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German Intelligence and the 9/11 Conspirators

[1]COMMENT: In past broadcasts, we’ve spoken about the profound German links to 9/11, as well as links between “fascist-descended” European intelligence services and the bad intelligence that lured the United States into the invasion of Iraq.

 In addition to the role of the fascist-linked SISMI service of Italy [2] (which generated the Niger Yellowcake disinformation), we’ve examined the BND-nurtured “Curveball” [3]–whose privileged status and relative inviolability are further illustrated by a Danish TV segment linked at the Germany Watch article linked below.

Worth bearing in mind as well is a meeting that took place in the Spring of 2002 in Mt. Pellerin in Switzerland, in which prominent European fascists met with Bank al Taqwa’s Achmed Huber and an unnamed American far-right extremist. (This account is carried in several linked posts.)

Given the damage that the Iraq war did to the United States at many levels, politically, economically, diplomatically, we have speculated about the meeting and its possible connections to Iraq War intelligence. We’ve noted in the past that luring the U.S. into Iraq took all the guile of placing a jar of honey in front of a marauding bear.

Long term, the goals of the Underground Reich have been advanced by that conflict. Other posts on [4]Germany Watch [4] analyzes the long-term German strategic outlines for global domination, as articulated early in the last century [5]. Evaluate those goals against the background of the Iraq War. 

Recall that, as discussed in FTR #395 [6], German intelligence and law enforcement had Mohammed Atta’s Hamburg cell  ujnder surveillance by August of 1998, and yet took no action.

A video accessed by Germany Watch states that the chief of the Hamburg police at the time was promoted to head of the BND!

Relying on the seminal work of Daniel Hopsicker, we saw in FTR #456 [7], among other programs,  that Atta entered the United States courtesy of the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft, and was associated with Germans, Austrians and Swiss in South Florida.

“WMD and Germany’s Dirty Secret”; Germany Watch; 9/7/2011. [8]

EXCERPT: . . . The 9/11 perpetrators were known as the “Hamburg Cell”. This video mentions the chief of Hamburg Police at the time of 9/11, later became the head of the BND. . . .

. . . . One of the main people supplying ‘info’ to the propagandists pushing the “9/11 was an inside job” view is Andreas von Bülow , linked with German Intelligence, and actively providing the disinformation to conspiracy theorists, to paint the conspirators to be feared as their own (“Zionist Occupied”) democracies. Subversion.

Note that the NWO/911/WMD conspiracy theories never talk about Germany. . . .

“German Secret Service ‘Failed to Act on Terrorist Warnings'” by Toby Helm; The Telegraph [UK]; 11/24/2001. [9]

EXCERPT: . . . . The information about the intelligence failure, always denied by German intelligence, comes from a source on a parliamentary committee that oversees the work of the Hamburg state secret service.

The source said it would be “absolutely right” to say that the intelligence agency had known about the flat before September 11.

The revelation adds to a growing volume of evidence suggesting that the German intelligence services were much closer to the potential terrorists in Hamburg before September 11 than they have wanted to admit.

Since the attacks on New York and Washington, the German authorities have maintained that members of the Hamburg group were just students who they had no reason to suspect because they led unremarkable lives, typical of terrorist “sleepers”.

“They had completely inconspicuous lives. Nothing they did gave us cause to be suspicious,” said a senior German investigator. They also claimed that they had never been directed towards 54 Marienstrasse.

However, this defence is looking less credible by the day. The Telegraph has established that a committee of MPs with responsibility for intelligence matters in Hamburg met on Sept 17 to discuss the implications of the attack.

According to a source who was there, MPs were told that the Hamburg state intelligence service had been asked by the Federal intelligence services more than a year earlier to observe 54 Marienstrasse.

The source, who did not want to be named, said the intelligence services did not react and that no evidence was ever gathered from the flat. . . .

“Ger­mans Were Track­ing Sept. 11 Con­spir­a­tors as Early as 1998, Doc­u­ments Dis­close” by Desmond But­ler; New York Times; 1/18/2003; p. A10. [10]

EXCERPT: . . . . Three years before the Sept. 11 attacks, Germany’s domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice was track­ing promi­nent mem­bers of the Ham­burg ter­ror­ist cell that planned and exe­cuted the air­craft hijack­ings, accord­ing to newly obtained doc­u­ments. The doc­u­ments, includ­ing intel­li­gence reports, sur­veil­lance logs and tran­scripts of inter­cepted tele­phone calls, appear to con­tra­dict pub­lic claims by the Ger­man author­i­ties that they knew lit­tle about the mem­bers of the Ham­burg cell before the attacks.

As early as 1998, the records show, the Ger­mans mon­i­tored a meet­ing between men sus­pected of plot­ting the attacks. The sur­veil­lance would lead a year later to the Ham­burg apart­ment where Mohamed Atta and other main plot­ters were liv­ing while attend­ing uni­ver­si­ties. While the records do not indi­cate that author­i­ties heard any men­tion of a spe­cific plan, they depict a sur­veil­lance mis­sion exten­sive enough to raise anew the polit­i­cally sen­si­tive ques­tion of whether the Ger­mans missed a chance to dis­rupt the cell dur­ing the ini­tial stages of plan­ning the attacks. Some Amer­i­can inves­ti­ga­tors and offi­cials have argued that the Ger­mans in the past missed evi­dence that could have stopped the plot. The Ger­mans have main­tained stead­fastly that the infor­ma­tion they had was too scanty to war­rant seri­ous alarm, and that their police and intel­li­gence agen­cies were not focused on Al Qaeda at the time.
The doc­u­ments come from the files of var­i­ous Ger­man police and intel­li­gence agen­cies. They detail how close an inves­ti­ga­tion of Qaeda con­tacts in Ham­burg begun in 1997 by the Con­sti­tu­tional Pro­tec­tion Agency, Germany’s domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice, came to the main cell mem­bers. They were pro­vided to The New York Times by some­one with offi­cial access to the files of the con­tin­u­ing inves­ti­ga­tion into the events lead­ing to the Sept. 11 attacks. When the doc­u­ments were described to offi­cials at the Ger­man Inte­rior Min­istry and the con­sti­tu­tional pro­tec­tion police, they declined to answer any ques­tions about them but did not dis­pute their authenticity . . .

Mr. Motas­sadeq admit­ted that he knew Mr. Atta and other plot­ters and had attended Qaeda train­ing camps in Afghanistan. He has main­tained in trial tes­ti­mony that he did not know that his friends were plan­ning to attack the United States. No evi­dence has been pre­sented at his three-month trial that would reveal when the police first opened an inquiry into Mr. Motas­sadeq. But the intel­li­gence agency doc­u­ments show that by August 1998 he was under sur­veil­lance and that the trail soon led to most of the main par­tic­i­pants in the later attacks.

Accord­ing to the doc­u­ments, the sur­veil­lance was in place on Aug. 29, 1998, when Mr. Motas­sadeq and Mohamed Hay­dar Zam­mar, who had already been iden­ti­fied by police as a sus­pected extrem­ist, met at the Ham­burg home of Said Bahaji. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s] The police mon­i­tored sev­eral other meet­ings between the men in the months that fol­lowed, the doc­u­ments said. The record of the meet­ing shows that police had iden­ti­fied Mr. Bahaji, another per­son sus­pected of being a cell mem­ber and believed to have been inti­mately involved in the plan­ning and logis­tics of the plot, who fled to Pak­istan days before the attacks. Mr. Bahaji later moved in with Mr. Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the now-infamous apart­ment at 54 Marien­strasse in the Har­burg sec­tion of Hamburg. . . .