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AFA 4: Terpil, Wilson & Company

Part 1 47:33 | Part 2 47:36 | Part 3 47:30 | Part 4 47:30 | Part 5 41:20
(Record­ed August 21, 1984)

Cov­er­ing the numer­ous and var­ied activ­i­ties of the noto­ri­ous “ex” CIA oper­a­tives Frank Ter­pil and Edwin Wil­son, this pro­gram cen­ters large­ly on the pair’s activ­i­ties train­ing and equip­ping some of the world’s most noto­ri­ous “left-wing” ter­ror­ists. Moham­mar Khadafy’s ter­ror­ist cadre, the Red Brigades and Car­los the Jack­al were alleged­ly among the recip­i­ents of Wil­son and Ter­pil’s exper­tise.

Although they sup­pos­ed­ly per­formed as rene­gades, they claimed that their activ­i­ties sup­port­ive of “left” ter­ror were per­formed at the bequest of U.S. intel­li­gence. This pro­gram presents infor­ma­tion which bol­sters this con­tention. Many of the peo­ple and ele­ments dis­cussed in this broad­cast lat­er fig­ured promi­nent­ly in the Iran-Con­tra scan­dal.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: the group’s use of active-duty Green Berets to train Khadafy’s ter­ror­ists; Ed Wilson’s oper­a­tion of Task Force 157, an intel­li­gence oper­a­tion that spawned the Nugan Hand Bank (a CIA-con­nect­ed bank that laun­dered drug and arms deal prof­its); Wilson’s role in bro­ker­ing ship­ments of U.S. arms to Egypt; Eye­wit­ness sub­stan­ti­a­tion of the duo’s con­nec­tion to Car­los the Jack­al; the role of for­mer CIA offi­cials Theodore Shack­ley and Thomas Clines in Ter­pil and Wilson’s activ­i­ties; the untime­ly deaths of numer­ous wit­ness­es to, or par­tic­i­pants in, the pair’s oper­a­tions; Wilson’s past oper­a­tions for CIA, includ­ing the Bay of Pigs project and the U‑2 spy plane; Wilson’s alleged role in procur­ing explo­sives for the assas­si­na­tion of Orlan­do Lete­lier; Wilson’s con­nec­tions to Repub­li­can king­mak­er Robert Kei­th Gray; alle­ga­tions of con­nec­tions between Ter­pil and a drug-smug­gling gang known as “The Com­pa­ny;” Ter­pil’s claims that drug prof­its from the above-men­tioned Nugan Hand Bank sus­tained U.S. elec­tron­ic sur­veil­lance facil­i­ties in Aus­tralia; state­ments from for­mer U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cers that the Ter­pil-Wil­son oper­a­tions in Libya were, indeed, offi­cial­ly sanc­tioned; alle­ga­tions that a “tame CIA insid­er” deflect­ed Con­gres­sion­al inquiries into Ter­pil and Wilson’s activ­i­ties; Libyan strong­man Khadafy’s bankrolling of the Pal­adin Group, a fas­cist mer­ce­nary orga­ni­za­tion; a Latin-Amer­i­can assas­si­na­tion con­sor­tium known as “Oper­a­tion Con­dor.”

Discussion

4 comments for “AFA 4: Terpil, Wilson & Company”

  1. Edwin Wil­son dies.

    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/49134559/ns/us_news-the_new_york_times/t/edwin-p-wilson-spy-who-lived-it-dies/#.UF7QR46sQpp

    Appar­ent­ly this sav­age spent his last years liv­ing in the same city I live in, Seat­tle.

    Had I known, I would have done every­thing in my pow­er to find him, detain him, and obtain infor­ma­tion, using the CIA’s meth­ods.

    Posted by R. Wilson | September 23, 2012, 1:08 am
  2. Dave,

    In the news it is being report­ed that Ed Wil­son passed away at the age of 84.

    Thanks for hero­icly sound­ing the alarm on the ele­ments behind Ter­pil, Wil­son and Com­pa­ny for so long and so well.

    You have been so spot on in your analy­sis in this area for thir­ty plus years. Thank you.

    Posted by George Karnazes | September 23, 2012, 6:13 am
  3. The lat­est machi­na­tions of Robert Kei­th Gray.

    Arti­cle will not post when I include link, which is at hawai­ire­porter (dot) com slash obama-lifestyle-criticized-as-royal-author-documents-presidential-vacations-staffing-as-costing‑1–4‑billion-annually/123

    Oba­ma Lifestyle Crit­i­cized as ‘Roy­al’: Author Doc­u­ments Pres­i­den­tial Vaca­tions, Staffing as Cost­ing $1.4 Bil­lion Annu­al­ly

    BY MALIA ZIMMERMAN — Pres­i­dent Barack Oba­ma and his fam­i­ly have tak­en a $4 mil­lion vaca­tion in Kailua, Hawaii, each Christ­mas, since 2008, cour­tesy of the nation’s tax­pay­ers.

    Accord­ing to a new book — “Pres­i­den­tial Perks Gone Roy­al” –by Author Robert Kei­th Gray, Hawaii Reporter’s inves­ti­ga­tion into the vaca­tion expens­es on the island of Oahu mere­ly scratch­es the sur­face of the $1.4 bil­lion the tax­pay­ers spend in just one year for trans­porta­tion, hous­ing, staffing, secu­ri­ty and enter­tain­ment for Pres­i­dent Oba­ma and first fam­i­ly.

    Gray, who worked with­in the White House under three pres­i­dents and had close ties with two more, notes that while oth­er pres­i­dents have tak­en advan­tage of perks, the amount of mon­ey spent on the first fam­i­ly has risen sub­stan­tial­ly under the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion, and must be brought under con­trol.

    Gray also notes the inequity of tax­pay­er dol­lars being spent by Oba­ma for his re-elec­tion effort by using Air Force One to trav­el between cam­paign stops.

    Some of the exam­ples of pres­i­den­tial perks that are high­light­ed in Gray’s book:

    There are 26 cab­in crewmem­bers and five chefs on Air Force One.

    The president’s dog gets its own high-paid staffer, who is always on duty, paid an annu­al salary of $102,000 last year.

    On at least one air­line flight, Bo the dog and his han­dler were only pas­sen­gers aboard.

    The pres­i­dent has a full-time movie pro­jec­tion­ist in the White House the­ater who sleeps at the White House and is on duty 24 hours a day in case any­one needs to see a movie.

    First Lady Michelle Oba­ma spent more than 42 days on vaca­tion in one year with secu­ri­ty, trav­el and accom­mo­da­tions paid for by tax­pay­ers.

    And because the pres­i­dent can appoint high-paid staffers with­out Sen­ate con­fir­ma­tion, Oba­ma has 469 senior staffers and 43 “czars.”

    226 are paid more than $100,000 a year, and 77 are paid as much as $172,000 per year.

    In 2009, Gray said the mil­i­tary pay­roll at Camp David was $8 mil­lion and were put there serve the First Fam­i­ly and its guests.

    “The British spent $57.8 Mil­lion on its roy­al fam­i­ly last year. We Amer­i­cans spent near­ly $2 Bil­lion hous­ing, trans­port­ing, enter­tain­ing, staffing, our First Fam­i­ly and pay­ing a hefty por­tion of the president’s cam­paign expens­es,” Gray said.

    Gray notes that respon­si­ble cit­i­zens want the Pres­i­dent to be “safe, com­fort­able and hap­py” but he main­tains the “unchecked growth of out-of con­trol perks, bestowed on this duly elect­ed offi­cial with­out over­sight by any indi­vid­ual or gov­ern­ing body, are a dan­ger­ous sur­ren­der of the demo­c­ra­t­ic process because the seat­ed pres­i­dent has a vir­tu­al­ly insur­mount­able re-elec­tion advan­tage over his oppo­nent.”

    Gray said what he dis­cov­ered dur­ing his research for this book led him to view the Oba­ma lifestyle and admin­is­tra­tion as “our pres­i­den­cy going roy­al.”

    Gray asks: “With our cur­rent president’s bil­lion- dol­lar lifestyle, can we rea­son­ably expect a pres­i­dent to iden­ti­fy with the real-world prob­lems of his cit­i­zens, when tens of mil­lions of them are cur­rent­ly unem­ployed?”

    Posted by R. Wilson | November 3, 2012, 6:29 pm
  4. We’ve had a string of sto­ries recent­ly about politi­cians seem­ing to almost be forced to adopt a ‘no nego­ti­a­tions’ stance regard­ing the con­flict in Ukraine. First, we had this bizarre sto­ry in the US about a let­ter signed by mem­bers of the Con­gres­sion­al Pro­gres­sive Cau­cus call­ing on Pres­i­dent Joe Biden to look for diplo­mat­ic solu­tions for Ukraine. The let­ter was prompt­ly with­drawn and excus­es were issued for why it was released in the first place. The sto­ry that even­tu­al­ly emerged was that this let­ter was draft­ed back in July and end­ed up only get­ting released now through some sort of staffer mis­take.
    The sec­ond sto­ry comes out of Roma­nia, where the defense min­ster was pres­sured into res­ig­na­tion days after mak­ing the case that Ukraine’s only chance to end the war was to nego­ti­ate with Rus­sia.

    Then there’s anoth­er part of the con­text for these sto­ries: it’s hap­pen at the same time Italy has a new gov­ern­ment led by the mod­ern day ver­sion of Mus­solin­i’s fas­cist par­ty. A gov­ern­ment that’s been large­ly embraced by its West­ern allies based large­ly, it seems, on pledges to remain stead­fast in sup­port for Ukraine and opposed to nego­ti­a­tions with Rus­sia

    So with sto­ries about politi­cians run­ning scared from even sug­gest­ing nego­ti­a­tions with Rus­sia at the same to fas­cists are wel­comed into pow­er in Italy as long as they toe the line on Rus­sia, here’s a sto­ry about a recent­ly declas­si­fied scan­dal out of the UK: The UK’s plot to inter­fere in Italy’s 1976 elec­tions. A plot that appears to have been run out of the UK’s Infor­ma­tion Research Depart­ment (IRD), an agency that was dis­band­ed the fol­low­ing year but han­dled at the time the UK’s most sen­si­tive for­eign pro­pa­gan­da oper­a­tions.

    The tar­get of the oper­a­tions was the Italy com­mu­nist par­ty, the PCI, which appeared to be poised for a vic­to­ry in that year’s elec­tions. UK offi­cials remained high­ly wary of the poten­tial con­se­quences of a com­mu­nist par­ty com­ing to pow­er in Italy despite the assur­ances by PCI leader Enri­co Berlinguer that the par­ty was not pro-Sovi­et and would remain a firm backer of NATO.

    Adding to the dis­turb­ing nature of this sto­ry is that it appears the IRD’s oper­a­tion was run as a rogue oper­a­tion with­out the approval of the For­eign Sec­re­tary’s office. Instead, accord­ing to an inter­nal IRD minute dat­ed 3 June 1976, it was agreed dur­ing a meet­ing held by Richard Sykes, then deputy under­sec­re­tary for Europe at the For­eign Office, that “con­tin­u­ing unat­trib­ut­able infor­ma­tion activ­i­ty” did not require “min­is­te­r­i­al sanc­tion”. So the IRD just decid­ed it could go ahead with this oper­a­tion with the approval of the deputy under­sec­re­tary for Europe at the For­eign Office but not the approval of the actu­al for­eign sec­re­tary. It’s the kind of sto­ry that should raise all sorts of ques­tions about how typ­i­cal this kind of inde­pen­dent covert action real­ly is inside the UK gov­ern­ment.

    As we’re going to see, MI6 was almost sure­ly involved in the IRD’s actions, so any rogue IRD action was also rogue MI6 action. Inter­est­ing­ly, as we’re also going to see, the IRD had an ally in its covert efforts to dis­cred­it the PCI: the Sovi­ets, who also did­n’t like Berlinguer and worked to dis­cred­it the PCI.

    Oh, and get this: the pro­pa­gan­da being sent to jour­nal­ists by the IRD against the PCI includ­ed sug­ges­tions for arti­cles com­par­ing the PCI’s surge to the rise of Ben­i­to Mus­soli­ni. Yep. Because that’s how our world works:

    The Guardian

    Revealed: the secret British plan to keep Italy’s com­mu­nists from pow­er
    Sup­port­ers of the Ital­ian com­mu­nist par­ty in 1976.

    New­ly declas­si­fied files expose the For­eign Office’s dirty tricks cam­paign to influ­ence the knife-edge 1976 elec­tion result

    James Oliv­er and Nicholas Gil­by
    Sun 2 Oct 2022 02.00 EDT

    On 7 June 1976, the BBC’s flag­ship cur­rent affairs pro­gramme Panora­ma report­ed on the forth­com­ing Ital­ian gen­er­al elec­tion. Two weeks before the poll, the Par­ti­to Comu­nista Ital­iano (PCI) – the largest com­mu­nist par­ty in Europe – stood “on the thresh­old of pow­er”.

    Intro­duc­ing the first for­eign tele­vi­sion inter­view with the then PCI leader, Enri­co Berlinguer, David Dim­ble­by stood in front of a pic­ture of Berlinguer cap­tioned “Would you trust this man?” High­light­ing the con­se­quences of a PCI vic­to­ry, Dim­ble­by informed BBC view­ers that if Italy vot­ed the par­ty in, “the rip­ples will spread far beyond Italy itself”.

    The inter­view had been secured by one of Panora­ma’s lead­ing cor­re­spon­dents, Richard Lind­ley. As Berlinguer sat with cig­a­rettes and a drink to hand, Lind­ley inter­ro­gat­ed him on his party’s atti­tude towards polit­i­cal repres­sion in the Sovi­et Union, its com­mit­ment to Nato and, “if the cold war came again … where your loy­al­ties would lie?”

    Lind­ley also pressed him on the strength of the PCI’s declared inde­pen­dence from the Sovi­et com­mu­nist par­ty, quot­ing a pre­vi­ous PCI leader’s ref­er­ence to a “bond of steel” between the two par­ties. “Our inde­pen­dence is sim­ply a fact,” Berlinguer said.

    The exchange caused sat­is­fac­tion in White­hall. “We were inter­est­ed to note the ‘bond of steel’ quo­ta­tion used by Lind­ley,” wrote a For­eign Office offi­cial, Peter Joy, to a col­league in Rome. “I assume you may have had the chance to talk to Lind­ley before the inter­view?” he wrote. “If so, well done!”

    Joy’s inter­est was not aca­d­e­m­ic. He over­saw a top-secret unit of the Infor­ma­tion Research Depart­ment (IRD), the covert cold war pro­pa­gan­da arm of the For­eign Office. The IRD’s Spe­cial Edi­to­r­i­al Unit (SEU) was respon­si­ble for the department’s most sen­si­tive oper­a­tions, run­ning pro­pa­gan­da mis­sions around the world against com­mu­nists and oth­ers deemed to threat­en British inter­ests. The unit worked close­ly with MI6.

    Recent inves­ti­ga­tions by the Observ­er have revealed how the IRD incit­ed mass mur­der in Indone­sia in the 1960s and ran a secret cam­paign to smear Ogin­ga Odin­ga, the left­wing vice-pres­i­dent of Kenya.

    Now, new­ly declas­si­fied doc­u­ments reveal that the IRD ran a cam­paign with MI6 to “under­mine the cred­i­bil­i­ty” of the Ital­ian com­mu­nist par­ty and influ­ence the 1976 elec­tion.

    ...

    The declas­si­fied files reveal that embassy offi­cials in Rome briefed Lind­ley, hand­ing him an unat­trib­uted IRD mem­o­ran­dum on the PCI. It con­tained the quote attrib­uted to for­mer par­ty leader Palmiro Togli­at­ti about the “bonds of steel” which IRD claimed still char­ac­terised the PCI’s rela­tion­ship with the Sovi­ets.

    Heulyn Dun­lop, an SEU offi­cial sec­ond­ed to Rome for the cam­paign, report­ed that the cor­re­spon­dent planned to ask Berlinguer “a num­ber of awk­ward ques­tions”.

    Joy was lat­er pleased to note: “Lind­ley suc­ceed in get­ting under Berlinguer’s guard – espe­cial­ly on the Nato issue”.

    Accord­ing to the then head of the IRD, Ray Whit­ney, the unat­trib­ut­able brief­ing paper was “a quar­ry of basic infor­ma­tion on the par­ty for the use of trust­ed con­tacts”. Jour­nal­ists would be told it had been pro­duced for diplo­mats, “but we are allowed to show them on a per­son­al basis to peo­ple who may find them use­ful”.

    It pro­vid­ed Lind­ley with painstak­ing research on the PCI, includ­ing quotes from dis­parate sources that could be deployed against Berlinguer. The doc­u­ments sug­gest that Lind­ley was unknown to the pro­pa­gan­dists and unaware who was behind the brief­ing. The same brief was hand­ed to for­eign cor­re­spon­dents work­ing for the Finan­cial Times and Wash­ing­ton Post.

    Just as many observers now fear Italy’s new right-wing gov­ern­ment might go soft on Putin’s Rus­sia and dis­rupt the EU, in the mid-1970s British offi­cials feared a sim­i­lar out­come if the PCI joined a coali­tion.

    In local elec­tions in 1975, the PCI won 33% of the vote, just behind the gov­ern­ing Chris­t­ian Democ­rats, attract­ing sup­port by attack­ing cor­rup­tion, dis­tanc­ing itself from Moscow and com­mit­ting to democ­ra­cy, free­dom and pri­vate enter­prise. Berlinguer promised an accom­mo­da­tion with Nato and the EEC.

    The For­eign Office was divid­ed on how gen­uine this was. Some believed Berlinguer’s lead­er­ship offered a chance of a “glit­ter­ing prize” – detach­ing a west­ern Euro­pean com­mu­nist par­ty from Moscow – but oth­ers saw the PCI as a wolf in sheep’s cloth­ing.

    In fact, KGB defec­tor Vasili Mitrokhin would lat­er tell British intel­li­gence that while Moscow con­tin­ued to fund the PCI, the Sovi­ets were dis­mayed by Berlinguer and, like the IRD, tried to dis­cred­it him.

    ...

    Alarmed by Italy’s slide to the left, in Novem­ber 1975 For­eign Office offi­cials asked the IRD to tar­get Berlinguer and his par­ty and expose the con­tra­dic­tion between the PCI’s new demo­c­ra­t­ic image and its offi­cial com­mit­ment to Marx­ism-Lenin­ism.

    “We do not want the com­mu­nist par­ties of west­ern Europe to come to pow­er in any form,” a senior British diplo­mat not­ed. They “must con­tin­ue to be opposed by every pos­si­ble means”. Britain’s ambas­sador in Rome argued it would be “cat­a­stroph­ic” if the PCI entered gov­ern­ment.

    In April 1976, Britain’s new Labour prime min­is­ter, Jim Callaghan, appoint­ed Antho­ny Crosland to replace him as for­eign sec­re­tary. The declas­si­fied files show that the For­eign Office’s top man­darin, Sir Michael Pal­lis­er, told the incom­ing for­eign sec­re­tary it was “not too late” to “pre­vent a com­mu­nist acces­sion to pow­er in Italy” and promised him pro­pos­als. There was good rea­son for the For­eign Office to expect Crosland’s bless­ing. A ded­i­cat­ed social demo­c­rat, he opposed Sovi­et com­mu­nism and had writ­ten crit­i­cal­ly about Euro­com­mu­nism.

    Four days after the date of the Ital­ian elec­tion was announced, offi­cials put for­ward their “options for action” in a paper sent to Crosland. It warned that PCI par­tic­i­pa­tion in gov­ern­ment was “a very dan­ger­ous prospect” and that if the par­ty achieved “major­i­ty par­tic­i­pa­tion … lead­ing on to full pow­er, the sit­u­a­tion would prob­a­bly have to be regard­ed as irre­triev­able by the Nato allies and Com­mu­ni­ty part­ners”.

    A “clean sur­gi­cal coup” was reject­ed as “unre­al­is­tic”, although “in the right cir­cum­stances”, offi­cials mused, they could encour­age the Ital­ian gov­ern­ment to repress the PCI, and sug­gest­ed “it might be worth” arrang­ing pre­texts for this. But offi­cials advised they could “orches­trate a cam­paign” against Berlinguer and the PCI, rec­om­mend­ing “increased action in the pro­pa­gan­da field, both overt and covert, to under­mine the cred­i­bil­i­ty of the PCI”.

    While offi­cials await­ed Crosland’s approval, the doc­u­ments reveal, the IRD was already start­ing covert oper­a­tions. Dun­lop of the SEU was sec­ond­ed to the embassy in Rome to dis­cov­er ways “to influ­ence Ital­ian opin­ion” to sup­port “the mid­dle ground in the run-up to the elec­tion”.

    Dis­cus­sions began as to pos­si­ble tac­tics. One IRD offi­cial sug­gest­ed that “it might be rumour-mon­gered” that Alto Adi­ge, a north­ern region trans­ferred to Italy after the first world war, planned to declare inde­pen­dence or rejoin Aus­tria if the PCI won.

    IRD want­ed the BBC to broad­cast west­ern com­ment on “Ital­ian polit­i­cal devel­op­ments” to lis­ten­ers to its Ital­ian Ser­vice and report­ed they “seem very ready to be coop­er­a­tive”.

    But in Rome, embassy diplo­mats feared “the direct sur­fac­ing of mate­r­i­al” would reveal “HMG’s hand”, Dun­lop wrote. These sen­si­tiv­i­ties guar­an­teed MI6’s involve­ment in the IRD oper­a­tions, which were planned in col­lab­o­ra­tion with Britain’s spies. A secret mem­o­ran­dum reveals how the IRD and MI6 pro­posed to col­lab­o­rate. Joy asked Britain’s spies to pro­vide secret intel­li­gence on the PCI lead­ers, their rela­tions with Moscow and Sovi­et fund­ing, and which media out­lets were most used by swing vot­ers.

    Oth­ers show a long­stand­ing agent han­dled by MI6’s Swiss sta­tion chief, Ter­ry O’Bryan-Tear, recruit­ed rightwing Swiss politi­cian Fran­co Masoni to print anti-Com­mu­nist mate­r­i­al in the Gazzetta Tici­nese. Masoni offered to cir­cu­late 60,000 copies across the Swiss bor­der, giv­ing IRD a covert media out­let in Italy. O’Bryan-Tear’s “agent” also agreed to print a book­let show­ing how Com­mu­nists exploit­ed the demo­c­ra­t­ic process of Czecho­slo­va­kia to seize pow­er in 1948.

    The British oper­a­tion could not have been more sen­si­tive. A few months ear­li­er, the CIA’s fund­ing of Ital­ian polit­i­cal par­ties had been revealed in the US press. David Lipsey, then Crosland’s polit­i­cal advis­er, warned Britain “could hard­ly expect the [com­mu­nist par­ty] to play to demo­c­ra­t­ic rules if we resort­ed to dirty tricks”. “If we give the com­mu­nists enough rope, they may prove them­selves inno­cent; or they may hang them­selves.” A “lynch­ing oper­a­tion” threat­ened to dam­age “our demo­c­ra­t­ic cred­i­bil­i­ty … not theirs”, he wrote.

    “This was poten­tial­ly incen­di­ary with the British Labour par­ty,” David, now Lord, Lipsey, told the Observ­er. “Here was this par­ty, putting for­ward its cre­den­tials to be a demo­c­ra­t­ic social­ist par­ty oppos­ing a right-wing Ital­ian gov­ern­ment.” Going against it “would be like back­ing the US in Viet­nam. I don’t think we would have mind­ed if we thought … they [the PCI] were just Moscow’s tools in Italy.”

    Just over a month before the elec­tion, at a meet­ing to dis­cuss For­eign Office “options for action” in Italy, Pal­lis­er and senior col­leagues failed to con­vince Crosland to accept their rec­om­men­da­tions, and no deci­sion was made one way or the oth­er.

    Lipsey advised the IRD’s head, Whit­ney, not to send the department’s paper on the PCI out­side the diplo­mat­ic ser­vice. The fol­low­ing day, Crosland met his min­is­te­r­i­al col­leagues and agreed that Britain should issue “no pub­lic state­ments or pri­vate warn­ings to affect the elec­tion result”. Nev­er­the­less, IRD oper­a­tions in Italy went ahead, seem­ing­ly cir­cum­vent­ing Crosland’s appar­ent reluc­tance. An inter­nal IRD minute dat­ed 3 June 1976 reveals that at a meet­ing held by Richard Sykes, then deputy under­sec­re­tary for Europe at the For­eign Office, it was agreed that “con­tin­u­ing unat­trib­ut­able infor­ma­tion activ­i­ty” did not require “min­is­te­r­i­al sanc­tion”.

    Lipsey said: “Nobody could think that that shouldn’t have been brought to [Crosland’s] atten­tion”. IRD “should be work­ing to the instruc­tions of the for­eign sec­re­tary of the day”. He is con­vinced Crosland did not give “the go-ahead for a cam­paign of this kind”.

    David, now Lord, Owen, who suc­ceed­ed Crosland as for­eign sec­re­tary in 1977, told the Observ­er: “Need­less to say, demo­c­ra­t­ic politi­cians should not inter­fere clan­des­tine­ly in oth­er democ­ra­cies hold­ing elec­tions.”

    The IRD paper on the PCI was dis­trib­uted for “inter­est­ed con­tacts” at the “dis­cre­tion” of each embassy. The Rome embassy issued a bul­letin of UK press com­ment on the elec­tion slant­ed against the PCI.

    From Rome, Dun­lop sent Joy sug­ges­tions for arti­cles, includ­ing com­par­ing the PCI’s surge to the rise of Ben­i­to Mus­soli­ni. Joy sent covert press con­tacts anti-com­mu­nist arti­cles writ­ten by the IRD, high­light­ing the insin­cer­i­ty of Berlinguer and the com­mu­nists, and oth­er anti-com­mu­nist themes.

    Fol­low­ing an arti­cle by the for­mer Labour min­is­ter Lord Chal­font in the Times about the com­mu­nist threat to democ­ra­cy and how their vic­to­ry would lead to Italy’s expul­sion from Nato, Dun­lop called for anoth­er arti­cle to refute “argu­ments adduced by the PCI”. In an inter­view two days lat­er, Lord Chal­font rebutted the PCI argu­ments using lines pro­vid­ed by Joy.

    Dun­lop report­ed that the IRD paper on the PCI had been passed “to the Chris­t­ian Demo­c­rat par­ty, which intends some of it for cir­cu­la­tion to can­di­dates before the elec­tions”.

    A week before the elec­tion, two forged pam­phlets pur­port­ing to have been issued by Sovi­et news agency Novosti were cir­cu­lat­ed.

    Dun­lop report­ed that they appeared to be “evi­dence of Sovi­et attempt­ed manip­u­la­tion of the elec­tions” and “prob­a­bly con­tributed to some degree to strength­en­ing the vote for the Chris­t­ian Democ­rats”. Although the ori­gin of the forg­eries is unclear, the IRD had pre­vi­ous­ly pro­duced at least 11 Novosti forg­eries. Joy said they were “clear­ly very suc­cess­ful and pro­vide impor­tant lessons for the future”.

    On elec­tion day, there was a swing to the left, but the Chris­t­ian Democ­rats emerged as the largest par­ty. Dun­lop, report­ing after­wards, iden­ti­fied the key devel­op­ment as “a large­ly spon­ta­neous and effec­tive cam­paign” by the Ital­ian press, alert­ing Ital­ians “to the dan­gers of vot­ing the PCI into pow­er”. The IRD’s oper­a­tions against the PCI were, she wrote, “last minute” and “could only have had a lim­it­ed impact”.

    Joy said the elec­tions had “won us a short breath­ing space in which to pre­pare for the sec­ond round in Italy”. But the secret oper­a­tion was the last major “black job” mount­ed by the IRD and its SEU: the fol­low­ing year, the new for­eign sec­re­tary, David Owen, shut down the IRD.

    ————–

    “Revealed: the secret British plan to keep Italy’s com­mu­nists from pow­er” by James Oliv­er and Nicholas Gil­by; The Guardian; 10/02/2022

    “Now, new­ly declas­si­fied doc­u­ments reveal that the IRD ran a cam­paign with MI6 to “under­mine the cred­i­bil­i­ty” of the Ital­ian com­mu­nist par­ty and influ­ence the 1976 elec­tion.”

    Sur­prise sur­prise. New­ly declas­si­fied doc­u­ments reveal a covert UK cam­paign to inter­vene in Italy’s 1976 elec­tions. The Infor­ma­tion Research Depart­ment (IRD) was the agency large­ly in charge of the oper­a­tion. An oper­a­tion that appears to have involved the IRD’s Spe­cial Edi­to­r­i­al Unit (SEU), which was respon­si­ble for run­ning the most sen­si­tive pro­pa­gan­da mis­sions around the world. Hence the inten­tion­al­ly provoca­tive ques­tions posed to the PCI can­di­date dur­ing the first for­eign tele­vi­sion inter­view of then PCI leader Enri­co Berlinguer. It was quite lit­er­al­ly a plan for for­eign elec­tion inter­fer­ence against a fel­low NATO ally:

    ...
    Intro­duc­ing the first for­eign tele­vi­sion inter­view with the then PCI leader, Enri­co Berlinguer, David Dim­ble­by stood in front of a pic­ture of Berlinguer cap­tioned “Would you trust this man?” High­light­ing the con­se­quences of a PCI vic­to­ry, Dim­ble­by informed BBC view­ers that if Italy vot­ed the par­ty in, “the rip­ples will spread far beyond Italy itself”.

    The inter­view had been secured by one of Panora­ma’s lead­ing cor­re­spon­dents, Richard Lind­ley. As Berlinguer sat with cig­a­rettes and a drink to hand, Lind­ley inter­ro­gat­ed him on his party’s atti­tude towards polit­i­cal repres­sion in the Sovi­et Union, its com­mit­ment to Nato and, “if the cold war came again … where your loy­al­ties would lie?”

    ...

    The exchange caused sat­is­fac­tion in White­hall. “We were inter­est­ed to note the ‘bond of steel’ quo­ta­tion used by Lind­ley,” wrote a For­eign Office offi­cial, Peter Joy, to a col­league in Rome. “I assume you may have had the chance to talk to Lind­ley before the inter­view?” he wrote. “If so, well done!”

    Joy’s inter­est was not aca­d­e­m­ic. He over­saw a top-secret unit of the Infor­ma­tion Research Depart­ment (IRD), the covert cold war pro­pa­gan­da arm of the For­eign Office. The IRD’s Spe­cial Edi­to­r­i­al Unit (SEU) was respon­si­ble for the department’s most sen­si­tive oper­a­tions, run­ning pro­pa­gan­da mis­sions around the world against com­mu­nists and oth­ers deemed to threat­en British inter­ests. The unit worked close­ly with MI6.

    Recent inves­ti­ga­tions by the Observ­er have revealed how the IRD incit­ed mass mur­der in Indone­sia in the 1960s and ran a secret cam­paign to smear Ogin­ga Odin­ga, the left­wing vice-pres­i­dent of Kenya.

    ...

    The declas­si­fied files reveal that embassy offi­cials in Rome briefed Lind­ley, hand­ing him an unat­trib­uted IRD mem­o­ran­dum on the PCI. It con­tained the quote attrib­uted to for­mer par­ty leader Palmiro Togli­at­ti about the “bonds of steel” which IRD claimed still char­ac­terised the PCI’s rela­tion­ship with the Sovi­ets.
    ...

    Also note this oper­a­tion appears to have orig­i­nat­ed in the office of then-for­eign sec­re­tary Jim Callaghan, who became the UK’s new prime min­is­ter in April 1976. Callaghan tapped Antho­ny Cros­by to replace him as for­eign sec­re­tary. And accord­ing to declas­si­fied files, Cros­by was told by the for­eign sec­re­tary office’s top man­darin, Sir Michael Pal­lis­er, that it was “not too late” to “pre­vent a com­mu­nist acces­sion to pow­er in Italy” and promised him pro­pos­als. At the same time, the IRD was appar­ent­ly just going ahead with its own covert oper­a­tions with­out wait­ing for Cros­by’s approval. In oth­er words, this for­eign elec­tion inter­fer­ence was rogue for­eign elec­tion inter­fer­ence being car­ried out uni­lat­er­al­ly by an intel­li­gence agency with­out approval. It’s an omi­nous anec­dote:

    ...
    Alarmed by Italy’s slide to the left, in Novem­ber 1975 For­eign Office offi­cials asked the IRD to tar­get Berlinguer and his par­ty and expose the con­tra­dic­tion between the PCI’s new demo­c­ra­t­ic image and its offi­cial com­mit­ment to Marx­ism-Lenin­ism.

    “We do not want the com­mu­nist par­ties of west­ern Europe to come to pow­er in any form,” a senior British diplo­mat not­ed. They “must con­tin­ue to be opposed by every pos­si­ble means”. Britain’s ambas­sador in Rome argued it would be “cat­a­stroph­ic” if the PCI entered gov­ern­ment.

    In April 1976, Britain’s new Labour prime min­is­ter, Jim Callaghan, appoint­ed Antho­ny Crosland to replace him as for­eign sec­re­tary. The declas­si­fied files show that the For­eign Office’s top man­darin, Sir Michael Pal­lis­er, told the incom­ing for­eign sec­re­tary it was “not too late” to “pre­vent a com­mu­nist acces­sion to pow­er in Italy” and promised him pro­pos­als. There was good rea­son for the For­eign Office to expect Crosland’s bless­ing. A ded­i­cat­ed social demo­c­rat, he opposed Sovi­et com­mu­nism and had writ­ten crit­i­cal­ly about Euro­com­mu­nism.

    Four days after the date of the Ital­ian elec­tion was announced, offi­cials put for­ward their “options for action” in a paper sent to Crosland. It warned that PCI par­tic­i­pa­tion in gov­ern­ment was “a very dan­ger­ous prospect” and that if the par­ty achieved “major­i­ty par­tic­i­pa­tion … lead­ing on to full pow­er, the sit­u­a­tion would prob­a­bly have to be regard­ed as irre­triev­able by the Nato allies and Com­mu­ni­ty part­ners”.

    A “clean sur­gi­cal coup” was reject­ed as “unre­al­is­tic”, although “in the right cir­cum­stances”, offi­cials mused, they could encour­age the Ital­ian gov­ern­ment to repress the PCI, and sug­gest­ed “it might be worth” arrang­ing pre­texts for this. But offi­cials advised they could “orches­trate a cam­paign” against Berlinguer and the PCI, rec­om­mend­ing “increased action in the pro­pa­gan­da field, both overt and covert, to under­mine the cred­i­bil­i­ty of the PCI”.

    While offi­cials await­ed Crosland’s approval, the doc­u­ments reveal, the IRD was already start­ing covert oper­a­tions. Dun­lop of the SEU was sec­ond­ed to the embassy in Rome to dis­cov­er ways “to influ­ence Ital­ian opin­ion” to sup­port “the mid­dle ground in the run-up to the elec­tion”.
    ...

    Per­haps the most dis­turb­ing part about learn­ing that the IRD went ahead with that covert action on its own is the jus­ti­fi­ca­tion the agency used to do it: dur­ing a meet­ing with then deputy under­sec­re­tary for Europe at the For­eign Office, it was agreed that “con­tin­u­ing unat­trib­ut­able infor­ma­tion activ­i­ty” did not require “min­is­te­r­i­al sanc­tion”. It’s the kind of ‘agree­ment’ that should raise all sorts of ques­tions about how oth­er activ­i­ty of this nature the IRD was engaged in with­out the approval of the UK gov­ern­ment. How much rogue anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic pro­pa­gan­da was there?

    ...
    “This was poten­tial­ly incen­di­ary with the British Labour par­ty,” David, now Lord, Lipsey, told the Observ­er. “Here was this par­ty, putting for­ward its cre­den­tials to be a demo­c­ra­t­ic social­ist par­ty oppos­ing a right-wing Ital­ian gov­ern­ment.” Going against it “would be like back­ing the US in Viet­nam. I don’t think we would have mind­ed if we thought … they [the PCI] were just Moscow’s tools in Italy.”

    Just over a month before the elec­tion, at a meet­ing to dis­cuss For­eign Office “options for action” in Italy, Pal­lis­er and senior col­leagues failed to con­vince Crosland to accept their rec­om­men­da­tions, and no deci­sion was made one way or the oth­er.

    Lipsey advised the IRD’s head, Whit­ney, not to send the department’s paper on the PCI out­side the diplo­mat­ic ser­vice. The fol­low­ing day, Crosland met his min­is­te­r­i­al col­leagues and agreed that Britain should issue “no pub­lic state­ments or pri­vate warn­ings to affect the elec­tion result”. Nev­er­the­less, IRD oper­a­tions in Italy went ahead, seem­ing­ly cir­cum­vent­ing Crosland’s appar­ent reluc­tance. An inter­nal IRD minute dat­ed 3 June 1976 reveals that at a meet­ing held by Richard Sykes, then deputy under­sec­re­tary for Europe at the For­eign Office, it was agreed that “con­tin­u­ing unat­trib­ut­able infor­ma­tion activ­i­ty” did not require “min­is­te­r­i­al sanc­tion”.

    Lipsey said: “Nobody could think that that shouldn’t have been brought to [Crosland’s] atten­tion”. IRD “should be work­ing to the instruc­tions of the for­eign sec­re­tary of the day”. He is con­vinced Crosland did not give “the go-ahead for a cam­paign of this kind”.

    David, now Lord, Owen, who suc­ceed­ed Crosland as for­eign sec­re­tary in 1977, told the Observ­er: “Need­less to say, demo­c­ra­t­ic politi­cians should not inter­fere clan­des­tine­ly in oth­er democ­ra­cies hold­ing elec­tions.”

    The IRD paper on the PCI was dis­trib­uted for “inter­est­ed con­tacts” at the “dis­cre­tion” of each embassy. The Rome embassy issued a bul­letin of UK press com­ment on the elec­tion slant­ed against the PCI.

    From Rome, Dun­lop sent Joy sug­ges­tions for arti­cles, includ­ing com­par­ing the PCI’s surge to the rise of Ben­i­to Mus­soli­ni. Joy sent covert press con­tacts anti-com­mu­nist arti­cles writ­ten by the IRD, high­light­ing the insin­cer­i­ty of Berlinguer and the com­mu­nists, and oth­er anti-com­mu­nist themes.
    ...

    Ulti­mate­ly, we find that two forged pam­phlet end­ed up get­ting cir­cu­lat­ed a week for the elec­tion. And while there isn’t direct evi­dence the IRD was behind it, cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence sug­gests that the case. So we have clas­si­fied doc­u­ments indi­cat­ing that the IRD was engaged in rogue oper­a­tions, but we don’t actu­al­ly have doc­u­ments con­firm­ing the spe­cif­ic oper­a­tions and are still forced to spec­u­late. It’s the kind of detail that again rais­es major ques­tions about how many undis­closed and undis­cov­ered oper­a­tions of this nature were being run by rogue UK agen­cies dur­ing the post-War peri­od:

    ...
    A week before the elec­tion, two forged pam­phlets pur­port­ing to have been issued by Sovi­et news agency Novosti were cir­cu­lat­ed.

    Dun­lop report­ed that they appeared to be “evi­dence of Sovi­et attempt­ed manip­u­la­tion of the elec­tions” and “prob­a­bly con­tributed to some degree to strength­en­ing the vote for the Chris­t­ian Democ­rats”. Although the ori­gin of the forg­eries is unclear, the IRD had pre­vi­ous­ly pro­duced at least 11 Novosti forg­eries. Joy said they were “clear­ly very suc­cess­ful and pro­vide impor­tant lessons for the future”.

    On elec­tion day, there was a swing to the left, but the Chris­t­ian Democ­rats emerged as the largest par­ty. Dun­lop, report­ing after­wards, iden­ti­fied the key devel­op­ment as “a large­ly spon­ta­neous and effec­tive cam­paign” by the Ital­ian press, alert­ing Ital­ians “to the dan­gers of vot­ing the PCI into pow­er”. The IRD’s oper­a­tions against the PCI were, she wrote, “last minute” and “could only have had a lim­it­ed impact”.

    Joy said the elec­tions had “won us a short breath­ing space in which to pre­pare for the sec­ond round in Italy”. But the secret oper­a­tion was the last major “black job” mount­ed by the IRD and its SEU: the fol­low­ing year, the new for­eign sec­re­tary, David Owen, shut down the IRD.
    ...

    Sim­i­lar­ly, we have to ask just how many oth­er jour­nal­ists were get­ting fed pro­pa­gan­dis­tic ques­tions and oth­er weaponized con­tent from the IRD. Accord­ing to these declas­si­fied doc­u­ments, for­eign cor­re­spon­dents for the Finan­cial Times and Wash­ing­ton Post also received the same brief that shaped that Panora­ma inter­view of PCI leader Enri­co Berlinguer:

    ...
    Accord­ing to the then head of the IRD, Ray Whit­ney, the unat­trib­ut­able brief­ing paper was “a quar­ry of basic infor­ma­tion on the par­ty for the use of trust­ed con­tacts”. Jour­nal­ists would be told it had been pro­duced for diplo­mats, “but we are allowed to show them on a per­son­al basis to peo­ple who may find them use­ful”.

    It pro­vid­ed Lind­ley with painstak­ing research on the PCI, includ­ing quotes from dis­parate sources that could be deployed against Berlinguer. The doc­u­ments sug­gest that Lind­ley was unknown to the pro­pa­gan­dists and unaware who was behind the brief­ing. The same brief was hand­ed to for­eign cor­re­spon­dents work­ing for the Finan­cial Times and Wash­ing­ton Post.
    ...

    But as the arti­cle notes, we should­n’t assume the IRD was the only agency involved with these covert oper­a­tions. Due to their high­ly sen­si­tive nature MI6 was almost cer­tain­ly involved:

    ...
    Dis­cus­sions began as to pos­si­ble tac­tics. One IRD offi­cial sug­gest­ed that “it might be rumour-mon­gered” that Alto Adi­ge, a north­ern region trans­ferred to Italy after the first world war, planned to declare inde­pen­dence or rejoin Aus­tria if the PCI won.

    IRD want­ed the BBC to broad­cast west­ern com­ment on “Ital­ian polit­i­cal devel­op­ments” to lis­ten­ers to its Ital­ian Ser­vice and report­ed they “seem very ready to be coop­er­a­tive”.

    But in Rome, embassy diplo­mats feared “the direct sur­fac­ing of mate­r­i­al” would reveal “HMG’s hand”, Dun­lop wrote. These sen­si­tiv­i­ties guar­an­teed MI6’s involve­ment in the IRD oper­a­tions, which were planned in col­lab­o­ra­tion with Britain’s spies. A secret mem­o­ran­dum reveals how the IRD and MI6 pro­posed to col­lab­o­rate. Joy asked Britain’s spies to pro­vide secret intel­li­gence on the PCI lead­ers, their rela­tions with Moscow and Sovi­et fund­ing, and which media out­lets were most used by swing vot­ers.

    Oth­ers show a long­stand­ing agent han­dled by MI6’s Swiss sta­tion chief, Ter­ry O’Bryan-Tear, recruit­ed rightwing Swiss politi­cian Fran­co Masoni to print anti-Com­mu­nist mate­r­i­al in the Gazzetta Tici­nese. Masoni offered to cir­cu­late 60,000 copies across the Swiss bor­der, giv­ing IRD a covert media out­let in Italy. O’Bryan-Tear’s “agent” also agreed to print a book­let show­ing how Com­mu­nists exploit­ed the demo­c­ra­t­ic process of Czecho­slo­va­kia to seize pow­er in 1948.
    ...

    Nor should we assume UK spies were the only ones engaged in this kind of action regard­ing Italy’s democ­ra­cy. The CIA, for exam­ple, was also play­ing in that are­na:

    ...
    The British oper­a­tion could not have been more sen­si­tive. A few months ear­li­er, the CIA’s fund­ing of Ital­ian polit­i­cal par­ties had been revealed in the US press. David Lipsey, then Crosland’s polit­i­cal advis­er, warned Britain “could hard­ly expect the [com­mu­nist par­ty] to play to demo­c­ra­t­ic rules if we resort­ed to dirty tricks”. “If we give the com­mu­nists enough rope, they may prove them­selves inno­cent; or they may hang them­selves.” A “lynch­ing oper­a­tion” threat­ened to dam­age “our demo­c­ra­t­ic cred­i­bil­i­ty … not theirs”, he wrote.
    ...

    Final­ly, note one of the grand­est ironies here: the Sovi­ets did­n’t trust the PCI and, like the IRD, tried to dis­cred­it Berlinguer. It’s the kind of detail that should raise ques­tions about whether or not the fears of a Sovi­et ori­en­ta­tion were real­ly the dri­ving force behind this covert action:

    ...
    Just as many observers now fear Italy’s new right-wing gov­ern­ment might go soft on Putin’s Rus­sia and dis­rupt the EU, in the mid-1970s British offi­cials feared a sim­i­lar out­come if the PCI joined a coali­tion.

    ...

    In fact, KGB defec­tor Vasili Mitrokhin would lat­er tell British intel­li­gence that while Moscow con­tin­ued to fund the PCI, the Sovi­ets were dis­mayed by Berlinguer and, like the IRD, tried to dis­cred­it him.
    ...

    It was a group effort: the IRD, MI6, and the KGB all effec­tive­ly work­ing to under­mine the func­tion­ing of Italy’s democ­ra­cy. And while the PCI was kept from win­ning an out­right vic­to­ry in that round of vot­ing, it was even­tu­al­ly part of the gov­ern­ment that was formed. And then the Red Brigades’ ‘left-wing’ ter­ror cam­paign rocked Italy. Because that’s also how our world works.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 29, 2022, 4:38 pm

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