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German Banks and the Eurozone Crisis

COMMENT: The Ger­man word for power is “macht”–derived from “Machi­avel­lian.” One of the rel­a­tively few Inter­net enti­ties cov­er­ing the behav­ior of the sup­pos­edly “new” Ger­many is the Ger­many­Watch blogspot.

They fea­ture a post high­light­ing the aggres­sive, skill­fully cyn­i­cal maneu­ver­ing of Ger­man finan­cial insti­tu­tions with regard to the Euro­zone cri­sis. Far from being the ideal role model for the rest of the continent’s finan­cial enti­ties, Ger­man banks in fact pumped cap­i­tal into the bub­ble economies of the periph­eral coun­tries, thus set­ting those coun­tries up for the col­lapse that threat­ens the global economy.

(In that con­text, one should not lose sight of the fact that the major Ger­man banks oper­ate under the stew­ard­ship of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work, as dis­cussed in FTR #232.)

Not only did they “do every­thing right” while every­one else “did every­thing wrong,” but Ger­man banks had enor­mous expo­sure to the burst­ing bub­ble of the periph­eral Euro­pean economies.

Cit­ing an arti­cle from The Inde­pen­dent, this post takes stock of that fact.

With Ger­many push­ing for the afflicted nations to sur­ren­der polit­i­cal sov­er­eignty as a con­di­tion for Ger­man finan­cial assis­tance (ful­fill­ing the goal enun­ci­ated by Friedrich List in the 19th cen­tury and put into action by the Third Reich in its above-ground phase), we see that Ger­man banks have been acces­sories or enablers for the loom­ing disaster.

A 2012 arti­cle by Mr. Chu in The Inde­pen­dent details how the Ger­man bailouts have actu­ally helped to assist Ger­man banks, illus­trat­ing “macht” or “Machi­avel­lian­ism” in action.

In this con­text, we should not lose sight of two con­sid­er­a­tions we’ve dis­cussed in the past.

One is the role of the mys­te­ri­ous Roland Arnall (“the Johnny Apple­seed of sub­prime”) in help­ing to pre­cip­i­tate the global finan­cial col­lapse that burst the Euro­pean bub­bles, set­ting the stage for the cur­rent Ger­man power play.

A refugee from Nazi occu­pied Europe, Arnall was alto­gether mys­te­ri­ous, mask­ing every­thing but his avowed Jew­ish­ness and sup­port for the Simon Weisen­thal Cen­ter. When ana­lyz­ing an indi­vid­ual who goes to great lengths to hide infor­ma­tion about him­self, those details he goes to great lengths to empha­size are significant–not for what they tell us about what he is, but for what they tell us about what he isn’t.

In FTR #690, we exam­ined the very real pos­si­bil­ity that Arnall was a “Bor­mann Jew.” What bet­ter cover for a Nazi finan­cial gam­bit than to have a Jew fronting for the operation?

We should also remem­ber that the Under­ground Reich and its SS foot sol­diers had designed to exe­cute con­spir­a­cies on behalf of Ger­man car­tels in for­eign countries.

Are Arnall and the Ger­man banks that set up the Euro­zone cri­sis, thus jeo­pradiz­ing the global econ­omy rep­re­sen­ta­tive of those conspiracies?

(Newer lis­ten­ers should make a point of down­load­ing, print­ing and read­ing Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile. Increas­ingly, the pro­grams and posts will be incom­pre­hen­si­ble with­out doing so.

“Ger­man Bank­ing Supe­ri­or­ity Is a Lie”; Ger­many Watch; 9/2/2011.

EXCERPT: . . . . And of course, the very claims of eco­nomic supe­ri­or­ity are a com­plete fab­ri­ca­tion. Ger­man lead­ers defined the prob­lem as an Anglo-Saxon one, and blamed Amer­ica and Britain (all they have done is drop the claim that Anglo-American Cap­i­tal­ism is run by Jews. They still want to bring down Anglo-American capitalism).

As we have men­tioned before, accord­ing to the Bank for Inter­na­tional Set­tle­ments, Ger­many lent almost $1.5 tril­lion to Greece, Spain, Por­tu­gal, Ire­land, and Italy. Add to that heavy Ger­man involve­ment in the credit binge in Amer­i­can real estate, and it is clear that wher­ever par­ties were tak­ing place, Ger­man banks were sup­ply­ing the drinks.

Ger­man banks are two and a half times more lever­aged than their US bank­ing peers, accord­ing to the Inter­na­tional Mon­e­tary Fund.

Some of them have pulled out of the bank­ing stress-tests that the rest of Europe has had to under­take, because they did not want the results to go public.

The arti­cle [by Ben Chu of the Lon­don Inde­pen­dent] also says; “A poll of Ger­mans last month indi­cated that 71 per cent of the pop­u­la­tion are either par­tially or com­pletely in the dark about the tech­ni­cal rea­sons behind the sin­gle cur­rency crisis.” . . . .

“Ben Chu: Ger­many Is not Bail­ing out Europe, It Is Res­cu­ing Itself” by Ben Chu; The Lon­don Inde­pen­dent; 7/5/2012.

EXCERPT: Poor Ger­many, forced to pro­vide mas­sive guar­an­tees for its prof­li­gate Euro­pean neighbours.

The Fed­eral Repub­lic did every­thing right – push­ing its domes­tic labour costs down, keep­ing pub­lic bor­row­ing low. And its neigh­bours did every­thing wrong – let­ting wages spi­ral and run­ning up big pub­lic debt piles. But now pru­dent Ger­many is being forced to foot the entire bill.

And even with­out the addi­tional costs of bail­ing out Greece, Ire­land, Por­tu­gal, Spain and Cyprus, Berlin is fac­ing a cat­a­strophic bill thanks to the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank’s (ECB) pro­vi­sion of liq­uid­ity life sup­port for the eurozone’s bank­ing sys­tem. The Bun­des­bank has racked up vast claims against other cen­tral banks through the mon­e­tary clear­ing sys­tem known as “Tar­get 2″.

That’s the stan­dard nar­ra­tive from Ger­many. And it’s largely false. The guar­an­tees that Ger­many has extended – and the huge liq­uid­ity oper­a­tions of the ECB – have indeed been used to assist the strug­gling nations of the euro­zone periph­ery. But they have also, as new research from Gold­man Sachs show, been used to bail out Ger­man banks. . . .

. . . .  Ger­man banks have been steadily extri­cat­ing them­selves from their expo­sure to south­ern Europe since 2007, as Chart 3 shows. Ger­man banks’ gross credit claims against the nations of the euro­zone periph­ery have fallen by 50 per cent, down to €300bn. They have been busily off-loading euro­zone assets to reduce the risks to their bal­ance sheets.

And that has been tak­ing place as the ECB has been extend­ing its own bal­ance sheet by pro­vid­ing cheap lend­ing for banks across the con­ti­nent to pre­vent them from run­ning out of money. Here’s how that works:German banks have stopped lend­ing to euro­zone periph­ery banks. And those banks have been forced to fund them­selves, instead, by tap­ping the ECB for cash.

But the risks return. Euro­zone periph­ery nations are still run­ning trade deficits with Ger­many. Those deficits that were pre­vi­ously financed by pri­vate Ger­man banks are now financed by the ECB. And thanks to the mechan­ics of the Euro­pean mon­e­tary sys­tem that has resulted in the bal­loon­ing of the Bundesbank’s claims against other euro­zone cen­tral banks.

“It is no coin­ci­dence that the increase in net for­eign assets on the Bundesbank’s bal­ance sheet roughly matches the decline seen on banks’ bal­ance sheets,” said Dirk Schu­macher of Gold­man. “The Tar­get 2 imbal­ances … have mainly replaced finan­cial risk that was pre­vi­ously sit­ting on private-sector bal­ance sheets.”

What this means is that the ECB and euro­zone gov­ern­ments, as well as bail­ing out other mem­bers states, have qui­etly been res­cu­ing Ger­man banks and, by exten­sion, Ger­man savers. With­out these emer­gency oper­a­tions, the euro­zone would have bro­ken up, Ger­man banks would have gone bust and the sav­ings of many ordi­nary Ger­mans might have been wiped out. More likely the Ger­man tax­payer would have had been forced to bail out those banks.

So, as the Ger­man peo­ple dis­trib­ute blame for the sit­u­a­tion in which they find them­selves, they should not ignore their own bankers. If those insti­tu­tions had not made these invest­ments and financed the cur­rent account deficits of Germany’s neigh­bours for so many years, their coun­try would not be on the hook for hun­dreds of bil­lions of euros of bad debts.

Yet this is some­thing Ger­man politi­cians refuse to acknowledge. . . .

Discussion

11 comments for “German Banks and the Eurozone Crisis”

  1. Thanks for the men­tion Dave.

    Some­thing we sug­gest all of your site vis­i­tors read, is Sara Moore’s new book.

    Com­bined with your work on the Bor­mann net­work, her expo­sure of his­tor­i­cal Ger­man eco­nomic move­ments ties every­thing together.
    Sara is an eco­nomic his­to­rian, and very nice per­son too.
    http://www.howhitlercametopower.com

    We believe our only chance of solv­ing the Ger­man dom­i­na­tion issue before they wreak more war havoc on the world, is con­cen­trat­ing on their main power. BERTELSMANN.

    We have a big post com­ing soon on Ber­tels­mann, and its pretty shocking.

    Ber­tels­mann is the number1 dri­ver of Ger­man impe­r­ial for­eign pol­icy.
    Their con­trol and influ­ence of pub­lish­ing and media is pre­vent­ing demo­c­ra­tic nations from learn­ing the truth of the last cen­tury. By pre­vent­ing large scale pub­lish­ing of books like Sara Moore’s, they are pulling the blind­fold over entire nations.

    One thing we will be talk­ing about is the Lis­bon Constitution/Treaty.
    When the Lis­bon Con­sti­tu­tion failed to gain YES votes around Europe, it was the BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION which re-wrote and sug­gested the lie of the Lis­bon Treaty. Ber­tels­mann has a HUGE influ­ence in the pol­i­tics of the EU. In fact they even have their own MEP, Elmar Brok. He is an employee of Ber­tels­mann, and is Chair­man of the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment Com­mit­tee on For­eign Affairs!!

    Ber­tels­mann, by hav­ing built a large printer in Liv­er­pool, have under­cut other print­ers in the UK. By doing this, they have picked up 10 year print­ing con­tracts for major British news­pa­pers and mag­a­zines, inc The Times and the FT! You can be pretty sure noth­ing will be printed in Brit media against Bertelsmann.

    Their huge influ­ence over Euro­pean media allows their pro­pa­ganda press releases to be printed unchal­lenged — even by the BBC. Back­ward report­ing over islamists empow­ered by the ‘spring’? Bertelsmann.

    Pro­pa­ganda about Ger­man fis­cal supe­ri­or­ity and the need for Ger­man lead­er­ship in Europe? Bertelsmann.

    Rewrit­ing of his­tory in Pol­ish school books? Bertelsmann.

    EU/German pro­pa­ganda in major Euro­pean TV shows? Bertelsmann.

    Anti-American sen­ti­ment in EUro­pean media, inc the spread­ing of pro­pa­ganda about lack of WMD in the Gulf? Bertelsmann.

    Run­ning of 5 British CITY/DISTRICT COUNCILS, WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO ENFORCE LAWS, AND THE RIGHT UNDER THE R.I.P.A ACT TO SPY ON AND INVESTIGATE BRITISH CITIZENS, USING BRITISH CRIMINAL RECORDS, CCTV, BRITISH COURTS, etc? BERTELSMANN!

    If we don’t expose that Octo­pus, it will be impos­si­ble to pre­vent Ger­many from hav­ing com­plete admin­is­tra­tive con­trol over Britain.

    Get Ber­tels­mann out of the way, and then remove Siemens’ influ­ence, and we might stand a chance.

    Posted by GW | August 2, 2012, 5:51 am
  2. @GW–Do a search for Ber­tels­mann on this site. I did a mas­sive series on Ger­man cor­po­rate con­trol over Amer­i­can media in the late ’90’s and early part of the new century.

    The pub­lisher for the SS dur­ing the war, Ber­tels­mann is real­iz­ing the goal of the Under­ground Reich as set forth in “Serpent’s Walk.”

    It is indeed important.

    Thanks for your work.

    Dave Emory

    Posted by Dave Emory | August 2, 2012, 6:54 pm
  3. What a sur­prise: In response to the grow­ing con­sen­sus within the euro­zone that the ECB needs to engage in emer­gency bond buy­ing, Berlin politi­cians are call­ing for an over­haul of the ECB’s gov­ern­ing board the shrinks to board from 23 to 9 mem­bers and gives the largest coun­tries per­ma­nent sta­tus on the 9-person coun­cil. The rest of the rab­ble get to share the remain­ing non-permanent seats. Vas­sal state tech­noc­racy here we come!

    WSJ
    August 5, 2012, 11:40 a.m. ET
    Write to Christo­pher Law­ton at christopher.lawton@dowjones.com

    Ger­man Offi­cials Push For More ECB Control

    Ger­man politi­cians and for­mer Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank offi­cials sharply crit­i­cized the ECB over the week­end and pushed for Ger­many, as the largest con­trib­u­tor to the euro zone res­cue effort, to have more con­trol in the cen­tral bank’s mat­ters, after Pres­i­dent Mario Draghi sig­naled that the cen­tral bank could soon start pur­chas­ing gov­ern­ment bonds.

    “The new sit­u­a­tion that Ger­many pro­vides a grow­ing share of the euro res­cue, but has only one vote just like any other coun­try no longer fits,” Her­bert Reul, a Ger­man politi­cian and chair­man of the Chris­t­ian Demo­c­ra­tic Union and Chris­t­ian Social Union group within the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment, told Ger­man mag­a­zine Focus on Sunday.

    On Thurs­day, Mr. Draghi indi­cated that the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank may soon step in to buy gov­ern­ment bonds on the open mar­ket and con­sider other uncon­ven­tional mea­sures to lower the high bor­row­ing costs of finan­cially stressed euro-zone economies.

    The Deutsche Bun­des­bank, Germany’s cen­tral bank, has adamantly opposed the ECB’s gov­ern­ment bond pur­chases for more than two years, argu­ing they dis­cour­age gov­ern­ments from imple­ment­ing much-needed reforms.

    ...

    While Ger­many holds 27.1% of the cap­i­tal of the cen­tral bank, Exec­u­tive Board Mem­ber Joerg Asmussen is the only other Ger­man on the 23-member gov­ern­ing coun­cil after Mr. Wei­d­mann, who has just one vote.

    In an inter­view with Focus mag­a­zine, For­eign Min­is­ter Guido West­er­welle said the prob­lem is that “the eco­nomic and demo­graphic weight in some com­mit­tees and sit­u­a­tions is not rep­re­sented accordingly.”

    To strengthen the weight of the Bun­des­bank, Mr. Stark sug­gested to Focus mag­a­zine that the ECB remake its board, which today includes 23 mem­bers, to a nine-member board set up, where big mem­ber states such as Ger­many would receive a per­ma­nent seat and the other states would share the remain­ing seats.

    That would require changes to both the Maas­tricht Treaty and the ECB’s statutes, he noted.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | August 5, 2012, 4:34 pm
  4. Proverbs 22:7
    “The rich ruleth over the poor; And the bor­rower is slave to the lender.”

    Posted by GK | August 13, 2012, 12:23 am
  5. True to form, Rajoy gives the Span­ish pub­lic another kick in the gut:

    Bloomberg
    Spain Deficit Pain Bites Con­sumers as Rajoy Steps Up Cuts
    By Ange­line Benoit — Aug 27, 2012 10:26 AM CT

    Span­ish Prime Min­is­ter Mar­i­ano Rajoy’s aus­ter­ity drive will inten­sify this week as a sales-tax increas tight­ens the squeeze on con­sumers whose spend­ing is already plummeting.

    The move to raise the value-added tax on Sept. 1 will fol­low a flurry of data show­ing pres­sure build­ing on house­hold finances in the euro area’s fourth-biggest econ­omy, home to a third of its unem­ployed. A report today showed mort­gages fell 25.2 per­cent from a year ago in June after a 30.5 per­cent drop in May. Mean­while, the Health Min­istry today said spend­ing on pre­scrip­tion drugs fell 23.9 per­cent from a year ago in July, the steep­est drop since the series started in 1999, after the gov­ern­ment last month increased the share patients pay for pharmaceuticals.

    A break­down of second-quarter gross domes­tic prod­uct is due tomor­row and infla­tion on Aug. 30. Retail and current-account data are due Aug. 31 as well as pub­lic finance figures.

    The data will illus­trate the extent of Rajoy’s chal­lenge as he tries to curb the euro region’s third-largest bud­get deficit and con­sid­ers whether to seek fur­ther inter­na­tional aid. Con­sumers have already endured a reces­sion last­ing three quar­ters as a pre­lude to his tax increase due this week and an annual cut in pub­lic wages for the month of Decem­ber.
    ‘Dra­matic’ Weakening

    “I expect a fairly dra­matic weak­en­ing of GDP in the third and fourth quar­ters and fur­ther ahead as all com­po­nents of domes­tic demand fall,” Ebrahim Rah­bari, a London-based Cit­i­group Inc. econ­o­mist, said by tele­phone. “Fis­cal tight­en­ing will hurt sub­stan­tially in Spain, and most of its effects are still to come.”

    Rajoy last month aban­doned his fore­cast for a return to growth in 2013 as he unveiled spend­ing cuts and tax increases through 2014 that will triple his planned aus­ter­ity effort to a total of 15 per­cent of annual gross domes­tic prod­uct. New mea­sures start­ing in Sep­tem­ber will add 102 bil­lion euros to the 48 billion-euro adjust­ment ini­tially planned for this year, which began tak­ing effect in the sec­ond quarter.

    ...

    “The Greek exam­ple shows there is a risk of a down­ward spi­ral that can leave the econ­omy stuck in a depres­sion,” said Chris­t­ian Schulz, an econ­o­mist at Beren­berg Bank in London.

    GDP data tomor­row may show how con­sumer spend­ing already suf­fered dur­ing the sec­ond quar­ter. The report from the national sta­tis­tics insti­tute, INE, fol­lows a July 30 esti­mate show­ing Spain’s reces­sion wors­ened with a 0.4 per­cent con­trac­tion. The gov­ern­ment fore­casts domes­tic demand will fall 4 per­cent this year, more than twice last year’s drop. July retail sta­tis­tics is expected to sig­nal the weak­ness in house­hold finances on Aug. 31, after a 5.2 per­cent annual decline in June.

    Tax Increase

    Adding to pres­sure on con­sumers is the VAT increase, the sec­ond since 2010, which will raise the levy to 21 per­cent from 18 per­cent. It’s the first item to take effect as part of Rajoy’s fourth budget-tightening exer­cise in eight months. Along with a one-month wage cut for civil ser­vants and a reduc­tion in job­less pay, it will account for most of the extra mea­sures he has sought to curb the deficit this year.

    Higher sales tax risks “exac­er­bat­ing” the slump in domes­tic con­sump­tion and spark­ing a spi­ral in which prices feed wages, said London-based econ­o­mist Andrew Ben­ito at Gold­man Sachs Group Inc., a for­mer Bank of Eng­land spe­cial­ist on con­sumer spending.

    Consumer-price gains are already accel­er­at­ing. The infla­tion rate rose to 2.2 per­cent in July because of higher costs of drugs and increases in local taxes, and prob­a­bly reached an eight-month high of 2.3 per­cent this month, accord­ing to the median fore­cast of 10 econ­o­mists in a Bloomberg News sur­vey.

    ...

    Great, on top of it all, there’s also infla­tion pick­ing up, due, in part, to higher drug costs even though spend­ing on pre­scrip­tion drugs fell 23% annu­ally. I guess that means the Bun­des­bank gets to lec­ture Spain about the risk of debt addic­tion:

    UPDATE 2-Bundesbank chief says ECB bond buy­ing “like a drug”

    Sun Aug 26, 2012 8:21am EDT

    * Ger­man cen­tral bank con­cerned at ECB’s chang­ing role

    * Says bond pro­posal looks like print­ing cash to fund govts

    * Inter­view pub­lished ahead of Sept. 6 ECB meeting

    By Paul Carrel

    FRANKFURT, Aug 26 (Reuters) — The head of Germany’s Bun­des­bank stepped up his oppo­si­tion to the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank’s lat­est moves to bat­tle the euro zone’s debt cri­sis on Sun­day, say­ing that plans to buy bonds risked becom­ing a drug on which gov­ern­ments would get hooked.

    In the lat­est sign of a deep­en­ing rift within the ECB that has wor­ried finan­cial mar­kets, Jens Wei­d­mann warned in an inter­view in weekly Der Spiegel that the buy­ing pro­gramme verged on the taboo for the bank of out­right financ­ing of governments.

    He also hinted he was not alone at the ECB in his con­cern over the pro­gramme — in con­trast to indi­ca­tions by the bank’s Pres­i­dent Mario Draghi that Wei­d­mann had been iso­lated in express­ing reservations.

    The ECB is being forced to take a greater role in fight­ing the cri­sis while gov­ern­ments nego­ti­ate legal and polit­i­cal hur­dles to coor­di­nat­ing a longer-term response, but the Bun­des­bank wants to limit the scope of cen­tral bank action.

    Draghi is expected to detail the bond-buying plan after a Sept. 6 meet­ing of the bank’s 23-member Gov­ern­ing Council.

    “Such a pol­icy is for me close to state financ­ing via the print­ing press,” Wei­d­mann told the weekly mag­a­zine. “In democ­ra­cies, it is par­lia­ments and not cen­tral banks that should decide on such a com­pre­hen­sive pool­ing of risks.”

    Financ­ing gov­ern­ments has long been a line in the sand for the ECB. Weidmann’s pre­de­ces­sor as Bun­des­bank chief, Axel Weber, quit last year in protest at the ECB’s exist­ing, but now dor­mant, bond-buying scheme — the Secu­ri­ties Mar­kets Pro­gramme (SMP).

    “We should not under­es­ti­mate the risk that cen­tral bank financ­ing can become addic­tive like a drug,” Wei­d­mann said.

    The Bun­des­bank retains sub­stan­tial influ­ence within Ger­many and on finan­cial mar­kets due to its inflation-fighting cre­den­tials but, as just one of 17 con­stituents at the ECB, it is unlikely it could scup­per Draghi’s plan.

    Pol­i­cy­mak­ers are pos­tur­ing over the pro­gramme ahead of their Sept. 6 meet­ing, at which mar­kets will be look­ing for the cen­tral bank to spell out more details of the plan.

    Cen­tral bank sources told Reuters on Fri­day that the ECB is con­sid­er­ing set­ting yield band tar­gets under the new bond-buying pro­gramme to allow it to keep its strat­egy shielded and avoid spec­u­la­tors try­ing to cash in.

    Wei­d­mann said set­ting such yield band tar­gets was a “sen­si­tive notion” but rejected sug­ges­tions that he was iso­lated on the ECB Gov­ern­ing Coun­cil in hav­ing such reservations.

    “I hardly believe that I am the only one to get stom­ach ache over this,” he said.

    ECB DISPUTE

    Der Spiegel also reported that there was a dis­pute within the ECB over the form of the pro­gramme, with offi­cials from coun­tries like Spain and Italy push­ing for unlim­ited ECB inter­ven­tion in sec­ondary bond markets.

    ECB offi­cials from north­ern euro zone coun­tries only want the cen­tral bank to inter­vene in a “short, but ener­getic” way when bond yields “explode” upwards, the mag­a­zine said.

    ...

    You have to love the method of cen­tral bank­ing on dis­play: we promise to do noth­ing to pre­vent a cri­sis in the bond sec­tor unless bond yields “explode”, at which point we will do “some­thing”, but only for a short period of time: The “just in time, just barely enough” method of cen­tral bank­ing psy­cho­log­i­cal war­fare. I can’t say that’s it’s been an effec­tive pol­icy thus far but it’s cer­tainly inter­est­ing to watch.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | August 27, 2012, 12:36 pm
  6. Hi, long time lis­tener.
    this is my first time post­ing a com­ment here.

    I fig­ured you all might be inter­ested in this blog post. It essen­tially sum­ma­rizes the gen­eral ill will between the Ger­man gov. and the Greek peo­ple. I took notice because it clearly is in line w/ Mr. Emory’s research. Excuse the imper­fec­tions. Eng­lish is not the writer’s 1st lan­guage. I hope this is helpful:

    http://farosradio.gr/el/faros-news/item/2320-germany-against-russia-in-greek-battlespace.html

    Posted by diogenes | September 19, 2012, 12:16 am
  7. In case we needed a timely reminder of the fact that Spain’s hous­ing bub­ble bank­ing cri­sis was facil­i­tated with the full aware­ness of big Ger­man lenders, here we go:

    Updated Sep­tem­ber 24, 2012, 8:15 p.m. ET
    WSJ
    State of Europe’s Banks: Safe and Stressed
    Germany’s Lenders Find For­tunes Tied To Span­ish Peers

    FRANKFURT—As Europe races to restore con­fi­dence in Spain’s finances and the euro, Ger­many has another rea­son for urgency in resolv­ing the cri­sis: the health of its own banks.

    Ger­man lenders have the high­est expo­sure in Europe to Spain, at $139.9 bil­lion, of which $45.9 bil­lion alone is expo­sure to banks, accord­ing to the Bank for Inter­na­tional Set­tle­ments.

    Euro­pean coun­tries agreed to extend to Spain a €100 bil­lion ($130 bil­lion) aid pack­age for its ail­ing banks this sum­mer, but con­cern is grow­ing that Spain might need a more com­pre­hen­sive res­cue pack­age to shore up its pub­lic finances. A key test of Madrid’s finan­cial sys­tem will come on Fri­day, when the coun­try unveils results of the lat­est “stress tests” of its banks, a process that will deter­mine how much new cap­i­tal they need.

    Ger­man banks have largely hedged or dis­posed of their hold­ings of Span­ish gov­ern­ment debt, but they remain heav­ily invested in Span­ish finan­cial insti­tu­tions, com­mer­cial real estate and in other busi­nesses hit by the crisis.

    Con­cerns that Span­ish assets would be severely impaired if the country’s cri­sis wors­ens con­tributed to Moody’s Investors Service’s recent deci­sion to change its out­look on Ger­many to “neg­a­tive” from “sta­ble.” Moody’s, in its analy­sis, high­lighted the vul­ner­a­bil­ity of Germany’s bank­ing sec­tor to a wors­en­ing euro cri­sis and warned that those risks could cost the coun­try its prized triple-A credit rating.

    “The Ger­man banks’ siz­able expo­sures to the most stressed euro-area coun­tries, par­tic­u­larly to Italy and Spain, together with their lim­ited loss-absorption capac­ity and struc­turally weak earn­ings, make them vul­ner­a­ble to a fur­ther deep­en­ing of the cri­sis,” Moody’s wrote.

    One of the biggest expo­sures Ger­man banks have to Spain is through cov­ered bonds, long a favorite fundrais­ing tool of Span­ish banks. Such bonds are backed by col­lat­eral, usu­ally res­i­den­tial mort­gages, and are gen­er­ally con­sid­ered low risk because if a bank defaults on the loan, the cred­i­tor receives the col­lat­eral. In Spain’s case, how­ever, the steep decline in the real-estate mar­ket means that the col­lat­eral would be worth less, likely leav­ing the lender with a loss.

    Germany’s trou­bled public-sector lenders, known as Lan­des­banks, are par­tic­u­larly exposed to Span­ish cov­ered bonds and senior bank notes, accord­ing to analysts.

    Lan­des­bank Baden-Württemberg, known as LBBW, had a total expo­sure to Spain of €5.2 bil­lion in June, with nearly a quar­ter of that in expo­sure to finan­cial insti­tu­tions. Bay­ernLB reported an expo­sure of €4.9 bil­lion at year-end, and NordLB had an expo­sure of €3.6 billion.

    Bay­ernLB said it reduced its expo­sure to the Span­ish bank­ing sec­tor by nearly €1 bil­lion in the first half to €1.7 bil­lion, in part through large repay­ments. A spokesman for NordLB said the bank is work­ing to decrease its expo­sure to Spain. Spokes­men from the banks declined to com­ment further.

    Lan­des­banks rushed in and invested heav­ily in Euro­pean bonds issued by var­i­ous coun­tries and banks—along with mortgage-backed secu­ri­ties and other risky assets—in the early 2000s as their access to extremely cheap fund­ing through state guar­an­tees was phased out by the Euro­pean Union.

    Dur­ing that same period, the vol­ume of out­stand­ing jumbo cov­ered bonds from Spain, known as cedu­las, increased dras­ti­cally, more than dou­bling from €61 bil­lion in 2003 to €155 bil­lion in 2005, accord­ing to data from the Euro­pean Cov­ered Bond Council.

    ...

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 27, 2012, 8:08 am
  8. How inspi­ra­tional:

    Bloomberg
    Merkel Emu­lates Kohl Ger­man Unity Turn­ing Euro Cri­sis Into Votes
    By Tony Czuczka and Leon Man­gasar­ian — Oct 3, 2012 3:00 AM CT

    Three days before East and West Ger­many reunited in 1990, Angela Merkel made an acquain­tance that was to put her on the path to power.

    An East Ger­man sci­en­tist pro­pelled into pol­i­tics by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the com­mu­nist regime’s col­lapse, Merkel wan­gled an audi­ence with Hel­mut Kohl at a party event in Ham­burg. Within four months, Kohl had rid­den Ger­man reuni­fi­ca­tion to a land­slide third elec­tion vic­tory and Merkel secured a post in his Cabinet.

    Just as Kohl knew what Ger­mans on both sides of the bor­der wanted when they united 22 years ago today, Merkel is tuned in to vot­ers who balk at pay­ing the price of the united Europe Kohl brought about. While her peers in France, Italy and Spain have been removed in the three years since the debt cri­sis emerged in Greece, Merkel’s abil­ity to chan­nel domes­tic pub­lic opin­ion paired with a still-expanding econ­omy led polling com­pany Forsa to con­clude that she looks unbeat­able before 2013 elections.

    “The cri­sis makes peo­ple rally behind Merkel,” Gerd Languth, a his­to­rian and pro­fes­sor of pol­i­tics at the Uni­ver­sity of Bonn whose 2005 biog­ra­phy of the chan­cel­lor doc­u­ments her meet­ing with Kohl, said by phone. “Peo­ple see her as being on top of the issues and the only one who can solve the problems.”

    ...

    Steinbrueck’s Chal­lenge

    Merkel’s edge over three oppo­si­tion lead­ers is now so wide in a Forsa poll that she “appears unbeat­able” a year from the elec­tion, Stern mag­a­zine said Sept. 19. Peer Stein­brueck, Merkel’s first-term finance min­is­ter who was nom­i­nated on Oct. 1 as her main chal­lenger, trails her approval rat­ing by 22 per­cent­age points. She is Germany’s most pop­u­lar politi­cian and her approval rat­ing is hov­er­ing near the high­est since Novem­ber 2009, a sep­a­rate FG Wahlen poll released Sept. 28 showed.

    The chan­cel­lor hasn’t offered her polit­i­cal foes much space to land blows as she preaches bud­get cuts for the euro area, refuses to under­write the region’s debt with Ger­man eco­nomic might and barely acknowl­edges anti-austerity protests from Greece to Spain. Instead she tells weaker euro coun­tries there’s no pros­per­ity with­out pain.

    “We remain true to our phi­los­o­phy of no help with­out some­thing in return,” she said in Brus­sels in June. That fol­lowed an all-night Euro­pean Union sum­mit at which Merkel fended off pres­sure from Italy and Spain for direct bank bailouts and government-backed buy­ing of sov­er­eign bonds.

    ...

    These are really just a minor quib­bles with Angela regard­ing her phi­los­o­phy of only offer­ing help in exchange for some­thing else: that might actu­ally be closer to ‘barter’ than ‘help’. Of course, the ‘thing’ the helper might be ask­ing for could sim­ply be that the indi­vid­ual help them­selves. But when this philosophy’s pre­scribed form of self-improvement comes in the form of the recip­i­ent actively destroy­ing their future skills and eco­nomic capac­ity and there’s no seri­ous rea­son to believe this kind of ‘help’ will actu­ally be help­ful, it’s also kind of a shitty philosophy.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 3, 2012, 8:28 am
  9. In case you were ever curi­ous about what a bad actor try­ing to emote reverse Stock­holm Syn­drome might look like, Angela just gave us an idea.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 9, 2012, 1:47 pm
  10. Moody’s just warned on the con­tin­ued weak­ness in the Ger­man bank­ing sec­tor. It turns out that all those real estate loans to Spain and Italy are still threat­en­ing to dec­i­mate the Ger­man bank­ing sec­tor should those banks incur any major “unfore­seen” losses. It’s not new news, but it’s still extremely rel­e­vant:

    NY Times
    Moody’s Warns of Weak­ness in Ger­man Bank­ing Sec­tor
    By JACK EWING
    Pub­lished: Octo­ber 19, 2012

    FRANKFURT — The debt rat­ings agency Moody’s Investors Ser­vice pro­vided a reminder Fri­day that the vaunted Ger­man econ­omy has a major weak­ness: its bank­ing system.

    In a report, Moody’s warned that Ger­man banks suf­fer from mea­ger prof­its, ris­ing risk and insuf­fi­cient reserves to absorb losses. The rat­ing agency reaf­firmed the neg­a­tive out­look it has assigned to Ger­man banks since 2008.

    The poor state of Ger­man banks seems sur­pris­ing con­sid­er­ing that the country’s econ­omy has held up fairly well to the euro zone cri­sis. In addi­tion, Ger­man banks ben­e­fit from the country’s sta­tus as a haven from the tur­moil and are able to bor­row money at much lower rates than coun­ter­parts in other Euro­pean coun­tries. There is no real estate bub­ble and house­holds are not over-indebted.

    Ger­man banks did, how­ever, invest heav­ily in coun­tries like Spain and Italy before the cri­sis, because they could earn more prof­its there than at home. Four years after the finan­cial cri­sis began, they remain exposed to prob­lems in those coun­tries, Moody’s said.

    In addi­tion, Moody’s said, Ger­many still has too many banks in rela­tion to the size of the coun­try. The over­sup­ply pushes down lend­ing rates and profits.

    “Intense com­pe­ti­tion and low inter­est rates are caus­ing mar­gin pres­sure that will likely fur­ther erode already-weak bank rev­enues and prof­its,” Moody’s said in a state­ment early Friday.

    The com­bi­na­tion of low prof­its and high lever­age “will make it dif­fi­cult for many Ger­man banks to cope with major (unfore­seen) losses,” Moody’s said.

    The report comes after Euro­pean lead­ers meet­ing in Brus­sels until early Fri­day agreed on leg­is­la­tion that will con­cen­trate bank­ing super­vi­sion at the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank, a mea­sure aimed at pre­vent­ing national reg­u­la­tors from favor­ing their own banks. Weak reg­u­la­tion is blamed on prob­lems in Span­ish banks. But the lead­ers were vague on when the new reg­u­la­tory regime will take shape, appar­ently in def­er­ence to Ger­man polit­i­cal sensitivities.

    Ger­man lead­ers have resisted giv­ing up super­vi­sory con­trol of smaller and mid-sized banks, which are often owned by states or munic­i­pal­i­ties and are a for­mi­da­ble lobby in Berlin.

    ...

    This report once again reminds us all that the euro­zone cri­sis was NOT at all due to a hous­ing bub­ble fueled by Ger­man banks that exploded in a highly fore­see­able man­ner that lenders should have been fully aware of when mak­ing the loans. Instead, it was was pri­mar­ily due to overly pro­tec­tive labor laws. Yeah, that’s the ticket.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 19, 2012, 9:27 am
  11. The Bun­des­bank called, it wants its gold back:

    Jan. 15, 2013, 10:40 a.m. EST
    Ger­many wants its gold back; plat­inum pops
    Feb­ru­ary gold rises $11, helped in part by ris­ing Japan infla­tion outlook

    By Bar­bara Kollmeyer and Sarah Turner, MarketWatch

    MADRID (Mar­ket­Watch) — Good­bye, Big Apple. Adieu, Paris. It seems the Bun­des­bank could finally be ready to bow to some long­stand­ing pub­lic pres­sure and bring its for­eign gold reserves home.

    Germany’s Han­deslblatt news­pa­per claimed Mon­day night that the Bun­des­bank has devel­oped a new strat­egy that involves fewer gold bars flung afar. It seems the orig­i­nal rea­son for hold­ing its gold at the New York Fed­eral Reserve and other cen­tral banks — in places for decades as a mea­sure of secu­rity — no longer holds up. The cen­tral bank’s press office said a news con­fer­ence is planned for Wednes­day morn­ing, and the topic will be gold reserves.

    The rela­tion­ship between a cen­tral bank and its gold are closely watched by gold investors, since cen­tral banks hold so much of the world’s gold. Feb­ru­ary gold GCG3 +0.90% rose $10.20, or 0.6%, to $1,680 an ounce on Tues­day, helped in part by stronger gold inter­est in Japan and expec­ta­tions of a ris­ing infla­tion out­look from the Bank of Japan. Gold has tra­di­tion­ally been used as a hedge against infla­tion, so signs of higher infla­tion tend to work in the metal’s favor.

    ...

    Thorsten Polleit, Frankfurt-based chief econ­o­mist at Degussa, a precious-metals firm, said the pub­lic has been long demand­ing an audit of the Ger­man gold reserves and repa­tri­a­tion of those reserves. Some fuel was thrown on that fire in the last year by the finan­cial crisis.

    “Peo­ple have got­ten a sense of how bad things could become and gold is the ulti­mate means of pay­ment. The euro won’t last for­ever, [and] gold, for var­i­ous rea­sons, is the anchor,” said Polleit.

    Polleit said that the Bun­des­bank hasn’t had those world­wide reserves audited down to the last bar for decades, maybe never, much to the unhap­pi­ness of the gen­eral pub­lic. So in a sense, it may be a bit of a mys­tery just what is in the vaults of the New York Fed­eral Reserve, which holds a 45% chunk of Germany’s gold reserves. The Bank of Eng­land and the Bank of France hold 13% and 11% each. The Bun­des­bank itself holds 31% of those reserves.

    By coun­try, Ger­many has the largest gold hold­ings behind the U.S.

    “In recent years it’s been quite pop­u­lar to swap gold stocks for hold­ing gov­ern­ment bonds. ... There’s no exact data but some fear gold could have been lent out. It might still be there in phys­i­cal terms but its kind of hard to decide who is the actual owner,” said Polleit. He said the Bun­des­bank has said some bars might have been checked, but not the total stock. Read what the Bun­des­bank had to say about audit­ing last October

    He said the Bun­des­bank has always tried to play this whole gold reserves issue down, but now they may be either poised to move more reserves out of for­eign coun­tries, or come com­pletely clean about all of those reserves.

    Still, Polleit isn’t expect­ing some “aha” moment from the Bun­des­bank to have any effect on phys­i­cal prices. He expects gold will hit $2,070 an ounce this year on the view that gov­ern­ments are print­ing ever great amounts of money.

    Zero­Hedge finan­cial blog took a grim view of any move by the Bun­des­bank to take its gold out of New York. Such a deci­sion would be a sign that trust between cen­tral banks is now ending.

    While it’s “one thing for a ‘crazy, lunatic’ dic­ta­tor such as Hugo Chavez to pull his gold out of the Bank of Eng­land, it is some­thing entirely dif­fer­ent, and far less dis­mis­si­ble, when the bank with the sec­ond most offi­cial gold reserves in the world pro­ceeds to for­mally pull some of its gold from the bank with the most,” said Zero­Hedge. Read arti­cle on ZeroHedge

    ...

    Note that Pimco’s Bill Gross is also push­ing the idea that the cen­tral banks are los­ing trust with each other. And this doesn’t appear to be a poten­tial divi­sion between, say, the Bun­des­bank an the Fed­eral Reserve or Bank of Japan...it includes the Bank of France, Germany’s long-standing key part­ner in the euro­zone! This is cer­tainly a curi­ous move given the recent PR push of the idea that the euro­zone cri­sis is over.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | January 15, 2013, 10:09 am

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