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All’s Well that’s Orwell, Part 2–Yuschenko Uber Alles: The Ukrainian Ministry of Truth

Swoboda leader Oleh Tiahanybok salutes

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash drive that can be obtained here. (The flash drive includes the anti-fascist books avail­able on this site.)

COMMENT: The Orwellian aspects of the Ukrainian crisis could not be exaggerated and are explored at greater length in this post (and will be in upcoming programs as well.)

(Photo source, Global Research arti­cle.)

(We have done four pro­grams to date about the Ukrain­ian cri­sis: FTR #‘s 777778779780.)

In past programs and posts, we have noted that Victor Yuschenko’s term as president of the Ukraine–realized through the so-called Orange Revolution–featured the former Ykaterina Chumachenko as his wife. Formerly Ronald Reagan’s Deputy Director of Public Liaison, the former Ms. Chumachenko was a prominent member of the UCCA, the top OUN/B front organization in the United States. (For background on the OUN/B, the Ukrainian fascist template organization for Swoboda, see the For The Record programs noted above.)

We suspect that the former Ms. Chumachenko was the real power behind the throne. 

While president of the Ukraine, Yuschenko presided over a fundamental makeover of Ukrainian history and, through that, political ideology.

The dramatic and fundamental nature of this revisionism paved the way for the public positioning of the fascist Swoboda party as a viable, democratic entity. Swoboda is a primary element in the new Ukrainian government, dominating the military and judicial processes of that country.

PLEASE take time to examine the text excerpt below in detail. Note the bold-faced parts. Orwell made manifest.

Key points of Yuschenko’s ideological makeover of the Ukraine, which set up the “legitimacy” of Swoboda:

  • Yuschenko literally undertook to create a ministry of truth, in effect, designating the former KGB archives as the focal point to begin a fundamental political makeover of Ukrainian history and ideology.
  • Contrasting the OUN/B and its affiliated organizations as truthful and just, contrasted with “everything Soviet” as false and evil, Yuschenko succesfuly effected a wholesale revisionism of Ukrainian politics and history.
  • Yushchenko appointed the young activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) direc­tor of the SBU archives [the focal point of the successful revisionist effort–D.E.]. V’’iatrovych com­bined his posi­tion as government-appointed mem­ory man­ager with ultra-nationalist activism; he was simul­ta­ne­ously direc­tor of an OUN(b) front orga­ni­za­tion, the Cen­ter for the Study for the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment.
  • The revisionism cast the OUN/B as having fought the Nazis, a complete historical lie.
  • The alleged anti-Nazi activity of the OUN/B co-exists in a remarkable political landscape with adulation of the 14th Waffen SS Division (Galicia) and its allied formations. Even as OUN/B is portrayed as having saved Jews from the Holocaust, its activities in murdering them is celebrated.
  • Directly, explicitly and overtly evolved from the OUN/B, Swoboda retains all of the OUN/B’s fascism and bigotry, masked by nationalistic fervor.
  • The fundamentals of Swoboda’s politics and character can be gleaned from examining party leader Oleh Tiahnybok’s ideological adviser. “Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn (b. 1982), Tiahnybok’s adviser on ide­o­log­i­cal mat­ters, Svoboda’s top name in the elec­tion to the Lviv city coun­cil and its can­di­date for mayor in 2010, rep­re­sents a more rad­i­cal cur­rent in the move­ment. Proudly con­fess­ing him­self part of the fas­cist tra­di­tion, Mykhal’chyshyn rel­ishes the harsh­ness, extrem­ism and uncom­pro­mis­ing rad­i­cal­ism of his idols of the 1930s and 1940s.
  • In Canada, Tiahnybok was honored by veterans of the 14th Waffen SS Division. In the Ukraine, Swoboda held celebrations of the division, featuring and honoring veterans of the unit, returning the grace and favor deferred upon its leader.
  • Tiahnybok ideological adviser Mykhal’chyshyn openly embraces street violence as a fundamental tactic.
  • Tiahnybok ideological adviser Mykhal’chyshyn celebrates the Holocaust and supports Hamas.
  • Swoboda is affiliated with other European fascist parties, including the Swedish fascist milieu to which Pirate Bay/WikiLeaks benefactor Carl Lundstrom belongs.

“The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right: The Case of VO Svoboda,” by Per Anders Rudling;  Analyzing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text edited by Ruth Wodak and John E. Richardson;  Routledge [London and New York] 2013; pp. 228-255, more.

EXCERPT: . . . . . Swept to power by the Orange Revolution, the third president of Ukraine,Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), put in substantial efforts into the production of historical myths. He tasked a set of nationalistically minded historians to produce and disseminate an edifying national history as well as a new set of national heroes. . . . .

. . . . . The OUN wings disagreed on strategy and ideology but shared a commitment to the manufacture of a historical past based on victimization and heroism. The émigrés developed an entire literature that denied the OUN’s fascism, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, and its participation in atrocities, instead presenting the organization as composed of democrats and pluralists who had rescued Jews during the Holocaust. The diaspora narrative was contradictory, combining celebrations of the supposedly anti-Nazi resistance struggle of the OUN-UPA with celebrations of the Waffen SS Galizien, a Ukrainian collaborationist formation established by Heinrich Himmler in 1943 (Rudling, 2011a, 2011c, 2012a). Thus, Ukrainian Waffen SS veterans could celebrate the UPA as “anti-Nazi resistance fighters” while belonging to the same war veterans’ organizations (Bairak, 1978). Unlike their counterparts in some other post-Soviet states, Ukrainian “nationalizing” historians did not have to invent new nationalist myths but re-imported a narrative developed by the émigrés (Dietsch, 2006: 111–146; Rudling, 2011a: 751–753). . . . .


As president, Yushchenko initiated substantial government propaganda initiatives. In July 2005, he established an Institute of National Memory, assigned the archives of the former KGB (now the SBU, Sluzhba Bezpeki Ukrainy, the Ukrainian Security Service) formal propagandistic duties and supported the creation of a “Museum of Soviet Occupation” in Kyiv (Jilge, 2008: 174). Yushchenko appointed the young activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) director of the SBU archives. V’’iatrovych combined his position as government-appointed memory manager with ultra-nationalist activism; he was simultaneously director of an OUN(b) front organization, the Center for the Study for the Liberation Movement. State institutions disseminated a sanitized, edifyingly patriotic version of the history of the “Ukrainian national liberation movement,” the leaders of which were presented in iconographic form as heroic and saintly figures, martyrs of the nation (Rasevych, 2010; Rudling, 2011c: 26–33, 2012b).

Yushchenko’s mythmaking had two central components. The first was the presentation of the 1932–1933 famine as “the genocide of the Ukrainian nation,” a deliberate attempt to exterminate the Ukrainians which, his myth-makers claimed, resulted in the death of 10 million people in the republic.

The other component was a heroic cult of the OUN(b), the UPA and their leaders. The “memory managers” juxtaposed the genocidal Soviet rule withthe self-sacrificial heroism of the OUN-UPA, producing a teleological narrative of suffering (the famine) and resistance (the OUN-UPA) leading to redemption (independence, 1991). Curiously, Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians presented their instrumentalized use of history as “truth,” which they juxtaposed to “Soviet myths.” Wilfried Jilge, a historian at the University of Leipzig, writes that “[i]t takes place by means of discourse, rituals, and symbols and uses the past to provide legitimization and to mobilize the population for political purposes. . . . A reconstructed historical memory is created as ‘true memory’ and then contrasted with ‘false Soviet history’ ”(Jilge, 2007:104–105). Thus, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, SBU director under Yushchenko, described the task of his agency as being to disseminate “the historical truth of the past of the Ukrainian people,” to “liberate Ukrainian history from lies and falsifications and to work with truthful documents only” (Jilge, 2008:179). Ignoring the OUN’s antisemitism, denying its participation in anti- Jewish violence, and overlooking its fascist ideology, Nalyvaichenko and his agency presented the OUN as democrats, pluralists, even righteous rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust.

The hegemonic nationalist narrative is reflected also in academia, where the line between “legitimate” scholarship and ultra-nationalist propaganda often is blurred. Mainstream bookstores often carry Holocaust denial and antisemitic literature, some of which finds its way into the academic mainstream (Rudling, 2006). So too, for instance, can academic works on World War II by reputable historians integrate the works of Holocaust deniers and cite the former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke as a “expert” on the “Jewish Question.” . . . .

. . . . The culmination of Yushchenko’s Geschichtspolitik was his designation, a few days before leaving office, of Bandera as a hero of Ukraine. Again, there was little protest from intellectuals who identify themselves as liberals. . . . .

. . . . On June 30, 2011, the 70th anniversary of the German invasion and Stetsko’s “renewal of Ukrainian statehood” was re-enacted in Lviv as a popular festival, where parents with small children waved flags to re-enactors in SS uniforms. . . .

. . . . . Ironically, the presentation of the OUN as resistance fighters against Nazi Germany coexists with an elaborate cult of the Waffen SS Galizien (Rudling, 2012a). Lviv streets have been renamed after Nazi collaboratorslike Roman Shukhevych and Volodymyr Kubijovyc. In the Lviv city hall, Svoboda is currently working to have the Lviv airport renamed after Bandera. Svoboda deputy Iuryi Mykahl’chyshyn stated, “We should have the airport named after Stepan Bandera. I don’t want to point any fingers. . . . But we will have a Bandera airport, a Bandera stadium, and the entire city will be carrying Bandera’s name, because he is its most living symbol”(“U L’vovi budut’ stadion,” 2012). In the fall of 2011, Svoboda deputies in a municipality in the Lviv district renamed a street from the Soviet-era name Peace Street (Vulytsia Myru ) to instead carry the name of the Nachtigall Battalion, a Ukrainian nationalist formation involved in the mass murder of Jews in 1941, arguing that “ ‘Peace’ is a holdover from Soviet stereotypes”(“Vulytsiu myru,” 2011). . . .

. . . . Svoboda’s claims to the OUN legacy are based upon ideological continuity, as well as organization and political culture (Shekhovtsov, 2011b:13–14). Presenting Svoboda as the successor of Dontsov and the OUN, Tiahnybok regards Svoboda as “an Order-party which constitutes the true elite of the nation” (Tiahnybok, 2011). Like those of many other far-right movements, Svoboda’s official policy documents are relatively cautious and differ from its daily activities and internal jargon, which are much more radical and racist (Olszan´ski, 2011). Svoboda subscribes to the OUN tradition of national segregation and demands the re-introduction of the Soviet “nationality” category into Ukrainian passports. “We are not America, a mishmash of all sorts of people,” the Svoboda website states. “The Ukrainian needs to stay Ukrainian, the Pole—Polish, the Gagauz—Gagauz, the Uzbek—Uzbek” (“Hrafa ‘natsional’nost’v pasporti,” 2005). Svoboda’s ultra-nationalism is supplemented with more traditional “white racism” (Shekhovtsov, 2011b: 15). . . . .

. . . . Conspiracy theory is integral to Svoboda Weltanschauung, particularly conspiracies with anti-Semitic undertones. In August 2011, in an apparent attempt to distance themselves from the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, Svoboda claimed that he was a Jewish Mason (Redkolehiia chaso-pysu “Svoboda,” 2011). In September 2011, Svoboda activists mobilized from several parts of Ukraine to organize rallies against Hasidic pilgrims to Uman.

Following violent clashes, the police detained more than 50 Svoboda activists, armed with gas canisters, smoke bombs and catapults. The Cherkasy branch of Svoboda criticized the police for their alleged failure “to stop and avert aggression by Hasidic Jews to Ukrainians” (“Uman: Righ-twing activists detained,” 2011).Svoboda’s anti-Russian and anti-Jewish rhetoric is accompanied by an anti-Polish message. Svoboda maintains that Poland has played a negative historical role in Ukrainian lands. The party demands an official apology from Poland for five hundred years of Polonization, from the 15th to the 20th centuries, and indemnities for “the Polish terror and occupation of Ukrainian lands in the 20th century” (“Zaiava VO ‘Svoboda’ shchodoproiaviv ukrainofobii,” 2010). Focusing on divisive and sensitive issues, Svoboda provocatively denies any involvement of the Waffen SS Galizien in atrocities against the Polish minority in Galicia. For instance, on the site of Huta Pieniacka, Svoboda hasplaced a huge billboard denying the conclusion of both Polish and Ukrainian historical commissions that the fourth police regiment, which was later adjoined to the Waffen SS Galizien, burnt this Polish village and slaughtered most of its residents on February 28, 1944. . . .

. . . . Svoboda is a member of the so-called Alliance of European National Movements, a network which includes theBritish National Party, Nationaldemokraterna of Sweden, the Front National in France, Fiamma Tricolore in Italy, the Belgian National Front, and the Hungarian Jobbik (Umland, 2011). This seemingly unlikely cooperation is partly facilitated by a joint fascination with ethnic purity, inspired by Alain de Benoit, the ideologue of the French Nouvelle Droit. De Benoit fears the disappearance of pluralism and the reduction of all cultures into a world civilization and argues that each ethnos should be allowed to develop independently on its given territory, without the admixture of other cultures. Nationaldemokraterna, their Swedish sister party, advocates a form of ethnic segregation, which they refer to as “ethnopluralism” (Dahl, 1999: 68, 136).

Svoboda has opened an office in Toronto, which has been visited by several of its leading figures (“Diial’nist Kanads’koho predstavnytstva ‘Svo-body,’ ” 2009). In Canada, in May 2010, Tiahnybok received the golden cross “for his service to Ukraine” from the Brotherhood of the Veterans of the First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army, as the veterans of the Waffen SS Galizien call themselves (“Esesovtsy nagradil lideraukrainskikh natsionalistov,” 2010). Following the conviction and sentencing of the death camp guard John Demjanjuk to five years of jail for his role as an accessory to the murder of 27,900 people at the Sobibór death camp,Tiahnybok traveled to Germany and met up with Demjanjuk’s lawyer, Ulrich Busch, presenting the death camp guard as a hero, a victim of persecution, who is “fighting for truth” (“Oleh Tiahnybok iz dvodennym vizytomvidvidav Nimechynu,” 2010). 10

Tiahnybok’s heroization of the Waffen SS Galizien and other Nazi collaborators is accompanied by ideological claims that the OUN-UPA conducted an anti-Nazi resistance struggle against Hitler.

Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn (b. 1982), Tiahnybok’s adviser on ideological matters, Svoboda’s top name in the election to the Lviv city council and its candidate for mayor in 2010, represents a more radical current in the movement. Proudly confessing himself part of the fascist tradition, Mykhal’chyshyn relishes the harshness, extremism and uncompromising radicalism of his idols of the 1930s and 1940s. Constantly reiterating that “We consider tolerance a crime” and that “We value the truth of the spirit and blood over-all success and wealth” (Nasha Vatra , n.d.), Mykhal’chyshyn takes pride in the label “extremist,” which he proudly shares with “Stepan Bandera,who created an underground terrorist-revolutionary army, the shadow of which still stirs up horrible fear in the hearts of the enemies of our Nation”(Mykhal’chyshyn, “Orientyry”, n.d.). Mykhal’chyshyn serves as a link between VO Svoboda and the so-called autonomous nationalists. Mirroring the “autonomous anarchists” of the extreme left, which they resemble in terms of dress code, lifestyle, aesthetics, symbolism and organization, the “autonomous nationalists” attract particularly militant and extremely violent “event-oriented” young fascists. Mykhal’chyshyn has combined the attributes of various stands of the extra-parliamentary extreme right: Doc Martens shoes, buzz cuts and bomber jackets are in the tradition of the skinheads, while the nightly torchlight parades under black banners with SS symbols resemble the political rituals and Aufmärsche in Nazi Germany. The glorification of street violence is a key component of this political subculture: in an extra session with the Lviv regional Rada in front of the Bandera memorial in Lviv, Mykhal’chyshyn boasted that “Our Banderite army will cross the Dnipro and throw that blue-ass gang, which today usurps the power, out of Ukraine. . . . That will make those Asiatic dogs shut their ugly mouths.”

While hardly a typical man of the belles-lettres , Mykhal’chyshyn, is actually a student of fascism. . . . His interest is not exclusively academic; under the pseudonym Nachtigall 88, Mykhal’chyshyn promotes fascist ideology with the purpose of promoting a fascist transformation of society in Web forums linked to Svoboda and “autonomous nationalists.” In 2005, he organized a political think tank, originally called “the Joseph Goebbels Political Research Center” but later re-named after the German conservative revolutionary Ernst Jünger. (Olszan´ski, 2011).

Explicitly endorsing Hamas, Mykhal’chyshyn regards the Holocaust as “a bright episode in European civilization” which “strongly warms the hearts of the Palestinian population. . . . They hope it will be all repeated” (“Mikhal’chyshyn schitaet Kholokost,” 2011; “Ukrainskii natsist,” 2011).

We recognize the heavy emphasis on heroes and heroism from the narrative of the émigré OUN and from Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians. The difference is that, unlike these two influences, Mykhal’chyshyn does not deny Bandera and Stets’ko’s fascism. On the contrary, their fascist ideology constitutes the basis for his admiration. . . .

. . . . While he is no longer a serious political player, Yushchenko left behind a legacy of myths which helped legitimized Svoboda’s ideology. Svoboda’s appropriation of many rituals in honour of “national heroes” from more moderate nationalists is but one expression of its increased political strength in post-Yushchenko Western Ukraine. . . .

. . . . On April 28, 2011, Svoboda celebrated the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Waffen SS Galizien. Octogenarian Waffen SS veterans were treated as heroes in a mass rally, organized by Svoboda and the “autonomous nationalists.” Nearly 700 participants (the or-ganizers claimed 2,000) marched down the streets of Lviv, from the massive socialist–realist style Bandera monument, to Prospekt Svobody, the main street, shouting slogans like “One race, one nation, one fatherland!,” . . . .

. . . . The procession was led by Mykhal’chyshyn . . . .


4 comments for “All’s Well that’s Orwell, Part 2–Yuschenko Uber Alles: The Ukrainian Ministry of Truth”

  1. Hi Dave,

    Sorry to have been absent for so long. On the subject of Ukraine, there is a small detail that intrigues me with Chumachenko. She has the exact same coiffure or hairdo than Star Wars’ Princess Leia. It strikes me as no coincidence. Remember that in that movie, the “freedom fighters” fight against an “empire” under the tyrannic rule of a dark figure…It strikes me as if the West wants to put her in a good light against the “evil” Putin. I also have the impression that the West wanted to do what they are doing in Maidan for a long time, that movie being a propaganda piece to prepare the collective consciouness.


    Posted by Claude | March 13, 2014, 10:14 pm
  2. @Claude–

    I think it is Yulia Timoshenko, not Ykaterina [Chumachenko] Yuschenko, to whom you are referring.

    With all due respect, I don’t think it’s relevant.

    I’m no expert on Ukrainian native dress and coiffure, but I suspect it has more to do with local styling considerations.



    Posted by Dave Emory | March 14, 2014, 4:01 pm
  3. @Claude: Yulia Tymoshenko’s braids are a key part of her political “brand”. They’re traditional peasant braids which is pretty handy for a oligarch politician that wants to project an “I still remember my roots” image:

    Yulia Tymoshenko: Ukraine’s shape-shifting icon prepares for next act
    Opposition leader has emerged from prison to find a country much changed in her absence, and her political future far from certain.

    By: Olivia Ward Foreign Affairs Reporter, Published on Mon Feb 24 2014

    A cheering crowd, a returning martyr, an ethereal blond woman in a wheelchair, her head wrapped in iconic braids.

    It’s a clip straight out of Central Casting. But some say the abrupt appearance of once-imprisoned Ukrainian political leader Yulia Tymoshenko in Kyiv’s Maidan square may not be the trailer to a happy ending.

    Since Ukraine’s protests broke out three months ago, the opposition has been largely leaderless. But whether Tymoshenko is a comeback kid, or yesterday’s woman, is up for grabs as the country struggles to find its balance after the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych.

    “People were horrified by her political persecution, but when she was jailed there was no massive uprising,” said Marta Dyczok, a Ukraine expert at Western University, who is in close touch with the Maidan protesters. “That’s the key thing to remember.”

    Tymoshenko, 53, was serving a seven-year prison sentence for abuse of office when parliament changed the criminal code to free her last week. The charges sprang from her negotiations with Russia over a gas deal, and many felt they were politically driven by her rival Yanukovych. As his popularity plummeted, sympathy for Tymoshenko rose and reports of brutal treatment and neglect of her health problems in jail sparked an international outcry.

    “She’s one of Ukraine’s most famous political prisoners and a symbol of resistance,” says Alexander Motyl of Rutgers University Newark. “If she played her cards right, she could become a female Mandela and win the election.”

    But in the 30 months Tymoshenko has been out of public view, things have moved swiftly in Ukraine, especially for a woman whose much-rumoured past casts murky shadows of the country’s old regime.

    “Her speech to Maidan was a flop,” said Mychailo Wynnyckyj, a Canadian-born associate professor of sociology at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. “She set herself up as a Joan of Arc, saying ‘I will be the guarantor that this never happens to you again.’ Ukrainians don’t need a saviour now; they want to take care of themselves.”

    Tymoshenko’s famous image — peasant braids and designer clothes — was carefully constructed to appeal to Ukrainian nationalism, while hinting at western efficiency. “Her hair is the symbol of Ukraine’s braided wheat sheaves,” said Wynnyckyj.

    Like much of Tymoshenko’s life, the image is a work in progress.

    Born in the largely Russian-speaking research town of Dnipropetrovsk in eastern Ukraine, she was the child of an impoverished single mother — and determined never to be poor again. She studied economics, went on to university and married at 18, giving birth to daughter Eugenia a year later.

    Her marriage to Oleksandr Tymoshenko, a scion of the Soviet elite, started her climb up the economic ladder, and his family joined her in an oil venture, the Ukrainian Petrol Corp.: “the first company of many that would demonstrate the murky and often Byzantine nature of (her) business dealings,” alleged MP Inna Bohoslovska in an ongoing biography on her website.

    After Ukraine’s 1991 independence, when fortunes were made overnight, Tymoshenko hit the jackpot. A newly minted millionaire, she transformed the petrol company into United Energy Systems of Ukraine, importing much of the country’s natural gas, and winning herself the label of Gas Princess.

    But her status as a Ukrainian oligarch was downgraded when she entered politics in 1996 as an MP, battling President Leonid Kuchma, a former communist official who retaliated by destroying her company. She would later lead her own political bloc, shape-shifting to her current blond braided image and perfecting her Ukrainian.

    After tumultuous years of combat with Kuchma, Tymoshenko became the most famous face of the Orange Revolution against his successor, Yanukovych, who was accused of rigging the 2004 election. But destructive infighting with fellow revolution leader Viktor Yushchenko, and a serious economic slump, deflated her popularity, and Yanukovych beat her in a 2010 presidential race.

    In her absence, three parliamentary leaders were in the forefront, but likely presidential front-runners have yet to appear.

    “There is a place for Tymoshenko in a different kind of role, but not political leadership,” says Wynnyckyj. “She doesn’t really understand civil society. What Ukrainians want now is a housecleaning of the whole political establishment.

    Notice that she lost in 2010 and her speech on the Maidan is characterized as a “flop” but she’s still not really facing any clear front-runner challengers for the presidency. So Tymoshenko is basically the front-runner if she decides to run but she’s also tainted by her own deeply corrupt past in a country deeply tired of corruption. This is going to be something to watch over the coming months because if Tymoshenko’s popularity plummets for whatever reason or if she decides not to run at all there’s going to be popularity vacuum and we’re all going to have to hope that the popularity vacuum doesn’t get filled with an even worse morality vacuum.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | March 14, 2014, 7:26 pm
  4. OpEdNews Op Eds 3/16/2014 at 11:26:27
    The Nazis Even Hitler Was Afraid of
    By George Eliason



    EU politicians that supported the Maidan Revolution are voicing concerns bordering on fear about how much control Ultra Nationalists have over the government in Kiev. Chancellor Merkel’s government is telling her she can no longer afford to ignore the Ultra Nationalists in Ukraine. They are scared Germany will be responsible for setting up a new Reich. It’s time to strip away the rest of the veneer and take a look at what’s really there.

    Forget about the Nazi symbolism, and ultra-nationalist exuberance. I will even grant supporters of the current government that much.

    Every important ministry, from education and social policy to policing, prosecution and national defense, is headed by Ultra Nationalists. In every aspect of national life, Ultra Nationalists now determine what it means to be Ukrainian and all the policies needed to enforce it.

    How Does Bandera Fit in 70 Years Later?
    On June 30, 1941 Stepan Bandera declared the formation of the Ukrainian State in Lviv. Stepan Bandera made his lieutenant Yaroslav Stetsko the Premier. After the war the Bandera groups formed their Government in Exile that was given quiet legitimacy by both the US and Canadian governments shortly after WW2. Part of this was due to their support during the cold war against the Soviet Union, and part due to the size of their lobbying effort. They pump a lot of money into Congress. That they were legitimized by the US Government is clear from all the released Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act documents I have come across.

    It is very clear that the most important branches of the Diaspora government are in the US and Canada. Until 2003 the exiled leadership of the Bandera Government of Ukraine was only one step away from the person of Stepan Bandera himself. The supreme leadership of Bandera’s Ultra Nationalists worldwide changed hands twice after his assassination. Both supreme leaders had been his closest associates.

    The first was Yaroslav Stetsko, Bandera’s Premier in exile. He took over control of the Ultra Nationalist Government in Exile on the death of Stepan Bandera and held the position until his own death in 1986. Upon his death, his wife Slava Stetsko took over the leadership role and lived to bring the worldwide movement home to Ukraine.


    Most recognizable Ukrainian politicians, including Victor Yushhenko and Yulia Tymoshenko , are protégés of Slava Stetsko. This will explain why Mr. Yuschenko made Stepan Bandera a “Hero of Ukraine.” The EU sharply objected to this at the time, because of Bandera’s involvement in genocide, and Victor Yanukovych subsequently rescinded the award. That didn’t work out well for him.

    The 1st generation Bandera government, which pledged fidelity to Adolf Hitler and committed rampant and brutal genocide that it still denies, was alive and well until 2003. It ruled and raised funds from the Ukrainian Diaspora, which constitutes a third of the Ukrainian population worldwide, or 20 million people.

    Today, the Kiev government is only the 2nd generation of Bandera government. Looked at realistically, it still promotes the teachings, policies, and doctrines of Stepan Bandera less than 10 years removed from their institutional moorings.

    The Bandera leaders of today were cultivated to make sure they would not stray far. The present government in Kiev can also be counted to be true to its history.


    School Kids That Scare Me

    One of the changes happening now in Ukraine is forced Ukrainization. If you remember Nazi history and the Hitler Youth, you’ll understand what Ukrainization means. It demands the same unquestioning loyalty from little children, a loyalty even greater than that to family.

    What is forced Ukrainization at the pre school level ? Irina Farion was a favorite for the Minister of Education slot, until a discussion behind closed doors in the Senate. Sergei Kvit from Trizub (Yarosh core group), a real Ultra-Nationalist, got the nod instead.

    Here is Irina Farion speaking to a little child: What is your name? Misha. It’s not Ukrainian. You are Mihailo!

    And your name? Masha. You are Marusa. But my mom calls me this! If you want to be Masha, go to Moscow!

    Don’t call other children Russian names. It is degrading. It’s like calling them an animal that lives in the woods and walks on all fours.

    Imagine a government official speaking to children like this. Children are now taught that if they have Russian names they are second-class citizens. All of the children of Ukraine will grow up to be Ultra Nationalists. Those instilled with National Socialism will get a better education, a better job, a better life.


    What Does This Mean for South and East Ukraine?
    South and East Ukraine don’t want their children taught these things. Would you? Vladimir Putin and Russia are the only parties putting the brakes on that right now. The same Europe and America that 70 years ago violently overthrew the forces of bigotry and indoctrination are now saying that the Ukrainian people must accept them quietly!

    Dmitri Yarosh (Trizub and Pravy Sektor, and Assistant Secretary of Defense [Military] and National Security): “It is better for us to build our own National State! Does that mean knives to the Moskals and ropes to the Jews? Well, not so unsophisticated. There must be a Ukrainian authority in Ukraine; the titular nation must dominate in business, politics, and culture…then–forced Ukrainization. Russians do not like it? Well, go back to F#cking Russia! Those that don’t want to go–we can help them. Russians are not even Slavs…. Next we will liberate our lands: Voronezh, Kursk, Belogorod Oblast, and Kuban. These are all Ukrainian lands!”

    The only problem is all of these Oblasts (regions) are in Russia!


    More at link

    Posted by Swamp | March 17, 2014, 8:23 am

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