For The Record

Fascism: 2019 World Tour, Part 10, The Intermarium Continuity

FTR #1100

MP3: FTR #1100

Lat­est Pro­gram Record­ed Is: FTR #1102 Fas­cism: 2019 World Tour, Part 12–The Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity, Part 3 (Fur­ther Reflec­tions on the Piv­ot Point)

Mr. Emory has how fin­ished and pub­lished AFA #39: “The World Will be Plunged into an Abyss . . . .”   Mr. Emory VERY much hopes lis­ten­ers and read­ers will close­ly exam­ine, record and dis­sem­i­nate this infor­ma­tion. It may well be what the Nazi future will look like, up to a point.

You can sub­scribe to the com­ments made on pro­grams and posts–an excel­lent source of infor­ma­tion in, and of, itself HERE.

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. The new dri­ve is a 32-giga­byte dri­ve that is cur­rent as of the pro­grams and arti­cles post­ed by ear­ly autumn of 2019.

Please con­sid­er sup­port­ing the WORK DAVE EMORY DOES.

Azov Bat­tal­ion Spin Off Nation­al Mili­tia, served as elec­tion mon­i­tors in Ukraine. Azov is a major pro­mot­er of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept.

This broad­cast con­tin­ues exam­i­na­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept and the geopo­lit­i­cal posi­tion of Ukraine as the “Piv­ot Point” in the Earth Island. Inter­mar­i­um is a con­cept that orig­i­nat­ed in the imme­di­ate World War I peri­od and evolved over the rough­ly one hun­dred years since.

Ini­tial­ly con­ceived as a polit­i­cal alliance of Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean nations to coun­ter­act the influ­ence of both Ger­many and Rus­sia, the Inter­mar­i­um idea evolved into a fas­cist con­struct in the years lead­ing up to World War II, the Sec­ond World War years, the Cold War and the present.

Most of the four pro­grams high­light­ing the evo­lu­tion and appli­ca­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept con­sist of read­ing and analy­sis of a long aca­d­e­m­ic paper by Mar­lene Laru­elle and Ellen Rivera. Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance in this dis­cus­sion is the piv­otal role of Ukrain­ian fas­cist orga­ni­za­tions in the Inter­mar­i­um and close­ly con­nect­ed Promethean net­works, from the post World War I peri­od, through the time between the World Wars, through the Cold War and up to and includ­ing the Maid­an coup.

We present key excerpts of the paper to under­score dom­i­nant fea­tures of this evo­lu­tion­ary con­ti­nu­ity:

1. A key play­er in the events that brought the OUN suc­ces­sor orga­ni­za­tions to pow­er in Ukraine has been the Atlantic Coun­cil. It receives back­ing from NATO, the State Depart­ment, Lithua­nia and Ukrain­ian oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk. The think tank also receives major fund­ing from the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress, which evolved from the OUN. ” . . . . In 1967, the World Con­gress of Free Ukraini­ans was found­ed in New York City by sup­port­ers of Andriy Mel­nyk. [The head of the OUN‑M, also allied with Nazi Germany.–D.E.] It was renamed the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress in 1993. In 2003, the Ukrain­ian World Con­gress was rec­og­nized by the Unit­ed Nations Eco­nom­ic and Social Coun­cil as an NGO with spe­cial con­sul­ta­tive sta­tus. It now appears as a spon­sor of the Atlantic Coun­cil . . . . The con­ti­nu­ity of insti­tu­tion­al and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries from Sec­ond World War col­lab­o­ra­tionists to Cold War-era anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions to con­tem­po­rary con­ser­v­a­tive U.S. think tanks is sig­nif­i­cant for the ide­o­log­i­cal under­pin­nings of today’s Inter­mar­i­um revival. . . .”
2. Ukrain­ian pro­to-fas­cist forces were at the core of Josef Pil­sud­ski’s Pol­ish-led Inter­mar­i­um and over­lap­ping Promethean orga­ni­za­tions. Those forces coa­lesced into the OUN. ” . . . . Accord­ing to the British schol­ar and jour­nal­ist Stephen Dor­ril, the Promethean League served as an anti-com­mu­nist umbrel­la orga­ni­za­tion for anti-Sovi­et exiles dis­placed after the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment of Simon Petlu­ra (1879–1926) gave up the fight against the Sovi­ets in 1922.^[12]  . . . . as Dor­ril affirms, ‘the real lead­er­ship and latent pow­er with­in the Promethean League emanat­ed from the Petlu­ra-dom­i­nat­ed Ukrain­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic in exile and its Pol­ish spon­sors. The Poles ben­e­fit­ed direct­ly from this arrange­ment, as Promethean mil­i­tary assets were absorbed into the Pol­ish army, with Ukrain­ian, Geor­gian and Armen­ian con­tract offi­cers not uncom­mon in the ranks.’^[13] The alliance between Pił­sud­s­ki and Petlu­ra became very unpop­u­lar among many West­ern Ukraini­ans, as it result­ed in Pol­ish dom­i­na­tion of their lands. This oppo­si­tion joined the insur­gent Ukrain­ian Mil­i­tary Orga­ni­za­tion (Ukrain­s­ka viisko­va orh­a­nizat­si­ia, UVO—founded 1920), which lat­er trans­formed into the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (Orh­a­nizat­si­ia ukrain­skykh nat­sion­al­is­tiv, OUN). . . .”
3. Accord­ing to for­mer Army intel­li­gence offi­cer William Gowen (a source used and trust­ed by John Lof­tus and Mark Aarons) the Inter­mar­i­um and Promethean net­work assets were used by Third Reich intel­li­gence dur­ing World War II. ” . . .  . Based on Gowen’s reports, such authors as Christo­pher Simp­son, Stephen Dor­ril, Mark Aarons, and John Lof­tus have sug­gest­ed that the net­works of the Promethean League and the Inter­mar­i­um were uti­lized by Ger­man intel­li­gence. . . .”
4. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the Intermarium/Promethean milieu appears to have been cen­tral­ly involved in the Nazi escape net­works, the Vat­i­can-assist­ed “Rat­lines,” in par­tic­u­lar. ” . . . . Amer­i­can intel­li­gence began to take notice of the Inter­mar­i­um net­work in August 1946^[42] in the frame­work of Oper­a­tion Cir­cle, a Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Corps (CIC) project the orig­i­nal goal of which was to deter­mine how net­works inside the Vat­i­can had spir­it­ed away so many Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors, most­ly to South Amer­i­ca.^[43] Among the group of CIC offi­cers involved in the oper­a­tion was Levy’s source William Gowen. Then a young offi­cer based in Rome, Gowen sus­pect­ed the Inter­mar­i­um net­work to be behind Nazi war crim­i­nals and col­lab­o­ra­tors’ exten­sive escape routes from Europe. . . .”
5. It comes as no sur­prise, as well, that U.S. intel­li­gence absorbed the Intermarium/Promethean  net­works after the war. ” . . . . Accord­ing to Aarons and Lof­tus, although he had ini­tial­ly been thor­ough­ly opposed to this course of action, by ‘ear­ly July 1947, Gowen was strong­ly advo­cat­ing that Amer­i­can intel­li­gence should take over Inter­mar­i­um; before long, the CIC offi­cer was no longer hunt­ing for Nazis, but recruit­ing them.’^[49] . . . .”
6. One of the main com­po­nents of  the “Inter­mar­i­um con­ti­nu­ity” is the ABN—the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations. The OUN and asso­ci­at­ed ele­ments con­sti­tute the most impor­tant ele­ment of the ABN. ” . . . . a vast num­ber of anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions were formed in the imme­di­ate post-war peri­od and sup­port­ed by the US.^[57] They con­sti­tute one of the main com­po­nents of the Inter­mar­i­um ‘genealog­i­cal tree,’ in the sense that they revived the mem­o­ry of Piłsudski’s attempts to uni­fy Cen­tral and East­ern Europe against Sovi­et Rus­sia and gave them new life, but blend­ed this mem­o­ry with far-right tones inspired by col­lab­o­ra­tion with Nazi Ger­many.^[58] The most impor­tant of the Euro­pean anti-com­mu­nist orga­ni­za­tions was the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN). . . . Because fas­cist move­ments were, in the 1930s, the first to orga­nize them­selves against the Sovi­et Union, the ABN recruit­ed mas­sive­ly among their ranks and served as an umbrel­la for many for­mer col­lab­o­ra­tionist para­mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tions in exile, amongst them the Orga­ni­za­tion of Ukrain­ian Nationalists—Bandera (OUN‑B), the Croa­t­ian Ustaše, the Roman­ian Iron Guard, and the Slo­va­kian Hlin­ka Guard.^[59] It thus con­tributed to guar­an­tee­ing the sur­vival of their lega­cies at least until the end of the Cold War. Accord­ing to the lib­er­al Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies think tank, cre­at­ed by two for­mer aides to Kennedy advi­sors, the ABN was the ‘largest and most impor­tant umbrel­la for for­mer Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tors in the world.’ . . . .”
7. In addi­tion to the OUN/Ukrainian fas­cist milieu, the Croa­t­ian Ustashe fas­cists became a dom­i­nant ele­ment. This is fun­da­men­tal to the Azov Bat­tal­ion’s Inter­mar­i­um project, dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097. ” . . . . The most active groups with­in the ABN became the Ukrain­ian and Croa­t­ian orga­ni­za­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly the Ukrain­ian OUN.^[61] The OUN, under the lead­er­ship of Andriy Mel­nyk (1890–1964), col­lab­o­rat­ed with the Nazi occu­piers from the latter’s inva­sion of Poland in Sep­tem­ber 1939. The Gestapo trained Myko­la Lebed and the adher­ents of Melnyk’s younger com­peti­tor, Stepan Ban­dera (1909–1959), in sab­o­tage, guer­ril­la war­fare, and assas­si­na­tions. The OUN’s 1941 split into the so-called OUN‑B, fol­low­ing Stepan Ban­dera, and OUN‑M, fol­low­ing Andriy Mel­nyk,^[62] did not keep both fac­tions from con­tin­u­ing to col­lab­o­rate with the Ger­mans. . . .”
8. For­mer SS and Abwehr offi­cer Theodor Oberlaender–the “polit­i­cal offi­cer” (read “com­man­der”) of the Nachti­gall Bat­tal­ion in the Lviv pogram of 1941–became the Ger­man Min­is­ter of Expellees and was vital to the ascent of the OUN in the ABN. ” . . . .While in Sovi­et Ukraine the UPA kept on fight­ing against Moscow until the ear­ly 1950s, their capac­i­ties were exhaust­ed. . . . As Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for Dis­placed Per­sons, Refugees, and the War-Dam­aged dur­ing the Ade­nauer gov­ern­ment, Ober­län­der played a cru­cial role in the rise of the ABN and allowed Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionists to take the lead in it. Yaroslav Stet­sko (1912–1986), who presided over the Ukrain­ian col­lab­o­ra­tionist gov­ern­ment in Lviv from as ear­ly as 30 June 1941, led the ABN from its cre­ation in 1946 until his death in 1986. . . .”
9. The Army’s Counter Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC) con­firmed the pri­ma­cy of the OUN/B with­in the ABN: ” . . . . CIC con­firmed that by 1948 both the ‘Inter­mar­i­um’ and the UPA (Ukrain­ian par­ti­san com­mand) report­ed to the ABN pres­i­dent, Yaroslav Stet­sko. The UPA in turn had con­sol­i­dat­ed all the anti-Sovi­et par­ti­sans under its umbrel­la. Yaroslav Stet­sko was also Sec­re­tary of OUN/B and sec­ond in com­mand to Ban­dera, who had the largest remain­ing par­ti­san group behind Sovi­et lines under his direct com­mand. Thus, OUN/B had achieved the lead­er­ship role among the anti-Com­mu­nist exiles and was ascen­dant by 1950 . . . .”
10. Con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is the focal point of the rein­car­nat­ed Inter­mar­i­um con­cept. ” . . . . The most recent rein­car­na­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um has tak­en form in Ukraine, espe­cial­ly among the Ukrain­ian far right, which has re-appro­pri­at­ed the con­cept by cap­i­tal­iz­ing on the sol­id ide­o­log­i­cal and per­son­al con­ti­nu­ity between actors of the Ukrain­ian far right in the inter­war and Cold War peri­ods and their heirs today. . . .”
11. The con­ti­nu­ity of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept as man­i­fest­ed in con­tem­po­rary Ukraine is epit­o­mized by the role of Yarosla­va Stet­sko (Yaroslav’s wid­ow and suc­ces­sor as a deci­sive ABN and OUN leader). Note the net­work­ing between her Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists and Svo­bo­da. “. . . . This con­ti­nu­ity is exem­pli­fied by the wife of long-time ABN leader Yaroslav Stet­sko, Yarosla­va Stet­sko (1920–2003), a promi­nent fig­ure in the Ukrain­ian post-Sec­ond World War émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty who became direct­ly involved in post-Sovi­et Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. Hav­ing joined the OUN at the age of 18, she became an indis­pens­able sup­port­er of the ABN after the war . . . . In July 1991, she returned to Ukraine, and in the fol­low­ing year formed the Con­gress of Ukrain­ian Nation­al­ists (CUN), a new polit­i­cal par­ty estab­lished on the basis of the OUN, pre­sid­ing over both.^[129] Although the CUN nev­er achieved high elec­tion results, it coop­er­at­ed with the Social-Nation­al Par­ty of Ukraine (SNPU), which lat­er changed its name to Svo­bo­da, the far-right Ukrain­ian par­ty that con­tin­ues to exist. . . .”
12. Yarosla­va Stet­sko’s CUN was co-found­ed by her hus­band’s for­mer sec­re­tary in the 1980s, Roman Svarych. Min­is­ter of Jus­tice in the Vik­tor Yuschenko gov­ern­ment (as well as both Tim­o­shenko gov­ern­ments), Svarych became the spokesman and a major recruiter for the Azov Bat­tal­ion. ” . . . . The co-founder of the CUN and for­mer­ly Yaroslav Stetsko’s pri­vate sec­re­tary, the U.S.-born Roman Zvarych (1953), rep­re­sents a younger gen­er­a­tion of the Ukrain­ian émi­gré com­mu­ni­ty active dur­ing the Cold War and a direct link from the ABN to the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . . Zvarych par­tic­i­pat­ed in the activ­i­ties of the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations in the 1980s. . . . In Feb­ru­ary 2005, after Vik­tor Yushchenko’s elec­tion, Zvarych was appoint­ed Min­is­ter of Jus­tice. . . . Accord­ing to Andriy Bilet­sky, the first com­man­der of the Azov bat­tal­ion, a civ­il para­mil­i­tary unit cre­at­ed in the wake of the Euro­maid­an, Zvarych was head of the head­quar­ters of the Azov Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in 2015 and sup­port­ed the Azov bat­tal­ion with ‘vol­un­teers’ and polit­i­cal advice through his Zvarych Foun­da­tion. . . .”
13. The “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is inex­tri­ca­ble with the his­tor­i­cal revi­sion­ism about the roles of the OUN and UPA in World War II. That revi­sion­ism is insti­tion­al­ized in the Insti­tute of Nation­al Remem­brance. ” . . . .The rein­tro­duc­tion of the Inter­mar­i­um notion in Ukraine is close­ly con­nect­ed to the broad reha­bil­i­ta­tion of the OUN and UPA, as well as of their main hero, Stepan Ban­dera. . . . Dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010), and par­tic­u­lar­ly through the cre­ation of the Insti­tute for Nation­al Remem­brance,  Vik­tor Yushchenko built the image of Ban­dera as a sim­ple Ukrain­ian nation­al­ist fight­ing for his country’s inde­pen­dence . . . .”
14. As dis­cussed in numer­ous pro­grams, anoth­er key ele­ment in the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” is Katery­na Chu­machenko, an OUN oper­a­tive who served in the State Depart­ment and Ronald Rea­gan’s admin­is­tra­tion. She mar­ried Vik­tor Yuschenko. ” . . . . It is not unlike­ly Yushchenko’s readi­ness dur­ing his pres­i­den­cy (2005–2010) to open up to right-wing ten­den­cies of the Ukrain­ian exile leads back to his wife, who had con­nec­tions to the ABN. Katery­na Chu­machenko [Yushchenko], born 1961 in Chica­go, was socialised there in the Ukrain­ian exile youth organ­i­sa­tion SUM (Spilka Ukra­jin­sko­ji Molo­di, Ukrain­ian Youth Organ­i­sa­tion) in the spir­it of the OUN. Via the lob­by asso­ci­a­tion Ukrain­ian Con­gress Com­mit­tee of Amer­i­ca (UCCA) she obtained a post as  ‘spe­cial assis­tant’ in the U.S. State Depart­ment in 1986, and was from 1988 to 1989 employed by the Office of Pub­lic Liai­son in the White House. . . .”
15. Embody­ing the “Inter­mar­i­um Con­ti­nu­ity” are the lus­tra­tion laws, which make it a crim­i­nal offense to tell the truth about the OUN and UPA’s roles in World War II. Note Volodymyr Via­tro­vy­ch’s posi­tion as min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion. ” . . . . This reha­bil­i­ta­tion trend accel­er­at­ed after the Euro­Maid­an. In 2015, just before the sev­en­ti­eth anniver­sary of Vic­to­ry Day, Volodymyr Via­tro­vych, min­is­ter of edu­ca­tion and long-time direc­tor of the Insti­tute for the Study of the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment, an orga­ni­za­tion found­ed to pro­mote the hero­ic nar­ra­tive of the OUN–UPA, called on the par­lia­ment to vote for a set of four laws that cod­i­fied the new, post-Maid­an his­to­ri­og­ra­phy. Two of them are par­tic­u­lar­ly influ­en­tial in the ongo­ing mem­o­ry war with Rus­sia. One decrees that OUN and UPA mem­bers are to be con­sid­ered ‘fight­ers for Ukrain­ian inde­pen­dence in the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry,’ mak­ing pub­lic denial of this unlaw­ful. . . .”
16. As high­light­ed in a Nation arti­cle in FTR #1072, ” . . . . With­in sev­er­al years, an entire gen­er­a­tion will be indoc­tri­nat­ed to wor­ship Holo­caust per­pe­tra­tors as nation­al heroes. . . .”
17. As dis­cussed dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 1096 and 1097, the Azov Bat­tal­ion is in the lead­er­ship of the revival of the Inter­mar­i­um con­cept.” . . . . In this con­text of reha­bil­i­ta­tion of inter­war heroes, ten­sions with Rus­sia, and dis­il­lu­sion with Europe over its per­ceived lack of sup­port against Moscow, the geopo­lit­i­cal con­cept of Inter­mar­i­um could only pros­per. It has found its most active pro­mot­ers on the far right of the polit­i­cal spec­trum, among the lead­er­ship of the Azov Bat­tal­ion. . . .”
18. Azov’s Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group has held three net­work­ing con­fer­ences to date, bring­ing togeth­er key fig­ures of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” orga­ni­za­tions. In addi­tion to focus­ing on the devel­op­ment of what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions, the con­fer­ence is stress­ing mil­i­tary orga­ni­za­tion and pre­pared­ness: ” . . . . In 2016, Bilet­sky cre­at­ed the Inter­mar­i­um Sup­port Group (ISG),^[152] intro­duc­ing the con­cept to poten­tial com­rades-in-arms from the Baltic-Black Sea region.^[153] The first day of the found­ing con­fer­ence was reserved for lec­tures and dis­cus­sions by senior rep­re­sen­ta­tives of var­i­ous sym­pa­thet­ic orga­ni­za­tions, the sec­ond day to ‘the lead­ers of youth branch­es of polit­i­cal par­ties and nation­al­ist move­ments of the Baltic-Black Sea area.’ . . . . It also includ­ed ‘mil­i­tary attach­es of diplo­mat­ic mis­sions from the key coun­tries in the region (Poland, Hun­gary, Roma­nia and Lithua­nia). . . .”
19. Azov’s third ISG con­fer­ence con­tin­ued to advance the mil­i­tary net­work­ing char­ac­ter­is­tics of the ear­li­er gath­er­ings, includ­ing the neces­si­ty of giv­ing mil­i­tary train­ing to what are euphem­ized as “nation­al­ist” youth orga­ni­za­tions: ” . . . . On Octo­ber 13, 2018, the ISG orga­nized its third con­gress. Besides the Ukrain­ian hosts, a large share of the for­eign speak­ers from Poland, Lithua­nia, and Croa­t­ia had a (para-)military back­ground, among them advi­sor to the Pol­ish Defence Min­is­ter Jerzy Tar­gal­s­ki and retired Brigadier Gen­er­al of the Croa­t­ian Armed Forces Bruno Zor­i­ca.^[156] Among the talk­ing points of Pol­ish mil­i­tary edu­ca­tor Damien Duda were ‘meth­ods of the prepa­ra­tion of a mil­i­tary reserve in youth orga­ni­za­tions” and the “impor­tance of para­mil­i­tary struc­tures with­in the frame­work of the defence com­plex of a mod­ern state.’ . . . .”