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German Intelligence and the 9/11 Conspirators

[1]COMMENT: In past broad­casts, we’ve spo­ken about the pro­found Ger­man links to 9/11, as well as links between “fas­cist-descend­ed” Euro­pean intel­li­gence ser­vices and the bad intel­li­gence that lured the Unit­ed States into the inva­sion of Iraq.

 In addi­tion to the role of the fas­cist-linked SISMI ser­vice of Italy [2] (which gen­er­at­ed the Niger Yel­low­cake dis­in­for­ma­tion), we’ve exam­ined the BND-nur­tured “Curve­ball” [3]–whose priv­i­leged sta­tus and rel­a­tive invi­o­la­bil­i­ty are fur­ther illus­trat­ed by a Dan­ish TV seg­ment linked at the Ger­many Watch arti­cle linked below.

Worth bear­ing in mind as well is a meet­ing that took place in the Spring of 2002 in Mt. Pel­lerin in Switzer­land, in which promi­nent Euro­pean fas­cists met with Bank al Taqwa’s Achmed Huber and an unnamed Amer­i­can far-right extrem­ist. (This account is car­ried in sev­er­al linked posts.)

Giv­en the dam­age that the Iraq war did to the Unit­ed States at many lev­els, polit­i­cal­ly, eco­nom­i­cal­ly, diplo­mat­i­cal­ly, we have spec­u­lat­ed about the meet­ing and its pos­si­ble con­nec­tions to Iraq War intel­li­gence. We’ve not­ed in the past that lur­ing the U.S. into Iraq took all the guile of plac­ing a jar of hon­ey in front of a maraud­ing bear.

Long term, the goals of the Under­ground Reich have been advanced by that con­flict. Oth­er posts on [4]Ger­many Watch [4] ana­lyzes the long-term Ger­man strate­gic out­lines for glob­al dom­i­na­tion, as artic­u­lat­ed ear­ly in the last cen­tu­ry [5]. Eval­u­ate those goals against the back­ground of the Iraq War. 

Recall that, as dis­cussed in FTR #395 [6], Ger­man intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment had Mohammed Atta’s Ham­burg cell  ujn­der sur­veil­lance by August of 1998, and yet took no action.

A video accessed by Ger­many Watch states that the chief of the Ham­burg police at the time was pro­mot­ed to head of the BND!

Rely­ing on the sem­i­nal work of Daniel Hop­sick­er, we saw in FTR #456 [7], among oth­er pro­grams,  that Atta entered the Unit­ed States cour­tesy of the Carl Duis­berg Gesellschaft, and was asso­ci­at­ed with Ger­mans, Aus­tri­ans and Swiss in South Flori­da.

“WMD and Ger­many’s Dirty Secret”; Ger­many Watch; 9/7/2011. [8]

EXCERPT: . . . The 9/11 per­pe­tra­tors were known as the “Ham­burg Cell”. This video men­tions the chief of Ham­burg Police at the time of 9/11, lat­er became the head of the BND. . . .

. . . . One of the main peo­ple sup­ply­ing ‘info’ to the pro­pa­gan­dists push­ing the “9/11 was an inside job” view is Andreas von Bülow , linked with Ger­man Intel­li­gence, and active­ly pro­vid­ing the dis­in­for­ma­tion to con­spir­a­cy the­o­rists, to paint the con­spir­a­tors to be feared as their own (“Zion­ist Occu­pied”) democ­ra­cies. Sub­ver­sion.

Note that the NWO/911/WMD con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries nev­er talk about Ger­many. . . .

“Ger­man Secret Ser­vice ‘Failed to Act on Ter­ror­ist Warn­ings’ ” by Toby Helm; The Tele­graph [UK]; 11/24/2001. [9]

EXCERPT: . . . . The infor­ma­tion about the intel­li­gence fail­ure, always denied by Ger­man intel­li­gence, comes from a source on a par­lia­men­tary com­mit­tee that over­sees the work of the Ham­burg state secret ser­vice.

The source said it would be “absolute­ly right” to say that the intel­li­gence agency had known about the flat before Sep­tem­ber 11.

The rev­e­la­tion adds to a grow­ing vol­ume of evi­dence sug­gest­ing that the Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vices were much clos­er to the poten­tial ter­ror­ists in Ham­burg before Sep­tem­ber 11 than they have want­ed to admit.

Since the attacks on New York and Wash­ing­ton, the Ger­man author­i­ties have main­tained that mem­bers of the Ham­burg group were just stu­dents who they had no rea­son to sus­pect because they led unre­mark­able lives, typ­i­cal of ter­ror­ist “sleep­ers”.

“They had com­plete­ly incon­spic­u­ous lives. Noth­ing they did gave us cause to be sus­pi­cious,” said a senior Ger­man inves­ti­ga­tor. They also claimed that they had nev­er been direct­ed towards 54 Marien­strasse.

How­ev­er, this defence is look­ing less cred­i­ble by the day. The Tele­graph has estab­lished that a com­mit­tee of MPs with respon­si­bil­i­ty for intel­li­gence mat­ters in Ham­burg met on Sept 17 to dis­cuss the impli­ca­tions of the attack.

Accord­ing to a source who was there, MPs were told that the Ham­burg state intel­li­gence ser­vice had been asked by the Fed­er­al intel­li­gence ser­vices more than a year ear­li­er to observe 54 Marien­strasse.

The source, who did not want to be named, said the intel­li­gence ser­vices did not react and that no evi­dence was ever gath­ered from the flat. . . .

“Ger­mans Were Track­ing Sept. 11 Con­spir­a­tors as Ear­ly as 1998, Doc­u­ments Dis­close” by Desmond But­ler; New York Times; 1/18/2003; p. A10. [10]

EXCERPT: . . . . Three years before the Sept. 11 attacks, Germany’s domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice was track­ing promi­nent mem­bers of the Ham­burg ter­ror­ist cell that planned and exe­cuted the air­craft hijack­ings, accord­ing to new­ly obtained doc­u­ments. The doc­u­ments, includ­ing intel­li­gence reports, sur­veil­lance logs and tran­scripts of inter­cepted tele­phone calls, appear to con­tra­dict pub­lic claims by the Ger­man author­i­ties that they knew lit­tle about the mem­bers of the Ham­burg cell before the attacks.

As ear­ly as 1998, the records show, the Ger­mans mon­i­tored a meet­ing between men sus­pected of plot­ting the attacks. The sur­veil­lance would lead a year lat­er to the Ham­burg apart­ment where Mohamed Atta and oth­er main plot­ters were liv­ing while attend­ing uni­ver­si­ties. While the records do not indi­cate that author­i­ties heard any men­tion of a spe­cific plan, they depict a sur­veil­lance mis­sion exten­sive enough to raise anew the polit­i­cally sen­si­tive ques­tion of whether the Ger­mans missed a chance to dis­rupt the cell dur­ing the ini­tial stages of plan­ning the attacks. Some Amer­i­can inves­ti­ga­tors and offi­cials have argued that the Ger­mans in the past missed evi­dence that could have stopped the plot. The Ger­mans have main­tained stead­fastly that the infor­ma­tion they had was too scanty to war­rant seri­ous alarm, and that their police and intel­li­gence agen­cies were not focused on Al Qae­da at the time.
The doc­u­ments come from the files of var­i­ous Ger­man police and intel­li­gence agen­cies. They detail how close an inves­ti­ga­tion of Qae­da con­tacts in Ham­burg begun in 1997 by the Con­sti­tu­tional Pro­tec­tion Agency, Germany’s domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice, came to the main cell mem­bers. They were pro­vided to The New York Times by some­one with offi­cial access to the files of the con­tin­u­ing inves­ti­ga­tion into the events lead­ing to the Sept. 11 attacks. When the doc­u­ments were described to offi­cials at the Ger­man Inte­rior Min­istry and the con­sti­tu­tional pro­tec­tion police, they declined to answer any ques­tions about them but did not dis­pute their authen­tic­i­ty . . .

Mr. Motas­sadeq admit­ted that he knew Mr. Atta and oth­er plot­ters and had attend­ed Qae­da train­ing camps in Afghanistan. He has main­tained in tri­al tes­ti­mony that he did not know that his friends were plan­ning to attack the Unit­ed States. No evi­dence has been pre­sented at his three-month tri­al that would reveal when the police first opened an inquiry into Mr. Motas­sadeq. But the intel­li­gence agency doc­u­ments show that by August 1998 he was under sur­veil­lance and that the trail soon led to most of the main par­tic­i­pants in the lat­er attacks.

Accord­ing to the doc­u­ments, the sur­veil­lance was in place on Aug. 29, 1998, when Mr. Motas­sadeq and Mohamed Hay­dar Zam­mar, who had already been iden­ti­fied by police as a sus­pected extrem­ist, met at the Ham­burg home of Said Baha­ji. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s] The police mon­i­tored sev­eral oth­er meet­ings between the men in the months that fol­lowed, the doc­u­ments said. The record of the meet­ing shows that police had iden­ti­fied Mr. Baha­ji, anoth­er per­son sus­pected of being a cell mem­ber and believed to have been inti­mately involved in the plan­ning and logis­tics of the plot, who fled to Pak­istan days before the attacks. Mr. Baha­ji lat­er moved in with Mr. Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the now-infa­mous apart­ment at 54 Marien­strasse in the Har­burg sec­tion of Ham­burg. . . .