the new gov­ern­ment, but it is becom­ing clearer than ever that the prob­lems of the polit­i­cal estab­lish­ment run to its very foun­da­tions. The protests can­not deliver the solu­tion when there is need for rad­i­cal change in the way pol­i­tics is prac­ticed. The small vic­tory over the Peev­ski appoint­ment, how­ever, may serve to bring closer the social and polit­i­cal spheres which have been so pro­foundly divided ever since the end of single-party rule 24 years ago.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 26, 2013, 6:58 pm
  2. Thanks Dave!

    Posted by Remond Common | June 27, 2013, 7:39 pm

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