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Is the Underground Reich Beginning a Terrorist and Economic World War III against the U.S. and Britain?

[1]

Mar­tin Bor­mann (right) with Himm­ler

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. [2] (The flash dri­ve includes the anti-fas­cist books avail­able on this site.)

This post has been updat­ed since it was first cre­at­ed.

COMMENT: A recent post [3] by “Pter­rafractyl” high­lights some con­sum­mate­ly impor­tant con­sid­er­a­tions.

Brazil and Ger­many have been part­ner­ing in what might be a joint offen­sive against the U.S. and U.K.

As one reads this post and Pter­rafractyl’s arti­cle, remem­ber that the Three Bor­ders [4] area of Brazil is a hotbed of over­lap­ping crim­i­nal, Nazi and Islamist ter­ror­ist activ­i­ty. 

Do not for­get that Brazil is where Glenn Green­wald is hang­ing his hat these days.

The ini­tia­tives being under­tak­en by Ger­many and Brazil–ably and exhaus­tive­ly detailed by Pter­rafractyl in the above post–might very well embody an attempt at sup­plant­i­ng the U.S. as an inter­net giant. This would be a con­sum­mate ele­ment of eco­nom­ic war­fare against the Unit­ed States.

In addi­tion, pro­vid­ing encrypt­ed com­mu­ni­ca­tion capa­bil­i­ty that NSA and GCHQ could­n’t deci­pher would per­mit the fur­ther­ing of crim­i­nal activ­i­ty and ter­ror­ist [5] war­fare to an almost unlim­it­ed extent.

The Four Horse­men in the Pter­rafractyl post refers to ter­ror­ist and crim­i­nal activ­i­ty.

Some thoughts–paraphrasing Pter­rafractyl:

“The social impli­ca­tions of main­stream strong encryp­tion are such that there’s just no way any gov­ern­ment would encour­age the broad use of encryp­tion stan­dards that it can’t decrypt itself. And yet Ger­many and Brazil are now both talk­ing about ring-fenc­ing the inter­net to pre­vent col­lec­tion of encrypt­ed traf­fic (which the NSA can decrypt). They’re also talk­ing about cre­at­ing their own indus­tries and encryp­tion stan­dards.

Ger­many and Brazil already have indus­tries that cre­ate prod­ucts they can’t decrypt.  That’s for select clien­tele that has the mon­ey to invest in the kind of secu­ri­ty that that Brazil­ian banker had. (see below.) They just aren’t going to main­stream strong­ly-encrypt­ed web ser­vices that they can’t even decrypt them­selves.  The un-decryptible indus­tries exists in the EU and US and is grow­ing.

So the top­ic of encryp­tion and the Cypher­punk’s own acknowl­edge­ment that strong encryp­tion real­ly does invite in the Four Horse­men of the Infopoca­lypse (and we should just accept that ) is going to be impor­tant because there is just no way in Hell Ger­many or Brazil are actu­al­ly going to cre­ate indus­tries that sell prod­ucts that they, them­selves, can’t decrypt. And all indi­ca­tions so far point towards them try­ing to jump-start their IT sec­tors by sell­ing “secure” prod­ucts that are obvi­ous­ly going to be hack­able by the Ger­many and Brazil­ian IT sec­tor.

This is going to be a HUGE top­ic going out, because if a mar­ket like the EU changes its encryp­tion stan­dards, the whole IT indus­try frag­ments and needs to decide which stan­dards to adopt or pay the cost of adopt­ing both.

 More like­ly is a big fight over inter­na­tion­al stan­dards at the upcom­ing con­fer­ence in Brazil in April.  New encryp­tion stan­dards would­n’t be imple­ment­ed imme­di­ate­ly and be resolved soon because of the mon­ey at stake.  It would be so destruc­tive that it could­n’t hap­pen.  Brazil and Ger­many are jock­ey­ing for play­ing key posi­tions in for­mu­lat­ing the next-gen­er­a­tion of  inter­na­tion­al dig­i­tal stan­dards.”

We also call atten­tion to a very impor­tant arti­cle [6] from Al Jazeera, which sheds fur­ther light on the pos­si­bil­i­ties of a Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work [7] crim­i­nal, eco­nom­ic and ter­ror offen­sive in Latin Amer­i­ca. Note that Paraguay (along with Argenti­na and Brazil) is one of the “Three Bor­ders.”

Again, we present a para­phras­ing of Pter­rafractyl’s obser­va­tions in this regard:

“Brazil is sell­ing the “we won’t tap your cables that pass through our ter­ri­to­ry” pitch to Paraguay and Bolivia. Or, at least the arti­cle (which was writ­ten by some­one very sup­port­ive of Brazil’s plan), is imply­ing that the because the cables run­ning Bolivi­a’s and Paraguay’s traf­fic to the coasts will be in Brazil’s sov­er­eign ter­ri­to­ry ‘it’s much less like­ly that they will be tapped than their under­sea equi­l­va­lents’. The unspo­ken assump­tion is that Brazil would­n’t dream of tap­ping its neigh­bor’s cables. Who knows, maybe the pipes for Under­ground Reich’s cables real­ly will get hands off treat­ment!

The oth­er impli­ca­tion to that is that a lot of intra-South Amer­i­can traf­fic might be be travle­ing through Paraguay or Boli­vian in order to keep it in the con­ti­nent. It’ll be inter­est­ing to learn about who’s going to own those pipes!”

We also note that, in 2009, a Brazil­ian banker was found [8] with encrypt­ed files that were encrypt­ed in such a way as NO ONE could deci­pher them!

One won­ders how many oth­er bankers have unde­ci­pher­able encrypt­ed files, who they work for and what is on the files!

“On Inter­net, Brazil Is Beat­ing US at Its Own Game” by Bill Wood­cock; Al Jazeera; 9/20/2013. [6]

EXCERPT: ...The third and less doc­u­ment­ed area of devel­op­ment con­sists of pri­vate over­land fiber cable sys­tems link­ing Brazil to each of its South Amer­i­can neigh­bors. These fol­low a pat­tern sim­i­lar to Brazil­ian pri­vate-sec­tor invest­ment in under­sea cables but on a much small­er scale. This is par­tic­u­lar­ly impor­tant with regard to the land­locked coun­tries of Paraguay and Bolivia. With no inde­pen­dent access to the under­sea inter­na­tion­al cable sys­tems, they depend entire­ly on this form of tran­si­tive con­nec­tiv­i­ty through their coastal neigh­bors. Because these over­land cables will lie exclu­sive­ly with­in the sov­er­eign ter­ri­to­ries of their respec­tive users, it’s much less like­ly that they will be tapped than their under­sea equiv­a­lents. They are thus like­ly to pro­vide effec­tive­ly pri­vate com­mu­ni­ca­tion chan­nels between Brazil and its neigh­bor­ing coun­tries....

“Brazil­ian Banker’s Cryp­to Baf­fles FBI” by John Ley­den; The Reg­is­ter [UK]; 6/28/2013.  [8]

EXCERPT: Cryp­to­graph­ic locks guard­ing the secret files of a Brazil­ian banker sus­pect­ed of finan­cial crimes have defeat­ed law enforce­ment offi­cials.

Brazil­ian police seized five hard dri­ves when they raid­ed the Rio apart­ment of banker Daniel Dan­tas as part of Oper­a­tion Satya­gra­ha in July 2008. But sub­se­quent efforts to decrypt files held on the hard­ware using a vari­ety of dic­tio­nary-based attacks failed even after the South Amer­i­cans called in the assis­tance of the FBI.

The files were encrypt­ed using True­crypt and an unnamed algo­rithm, report­ed­ly based on the 256-bit AES stan­dard. In the UK, Dan­tas would be com­pelled to reveal his passphrase under threat of impris­on­ment, but no such law exists in Brazil.

The Brazil­ian Nation­al Insti­tute of Crim­i­nol­o­gy (INC) tried for five months to obtain access to the encrypt­ed data with­out suc­cess before turn­ing over the job to code-break­ers at the FBI in ear­ly 2009. US com­put­er spe­cial­ists also drew a blank even after 12 months of efforts to crack the code, Brazil’s Globo news­pa­per reports.

The case is an illus­tra­tion of how care in choos­ing secure (hard-to-guess) pass­words and apply­ing encryp­tion tech­niques to avoid leav­ing file frag­ments that could aid code break­ers are more impor­tant in main­tain­ing secu­ri­ty than the algo­rithm a code mak­er choos­es. In oth­er cas­es, law enforce­ment offi­cials have defeat­ed sus­pects’ use of encryp­tion because of weak cryp­to­graph­ic trade craft or poor pass­words, rather than inher­ent flaws in encryp­tion pack­ages.