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FTR #1022 “Edwin” Manafort, the Coming of Fascism to Ukraine and the “Russia-Gate” Psy-Op

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This broad­cast was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Vic­to­ria Nuland and Svo­bo­da’s Tihany­bok, left, and “Yats” Arsenyuk on the right.

Intro­duc­tion: In the wake of the high-pro­file con­vic­tion of for­mer Trump cam­paign aide Paul Man­afort, we present infor­ma­tion which great­ly flesh­es out his deal­ings with the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment of Vik­tor Yanukovich and the “Haps­burg Group” of Euro­pean politi­cians that were work­ing to tease Ukraine from the Russ­ian sphere of influ­ence into the West­ern orbit.

For pur­pos­es of this pro­gram, we have nick­named Man­afort “Edwin Man­afort,” cit­ing him in the con­text of the oper­a­tions of Edwin Wil­son, whose exploits we ana­lyzed at length in AFA #4.

Far from being the “rogue” crim­i­nal he was report­ed as being, Wil­son was actu­al­ly oper­at­ing on behalf of ele­ments of the CIA in his ter­ror­ist sup­port oper­a­tions. Short­ly before Wilson’s death, a judge sup­port­ed that con­clu­sion and Wil­son was even­tu­al­ly released from prison.

Far from being a “Russ­ian agent,” Paul Man­afort is a U.S. spook who was work­ing with a group of Euro­pean politi­cians known as the Haps­burg Group, as dis­cussed in FTR #1008.

A sto­ry from BNE Intellinews, since tak­en down but avail­able via the Way Back Machine, details Man­afort’s net­work­ing with the Haps­burg Group milieu, pro­vid­ing more details that sup­ple­ment pre­vi­ous dis­cus­sion of the rela­tion­ship.

Most impor­tant­ly, how­ev­er, the arti­cle pro­vides impor­tant infor­ma­tion on Man­afort’s post-Maid­an doings in Ukraine! He spent more time in post-Maid­an Ukraine than before the coup.

Oleh Tihany­bok, leader of the OUN/B suc­ces­sor orga­ni­za­tion Svo­bo­da

Even more impor­tant­ly, the arti­cle pro­vides sig­nif­i­cant details on Man­afort’s pos­si­ble col­lab­o­ra­tors in arrang­ing the vio­lence that led to Yanukovy­ch’s ouster.

Before dis­cussing the sig­nif­i­cant details of Man­afort and his asso­ciates’ pos­si­ble roles in the vio­lence that led to Yanukovy­ch’s ouster, we present the first part of the arti­cle, in order to flesh out the Man­afort-Haps­burg net­work­ing.

Key points of infor­ma­tion include:

  1. Man­afort’s close rela­tion­ship with Ser­hiy Lovochkin, a key aide to Vik­tor Yanukovich and own­er of a pre­mier Ukrain­ian TV sta­tion, and his sis­ter Yulia Lovochk­i­na, who owns an air­line whose planes fer­ried Man­afort in his deal­ings with the Haps­burg group.
  2. The impor­tant role of Ser­hiy Lovochkin and his sis­ter in pro­mot­ing the EU Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment. It was Yanukovich’s even­tu­al rejec­tion of that agree­ment that led to the demon­stra­tions that led up to the Maid­an coup.
  3. The dual role played by Haps­burg Group mem­ber Alexan­der Kras­niews­ki, who was ran the EU’s Ukraine Obser­va­tion Group.
  4. The pro­found degree of involve­ment of Man­afort with the Haps­burg Group.

Of para­mount sig­nif­i­cance for our pur­pos­es, is the behav­ior of Man­afort, Lovochkin, Lovochk­i­na, Dmytro Fir­tash and Vic­to­ria Nuland.

Not­ing the pro­found rela­tion­ship between Man­afort, Ser­hii Lovochkin, Yulia Lovochk­i­na, the Haps­burg Group and the EU, it is impor­tant to eval­u­ate the Manafort/Lovochkin rela­tion­ship in the con­text of the Maid­an snipers. (In FTR #‘s 982, 993, we not­ed evi­dence that the Maid­an shoot­ings may have been a provo­ca­tion. This infor­ma­tion will be reviewed in our next pro­gram.)

  1. ” . . . . The pri­vate jet flights and per­son­al con­nec­tions show that Manafort’s part­ner in this lob­by­ing effort was Yanukovych’s chief of staff Lovochkin. . . . Manafort’s Ukraine engage­ments actu­al­ly increased fol­low­ing Yanukovych’s ouster in Feb­ru­ary 2014. In March to June 2014, he spent a total of 27 days in Ukraine, where­as dur­ing the four pre­ced­ing Euro­maid­an months, Novem­ber-Feb­ru­ary 2014, Man­afort only vis­it­ed Ukraine three times for a total of nine days. . . .”
  2. ” . . . . Lovochkin is the junior part­ner of bil­lion­aire oli­garch Dmytro Fir­tash . . . . Lovochkin and Fir­tash togeth­er also con­trol Ukraine’s largest TV chan­nel, Inter. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Manafort’s con­tin­ued par­tic­i­pa­tion in post-Yanukovych Ukraine also points to his ties to Lovochkin and Fir­tash. While most mem­bers of the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion fled to Rus­sia or were arrest­ed after Feb­ru­ary 2014, Lovochkin has con­tin­ued his polit­i­cal career with impuni­ty, despite hav­ing served at the heart of Yanukovych’s regime for four years. . . .”
  4. ” . . . . Euro­maid­an was trig­gered by events in Kyiv on the night of Novem­ber 29, when police vio­lent­ly dis­persed a small demon­stra­tion of pro-EU stu­dents who were protest­ing after Yanukovych refused to sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment. The vio­lence prompt­ed a huge demon­stra­tion occu­py­ing the heart of Kyiv on Decem­ber 1. . . .”
  5. ” . . . . Accord­ing to mes­sages between the sis­ters dis­cussing Manafort’s actions in Ukraine, it was Manafort’s idea ‘to send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered. Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts [sic] and what not […] As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.’ Manafort’s daugh­ter called her father’s mon­ey ‘blood mon­ey.’ . . .”
  6. ” . . . . The remarks were made by those privy to the deep­est secrets of Manafort’s per­son­al life. They evoke the sus­pi­cion that Man­afort manip­u­lat­ed the Maid­an protests and the police vio­lence to influ­ence inter­na­tion­al opin­ion. The appear­ance of the Man­afort mes­sages in 2016 reignit­ed spec­u­la­tion in Ukraine that none oth­er than Lovochkin insti­gat­ed the attack on the stu­dents’ demon­stra­tion on Novem­ber 29, 2013, to trig­ger out­rage against Yanukovych. . . .”
  7. ” . . . . Some of the time­line fits this inter­pre­ta­tion: On the day before the police attack, reporters not­ed Yulia Lovochk­i­na open­ly frater­nising with the stu­dents on the Maid­an. Lovochkin’s TV crews cov­ered the 4am events close­ly, and Lovochkin imme­di­ate­ly ten­dered his res­ig­na­tion in protest at the police vio­lence. . . .”
  8. ” . . . . The next day, Lovochkin’s TV chan­nel played footage of the worst of the police vio­lence on heavy rota­tion on prime time news. News anchors intoned that Yanukovych had ‘shed the blood of Ukrain­ian chil­dren.’ Where­as the stu­dent protests had attract­ed hun­dreds, protests on Sun­day Decem­ber 1 against the police vio­lence attract­ed hun­dreds of thou­sands. This was the start of Euro­maid­an. . . .”
  9. Of great sig­nif­i­cance as well, is the maneu­ver­ing around a war­rant for the arrest of Ukrain­ian oli­garch and Lovochkin part­ner Dmytro Fir­tash. The role of Vic­to­ria Nuland in this maneu­ver­ing is par­tic­u­lar­ly sig­nif­i­cant: ” . . . . On Octo­ber 30 2013 — as Yanukovych was waver­ing over the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU — the US issued an arrest war­rant for Fir­tash. The US with­drew the arrest war­rant four days lat­er — after US deputy sec­re­tary of state Vic­to­ria Nuland met Yanukovych in Kyiv, and received assur­ances that Yanukovych would sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment, Fir­tash said dur­ing extra­di­tion hear­ings in Vien­na in 2015 that first revealed the details of the case. But come the Vil­nius Sum­mit, Yanukovych failed to sign. The arrest war­rant was reis­sued in March 2014, and Fir­tash was arrest­ed in Vien­na on March 12, 2014. . . . .”

The wed­ding of Prince Max Egon von Hohen­loe-Lan­gen­burg

We also review (in the descrip­tion only) the rela­tion­ship between mem­bers of the Haps­burg fam­i­ly and Euro­pean inte­gra­tion, the Cold War against the Sovi­et Union, con­tem­po­rary Ukraine and the OUN/B.

1a. Begin­ning the descrip­tion, we review links of mem­bers of the Haps­burg dynasty to the events around Man­afort’s deal­ings with Ukraine, for the ben­e­fit of read­ers.

In FTR #1009, we set forth the col­lab­o­ra­tion between the U.S. nation­al secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment and the Haps­burgs, a rela­tion­ship dat­ing to the imme­di­ate post World War I peri­od and cement­ed in the con­text of anti-Com­mu­nis­m/an­ti-Sovi­et activism. Note that Prince Egon Von Hohenloe–who mar­ried into the Haps­burg family–was the key go-between in nego­ti­a­tions between U.S. intel­li­gence, Allen Dulles in par­tic­u­lar and Wal­ter Schel­len­berg of SS intel­li­gence.

  • Mem­bers of the Hab­s­burg dynasty have been involved in the con­text in which “Edwin” Man­afort and the Hab­s­burg Group were oper­at­ing, in order to ease Ukraine into the West­ern, rather than the Russ­ian orbit. ” . . . .The most strik­ing exam­ple of the trend is the appoint­ment this week of Georg von Hab­s­burg, the 32-year-old-grand­son of Emper­or Karl I, to the posi­tion of Hungary’s ambas­sador for Euro­pean Inte­gra­tion. In neigh­bour­ing Aus­tria, the tra­di­tional heart of Hab­s­burg pow­er, Georg’s broth­er, Karl, 35, was recent­ly elect­ed to rep­re­sent the coun­try in the Euro­pean par­lia­ment. In addi­tion to this, he serves as the pres­i­dent of the Aus­trian branch of the Pan-Euro­pean move­ment. . . . .”
  • Jump­ing for­ward some 14 years from our pre­vi­ous arti­cle, we see that a Hab­s­burg princess was anoint­ed as Geor­gia’s ambas­sador to Ger­many. Note that [now for­mer] Geor­gian pres­i­dent Mikheil Saakashvili endorsed her. Saakashvili became, for a time, the gov­er­nor of the Ukrain­ian province of Odessa! Note, also, the role of the Hab­s­burgs in the final phase of the Cold War: “. . . . The heirs to the Hab­s­burg emper­ors helped speed the down­fall of the Sovi­et empire, par­tic­u­larly by arrang­ing the cross-bor­der exo­dus from Hun­gary to Aus­tria in the sum­mer of 1989 that punched the first big hole in the iron cur­tain. . . .”
  • Karl von Hab­s­burg has been active in Ukraine for some years before estab­lish­ing a radio sta­tion. Karl von Hab­s­burg is the head of the UNPO. Note the Ukrain­ian ori­en­ta­tion and influ­ence of Wil­helm von Hab­s­burg, in World War I through the World War II eras, as well as his anti-Sovi­et activism: ” . . . . A mil­i­tary offi­cer by train­ing, Wil­helm sup­ported Ukraine’s inde­pen­dence strug­gle dur­ing World War I. He fought with Ukrain­ian troops against the Rus­sians, and had schemed and cajoled a myr­iad of politi­cians to sup­port his monar­chial aspi­ra­tions. Almost until his death at the hands of the Sovi­ets in 1948 – he was snatched off the streets of Vien­na and trans­ported to a prison in Kyiv for work­ing as an agent against the Sovi­et Union – Wil­helm believed this slice of the family’s empire could be his. . . .”
  • Fast-for­ward­ing again some five years from our pre­vi­ous two arti­cles and one year after the Euro­Maid­an coup we see that actions speak loud­er than words, and Karl’s new Ukrain­ian radio sta­tion says a lot: “Since 20 Jan­u­ary, a tru­ly Euro­pean radio sta­tion [Note this–D.E.] is broad­cast­ing in Ukraine, its main spon­sor, Karl-Hab­s­burg Lothrin­gen, told EurAc­tiv in an exclu­sive inter­view . . . . Karl Hab­s­burg-Lothrin­gen is an Aus­trian politi­cian and head of the House of Hab­s­burg. Since 1986, he has served as Pres­i­dent of the Aus­trian branch of the Paneu­ro­pean Union. . . .”
  • OUN/B World War II Ukrain­ian prime min­is­ter Jaroslav Stet­sko and then Vice-Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush

    As we not­ed, “Plan B” for Ukraine might be termed “Plan OUN/B.” Otto von Hab­s­burg formed the Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil with Jaroslav Stet­zko, the wartime head of the Ukrain­ian Nazi col­lab­o­ra­tionist gov­ern­ment that imple­ment­ed Third Reich eth­nic cleans­ing pro­grams in Ukraine. The EFC was close­ly aligned with the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations, head­ed by Stet­zko. The ABN, as we have seen in the past, is a re-nam­ing of the Com­mit­tee of Sub­ju­gat­ed Nations, a con­sor­tium of East­ern Euro­pean fas­cist groups formed by Hitler in 1943.. . . . The Haps­burg monar­chy helped guide the lead­er­ship in their for­mer pos­ses­sions. The Free­dom Coun­cil was formed by Otto von Haps­burg and Jaroslav Stet­zko at a con­fer­ence in Munich on June 30-July 2 1967, as a coor­di­nat­ing body for orga­ni­za­tions fight­ing com­mu­nism in Europe. EMP H.R.H. Otto von Haps­burg was hon­orary chair­man of the Euro­pean Free­dom Coun­cil, based in Munich, dur­ing the 1980s and allied to the Anti-Bol­she­vik Bloc of Nations (ABN). . . .”

1b. Most impor­tant­ly, how­ev­er, the BNE Intellinews arti­cle pro­vides impor­tant infor­ma­tion on Man­afort’s post-Maid­an doings in Ukraine! He spent more time in post-Maid­an Ukraine than before the coup.

Even more impor­tant­ly, the arti­cle pro­vides sig­nif­i­cant details on Man­afort’s pos­si­ble col­lab­o­ra­tors in arrang­ing the vio­lence that led to Yanukovy­ch’s ouster.

Before dis­cussing the sig­nif­i­cant details of Man­afort and his asso­ciates’ pos­si­ble roles in the vio­lence that led to Yanukovy­ch’s ouster, we present the first part of the arti­cle, in order to flesh out the Man­afort-Haps­burg net­work­ing.

Key points of infor­ma­tion include:

  1. Man­afort’s close rela­tion­ship with Ser­hiy Lovochkin, a key aide to Vik­tor Yanukovich and own­er of a pre­mier Ukrain­ian TV sta­tion, and his sis­ter Yulia Lovochk­i­na, who owns an air­line whose planes fer­ried Man­afort in his deal­ings with the Haps­burg group.
  2. The impor­tant role of Ser­hiy Lovochkin and his sis­ter in pro­mot­ing the EU Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment. It was Yanukovich’s even­tu­al rejec­tion of that agree­ment that led to the demon­stra­tions that led up to the Maid­an coup.
  3. The dual role played by Haps­burg Group mem­ber Alexan­der Kras­niews­ki, who was ran the EU’s Ukraine Obser­va­tion Group.
  4. The pro­found degree of involve­ment of Man­afort with the Haps­burg Group.

“Wheels up: Paul Manafort’s flight records show how he super­vised EU top brass in the run-up to Ukraine rev­o­lu­tion” by Gra­ham Stack in Berlin; BNE Intellinews; 07/02/2018

Infa­mous US lob­by­ist Paul Man­afort organ­ised EU lumi­nar­ies to plead with Brus­sels to sign off on an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with Ukraine with­out the free­ing of jailed oppo­si­tion leader Yulia Tymoshenko in 2012–2013, his flight records, revealed by bne IntelliNews for the first time, show.Man­afort organ­ised the lob­by­ing cam­paign on the orders of Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych, who was oust­ed by mass demon­stra­tions in Kyiv when he even­tu­al­ly failed to sign the deal.

The infor­ma­tion backs up alle­ga­tions made by US spe­cial con­sul Robert Mueller that, as part of the cam­paign to do an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment deal, Man­afort retained EU “super VIPs” to lob­by for Yanukovych.

The flight records also reveal Man­afort remained a play­er in Ukraine after the Maid­an rev­o­lu­tion until as late as 2015 – only months before he signed up as US pres­i­den­tial can­di­date Don­ald Trump’s cam­paign man­ag­er.

And Manafort’s rela­tion­ship to a top Yanukovych aide, who turned against his mas­ter dur­ing the Euro­maid­an move­ment, rais­es ques­tions about the spin doctor’s role in Ukraine’s 2013–14 rev­o­lu­tion.

VIP trips

The sto­ry starts with a key meet­ing in Rome in 2013. Flanked by EU elder states­men, all for­mer heads of their respec­tive states, Yulia Lovochk­i­na, a Ukrain­ian MP, addressed a select gath­er­ing in Rome on the top­ic of Ukraine’s goal of sign­ing an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU.

“Ukraine has made its irrev­o­ca­ble choice and is com­mit­ted to being a part of Europe, part of the Euro­pean Union,” she said, refer­ring to plans to sign an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU at a sum­mit in Vil­nius slat­ed for Novem­ber 2013. “The pres­i­dent of Ukraine reit­er­at­ed that he is ready to imple­ment all the nec­es­sary mea­sures,” she added.

The date of the Rome meet­ing was March 6, 2013, and the speak­er Yulia Lovochk­i­na was none oth­er the sis­ter of Ser­hii Lovochkin, Yanukovych’s pow­er­ful chief of staff. Despite the assur­ances of com­mit­ment to the EU, less than a year lat­er, Yanukovych’s secu­ri­ty forces would mas­sacre 100 pro-EU pro­tes­tors in the heart of Kyiv. Three days lat­er he fled Ukraine for Rus­sia.

Tymoshenko, leader of Ukraine’s oppo­si­tion at the time, was lan­guish­ing in prison. She had lost to Yanukovych in the pres­i­den­tial elec­tions of 2010 – and Yanukovych prompt­ly jailed her in 2011. The inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty were out­raged, call­ing her jail­ing polit­i­cal­ly moti­vat­ed and link­ing her release to the pas­sage of the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment deal.

All the speak­ers at the Rome meet­ing were unit­ed by a desire to do the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment deal, but the under­cur­rent to their speech­es was an insis­tence that the sign­ing of the agree­ment and Tymoshenko’s fate were two sep­a­rate issues, which was in stark con­trast to Brus­sels’ ini­tial line.

In her speech, Lovochk­i­na was explic­it: the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment should be signed inde­pen­dent­ly from Tymoshenko’s case. “It [sign­ing the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment] can­not be held hostage by a sin­gle crim­i­nal case […] by the future of Yulia Tymoshenko because it is an issue con­cern­ing the future of Ukraine,” she said.

As a rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion, Lovochkina’s line was pre­dictable. But more sur­pris­ing­ly was the sup­port she got from the emi­nent Euro­pean VIPs who backed her up. Using a vari­ety of euphemisms, they pushed essen­tial­ly the same argu­ment: that the issue of the EU-Ukraine Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment, and the issue of Tymoshenko’s impris­on­ment, should be kept sep­a­rate from each oth­er.

“The ques­tion of the des­tiny of Ukraine and its Euro­pean future can­not depend on one sin­gle case,” Alfred Gusen­bauer, for­mer chan­cel­lor of Aus­tria, said. “In the case of Tymoshenko it is nec­es­sary to look for solu­tions with­out mak­ing a com­pli­cat­ed sit­u­a­tion more com­pli­cat­ed,” said Alexan­der Kwas­niews­ki, for­mer pres­i­dent of Poland, who was also the senior part­ner in the Euro­pean Parliament’s “mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion” to Ukraine that had been tasked with resolv­ing the impasse caused by Tymoshenko’s impris­on­ment.

Con­clud­ing the con­fer­ence, Roman Pro­di, for­mer prime min­is­ter of Italy and pres­i­dent of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion, argued that the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion to Ukraine — run by Kwas­niews­ki — should exam­ine the Tymoshenko case as “the cor­rect frame­work for a Euro­pean Union that helps pro­motes rights, but at the same time does not close off a rela­tion­ship which is valu­able for Ukraine and Europe.”

As the audi­ence applaud­ed the awk­ward group­ing on the podi­um, one man in the audi­ence may have been par­tic­u­lar­ly hap­py: US spin doc­tor Paul Man­afort, who had flown to Rome that day with Lovochk­i­na in one of the Lovochkin family’s pri­vate jets. Man­afort had assem­bled the speak­ers sit­ting in front of him on the podi­um, and was pulling the strings at the meet­ing.

Jail­ing Yulia Tymoshenko

A few months ear­li­er West­ern lead­ers and EU offi­cials had made Ukraine’s sign­ing of an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment con­di­tion­al on the release of Tymoshenko.

Man­afort was Yanukovych’s ace in the cam­paign to win over the west.

In part as a result of Manafort’s lob­by­ing efforts, by Novem­ber 2013 the EU had agreed to sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with Ukraine in Vil­nius, with­out hav­ing secured Tymoshenko’s release. Instead she was to be allowed to leave Ukraine for med­ical treat­ment, exil­ing her from Ukraine.

This was Manafort’s hour of tri­umph. But Russ­ian fury at the thought of Ukraine slip­ping from its grasp meant that it was short-lived. On Novem­ber 21, 2013, Ukraine’s gov­ern­ment announced it would not sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU on Novem­ber 28.

The Haps­burg PR

On Feb­ru­ary 28, US Spe­cial Coun­sel Robert Mueller indict­ed Man­afort for ille­gal lob­by­ing. The details of the indict­ment point to Man­afort pulling the strings at the March 6 Rome con­fer­ence.

Mueller’s indict­ment states that Man­afort “secret­ly retained a group for for­mer senior Euro­pean politi­cians to take posi­tions favourable to Ukraine. The plan was for the for­mer politi­cians, infor­mal­ly called the “Haps­burg Group,” to appear to be pro­vid­ing an inde­pen­dent assess­ment of the gov­ern­ment of Ukraine actions, when in fact they were paid lob­by­ists for Ukraine.”

Accord­ing to the indict­ment Man­afort paid over €2mn to the “super VIPs” from off­shore accounts in 2012 and 2013.

While the politi­cians were unnamed, the indict­ment spec­i­fies a Euro­pean “chan­cel­lor” as head­ing the group. An ini­tial­ly unredact­ed doc­u­ment filed on June 13 iden­ti­fied for­mer Aus­tri­an chan­cel­lor Gusen­bauer by name as part of the Haps­burg group.

The doc­u­ment was a mem­o­ran­dum to Man­afort authored in June 2012 by Ital­ian-based US jour­nal­ist Alan Fried­man — the man who chaired the March 2013 con­fer­ence in Rome.

In the memo, Fried­man sug­gest­ed recruit­ing Kwas­niews­ki to the group. But he not­ed that Kwas­niews­ki would have a con­flict of inter­ests because Kwas­niews­ki was the lead­ing fig­ure in the Euro­pean Parliament’s mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion to Ukraine.

The mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion was tasked with judg­ing whether Ukraine was fit to sign an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the Euro­pean Union. A leader of the mon­i­tor­ing to mis­sion could hard­ly also pub­licly lob­by in favour of Ukraine.

Fried­man then sug­gest­ed to Man­afort that Kwas­niews­ki appear at con­fer­ences togeth­er with Gusen­bauer, with con­fer­ences planned for Berlin, Rome and Brus­sels. Those recruit­ed for the group would “take direc­tion from us infor­mal­ly and via Alfred [Gusen­bauer].”

“I par­tic­i­pat­ed in sev­er­al inter­na­tion­al con­fer­ences as a speak­er and for this rea­son, like oth­er par­tic­i­pants, I have received a hon­o­rar­i­um,” Kwas­niews­ki acknowl­edges. “I have not received any finan­cial grat­i­fi­ca­tion from the [Man­afort-linked lob­by­ists] Cen­tre for Mod­ern Ukraine or Mer­cury, I have nev­er received any sug­ges­tions for my con­tri­bu­tions from Mr. Man­afort, Mr. Fried­man or any­one else. In all my polit­i­cal activ­i­ties I have pre­sent­ed my own opin­ions,” Kwas­niews­ki added.

In Kwasniewski’s ghost-writ­ten account of his activ­i­ties in Ukraine 2012–2014, he describes hav­ing had a “dou­ble-hat­ted role … as Ukraine’s ambas­sador in Europe and the Unit­ed States and as ambas­sador of the transat­lantic com­mu­ni­ty in Ukraine.”

“It [the mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion] always kept an eye on its inde­pen­dence and impar­tial­i­ty […] not allow­ing any side to use the mis­sion for its own pur­pos­es […] it is our belief that this inde­pen­dence and impar­tial­i­ty was ful­ly achieved,” Euro­pean Par­lia­ment press offi­cer Sanne De Ryck said.

”Alexan­der Kwas­niews­ki had a dou­ble role, work­ing for Ukrain­ian oli­garchs and the EU […] This cre­ates con­flicts of inter­est, which is indeed prob­lem­at­ic,” Ste­fan Meis­ter, expert at the Ger­man Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­tions told bne IntelliNews.

Flight-track­ing Man­afort

bne IntelliNews obtained flight data for Manafort’s Ukraine vis­its for those years. His flight data made it pos­si­ble to track his lob­by­ing activ­i­ties in 2012–2015, in the run-up to the Euro­maid­an rev­o­lu­tion of Feb­ru­ary 2014 and its after­math.

The flight data points to inten­sive Man­afort super­vi­sion of the “Haps­burg Group” mem­bers such as Gusen­bauer, Kwas­niews­ki, and Pro­di. Man­afort fre­quent­ly flew on the Lovochkin family’s per­son­al jets between Ukraine and Europe to attend their con­fer­ences or meet indi­vid­u­al­ly.

Manafort’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive Jason Mal­oni declined to com­ment on the flight data. A source close to Man­afort, how­ev­er, argued that he had “con­sis­tent­ly advo­cat­ed for Ukraine to have clos­er ties to the West.”

Kwas­niews­ki con­firmed this. “He [Man­afort] was in favour of sign­ing the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment.”

Yulia Lovochk­i­na acknowl­edged own­ing an exec­u­tive jet busi­ness. “Its ser­vices were open to every­one on the mar­ket,” she said. She also acknowl­edged fly­ing with Man­afort to the Rome con­fer­ence on one of the planes. She “paid for the tick­et her­self and had her own agen­da for the trip,” she said.

Man­afort lost lit­tle time after the cre­ation of the Haps­burg group in June 2012. On Sep­tem­ber 20, 2012, Gusen­berg and Pro­di spoke at a con­fer­ence organ­ised by the Otto Ren­ner Insti­tut. Man­afort flew to Vien­na on its con­clu­sion the fol­low­ing day.

On Octo­ber 23, 2012, he flew on a one-day trip from Kyiv to Berlin, where the Haps­burg group — includ­ing Kwas­niews­ki — were appear­ing at a con­fer­ence organ­ised by the East­ern Econ­o­my Com­mit­tee. Kwas­niews­ki con­firmed a meet­ing with Man­afort here.

By the end of 2012, the lob­by­ing effort was begin­ning to pay off. The crown­ing came on Decem­ber 18, 2012, when Manafort’s vis­it to Kyiv coin­cid­ed with the 11th Cox-Kwas­niews­ki mis­sion vis­it. Kwas­niews­ki con­firmed meet­ing Man­afort on this occa­sion.

Yanukovych, orig­i­nal­ly sched­uled to be vis­it­ing Moscow, can­celled on the Krem­lin with no notice to meet Cox and Kwas­niews­ki

In return, Cox and Kwas­niews­ki heaped praise on Ukraine’s then prime min­is­ter Myko­la Azarov on the occa­sion of his birth­day in an open let­ter. This was a huge turn­around com­pared to sev­en months ear­li­er, when Pres­i­dent of the Euro­pean Coun­cil Her­man van Rompuy had told jour­nal­ists that Azarov “should stay at home” instead of vis­it­ing Brus­sels.

The road to Vil­nius

The lob­by­ing effort accel­er­at­ed in 2013, start­ing with the March 2013 Rome con­fer­ence. The EU’s Vil­nius sum­mit slat­ed for Novem­ber 2013 was approach­ing where Ukraine was expect­ed to sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment.

On May 15–17, 2013, Man­afort flew again for a week­end in War­saw and Brus­sels, return­ing on a Lovochkin exec­u­tive jet. In War­saw he met one-on-one with Kwas­niews­ki. On May 17, Pro­di and Gusen­bauer were in Brus­sels for the Ukraine on the road to Vil­nius con­fer­ence.

Two months lat­er, Man­afort was again air bound on a Lovochkin plane, on a one day vis­it from Frank­furt, land­ing from the US, bound for the Crimea on July 29. He flew back from Crimea to Frank­furt on the same day.

One day before, Rus­sia and Ukraine had joint­ly cel­e­brat­ed the Sovi­et-era Navy Day with a shared dis­play of their two fleets that was attend­ed by Putin and Yanukovych. Join manoeu­vres dis­played the close con­tacts between the top brass of the two fleets that pre­fig­ured Russia’s annex­a­tion of the Crimean penin­su­la only nine months lat­er.

But it was not for Navy Day that Man­afort flew to Crimea, togeth­er with his assis­tant Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, one day lat­er. His mis­sion was to bol­ster Yanukovych’s deci­sion to go for Europe.

Cox and Kwas­nievs­ki arrived in Crimea on the same day as Man­afort. On the morn­ing of July 30, they were sched­uled to meet with Yanukovych in Crimea for anoth­er ses­sion on Tymoshenko’s fate. Kwas­niews­ki said Man­afort did not meet with the mon­i­tor­ing mis­sion in Crimea that day.

But as the pace of events quick­ened in sum­mer and autumn 2013, Man­afort had a series of one-to-one meet­ings with Kwas­niews­ki in War­saw, the for­mer Pol­ish pres­i­dent acknowl­edged.

These cul­mi­nat­ed in Man­afort fly­ing to War­saw on Octo­ber 18 — on Lovochkin’s plane — to meet Kwas­niews­ki. Lat­er the same day Yanukovych said he would be ready to let Tymoshenko depart to Ger­many for treat­ment, as soon as Ukraine’s par­lia­ment passed leg­is­la­tion enabling this.

1b. Not­ing the pro­found rela­tion­ship between Man­afort, Ser­hii Lovochkin, Yulia Lovochk­i­na, the Haps­burg Group and the EU, it is impor­tant to eval­u­ate the Manafort/Lovochkin rela­tion­ship in the con­text of the Maid­an snipers:

  1. ” . . . . The pri­vate jet flights and per­son­al con­nec­tions show that Manafort’s part­ner in this lob­by­ing effort was Yanukovych’s chief of staff Lovochkin. . . . Manafort’s Ukraine engage­ments actu­al­ly increased fol­low­ing Yanukovych’s ouster in Feb­ru­ary 2014. In March to June 2014, he spent a total of 27 days in Ukraine, where­as dur­ing the four pre­ced­ing Euro­maid­an months, Novem­ber-Feb­ru­ary 2014, Man­afort only vis­it­ed Ukraine three times for a total of nine days. . . .”
  2. ” . . . . Lovochkin is the junior part­ner of bil­lion­aire oli­garch Dmytro Fir­tash . . . . Lovochkin and Fir­tash togeth­er also con­trol Ukraine’s largest TV chan­nel, Inter. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Manafort’s con­tin­ued par­tic­i­pa­tion in post-Yanukovych Ukraine also points to his ties to Lovochkin and Fir­tash. While most mem­bers of the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion fled to Rus­sia or were arrest­ed after Feb­ru­ary 2014, Lovochkin has con­tin­ued his polit­i­cal career with impuni­ty, despite hav­ing served at the heart of Yanukovych’s regime for four years. . . .”
  4. ” . . . . Euro­maid­an was trig­gered by events in Kyiv on the night of Novem­ber 29, when police vio­lent­ly dis­persed a small demon­stra­tion of pro-EU stu­dents who were protest­ing after Yanukovych refused to sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment. The vio­lence prompt­ed a huge demon­stra­tion occu­py­ing the heart of Kyiv on Decem­ber 1. . . .”
  5. ” . . . . Accord­ing to mes­sages between the sis­ters dis­cussing Manafort’s actions in Ukraine, it was Manafort’s idea ‘to send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered. Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts [sic] and what not […] As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.’ Manafort’s daugh­ter called her father’s mon­ey ‘blood mon­ey.’ . . .”
  6. ” . . . . The remarks were made by those privy to the deep­est secrets of Manafort’s per­son­al life. They evoke the sus­pi­cion that Man­afort manip­u­lat­ed the Maid­an protests and the police vio­lence to influ­ence inter­na­tion­al opin­ion. The appear­ance of the Man­afort mes­sages in 2016 reignit­ed spec­u­la­tion in Ukraine that none oth­er than Lovochkin insti­gat­ed the attack on the stu­dents’ demon­stra­tion on Novem­ber 29, 2013, to trig­ger out­rage against Yanukovych. . . .”
  7. ” . . . . Some of the time­line fits this inter­pre­ta­tion: On the day before the police attack, reporters not­ed Yulia Lovochk­i­na open­ly frater­nising with the stu­dents on the Maid­an. Lovochkin’s TV crews cov­ered the 4am events close­ly, and Lovochkin imme­di­ate­ly ten­dered his res­ig­na­tion in protest at the police vio­lence. . . .”
  8. ” . . . . The next day, Lovochkin’s TV chan­nel played footage of the worst of the police vio­lence on heavy rota­tion on prime time news. News anchors intoned that Yanukovych had ‘shed the blood of Ukrain­ian chil­dren.’ Where­as the stu­dent protests had attract­ed hun­dreds, protests on Sun­day Decem­ber 1 against the police vio­lence attract­ed hun­dreds of thou­sands. This was the start of Euro­maid­an. . . .”
  9. Of great sig­nif­i­cance as well, is the maneu­ver­ing around a war­rant for the arrest of Ukrain­ian oli­garch and Lovochkin part­ner Dmytro Fir­tash. The role of Vic­to­ria Nuland in this maneu­ver­ing is par­tic­u­lar­ly sig­nif­i­cant: ” . . . . On Octo­ber 30 2013 — as Yanukovych was waver­ing over the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU — the US issued an arrest war­rant for Fir­tash. The US with­drew the arrest war­rant four days lat­er — after US deputy sec­re­tary of state Vic­to­ria Nuland met Yanukovych in Kyiv, and received assur­ances that Yanukovych would sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment, Fir­tash said dur­ing extra­di­tion hear­ings in Vien­na in 2015 that first revealed the details of the case. But come the Vil­nius Sum­mit, Yanukovych failed to sign. The arrest war­rant was reis­sued in March 2014, and Fir­tash was arrest­ed in Vien­na on March 12, 2014. . . . .”

“Wheels up: Paul Manafort’s flight records show how he super­vised EU top brass in the run-up to Ukraine rev­o­lu­tion” by Gra­ham Stack in Berlin; BNE Intellinews; 07/02/2018

. . . . The Fir­tash con­nec­tion

The pri­vate jet flights and per­son­al con­nec­tions show that Manafort’s part­ner in this lob­by­ing effort was Yanukovych’s chief of staff Lovochkin.

Lovochkin said that he had also “always been a strong sup­port­er of the Euro­pean inte­gra­tion of Ukraine,” but denied that he had super­vised Manafort’s lob­by­ing. Kwas­niews­ki con­firmed that Lovochkin was in the pro-EU camp.

Lovochkin is the junior part­ner of bil­lion­aire oli­garch Dmytro Fir­tash who made his for­tune trad­ing gas via noto­ri­ous com­pa­ny Rosukren­er­go, who had made his for­tune trad­ing gas via noto­ri­ous com­pa­ny Rosukren­er­go, that alleged­ly skimmed off hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars for the Russ­ian and Ukrain­ian elite. Lovochkin and Fir­tash togeth­er also con­trol Ukraine’s largest TV chan­nel, Inter.

Manafort’s con­tin­ued par­tic­i­pa­tion in post-Yanukovych Ukraine also points to his ties to Lovochkin and Fir­tash. While most mem­bers of the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion fled to Rus­sia or were arrest­ed after Feb­ru­ary 2014, Lovochkin has con­tin­ued his polit­i­cal career with impuni­ty, despite hav­ing served at the heart of Yanukovych’s regime for four years.

Post Yanukovych’s oust­ing, Man­afort may have attend­ed top-lev­el Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal meet­ings where the oli­garchs decid­ed who would gov­ern.

On March 25 he flew out of Vien­na to Kyiv. His vis­it to Vien­na had coin­cid­ed with a cru­cial meet­ing between Petro Poroshenko and Vien­na-based Fir­tash in that city. Lovochkin had also attend­ed the meet­ing at which Fir­tash agreed to back Poroshenko for the post of pres­i­dent, rather than for­mer box­er Vitaly Klichko, effec­tive­ly crown­ing Poroshenko pres­i­dent.

In Novem­ber 13, 2014, as details of a new gov­ern­ment were being ham­mered out after the par­lia­men­tary elec­tions, the flight data records that Man­afort flew from Kyiv to Nice, France, on a pri­vate jet with Ihor Tara­siuk, the busi­ness part­ner of Poroshenko’s first deputy chief of staff, Yuri Kosiuk. Tara­siuk denied tak­ing the flight to bne IntelliNews, although he con­firmed the per­son­al data pro­vid­ed was cor­rect.

Manafort’s Ukraine engage­ments actu­al­ly increased fol­low­ing Yanukovych’s ouster in Feb­ru­ary 2014. In March to June 2014, he spent a total of 27 days in Ukraine, where­as dur­ing the four pre­ced­ing Euro­maid­an months, Novem­ber-Feb­ru­ary 2014, Man­afort only vis­it­ed Ukraine three times for a total of nine days.

Accord­ing to the Mueller indict­ment, Man­afort was engaged as lob­by­ist for Lovochkin’s new par­ty Oppo­si­tion Bloc, wide­ly regard­ed as fund­ed by Fir­tash. This explains Manafort’s long stays in Ukraine dur­ing the post-Maid­an elec­tion cam­paigns, accord­ing to the flight data: one week pri­or to the pres­i­den­tial elec­tions in May 2014, and one month pri­or to the par­lia­men­tary elec­tions in Octo­ber 2014.

Manafort’s flight data con­cludes with a four-week stay in Ukraine through to Octo­ber 27, 2015. This peri­od coin­cides with the cam­paign for region­al elec­tions, which cement­ed Lovochkin’s Oppo­si­tion Bloc as a dom­i­nant force across south and east Ukraine. Only months after the close of elec­tion­eer­ing in con­flict-wracked Ukraine, Man­afort was elec­tion­eer­ing in the US, on behalf of the con­tro­ver­sial can­di­date for the world’s most pow­er­ful office.

Maid­an mys­tery

Manafort’s flight data sheds no light how­ev­er on his rela­tion­ship, if any, to the Euro­maid­an rev­o­lu­tion. Euro­maid­an was trig­gered by events in Kyiv on the night of Novem­ber 29, when police vio­lent­ly dis­persed a small demon­stra­tion of pro-EU stu­dents who were protest­ing after Yanukovych refused to sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment. The vio­lence prompt­ed a huge demon­stra­tion occu­py­ing the heart of Kyiv on Decem­ber 1.

All we have are cryp­tic mes­sages exchanged between Manafort’s daugh­ters, one of whose phones was hacked in 2016. Man­afort con­firmed the hack and cor­rob­o­rat­ed some of the mes­sages to Politi­co.

Accord­ing to mes­sages between the sis­ters dis­cussing Manafort’s actions in Ukraine, it was Manafort’s idea “to send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered. Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts [sic] and what not […] As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.” Manafort’s daugh­ter called her father’s mon­ey “blood mon­ey.”

The remarks were made by those privy to the deep­est secrets of Manafort’s per­son­al life. They evoke the sus­pi­cion that Man­afort manip­u­lat­ed the Maid­an protests and the police vio­lence to influ­ence inter­na­tion­al opin­ion.

The appear­ance of the Man­afort mes­sages in 2016 reignit­ed spec­u­la­tion in Ukraine that none oth­er than Lovochkin insti­gat­ed the attack on the stu­dents’ demon­stra­tion on Novem­ber 29, 2013, to trig­ger out­rage against Yanukovych.

Some of the time­line fits this inter­pre­ta­tion: On the day before the police attack, reporters not­ed Yulia Lovochk­i­na open­ly frater­nising with the stu­dents on the Maid­an. Lovochkin’s TV crews cov­ered the 4am events close­ly, and Lovochkin imme­di­ate­ly ten­dered his res­ig­na­tion in protest at the police vio­lence.

The next day, Lovochkin’s TV chan­nel played footage of the worst of the police vio­lence on heavy rota­tion on prime time news. News anchors intoned that Yanukovych had “shed the blood of Ukrain­ian chil­dren.” Where­as the stu­dent protests had attract­ed hun­dreds, protests on Sun­day Decem­ber 1 against the police vio­lence attract­ed hun­dreds of thou­sands. This was the start of Euro­maid­an.

Author­i­ta­tive chron­i­cler of the Euro­maid­an rev­o­lu­tion Sonya Koshk­i­na, as well as Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tors, have argued it was anti-EU hard­lin­ers who were respon­si­ble for attack­ing the stu­dents.

But on the third anniver­sary of events, Novem­ber 29, 2016, Ukraine’s inte­ri­or min­is­ter Arsen Avakov told the BBC that “Lovochkin was the author of the dis­per­sal of the [stu­dents’] Maid­an, and should be in prison, not in par­lia­ment.”

Lovochkin denies any role in the attack on the stu­dents. “I sub­mit­ted my res­ig­na­tion because of Pres­i­dent Yanukovych’s deci­sion to decline sign­ing the Deep and Com­pre­hen­sive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) […] and the use of force against peace­ful pro­test­ers in Kyiv fol­low­ing it,” he said.

What was Lovochkin’s moti­va­tion to break with Yanukovych so abrupt­ly over Europe, whether or not he was involved in the vio­lence? Accord­ing to Koshk­i­na, Lovochkin was “a place­man of Fir­tash and one of the archi­tects of the regime,” hard­ly a nation­al­ist or free­dom-lov­ing lib­er­al. But in June 2013 the US had indict­ed Fir­tash for alleged bribery in India. On Octo­ber 30 2013 — as Yanukovych was waver­ing over the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with the EU — the US issued an arrest war­rant for Fir­tash.

The US with­drew the arrest war­rant four days lat­er — after US deputy sec­re­tary of state Vic­to­ria Nuland met Yanukovych in Kyiv, and received assur­ances that Yanukovych would sign the Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment, Fir­tash said dur­ing extra­di­tion hear­ings in Vien­na in 2015 that first revealed the details of the case. But come the Vil­nius Sum­mit, Yanukovych failed to sign. The arrest war­rant was reis­sued in March 2014, and Fir­tash was arrest­ed in Vien­na on March 12, 2014. . . . .

 

Discussion

17 comments for “FTR #1022 “Edwin” Manafort, the Coming of Fascism to Ukraine and the “Russia-Gate” Psy-Op”

  1. Well this is awe­some: Ivan Katchanovs­ki, a Cana­di­an aca­d­e­m­ic who has been foren­si­cal­ly study­ing the evi­dence of the Maid­an sniper attacks and con­clud­ed that much of the sniper fire was com­ing from Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings, has a won­der­ful­ly suc­cinct dig­i­tal mul­ti­me­dia ‘poster’ (an ‘iPoster’) for his work that was pre­sent­ed dur­ing the 2018 Amer­i­can Polit­i­cal Sci­ence Asso­ci­a­tion con­fer­ence in Boston. It’s like most aca­d­e­m­ic posters that gives a high lev­el overview of the find­ings of his research and filled with embed­ded videos. You can view it Here’s the con­tents of the poster. Be sure to check out the numer­ous images and videos includ­ed in the actu­al iPoster online:

    The Maid­an Mas­sacre in Ukraine: Rev­e­la­tions from Tri­als and Inves­ti­ga­tions

    Ivan Katchanovs­ki, Ph.D.
    Uni­ver­si­ty of Ottawa

    Pre­vi­ous Stud­ies

    The Maid­an mas­sacre in Ukraine in Feb­ru­ary 2014 led to or con­tributed to

    * Vio­lent over­throw of the semi-demo­c­ra­t­ic pro-Russ­ian gov­ern­ment
    * Russ­ian annex­a­tion of Crimea
    * Civ­il war in Don­bas
    * Russ­ian covert mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion in Don­bas in sup­port of sep­a­ratists
    * Con­flict between the West and Rus­sia

    (See Black and Johns, 2016; Hahn, 2017; Katchanovs­ki, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Kudelia, 2016, 2018)

    Only a few pre­vi­ous schol­ar­ly stud­ies of this cru­cial case of polit­i­cal vio­lence

    * All by polit­i­cal sci­en­tists

    Most pre­vi­ous stud­ies find that this was a false flag mass killing involv­ing sec­tions of Maid­an lead­er­ship and far right and involved the mas­sacre of the police (Hahn, 2017; Katchanovs­ki, 2015, 2016)

    Kudelia (2018) argues that the vio­lence was ini­ti­at­ed by the Maid­an pro­test­ers, who killed and wound­ed many police­men and that the Berkut police then mas­sa­cred unarmed pro­test­ers in turn

    * But the pre­vi­ous stud­ies did not exam­ine sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly evi­dence revealed by Maid­an mas­sacre tri­als and inves­ti­ga­tions
    * Many schol­ars uncrit­i­cal­ly cit­ed Maid­an politi­cians, gov­ern­ment offi­cials, and the media con­cern­ing this mas­sacre with­out exam­in­ing evi­dence, includ­ing from tri­al and inves­ti­ga­tions, for exam­ple, mis­at­tribut­ing the mas­sacre to gov­ern­ment snipers (See, for exam­ple, Marples and Mills, 2015; Wil­son, 2014).

    Ukrain­ian and West­ern gov­ern­ments and media dom­i­nant nar­ra­tives

    * Gov­ern­ment snipers and/or a Berkut anti-riot police unit mas­sa­cred peace­ful Maid­an pro­test­ers on a Yanukovych order
    * Killed pro­test­ers com­mem­o­rat­ed by the gov­ern­ment and media in Ukraine as nation­al heroes
    * Lim­it­ed media report­ing and offi­cial state­ments about the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al even though this is the tri­al of the cen­tu­ry in Ukraine
    * Charges against Yanukovych, his inter­nal affairs and secu­ri­ty min­is­ters, and a spe­cial Berkut unit are gen­er­al­ly tak­en at face val­ue
    * With some lim­it­ed excep­tions, no media report­ing or offi­cials state­ments about rev­e­la­tions of evi­dence at the tri­al regard­ing snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled loca­tions or such evi­dence is dis­missed as a con­spir­a­cy the­o­ry or fake

    Research Ques­tion & Data

    Research Ques­tion

    * What does evi­dence made pub­lic by the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­als and Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tions reveal about which of the par­ties of the con­flict was involved in this mass killing?

    Data and Method­ol­o­gy

    * Sev­er­al hun­dred hours of online video record­ings of Maid­an mas­sacre tri­als
    * Over 2,000 court deci­sions con­cern­ing inves­ti­ga­tion of the mas­sacre from the offi­cial court deci­sions data­base in Ukraine
    * Focus on the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al of 5 Berkut police­men charged with the mas­sacre on Feb­ru­ary 20, 2014

    Qual­i­ta­tive and quan­ti­ta­tive inter­views analy­sis

    * Exam­ines tri­al and inves­ti­ga­tion tes­ti­monies of more than 100 wound­ed pro­test­ers and rel­a­tives of the killed pro­test­ers, Yanukovych, and his Inter­nal Troops com­man­der
    * Tes­ti­monies by wit­ness­es at the tri­al, inves­ti­ga­tion, media, and social media

    Con­tent analy­sis

    * Analy­sis and syn­chro­niza­tion of videos, audio record­ings, and pho­tos of the Maid­an mas­sacre shown dur­ing the tri­al, in the media, and social media
    * Com­par­isons of the tri­al and inves­ti­ga­tion data with oth­er evi­dence, such as syn­chro­nised videos of the mas­sacre and tes­ti­monies of wit­ness­es in the media and social media
    * Com­par­i­son with results of foren­sic bal­lis­tic and med­ical exam­i­na­tions and inves­tiga­tive exper­i­ments made pub­lic at the tri­al
    * Online video appen­dix­es with Eng­lish-lan­guage sub­ti­tles con­tain rel­e­vant video seg­ments from the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al, the media, and social media for analy­sis and repli­ca­tion pur­pos­es

    Rev­e­la­tions about Snipers
    The Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al & inves­ti­ga­tion revealed var­i­ous evi­dence that Maid­an pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 20 were mas­sa­cred by snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings

    * At least 25 out of 66 wound­ed Maid­an pro­test­ers, with whose shoot­ing Berkut police­men are charged, tes­ti­fied at the tri­al & inves­ti­ga­tion that they were shot from Maid­an-con­trolled buildings/ areas & 29 tes­ti­fied that they wit­nessed snipers there or were told about them by oth­er pro­test­ers (See Video Appen­dix D)
    [see video]
    * Many wit­ness tes­ti­monies at the tri­al & inves­ti­ga­tion about snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings (Video Appen­dix E)
    [see video]

    Such tes­ti­monies are con­sis­tent with some 200 wit­ness tes­ti­monies in media and social media about snipers in Maid­an areas, includ­ing over 70 video tes­ti­monies.

    * Six Maid­an politi­cians and activists pub­licly tes­ti­fied that they wit­nessed involve­ment of spe­cif­ic top Maid­an lead­ers in the mas­sacre, such as their deploy­ment of snipers and evac­u­a­tion of snipers who were cap­tured by Maid­an-pro­test­ers
    * An ex-spon­sor of the Right Sec­tor to tes­ti­fy at the tri­al

    (See Video Appen­dix B).
    [see video]

    They are also gen­er­al­ly con­sis­tent with tes­ti­monies of 5 Geor­gian ex-mil­i­tary in Ital­ian, Israeli, Mace­don­ian, & Russ­ian media and their depo­si­tions pro­vid­ed to Berkut lawyers for the tri­al. They tes­ti­fied that their groups received weapons, pay­ments, & orders to mas­sacre both police and pro­test­ers from spe­cif­ic Maid­an and Geor­gian politi­cians & instruc­tions from a far-right linked ex-US Army sniper and then saw Geor­gian, Baltic States, and spe­cif­ic far right Right Sec­tor-linked Ukrain­ian snipers shoot­ing from spe­cif­ic Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings (see Ital­ian & Israeli TV doc­u­men­taries (Eng­lish lan­guage ver­sions))
    [see video]
    [see video]
    [see video]

    These Geor­gians revealed in the media their names, pass­port num­bers & bor­der stamps, copies of plane tick­ets, videos and pho­tos in Ukraine or Geor­gian mil­i­tary, and oth­er evi­dence in sup­port of their tes­ti­monies

    * Iden­ti­ties, pres­ence in Ukraine, and Geor­gian mil­i­tary ser­vice of some of them cor­rob­o­rat­ed by evi­dence & oth­er sources
    * Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al deci­sion autho­rised two of them tes­ti­fy at the tri­al via video link from Arme­nia

    The Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office inves­ti­ga­tion revealed in Octo­ber 2016 that one of the lead­ers of far right Svo­bo­da and its mem­ber of the par­lia­ment occu­pied a Hotel Ukraina room from which a sniper in report­ed Maid­an style green hel­met was filmed shoot­ing by BBC and ICTV in the direc­tion of the Maid­an pro­test­ers and the BBC jour­nal­ists. (See Video Appen­dix A)

    Three Maid­an snipers admit­ted in BBC and Ukrain­ian media inter­views that the mas­sacre on Feb­ru­ary 20 start­ed with them and oth­er Maid­an snipers shoot­ing at the police from the Music Con­ser­va­to­ry and forc­ing the police units to flee the Maid­an square which they besieged (see BBC report and Katchanovs­ki, 2015b)
    [see video]

    * Inves­ti­ga­tion deter­mined that one of them killed two police­men dur­ing the mas­sacre from a hunt­ing ver­sion of Kalash­nikov assault rifle
    * Kyiv court deci­sions revealed that the Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office of Ukraine inves­ti­gat­ed lead­ers and mem­bers of the far right Right Sec­tor, neo-Nazi “War­riors of Nar­nia,” Sok­il, a youth affil­i­ate of far right Svo­bo­da par­ty, far right Brat­st­vo and oth­er uniden­ti­fied Maid­an activists for their sus­pect­ed involve­ment in the killing and wound­ing of the Inte­ri­or Troops ser­vice­men and the Berkut police on Feb­ru­ary 18–20 (see, for exam­ple, Ukhvala, 2016a).
    * Right Sec­tor mem­bers match killers of two Inte­ri­or Troops mem­bers on Feb­ru­ary 18

    The Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office of Ukraine inves­ti­ga­tion deter­mined based on their tes­ti­monies and inves­tiga­tive exper­i­ments that almost half of pro­test­ers (77 out of 157) were wound­ed on Feb­ru­ary 20 from oth­er sec­tors than the Berkut police and did not charge Berkut with their shoot­ing

    * Since the inves­ti­ga­tion deter­mined that gov­ern­ment snipers did not mas­sacre the Maid­an pro­test­ers this sug­gests that these pro­test­ers were wound­ed from the Maid­an-con­trolled buildings/areas
    * E,g., a female #Maid­an medic, whose wound­ing on Maid­an was wide­ly blamed by West­ern & Ukrain­ian media and politi­cians on gov­ern­ment snipers
    [see video]

    No such tes­ti­monies admit­ting involve­ment in the mas­sacre or knowl­edge of such involve­ment by the Berkut police­men, ex-police and secu­ri­ty ser­vices com­man­ders, and ex-Yanukovych gov­ern­ment offi­cials

    * This includes both those charged with the mas­sacre and those not charged and serv­ing the new Maid­an gov­ern­ment or remain­ing in Ukraine
    * Charged Berkut police­men denied that they mas­sa­cred pro­test­ers
    Their lawyers argue at the tri­al that both pro­test­ers and police were mas­sa­cred by snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings
    * Yanukovych and his com­man­der of Inter­nal Troops tes­ti­fied at the tri­al as wit­ness­es via video link from Rus­sia the same and that they did not give orders to mas­sacre pro­test­ers.
    * They were only charged in 2017 in absen­tia with order­ing the mas­sacre
    * Such tes­ti­monies of police­men and senior ex-gov­ern­ment offi­cials pub­licly accused or charged with the mass killing are in line with their per­son­al, polit­i­cal, and mon­e­tary incen­tives but they are gen­er­al­ly con­sis­tent with var­i­ous oth­er evi­dence

    No spe­cif­ic evi­dence of orders by then pres­i­dent Yanukovych, his inter­nal affairs and secu­ri­ty ser­vice min­is­ters, or police and secu­ri­ty ser­vice com­man­ders to mas­sacre unarmed pro­test­ers has been revealed at the tri­als or made pub­lic by the pros­e­cu­tion or oth­er sources

    A minor­i­ty of wound­ed pro­test­ers tes­ti­fied at the tri­al and inves­ti­ga­tion that they were shot by gov­ern­ment snipers or Berkut police

    * Most of these tes­ti­monies are not con­sis­tent with foren­sic med­ical exam­i­na­tions, in par­tic­u­lar, about their steep/slope wound direc­tions and their posi­tions in videos, inves­ti­ga­tion find­ing that pro­test­ers were not mas­sa­cred by gov­ern­ment snipers
    * There is lack of such foren­sic exam­i­na­tions, videos, and wit­ness tes­ti­monies is a many of these cas­es or the evi­dence is con­tra­dic­to­ry
    * Such tes­ti­monies by wound­ed Maid­an pro­test­ers are much more like­ly to be biased because of per­son­al, mon­e­tary and polit­i­cal incen­tives to cor­rob­o­rate the dom­i­nant gov­ern­ment, media and pros­e­cu­tion nar­ra­tive of the mas­sacre com­pared to oppo­site incen­tive of tes­ti­monies by wound­ed Maid­an pro­test­ers about snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings and areas

    Inves­ti­ga­tion by the Mil­i­tary Pros­e­cu­tor Office in Lviv found that the Maid­an pro­test­ers in Khmel­nyt­skyi were killed and wound­ed by uniden­ti­fied Maid­an shoot­er from the Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice of Ukraine region­al head­quar­ters porch that was occu­pied by Maid­an pro­test­ers. This is con­sis­tent with the con­tent analy­sis of videos of this mas­sacre (see Video Appen­dix C).

    Foren­sic Exam­i­na­tions

    Offi­cial foren­sic med­ical exam­i­na­tions

    * Absolute major­i­ty of pro­test­ers shot on Feb­ru­ary 20 from side & back direc­tions
    * 40 out of 48 killed pro­test­ers, with whose mur­der Berkut police­men are charged, had slope wounds & 1 even
    * 36 with slope wounds were killed when police was on sim­i­lar lev­el on the ground
    * E.g. 3 pro­test­ers in US archi­tec­ture com­pa­ny 3‑D mod­el for Maid­an lawyers but their wounds made near­ly straight

    Loca­tions & direc­tions of Dmytriv wounds in foren­sic med­ical reports (Report, 2015a) & Krovavyi (2014) & Tri­al (2016) videos & their & bul­let direc­tion mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tions by SITU (2018), New York Times (2018), BBC (2014) & pros­e­cu­tion
    [see image]
    They are con­sis­tent with bul­let tra­jec­to­ries in videos & pho­tos (see Video Appen­dix C)
    [see video]

    Foren­sic exam­i­na­tions and a video of his shoot­ing sug­gest that one pro­test­er shot in his side at near­ly even lev­el was killed from a Maid­an direc­tion

    Out of 7 killed pro­test­ers with no foren­sic infor­ma­tion about their wounds direc­tion made pub­lic:

    * Three were shot by hunt­ing pel­lets before the Berkut spe­cial com­pa­ny appeared in the Maid­an area
    * One was shot by an expand­ing hunt­ing bul­let of a US cal­iber which does not match cal­iber of gov­ern­ment units firearms
    * One was killed, inter alia, by a hand­gun bul­let behind a wall that made it phys­i­cal­ly impos­si­ble to shoot him from Berkut posi­tions
    * Two oth­er were killed at the same time and place as the many oth­er pro­test­ers

    (See Video Appen­dix A)

    Sim­i­lar­ly, 48 out of 51 wound­ed pro­test­ers, whose wound direc­tions were revealed at the tri­al and with whose shoot­ing on Feb­ru­ary 20th Berkut police­men were charged, had wounds at sig­nif­i­cant slopes.

    * Com­mon sense and foren­sic text­books sug­gest that this is con­sis­tent with shoot­ing by snipers in/on build­ings.

    Side­ways and back loca­tions and direc­tions of their wounds in the absolute major­i­ty of cas­es also point to shoot­ing from Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings locat­ed on both sides and in the back of advanc­ing pro­test­ers and not from their front by the Berkut police (see Map).

    * One does not need to be a foren­sic expert to deter­mine whether over­all loca­tions and direc­tions of wounds at the times and spots iden­ti­fied at the tri­al and in syn­chro­nized videos of the mas­sacre point to the Berkut posi­tions on the ground in front of the pro­test­ers or to Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings on the pro­test­ers’ left and right sides and in the back of the pro­test­ers

    Foren­sic bal­lis­tic exam­i­na­tions

    * Report­ed that 19 pro­test­ers were killed on Feb­ru­ary 20 by 7.62x39mm cal­iber bul­lets
    * Stat­ed that they could not deter­mine if the bul­lets were fired from Kalash­nikov assault rifles of this cal­iber, hunt­ing ver­sions of Kalash­nikov assault rifles, or oth­er weapons of this cal­iber, such as Simonov car­bine (SKS)
    * They indi­cat­ed that one pro­test­er was killed from Vepr car­bine, a hunt­ing ver­sion of Kalash­nikov machine gun
    * Three oth­er pro­test­ers were killed by pel­lets used in hunt­ing.
    * Two pro­test­ers were killed by expand­ing hunt­ing bul­lets. Their cal­iber did not match cal­ibers of weapons used by the spe­cial Berkut com­pa­ny, whose mem­bers were charged with killing them.
    * A foren­sic bal­lis­tic exam­i­na­tion con­duct­ed by gov­ern­ment insti­tute experts on the pros­e­cu­tion request with use of an auto­mat­ic com­put­er based IBIS-TAIS sys­tem in Jan­u­ary 2015 found that bul­lets extract­ed from killed pro­test­ers, trees, and the Hotel Ukraina rooms did not match police data­base of bul­let sam­ples from any 7.62x39 cal­iber Kalash­nikov assault rifles of mem­bers of the entire Kyiv Berkut reg­i­ment, includ­ing the spe­cial Berkut com­pa­ny charged with the mas­sacre of the pro­test­ers
    * Find­ings of this com­put­er-based bal­lis­tic exam­i­na­tion and results of some 40 oth­er bal­lis­tic exam­i­na­tions were reversed in a cou­ple of bal­lis­tic exam­i­na­tions con­duct­ed man­u­al­ly in the very end of the inves­ti­ga­tion
    * This sug­gests that these rever­sals are unre­li­able, and bal­lis­tic experts could not explain them at the tri­al

    Foren­sic exam­i­na­tions along with tes­ti­monies of wound­ed pro­test­ers & wit­ness­es, loca­tions & posi­tions of the killed & wound­ed pro­test­ers in videos & pho­tos, & Google Earth map of the mas­sacre site sug­gest that at least absolute major­i­ty of pro­test­ers, includ­ing Dmytriv, were shot by snipers in the Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings (See map and Video Appen­dix A)

    [see Map of the Maid­an mas­sacre on Feb­ru­ary 20]

    Killing and wound­ing of a small minor­i­ty of pro­test­ers by the Berkut police, in par­tic­u­lar, by ric­o­chets or in cross-fire with snipers in the Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings, can­not be exclud­ed because of lack of data or con­tra­dic­to­ry data

    * But their killing and wound­ing in the same loca­tions and at the same time as oth­er pro­test­ers sug­gest that most of them were also like­ly shot by the Maid­an snipers.

    Gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tion deter­mined that most of pro­test­ers killed on Feb­ru­ary 18–19 were shot with hunt­ing pel­lets and smooth­bore rifles used in hunt­ing

    The gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tion revealed that the absolute major­i­ty of 11 police­men killed on Feb­ru­ary 18–19, and all 4 police­men killed on Feb­ru­ary 20 were shot from sim­i­lar types and cal­ibers of hunt­ing pel­lets and bul­lets, hand­gun bul­lets, and 7,62x39 bul­lets as the pro­test­ers

    Court rul­ings revealed that the weapons used by two wound­ed Right Sec­tor activists in a sep­a­ratist check­point attack in April 2014 were the same weapons from which two Inter­nal Troops ser­vice­men were killed and three oth­er police­men wound­ed on the Maid­an on Feb­ru­ary 18 (Ukhvala, 2016b).

    Cov­er-up & Stonewalling

    * Inves­ti­ga­tion denies that there were snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings & not inves­ti­gates them in spite of over­whelm­ing evi­dence revealed by inves­ti­ga­tion & tri­al & pub­licly avail­able evi­dence, such as tes­ti­monies by over 100 wound­ed pro­test­ers & over 200 wit­ness­es, & videos, pho­tos & audio of snipers in/on these build­ings, includ­ing their shoot­ing at pro­test­ers & police (Video Appen­dix A).
    [see video]

    The Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al of Ukraine, who was one of the top Maid­an politi­cians, declared that the inves­ti­ga­tion of the Maid­an mas­sacre is de fac­to com­plet­ed

    * Pub­lic state­ments by 6 Maid­an politi­cians and activists and 5 Geor­gians about involve­ment of snipers and Maid­an lead­ers in the mas­sacre and its cov­er-up have not been inves­ti­gat­ed
    * Ex-pres­i­dent of Geor­gia hasti­ly detained and expelled from Ukraine a day before his tes­ti­mo­ny con­cern­ing “Geor­gian snipers” at the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al
    * Sim­i­lar­ly, a pub­lic state­ment by a Maid­an mem­ber of the par­lia­ment that one of titusky lead­ers, who was involved in killing of a jour­nal­ist on Feb­ru­ary 19, worked for a busi­ness of lead­ing Maid­an activists and that they knew about the mas­sacar in advance also has not been inves­ti­gat­ed

    Fail­ure by the inves­ti­ga­tion to deter­mine bul­let tra­jec­to­ries with help of foren­sic bal­lis­tic experts even after the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al ordered such exam­i­na­tions, specif­i­cal­ly to deter­mine if these tra­jec­to­ries were from the Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings

    * The inves­ti­ga­tion instead of bal­lis­tic experts used com­plex foren­sic exam­i­na­tions by medics to deter­mine sec­tors of fire with­out on-site vis­its and any mea­sure­ments and expla­na­tions pro­vid­ed
    * At least sev­er­al dozens of such exam­i­na­tions were con­duct­ed by the same three med­ical experts dur­ing the last weeks of the inves­ti­ga­tion
    * Not bal­lis­tic experts but archi­tects from a US archi­tec­ture com­pa­ny were hired by Maid­an vic­tims lawyers with involve­ment of the pros­e­cu­tion to deter­mine bul­let tra­jec­to­ries of 3 select­ed killed pro­test­ers out of 49 killed and 157 wound­ed pro­test­ers for the tri­al con­cern­ing Feb­ru­ary 20th Maid­an mas­sacre
    * Both these com­plex med­ical exam­i­na­tions and the 3‑D mod­el by New York archi­tec­ture com­pa­ny pro­vid­ed prac­ti­cal­ly iden­ti­cal bul­let trajectories/sectors of fire from Berkut bar­ri­cades on the ground in cas­es of these 3 killed pro­test­ers.
    * But wounds loca­tions and steep slopes of the entry and exit wounds in foren­sic med­ical exam­i­na­tions used both by the med­ical and archi­tec­tur­al experts in deter­min­ing these bal­lis­tic tra­jec­to­ries dif­fer sig­nif­i­cant­ly from their loca­tions and near­ly hor­i­zon­tal lev­els in the 3‑D mod­el by SITU Research
    * This con­cerns not only Dmytriv wounds but also Dyh­dalovych and Parashchuk wounds
    (See images con­cern­ing Dmyriv above and Dyh­dalovych below, Report (2015a, 2015b); SITU (2018)).
    [see image of Dyh­dalovych wounds loca­tions and direc­tions and their mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion in SITU mod­el]

    Bul­let wounds loca­tions and their steep slopes along with bul­let holes appear­ing in shields right after their killings in the same spot with­in 2 min­utes and a tes­ti­mo­ny of a pro­test­er who was in the same spot that he saw Dyh­dalovych shot by a sniper on the Bank Arka­da point to the top of this build­ing as a loca­tion of snipers who killed both Dyh­dalovych and Dmytriv.

    (See Map, Video Appen­dix A).

    * These bul­let holes and the tes­ti­monies of two pro­test­ers, who wit­nessed their killings, about snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings shoot­ing Dyh­dalovych and Dmytriv were not men­tioned at the tri­al
    * Similarly,videos and audio record­ings of snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings and pub­licly avail­able tes­ti­monies of numer­ous oth­er Maid­an pro­test­ers about such snipers were not men­tioned by the inves­ti­ga­tion and at the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al

    The land­scape, the street, & trees on the site of the mas­sacre would be almost com­plete­ly changed into a park and a new Maid­an mas­sacre muse­um by Feb­ru­ary 2019 and it would be phys­i­cal­ly impos­si­ble to con­duct on-site inves­tiga­tive exper­i­ments to deter­mine bul­let tra­jec­to­ries

    A new bal­lis­tic expert exam­i­na­tions of bul­lets that was ordered by the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al has not start­ed for more than 1 year after the court deci­sion

    No foren­sic video and audio exam­i­na­tions were con­duct­ed by the inves­ti­ga­tion

    The Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office reversed with­out any expla­na­tions their own pre­vi­ous inves­ti­ga­tion find­ings

    * Admis­sions that pro­test­ers were mas­sa­cred by snipers from the Hotel Ukraina from SKS car­bines and that at least 3 pro­test­ers were killed from this hotel and 10 oth­ers were also killed from sig­nif­i­cant heights
    * Inves­ti­ga­tions of the mas­sacres of the police and the pro­test­ers were sep­a­rat­ed even though they hap­pened on the same days and in the same places
    * No foren­sic exam­i­na­tions com­par­isons of bul­lets extract­ed from bod­ies of the police and the pro­test­ers in spite of var­i­ous evi­dence that they were shot by same groups of snipers
    * Sim­i­lar unex­plained rever­sals of foren­sic exam­i­na­tions of bul­lets and direc­tions of wounds of pro­test­ers a few weeks before the inves­ti­ga­tion sub­mit­ted the case to a court for tri­al
    * Sim­i­lar unex­plained rever­sals at the tri­al tes­ti­monies of many wound­ed pro­test­ers pre­vi­ous­ly pro­vid­ed to the inves­ti­ga­tion

    The Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office has been head­ed by Maid­an politi­cians or close allies of the cur­rent pres­i­dent of Ukraine and the inves­ti­ga­tion of the mas­sacre has been under con­trol of Maid­an gov­ern­ment lead­ers from the start

    Two fac­tions of main rul­ing Maid­an par­ties blocked cre­ation of a par­lia­men­tary com­mis­sion con­cern­ing Maid­an mas­sacre inves­ti­ga­tion

    Key pieces of foren­sic evi­dence of the mas­sacre on Feb­ru­ary 20 dis­ap­peared when it was under the Maid­an oppo­si­tion or Maid­an gov­ern­ment con­trol or when it was in the pos­ses­sion of the Maid­an gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tion with­out any­one respon­si­ble iden­ti­fied and pros­e­cut­ed

    * Almost all shields and hel­mets of killed and wound­ed pro­test­ers since bul­let holes in them or their absence could iden­ti­fy loca­tions of the shoot­ers
    * Many bul­lets extract­ed from bod­ies of the pro­test­ers and the police, trees, soil, a flower box, and the Maid­an build­ings
    * Some trees with bul­lets and/or bul­let holes were cut soon after the mas­sacre, and the pros­e­cu­tion admit­ted this three years after­wards
    * Record­ings of live online streams and oth­er videos from the time of shoot­ing at the police from the Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings in the ear­ly morn­ing of Feb­ru­ary 20
    * Secu­ri­ty cam­eras record­ings from the Hotel Ukraina, the Bank Arka­da, and oth­er Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings at the time when snipers were locat­ed there
    * Bul­lets extract­ed from bod­ies of pro­test­ers in Khmel­nyt­skyi
    * A leader of a Maid­an orga­ni­za­tion and its mem­bers were revealed and inves­ti­gat­ed by the Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al Office for evac­u­at­ing and hid­ing firearms of the spe­cial Berkut com­pa­ny charged with the mas­sacre of the pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 20

    Noone was charged with killing and wound­ing the major­i­ty of Maid­an pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 18–19

    * Berkut police­men charged with killing the first 3 pro­test­ers and wound­ing 33 pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 18 were released by the courts and allowed by the law enforce­ment to flee Ukraine
    * The same con­cerns a Berkut com­man­der whose com­pa­ny was charged with killing of 48 pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 20
    * Foren­sic evi­dence in killings pro­test­ers and the police on Feb­ru­ary 18–19 has not been made pub­lic
    * A pro­test­er who killed anoth­er pro­test­er by dri­ving him over in a seized truck and was tried was released under an amnesty law for crimes com­mit­ted by Maid­an pro­test­ers dur­ing the “Euro­maid­an”

    Nobody is charged with killing of a Geor­gian pro­test­er on Feb­ru­ary 20 and cir­cum­stances of his killing and its inves­ti­ga­tion are not made pub­lic

    Nobody is charged and tried for killing and wound­ing police­men on Feb­ru­ary 18–20

    * Charges of killing two police­men against one Maid­an sniper who pub­licly admit­ted in the Ukrain­ian media this were dropped and replaced by milder charges by the Pros­e­cu­tor Gen­er­al of Ukraine

    The Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al was restart­ed from the begin­ning, has not com­plet­ed tes­ti­monies of rel­a­tives of killed and wound­ed pro­test­ers, and it would not pro­duce a ver­dict before the 2019 pres­i­den­tial elec­tions

    Sev­er­al attacks by the neo-Nazi C14 and oth­er far right groups dis­rupt­ed and threat­ened the tri­al

    * C14 took refuge in the Cana­di­an Embassy short­ly before the Maid­an mas­sacre, and one of its ex-lead­ers stat­ed that the C14 knew about the mas­sacre in advance

    No such evi­dence of sys­tem­at­ic cov­er-up by the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment lead­ers and Berkut mem­bers

    * Yanukovych trea­son tri­al revealed var­i­ous evi­dence that he fled Ukraine fol­low­ing sev­er­al asso­ci­a­tions attempts by Maid­an forces, includ­ing far right
    * He, his min­is­ters and Inter­nal Troops ex-com­man­der vol­un­teered to tes­ti­fy via video links about the mas­sacre at the tri­als
    * Absolute major­i­ty of Berkut mem­bers, who were charged with the mas­sacre did not flee Ukraine until they were to be charged with the mas­sacre or after they were charged

    Not a sin­gle per­son is con­vict­ed for killing and wound­ing some 100 pro­test­ers and the police on Feb­ru­ary 18–20, 2014

    Con­clu­sion

    Maid­an mas­sacre tri­al and inves­ti­ga­tion evi­dence have revealed var­i­ous evi­dence that at least the absolute major­i­ty of 49 killed and 157 wound­ed Maid­an pro­test­ers on Feb­ru­ary 20, 2014 were mas­sa­cred by snipers in Maid­an-con­trolled build­ings

    * Such evi­dence includes tes­ti­monies of the major­i­ty of wound­ed pro­test­ers and many wit­ness­es, foren­sic med­ical and bal­lisitic exam­i­na­tions, and inves­ti­ga­tion own find­ing that about half of Maid­an pro­test­ers were wound­ed from oth­er loca­tions than the Berkut police

    Var­i­ous indi­ca­tions of stonewalling of the Maid­an mas­sacre inves­ti­ga­tions and the tri­als by the Maid­an gov­ern­ment offi­cials and by far right orga­ni­za­tions

    Var­i­ous indi­ca­tions of the cov­er-up of much of the key evi­dence of the mas­sacre

    Such rev­e­la­tions from the Maid­an mas­sacre tri­als and inves­ti­ga­tions cor­rob­o­rate pre­vi­ous stud­ies find­ings that this mas­sacre was a false flag mass killing with involve­ment of ele­ments of Maid­an lead­er­ship and the far right and that it includ­ed the mas­sacre of the police

    The puz­zling mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion of the Maid­an mas­sacre, its inves­ti­ga­tion, and the tri­al by West­ern media and gov­ern­ments require fur­ther research con­cern­ing rea­sons for such mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion

    ——————

    Ivan Katchanovs­ki. The Maid­an Mas­sacre in Ukraine: Rev­e­la­tions from Tri­als and Inves­ti­ga­tions. Poster pre­sent­ed at: 2018 Con­fer­ence of the Amer­i­can Polit­i­cal Stud­ies Asso­ciate; 2018 Aug 30-Sept; Boston, MA

    “The puz­zling mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion of the Maid­an mas­sacre, its inves­ti­ga­tion, and the tri­al by West­ern media and gov­ern­ments require fur­ther research con­cern­ing rea­sons for such mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion”

    That’s a great way to sum­ma­ry his pre­sen­ta­tion at the end. Because as big as the ques­tion is over what actu­al­ly hap­pened dur­ing the Maid­an mas­sacre, a much larg­er ques­tion is why almost no one cares about answer­ing that ques­tion.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | August 31, 2018, 2:18 pm
  2. There was anoth­er remark­able guilty plea on Fri­day that man­ages to tie togeth­er Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, the hacks of the Democ­rats, Paul Man­afort, Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, and Ser­hii Lovochkin. And it involves some­one who as large­ly been out of this whole sto­ry until now: GOP polit­i­cal con­sul­tant Sam Pat­ten just plead guilty to a num­ber of crimes and is now a coop­er­at­ing wit­ness. The crimes include vio­lat­ing the For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act (FARA) like Paul Man­afort. So it should come as no sur­prise that he worked with Man­afort.

    And guess who Pat­ten was act­ing as a for­eign agent for: Ser­hii Lovochkin! Yep. At least in part. Pat­ten formed a con­sult­ing com­pa­ny in the US with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik — Man­afort’s long-time Ukrain­ian con­sult­ing part­ner (who pre­vi­ous­ly worked for the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute) — and it was through this com­pa­ny that Pat­ten pro­vid­ed ser­vices to Lovochkin that he did­n’t dis­close, hence the FARA vio­la­tion charge. They also pro­vid­ed con­sult­ing ser­vices for Lovochk­in’s Oppo­si­tion Bloc in gen­er­al, earn­ing about $1 mil­lion in ser­vices. Those ser­vices includ­ed lob­by­ing US politi­cians.

    Recall how Man­afort and Lovochkin were report­ed­ly quite close dur­ing Man­afort’s time work­ing for Yanukovych, so if Pat­ten formed a con­sult­ing busi­ness with Kil­imnik that sug­gests Pat­ten and Man­afort may have been close. The busi­ness was formed in 2015, in the post-Maid­an peri­od when Man­afort was advis­ing the Oppo­si­tion Bloc, Pat­ten and Man­afort were like­ly work­ing close­ly togeth­er on this.

    The par­tic­u­lar ser­vices Pat­ten pro­vid­ed Lovochkin that got him into trou­ble are also quite inter­est­ing: Lovochkin want­ed to donate $50,000 to Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion and also get tick­ets to the inau­gu­ra­tion. But for­eign­ers were barred from giv­ing mon­ey to the inau­gu­ra­tion, so Pat­ten got an Amer­i­can to act as a “straw pur­chas­er” to buy four tick­ets using $50,000 Lovochkin sent to an account in Cyprus. This Amer­i­can used the $50,000 to buy four tick­ets the next day. The tick­ets were used by Pat­ten, Kil­imnik, Lovochkin, and anoth­er Ukrain­ian. We don’t yet know who that oth­er Ukrain­ian was.

    We also tech­ni­cal­ly don’t know that Lovochkin is the oli­garch Pat­ten worked for because he’s not named in the guilty plea. Lovochk­in’s office would­n’t say if it believed he was the oli­garch described in the court doc­u­ments, but in an email it said: “Mr Lyovochkin was indeed invit­ed to the inau­gu­ra­tion and had the hon­or to attend. At the same time, he did not pay for that.” So that looks like an admis­sion.

    Pat­ten also plead guilty to lying to the Sen­ate about his for­eign lob­by­ing work for the Ukraini­ans and then lat­er destroy­ing evi­dence. Pat­ten admit­ted that he knew he was required to reg­is­ter as an agent for a for­eign­er but failed to do so after Lovochkin said “he did not want them to” until an unspec­i­fied future date. So while Pat­ten’s firm worked for the Oppo­si­tion Bloc in gen­er­al, it sounds like Lovochkin, the deputy head of the Oppo­si­tion Bloc, was the par­tic­u­lar oli­garch who they answered to when pro­vid­ing these ser­vices.

    Anoth­er ser­vice Pat­ten pro­vid­ed was writ­ing op-eds on behalf of his Ukrain­ian clients and get­ting them in US media. This includ­ed a pro-Trump Feb­ru­ary 2017 op-ed by Lovochkin that appeared in US News & World Report.

    So Pat­ten is already tied to crime that puts Lovochkin in the orbit of Man­afort and the Trump team dur­ing that crit­i­cal inau­gu­ra­tion peri­od when so many inter­ests were scram­bling to get clos­er to Trump. But there’s also the Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca angle. As the fol­low­ing arti­cle notes, Pat­ten’s bio on his web­site says he “worked with one of London’s most inno­v­a­tive strate­gic com­mu­ni­ca­tions com­pa­nies to intro­duce new tech­nolo­gies and method­olo­gies” dur­ing the 2014 US elec­tion, so he was appar­ent­ly part of SCL’s ini­tial work for the GOP dur­ing the 2014 midterms. This includ­ed work on micro-tar­get­ing. There’s no evi­dence yet that he worked with Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca’s 2016 work for the Trump cam­paign.

    Pat­ten also admit­ted to a British aca­d­e­m­ic researcher last year regard­ing his work at Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca that, “I’ve worked in Ukraine, Iraq, I’ve worked in deeply cor­rupt coun­tries, and [the Amer­i­can] sys­tem isn’t very dif­fer­ent.” Recall how SCL/Cambridge Ana­lyt­i­ca spin­off AIQ was doing con­sult­ing work for Ukrain­ian oli­garch Sergei Taru­ta, who, like Lovochkin, appears to be an Ukrain­ian oli­garch who strad­dles the East/West divide in the coun­try while gen­er­al­ly sup­port­ing mov­ing Ukraine towards the West. So it would be inter­est­ing to learn if Pat­ten’s work in Ukraine involved ser­vices Taru­ta of Lovochkin.

    And here’s the part of Pat­ten’s back­ground that ties into the hacks: Pat­ten appar­ent­ly played a cen­tral role in SCL Group’s 2015 work in Nige­ria for then-pres­i­dent Good­luck Johnathan. And as we saw, SCL used an “Israeli team” of hack­ers to hack Johnathan’s oppo­nent! In oth­er words, Pat­ten has expe­ri­ence run­ning polit­i­cal hack­ing oper­a­tions and he gained that expe­ri­ence while work­ing at Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca par­ent SCL.

    Giv­en how he con­nects up so many of the dif­fer­ent aspects of this mess it’s kind of amaz­ing that he was large­ly off the #TrumpRus­sia radar up to this point:

    The Guardian

    Man­afort asso­ciate paid Trump inau­gu­ra­tion $50,000 in Ukrain­ian cash

    * Sam Pat­ten pleads guilty under For­eign Agents Reg­is­tra­tion Act
    * Repub­li­can once worked with Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca

    Jon Swaine
    Fri 31 Aug 2018 15.20 EDT

    A Repub­li­can polit­i­cal con­sul­tant linked to Paul Man­afort and Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca has admit­ted to fun­nel­ing $50,000 from a Ukrain­ian oli­garch to Don­ald Trump’s pres­i­den­tial inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee.

    Sam Pat­ten used the mon­ey to buy tick­ets for the oli­garch and a Russ­ian asso­ciate to Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion in Jan­u­ary 2017, accord­ing to a plea agree­ment made pub­lic on Fri­day. The inau­gu­ra­tion fund was not allowed to accept mon­ey from for­eign­ers.

    The dis­clo­sure came as Pat­ten plead­ed guilty to ille­gal­ly lob­by­ing in the US for pro-Rus­sia politi­cians from Ukraine. As part of his plea deal, he agreed to coop­er­ate with Robert Mueller, the spe­cial coun­sel inves­ti­gat­ing links between Don­ald Trump’s cam­paign team and Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tion.

    Pat­ten, 47, admit­ted caus­ing the Ukrain­ian funds to be paid to the inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee, and to lying to a Sen­ate com­mit­tee inves­ti­gat­ing Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in an attempt to cov­er this up. He was not charged for these actions.

    He plead­ed guilty to one count of work­ing as an unreg­is­tered agent for the oligarch’s Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ty, Oppo­si­tion Bloc, which also employed Man­afort, the for­mer chair­man of Trump’s 2016 cam­paign. Pat­ten was released on bail by judge Amy Berman Jack­son fol­low­ing a hear­ing in Wash­ing­ton.

    The charge was brought by the US attorney’s office in the cap­i­tal, which took over the case fol­low­ing a refer­ral from Mueller’s office. The court fil­ings indi­cat­ed that Pat­ten had been in dis­cus­sions with Mueller’s office for at least three months.

    A spokesman for the US attorney’s office said the charge against Pat­ten was a felony pun­ish­able by a max­i­mum of five years in prison and also car­ried poten­tial fines. Stu­art Sears, an attor­ney for Pat­ten, declined to com­ment.

    A spokes­woman for Thomas Bar­rack, the chair­man of Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee, did not respond to requests for com­ment.

    The fil­ings recount­ed how Pat­ten formed a con­sult­ing com­pa­ny in the US with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, a Russ­ian polit­i­cal oper­a­tive with alleged ties to intel­li­gence ser­vices. Kil­imnik, iden­ti­fied as “for­eign­er A” in the fil­ings, has also worked exten­sive­ly with Man­afort, who was a con­sul­tant to Oppo­si­tion Bloc in Ukraine.

    After dis­cov­er­ing for­eign­ers were barred from giv­ing mon­ey to the inau­gu­ra­tion, Pat­ten enlist­ed anoth­er Amer­i­can to buy four tick­ets. The oli­garch paid $50,000 to Pat­ten and Kilimnik’s com­pa­ny from an account in Cyprus. Pat­ten then wrote the Amer­i­can “straw pur­chas­er” a $50,000 check and the Amer­i­can used these funds to buy the tick­ets the fol­low­ing day. The tick­ets were used by Pat­ten, Kil­imnik, the oli­garch and anoth­er Ukrain­ian.

    Pat­ten then lied about this arrange­ment dur­ing tes­ti­mo­ny to the Sen­ate intel­li­gence com­mit­tee in Jan­u­ary 2018, he admit­ted on Fri­day. He failed to pro­vide request­ed doc­u­ments, gave mis­lead­ing evi­dence and then after his inter­view delet­ed files relat­ing to his work for the Ukraini­ans.

    In all, accord­ing to the court doc­u­ments, Patten’s firm was paid about $1m for advis­ing Oppo­si­tion Bloc and lob­by­ing US politi­cians on its behalf. Pat­ten worked to set up meet­ings for Kil­imnik and the oli­garch with state depart­ment offi­cials and mem­bers of Con­gress, includ­ing sen­a­tors on the for­eign rela­tions com­mit­tee and House mem­bers on the for­eign affairs com­mit­tee.

    Pat­ten admit­ted that he knew he was required to reg­is­ter as an agent for a for­eign­er but failed to do so after the Ukrain­ian oli­garch said “he did not want them to” until an unspec­i­fied future date.

    Pat­ten also draft­ed opin­ion arti­cles for the Ukrain­ian oli­garch and suc­ceed­ed in hav­ing at least one pub­lished by a nation­al Amer­i­can media out­let in Feb­ru­ary 2017.

    The Ukrain­ian fig­ure and media out­let were not iden­ti­fied in the charg­ing doc­u­ments. A pro-Trump arti­cle was pub­lished by US News & World Report in Feb­ru­ary 2017 under the byline of Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, an Oppo­si­tion Bloc MP who was a senior offi­cial in Ukraine’s for­mer pro-Krem­lin admin­is­tra­tion.

    Enx­hi Mysl­mi, a spokes­woman for US News & World Report, said: “To our knowl­edge, no one at US News has been con­tact­ed by law enforce­ment regard­ing the pub­li­ca­tion of this piece.”

    Lyovochkin’s office declined to say if it believed he was the oli­garch described in the court doc­u­ments. In an unsigned email, it said: “Mr Lyovochkin was indeed invit­ed to the inau­gu­ra­tion and had the hon­or to attend. At the same time, he did not pay for that.”

    Ear­li­er this month, Man­afort was con­vict­ed on eight counts of bank and tax fraud aris­ing from the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion. Dur­ing the tri­al, a for­mer col­league tes­ti­fied that Man­afort received pay­ments from Lyovochkin and dis­guised them as loans to avoid pay­ing tax.

    ...

    Pat­ten also car­ried out work for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, the now-defunct con­sul­tan­cy that is under scruti­ny for its work on Trump’s 2016 elec­tion cam­paign. A page on Patten’s web­site that has since been removed said he “worked with one of London’s most inno­v­a­tive strate­gic com­mu­ni­ca­tions com­pa­nies to intro­duce new tech­nolo­gies and method­olo­gies” dur­ing the 2014 US elec­tion.

    Dur­ing an inter­view last year with a British aca­d­e­m­ic researcher, Pat­ten said: “I’ve worked in Ukraine, Iraq, I’ve worked in deeply cor­rupt coun­tries, and [the Amer­i­can] sys­tem isn’t very dif­fer­ent.”

    ———-

    “Man­afort asso­ciate paid Trump inau­gu­ra­tion $50,000 in Ukrain­ian cash” by Jon Swaine; The Guardian; 08/31/2018

    Sam Pat­ten used the mon­ey to buy tick­ets for the oli­garch and a Russ­ian asso­ciate to Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion in Jan­u­ary 2017, accord­ing to a plea agree­ment made pub­lic on Fri­day. The inau­gu­ra­tion fund was not allowed to accept mon­ey from for­eign­ers.”

    That’s the core of the crime Pat­ten is charged with: arrang­ing for the secret pay­ment of for­eign funds to the Trump inau­gu­ra­tion fund in addi­tion to lying to a Sen­ate com­mit­tee. And he’s agreed to coop­er­ate with Mueller as part of his plea deal. That has to have Trump and the rest of the GOP freaked out:

    ...

    The dis­clo­sure came as Pat­ten plead­ed guilty to ille­gal­ly lob­by­ing in the US for pro-Rus­sia politi­cians from Ukraine. As part of his plea deal, he agreed to coop­er­ate with Robert Mueller, the spe­cial coun­sel inves­ti­gat­ing links between Don­ald Trump’s cam­paign team and Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tion.

    Pat­ten, 47, admit­ted caus­ing the Ukrain­ian funds to be paid to the inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee, and to lying to a Sen­ate com­mit­tee inves­ti­gat­ing Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in an attempt to cov­er this up. He was not charged for these actions.

    He plead­ed guilty to one count of work­ing as an unreg­is­tered agent for the oligarch’s Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ty, Oppo­si­tion Bloc, which also employed Man­afort, the for­mer chair­man of Trump’s 2016 cam­paign. Pat­ten was released on bail by judge Amy Berman Jack­son fol­low­ing a hear­ing in Wash­ing­ton.
    ...

    And while, on the sur­face, these crimes might seem rel­a­tive­ly insignif­i­cant in the con­text of the larg­er #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion, when you look at who Pat­ten is, his his­to­ry, and who the for­eign oli­garch is that he worked for that Pat­ten sud­den­ly starts look­ing like a poten­tial­ly cen­tral char­ac­ter in this scan­dal. The fact that this he set up a con­sult­ing ser­vice with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik to pro­vide con­sult­ing ser­vices puts him square­ly in Paul Man­afort’s Ukraine con­sult­ing net­work. Giv­en the ties between Kil­imnik and Man­afort and the work Man­afort was doing for the Oppo­si­tion Bloc in 2015, we should prob­a­bly view the Kilimnik/Patten clients as basi­cal­ly Man­afort’s clients. And the fact that their ser­vices includ­ed help­ing Lovochkin ille­gal­ly get Trump inau­gu­ra­tion tick­ets gives is an idea of how far Pat­ten was will­ing to go to please his Ukrain­ian clients:

    ...
    The fil­ings recount­ed how Pat­ten formed a con­sult­ing com­pa­ny in the US with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, a Russ­ian polit­i­cal oper­a­tive with alleged ties to intel­li­gence ser­vices. Kil­imnik, iden­ti­fied as “for­eign­er A” in the fil­ings, has also worked exten­sive­ly with Man­afort, who was a con­sul­tant to Oppo­si­tion Bloc in Ukraine.

    After dis­cov­er­ing for­eign­ers were barred from giv­ing mon­ey to the inau­gu­ra­tion, Pat­ten enlist­ed anoth­er Amer­i­can to buy four tick­ets. The oli­garch paid $50,000 to Pat­ten and Kilimnik’s com­pa­ny from an account in Cyprus. Pat­ten then wrote the Amer­i­can “straw pur­chas­er” a $50,000 check and the Amer­i­can used these funds to buy the tick­ets the fol­low­ing day. The tick­ets were used by Pat­ten, Kil­imnik, the oli­garch and anoth­er Ukrain­ian.
    ...

    And then he lied about this all to the Sen­ate and destroyed evi­dence, which is pret­ty inter­est­ing giv­en that those ser­vices includ­ed lob­by­ing sen­a­tors con­gress on behalf his Ukrain­ian clients:

    ...
    Pat­ten then lied about this arrange­ment dur­ing tes­ti­mo­ny to the Sen­ate intel­li­gence com­mit­tee in Jan­u­ary 2018, he admit­ted on Fri­day. He failed to pro­vide request­ed doc­u­ments, gave mis­lead­ing evi­dence and then after his inter­view delet­ed files relat­ing to his work for the Ukraini­ans.

    In all, accord­ing to the court doc­u­ments, Patten’s firm was paid about $1m for advis­ing Oppo­si­tion Bloc and lob­by­ing US politi­cians on its behalf. Pat­ten worked to set up meet­ings for Kil­imnik and the oli­garch with state depart­ment offi­cials and mem­bers of Con­gress, includ­ing sen­a­tors on the for­eign rela­tions com­mit­tee and House mem­bers on the for­eign affairs com­mit­tee.

    Pat­ten admit­ted that he knew he was required to reg­is­ter as an agent for a for­eign­er but failed to do so after the Ukrain­ian oli­garch said “he did not want them to” until an unspec­i­fied future date.
    ...

    And some of those US lob­by­ing ser­vices includ­ed get opin­ion arti­cles for their clients insert­ed into the US media, includ­ing a pro-Trump piece osten­si­bly writ­ten by Lovochkin him­self in US News & World Report:

    ...
    Pat­ten also draft­ed opin­ion arti­cles for the Ukrain­ian oli­garch and suc­ceed­ed in hav­ing at least one pub­lished by a nation­al Amer­i­can media out­let in Feb­ru­ary 2017.

    The Ukrain­ian fig­ure and media out­let were not iden­ti­fied in the charg­ing doc­u­ments. A pro-Trump arti­cle was pub­lished by US News & World Report in Feb­ru­ary 2017 under the byline of Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, an Oppo­si­tion Bloc MP who was a senior offi­cial in Ukraine’s for­mer pro-Krem­lin admin­is­tra­tion.

    Enx­hi Mysl­mi, a spokes­woman for US News & World Report, said: “To our knowl­edge, no one at US News has been con­tact­ed by law enforce­ment regard­ing the pub­li­ca­tion of this piece.”
    ...

    And while Lovochk­in’s is nev­er named in the guilty plea, it’s pret­ty obvi­ous he’s the oli­garch Pat­ten was direct­ly work­ing for:

    ...
    Lyovochkin’s office declined to say if it believed he was the oli­garch described in the court doc­u­ments. In an unsigned email, it said: “Mr Lyovochkin was indeed invit­ed to the inau­gu­ra­tion and had the hon­or to attend. At the same time, he did not pay for that.”

    Ear­li­er this month, Man­afort was con­vict­ed on eight counts of bank and tax fraud aris­ing from the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion. Dur­ing the tri­al, a for­mer col­league tes­ti­fied that Man­afort received pay­ments from Lyovochkin and dis­guised them as loans to avoid pay­ing tax.
    ...

    And then there’s Pat­ten’s work for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca. Work that, by his own admis­sion, includ­ed work in Ukraine:

    ...
    Pat­ten also car­ried out work for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, the now-defunct con­sul­tan­cy that is under scruti­ny for its work on Trump’s 2016 elec­tion cam­paign. A page on Patten’s web­site that has since been removed said he “worked with one of London’s most inno­v­a­tive strate­gic com­mu­ni­ca­tions com­pa­nies to intro­duce new tech­nolo­gies and method­olo­gies” dur­ing the 2014 US elec­tion.

    Dur­ing an inter­view last year with a British aca­d­e­m­ic researcher, Pat­ten said: “I’ve worked in Ukraine, Iraq, I’ve worked in deeply cor­rupt coun­tries, and [the Amer­i­can] sys­tem isn’t very dif­fer­ent.”
    ...

    “I’ve worked in Ukraine, Iraq, I’ve worked in deeply cor­rupt coun­tries, and [the Amer­i­can] sys­tem isn’t very dif­fer­ent.” What a line.

    And as the fol­low­ing arti­cle notes, Pat­ten’s work for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca was­n’t just some ran­dom work there. He worked for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca’s 2014 work in the US elec­tions for the GOP, includ­ing work on micro-tar­get­ing. And, more impor­tant­ly, Pat­ten played a cen­tral role in SCL’s 2015 work in Nige­ria that includ­ed the use of an “Israeli team” to hack their clien­t’s oppo­nent:

    Raw Sto­ry

    Man­afort asso­ciate Sam Patten’s guilty plea could help Mueller nail Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca for rig­ging 2016 elec­tion

    Travis Get­tys
    31 Aug 2018 at 12:55 ET

    The Paul Man­afort asso­ciate who plead­ed guilty Fri­day as part of a coop­er­a­tion agree­ment could help inves­ti­ga­tors fill in some blanks about Cam­bridge Analytica’s work for the Trump cam­paign.

    Lob­by­ist Sam Pat­ten agreed to coop­er­ate with U.S. pros­e­cu­tors after admit­ting to fail­ing to reg­is­ter in as a for­eign agent for his lob­by­ing work for a Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ty.

    Pat­ten worked with Man­afort, the for­mer Trump cam­paign chair who was con­vict­ed last week of tax and bank fraud, and sus­pect­ed Russ­ian intel­li­gence oper­a­tive Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, who was indict­ed this sum­mer in the spe­cial coun­sel probe.

    Anoth­er long­time Man­afort asso­ciate, Rick Gates, plead­ed guilty in Feb­ru­ary to lying to fed­er­al author­i­ties and con­spir­a­cy to com­mit fraud, and he tes­ti­fied in court against his for­mer boss.

    Spe­cial coun­sel Robert Mueller referred the Pat­ten case to the U.S. Attor­ney in the Dis­trict of Colum­bia as part of his sprawl­ing inves­ti­ga­tion of Trump cam­paign ties to Rus­sia.

    Pat­ten worked at the Ore­gon offi­cer of Cam­bridge Analytica’s par­ent com­pa­ny, SCL Group, where he helped the data com­pa­ny devel­op vot­er tar­get­ing oper­a­tions ahead of the 2014 midterm elec­tions.

    The lob­by­ist described that work on his pro­fes­sion­al web­site, say­ing that he helped con­duct beta tests of vot­er micro-tar­get­ing that he boast­ed were “adopt­ed by at least one major U.S. pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.”

    Sen. Ted Cruz (R‑TX) hired Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca dur­ing his Repub­li­can pri­ma­ry run, but after he dropped out the data com­pa­ny was hired by Don­ald Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kush­n­er, who over­saw the campaign’s dig­i­tal oper­a­tions.

    Mueller is inves­ti­gat­ing the com­pa­ny, which was owned by hedge fund bil­lion­aire Robert Mer­cer.

    There’s no evi­dence that Pat­ten did any work for the Trump cam­paign or Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, whose board includ­ed Trump’s cam­paign CEO and for­mer chief White House strate­gist Steve Ban­non.

    But he played a cen­tral role in SCL Group’s work in Nige­ria in ear­ly 2015, when the Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca par­ent com­pa­ny report­ed­ly hired Israeli hack­ers to steal emails and dig com­pro­mis­ing infor­ma­tion on the can­di­date chal­leng­ing incum­bent pres­i­dent Good­luck Jonathan.

    ...

    ———-

    “Man­afort asso­ciate Sam Patten’s guilty plea could help Mueller nail Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca for rig­ging 2016 elec­tion” by Travis Get­tys; Raw Sto­ry; 08/31/2018

    “Pat­ten worked at the Ore­gon offi­cer of Cam­bridge Analytica’s par­ent com­pa­ny, SCL Group, where he helped the data com­pa­ny devel­op vot­er tar­get­ing oper­a­tions ahead of the 2014 midterm elec­tions.”

    So in 2014 he was work­ing in SCL’s Ore­gon office, where he helped the com­pa­ny devel­op vot­er-tar­get­ing oper­a­tions. And that includ­ed beta-test­ing of vot­er micro-tar­get­ing that he boast­ed were “adopt­ed by at least one major U.S. pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.” Keep in mind that both Ted Cruz and Trump hired Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca so they were both employ­ing these micro-tar­get­ing ser­vices:

    ...
    The lob­by­ist described that work on his pro­fes­sion­al web­site, say­ing that he helped con­duct beta tests of vot­er micro-tar­get­ing that he boast­ed were “adopt­ed by at least one major U.S. pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.”
    ...

    This is, how­ev­er, no evi­dence yet that he was work­ing on Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca’s 2016 work for Trump:

    ...
    There’s no evi­dence that Pat­ten did any work for the Trump cam­paign or Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, whose board includ­ed Trump’s cam­paign CEO and for­mer chief White House strate­gist Steve Ban­non.
    ...

    Giv­en how con­tro­ver­sial that work was it would­n’t be a shock­er if he inten­tion­al­ly left that kind of work off of his pub­lic bio. Espe­cial­ly if that work includ­ing orches­trat­ing some of the ‘dark arts’ polit­i­cal ser­vices Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca was known to offer its clients. Ser­vices Pat­ten like­ly has expe­ri­ence deploy­ing giv­en the lead role he played in SCL’s 2015 Niger­ian con­sult­ing ser­vices that includ­ed hir­ing hack­ers to hack their clien­t’s oppo­nent:

    ...
    But he played a cen­tral role in SCL Group’s work in Nige­ria in ear­ly 2015, when the Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca par­ent com­pa­ny report­ed­ly hired Israeli hack­ers to steal emails and dig com­pro­mis­ing infor­ma­tion on the can­di­date chal­leng­ing incum­bent pres­i­dent Good­luck Jonathan.
    ...

    So that’s the lat­est twist to emerge from the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion.

    It’s also imp­torant to keep in mind that the now-defunct Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca appears to have been reformed as “Emer­da­ta”, a com­pa­ny offer­ing sim­i­lar ser­vices and with UAE mon­ey behind it. Also recall the Saudi/UAE del­e­ga­tion that secret­ly met at Trump Tow­er in ear­ly August of 2016 offer­ing ser­vices very sim­i­lar to Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca to help Trump win.
    So there appears to be a con­cert­ed UAE effort to invest in cut­ting edge Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca-style polit­i­cal dirty tricks oper­a­tions, which rais­es the ques­tion of how much UAE involve­ment there may have been in Cam­bridge Analytica/SCL’s oper­a­tions in 2015–2016. It’s one of many open ques­tions that remain in this inves­ti­ga­tion.

    So as we can see, Sam Pat­ten is both a man of mys­tery and poten­tial­ly a kind of ‘miss­ing link’ in the larg­er #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion. And he’s appar­ent­ly coop­er­at­ing with inves­ti­ga­tors at this point. That’s one hel­lu­va guilty plea.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 1, 2018, 2:12 pm
  3. Here’s an inter­est­ing fun-fact about Sam Pat­ten, the long-time asso­ciate of Paul Man­afort and Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik who just plead­ed guilty to a series a crimes includ­ing help­ing Sergii Lovochkin (Vik­tor Yanukovy­ch’s for­mer chief of staff) secret­ly donate $50,000 to Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion fund in exchange for tick­ets to the inau­gu­ra­tion. First, recall how Pat­ten and Kil­imnik set up a con­sult­ing com­pa­ny in 2015 that con­sult­ed exten­sive­ly for the new Oppo­si­tion Bloc par­ty. Well, as the fol­low­ing arti­cle points out, Pat­ten’s con­sult­ing work was­n’t lim­it­ed to the Oppo­si­tion Bloc. It turns out Pat­ten worked on the 2015 may­oral cam­paign of Vitalii Klitschko for may­or of Kiev. Klitschko was, of course, one of the key lead­ers of the Maid­an protests who was elect­ed may­or of Kiev in May of 2014. Don’t for­get that the noto­ri­ous “F*ck the EU” wire­tapped call between Assis­tant Sec­re­tary of State Vic­to­ria Nuland and the US Ambas­sador to Ukraine, Geof­frey Pyatt that took place in ear­ly Feb­ru­ary 2014 was a dis­cus­sion over whether or not Klitschko or Arseniy Yat­se­niuk should replace Yanukovych. Nuland called for Yat­se­niuk over Klitschko, but Klitschko was still clear­ly a promi­nent enough leader of the Maid­an protests that he was one of two peo­ple under con­sid­er­a­tion to lead a post-Maid­an Ukraine.

    So we have Pat­ten con­sult­ing for the Oppo­si­tion Bloc AND one of the key Maid­an lead­ers a year after the Maid­an protests. But get this: it was report­ed­ly Sergei Lovochkin who recruit­ed Pat­ten to work on Klitschko’s cam­paign. In addi­tion, Lovochk­in’s oli­garch part­ner, Dmytro Fir­tash, also boast­ed in 2015 that he was involved with Klit­shko’s may­oral cam­paign:

    The Atlantic

    A Sus­pect­ed Russ­ian Spy, With Curi­ous Ties to Wash­ing­ton

    A long­time Repub­li­can oper­a­tive has been in con­tact with a sus­pect­ed Russ­ian intel­li­gence agent for near­ly two decades. What does it mean for Robert Mueller’s inves­ti­ga­tion?

    Natasha Bertrand
    Apr 6, 2018

    A long­time Repub­li­can oper­a­tive with ties to the con­tro­ver­sial data firm hired by Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s cam­paign team also has a near­ly two-decade-long friend­ship and busi­ness rela­tion­ship with a sus­pect­ed Russ­ian intel­li­gence agent, Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, who has land­ed in Spe­cial Coun­sel Robert Mueller’s crosshairs.

    The Wash­ing­ton-based oper­a­tive, Sam Pat­ten, would not tell me whether he has been inter­viewed by Mueller’s team as part of their inves­ti­ga­tion into Russia’s elec­tion inter­fer­ence and poten­tial col­lu­sion between the Trump cam­paign and Moscow. But Pat­ten said that his rela­tion­ship with Kilimnik—a for­mer offi­cer in Russia’s Main Intel­li­gence Direc­torate (GRU) who worked close­ly with Trump’s cam­paign chair­man Paul Man­afort and his deputy, Rick Gates, for over a decade—has “been thor­ough­ly explored by rel­e­vant gov­ern­ment enti­ties.”

    Patten’s long friend­ship with Kilimnik—which stems from their time work­ing togeth­er at the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute in Moscow between 2001 and 2003—would like­ly be enough to draw scruti­ny from Mueller, who appears to have homed in on Kil­imnik as a poten­tial­ly sig­nif­i­cant link between the Trump cam­paign and Rus­sia. The spe­cial counsel’s office alleged in a court fil­ing late last month that Kil­imnik still had ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices in 2016, and that his con­ver­sa­tions with Gates in Sep­tem­ber of that year are rel­e­vant to the inves­ti­ga­tion. Man­afort and Gates’s arrival to the cam­paign team coin­cid­ed with the most piv­otal Rus­sia-relat­ed episode of the elec­tion: the release of emails that had been stolen from the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Nation­al Com­mit­tee by hack­ers work­ing for the GRU, Russia’s pre­mier mil­i­tary-intel­li­gence unit.

    “We’ve known each oth­er for more than 15 years, and we peri­od­i­cal­ly look for places we can work togeth­er,” Pat­ten told me of Kil­imnik. Their rela­tion­ship is also proof that Kilimnik’s abil­i­ty to ingra­ti­ate him­self with Amer­i­can polit­i­cal con­sul­tants went beyond Man­afort and Gates—a fact that could serve as a new data point in exam­in­ing Russia’s ties to Repub­li­can oper­a­tives in the U.S. By the spring of 2015—when, as my col­league Frank Foer wrote, Manafort’s “life had tipped into a deep trough”—Kilimnik was already work­ing on a new ven­ture with Pat­ten that appeared to be focused on tar­get­ed mes­sag­ing in for­eign elec­tions.

    That ven­ture, first report­ed by The Dai­ly Beast this week, was a pri­vate LLC incor­po­rat­ed in Feb­ru­ary 2015 called Bege­mot Ven­tures Inter­na­tion­al (BVI) with a mis­sion to “build the right argu­ments before domes­tic and inter­na­tion­al audi­ences.” Kil­imnik is list­ed as the firm’s prin­ci­pal and Pat­ten is list­ed as an exec­u­tive, accord­ing to com­pa­ny records, and the com­pa­ny is reg­is­tered to Patten’s office address in Wash­ing­ton. A web­site for Begemot—which was built almost two years after the com­pa­ny was incorporated—links to Patten’s email for inquiries, but does not list the company’s clients.

    It is not clear why Pat­ten, who already had a con­sult­ing firm reg­is­tered in D.C., decid­ed to open a brand-new com­pa­ny with Kil­imnik. Asked whether any of the firm’s clients were in Rus­sia or Ukraine, Pat­ten replied, “It would be poor busi­ness to talk about our clients, but I can tell you declar­a­tive­ly that none of the clients have involve­ment in the par­tic­u­lar cir­cus in the U.S. that seems to have become a news indus­try in and of itself,” an appar­ent ref­er­ence to the Rus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion. He con­firmed that the com­pa­ny, which he described as pro­vid­ing “strate­gic com­mu­ni­ca­tions advice for clients out­side the U.S.,” is still active, but said it has no projects ongo­ing at this time.

    “BVI has only worked for clients out­side U.S. in oth­er coun­tries,” Pat­ten said. “As a result of all this, I regret it prob­a­bly won’t be work­ing for any­one any­more, but you nev­er know. Life can be unpre­dictable.” Pat­ten said that, “to the best of [his] knowl­edge,” Kil­imnik “was no longer work­ing for Man­afort when BVI was formed.” But he acknowl­edged that Kil­imnik and Man­afort, who began work­ing togeth­er in Kiev in 2005, “remained in touch, as is well-known.” Patten’s work in Ukraine dove­tailed with Manafort’s. About eight months after BVI was incor­po­rat­ed, in Octo­ber 2015, Pat­ten was in Ukraine advis­ing Kiev May­or Vitali Klitschko on his reelec­tion cam­paign. On his web­site, Pat­ten writes that he “helped steer May­or Klitschko to reelec­tion in Ukraine’s cap­i­tal and largest city in one of the tough­est anti-gov­ern­ment atmos­pheres in that country’s his­to­ry.”

    Ser­hiy Lyovochkin—the for­mer chief of staff to oust­ed Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych, who hired Man­afort to rebrand the pro-Rus­sia Par­ty of Regions in 2014—brought Pat­ten onto Klitschko’s team, Ukrain­ian media report­ed at the time. Dmit­ry Fir­tash, a pro-Rus­sia Ukrain­ian oli­garch with ties to Man­afort who is known for bankrolling pro-Rus­sia can­di­dates in Ukraine, also boast­ed in 2015 that he was involved in Klitschko’s cam­paign. Asked whether Man­afort coor­di­nat­ed with Pat­ten and/or Kil­imnik on Klitschko’s reelec­tion cam­paign, a spokesman for Man­afort said he had “noth­ing to add.”

    Pat­ten describes him­self as an “inter­na­tion­al polit­i­cal con­sul­tant” on his web­site, but he worked at the Ore­gon office of Cam­bridge Analytica’s par­ent com­pa­ny, SCL Group, help­ing to fine-tune the firm’s vot­er tar­get­ing oper­a­tions in the runup to the 2014 midterm elec­tions, accord­ing to inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ist Nafeez Ahmed, now a colum­nist for Mid­dle East Eye. Pat­ten allud­ed to this work on his web­site, writ­ing that he worked with “one of London’s most inno­v­a­tive strate­gic com­mu­ni­ca­tions com­pa­nies” on “a beta run of a cut­ting-edge elec­toral approach” that “includ­ed tak­ing micro-tar­get­ing to the next lev­el” dur­ing the 2014 con­gres­sion­al cycle. Those tech­nolo­gies, he wrote, were “adopt­ed by at least one major U.S. pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.”

    Both Repub­li­can can­di­dates Ted Cruz and Don­ald Trump employed Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca dur­ing the 2016 elec­tion. Mueller is now scru­ti­niz­ing the Trump campaign’s ties to Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca, whose board includ­ed Trump’s cam­paign CEO and for­mer chief strate­gist, Steve Ban­non. Ban­non inter­viewed Pat­ten in July 2016 for his Sir­iusXM radio show, Bre­it­bart News Dai­ly, about a group Pat­ten rep­re­sents called the Com­mit­tee to Destroy ISIS. There is no evi­dence that Pat­ten did any work with Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca or the Trump cam­paign dur­ing the 2016 elec­tion. But his rela­tion­ship with the data firm did not end with the 2014 midterm elec­tions. Accord­ing to The Guardian’s Car­ole Cad­wal­ladr, Pat­ten ““played a cen­tral role”” in the firm’s work in Nige­ria in ear­ly 2015—work that includ­ed hir­ing Israeli com­put­er hack­ers to search for “kom­pro­mat,” or com­pro­mis­ing infor­ma­tion, on the can­di­date chal­leng­ing the incum­bent pres­i­dent at the time, Good­luck Jonathan. Pat­ten didn’t respond to a request for com­ment about the Nige­ria cam­paign.

    Pat­ten said that he remains in touch with Kil­imnik, who he believes has been unfair­ly scru­ti­nized. “As you might imag­ine, the bar­rage of shade and innu­en­do that has been cast on him since Man­afort had his time in Trump Tow­er has not been some­thing he’d wel­comed, nor any­thing that could objec­tive­ly be called fair,” Pat­ten said, refer­ring to Manafort’s role on the cam­paign, which was head­quar­tered at Trump Tow­er.

    ...

    ———-

    “A Sus­pect­ed Russ­ian Spy, With Curi­ous Ties to Wash­ing­ton” by Natasha Bertrand; The Atlantic; 04/06/2018

    That ven­ture, first report­ed by The Dai­ly Beast this week, was a pri­vate LLC incor­po­rat­ed in Feb­ru­ary 2015 called Bege­mot Ven­tures Inter­na­tion­al (BVI) with a mis­sion to “build the right argu­ments before domes­tic and inter­na­tion­al audi­ences.” Kil­imnik is list­ed as the firm’s prin­ci­pal and Pat­ten is list­ed as an exec­u­tive, accord­ing to com­pa­ny records, and the com­pa­ny is reg­is­tered to Patten’s office address in Wash­ing­ton. A web­site for Begemot—which was built almost two years after the com­pa­ny was incorporated—links to Patten’s email for inquiries, but does not list the company’s clients.”

    Note how the stat­ed pur­pose of Pat­ten’s and Kil­imnik’s Bege­mot Ven­tures Inter­na­tion­al was to “build the right argu­ments before domes­tic and inter­na­tion­al audi­ences.” Giv­en how the whole “Haps­burg Group” ini­tia­tive was about shap­ing inter­na­tion­al (Euro­pean and US) opin­ion of Ukraine’s gov­ern­ment and giv­en the close involve­ment Sergii Lovochkin and his sis­ter had with that effort, you have to won­der if Pat­ten and Kil­imnik were involved in some sort of post-Maid­an ver­sion of the Hap­burg Group to con­tin­ue influ­enc­ing US and Euro­pean atti­tudes towards Ukraine.

    Regard­less, the fact that Pat­ten and Kil­imnik were brought onto the Klitschko’s team by Lovochkin and Fir­tash adds fur­ther weight to the con­clu­sion that Lovochkin (and Man­afort) were basi­cal­ly lead­ing a pro-EU fac­tion of Yanukovy­ch’s Part of Regions dur­ing that cru­cial Haps­burg Group peri­od:

    ...
    “BVI has only worked for clients out­side U.S. in oth­er coun­tries,” Pat­ten said. “As a result of all this, I regret it prob­a­bly won’t be work­ing for any­one any­more, but you nev­er know. Life can be unpre­dictable.” Pat­ten said that, “to the best of [his] knowl­edge,” Kil­imnik “was no longer work­ing for Man­afort when BVI was formed.” But he acknowl­edged that Kil­imnik and Man­afort, who began work­ing togeth­er in Kiev in 2005, “remained in touch, as is well-known.” Patten’s work in Ukraine dove­tailed with Manafort’s. About eight months after BVI was incor­po­rat­ed, in Octo­ber 2015, Pat­ten was in Ukraine advis­ing Kiev May­or Vitali Klitschko on his reelec­tion cam­paign. On his web­site, Pat­ten writes that he “helped steer May­or Klitschko to reelec­tion in Ukraine’s cap­i­tal and largest city in one of the tough­est anti-gov­ern­ment atmos­pheres in that country’s his­to­ry.”

    Ser­hiy Lyovochkin—the for­mer chief of staff to oust­ed Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych, who hired Man­afort to rebrand the pro-Rus­sia Par­ty of Regions in 2014—brought Pat­ten onto Klitschko’s team, Ukrain­ian media report­ed at the time. Dmit­ry Fir­tash, a pro-Rus­sia Ukrain­ian oli­garch with ties to Man­afort who is known for bankrolling pro-Rus­sia can­di­dates in Ukraine, also boast­ed in 2015 that he was involved in Klitschko’s cam­paign. Asked whether Man­afort coor­di­nat­ed with Pat­ten and/or Kil­imnik on Klitschko’s reelec­tion cam­paign, a spokesman for Man­afort said he had “noth­ing to add.”
    ...

    “Asked whether Man­afort coor­di­nat­ed with Pat­ten and/or Kil­imnik on Klitschko’s reelec­tion cam­paign, a spokesman for Man­afort said he had “noth­ing to add.””

    That sure sounds like a qui­et “yes” from Man­afort’s spokesper­son. Giv­en that both Kil­imnik and Pat­ten were work­ing for Klitschko it would almost be sur­pris­ing if Man­afort was­n’t work­ing for him too. And would­n’t that be quite a twist if true.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 6, 2018, 11:15 am
  4. Just a quick note: that bne Intellinews arti­cle by Gra­ham Stack about Paul Man­afort’s flight records is cur­rent­ly avail­able on the bne Intellinews site again. So we don’t have to rely on the Way­back Machine for that cru­cial arti­cle.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 20, 2018, 12:20 pm
  5. Rob Gold­stone just did an inter­view. The main top­ic was of course the role he played in arrang­ing the June 9th Trump Tow­er meet­ing. Most of it is a rehash­ing of what we’ve already heard but there are some inter­est­ing new tid­bits. For instance, Gold­stone reit­er­ates that none of the “dirt” on Hillary Clin­ton Gold­stone offered in his ini­tial emails to Don­ald Trump, Jr. ever mate­ri­al­ized. But he also con­firms that Trump Jr. did come into that meet­ing antic­i­pat­ing — and very hap­py to accept — “oppo­si­tion research” on Hillary that he believed was com­ing from the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment.

    Gold­stone is also open to believ­ing that the meet­ing could have been a set-up by Russ­ian-intel­li­gence, say­ing, “I’m will­ing to believe that I don’t know who want­ed this meet­ing.”

    And Gold­stone makes a claim that points towards a poten­tial­ly sig­nif­i­cant legal risk to Trump, Jr.: Gold­stone believe that it was­n’t the ini­tial email he sent to Trump Jr. that secured the meet­ing. Instead, there were a series of fol­lowup calls between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov where the actu­al meet­ing was worked out. Phone records obtained by the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee show Agalarov and Trump Jr. had three calls days before the meet­ing, each two to three min­utes long, on June 6 and 7, 2016. Gold­stone said it was­n’t until after the final call that Trump Jr. sent an email set­ting a date for the meet­ing. And yet, dur­ing his Sen­ate tes­ti­mo­ny, Trump Jr. said he did not recall speak­ing with Agalarov. So it sounds like Trump Jr. may have been caught in a lie while under oath, although say­ing he “did not recall” could poten­tial­ly give him some wig­gle-room.

    Gold­stone also said that it was only after the calls between Trump Jr. and Agalarov that Trump Jr. intro­duced Jared Kush­n­er and Paul Man­afort into the dis­cus­sion and said they would be attend­ing the meet­ing. And this where a more com­plete under­stand­ing of the his­to­ry of Paul Man­afort could be par­tic­u­lar­ly help­ful. Because if, as is wide­ly assumed, Paul Man­afort was act­ing as a Krem­lin agent this whole time it does­n’t seem like it would be a very big deal if Paul Man­afort attend­ed a meet­ing where the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment offered illic­it help to the Trump cam­paign. If, on the oth­er hand, Man­afort was seen by the Krem­lin as a pro-West­ern change agent who has been try­ing to pull Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit and into the arms of the EU, sud­den­ly invit­ing Paul Man­afort to the meet­ing could have been seen as an unac­cept­able risk.

    And that rais­es a rather fas­ci­nat­ing pos­si­bil­i­ty: what if this Russ­ian del­e­ga­tion real­ly was plan­ning involved with Russ­ian intel­li­gence and real­ly was plan­ning on pro­vid­ing some sort of “dirt” on Hillary at that meet­ing — not nec­es­sar­i­ly the hacked doc­u­ments but some­thing — and they had to basi­cal­ly drop those plans because they did­n’t trust Man­afort. Might that explain why the meet­ing was appar­ent­ly such a waste of time accord­ing to all the par­tic­i­pants? Of course, it’s pos­si­ble they are all lying and there real­ly was some sort of dirt on Hillary passed to the Trump team dur­ing that meet­ing. But if it panned out the way they all describe it and no real dirt was dis­cussed or hand­ed over dur­ing the meet­ing, and it real­ly was a Russ­ian intel­li­gence oper­a­tion, the fact that Man­afort’s inclu­sion in the meet­ing was done at the last minute means it’s worth keep­ing in mind that Man­afort’s pro­file as a pro-West change agent could have made him a last minute ‘fly in the col­lu­sion oint­ment’ who forced the meet­ing to devolve into the worth­less gath­er­ing that all the par­tic­i­pants claim it was:

    NBC News

    Rob Gold­stone wish­es he’d nev­er set up that Trump Tow­er meet­ing with the Rus­sians
    Gold­stone, who arranged the Trump Tow­er meet­ing at the request of a pop star, says Mueller’s team want­ed to know about links between Trump and Rus­sia.

    by Sarah Fitz­patrick, Cyn­thia McFad­den and Ken Dilan­ian / Sep.24.2018 / 3:33 AM CDT / Updat­ed 7:06 AM CDT

    The British-born music pub­li­cist who helped arrange that infa­mous meet­ing between senior Trump cam­paign offi­cials and a Russ­ian lawyer promis­ing dirt on Democ­rats now believes the meet­ing could have been a set-up by Russ­ian intel­li­gence, he told NBC News in an exclu­sive tele­vi­sion inter­view.

    “I’m will­ing to believe that I don’t know who want­ed this meet­ing,” Rob Gold­stone told NBC’s Cyn­thia McFad­den in a wide-rang­ing inter­view, in which he also dis­cussed Trump’s behav­ior in Moscow dur­ing the 2013 Miss Uni­verse pageant.

    Asked if he had con­veyed a “dirty offer” to the Trump team in bro­ker­ing the June 2016 Trump Tow­er meet­ing, Gold­stone said, “Yes. That is true.”

    “That [dirt] did­n’t mate­ri­al­ize,” said Gold­stone, but he believes the appar­ent will­ing­ness of cam­paign offi­cials to accept dirt is what drew the scruti­ny of con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors and spe­cial coun­sel Robert Mueller.

    Gold­stone’s account of the meet­ing, which he says he relayed in detail to Mueller’s grand jury in March, is large­ly con­sis­tent with how it’s been described by oth­er par­tic­i­pants. He says Russ­ian lawyer Natalia Vesel­nit­skaya talked in a mean­der­ing fash­ion about U.S. sanc­tions against Rus­sians — and the financier who lob­bied for those sanc­tions, Bill Brow­der — but did­n’t offer any infor­ma­tion about Trump’s foe in the 2016 pres­i­den­tial race, Hillary Clin­ton. He con­sid­ered the Rus­sian’s pre­sen­ta­tion “com­plete and utter non­sense,” he said.

    Nonethe­less, he acknowl­edged that the can­di­date’s son, Don­ald Trump Jr., came into the room antic­i­pat­ing — and very hap­py to accept — “oppo­si­tion research” he believed was com­ing from the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment.

    Gold­stone him­self had promised as much, in an email to Trump Jr. say­ing the Russ­ian had infor­ma­tion that “would incrim­i­nate Hillary and her deal­ings with Rus­sia and would be very use­ful to your father,” and that it was “part of Rus­sia and its gov­ern­men­t’s sup­port for Mr. Trump.”

    Gold­stone says he was asked to set up the meet­ing — and relay the offer of incrim­i­nat­ing infor­ma­tion about Clin­ton — by Emin Agalarov, on behalf of his father Aras Agalarov, one of Rus­si­a’s wealth­i­est devel­op­ers. At the time, Gold­stone was work­ing as a pub­li­cist for the younger Agalarov, who had launched a career as a Russ­ian pop star.

    The email, Gold­stone said, “was writ­ten in about three min­utes on my cell phone with scant infor­ma­tion, with my own, I sup­pose, way of inter­pret­ing what I believe my client was try­ing to get across, and puff­ing it. That’s what I do. I’m a pub­li­cist.”

    Gold­stone now says he had no direct knowl­edge that the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment was try­ing to help Trump, but assumed such because he had observed the favor­able treat­ment then-can­di­date Trump received from Russ­ian press at the time, and saw first-hand how Rus­sians treat­ed Trump with great affec­tion and enthu­si­asm dur­ing his vis­it to Moscow for the 2013 Miss Uni­verse pageant.

    But he did believe, he said, that Vesel­nit­skaya had Krem­lin con­nec­tions, some­thing that has proven to be true. In an April inter­view with NBC News, she acknowl­edged she had worked close­ly with and pro­vid­ed infor­ma­tion to the Russ­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, a high-rank­ing Krem­lin offi­cial.

    Gold­stone believes it was­n’t his email that secured the meet­ing, but a series of calls after­ward between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov. Gold­stone was not on the line.

    Phone records obtained by the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee indi­cate Agalarov and Trump Jr. had three calls, each two to three min­utes long, on June 6 and 7, 2016. In his Sen­ate tes­ti­mo­ny, Trump Jr. said he did not recall speak­ing with Agalarov.

    “I don’t know what was dis­cussed,” Gold­stone said. “What I do believe is that it is almost [incred­i­ble] to think that this con­ver­sa­tion or these con­ver­sa­tions could have tak­en place with­out dis­cus­sion of fund­ing, Russ­ian fund­ing, ille­gal fund­ing, Democ­rats, Hillary, and it being of use to the cam­paign. I — I just can’t under­stand how — how it would­n’t have been touched upon.”

    Gold­stone not­ed that it was­n’t until after the final call that Trump Jr. sent an email set­ting a date for a meet­ing, and say­ing his broth­er-in-law Jared Kush­n­er and Trump cam­paign chair Paul Man­afort would be join­ing. Gold­stone said he found it “odd” that those senior cam­paign offi­cials would be includ­ed if they did not expect the con­ver­sa­tion to be sub­stan­tive.

    After­wards, the Agalarovs con­tin­ued to seek anoth­er meet­ing for Vesel­nit­skaya with the Trump team. Gold­stone says the requests came short­ly after Trump’s vic­to­ry in Novem­ber 2016, and then again around the time of the inau­gu­ra­tion. Gold­stone says he did not pur­sue the meet­ings, and does not believe any took place.

    Gold­stone said those fol­low-up meet­ings were of par­tic­u­lar inter­est to spe­cial coun­sel Mueller’s team, and he was asked about them before a fed­er­al grand jury in Wash­ing­ton, D.C.

    “They asked a lot of ques­tions about my con­nec­tion to the Trumps, Trump’s con­nec­tion to the Agalarovs, [Aras] Agalarov’s con­nec­tion to the Krem­lin, Trump’s con­nec­tion the Krem­lin, to the Agalarovs.”

    “They seemed most inter­est­ed in why this meet­ing may have come about and why the Agalarovs may have want­ed it,” said Gold­stone, “[and] also two fol­low-up requests for meet­ings.”

    They obvi­ous­ly want­ed to talk to me about my email and the rea­sons behind it,” said Gold­stone, adding that the inves­ti­ga­tors’ respons­es to his tes­ti­mo­ny indi­cat­ed “they sort of under­stood it was a puffed up email.”

    Gold­stone says that on the day of his grand jury tes­ti­mo­ny in March, he was picked up in an unmarked car by two FBI agents and dri­ven to an under­ground entrance to what looked like an office build­ing. He rode a freight ele­va­tor up to a grand jury room.

    “It was like a lec­ture room in a col­lege,” Gold­stone said. “There were about 22 or 23 peo­ple there, [across] three tiers. And then there’s a long table.”

    “The inves­ti­ga­tors, they have notes and doc­u­ments and an over­head pro­jec­tor and all — which I thought was a lit­tle bit old-fash­ioned. And then there’s a table for me that has noth­ing. And my bot­tle of water. Even now, it makes me kind of shud­der a lit­tle bit.”

    Gold­stone said the grand jury was com­prised of a wide range of peo­ple. “There were a cou­ple of old­er folk. Most of them, I would say, they ranged prob­a­bly from late 20s, ear­ly 30s, to their 50s. Black, white, Lati­no. There were a cou­ple of real­ly stu­dious-look­ing peo­ple that were in the front row — I actu­al­ly thought to myself, oh, if any­one was going to ask a ques­tion or float a ques­tion or — prob­a­bly these two.”

    ...

    The Mueller team also want­ed to know about his time with Trump in Moscow in 2013, he said.

    Asked whether he believed the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment may have seen Trump as some­one they could use, Gold­stone said, “I think it’s not beyond the realm of pos­si­bil­i­ty that they would have real­ized ear­ly on that he’s some­body who cer­tain­ly had affec­tion for Rus­sia — and whose will­ing­ness to be there and meet with them and accept this kind of unques­tion­ing adu­la­tion — maybe that does make you a tar­get for that.”

    Gold­stone says he is sure Trump spent the night at the Ritz-Carl­ton hotel, despite Trump alleged­ly telling ex-FBI Direc­tor James Comey he did­n’t sleep there. The dossier on Trump com­piled by for­mer British spy Christo­pher Steele alleges he had an unusu­al dal­liance with pros­ti­tutes at the Ritz. Trump denies it. Gold­stone says he nev­er heard about such a thing, and believed he would have.

    Gold­stone says there was an attempt to arrange a meet­ing between Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin and Trump dur­ing the Miss Uni­verse pageant, but it ulti­mate­ly did not occur. “I was in the room for that call with Mr. Trump and with Emin and Aras. And it was Pres­i­dent Putin’s spokesman, a man by the name of Dmit­ry Peskov. And he spoke with Aras. And Emin trans­lat­ed and said, ‘Unfor­tu­nate­ly, although Mr. Putin would love to meet with Don­ald Trump today, the meet­ing can no longer go ahead because the king of Hol­land has been delayed in traf­fic.’ ”

    “And he said some­thing else that was inter­est­ing. He did say that Pres­i­dent Putin was very keen to meet Mr. Trump, and would make him­self avail­able at any oth­er oppor­tu­ni­ty where their paths coin­cid­ed, and invit­ed him to the Sochi Olympics.” Gold­stone says Trump lat­er received a wood­en box and a note from the Russ­ian leader.

    Gold­stone is not fac­ing any charges, and has appeared vol­un­tar­i­ly in front of Mueller’s grand jury and mul­ti­ple con­gres­sion­al com­mit­tees. Gold­stone said he par­tial­ly agreed with a quote attrib­uted to Steve Ban­non, that the meet­ing was “trea­so­nous” and “unpa­tri­ot­ic” and that the Trump team should have called the FBI rather than accept it.

    Trump Jr., Kush­n­er, and Man­afort all should have known the sit-down was improp­er, Gold­stone said.

    “Peo­ple have said to me, ‘Should­n’t I have known?’ Well, should­n’t they have known? I know noth­ing about pol­i­tics, I set up a meet­ing. Should­n’t they have known?”

    Though he can offer no evi­dence, Gold­stone finds it hard to imag­ine that then-can­di­date Trump was unaware of the meet­ing, as Trump has said.

    “It was tak­ing place in his con­fer­ence room and it was tak­ing place with his cam­paign chair sit­ting and attend­ing the meet­ing, as well as his son and his son-in-law. So, you know, the pub­li­cist in me would say, ‘It’s a bit of a stretch if he’s a floor or two above to believe that he does­n’t know it’s going on.’ ”

    Gold­stone says his per­son­al and pro­fes­sion­al life has been turned upside down by his role in the Trump-Rus­sia saga. He describes the onslaught of press atten­tion and spec­u­la­tion as “ter­ri­fy­ing.”

    Gold­stone has writ­ten a book, “Pop Stars, Pageants & Pres­i­dents: How an Email Trumped My Life,” which he hopes will pro­vide con­text for his role.

    While he says he is still angry with Emin Agalarov for get­ting him involved, he blames him­self for not lis­ten­ing to the “lit­tle voice in my head” that told him the meet­ing was a bad idea.

    He says he now believes the meet­ing came about because Emin and Don­ald Jr. have some­thing in com­mon — a desire to please their fathers: “It’s like they did it for dad­dy, both of them.”

    Scott Bal­ber, an attor­ney for the Agalarovs, said, “It is absolute­ly false that any­one from the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment or Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices asked the Agalarovs to arrange the meet­ing. Who­ev­er voiced these alle­ga­tions is sim­ply mak­ing it up.”

    A rep­re­sen­ta­tive of Paul Man­afort declined to com­ment, while rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Jared Kush­n­er did not respond to requests for com­ment. A lawyer for Don­ald Trump Jr. declined to com­ment. Rudolph Giu­liani, attor­ney for Pres­i­dent Trump, did not imme­di­ate­ly respond to a request for com­ment.

    ———-

    “Rob Gold­stone wish­es he’d nev­er set up that Trump Tow­er meet­ing with the Rus­sians” by Sarah Fitz­patrick, Cyn­thia McFad­den and Ken Dilan­ian; NBC News; 09/24/2018

    “The British-born music pub­li­cist who helped arrange that infa­mous meet­ing between senior Trump cam­paign offi­cials and a Russ­ian lawyer promis­ing dirt on Democ­rats now believes the meet­ing could have been a set-up by Russ­ian intel­li­gence, he told NBC News in an exclu­sive tele­vi­sion inter­view.

    Gold­stone is now open to the idea that the whole meet­ing could have been a set-up by Russ­ian intel­li­gence. Although if you look at his pre­cise word­ing it’s a pret­ty vague endorse­ment of the idea, where he sim­ply says, “I’m will­ing to believe that I don’t know who want­ed this meet­ing”:

    ...
    “I’m will­ing to believe that I don’t know who want­ed this meet­ing,” Rob Gold­stone told NBC’s Cyn­thia McFad­den in a wide-rang­ing inter­view, in which he also dis­cussed Trump’s behav­ior in Moscow dur­ing the 2013 Miss Uni­verse pageant.
    ...

    And while Gold­stone appears to remain uncer­tain as to whether or not the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment was behind the ini­tial push to set up this meet­ing, Gold­stone makes it clear that Don Jr. thought the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment was behind it:

    ...
    Asked if he had con­veyed a “dirty offer” to the Trump team in bro­ker­ing the June 2016 Trump Tow­er meet­ing, Gold­stone said, “Yes. That is true.”

    “That [dirt] did­n’t mate­ri­al­ize,” said Gold­stone, but he believes the appar­ent will­ing­ness of cam­paign offi­cials to accept dirt is what drew the scruti­ny of con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors and spe­cial coun­sel Robert Mueller.

    Gold­stone’s account of the meet­ing, which he says he relayed in detail to Mueller’s grand jury in March, is large­ly con­sis­tent with how it’s been described by oth­er par­tic­i­pants. He says Russ­ian lawyer Natalia Vesel­nit­skaya talked in a mean­der­ing fash­ion about U.S. sanc­tions against Rus­sians — and the financier who lob­bied for those sanc­tions, Bill Brow­der — but did­n’t offer any infor­ma­tion about Trump’s foe in the 2016 pres­i­den­tial race, Hillary Clin­ton. He con­sid­ered the Rus­sian’s pre­sen­ta­tion “com­plete and utter non­sense,” he said.

    Nonethe­less, he acknowl­edged that the can­di­date’s son, Don­ald Trump Jr., came into the room antic­i­pat­ing — and very hap­py to accept — “oppo­si­tion research” he believed was com­ing from the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment.

    Gold­stone him­self had promised as much, in an email to Trump Jr. say­ing the Russ­ian had infor­ma­tion that “would incrim­i­nate Hillary and her deal­ings with Rus­sia and would be very use­ful to your father,” and that it was “part of Rus­sia and its gov­ern­men­t’s sup­port for Mr. Trump.”
    ...

    Gold­stone then goes to say that he had no direct knowl­edge the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment was behind the meet­ing, but he assumed that was the case based on the pos­i­tive cov­er­age the Russ­ian media was giv­ing Trump at the time and the enthu­si­asm for Trump he wit­nessed dur­ing the 2013 Miss Uni­verse pageant:

    ...
    Gold­stone says he was asked to set up the meet­ing — and relay the offer of incrim­i­nat­ing infor­ma­tion about Clin­ton — by Emin Agalarov, on behalf of his father Aras Agalarov, one of Rus­si­a’s wealth­i­est devel­op­ers. At the time, Gold­stone was work­ing as a pub­li­cist for the younger Agalarov, who had launched a career as a Russ­ian pop star.

    The email, Gold­stone said, “was writ­ten in about three min­utes on my cell phone with scant infor­ma­tion, with my own, I sup­pose, way of inter­pret­ing what I believe my client was try­ing to get across, and puff­ing it. That’s what I do. I’m a pub­li­cist.”

    Gold­stone now says he had no direct knowl­edge that the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment was try­ing to help Trump, but assumed such because he had observed the favor­able treat­ment then-can­di­date Trump received from Russ­ian press at the time, and saw first-hand how Rus­sians treat­ed Trump with great affec­tion and enthu­si­asm dur­ing his vis­it to Moscow for the 2013 Miss Uni­verse pageant.

    But he did believe, he said, that Vesel­nit­skaya had Krem­lin con­nec­tions, some­thing that has proven to be true. In an April inter­view with NBC News, she acknowl­edged she had worked close­ly with and pro­vid­ed infor­ma­tion to the Russ­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, a high-rank­ing Krem­lin offi­cial.
    ...

    Now here’s the part of the inter­view that could point to poten­tial­ly seri­ous legal trou­ble for Trump Jr: Gold­stone claims that there were mul­ti­ple short phone calls between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov on June 6 and 7, and it was only after that final phone call that the meet­ing was sched­ule. And phone records of these calls were indeed obtained by the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee, but Trump Jr. told the Sen­ate that he did not recall speak­ing with Agalarov, which seems like a very like­ly lie. Gold­stone also sug­gests that there’s no way these con­ver­sa­tions between Trump Jr. and Agalarov did­n’t involve dis­cus­sions about some sort of Russ­ian gov­ern­ment assis­tance with the cam­paign since that was sup­posed to be the entire point of the meet­ing based on the intial emails:

    ...
    Gold­stone believes it was­n’t his email that secured the meet­ing, but a series of calls after­ward between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov. Gold­stone was not on the line.

    Phone records obtained by the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee indi­cate Agalarov and Trump Jr. had three calls, each two to three min­utes long, on June 6 and 7, 2016. In his Sen­ate tes­ti­mo­ny, Trump Jr. said he did not recall speak­ing with Agalarov.

    “I don’t know what was dis­cussed,” Gold­stone said. “What I do believe is that it is almost [incred­i­ble] to think that this con­ver­sa­tion or these con­ver­sa­tions could have tak­en place with­out dis­cus­sion of fund­ing, Russ­ian fund­ing, ille­gal fund­ing, Democ­rats, Hillary, and it being of use to the cam­paign. I — I just can’t under­stand how — how it would­n’t have been touched upon.”
    ...

    And then Gold­stone points some­thing out that sud­den­ly becomes poten­tial­ly quite sig­nif­i­cant in the con­text of Paul Man­afort act­ing as a pro-West­ern change agent dur­ing his work in Ukraine: It was only AFTER the final call between Trump Jr. and Agalarov that Trump Jr. emailed him to inform him that Jared Kush­n­er and Paul Man­afort would be at the meet­ing. So if Russ­ian intel­li­gence real­ly was behind the meet­ing, what would the sud­den inser­tion of Paul Man­afort into this sit­u­a­tion have done to their plans:

    ...
    Gold­stone not­ed that it was­n’t until after the final call that Trump Jr. sent an email set­ting a date for a meet­ing, and say­ing his broth­er-in-law Jared Kush­n­er and Trump cam­paign chair Paul Man­afort would be join­ing. Gold­stone said he found it “odd” that those senior cam­paign offi­cials would be includ­ed if they did not expect the con­ver­sa­tion to be sub­stan­tive.
    ...

    Gold­stone goes on to point out that the Agalarovs tried to set up new meet­ings with Natalia Vesel­nit­skaya after the 2016 elec­tion and again around the time of the inau­gu­ra­tion. Curi­ous­ly, Gold­stone says he did no pur­sue the meet­ings and does not believe any took place. So did the Agalarovs asked him to arrange anoth­er round of meet­ing and he refused to do so? If so, that’s odd.

    But it’s also worth not­ing that if Vesel­nit­skaya real­ly was act­ing on behalf of the Krem­lin it’s not like there weren’t plen­ty of oth­er instances in the post-elec­tion peri­od when we have word of the Trump team meet­ing with Krem­lin rep­re­sen­ta­tives. Don’t for­get that it was dur­ing the post-elec­tion peri­od when all the ‘back chan­nel’ machi­na­tions took place. For instance, there was the Decem­ber 1, 2016, meet­ing in Trump Tow­er with Russ­ian ambas­sador Sergei Kislyak dur­ing which Jared Kush­n­er report­ed­ly told Kislyak he want­ed to set up a secret back chan­nel between the Trump team and the Krem­lin. And then all of the sub­se­quent meet­ings asso­ci­at­ed with that ‘back chan­nel’. So if the Vesel­nit­skaya team real­ly was request­ing new meet­ings dur­ing this time it’s inter­est­ing that it appar­ent­ly was­n’t pur­sued giv­en the Trump team’s appar­ent desire for a Krem­lin back chan­nel and the fact that Vesel­nit­skaya alleged­ly act­ed as back chan­nel ear­li­er:

    ...
    After­wards, the Agalarovs con­tin­ued to seek anoth­er meet­ing for Vesel­nit­skaya with the Trump team. Gold­stone says the requests came short­ly after Trump’s vic­to­ry in Novem­ber 2016, and then again around the time of the inau­gu­ra­tion. Gold­stone says he did not pur­sue the meet­ings, and does not believe any took place.

    Gold­stone said those fol­low-up meet­ings were of par­tic­u­lar inter­est to spe­cial coun­sel Mueller’s team, and he was asked about them before a fed­er­al grand jury in Wash­ing­ton, D.C.

    “They asked a lot of ques­tions about my con­nec­tion to the Trumps, Trump’s con­nec­tion to the Agalarovs, [Aras] Agalarov’s con­nec­tion to the Krem­lin, Trump’s con­nec­tion the Krem­lin, to the Agalarovs.”

    “They seemed most inter­est­ed in why this meet­ing may have come about and why the Agalarovs may have want­ed it,” said Gold­stone, “[and] also two fol­low-up requests for meet­ings.”

    They obvi­ous­ly want­ed to talk to me about my email and the rea­sons behind it,” said Gold­stone, adding that the inves­ti­ga­tors’ respons­es to his tes­ti­mo­ny indi­cat­ed “they sort of under­stood it was a puffed up email.”
    ...

    Final­ly, Gold­stone points out the obvi­ous: that it’s hard to imag­ine Trump senior was well aware of the Trump Tow­er meet­ing:

    ...
    Though he can offer no evi­dence, Gold­stone finds it hard to imag­ine that then-can­di­date Trump was unaware of the meet­ing, as Trump has said.

    “It was tak­ing place in his con­fer­ence room and it was tak­ing place with his cam­paign chair sit­ting and attend­ing the meet­ing, as well as his son and his son-in-law. So, you know, the pub­li­cist in me would say, ‘It’s a bit of a stretch if he’s a floor or two above to believe that he does­n’t know it’s going on.’ ”
    ...

    Don’t for­get that it was on June 7, 2016, when Trump Sr. teased that he had a major speech on the cor­rup­tion of Hillary Clin­ton com­ing up. That speech nev­er hap­pened, but a week lat­er the ini­tial reports of the DNC hacks and the sub­se­quent release of hacked doc­u­ments by “Guc­cifer 2.0” did start hap­pen­ing.

    It’s all a reminder that the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence makes it very clear that the Trump team tried to col­lude with the Krem­lin. Whether or not they did so remains unclear, but they cer­tain­ly want­ed to. And giv­en every­thing we’ve learned about Paul Man­afort and the fact that he was insert­ed into these secret nego­ti­a­tions at the last min­utes, we now have to ask whether or not the pres­ence of Paul Man­afort actu­al­ly com­pli­cat­ed those col­lu­sion attempts by scar­ing off the Krem­lin. Would­n’t that be quite a twist.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 24, 2018, 3:18 pm
  6. @Pterrafractyl–

    A more prob­a­ble analy­sis: this whole thing is horse­shit.

    Trump’s “Russ­ian deal­ings” are almost cer­tain­ly a pen­e­tra­tion “op” with spook Felix Sater direct­ing traf­fic. That Russ­ian intel agents may have attend­ed any Trump-team meet­ings is con­sis­tent not only with counter-intel­li­gence method­ol­o­gy but would be unsur­pris­ing sim­ply in light of the fact that Trump was the GOP nom­i­nee and might be Pres­i­dent.

    Remem­ber, when Trump made his call for the Rus­sians to “hack” Hillary’s serv­er, her email account had been tak­en offline sev­er­al years ear­li­er for the Beng­hazi cir­cus.

    Hell, it was Hillary Clin­ton’s State Depart­ment (under Barack Oba­ma) that engi­neered the whole “Reboot with Rus­sia,” that came to an end with Eddie the Friend­ly Spook’s odyssey.

    As far as Fam­i­ly Trump–they are all cor­rupt and will seek mon­ey, assis­tance and influ­ence wher­ev­er they can find it.

    Don­ald, Sr. would fuck a bush if he thought there was a snake in it.

    Best,

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | September 24, 2018, 4:29 pm
  7. Here’s a pair of arti­cle that con­tain some inter­est­ing info about how the Haps­burg Group got start­ed and who was behind it: First, recall the recent report about Psy-Group — the Israeli cyber-intel­li­gence/pro­pa­gan­da firm that was appar­ent­ly hired by the UAE and Saud­is to assist the 2016 Trump cam­paign — and the fact that Psy-Group’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive, George Birn­baum, got into con­tact with Rick Gates days after Gates and Man­afort joined the Trump team in March of 2016. We are told that Birn­baum con­tact­ed Eckart Sager who passed alont Gates’s con­tact infor­ma­tion. We are also informed that Sager is one of the indi­vid­u­als who was ille­gal­ly con­tact­ed by Paul Man­afort in what was clear­ly some sort of wit­ness tam­per­ing attempt.

    So while it’s cer­tain­ly tempt­ing to assume that Man­afort may have been reach­ing out to Sager to dis­cuss what they were going to tell author­i­ties about the attempts by Birn­baum to get in con­tact with Gates over the Psy-Group pro­pos­al, it’s prob­a­bly the case that Man­afort was con­tact Sager pri­mar­i­ly over Sager’s involve­ment with the Haps­burg Group. Because as the fol­low­ing arti­cles makes clear, Sager and part­ner, Alan Fried­man, were deeply involved in set­ting up the Haps­burg Group and it was appar­ent­ly all ini­tial­ly Fried­man’s idea that he float­ed to Man­afort in 2011.

    First, here’s an arti­cle from June about how the Man­afort team acci­den­tal­ly revealed that Fried­man and Sager were the two pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives that Man­afort secret­ly reached out to dur­ing his wit­ness tam­per­ing attempts:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    U.S. fil­ing inad­ver­tent­ly iden­ti­fies pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives, for­mer politi­cians in Man­afort case

    By Spencer S. Hsu
    June 18, 2018

    (This file has been updat­ed to include addi­tion­al details of the court fil­ing and com­ments from indi­vid­u­als whose names were dis­closed in the inad­ver­tent release.)

    Court offi­cials inad­ver­tent­ly released a court fil­ing Wednes­day that iden­ti­fied two Euro­pean pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives alleged­ly approached to solic­it false tes­ti­mo­ny to aid Paul Man­afort and also revealed names of sev­er­al senior for­mer Euro­pean politi­cians one exec­u­tive sug­gest­ed approach­ing about a secret lob­by­ing cam­paign for Ukraine.

    The fil­ing in Wash­ing­ton by pros­e­cu­tors with spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III, was a cler­i­cal error, a court spokes­woman said. The fil­ing was with­drawn with­in min­utes by court offi­cials and repost­ed with redac­tions, in keep­ing with a judge’s order from ear­li­er in the day.

    The fil­ing iden­ti­fied the PR exec­u­tives as for­mer jour­nal­ists Alan Fried­man and Eckart Sager of FBC Media, or Fact­based Com­mu­ni­ca­tions Media, a Lon­don-based firm that has since gone into bank­rupt­cy.

    Fried­man and Sager did not respond to requests for com­ment ear­li­er this week when their firm was linked to Man­afort in news accounts, and they did not respond to emails seek­ing com­ment Wednes­day after­noon after the release.

    Also includ­ed in the fil­ing was a June 2012 memo from Fried­man addressed to Man­afort that named politi­cians Fried­man sought to enlist as part of a “small cho­rus of high-lev­el third-par­ty endorsers and polit­i­cal­ly cred­i­ble friends,” to help lob­by for Ukraine.

    It is not clear how many of the Euro­pean politi­cians men­tioned were ever approached and which, if any, were paid by Man­afort to act as lob­by­ists. The list includ­ed politi­cians from Aus­tria, Italy, Bel­gium, Ger­many and Spain.

    The names released Wednes­day had been with­held in a June 7 indict­ment charg­ing Man­afort and a Russ­ian asso­ciate with two counts of obstruct­ing jus­tice for their alleged attempts to have wit­ness­es give mis­lead­ing tes­ti­mo­ny about the for­eign lob­by­ing.

    Among the charges filed against Man­afort in the Mueller probe is an accu­sa­tion Man­afort failed to reg­is­ter with the U.S. as a lob­by­ist for a for­eign gov­ern­ment. The over­tures to the poten­tial wit­ness­es in the case alleged­ly involved attempts to have them say the lob­by­ing effort was only in Europe, court fil­ings show.

    ...

    The for­mer cam­paign man­ag­er for Pres­i­dent Trump is accused of laun­der­ing more than $30 mil­lion over a decade of undis­closed lob­by­ing for Ukraine, as well as tax and bank fraud charges. He faces an arraign­ment Fri­day in Wash­ing­ton on the counts of obstruct­ing jus­tice and also a hear­ing on whether his home deten­tion should be revoked pend­ing tri­als due to the wit­ness tam­per­ing counts.

    Pros­e­cu­tors have alleged that Man­afort fun­neled more than 2 mil­lion euros through four accounts in 2012 and 2013 to pay a group of politi­cians, called the “Haps­burg group.” The group includ­ed a for­mer Euro­pean chan­cel­lor and prime min­is­ter that in redact­ed fil­ings is referred to as “For­eign Politi­cian A,” who with oth­ers lob­bied mem­bers of Con­gress, the exec­u­tive branch and their staffs, pros­e­cu­tors assert.

    The obstruc­tion of jus­tice charges revolve around alle­ga­tions that Man­afort and his long­time man­ag­er in Kiev, Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, 47, tried to influ­ence two pub­lic-rela­tions exec­u­tives who were involved in lob­by­ing work in 2012 on behalf of pro-Russ­ian Ukraine pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych and his Par­ty of Regions.

    Accord­ing to court fil­ings, after Man­afort was accused in Feb­ru­ary of secret­ly lob­by­ing with­out reg­is­ter­ing as a lob­by­ist, he and Kil­imnik repeat­ed­ly con­tact­ed the two exec­u­tives to empha­size that their past work togeth­er did not involve Amer­i­can offi­cials and there­fore did not con­sti­tute lob­by­ing in the Unit­ed States.

    Politi­cians con­sid­ered for the “Haps­burg group” includ­ed for­mer Aus­tri­an chan­cel­lor Alfred Gusen­bauer, Ital­ian ex-prime min­is­ter Romano Pro­di, mem­ber of par­lia­ment Adol­fo Urso, Bel­gian judge Jean-Paul Moer­man, and the Euro­pean Union’s chief diplo­mat for a decade before 2009, and Javier Solana, of Spain, accord­ing to the court fil­ing acci­den­tal­ly post­ed.

    The fil­ing, which is part of pros­e­cu­tors’ case, con­tains a June 2012 memo from Fried­man to Man­afort assert­ing that Gusen­bauer had told Fried­man he was will­ing to help orga­nize the lob­by­ing effort at an annu­al rate of 300,000 euros. Gusen­bauer has been quot­ed in sev­er­al news reports repeat­ed­ly say­ing that he was not aware that the effort was financed by Man­afort or the Ukraine gov­ern­ment.

    Pro­di said in a tele­phone inter­view he was nev­er approached to lob­by for Ukraine and did not know of Manafort’s involve­ment, but con­tract­ed with and was paid by Gusen­bauer to attend a series of con­fer­ences and author op-ed arti­cles pro­mot­ing clos­er E.U.-Ukraine ties.

    “No one’s ever asked me to do any lob­by­ing, and I’ve con­sis­tent­ly main­tained the need for Ukraine’s rap­proche­ment to Europe,” Pro­di said, adding, “although this may just be my opin­ion, I deem that coher­ent with my pre­vi­ous task as Pres­i­dent of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion.”

    Urso con­firmed that he had been offered but did not agree to take part in “a work­ing group pro­mot­ed by the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment,” call­ing it “incom­pat­i­ble with my role as an MP of the Ital­ian Repub­lic,” Urso said he did know that Man­afort was involved.

    Moer­man in a tele­phone inter­view said that he had nev­er been con­tact­ed by Man­afort or his team.

    “I do not know these peo­ple. I do not see why my name appears here. I do not know who Paul Man­afort is,” said Moer­man, a judge on the Bel­gian Con­sti­tu­tion­al Court. “I have noth­ing to do with this,” he said.

    An aide to Solana declined to com­ment.

    ———-

    “U.S. fil­ing inad­ver­tent­ly iden­ti­fies pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives, for­mer politi­cians in Man­afort case” by Spencer S. Hsu; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 06/18/2018

    “Court offi­cials inad­ver­tent­ly released a court fil­ing Wednes­day that iden­ti­fied two Euro­pean pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives alleged­ly approached to solic­it false tes­ti­mo­ny to aid Paul Man­afort and also revealed names of sev­er­al senior for­mer Euro­pean politi­cians one exec­u­tive sug­gest­ed approach­ing about a secret lob­by­ing cam­paign for Ukraine.”

    Whoops! So the names of the two Euro­pean pub­lic rela­tions exec­u­tives Man­afort reached out to was acci­den­tal­ly made pub­lic. And those two PR exec­u­tives hap­pen to be Alan Fried­man and Eckart Sager of FBC Media:

    ...
    The fil­ing in Wash­ing­ton by pros­e­cu­tors with spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III, was a cler­i­cal error, a court spokes­woman said. The fil­ing was with­drawn with­in min­utes by court offi­cials and repost­ed with redac­tions, in keep­ing with a judge’s order from ear­li­er in the day.

    The fil­ing iden­ti­fied the PR exec­u­tives as for­mer jour­nal­ists Alan Fried­man and Eckart Sager of FBC Media, or Fact­based Com­mu­ni­ca­tions Media, a Lon­don-based firm that has since gone into bank­rupt­cy.
    ...

    Now, here’s a New York Times arti­cle from July that has more infor­ma­tion of Alan Fried­man’s back­ground and the role he played in the cre­ation of the Haps­burg Group. It turns out Fried­man, an Amer­i­can, is both a long-time jour­nal­ists and a shady busi­ness­man. He’s worked for the Finan­cial Times, the Inter­na­tion­al Her­ald Tri­bune, the New York Times, the Wall Street Jour­nal, and is basi­cal­ly a celebri­ty jour­nal­ist in Italy. Through­out much of his jour­nal­is­tic career in recent decades he was also work­ing as a con­sul­tant, lead­ing to var­i­ous con­flict of inter­est issues with his employ­ers.

    On June 25, 2011, Fried­man wrote a memo to Man­afort propos­ing a strat­e­gy to help bol­ster Yanukovy­ch’s gov­ern­ment. Fried­man then appar­ent­ly took the lead in 2012 in actu­al­ly assem­bling the team of Euro­pean politi­cians.

    And as the arti­cle notes, when Man­afort secret­ly con­tact Fried­man this year Fried­man inter­pret­ed that as sub­orn­ing per­jury and informed inves­ti­ga­tors. So it was Alan Fried­man, the guy who came to Man­afort with the Haps­burg Group pro­pos­al, who appar­ent­ly got Man­afort thrown back in jail for wit­ness tam­per­ing:

    The New York Times

    How Alan Fried­man, Italy’s Pro­fes­sion­al Amer­i­can, Put Paul Man­afort in Jail

    By Jason Horowitz
    July 30, 2018

    FLORENCE, Italy — Alan Fried­man is Italy’s pro­fes­sion­al Amer­i­can. A for­mer jour­nal­ist with a bari­tone voice and per­fect, if heav­i­ly accent­ed, Ital­ian, he has for decades pro­vid­ed the Amer­i­can per­spec­tive to Ital­ians.

    He host­ed and pro­duced Ital­ian tele­vi­sion shows, ran in elite cir­cles, wrote the autho­rized biog­ra­phy of for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Sil­vio Berlus­coni and still con­tributes columns to the country’s most pres­ti­gious news­pa­pers.

    But for all his fame and influ­ence in Italy, few had heard of Mr. Fried­man in the Unit­ed States until he helped land Pres­i­dent Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man, Paul Man­afort, in jail.

    Doc­u­ments filed last month by the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III, as part of the inves­ti­ga­tion into Russia’s influ­ence cam­paign in the 2016 Amer­i­can pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, showed that Mr. Fried­man worked close­ly with Mr. Man­afort in cre­at­ing the so-called Haps­burg Group.

    That was the infor­mal name of a group of Euro­pean politi­cians sur­rep­ti­tious­ly paid through over­seas accounts con­trolled by Mr. Man­afort, start­ing in 2011, to lob­by Amer­i­can politi­cians to sup­port Vik­tor F. Yanukovych, then the leader of Ukraine and a favorite of the Russ­ian pres­i­dent, Vladimir V. Putin.

    Nei­ther Mr. Man­afort nor Mr. Fried­man reg­is­tered as lob­by­ists, a poten­tial vio­la­tion of an Amer­i­can law intend­ed as a bul­wark against for­eign agents’ ped­dling influ­ence in Amer­i­can pol­i­tics.

    “I nev­er reg­is­tered as a for­eign agent because I nev­er was one,” Mr. Fried­man told The Guardian news­pa­per. “I was a com­mu­ni­ca­tions guy.”

    Mr. Man­afort faces pros­e­cu­tion for his fail­ure to reg­is­ter as well as for finan­cial crimes relat­ed to Ukraine. His tri­al is expect­ed to begin Tues­day.

    When the group was revealed in Feb­ru­ary, Mr. Man­afort des­per­ate­ly sought to give Mr. Fried­man a “heads up about Haps­burg,” Mr. Friedman’s lawyer has said. That includ­ed mes­sages on What­sApp say­ing, “This is Paul.”

    Mr. Fried­man told inves­ti­ga­tors that he con­sid­ered the mes­sages an effort to “sub­orn per­jury.” A judge agreed and in June revoked Mr. Manafort’s bail for wit­ness tam­per­ing.

    Now Mr. Fried­man, 62, has gone unchar­ac­ter­is­ti­cal­ly silent on the issue even as he trav­els around Italy pro­mot­ing his book “This Is Not Amer­i­ca,” which begins with his 2016 inter­view with Don­ald J. Trump, then a pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.

    Mr. Man­afort and his asso­ciate Rick Gates had a hand in arrang­ing the inter­view, which was out­side the usu­al media chan­nels and led cam­paign aides to ques­tion its pur­pose, accord­ing to a per­son famil­iar with the issue who was grant­ed anonymi­ty to dis­cuss inter­nal delib­er­a­tions.

    ...

    But Mr. Fried­man stopped being a reporter long ago. Instead, he has become an Amer­i­can exem­plar of Italy’s trans­ac­tion­al cul­ture, its some­times provin­cial sen­si­tiv­i­ty to the view from abroad and its porous lines between jour­nal­ists, pub­li­cists and polit­i­cal oper­a­tives.

    The sources Mr. Fried­man cul­ti­vat­ed as a reporter became his clients or instru­ments of lob­by­ing pres­sure for Mr. Man­afort. Accord­ing to the doc­u­ments Mr. Mueller filed, they are alleged to have includ­ed Romano Pro­di, a for­mer Ital­ian prime min­is­ter, for­mer pres­i­dent of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion and long­time acquain­tance of Mr. Fried­man.

    “Of course I know Alan Fried­man,” Mr. Pro­di said in a recent inter­view, before adding that he had nev­er heard of the Haps­burg Group. “He is writ­ing books about Ital­ian pol­i­tics since 20 years. How can I not know Alan Fried­man?”

    Mr. Fried­man, the son of Jews who escaped Ger­many after Kristall­nacht, attend­ed the Bronx High School of Sci­ence and New York Uni­ver­si­ty before grad­u­at­ing from the Lon­don School of Eco­nom­ics and the School of Advanced Inter­na­tion­al Stud­ies at Johns Hop­kins Uni­ver­si­ty in Wash­ing­ton.

    He made his name in jour­nal­ism at The Finan­cial Times, where he became the Italy cor­re­spon­dent in 1983. In 1988, he pub­lished “Agnel­li: Fiat and the Net­work of Ital­ian Pow­er,” a book about the Ital­ian mogul Gio­van­ni Agnel­li. Appar­ent­ly he learned a thing or two.

    “He became a famous per­son,” said Diet­mar Alfons, who was Mr. Friedman’s com­pan­ion for near­ly 20 years. “It was the first time some­body attacked the Agnel­li fam­i­ly, right­ly so. And at the end, they made peace and they became friends.”

    In 1994, The Inter­na­tion­al Her­ald Tri­bune, then joint­ly owned by The New York Times and The Wash­ing­ton Post, hired Mr. Fried­man as an eco­nom­ics colum­nist. He impressed some edi­tors with his intel­li­gence, showed entre­pre­neur­ial ener­gy and start­ed an I.H.T. tele­vi­sion show.

    But it was in Italy that he became a star. “He under­stands bet­ter than oth­ers the Ital­ians,” Mr. Alfons said.

    In 1998, Mr. Fried­man formed Fact Based Com­mu­ni­ca­tions, which pro­duced tele­vi­sion pro­grams in Lon­don and Rome. But his side jobs and con­sult­ing both­ered Wal­ter Wells, then the I.H.T.’s edi­tor.

    “I didn’t like the mix of his busi­ness and our jour­nal­ism,” said Mr. Wells, who fired Mr. Fried­man in 2003, the year The Times took full own­er­ship of the news­pa­per. He said Mr. Fried­man had respond­ed, “Are you going to leave a nice note on the bul­letin board?”

    The next year, Mr. Fried­man joined The Wall Street Jour­nal while con­tin­u­ing to pur­sue his own busi­ness. But in 2011, he suf­fered set­backs.

    That spring, Mr. Fried­man hired Alessan­dro Pro­to, a real estate agent to the stars, to help him sell an estate he shared with Mr. Alfons in the hills of Tus­cany. Mr. Pro­to, who was even­tu­al­ly con­vict­ed and jailed for fraud unre­lat­ed to his busi­ness with Mr. Fried­man, said in an inter­view that Mr. Fried­man had hoped to sell the vil­la for 18 mil­lion euros, or about $21 mil­lion at cur­rent exchange rates.

    Mr. Pro­to claimed to have cooked up a scheme, for which he says Mr. Fried­man paid him more than €40,000, to plant sto­ries in the Ital­ian media that the vil­la would be used as a hon­ey­moon locale by Prince William, sec­ond in line to the British throne, and Cather­ine Mid­dle­ton after their wed­ding. Mr. Fried­man, he said, took to call­ing the effort “Oper­a­tion Roy­al Mis­di­rec­tion.”

    Mr. Fried­man declined to com­ment.

    The roy­al hon­ey­moon sto­ry appeared in Cor­riere del­la Sera and oth­er pub­li­ca­tions. Emails pro­vid­ed by Mr. Pro­to to The Times showed that Mr. Fried­man took an active role.

    “I under­stand the ques­tion is very inter­est­ing to the Ital­ian press,” Mr. Fried­man told the Cor­riere reporter. “But real­ly I can’t say any­thing.”

    Months lat­er, in August 2011, The Inde­pen­dent, a British news­pa­per, report­ed that the Malaysian gov­ern­ment had paid Mr. Friedman’s com­pa­ny mil­lions of euros to pro­duce tele­vi­sion pro­grams, a fact he had with­held from the BBC, which aired the pro­grams. Embar­rassed, the BBC sus­pend­ed the pro­gram­ming.

    Even before that falling out, Mr. Fried­man was pur­su­ing new ven­tures. On June 25, 2011, he had writ­ten a memo to Mr. Man­afort propos­ing a strat­e­gy to help bol­ster Mr. Yanukovych, the embat­tled Ukrain­ian leader.

    The two signed a con­tract that paid near­ly €1.2 mil­lion, or about $1.4 mil­lion, to Mr. Friedman’s account in the British Vir­gin Islands, linked to a bank in Zurich, for a lob­by­ing cam­paign “aimed at media, deci­sion mak­ers, think tanks and busi­ness and polit­i­cal lead­ers in Europe and the Unit­ed States.”

    By June 2012, Mr. Fried­man had begun “to assem­ble a small cho­rus of high-lev­el Euro­pean third-par­ty endorsers” to act on Ukraine’s behalf, he wrote Mr. Man­afort in an email, accord­ing to doc­u­ments filed by the Jus­tice Depart­ment.

    He informed Mr. Man­afort that Alfred Gusen­bauer, the for­mer chan­cel­lor of Aus­tria, would dis­burse funds and that he “embraced the idea of what he called ‘under­ground com­ment­ing.’”

    In sub­se­quent emails, Mr. Fried­man told Mr. Man­afort that a mem­ber of the group would be “hap­py to speak” with a Unit­ed States sen­a­tor to “delay or tone down or stop the res­o­lu­tion” con­demn­ing Mr. Yanukovych’s jail­ing of a polit­i­cal oppo­nent.

    In March 2013, the same month Mr. Friedman’s par­ents and sis­ter came to Italy for his mar­riage to Gabriel­la Carig­nani, the descen­dant of a noble Tus­can fam­i­ly, Mr. Fried­man helped arrange a lob­by­ing trip to Wash­ing­ton for Mr. Pro­di.

    In Feb­ru­ary 2014, he wrote to Mr. Pro­di ask­ing him to “please review” an opin­ion piece for sub­mis­sion to The New York Times that would appear under Mr. Prodi’s name. The arti­cle argued that Mr. Yanukovych could bring Ukraine back from the brink of col­lapse and that Euro­pean lead­ers should not threat­en sanc­tions against him or the nation.

    Mr. Fried­man then wrote Mr. Gates, in an email now filed as Exhib­it K in the government’s case, that Mr. Pro­di had request­ed to make a change in “the very last sen­tence.” Weeks lat­er, opin­ion page edi­tors at The Times wrote a rep­re­sen­ta­tive of Mr. Pro­di that in order to pub­lish the piece, they need­ed evi­dence for some of Mr. Prodi’s asser­tions.

    The Times Op-Ed page said that Mr. Prodi’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive, redact­ed in the court doc­u­ments, was Glenn Selig, the pres­i­dent of Selig Mul­ti­me­dia. In 2017, Mr. Selig became a spokesman for Mr. Gates. And in Jan­u­ary of this year, he was killed in a ter­ror­ist attack on a hotel in Kab­ul, where his col­leagues told The Tam­pa Bay Times he was work­ing on a poten­tial coun­terex­trem­ism project for a gov­ern­ment agency.

    The paper’s requests to Mr. Selig made their way to Mr. Gates, who then wrote Mr. Fried­man that he had addressed the con­cerns, but that Mr. Fried­man should “make any changes you deem nec­es­sary.” He added, “No pride of author­ship here.”

    In a recent inter­view, Mr. Pro­di said, “I wrote the arti­cle,” and added of Mr. Fried­man, “Maybe we exchanged some lan­guage, but the arti­cle is mine.”

    Mr. Pro­di said he received pay­ment for his advo­ca­cy through Mr. Gusen­bauer, and assumed the project was fund­ed by Euro­pean busi­ness­men, not Ukraine. He said he had no offi­cial rela­tion­ship with Mr. Fried­man and was sure “I didn’t receive one dol­lar by Alan Fried­man.”

    “If you ask me whether Alan Fried­man men­tioned a lob­by group and so on, I tell you nev­er. Nev­er, nev­er, nev­er,” Mr. Pro­di added, say­ing he didn’t know “on which side Alan was work­ing.”

    In the motion to revoke Mr. Manafort’s bail, the gov­ern­ment said that Mr. Manafort’s goal had been to noti­fy mem­bers of the Haps­burg Group to say, if con­tact­ed, that they lob­bied “exclu­sive­ly in Europe.”

    Asked by a reporter on Feb. 24, the day Mr. Man­afort called Mr. Fried­man, whether he had ever talked to Amer­i­can offi­cials, Mr. Pro­di said, “No, no, no, no.”

    Lat­er that day, as news reports revealed his trip to Wash­ing­ton, Mr. Pro­di called back and said he had for­got­ten about the trip. “Let’s clear that up,” he said.

    Involve­ment with Mr. Man­afort, while a headache now, paid off then for Mr. Fried­man, not least with his cov­et­ed inter­view with Mr. Trump. But Mr. Fried­man had con­cealed his busi­ness arrange­ment with Mr. Man­afort.

    In a video post­ed on his web­site on July 12, 2017, Mr. Fried­man spoke in Ital­ian about how Don­ald Trump Jr. had con­vened Mr. Man­afort for a sus­pi­cious meet­ing with a Russ­ian lawyer.

    “When you accept help from a for­eign and hos­tile gov­ern­ment in a cam­paign, it’s a crime,” he explained.

    ———-

    “How Alan Fried­man, Italy’s Pro­fes­sion­al Amer­i­can, Put Paul Man­afort in Jail” by Jason Horowitz; The New York Times; 07/30/2018

    “But for all his fame and influ­ence in Italy, few had heard of Mr. Fried­man in the Unit­ed States until he helped land Pres­i­dent Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man, Paul Man­afort, in jail.”

    So an Ital­ian celebri­ty jour­nal­ist, who hap­pens to be an Amer­i­can long-time jour­nal­ist, was one of the key fig­ures behind the Haps­burg Group:

    ...
    Doc­u­ments filed last month by the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III, as part of the inves­ti­ga­tion into Russia’s influ­ence cam­paign in the 2016 Amer­i­can pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, showed that Mr. Fried­man worked close­ly with Mr. Man­afort in cre­at­ing the so-called Haps­burg Group.

    That was the infor­mal name of a group of Euro­pean politi­cians sur­rep­ti­tious­ly paid through over­seas accounts con­trolled by Mr. Man­afort, start­ing in 2011, to lob­by Amer­i­can politi­cians to sup­port Vik­tor F. Yanukovych, then the leader of Ukraine and a favorite of the Russ­ian pres­i­dent, Vladimir V. Putin.

    Nei­ther Mr. Man­afort nor Mr. Fried­man reg­is­tered as lob­by­ists, a poten­tial vio­la­tion of an Amer­i­can law intend­ed as a bul­wark against for­eign agents’ ped­dling influ­ence in Amer­i­can pol­i­tics.

    “I nev­er reg­is­tered as a for­eign agent because I nev­er was one,” Mr. Fried­man told The Guardian news­pa­per. “I was a com­mu­ni­ca­tions guy.”

    Mr. Man­afort faces pros­e­cu­tion for his fail­ure to reg­is­ter as well as for finan­cial crimes relat­ed to Ukraine. His tri­al is expect­ed to begin Tues­day.
    ...

    And it was Fried­man who appears to have informed inves­ti­ga­tors about Man­afort’s efforts to secret­ly con­tact him. Fried­man even told them he con­sid­ered the mes­sage an effort to “sub­orn per­jury”!

    ...
    When the group was revealed in Feb­ru­ary, Mr. Man­afort des­per­ate­ly sought to give Mr. Fried­man a “heads up about Haps­burg,” Mr. Friedman’s lawyer has said. That includ­ed mes­sages on What­sApp say­ing, “This is Paul.”

    Mr. Fried­man told inves­ti­ga­tors that he con­sid­ered the mes­sages an effort to “sub­orn per­jury.” A judge agreed and in June revoked Mr. Manafort’s bail for wit­ness tam­per­ing.
    ...

    That had to be an ‘ouch’ for Man­afort.

    Inter­est­ing­ly, it sounds like Fried­man was able to assem­ble his Haps­burg Group team by cul­ti­vat­ing his pri­or jour­nal­is­tic sources. Sources like Romano Pro­di. So Fried­man real­ly does appear to have played a crit­i­cal role in the cre­ation of the Haps­burg Group. He used the trust sources had in him from pre­vi­ous work as a reporter to turn them into lob­by­ist for Ukraine:

    ...
    But Mr. Fried­man stopped being a reporter long ago. Instead, he has become an Amer­i­can exem­plar of Italy’s trans­ac­tion­al cul­ture, its some­times provin­cial sen­si­tiv­i­ty to the view from abroad and its porous lines between jour­nal­ists, pub­li­cists and polit­i­cal oper­a­tives.

    The sources Mr. Fried­man cul­ti­vat­ed as a reporter became his clients or instru­ments of lob­by­ing pres­sure for Mr. Man­afort. Accord­ing to the doc­u­ments Mr. Mueller filed, they are alleged to have includ­ed Romano Pro­di, a for­mer Ital­ian prime min­is­ter, for­mer pres­i­dent of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion and long­time acquain­tance of Mr. Fried­man.

    “Of course I know Alan Fried­man,” Mr. Pro­di said in a recent inter­view, before adding that he had nev­er heard of the Haps­burg Group. “He is writ­ing books about Ital­ian pol­i­tics since 20 years. How can I not know Alan Fried­man?”

    Mr. Fried­man, the son of Jews who escaped Ger­many after Kristall­nacht, attend­ed the Bronx High School of Sci­ence and New York Uni­ver­si­ty before grad­u­at­ing from the Lon­don School of Eco­nom­ics and the School of Advanced Inter­na­tion­al Stud­ies at Johns Hop­kins Uni­ver­si­ty in Wash­ing­ton.

    He made his name in jour­nal­ism at The Finan­cial Times, where he became the Italy cor­re­spon­dent in 1983. In 1988, he pub­lished “Agnel­li: Fiat and the Net­work of Ital­ian Pow­er,” a book about the Ital­ian mogul Gio­van­ni Agnel­li. Appar­ent­ly he learned a thing or two.

    “He became a famous per­son,” said Diet­mar Alfons, who was Mr. Friedman’s com­pan­ion for near­ly 20 years. “It was the first time some­body attacked the Agnel­li fam­i­ly, right­ly so. And at the end, they made peace and they became friends.”

    In 1994, The Inter­na­tion­al Her­ald Tri­bune, then joint­ly owned by The New York Times and The Wash­ing­ton Post, hired Mr. Fried­man as an eco­nom­ics colum­nist. He impressed some edi­tors with his intel­li­gence, showed entre­pre­neur­ial ener­gy and start­ed an I.H.T. tele­vi­sion show.

    But it was in Italy that he became a star. “He under­stands bet­ter than oth­ers the Ital­ians,” Mr. Alfons said.
    ...

    In 1998, Fried­man formed Fact Based Com­mu­ni­ca­tions. That’s the firm Eckart Sager worked for. And it was this mix of side-busi­ness­es that irked his jour­nal­is­tic employ­ers:

    ...
    In 1998, Mr. Fried­man formed Fact Based Com­mu­ni­ca­tions, which pro­duced tele­vi­sion pro­grams in Lon­don and Rome. But his side jobs and con­sult­ing both­ered Wal­ter Wells, then the I.H.T.’s edi­tor.

    “I didn’t like the mix of his busi­ness and our jour­nal­ism,” said Mr. Wells, who fired Mr. Fried­man in 2003, the year The Times took full own­er­ship of the news­pa­per. He said Mr. Fried­man had respond­ed, “Are you going to leave a nice note on the bul­letin board?”
    ...

    And then in 2011, Fried­man was caught in a scheme were he appar­ent­ly paid some­one to plant sto­ries in the Ital­ian media claim­ing that a prop­er­ty Fried­man was try­ing to sell was going to be used as a hon­ey­moon locale by Prince William and Kate Mid­dle­ton. This rais­es the ques­tion of whether or not Fried­man was strapped for cash at this point or just greedy and unscrupu­lous:

    ...
    The next year, Mr. Fried­man joined The Wall Street Jour­nal while con­tin­u­ing to pur­sue his own busi­ness. But in 2011, he suf­fered set­backs.

    That spring, Mr. Fried­man hired Alessan­dro Pro­to, a real estate agent to the stars, to help him sell an estate he shared with Mr. Alfons in the hills of Tus­cany. Mr. Pro­to, who was even­tu­al­ly con­vict­ed and jailed for fraud unre­lat­ed to his busi­ness with Mr. Fried­man, said in an inter­view that Mr. Fried­man had hoped to sell the vil­la for 18 mil­lion euros, or about $21 mil­lion at cur­rent exchange rates.

    Mr. Pro­to claimed to have cooked up a scheme, for which he says Mr. Fried­man paid him more than €40,000, to plant sto­ries in the Ital­ian media that the vil­la would be used as a hon­ey­moon locale by Prince William, sec­ond in line to the British throne, and Cather­ine Mid­dle­ton after their wed­ding. Mr. Fried­man, he said, took to call­ing the effort “Oper­a­tion Roy­al Mis­di­rec­tion.”

    Mr. Fried­man declined to com­ment.

    The roy­al hon­ey­moon sto­ry appeared in Cor­riere del­la Sera and oth­er pub­li­ca­tions. Emails pro­vid­ed by Mr. Pro­to to The Times showed that Mr. Fried­man took an active role.

    “I under­stand the ques­tion is very inter­est­ing to the Ital­ian press,” Mr. Fried­man told the Cor­riere reporter. “But real­ly I can’t say any­thing.”
    ...

    Lat­er in 2011, Fried­man got caught work­ing for the Malaysian gov­ern­ment to pro­duce tele­vi­sion pro­grams with­out inform­ing the BBC which aired the shows:

    ...
    Months lat­er, in August 2011, The Inde­pen­dent, a British news­pa­per, report­ed that the Malaysian gov­ern­ment had paid Mr. Friedman’s com­pa­ny mil­lions of euros to pro­duce tele­vi­sion pro­grams, a fact he had with­held from the BBC, which aired the pro­grams. Embar­rassed, the BBC sus­pend­ed the pro­gram­ming.
    ...

    And it was that same year, in June 25, 2011, that Fried­man appar­ent­ly approached Man­afort about some sort of scheme to bol­ster the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment. Pre­sum­ably the ini­tial idea was the bol­ster the Yanukov­cyh gov­ern­men­t’s bid to join the EU trade asso­ci­a­tion, although that’s not entire­ly clear:

    ...
    Even before that falling out, Mr. Fried­man was pur­su­ing new ven­tures. On June 25, 2011, he had writ­ten a memo to Mr. Man­afort propos­ing a strat­e­gy to help bol­ster Mr. Yanukovych, the embat­tled Ukrain­ian leader.

    The two signed a con­tract that paid near­ly €1.2 mil­lion, or about $1.4 mil­lion, to Mr. Friedman’s account in the British Vir­gin Islands, linked to a bank in Zurich, for a lob­by­ing cam­paign “aimed at media, deci­sion mak­ers, think tanks and busi­ness and polit­i­cal lead­ers in Europe and the Unit­ed States.”

    By June 2012, Mr. Fried­man had begun “to assem­ble a small cho­rus of high-lev­el Euro­pean third-par­ty endorsers” to act on Ukraine’s behalf, he wrote Mr. Man­afort in an email, accord­ing to doc­u­ments filed by the Jus­tice Depart­ment.

    He informed Mr. Man­afort that Alfred Gusen­bauer, the for­mer chan­cel­lor of Aus­tria, would dis­burse funds and that he “embraced the idea of what he called ‘under­ground com­ment­ing.’”

    In sub­se­quent emails, Mr. Fried­man told Mr. Man­afort that a mem­ber of the group would be “hap­py to speak” with a Unit­ed States sen­a­tor to “delay or tone down or stop the res­o­lu­tion” con­demn­ing Mr. Yanukovych’s jail­ing of a polit­i­cal oppo­nent.

    In March 2013, the same month Mr. Friedman’s par­ents and sis­ter came to Italy for his mar­riage to Gabriel­la Carig­nani, the descen­dant of a noble Tus­can fam­i­ly, Mr. Fried­man helped arrange a lob­by­ing trip to Wash­ing­ton for Mr. Pro­di.
    ...

    So Fried­man appears to be aa rather col­or­ful, albeit some­what shady, char­ac­ter. And in 2011, the same year he approached Man­afort about start­ing the Haps­burg Group, he was act­ing extreme­ly shady. In that sense he seems like a nat­ur­al fit for the Ukrain­ian ini­tia­tive.

    Still, in that entire review of Fried­man, there is no indi­ca­tion as to why on earth he decid­ed to get involved in Ukraine. Which rais­es the obvi­ous ques­tion: did some­one else hire Fried­man to con­tact Man­afort about set­ting up this Haps­burg Group ini­tia­tive? Don’t for­get that one of the biggest mys­ter­ies about the Haps­burg Group is to what extent it was oper­at­ing on behalf of EU forces that want­ed to see Ukraine join the Trade Asso­ci­a­tion. Not just Ukrain­ian forces. So learn­ing that Fried­man approached Man­afort with the idea only backs up those sus­pi­cions that the Haps­burg Group real­ly was an inter­na­tion­al effort. Not just inter­na­tion­al in terms of who was involved but inter­na­tion­al in terms of who was behind the idea in the first place.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 10, 2018, 1:19 pm
  8. There was a poten­tial bomb­shell sto­ry regard­ing Paul Man­afort and Wik­ileaks a day after we learn that the Mueller team is charg­ing Paul Man­afort for repeat­ed­ly lying to pros­e­cu­tors after mak­ing a plea deal: Accord­ing to series of anony­mous sources to the Guardian, Paul Man­afort has held secret talks with Julian Assange on at least three occa­sions in 2013, 2015, and March of 2016. March of 2016 is, of course, the very same month that the hack­ers — alleged to be ‘Fan­cy Bear’/APT28 hack­ers — start­ed their spearphish­ing hack­ing attempts on the DNC servers and the same month Man­afort joined the Trump team as Trump’s cam­paign chair­man. Not that Man­afort offi­cial­ly joined Trump’s team on March 28, 2016, so the March 2016 meet­ing with Assange would have almost cer­tain­ly tak­en place before that time. Also recall that March of 2016 is the same month George Papadopou­los was approached by the mys­te­ri­ous Mal­tese pro­fes­sor Joseph Mif­sud. So that’s turn­ing out to be a par­tic­u­lar­ly impor­tant month in this whole sto­ry.

    There’s been a lot of focus on sourc­ing for this sto­ry in part because no oth­er out­lets have con­firmed it. And based on the lan­guage of the sto­ry it sounds like the sources are peo­ple in the Ecuado­ri­an gov­ern­ment, although that’s ambigu­ous. Rep­re­sen­ta­tives for Wik­ileaks and Man­afort deny the sto­ry.

    For the March 2016 meet­ing, the Ecuado­ri­an staff report­ed­ly did not log this vis­it as they nor­mal­ly do. The meet­ing last­ed about 40 min­utes. The 2013 vis­it appar­ent­ly took place a year after Assange sought refuge in the Ecuado­ran embassy, accord­ing to the arti­cle. Keep in mind that Assange entered the Ecuado­ran embassy in June of 2012, so assum­ing that “one year after” tim­ing is accu­rate, that would place the 2013 vis­it around mid 2013. Man­afort’s asso­ci­a­tion with Assange goes back at least 5 years to 2012–2013, accord­ing to sources

    No details are giv­en on when the 2015 vis­it took place, but it’s worth keep­ing in mind that the ini­tial hack of the DNC’s servers — alleged­ly by ‘Cozy Bear’/APT29 — took place in May 2015. That hack was unusu­al­ly ‘noisy’ and atyp­i­cal for Russ­ian gov­ern­ment hack­ers, accord­ing to US cyber­se­cu­ri­ty offi­cials watch­ing it. And don’t for­get that the FBI was made aware of this hack and tried and failed to noti­fy the DNC of this hack start­ing in Sep­tem­ber of 2015. Also recall the right-wing oper­a­tion — run by Bar­bara Ledeen, Newt Gin­grich, and Judi­cial Watch — alleged­ly set up to search the dark web for hack­ers with Hillary Clin­ton’s hacked emails. So giv­en the fact that the US gov­ern­ment was well aware of the hack of the DNC serv­er in 2015 and right-wing oper­a­tives were already putting out teams to search the dark web for hacked emails (or hire teams to hack them), we should­n’t rule out the pos­si­bil­i­ty that Man­afort’s alleged meet­ing with Assange in 2015 includ­ed a dis­cus­sion of hacked emails, either hacks yet to come or hacks that already tran­spired. It also makes the tim­ing of that alleged 2015 meet­ing par­tic­u­lar­ly impor­tant.

    The arti­cle also notes that Man­afort actu­al­ly vis­it­ed Ecuador in 2017 to hold talks with pres­i­dent-elect Moreno, osten­si­bly to drum up busi­ness for some of Man­afort’s Chi­nese clients. But Man­afort dis­creet­ly brought up the top of Assange’s sit­u­a­tion, accord­ing to one of the sources. A sec­ond source, described as a “senior for­eign min­istry source” was skep­ti­cal that the top­ic of Assange would have come up. So we know at least one source is a senior mem­ber of a for­eign min­istry, although we don’t know which for­eign min­istry.

    So there’s the obvi­ous big ques­tion of whether or not the meet­ings in 2015 and 2016 actu­al­ly took place and whether or not hacked emails were dis­cussed. But the 2013 meet­ing is also quite intrigu­ing giv­en that this was the time when Man­afort was work­ing on the “Haps­burg Group” lob­by­ing cam­paign to con­vince the EU to allow Ukraine into a trade asso­ci­a­tion with the EU despite Yanukovy­ch’s jail­ing of Yulia Tymoshenko. And that rais­es the intrigu­ing pos­si­bil­i­ty that Man­afort want­ed to use Wik­ileaks as a means vehi­cle for dis­cred­it­ing Tymoshenko in the eyes of the EU. At this point this is just spec­u­la­tion, but the tim­ing cer­tain­ly points in that direc­tion. Don’t for­get that Man­afort only agreed to coop­er­ate with Mueller right before his sec­ond tri­al, and that was going to be the tri­al that explored what actu­al­ly hap­pened with the “Haps­burg Group” schem­ing.

    Josh Mar­shall also makes an impor­tant point to keep in mind about all this: if these meet­ings did indeed take place, there’s good rea­son to believe the US and UK gov­ern­ments would have known about these meet­ings sim­ply because the Ecuado­ran embassy in Lon­don is going to be under intense sur­veil­lance specif­i­cal­ly because of Assange’s pres­ence there. Ecuador would also obvi­ous­ly know about these vis­its, so if the Ecuado­ran gov­ern­ment was coop­er­at­ing with the Mueller team and learned that Man­afort was being charged with lying to Mueller, releas­ing this sto­ry to the press could be a way for Ecuador’s gov­ern­ment to get out ahead of the sto­ry.

    So while we don’t know yet what lies Man­afort told Mueller’s team that brought about this new round of charges, it sounds like those lies may have includ­ed lying about mul­ti­ple secret meet­ings with Julian Assange:

    The Guardian

    Man­afort held secret talks with Assange in Ecuado­ri­an embassy, sources say

    Trump ally met Wik­iLeaks founder months before emails hacked by Rus­sia were pub­lished

    Luke Hard­ing and Dan Col­lyns in Quito

    Tue 27 Nov 2018 09.23 EST

    Don­ald Trump’s for­mer cam­paign man­ag­er Paul Man­afort held secret talks with Julian Assange inside the Ecuado­ri­an embassy in Lon­don, and vis­it­ed around the time he joined Trump’s cam­paign, the Guardian has been told.

    Sources have said Man­afort went to see Assange in 2013, 2015 and in spring 2016 – dur­ing the peri­od when he was made a key fig­ure in Trump’s push for the White House.

    It is unclear why Man­afort would have want­ed to see Assange and what was dis­cussed. But the last appar­ent meet­ing is like­ly to come under scruti­ny and could inter­est Robert Mueller, the spe­cial pros­e­cu­tor who is inves­ti­gat­ing alleged col­lu­sion between the Trump cam­paign and Rus­sia.

    A well-placed source has told the Guardian that Man­afort went to see Assange around March 2016. Months lat­er Wik­iLeaks released a stash of Demo­c­ra­t­ic emails stolen by Russ­ian intel­li­gence offi­cers.

    Man­afort, 69, denies involve­ment in the hack and says the claim is “100% false”. His lawyers declined to answer the Guardian’s ques­tions about the vis­its.

    In a series of tweets Wik­iLeaks said Assange and Man­afort had not met. Assange described the sto­ry as a hoax.

    Man­afort was jailed this year and was thought to have become a star coop­er­a­tor in the Mueller inquiry. But on Mon­day Mueller said Man­afort had repeat­ed­ly lied to the FBI, despite agree­ing to coop­er­ate two months ago in a plea deal. Accord­ing to a court doc­u­ment, Man­afort had com­mit­ted “crimes and lies” on a “vari­ety of sub­ject mat­ters”.

    His defence team says he believes what he has told Mueller to be truth­ful and has not vio­lat­ed his deal.

    Manafort’s first vis­it to the embassy took place a year after Assange sought asy­lum inside, two sources said.

    A sep­a­rate inter­nal doc­u­ment writ­ten by Ecuador’s Senain intel­li­gence agency and seen by the Guardian lists “Paul Man­aford [sic]” as one of sev­er­al well-known guests. It also men­tions “Rus­sians”.

    Accord­ing to the sources, Man­afort returned to the embassy in 2015. He paid anoth­er vis­it in spring 2016, turn­ing up alone, around the time Trump named him as his con­ven­tion man­ag­er. The vis­it is ten­ta­tive­ly dat­ed to March.

    Manafort’s 2016 vis­it to Assange last­ed about 40 min­utes, one source said, adding that the Amer­i­can was casu­al­ly dressed when he exit­ed the embassy, wear­ing sandy-coloured chi­nos, a cardi­gan and a light-coloured shirt.

    Vis­i­tors nor­mal­ly reg­is­ter with embassy secu­ri­ty guards and show their pass­ports. Sources in Ecuador, how­ev­er, say Man­afort was not logged.

    Embassy staff were aware only lat­er of the poten­tial sig­nif­i­cance of Manafort’s vis­it and his polit­i­cal role with Trump, it is under­stood.

    The rev­e­la­tion could shed new light on the sequence of events in the run-up to sum­mer 2016, when Wik­iLeaks pub­lished tens of thou­sands of emails hacked by the GRU, Russia’s mil­i­tary intel­li­gence agency. Hillary Clin­ton has said the hack con­tributed to her defeat.

    The pre­vi­ous­ly unre­port­ed Man­afort-Assange con­nec­tion is like­ly to be of inter­est to Mueller, who has been inves­ti­gat­ing pos­si­ble con­tacts between Wik­iLeaks and asso­ciates of Trump includ­ing the polit­i­cal lob­by­ist Roger Stone and Don­ald Trump Jr.

    One key ques­tion is when the Trump cam­paign was aware of the Kremlin’s hack­ing oper­a­tion – and what, if any­thing, it did to encour­age it. Trump has repeat­ed­ly denied col­lu­sion.

    Ear­li­er this year Mueller indict­ed 12 GRU intel­li­gence offi­cers for car­ry­ing out the hack, which began in March 2016.

    In June of that year Wik­iLeaks emailed the GRU via an inter­me­di­ary seek­ing the DNC mate­r­i­al. After failed attempts, Vladimir Putin’s spies sent the doc­u­ments in mid-July to Wik­iLeaks as an encrypt­ed attach­ment.

    Accord­ing to sources, Manafort’s acquain­tance with Assange goes back at least five years, to late 2012 or 2013, when the Amer­i­can was work­ing in Ukraine and advis­ing its Moscow-friend­ly pres­i­dent, Vik­tor Yanukovych.

    Why Man­afort might have sought out Assange in 2013 is unclear. Dur­ing this peri­od the vet­er­an con­sul­tant was involved in black oper­a­tions against Yanukovych’s chief polit­i­cal rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Yanukovych had jailed. Man­afort ran an exten­sive lob­by­ing oper­a­tion fea­tur­ing Euro­pean for­mer politi­cians.

    He flew fre­quent­ly from the US to Ukraine’s cap­i­tal, Kiev – usu­al­ly via Frank­furt but some­times through Lon­don, flight records seen by the Guardian show.

    Man­afort is cur­rent­ly in jail in Alexan­dria, Vir­ginia. In August a jury con­vict­ed him of crimes aris­ing from his decade-long activ­i­ties in Ukraine. They include large-scale mon­ey laun­der­ing and fail­ure to pay US tax. Man­afort plead­ed guilty to fur­ther charges in order to avoid a sec­ond tri­al in Wash­ing­ton.

    ...

    One per­son famil­iar with Wik­iLeaks said Assange was moti­vat­ed to dam­age the Democ­rats cam­paign because he believed a future Trump admin­is­tra­tion would be less like­ly to seek his extra­di­tion on pos­si­ble charges of espi­onage. This fate had hung over Assange since 2010, when he released con­fi­den­tial US state depart­ment cables. It con­tributed to his deci­sion to take refuge in the embassy.

    Accord­ing to the dossier writ­ten by the for­mer MI6 offi­cer Christo­pher Steele, Man­afort was at the cen­tre of a “well-devel­oped con­spir­a­cy of coop­er­a­tion” between the Trump cam­paign and Russia’s lead­er­ship. The two sides had a mutu­al inter­est in defeat­ing Clin­ton, Steele wrote, whom Putin “hat­ed and feared”.

    In a memo writ­ten soon after the DNC emails were pub­lished, Steele said: “The [hack­ing] oper­a­tion had been con­duct­ed with the full knowl­edge and sup­port of Trump and senior mem­bers of his cam­paign team.”

    As a can­di­date Trump warm­ly wel­comed the dump of DNC emails by Assange. In Octo­ber 2016 he declared: “I love Wik­iLeaks.” Trump’s com­ments came after Wik­iLeaks released a sec­ond tranche of emails seized from the email account of John Podes­ta, Clinton’s cam­paign chair­man.

    The Trump White House sub­se­quent­ly sent out mixed mes­sages over Assange and his legal fate. In 2017 and behind the scenes Assange tried to reach a deal with Trump’s Depart­ment of Jus­tice that might see him avoid US prison.

    In May 2017, , Man­afort flew to Ecuador to hold talks with the country’s pres­i­dent-elect Lenín Moreno. The dis­cus­sions, days before Moreno was sworn in, and before Man­afort was indict­ed – were osten­si­bly about a large-scale Chi­nese invest­ment.

    How­ev­er, one source in Quito sug­gests that Man­afort also dis­creet­ly raised Assange’s plight. Anoth­er senior for­eign min­istry source said he was scep­ti­cal Assange was men­tioned. At the time Moreno was expect­ed to con­tin­ue sup­port for him.

    Last week a court fil­ing released in error sug­gest­ed that the US jus­tice depart­ment had secret­ly charged Assange with a crim­i­nal offence. Writ­ten by the assis­tant US attor­ney, Kellen Dwyer, the doc­u­ment did not say what Assange had been charged with or when the alleged offence took place.

    ———-

    “Man­afort held secret talks with Assange in Ecuado­ri­an embassy, sources say” by Luke Hard­ing and Dan Col­lyns; The Guardian; 11/27/2018

    “Man­afort was jailed this year and was thought to have become a star coop­er­a­tor in the Mueller inquiry. But on Mon­day Mueller said Man­afort had repeat­ed­ly lied to the FBI, despite agree­ing to coop­er­ate two months ago in a plea deal. Accord­ing to a court doc­u­ment, Man­afort had com­mit­ted “crimes and lies” on a “vari­ety of sub­ject mat­ters”.

    Yep, this report comes just one day after Mueller charged Man­afort with repeat­ed­ly lying to the FBI despite a coop­er­a­tion agree­ment. The tim­ing is inter­est­ing.

    The 2016 meet­ing with in March, accord­ing to “a well-placed source”, although the arti­cle just says “The vis­it is ten­ta­tive­ly dat­ed to March”. So it sounds like there’s still some ambi­gu­i­ty on which month this meet­ing actu­al­ly hap­pened, although it seems like a safe bet that it would have hap­pened before Man­afort joined Trump’s team. And while the exact month of meet­ing is unclear, there are oth­er details from “sources in Ecuador”, like what Man­afort was wear­ing and how long it last­ed, along with the fact that Man­afort’s vis­it was­n’t logged. So we have an inter­est­ing mix of very spe­cif­ic details, like what Man­afort wore to the embassy, with rather vague details about the actu­al tim­ing of the vis­it:

    ...
    A well-placed source has told the Guardian that Man­afort went to see Assange around March 2016. Months lat­er Wik­iLeaks released a stash of Demo­c­ra­t­ic emails stolen by Russ­ian intel­li­gence offi­cers.

    ...

    Accord­ing to the sources, Man­afort returned to the embassy in 2015. He paid anoth­er vis­it in spring 2016, turn­ing up alone, around the time Trump named him as his con­ven­tion man­ag­er. The vis­it is ten­ta­tive­ly dat­ed to March.

    Manafort’s 2016 vis­it to Assange last­ed about 40 min­utes, one source said, adding that the Amer­i­can was casu­al­ly dressed when he exit­ed the embassy, wear­ing sandy-coloured chi­nos, a cardi­gan and a light-coloured shirt.

    Vis­i­tors nor­mal­ly reg­is­ter with embassy secu­ri­ty guards and show their pass­ports. Sources in Ecuador, how­ev­er, say Man­afort was not logged.

    Embassy staff were aware only lat­er of the poten­tial sig­nif­i­cance of Manafort’s vis­it and his polit­i­cal role with Trump, it is under­stood.
    ...

    The 2013 vis­it appears to be con­firmed by two sources and took place “a year after Assange sought asy­lum inside”, which would put it around mid-2013. :

    ...
    Manafort’s first vis­it to the embassy took place a year after Assange sought asy­lum inside, two sources said.

    A sep­a­rate inter­nal doc­u­ment writ­ten by Ecuador’s Senain intel­li­gence agency and seen by the Guardian lists “Paul Man­aford [sic]” as one of sev­er­al well-known guests. It also men­tions “Rus­sians”.
    ...

    And that mid-2013 ini­tial vis­it would put it right in the mid­dle of the “Haps­burg Group” schem­ing:

    ...
    Accord­ing to sources, Manafort’s acquain­tance with Assange goes back at least five years, to late 2012 or 2013, when the Amer­i­can was work­ing in Ukraine and advis­ing its Moscow-friend­ly pres­i­dent, Vik­tor Yanukovych.

    Why Man­afort might have sought out Assange in 2013 is unclear. Dur­ing this peri­od the vet­er­an con­sul­tant was involved in black oper­a­tions against Yanukovych’s chief polit­i­cal rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Yanukovych had jailed. Man­afort ran an exten­sive lob­by­ing oper­a­tion fea­tur­ing Euro­pean for­mer politi­cians.
    ...

    The Guardian also appears to have flight records of Man­afort’s trav­els dur­ing this peri­od and those flight records show that when Man­afort would trav­el back and forth between Kiev and the US he would usu­al­ly fly through Frank­furt but some­times through Lon­don:

    ...
    He flew fre­quent­ly from the US to Ukraine’s cap­i­tal, Kiev – usu­al­ly via Frank­furt but some­times through Lon­don, flight records seen by the Guardian show.
    ...

    It’s not a par­tic­u­lar­ly reveal­ing detail to learn that Man­afort was con­nect­ing through Lon­don when fly­ing to the US, but it’s inter­est­ing that the Guardian has access to Man­afort’s flight records. Recall how Gra­ham Stack­’s cru­cial report­ing on Man­afort’s activ­i­ties dur­ing this same “Haps­burg Group” peri­od relied on flight records that revealed Man­afort was trav­el­ing on planes own by Vik­tor Yanukovy­ch’s chief of staff Sergii Lovochkin. Did the Guardian get its hands on the same flight records or are the new flight records in the hands of jour­nal­ists?

    Final­ly, one of the sources speak­ing with the Guardian asserts that Man­afort trav­eled to Ecuador in May of 2017. The offi­cial rea­son was to hold talks with the coun­try’s pres­i­dent-elect on behalf of Chi­nese investor clients. And this isn’t in dis­pute. Man­afort’s meet­ing with Moreno was report­ed at the time. But accord­ing to one of these anony­mous sources, Man­afort also qui­et­ly raised the top­ic of Assange dur­ing this meet­ing, although a senior for­eign min­istry source dis­putes that:

    ...
    The Trump White House sub­se­quent­ly sent out mixed mes­sages over Assange and his legal fate. In 2017 and behind the scenes Assange tried to reach a deal with Trump’s Depart­ment of Jus­tice that might see him avoid US prison.

    In May 2017, , Man­afort flew to Ecuador to hold talks with the country’s pres­i­dent-elect Lenín Moreno. The dis­cus­sions, days before Moreno was sworn in, and before Man­afort was indict­ed – were osten­si­bly about a large-scale Chi­nese invest­ment.

    How­ev­er, one source in Quito sug­gests that Man­afort also dis­creet­ly raised Assange’s plight. Anoth­er senior for­eign min­istry source said he was scep­ti­cal Assange was men­tioned. At the time Moreno was expect­ed to con­tin­ue sup­port for him.

    Last week a court fil­ing released in error sug­gest­ed that the US jus­tice depart­ment had secret­ly charged Assange with a crim­i­nal offence. Writ­ten by the assis­tant US attor­ney, Kellen Dwyer, the doc­u­ment did not say what Assange had been charged with or when the alleged offence took place.
    ...

    We’ll see if any of the evi­dence behind these claims emerges. But don’t for­get that claims of Man­afort vis­it­ing the Ecuado­ran embassy in Lon­don in 2013, 2015, and 2016 are the kinds of claims where there could be video evi­dence of it some­where. Between US and UK mon­i­tor­ing who comes and goes in that embassy and the pos­si­bil­i­ty that the sources are com­ing from Ecuador’s gov­ern­ment itself, some­one could have video of these trips unless Man­afort was secret allowed into the build­ing. Recall how one source claims the 2016 meet­ing last­ed about 40 min­utes and Man­afort was casu­al­ly dressed when he exit­ed the embassy, wear­ing sandy-coloured chi­nos, a cardi­gan and a light-coloured shirt. Those kinds of details would sug­gest there’s video evi­dence of this float­ing around some­where, although it’s pos­si­ble those details are based on the mem­o­ry of Ecuado­ran embassy staff, espe­cial­ly since the actu­al month of that 2016 meet­ing appears to be some­what in doubt and its only ten­ta­tive­ly placed in March of 2016.

    But also keep in mind that Man­afort is com­plete­ly deny­ing all of this. So if he was deny­ing this to Mueller, and not just the press, and there real­ly is evi­dence of these meet­ings with Assange, that would give us an idea about some of things Mueller is charg­ing Man­afort with lying about at this point.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | November 27, 2018, 3:35 pm
  9. Petro Poroshenko did an inter­view with NBC News on Tues­day about the sit­u­a­tion in the Sea of Azov and there was a fas­ci­nat­ing implied threat to Pres­i­dent Trump con­tained in the inter­view. An implied threat to reopen Ukraine’s coop­er­a­tion with US inves­ti­ga­tions into Paul Man­afort.

    First, recall ear­li­er reports from back in May about how the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment basi­cal­ly froze all coop­er­a­tion with US inves­ti­ga­tors look­ing into Paul Man­afort’s activ­i­ties in Ukraine and this was done by the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment to please Trump and make him more like­ly to pro­vide Ukraine with lethal mil­i­tary aid, specif­i­cal­ly, the Javelin anti-tank mis­siles. Also recall how one of the rea­sons the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment like­ly did­n’t want to see Man­afort ful­ly inves­ti­gat­ed is because many peo­ple cur­rent­ly in the gov­ern­ment would be impli­cat­ed in those anti-cor­rup­tion inves­ti­ga­tions, in par­tic­u­lar inves­ti­ga­tions into the “black ledger”. Well, now that Ukraine is hop­ing to get naval mil­i­tary aid from the US in response to the Sea of Azov inci­dent, Poroshenko is declar­ing that Ukraine is once again ready to coop­er­ate with those US Man­afort inves­ti­ga­tions:

    NBC News

    In inter­view, Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent asks Trump to deliv­er point­ed mes­sage to Putin
    Petro Poroshenko warned Rus­sia would “pay a huge price” if they invad­ed Ukraine.

    Nov. 27, 2018 / 2:47 PM CST / Updat­ed Nov. 27, 2018 / 5:46 PM CST
    By Richard Engel and Corky Siemaszko

    KIEV, Ukraine — The pres­i­dent of Ukraine has a mes­sage that he wants Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump to per­son­al­ly deliv­er to Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin at the upcom­ing G‑20 sum­mit in Argenti­na:

    “Please, get out from Ukraine, Mr. Putin,” Petro Poroshenko said Tues­day.

    Poroshenko made the com­ments in a one-on-one inter­view with NBC News, which was con­duct­ed two days after Russ­ian forces cre­at­ed an inter­na­tion­al cri­sis by attack­ing and seiz­ing three Ukrain­ian ves­sels that were try­ing to pass through the Kerch Strait, a nar­row artery that con­nects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov.

    The Ukrain­ian leader also told NBC News that his coun­try is ready to coop­er­ate with the inves­ti­ga­tion of for­mer Trump cam­paign man­ag­er Paul Man­afort, who spent near­ly a decade in Ukraine as a con­sul­tant to a pro-Moscow polit­i­cal par­ty.

    But asked if the Ukraine has any evi­dence that Man­afort was get­ting paid direct­ly by the Krem­lin, Poroshenko said, “I am not per­son­al­ly con­nect­ed with the process.”

    Poroshenko on Mon­day declared mar­tial law in the provinces bor­der­ing Rus­sia and con­vened his war cab­i­net after the Russ­ian assault that left six Ukrain­ian sailors injured and two dozen more detained in a near­by port.

    The Rus­sians have effec­tive­ly con­trolled the Kerch Strait since they seized the Crimean Penin­su­la from Ukraine in 2014.

    Poroshenko said his mil­i­tary is ready to defend its coun­try but is count­ing on the Unit­ed States to live up to its pledges to sup­port Ukraine.

    “I count on the Unit­ed States,” Poroshenko told NBC News. “I count on the Unit­ed States peo­ple.”

    In the inter­view, Poroshenko also warned the Rus­sians that Ukraine will not roll over if war comes.

    “We will fight for our free­dom, we will fight for our democ­ra­cy, we will fight for our soil,” he said. “The Rus­sians will pay a huge price if they attack us.”

    After the ves­sels were seized on Sun­day, Nik­ki Haley, the out­go­ing U.S. ambas­sador to the Unit­ed Nations, and Sec­re­tary of State Mike Pom­peo joined oth­er West­ern lead­ers in imme­di­ate­ly point­ing the fin­ger of blame at the Krem­lin and Putin.

    But Trump was reluc­tant to blame the Russ­ian leader.

    “We don’t like what’s hap­pen­ing either way,” Trump said on Mon­day.

    ...

    Asked point-blank if he can count on Trump, Poroshenko answered diplo­mat­i­cal­ly: “This is the inter­na­tion­al oblig­a­tion of the Unit­ed States.”

    ———–

    “In inter­view, Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent asks Trump to deliv­er point­ed mes­sage to Putin” by Richard Engel and Corky Siemaszko;
    NBC News; 11/27/2018

    The Ukrain­ian leader also told NBC News that his coun­try is ready to coop­er­ate with the inves­ti­ga­tion of for­mer Trump cam­paign man­ag­er Paul Man­afort, who spent near­ly a decade in Ukraine as a con­sul­tant to a pro-Moscow polit­i­cal par­ty.”

    That sure sounds like a threat to Trump! It’s hard to come up with a dif­fer­ent inter­pre­ta­tion giv­en the fact that the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment was pret­ty open about cut­ting off that coop­er­a­tion before as a means of pla­cat­ing Trump. So this appears to be Ukraine’s carrot/stick with the US as long as Trump is in office: keep start­ing and/or stop­ping the Man­afort inves­ti­ga­tion coop­er­a­tion.

    At the same time, it’s entire­ly pos­si­ble this is a hol­low threat giv­en how an inves­ti­ga­tion into Man­afort could threat­en a num­ber of Ukrain­ian politi­cians. Relat­ed to that pos­si­bil­i­ty is Poroshenko’s claims that he has no idea if Man­afort was get­ting paid direct­ly by the Krem­lin:

    ...
    But asked if the Ukraine has any evi­dence that Man­afort was get­ting paid direct­ly by the Krem­lin, Poroshenko said, “I am not per­son­al­ly con­nect­ed with the process.”
    ...

    Part of what that state­ment some­what iron­ic is that the US inves­ti­ga­tion into Man­afort appeared to uncov­er evi­dence that Man­afort was actu­al­ly briefly work­ing for Poroshenko’s cam­paign in 2014 after the Maid­an protests led to the down­fall of the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment. That was the claim made by Man­afort’s long-time part­ner Rick Gates dur­ing an August 7th tes­ti­mo­ny. Gates went on to com­plain that a $1 mil­lion pay­ment for the work in 2014 was “sig­nif­i­cant­ly past due”, although it’s unclear whether or not that for work done for Poroshenko and Yanukovych. So we have Gates tes­ti­fy­ing that, yes, there was con­sult­ing work done for Poroshenko in 2014 but we don’t know if the unpaid $1 mil­lion was relat­ed to that work.

    The claim also came up in an March 31, 2014 email to Gates from Tad Devine (who worked for Bernie Sanders’ cam­paign in 2016). Devine attached a draft agree­ment for Man­afort’s firm to work on Poroshenko’s cam­paign, and wrote “This pro­pos­al antic­i­pates that we will spend a lot of time between now and the elec­tion on the ground in Kyiv,” Devine wrote. So it sounds like they got pret­ty far in the nego­ti­a­tions.

    Poroshenko’s admin­is­tra­tion pre­vi­ous­ly com­plete­ly denied that it hired Man­afort in 2014 or even con­sid­ered the Man­afort pro­pos­al in 2014. But on August 8th, a day after Gates’s tes­ti­mo­ny, the Poroshenko’s spokesper­son did con­firm that Poroshenko’s top strate­gist, Ihor Hryniv, did in fact meet with Man­afort’s team to year the pitch. But they con­tin­ue to insist that they nev­er hired Man­afort’s team. Hryniv asserts that Man­afort was eager to work for Poroshenko and had come pre­pared with an elab­o­rate strat­e­gy, polling num­bers, and pro­jec­tions. But Hryniv says that Man­afort “did not under­stand that the coun­try changed after the Maid­an” and so they did­n’t use his ser­vices. :

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty

    Poroshenko Con­firms 2014 Meet­ing With Man­afort Team

    Last Updat­ed: August 08, 2018 12:37 GMT

    By Christo­pher Miller

    KYIV — Before he became the vic­tor in Ukraine’s 2014 snap pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, busi­ness­man Petro Poroshenko was scram­bling to put togeth­er a win­ning cam­paign.

    That’s when his top strate­gist met with Paul Man­afort, RFE/RL has con­firmed.

    “We had a meet­ing, yes, but no rela­tion­ship” with Manafort’s team, Poroshenko spokes­woman Darya Khudyako­va con­firmed to RFE/RL by phone on August 8.

    The con­fir­ma­tion stands in con­trast to an offi­cial state­ment sent to RFE/RL from Poroshenko’s admin­is­tra­tion on August 2, which read: “Petro Poroshenko’s team has nev­er coop­er­at­ed with Man­afort, nor with his peo­ple. Pro­pos­als came from them among oth­ers, but they were not even con­sid­ered.”

    RFE/RL inquired about the meet­ing between the teams of Man­afort and Poroshenko after an email sur­faced this month ahead of Manafort’s tri­al, which is play­ing out in a U.S. dis­trict court in Alexan­dria, Vir­ginia.

    The email in ques­tion dis­cussed pitch­ing work to some­one named “P. P.,” a com­mon nick­name used to describe Poroshenko.

    ...

    The pos­si­bil­i­ty of Man­afort-Poroshenko coop­er­a­tion sur­faced again when Manafort’s for­mer busi­ness part­ner and right-hand man in Ukraine, Rick Gates, tes­ti­fied in court on August 7 that their com­pa­ny had done con­sult­ing work for Poroshenko in 2014.

    Gates also com­plained that a $1 mil­lion pay­ment for the work was “sig­nif­i­cant­ly past due” and “Man­afort was quite upset the mon­ey had not been sent.” It is unclear if the pay­ment was for work he did for Yanukovych or Poroshenko.

    ‘I Met Him And Lis­tened To His Strat­e­gy’

    Khudyako­va declined to give fur­ther details about the meet­ing and direct­ed RFE/RL to then-Poroshenko strate­gist Ihor Hryniv, who she con­firmed had met with Man­afort.

    Hryniv could not imme­di­ate­ly be reached for com­ment. But he did speak about his meet­ing with Man­afort to Ukraiyn­s­ka Prav­da, telling the Ukrain­ian news out­let that the two had dis­cussed coop­er­at­ing on Poroshenko’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. He claimed the plan nev­er came to fruition.

    “Man­afort was try­ing to offer his ser­vices and his strat­e­gy for Poroshenko’s cam­paign, and I met him then [in 2014] and lis­tened to his strat­e­gy,” Hryniv said. “But after these three hours, the con­ver­sa­tion with him end­ed.”

    Accord­ing to Hryniv, Man­afort very much want­ed to work on Poroshenko’s cam­paign and had come pre­pared with an elab­o­rate strat­e­gy, polling num­bers, and pro­jec­tions. But Man­afort “did not under­stand that the coun­try changed after the Maid­an,” Hryniv added.

    Hryniv said Manafort’s ideas were suit­able for the strat­e­gy he mas­ter­mind­ed as Yanukovych’s polit­i­cal con­sul­tant in 2009–2010, but not for the post-rev­o­lu­tion­ary peri­od of 2014.

    ‘Ready To Take On This Project’

    It is a March 31, 2014 email to Gates from Tad Devine that shows how seri­ous Manafort’s team was about join­ing up with Poroshenko.

    The email was one of more than 400 released ahead of Manafort’s tri­al by his lawyers, who accused Spe­cial Coun­cil Robert Mueller’s team of try­ing to intro­duce evi­dence that is irrel­e­vant to the case.

    Devine, a for­mer Bernie Sanders cam­paign strate­gist who also worked with Man­afort in Ukraine, writ­ing Yanukovych’s 2010 vic­to­ry speech, attached to his email to Gates a draft agree­ment for Manafort’s firm to work on Poroshenko’s cam­paign.

    “This pro­pos­al antic­i­pates that we will spend a lot of time between now and the elec­tion on the ground in Kyiv,” Devine wrote.

    Devine said a strat­e­gy sim­i­lar to one they had used in Ser­bia would like­ly work well for Poroshenko in Ukraine.

    “A pow­er­ful intro­duc­tion of PP could res­onate in Ukraine the way our cam­paign in Ser­bia res­onat­ed with vot­ers,” Devine wrote. “Our slo­gan in Ser­bia was ‘A Future to Believe In,’ which is prob­a­bly some­thing that peo­ple in Ukraine are look­ing for and des­per­ate to like­wise achieve.”

    Gates replied that same day, telling Devine, “we are ready to take on this project.”

    While it remains unclear exact­ly what, if any­thing, Man­afort’s team did for Poroshenko in the run-up to the pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, it is known that Man­afort, Gates, and Devine went on to work for the Oppo­si­tion Bloc as of June 2014, design­ing the for­mer Par­ty of Regions par­ty’s strat­e­gy ahead of that autum­n’s par­lia­men­tary elec­tions.

    Accord­ing to a Pow­er­Point file includ­ed in the doc­u­ments released by Man­afort’s lawyers, that strat­e­gy involved sev­er­al points that cur­rent Pres­i­dent Poroshenko and his pro-West­ern gov­ern­ment deem to be pro-Russ­ian. For instance, the idea of fed­er­al­iz­ing Ukraine, some­thing that the Krem­lin has long pushed for.

    ———–

    “Poroshenko Con­firms 2014 Meet­ing With Man­afort Team” By Christo­pher Miller; Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty; 08/08/2018

    ““We had a meet­ing, yes, but no rela­tion­ship” with Manafort’s team, Poroshenko spokes­woman Darya Khudyako­va con­firmed to RFE/RL by phone on August 8.”

    We had a meet­ing, but no rela­tion­ship. That was the new stance Poroshenko’s team took after pre­vi­ous­ly deny­ing Man­afort’s pitch was even con­sid­ered:

    ...
    The con­fir­ma­tion stands in con­trast to an offi­cial state­ment sent to RFE/RL from Poroshenko’s admin­is­tra­tion on August 2, which read: “Petro Poroshenko’s team has nev­er coop­er­at­ed with Man­afort, nor with his peo­ple. Pro­pos­als came from them among oth­ers, but they were not even con­sid­ered.”
    ...

    But despite those shift­ing denials, Rick Gates appears to have blunt­ly tes­ti­fied that, yes, Man­afort’s team did indeed to con­sult­ing work for Poroshenko, although it’s unclear whether or not the unpaid $1 mil­lion is relat­ed to that work:

    ...
    The pos­si­bil­i­ty of Man­afort-Poroshenko coop­er­a­tion sur­faced again when Manafort’s for­mer busi­ness part­ner and right-hand man in Ukraine, Rick Gates, tes­ti­fied in court on August 7 that their com­pa­ny had done con­sult­ing work for Poroshenko in 2014.

    Gates also com­plained that a $1 mil­lion pay­ment for the work was “sig­nif­i­cant­ly past due” and “Man­afort was quite upset the mon­ey had not been sent.” It is unclear if the pay­ment was for work he did for Yanukovych or Poroshenko.
    ...

    Then there’s March 31, 2014 email from Tad Devine that includ­ed an attached draft agree­ment for this work:

    ...
    ‘Ready To Take On This Project’

    It is a March 31, 2014 email to Gates from Tad Devine that shows how seri­ous Manafort’s team was about join­ing up with Poroshenko.

    The email was one of more than 400 released ahead of Manafort’s tri­al by his lawyers, who accused Spe­cial Coun­cil Robert Mueller’s team of try­ing to intro­duce evi­dence that is irrel­e­vant to the case.

    Devine, a for­mer Bernie Sanders cam­paign strate­gist who also worked with Man­afort in Ukraine, writ­ing Yanukovych’s 2010 vic­to­ry speech, attached to his email to Gates a draft agree­ment for Manafort’s firm to work on Poroshenko’s cam­paign.

    “This pro­pos­al antic­i­pates that we will spend a lot of time between now and the elec­tion on the ground in Kyiv,” Devine wrote.

    Devine said a strat­e­gy sim­i­lar to one they had used in Ser­bia would like­ly work well for Poroshenko in Ukraine.

    “A pow­er­ful intro­duc­tion of PP could res­onate in Ukraine the way our cam­paign in Ser­bia res­onat­ed with vot­ers,” Devine wrote. “Our slo­gan in Ser­bia was ‘A Future to Believe In,’ which is prob­a­bly some­thing that peo­ple in Ukraine are look­ing for and des­per­ate to like­wise achieve.”

    Gates replied that same day, telling Devine, “we are ready to take on this project.”
    ...

    But Poroshenko’s top strate­gist down­plays these rev­e­la­tions by admit­ting that, yes, he did meet with Man­afort and heard his pitch. But it was pitch that Hryniv did­n’t see as viable for the post-Maid­an polit­i­cal envi­ron­ment:

    ...
    ‘I Met Him And Lis­tened To His Strat­e­gy’

    Khudyako­va declined to give fur­ther details about the meet­ing and direct­ed RFE/RL to then-Poroshenko strate­gist Ihor Hryniv, who she con­firmed had met with Man­afort.

    Hryniv could not imme­di­ate­ly be reached for com­ment. But he did speak about his meet­ing with Man­afort to Ukraiyn­s­ka Prav­da, telling the Ukrain­ian news out­let that the two had dis­cussed coop­er­at­ing on Poroshenko’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. He claimed the plan nev­er came to fruition.

    “Man­afort was try­ing to offer his ser­vices and his strat­e­gy for Poroshenko’s cam­paign, and I met him then [in 2014] and lis­tened to his strat­e­gy,” Hryniv said. “But after these three hours, the con­ver­sa­tion with him end­ed.”

    Accord­ing to Hryniv, Man­afort very much want­ed to work on Poroshenko’s cam­paign and had come pre­pared with an elab­o­rate strat­e­gy, polling num­bers, and pro­jec­tions. But Man­afort “did not under­stand that the coun­try changed after the Maid­an,” Hryniv added.

    Hryniv said Manafort’s ideas were suit­able for the strat­e­gy he mas­ter­mind­ed as Yanukovych’s polit­i­cal con­sul­tant in 2009–2010, but not for the post-rev­o­lu­tion­ary peri­od of 2014.
    ...

    So what was this strat­e­gy that Man­afort pitch­es that Hryniv did­n’t see as viable in the post-Maid­an Ukraine? Well, accord­ing to Hryniv in the fol­low­ing arti­cle, “Man­afort’s strat­e­gy was [for Poroshenko] to posi­tion him­self as the can­di­date from the west and try to push his com­peti­tor out fur­ther to the east, and then gain the momen­tum and use the votes of west­ern Ukraine to win.” Yep, Man­afort want­ed Poroshenko to brand him­self as the “pro-West” can­di­date, which seems like a pret­ty rea­son­able brand­ing giv­en the sit­u­a­tion at the time, where the gov­ern­ment had lit­er­al­ly col­lapsed fol­low­ing mas­sive protests over the deci­sion to NOT move much clos­er to the EU. Plus, Poroshenko had posi­tioned him­self as a pro-Maid­an fig­ure. But Hryniv appar­ent­ly reject­ed it. So that’s all some­thing to keep in mind regard­ing the mys­tery of the “Hap­burg Group” and the fact that Man­afort appeared to be act­ing a change agent try­ing to move Ukraine into the arms of the West: right after the col­lapse of Yanukovy­ch’s gov­ern­ment, Man­afort want­ed to run an aggres­sive­ly ‘pro-West’ cam­paign for the guy that would replace Yanukovych:

    VOA News

    Man­afort Bid to Run Poroshenko ’14 Cam­paign Reject­ed as Too Divi­sive

    August 10, 2018 9:18 PM

    KYIV, UKRAINE —

    The cam­paign strate­gist for Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko’s 2014 elec­tion bid says Paul Man­afort’s offer to guide the nascent polit­i­cal cam­paign was reject­ed because it would have fur­ther divid­ed Ukraini­ans in the wake of dead­ly clash­es of the Maid­an rev­o­lu­tion that oust­ed pro-Krem­lin leader Vik­tor Yanukovich, Man­afort’s for­mer boss.

    Ques­tions about Man­afort’s role in the cur­rent Ukrain­ian pres­i­den­t’s elec­tion sur­faced dur­ing ques­tion­ing at Man­afort’s tri­al, which is under way in U.S. Dis­trict Court in Alexan­dria, Vir­ginia.

    ...

    Man­afort’s for­mer busi­ness part­ner and deputy in Ukraine, Rick Gates, who also worked for Trump, recent­ly tes­ti­fied that Man­afort was assist­ing Poroshenko short­ly after Yanukovych was oust­ed in the pop­ulist rev­o­lu­tion.

    On Wednes­day, Poroshenko’s for­mer cam­paign spokes­woman Darya Khudyako­va denied any rela­tion­ship with Man­afort, say­ing, “We had a meet­ing, yes, but no rela­tion­ship” with Man­afort’s firm.

    Ukrain­ian leg­is­la­tor Ihor Hryniv, who served as Poroshenko’s 2014 cam­paign strate­gist, said Man­afort ini­ti­at­ed the meet­ing with Poroshenko’s team imme­di­ate­ly after pay­ments from the oust­ed Yanukovych regime stopped.

    “I did not know him pri­or to the meet­ing and did not try to get such a meet­ing,” Hryniv told VOA’s Ukrain­ian ser­vice on Fri­day.

    “Man­afort offered his ser­vices in ear­ly March,” Hryniv added. “I believe he want­ed to stay in Ukraine and work here. He under­stood that Poroshenko was the win­ning can­di­date, which was almost clear at this point, so he bet on the favorite. It is very easy to help when your can­di­date’s rat­ing is 55 per­cent, not 4 per­cent.”

    That strat­e­gy that Man­afort offered Poroshenko’s team, Hryniv said, would have fur­ther divid­ed a coun­try still recov­er­ing from a bloody mass upris­ing that top­pled the Rus­sia-backed regime and brought a pro-West­ern gov­ern­ment to pow­er.

    “In brief, Man­afort’s strat­e­gy was [for Poroshenko] to posi­tion him­self as the can­di­date from the west and try to push his com­peti­tor out fur­ther to the east, and then gain the momen­tum and use the votes of west­ern Ukraine to win,” Hryniv said.

    “Our strat­e­gy of choice, to the con­trary, was to pro­mote uni­fi­ca­tion of Ukraine,” he added. “To pull it togeth­er and ensure that the can­di­date had sup­port of the whole coun­try. This was the win­ning strat­e­gy for the first round.”

    Hryniv refut­ed the ear­li­er alle­ga­tions that Man­afort could have worked for the cam­paign with­out pay, as Gates’ tes­ti­mo­ny implied.

    “I would like to see Man­afort work­ing free of charge,” Hryniv said.

    To this day, east­ern Ukraine and the Black Sea penin­su­la of Crimea remain occu­pied by Russ­ian-backed forces, and cit­i­zens are still bat­tling the cor­rup­tion that the Euro­maid­an demon­stra­tions sought to purge.

    ———-

    “Man­afort Bid to Run Poroshenko ’14 Cam­paign Reject­ed as Too Divi­sive”; VOA News; 08/10/2018

    “That strat­e­gy that Man­afort offered Poroshenko’s team, Hryniv said, would have fur­ther divid­ed a coun­try still recov­er­ing from a bloody mass upris­ing that top­pled the Rus­sia-backed regime and brought a pro-West­ern gov­ern­ment to pow­er.”

    Con­sid­er­ing every­thing that’s hap­pened in Ukraine over the last four years, where the demo­niza­tion of the eth­nic Russ­ian pop­u­lace and exal­ta­tion of viru­ent­ly anti-Russ­ian neo-Nazi groups like Svo­bo­da and Right Sec­tor has become a grim polit­i­cal real­i­ty, it’s kind of remark­able that Poroshenko’s chief strate­gist was appar­ent­ly turned off by Man­afort’s ‘pro-West’ pitch. But that’s what Hryniv is claim­ing:

    ...
    “In brief, Man­afort’s strat­e­gy was [for Poroshenko] to posi­tion him­self as the can­di­date from the west and try to push his com­peti­tor out fur­ther to the east, and then gain the momen­tum and use the votes of west­ern Ukraine to win,” Hryniv said.

    “Our strat­e­gy of choice, to the con­trary, was to pro­mote uni­fi­ca­tion of Ukraine,” he added. “To pull it togeth­er and ensure that the can­di­date had sup­port of the whole coun­try. This was the win­ning strat­e­gy for the first round.”
    ...

    So we still don’t know what, if any, work Man­afort actu­al­ly did for Poroshenko’s 2014 cam­paign. But it sure sounds like they did some sort of work. Will we even­tu­al­ly find out what work was done now that Poroshenko is offer­ing to reestab­lish Ukraine’s coop­er­a­tion in the US’s inves­ti­ga­tion into Man­afort? We’ll see. Although that pre­sum­ably depends on whether or not the US pro­vides lethal mar­itime aid, at which point Ukraine will pre­sum­ably end coop­er­a­tion with the Man­afort inves­ti­ga­tion again.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | November 29, 2018, 1:10 pm
  10. Here’s an impor­tant fol­lowup to the report by The Guardian a few days ago alleg­ing that Paul Man­afort per­son­al­ly met with Julian Assange in 2013, 2015, and March of 2016, right before he joined the Trump cam­paign. Recall how that report was based on mul­ti­ple anony­mous sources and includ­ed ref­er­ences to doc­u­ments by Ecuador’s Senain intel­li­gence agency that were seen by the Guardian. Also recall how, due the nature of the alle­ga­tions, the US, and UK gov­ern­ments would almost cer­tain­ly know whether or not the alle­ga­tions are true giv­en their sur­veil­lance of the Ecuado­ran embassy in Lon­don. The Ecuado­ran gov­ern­ment would also obvi­ous­ly know if this was true or not. So it was a sto­ry based on anony­mous sources, one described as a “well-placed source” in the arti­cle, and cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence sug­gests those sources were peo­ple involved with either the US, UK, or Ecuado­ran gov­ern­ments.

    Well, it’s been a few days since the sto­ry came out and no oth­er pub­li­ca­tions have con­firmed the sto­ry, lead­ing to grow­ing spec­u­la­tion that it was all made up:

    Colom­bia Jour­nal­ism Review

    Claims and coun­ter­claims fly around Guardian Manafort–Assange scoop

    By Jon All­sop, CJR
    Novem­ber 29, 2018

    Even by the dra­mat­ic stan­dards of the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion, it was a bomb­shell moment when, on Tues­day, The Guardian’s Luke Hard­ing and Dan Col­lyns report­ed that Paul Man­afort met repeat­ed­ly with Wik­iLeaks founder Julian Assange in Ecuador’s Lon­don embassy, includ­ing around the time Man­afort became chair­man of Don­ald Trump’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign in 2016. With the spe­cial counsel’s recent focus around the Trump campaign’s ties to WikiLeaks—looking, specif­i­cal­ly, at the latter’s dump of inter­nal Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty emails pro­cured from Russ­ian hack­ers—The Guardian’s sto­ry intro­duced a huge new lead (and one that oth­er reporters believe was not pre­vi­ous­ly on Mueller’s radar).

    Both Man­afort and Wik­iLeaks strong­ly denied that the meet­ings took place. Man­afort called The Guardian’s sto­ry “delib­er­ate­ly libelous” and said he was weigh­ing his legal options. Wik­iLeaks, mean­while, tweet­ed that it was will­ing to bet The Guardian a mil­lion dol­lars and “its edi­tors head” that the paper was wrong, then start­ed to crowd­fund a law­suit (as of this morn­ing, it post­ed $33,000 in dona­tions). No oth­er news out­let has yet been able to con­firm The Guardian’s report­ing.

    It’s not unusu­al for aggriev­ed sub­jects to push back—and while the denials had a note­wor­thy vehe­mence, that sen­ti­ment was arguably pro­por­tion­ate to the sever­i­ty of The Guardian’s charges. Cred­i­ble observers with no skin in the game—for exam­ple, the nation­al secu­ri­ty blog­ger Mar­cy Wheel­er—how­ev­er, also expressed skep­ti­cism. In a state­ment yes­ter­day, The Guardian sought to shore up its sto­ry, stress­ing that it relied on a num­ber of sources and that nei­ther Man­afort nor Assange had issued denials pri­or to pub­li­ca­tion. The state­ment could have been stronger, how­ev­er: “Notice­ably miss­ing [was] a line stat­ing that The Guardian is con­fi­dent in the accu­ra­cy of its sto­ry,” CNN’s Oliv­er Dar­cy not­ed on Twit­ter.

    The con­tro­ver­sy took anoth­er weird turn yes­ter­day as Politi­co pub­lished an arti­cle by “Alex Fin­ley,” who was iden­ti­fied, at the bot­tom of the post, as a for­mer CIA offi­cer writ­ing under a pseu­do­nym. “Fin­ley” sug­gests, with­out cit­ing any real evi­dence, that mali­cious actors—Russia, perhaps—may have fab­ri­cat­ed the Manafort–Assange sto­ry, then plant­ed it to dis­cred­it The Guardian in gen­er­al and Hard­ing, who has writ­ten wide­ly on poten­tial Russ­ian col­lu­sion in the 2016 elec­tion, in par­tic­u­lar.

    “Finley’s” arti­cle should be tak­en with a moun­tain of salt (if tak­en at all). Nonethe­less, in a round­about way it gets to the heart of a knot­ty prob­lem for reporters. The Mueller beat has always been char­ac­ter­ized by uncer­tain­ty: even excel­lent report­ing has relied on a very incom­plete pic­ture. And what we do know sits with­in a vipers’ nest of dou­ble-cross­ing and decep­tion. Just before The Guardian sto­ry broke this week, Mueller’s team alleged that Man­afort lied to them after strik­ing a deal to help them; then it emerged that Manafort’s lawyer had repeat­ed­ly con­tact­ed Trump’s legal team dur­ing that peri­od of coop­er­a­tion. Man­afort is angling for a pres­i­den­tial par­don, some spec­u­lat­ed. Yes­ter­day, in an inter­view with the New York Post, Trump refused to rule that out.

    Only time will tell if The Guardian suc­cess­ful­ly nav­i­gat­ed this thick­et of lies. For the time being, its sto­ry should at least be tak­en seri­ous­ly, despite legit­i­mate doubt. Just because oth­er out­lets can’t ver­i­fy it does not make it untrue, as New York Times reporter Michael S. Schmidt not­ed elo­quent­ly on his paper’s pod­cast, The Dai­ly, yes­ter­day. “We’re at a stage in the Mueller–Trump sto­ry where we’re sort of look­ing to see whether there is anoth­er shoe to drop,” Schmidt says. “Whether there is anoth­er big sto­ry here that moves the nar­ra­tive for­ward, or if we sim­ply know as much as we’re going to know.”

    ....

    ———-

    “Claims and coun­ter­claims fly around Guardian Manafort–Assange scoop” by Jon All­sop, Colom­bia Jour­nal­ism Review; 11/29/2018

    “It’s not unusu­al for aggriev­ed sub­jects to push back—and while the denials had a note­wor­thy vehe­mence, that sen­ti­ment was arguably pro­por­tion­ate to the sever­i­ty of The Guardian’s charges. Cred­i­ble observers with no skin in the game—for exam­ple, the nation­al secu­ri­ty blog­ger Mar­cy Wheel­er—how­ev­er, also expressed skep­ti­cism. In a state­ment yes­ter­day, The Guardian sought to shore up its sto­ry, stress­ing that it relied on a num­ber of sources and that nei­ther Man­afort nor Assange had issued denials pri­or to pub­li­ca­tion. The state­ment could have been stronger, how­ev­er: “Notice­ably miss­ing [was] a line stat­ing that The Guardian is con­fi­dent in the accu­ra­cy of its sto­ry,” CNN’s Oliv­er Dar­cy not­ed on Twit­ter.

    Yep, it’s not just Man­afort and Wik­ileaks who are dis­put­ing this sto­ry. Peo­ple like Mar­cy Wheel­er are also rais­ing ques­tions and even the Guardian itself would­n’t issue a state­ment con­fi­dent­ly back­ing the accu­ra­cy of the sto­ry.

    And then it got real­ly weird, with Politi­co pub­lish­ing an arti­cle writ­ten by an anony­mous ex-CIA agent, “Alex Fin­ley”, who sug­gests that this was all actu­al­ly part of some sort of Russ­ian dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tion intend­ed to dis­cred­it Luke Hard­ing:

    ...
    The con­tro­ver­sy took anoth­er weird turn yes­ter­day as Politi­co pub­lished an arti­cle by “Alex Fin­ley,” who was iden­ti­fied, at the bot­tom of the post, as a for­mer CIA offi­cer writ­ing under a pseu­do­nym. “Fin­ley” sug­gests, with­out cit­ing any real evi­dence, that mali­cious actors—Russia, perhaps—may have fab­ri­cat­ed the Manafort–Assange sto­ry, then plant­ed it to dis­cred­it The Guardian in gen­er­al and Hard­ing, who has writ­ten wide­ly on poten­tial Russ­ian col­lu­sion in the 2016 elec­tion, in par­tic­u­lar.

    “Finley’s” arti­cle should be tak­en with a moun­tain of salt (if tak­en at all). Nonethe­less, in a round­about way it gets to the heart of a knot­ty prob­lem for reporters. The Mueller beat has always been char­ac­ter­ized by uncer­tain­ty: even excel­lent report­ing has relied on a very incom­plete pic­ture. And what we do know sits with­in a vipers’ nest of dou­ble-cross­ing and decep­tion. Just before The Guardian sto­ry broke this week, Mueller’s team alleged that Man­afort lied to them after strik­ing a deal to help them; then it emerged that Manafort’s lawyer had repeat­ed­ly con­tact­ed Trump’s legal team dur­ing that peri­od of coop­er­a­tion. Man­afort is angling for a pres­i­den­tial par­don, some spec­u­lat­ed. Yes­ter­day, in an inter­view with the New York Post, Trump refused to rule that out.
    ...

    Again, recall how there were mul­ti­ple sources for Hard­ing’s arti­cle, includ­ing sources described as “well-placed”, and they gave the Guardian Ecuado­ran intel­li­gence doc­u­ments. So unless these sources were anony­mous to Hard­ing and his co-author too, it seems rather implau­si­ble that Russ­ian spies would some­how be able to orches­trate such a dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paign. And yet that’s what this anony­mous for­mer CIA agent sug­gests may have hap­pened:

    Politi­co

    Did Some­one Plant a Sto­ry Tying Paul Man­afort to Julian Assange?

    By ALEX FINLEY
    Novem­ber 28, 2018

    A bomb­shell report in the Guardian on Tues­day claims Paul Man­afort, Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man, met direct­ly with Julian Assange, the head of Wik­iLeaks, sev­er­al times in the Ecuado­ri­an Embassy in Lon­don.

    If true, the ram­i­fi­ca­tions are immense. It means the guy run­ning Trump’s cam­paign met direct­ly with the head of the orga­ni­za­tion that served as a tool of Russia’s intel­li­gence ser­vices, dis­trib­ut­ing stolen Demo­c­ra­t­ic emails in an effort to influ­ence the U.S. pres­i­den­tial elec­tion. It could be the prover­bial smok­ing gun that shows Trump’s cam­paign knew it was receiv­ing help from Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices and per­haps even aid­ed the oper­a­tion.

    Luke Hard­ing and Dan Col­lyns, the reporters behind the Guardian sto­ry, do not name their sources, although they claim to have mul­ti­ple, and they write that they have seen an inter­nal doc­u­ment from Ecuador’s intel­li­gence ser­vice list­ing “Paul Man­aford [sic]” as a vis­i­tor to the Ecuado­ri­an Embassy in Lon­don. Man­afort, for his part, has called the Guardian’s report “total­ly false and delib­er­ate­ly libelous.” And White House press sec­re­tary Sarah Huck­abee Sanders said, “Cer­tain­ly I remain con­fi­dent in the White House’s asser­tion that the pres­i­dent was involved in no wrong­do­ing, was not involved in any col­lu­sion.”

    While the imme­di­ate reac­tion to the sto­ry was a col­lec­tive “Wow!”, it is fair to take a step back and remain wary. Rather than being the bomb­shell smok­ing gun that direct­ly con­nects the Trump cam­paign to Wik­iLeaks, per­haps the report is some­thing else entire­ly: a dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paign. Is it pos­si­ble some­one plant­ed this sto­ry as a means to dis­cred­it the jour­nal­ists?

    A num­ber of par­ties in the Trump-Rus­sia cir­cus have an inter­est in dis­cred­it­ing the media. Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin has solid­i­fied his pow­er in Rus­sia by sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly quash­ing the free press and con­trol­ling the mes­sage through friend­ly media out­lets, includ­ing the likes of RT and Sput­nik. Trump, too, has con­sis­tent­ly shout­ed “Fake News!” at any sto­ry he doesn’t like and has made it a theme of late to refer to the media as “the ene­my of the peo­ple,” a term that has been used by dic­ta­tors through­out time, includ­ing to dev­as­tat­ing effect by Joseph Stal­in.

    Hard­ing is like­ly a major tar­get for any­one wrapped up in Russia’s intel­li­gence oper­a­tion against the West’s demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions. He has writ­ten a book about the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia—literally titled Col­lu­sion, as well as numer­ous arti­cles relat­ed to the case, includ­ing about the Steele Dossier, Russia’s plans to help res­cue Assange from Lon­don and spir­it him away to Moscow, Russia’s novi­chok poi­son­ing oper­a­tion against Sergei Skri­pal, and a slew of oth­er “Rus­sia-is-up-to-no-good” sto­ries.

    If this lat­est sto­ry about Man­afort and Assange is false—that is, if, for exam­ple, the sources lied to Hard­ing and Col­lyns (or if the sources them­selves were lied to and thus thought they were being truth­ful in their state­ments to the jour­nal­ists), or if the Ecuado­ri­an intel­li­gence doc­u­ment is a fake, the most log­i­cal expla­na­tion is that it is an attempt to make Hard­ing look bad. This, in turn, would call into ques­tion any of Harding’s past report­ing and could be raised any time some­one men­tions his report­ing as evi­dence of wrong­do­ing. Any men­tion of Hard­ing going for­ward would include the caveat, “accord­ing to a reporter who was once duped.” The under­ly­ing ques­tion would always be: How can any­thing he writes be trust­ed?

    We’ve seen this game before, even recent­ly. In Novem­ber last year, when Alaba­ma Sen­ate can­di­date Roy Moore was accused of hav­ing sev­er­al inap­pro­pri­ate rela­tion­ships with very young girls, a woman approached a Wash­ing­ton Post reporter to tell her sto­ry about under­age sex with Moore. She was, in fact, work­ing for Project Ver­i­tas, a con­ser­v­a­tive group that pur­ports to police and expose media bias, and had made the sto­ry up whole­sale, hop­ing the Post would run it and that Ver­i­tas could then debunk it and paint the Post as “fake news.” Pre­sum­ably, this would have dis­cred­it­ed neg­a­tive report­ing about Moore and thus boost­ed his chances of win­ning. Unfor­tu­nate­ly for the woman, the Post reporters did their due dili­gence and nev­er pub­lished her false account. A woman work­ing for a com­pa­ny hired by Har­vey Wein­stein sim­i­lar­ly attempt­ed to plant a false sto­ry in New York mag­a­zine in an attempt to dis­cred­it any accu­sa­tions against Wein­stein.

    It’s an old tac­tic, used to prime an audi­ence not to believe any­thing they hear from those whose role it is to hold peo­ple in pow­er to account. Auto­crat­ic lead­ers have long plant­ed the seeds of doubt so that no one in their intend­ed audi­ence will believe any infor­ma­tion except what the leader him­self tells them. The mes­sage is sim­ple: Only the leader can be trust­ed.

    I find it hard to believe Hard­ing would not go to great lengths to con­firm his sto­ry. He must know he is a tar­get for dis­in­for­ma­tion. But that is not to say it could not hap­pen.

    Inter­est­ing­ly, Russia’s dis­in­for­ma­tion net­work has jumped into the ring to pro­mote skep­ti­cism of the sto­ry. Sput­nik, one of Russia’s pro­pa­gan­da net­works, called the sto­ry into ques­tion and bol­stered the skep­ti­cism by quot­ing tweets from Eva Golinger, a for­mer advis­er to the gov­ern­ment of the late Venezue­lan leader Hugo Chávez and a cur­rent con­trib­u­tor to RT’s Span­ish-lan­guage net­work; Ivor Crot­ty, anoth­er RT con­trib­u­tor; and Wik­iLeaks, which the U.S. gov­ern­ment has called a non­state hos­tile actor and a tool of Russ­ian intel­li­gence. RT, also a Krem­lin mouth­piece, echoed Sput­nik and Wik­iLeaks. Do you see a pat­tern here?

    But even if some­one man­aged to dupe the reporters and plant a false sto­ry, that tells us some­thing, too. Name­ly, that some­one is ner­vous and eager to lay the ground­work for yelling “fake news!” at what­ev­er oth­er sto­ries are about to drop. Either they want you not to believe what is, in fact, a true sto­ry, or they plant­ed a fake sto­ry because they want you not to believe the jour­nal­ists and any oth­er infor­ma­tion that has yet to come out.

    As of this writ­ing, no oth­er news out­let has con­firmed the Guardian’s sto­ry about Man­afort meet­ing Assange. So is it fake or is it real? If it is real and oth­ers con­firm it, it would be damn­ing, and many peo­ple have an inter­est in try­ing to dis­cred­it it. On the oth­er hand, if some­one man­aged to dupe Hard­ing and his col­league, it would mean some­one was ready to put a lot of effort into dis­cred­it­ing the jour­nal­ists in order to sow doubt about a wide swath of report­ing. In either case, some­one has already primed a large audi­ence to dis­miss this Man­afort-Assange sto­ry and any oth­er infor­ma­tion that might tie the Trump cam­paign to Rus­sia. That implies more bad news is com­ing for Trump and Man­afort.

    ...

    ———-

    “Did Some­one Plant a Sto­ry Tying Paul Man­afort to Julian Assange?” by ALEX FINLEY; Politi­co; 11/28/2018

    “As of this writ­ing, no oth­er news out­let has con­firmed the Guardian’s sto­ry about Man­afort meet­ing Assange. So is it fake or is it real? If it is real and oth­ers con­firm it, it would be damn­ing, and many peo­ple have an inter­est in try­ing to dis­cred­it it. On the oth­er hand, if some­one man­aged to dupe Hard­ing and his col­league, it would mean some­one was ready to put a lot of effort into dis­cred­it­ing the jour­nal­ists in order to sow doubt about a wide swath of report­ing. In either case, some­one has already primed a large audi­ence to dis­miss this Man­afort-Assange sto­ry and any oth­er infor­ma­tion that might tie the Trump cam­paign to Rus­sia. That implies more bad news is com­ing for Trump and Man­afort.”

    It’s a valid obser­va­tion by Alex Fin­ley: If some­one real­ly did trick these jour­nal­ists, they must have put a fair amount of work into it giv­en that the sto­ry involved mul­ti­ple sources and even Ecuado­ran intel­li­gence doc­u­ments.

    But then Fin­ley goes on to sug­gest that it’s actu­al­ly Rus­sia who tricked Hard­ing and his co-author. The evi­dence? Well, a lot of Rus­sia news out­lets came out skep­ti­cal of the sto­ry. That’s seri­ous­ly the evi­dence:

    ...
    A num­ber of par­ties in the Trump-Rus­sia cir­cus have an inter­est in dis­cred­it­ing the media. Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin has solid­i­fied his pow­er in Rus­sia by sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly quash­ing the free press and con­trol­ling the mes­sage through friend­ly media out­lets, includ­ing the likes of RT and Sput­nik. Trump, too, has con­sis­tent­ly shout­ed “Fake News!” at any sto­ry he doesn’t like and has made it a theme of late to refer to the media as “the ene­my of the peo­ple,” a term that has been used by dic­ta­tors through­out time, includ­ing to dev­as­tat­ing effect by Joseph Stal­in.

    Hard­ing is like­ly a major tar­get for any­one wrapped up in Russia’s intel­li­gence oper­a­tion against the West’s demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions. He has writ­ten a book about the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia—literally titled Col­lu­sion, as well as numer­ous arti­cles relat­ed to the case, includ­ing about the Steele Dossier, Russia’s plans to help res­cue Assange from Lon­don and spir­it him away to Moscow, Russia’s novi­chok poi­son­ing oper­a­tion against Sergei Skri­pal, and a slew of oth­er “Rus­sia-is-up-to-no-good” sto­ries.

    ...

    I find it hard to believe Hard­ing would not go to great lengths to con­firm his sto­ry. He must know he is a tar­get for dis­in­for­ma­tion. But that is not to say it could not hap­pen.

    Inter­est­ing­ly, Russia’s dis­in­for­ma­tion net­work has jumped into the ring to pro­mote skep­ti­cism of the sto­ry. Sput­nik, one of Russia’s pro­pa­gan­da net­works, called the sto­ry into ques­tion and bol­stered the skep­ti­cism by quot­ing tweets from Eva Golinger, a for­mer advis­er to the gov­ern­ment of the late Venezue­lan leader Hugo Chávez and a cur­rent con­trib­u­tor to RT’s Span­ish-lan­guage net­work; Ivor Crot­ty, anoth­er RT con­trib­u­tor; and Wik­iLeaks, which the U.S. gov­ern­ment has called a non­state hos­tile actor and a tool of Russ­ian intel­li­gence. RT, also a Krem­lin mouth­piece, echoed Sput­nik and Wik­iLeaks. Do you see a pat­tern here?

    But even if some­one man­aged to dupe the reporters and plant a false sto­ry, that tells us some­thing, too. Name­ly, that some­one is ner­vous and eager to lay the ground­work for yelling “fake news!” at what­ev­er oth­er sto­ries are about to drop. Either they want you not to believe what is, in fact, a true sto­ry, or they plant­ed a fake sto­ry because they want you not to believe the jour­nal­ists and any oth­er infor­ma­tion that has yet to come out.
    ...

    It’s quite a twist to the unrav­el­ing of this sto­ry: mul­ti­ple anony­mous sources, who appears to like­ly be affil­i­at­ed with either US, UK, or Ecuado­ran intel­li­gence, feed Hard­ing this sto­ry. No oth­er news out­lets pick up on it and it starts look­ing like it might be dis­in­for­ma­tion. And then we have an anony­mous for­mer CIA agent pen a piece about how it may have been a Russ­ian intel­li­gence dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tion and her pri­ma­ry evi­dence is that Russ­ian media out­lets were skep­ti­cal of the sto­ry.

    So it’s look­ing increas­ing­ly like the ‘Paul Man­afort met Assange’ sto­ry was indeed dis­in­for­ma­tion. We’ll see. Maybe some sort of fol­low up sto­ry is on the way. Either way, this is clear­ly a good to reflect on all the oth­er Trump-Rus­sia sto­ries we’ve seen that were also based on anony­mous sources that have nev­er been con­firmed by more than a sin­gle news out­let. For instance, remem­ber the exclu­sive sto­ry in the Dai­ly Beast from March of this year that claimed that “Guc­cifer 2.0” was actu­al­ly traced direct­ly back to the GRU when a GRU offi­cer for­got to turn on his vir­tu­al pri­vate net­work, and it was all based on anony­mous sources? Well, we haven’t seen any fol­low up or con­fir­ma­tion of that sto­ry in any oth­er pub­li­ca­tions. And don’t for­get that Mueller’s indict­ment of the 12 GRU offi­cers over the hack­ing oper­a­tion nev­er actu­al­ly ref­er­enced the ‘evi­dence’ indi­cat­ed in that sto­ry. Might that sto­ry have also been one of these dis­in­for­ma­tion sto­ries? It’s a ques­tion that was­n’t asked at the time the Dai­ly Beast sto­ry came out. Can we ask now?

    It’s also worth ask­ing what the impli­ca­tions are if this Man­afort-Assange sto­ry is indeed dis­in­for­ma­tion and actu­al­ly came from a West­ern intel­li­gence agency. That seems like a pret­ty big deal.

    And regard­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty that this real­ly was a Russ­ian dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tion tar­get­ing Hard­ing in order to dis­cred­it him, keep in mind that wor­ry­ing about Russ­ian oper­a­tions against him is kind of Luke Hard­ing’s spe­cial­ty, so if the Rus­sians real­ly did pull this off that would be pret­ty impres­sive

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | November 30, 2018, 3:36 pm
  11. It cer­tain­ly seems like clum­sy covert trade­craft when an old hand like Paul Man­afort risks get­ting caught on sur­veil­lance sys­tems while
    vis­it­ing Assange at Equador’s Lon­don embassy. How­ev­er Luke Hard­ing is, to say the least, some­what of a polar­iz­ing fig­ure.
    From off-guardian.org Sept. 9 2015 a piece enti­tled “Luke Hard­ing: the hack who came in from the cold”:

    “Hard­ing was accused of pla­gia­rism by Mark Ames and Yasha Levine of the eXile for pub­lish­ing
    an arti­cle under his own name that lift­ed large pas­sages almost ver­ba­tim from their work.”

    Mark Ames @MarkAmesExile tweet­ed 6 April 2018 “Can any­one explain why Luke Hard­ing — caught pla­gia­riz­ing when I was in Moscow-
    entrust­ed with so many leaks?”

    Off-shore mon­ey laun­der­ing expert Lucy Komis­ar replied 7 Sep­tem­ber 2018 “Hard­ing was not going to reveal that an impor­tant Pana­ma
    Papers/Mossack Fon­se­ca shell com­pa­ny own­er was William Brow­der who used it to laun­der Russ­ian prof­its. As Hard­ing is a Brow­der acolyte,
    that fact stayed hid­den.”
    Brow­der him­self is a dubi­ous Amer­i­can ex-pat car­pet­bag­ger who wad­ed into the cor­rupt pri­va­ti­za­tion schemes ini­ti­at­ed dur­ing Boris
    Yeltsin’s reign which gave birth to the rise of the Russ­ian oli­garchy of gangsters/entrepreneurs. Brow­der was con­vict­ed in absen­tia of
    delib­er­ate bank­rupt­cy and tax-eva­sion and sen­tenced to nine years in prison. Komis­ar has main­tained a steady attack on Brow­der’s
    Mag­nit­sky hoax at her web­site thekomisarscoop.com.

    And so hav­ing a CIA oper­a­tive using a pen name (shades of E. Howard Hunt) to defend Hard­ing while point­ing the fin­ger once again at
    Rus­sia has all the ear­marks of Oper­a­tion Mock­ing­bird redux.

    Posted by Dennis | December 2, 2018, 7:31 pm
  12. Well that sto­ry changed fast: there was a ‘block­buster’ report ear­li­er this week that ini­tial­ly appeared to demon­strate evi­dence of the Trump cam­paign pass­ing polling data to the Krem­lin. Specif­i­cal­ly, it was a revealed that Paul Man­afort and Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik alleged­ly dis­cussed a Ukrain­ian ‘peace plan’ dur­ing a meet­ing in Madrid in ear­ly 2017. It’s unclear if this is the same plane as the ‘peace plan’ Michael Cohen, Felix Sater, Andreii Arte­menko, Alexan­der Rovt, and Curk Wel­don were work­ing on (which start­ed in ear­ly 2016). Arte­menko is claim­ing that he nev­er met Man­afort or Kil­imnik and that this must of been a dif­fer­ent peace plan. So that would be inter­est­ing, albeit some­what unsur­pris­ing, if Man­afort and Kil­imnik were at least aware of that same ‘peace plan’ and poten­tial­ly work­ing on it. But it would be pret­ty notable if they were work­ing on a dif­fer­ent plan from the Arte­menko plan.

    But here’s the big rev­e­la­tion from the report: Man­afort and Rick Gates both passed polling data — most of it pub­lic data, but some pri­vate — to Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik in the “spring of 2016”. Keep in mind that “spring” tech­ni­cal­ly begins in March, the same month the ‘Fan­cy Bear’ phish­ing attacks start­ed against the DNC. Although “spring” could also be as late as June.

    Crit­i­cal­ly, it was also ini­tial­ly report­ed that Man­afort and Gates asked Kil­imnik to pass the infor­ma­tion along to Oleg Deri­pas­ka, the Russ­ian oli­garch who Man­afort and Kil­imnik pre­vi­ous­ly worked for (before Deri­pas­ka accused them of embez­zling his mon­ey). If true, it would poten­tial­ly have been evi­dence of the Trump cam­paign man­ag­er pass­ing the kind of data to a Krem­lin oli­garch that could have been used for select­ing US vot­ers to polit­i­cal­ly tar­get.

    But then there was a cor­rec­tion to the report: it turns out Man­afort and Gates did­n’t ask Kil­imnik to pass the polling data to Deri­pas­ka. They asked Kil­imnik to pass the data along to Ser­hiy Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov. And as the arti­cle notes, Man­afort thought Lyovochkin(Lyvochkin/Lovochkin) and Akhme­tov owed him mil­lions of dol­lars from past ser­vices that had yet to be paid.

    Recall how Lyovochkin appears to have been Man­afort’s key part­ner with­in the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion in orches­trat­ing the ‘Haps­burg Group’ lob­by­ing cam­paign — a lob­by­ing cam­paign designed to con­vinced the EU to allow Ukraine into a trade agree­ment and away from Rus­si­a’s orbit — and the evi­dence that Lyovochkin may have simul­ta­ne­ous­ly played roles in both push­ing for the ini­tial gov­ern­ment crack­down on the pro-EU pro­tes­tors and then foment­ed the pub­lic back­lash that sparked the Maid­an protests.

    Also recall how Kil­imnik formed a lob­by­ing com­pa­ny with Sam Pat­ten, a GOP polit­i­cal con­sul­tant with a recent his­to­ry of work­ing for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca’s par­ent com­pa­ny SCL (he worked for SCL in 2015 on the Niger­ian cam­paign, where SCL hired hack­ers to use against their clien­t’s oppo­nent). This lob­by­ing busi­ness result­ed in Pat­ten get­ting charged with vio­lat­ing the For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act (FARA) when it was revealed that Lyovochkin was one of his clients and the firm was lob­by­ing on behalf of Lyovochk­in’s Oppo­si­tion Bloc par­ty. And recall how Pat­ten’s and Kil­imnik’s 2015 work in Ukraine was for Vitali Klitschko’s may­oral cam­paign and it was Lyovochkin who arranged for Pat­ten to do that work. So Pat­ten and Kil­imnik were con­sult­ing for one of the key pro-Maid­an fig­ures in 2015 and Lyovochkin was behind that, which is just one of the many pieces of cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence that sug­gests Lyovochkin has been basi­cal­ly work­ing as a pro-West­ern Ukrain­ian politi­cian for some time now.

    Final­ly, recall how Kil­imnik’s back­ground does­n’t just include his edu­ca­tion at a GRU-con­nect­ed lan­guage insti­tute. He also went on to work for the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute before team­ing up with Man­afort to start their Ukrain­ian con­sult­ing work in 2004. It was Rinat Akhme­tov, the rich­es man in Ukraine and the pri­ma­ry financier behind the Par­ty of Regions/Opposition Bloc polit­i­cal par­ties, who ini­tial­ly want­ed to hired Man­afort’s ser­vices.

    So now we learn that Man­afort and Gates want­ed Kil­imnik to pass polling data to Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov rel­a­tive­ly ear­ly on in the 2016 race dur­ing the “spring” of 2016 while the pri­maries were still going on. And based on what we’ve seen about Man­afort’s and Lyovochk­in’s time work­ing togeth­er, they appear to have a close work­ing rela­tion­ship on covert oper­a­tions like the ‘Haps­burg Group’ lob­by­ing ini­tia­tive and the provo­ca­tions against the Maid­an pro­tes­tors. And we’re also learn­ing that Man­afort thought Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov owed him mil­lions. Might this polling data have been giv­en to them for the pur­pose of pro­vid­ing some sort of ‘ser­vice’ for the Trump cam­paign? We def­i­nite­ly can’t rule it out, but if there was some sort of ser­vice being pro­vid­ed for Man­afort it’s hard to see it being in the ser­vice of the Krem­lin giv­en Lyovochk­in’s back­ground:

    The New York Times

    Man­afort Accused of Shar­ing Trump Polling Data With Russ­ian Asso­ciate
    Paul Man­afort, Pres­i­dent Trump’s for­mer cam­paign man­ag­er, was con­vict­ed last year of 10 felonies.

    By Sharon LaFraniere, Ken­neth P. Vogel and Mag­gie Haber­man
    Jan. 8, 2019

    WASHINGTON — As a top offi­cial in Pres­i­dent Trump’s cam­paign, Paul Man­afort shared polit­i­cal polling data with a busi­ness asso­ciate tied to Russ­ian intel­li­gence, accord­ing to a court fil­ing unsealed on Tues­day. The doc­u­ment pro­vid­ed the clear­est evi­dence to date that the Trump cam­paign may have tried to coor­di­nate with Rus­sians dur­ing the 2016 pres­i­den­tial race.

    Mr. Manafort’s lawyers made the dis­clo­sure by acci­dent, through a for­mat­ting error in a doc­u­ment filed to respond to charges that he had lied to pros­e­cu­tors work­ing for the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III, after agree­ing to coop­er­ate with their inves­ti­ga­tion into Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the elec­tion.

    The doc­u­ment also revealed that dur­ing the cam­paign, Mr. Man­afort and his Russ­ian asso­ciate, Kon­stan­tin V. Kil­imnik, dis­cussed a plan for peace in Ukraine. Through­out the cam­paign and the ear­ly days of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, Rus­sia and its allies were push­ing var­i­ous plans for Ukraine in the hope of gain­ing relief from Amer­i­can-led sanc­tions imposed after it annexed Crimea from Ukraine.

    ...

    The doc­u­ment gave no indi­ca­tion of whether Mr. Trump was aware of the data trans­fer or how Mr. Kil­imnik might have used the infor­ma­tion. But from March to August 2016, when Mr. Man­afort worked for the Trump cam­paign, Rus­sia was engaged in a full-fledged oper­a­tion using social media, stolen emails and oth­er tac­tics to boost Mr. Trump, attack Mrs. Clin­ton and play on divi­sive issues such as race and guns. Polling data could con­ceiv­ably have helped Rus­sia hone those mes­sages and tar­get audi­ences to help swing votes to Mr. Trump.

    Both Mr. Man­afort and Rick Gates, the deputy cam­paign man­ag­er, trans­ferred the data to Mr. Kil­imnik in the spring of 2016 as Mr. Trump clinched the Repub­li­can pres­i­den­tial nom­i­na­tion, accord­ing to a per­son knowl­edge­able about the sit­u­a­tion. Most of the data was pub­lic, but some of it was devel­oped by a pri­vate polling firm work­ing for the cam­paign, accord­ing to the per­son.

    Mr. Man­afort asked Mr. Gates to tell Mr. Kil­imnik to pass the data to two Ukrain­ian oli­garchs, Ser­hiy Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov, the per­son said. The oli­garchs had financed Russ­ian-aligned Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ties that had hired Mr. Man­afort as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant.

    A rep­re­sen­ta­tive for Mr. Akhme­tov said he did not request or receive any data from Mr. Kil­imnik and has had no con­tact with either Mr. Kil­imnik or Mr. Man­afort since before the 2016 pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. Mr. Lyovochkin did not respond to a request for com­ment.

    Why Mr. Man­afort want­ed them to see Amer­i­can polling data is unclear. He might have hoped that any proof that he was man­ag­ing a win­ning can­di­date would help him col­lect mon­ey he claimed to be owed for his work on behalf of the Ukrain­ian par­ties.

    About the same time, Mr. Man­afort was also try­ing to cur­ry favor with Oleg V. Deri­pas­ka, a Russ­ian bil­lion­aire close to the Krem­lin and an asso­ciate of Mr. Kil­imnik. In July 2016, Mr. Man­afort, then the Trump cam­paign chair­man, told Mr. Kil­imnik that he could offer Mr. Deri­pas­ka “pri­vate brief­in­gs,” accord­ing to emails report­ed by The Wash­ing­ton Post. Mr. Deri­pas­ka had claimed Mr. Man­afort owed him mil­lions from a failed busi­ness ven­ture, and Mr. Man­afort may have been try­ing to use his sta­tus in the cam­paign to hold him at bay.

    The sur­prise dis­clo­sures about Mr. Man­afort were the lat­est in two years of steady rev­e­la­tions about con­tacts between asso­ciates of Mr. Trump’s and Russ­ian offi­cials or oper­a­tives. In anoth­er devel­op­ment on Tues­day, the Russ­ian lawyer who met with senior cam­paign offi­cials at Trump Tow­er in June 2016 was charged with obstruc­tion of jus­tice in an unre­lat­ed case. Fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in Man­hat­tan said that the lawyer, Natalia V. Vesel­nit­skaya, had pre­tend­ed to a fed­er­al judge that she was pure­ly a pri­vate defense lawyer when in fact she was work­ing with the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment to thwart the civ­il pros­e­cu­tion of a Russ­ian com­pa­ny.

    Of the var­i­ous Russ­ian inter­me­di­aries to the Trump cam­paign, Mr. Kil­imnik appears to be one of the most impor­tant to Mr. Mueller’s inquiry. A Russ­ian cit­i­zen and res­i­dent, he faces charges from Mr. Mueller’s team of tam­per­ing with wit­ness­es who had infor­ma­tion about Mr. Man­afort, but Mr. Kil­imnik is not expect­ed to ever stand tri­al. He did not respond to a phone call and email seek­ing com­ment on Tues­day.

    His rela­tion­ship with Mr. Man­afort dates back years. The two men worked togeth­er to pro­mote a Rus­sia-aligned politi­cian, Vik­tor F. Yanukovych, who rose to Ukraine’s pres­i­den­cy, was oust­ed in a pop­u­lar upris­ing and fled to Rus­sia in 2014. The two men con­tin­ued work­ing togeth­er over the next three years as Mr. Manafort’s finan­cial trou­bles grew and inves­ti­ga­tors began to inves­ti­gate a fraud scheme that even­tu­al­ly led to his con­vic­tion for 10 felonies.

    In August 2016, appar­ent­ly just before Mr. Man­afort was fired from the Trump cam­paign, he and Mr. Kil­imnik met to dis­cuss a plan for Ukraine that seemed to fur­ther Russia’s inter­ests. They also met sev­er­al times after­ward, includ­ing once in Madrid in ear­ly 2017. In an inter­view in Feb­ru­ary 2017 in Kiev, Ukraine’s cap­i­tal, Mr. Kil­imnik sug­gest­ed the plan would have involved reviv­ing the polit­i­cal for­tunes of Mr. Yanukovych, the oust­ed Ukrain­ian leader.

    For Rus­sia, try­ing to influ­ence the incom­ing Trump administration’s pol­i­cy on Ukraine was of para­mount impor­tance. The eco­nom­ic sanc­tions imposed after Rus­sia annexed Crimea dam­aged the Russ­ian econ­o­my, and var­i­ous emis­saries have tried to con­vince admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials to bro­ker a res­o­lu­tion to a long-run­ning guer­ril­la war between Rus­sia and Ukraine.

    In one pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed case, for instance, an obscure Ukrain­ian law­mak­er, Andrii V. Arte­menko, worked with two asso­ciates of Mr. Trump’s, Felix Sater and Michael D. Cohen, to deliv­er one Ukraine “peace plan” to the White House. The plan land­ed on the desk of Michael T. Fly­nn, the president’s first nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, just before he was forced to resign.

    In an inter­view on Tues­day, Mr. Arte­menko said that inves­ti­ga­tors work­ing for Mr. Mueller had ques­tioned him exten­sive­ly about his efforts to pro­mote that plan. Mr. Arte­menko said he knew nei­ther Mr. Man­afort nor Mr. Kil­imnik and stressed that his plan was dif­fer­ent from theirs.

    Pros­e­cu­tors have accused Mr. Man­afort of lying not only about his inter­ac­tions with Mr. Kil­imnik, but about oth­er mat­ters, includ­ing his con­tacts with senior admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials in ear­ly 2017 and a pay­ment relat­ed to a pro-Trump polit­i­cal action com­mit­tee to cov­er his legal expens­es. In Novem­ber, after a dozen meet­ings with Mr. Man­afort, they broke off the plea agree­ment with him, cit­ing what they said was a series of lies.

    In their fil­ing, Mr. Manafort’s defense lawyers said that Mr. Man­afort nev­er inten­tion­al­ly mis­led fed­er­al author­i­ties. Instead, they cast him as a sick man — trou­bled by “severe” gout, as well as by depres­sion and anx­i­ety — who made mis­state­ments because of a faulty mem­o­ry and lack of access to his own records.

    They nev­er­the­less said that they would not seek a hear­ing to chal­lenge the pros­e­cu­tors’ accu­sa­tions that he lied, a deci­sion that brings Mr. Man­afort one step clos­er to being sen­tenced for his crimes.

    The deci­sion not to seek a hear­ing reflect­ed the dearth of legal choic­es for Mr. Man­afort, 69, who has been in jail in North­ern Vir­ginia since mid-June. One pros­e­cu­tion result­ed in his jury con­vic­tion in August for bank fraud, tax fraud and oth­er finan­cial crimes. A sec­ond led to his guilty plea in Sep­tem­ber on two con­spir­a­cy charges, includ­ing one stem­ming from a wit­ness-tam­per­ing scheme with Mr. Kil­imnik. Mr. Man­afort faces at least 10 years in prison.

    The plea agree­ment gives the pros­e­cu­tors the pow­er to almost uni­lat­er­al­ly decide whether Mr. Man­afort has vio­lat­ed it. Unless Mr. Man­afort can show they act­ed in bad faith — a high bar — their judg­ment stands. The pros­e­cu­tors could also decide to file new charges against Mr. Man­afort for lying to them, but appar­ent­ly they do not plan to do so, accord­ing to Tuesday’s fil­ing.

    “They have him so deeply in the soup here that what both sides are almost say­ing is that this doesn’t mat­ter,” said Nan­cy Gert­ner, a Har­vard Law School pro­fes­sor.

    Cor­rec­tion: Jan­u­ary 8, 2019
    A pre­vi­ous ver­sion of this arti­cle misiden­ti­fied the peo­ple to whom Paul Man­afort want­ed a Russ­ian asso­ciate to send polling data. Mr. Man­afort want­ed the data sent to two Ukrain­ian oli­garchs, Ser­hiy Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov, not to Oleg V. Deri­pas­ka, a Russ­ian oli­garch close to the Krem­lin.

    ———-

    “Man­afort Accused of Shar­ing Trump Polling Data With Russ­ian Asso­ciate” by Sharon LaFraniere, Ken­neth P. Vogel and Mag­gie Haber­man; The New York Times; 01/08/2019

    “Both Mr. Man­afort and Rick Gates, the deputy cam­paign man­ag­er, trans­ferred the data to Mr. Kil­imnik in the spring of 2016 as Mr. Trump clinched the Repub­li­can pres­i­den­tial nom­i­na­tion, accord­ing to a per­son knowl­edge­able about the sit­u­a­tion. Most of the data was pub­lic, but some of it was devel­oped by a pri­vate polling firm work­ing for the cam­paign, accord­ing to the per­son.”

    So most­ly pub­lic polling data was passed along to Kil­imnik in the spring of 2016, with Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov being two of the intend­ed recip­i­ents:

    ...
    Mr. Man­afort asked Mr. Gates to tell Mr. Kil­imnik to pass the data to two Ukrain­ian oli­garchs, Ser­hiy Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov, the per­son said. The oli­garchs had financed Russ­ian-aligned Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ties that had hired Mr. Man­afort as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant.

    A rep­re­sen­ta­tive for Mr. Akhme­tov said he did not request or receive any data from Mr. Kil­imnik and has had no con­tact with either Mr. Kil­imnik or Mr. Man­afort since before the 2016 pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. Mr. Lyovochkin did not respond to a request for com­ment.

    Why Mr. Man­afort want­ed them to see Amer­i­can polling data is unclear. He might have hoped that any proof that he was man­ag­ing a win­ning can­di­date would help him col­lect mon­ey he claimed to be owed for his work on behalf of the Ukrain­ian par­ties.
    ...

    Then, we are told that Man­afort and Kil­imnik met in August of 2016 to dis­cuss some sort of plan for Ukraine and then met sev­er­al times in ear­ly 2017 again to dis­cuss the plan. Arte­menko insists that this must have been a dif­fer­ent plan:

    ...
    In August 2016, appar­ent­ly just before Mr. Man­afort was fired from the Trump cam­paign, he and Mr. Kil­imnik met to dis­cuss a plan for Ukraine that seemed to fur­ther Russia’s inter­ests. They also met sev­er­al times after­ward, includ­ing once in Madrid in ear­ly 2017. In an inter­view in Feb­ru­ary 2017 in Kiev, Ukraine’s cap­i­tal, Mr. Kil­imnik sug­gest­ed the plan would have involved reviv­ing the polit­i­cal for­tunes of Mr. Yanukovych, the oust­ed Ukrain­ian leader.

    For Rus­sia, try­ing to influ­ence the incom­ing Trump administration’s pol­i­cy on Ukraine was of para­mount impor­tance. The eco­nom­ic sanc­tions imposed after Rus­sia annexed Crimea dam­aged the Russ­ian econ­o­my, and var­i­ous emis­saries have tried to con­vince admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials to bro­ker a res­o­lu­tion to a long-run­ning guer­ril­la war between Rus­sia and Ukraine.

    In one pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed case, for instance, an obscure Ukrain­ian law­mak­er, Andrii V. Arte­menko, worked with two asso­ciates of Mr. Trump’s, Felix Sater and Michael D. Cohen, to deliv­er one Ukraine “peace plan” to the White House. The plan land­ed on the desk of Michael T. Fly­nn, the president’s first nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, just before he was forced to resign.

    In an inter­view on Tues­day, Mr. Arte­menko said that inves­ti­ga­tors work­ing for Mr. Mueller had ques­tioned him exten­sive­ly about his efforts to pro­mote that plan. Mr. Arte­menko said he knew nei­ther Mr. Man­afort nor Mr. Kil­imnik and stressed that his plan was dif­fer­ent from theirs.
    ...

    So it’s worth recall­ing that, back when we first learned about the Ukrain­ian peace plan pro­pos­al in ear­ly 2017, there were reports that there was an alter­nate deal to aban­don the Min­sk peace accords that was being put for­ward by Vic­tor Punchuk, Ser­hiy Taru­ta, Vadym Chernysh, and Andriy Yer­mo­layev, the head of Nova Ukraina think tank, which is close to Ser­hiy Lyovochkin. Might this plan have been the plan Man­afort and Kil­imnik were dis­cussing?:

    Kyiv Post

    Arte­menko goes from obscu­ri­ty to noto­ri­ety

    24 Feb 2017
    BY VERONIKA MELKOZEROVA, OKSANA GRYTSENKO

    Andrey Arte­menko said he want­ed to be a peace­mak­er. But with­in a week of the New York Times reveal­ing on Feb. 19 that the lit­tle-known Ukrain­ian par­lia­men­tar­i­an had brought to Wash­ing­ton a plan to end Russia’s war against Ukraine, he faced wide­spread crit­i­cism in his home­land. He could even be charged with trea­son.

    That’s because Artemenko’s plan was dis­tinct­ly pro-Krem­lin. The Rad­i­cal Par­ty lawmaker’s ideas includ­ed leas­ing Crimea to Rus­sia for 50 years and the lift­ing of eco­nom­ic sanc­tions against Rus­sia by the Unit­ed States.

    It didn’t take long for the blow­back to arrive.

    On Feb. 20, Rad­i­cal Par­ty leader Oleh Lyashko told jour­nal­ists in par­lia­ment that Arte­menko had been expelled from the par­ty.

    “He (Arte­menko) has posi­tioned him­self as a ‘peace­mak­er’, so we expect that he will also give up being a law­mak­er,” said Lyashko. “Let those who sug­gest leas­ing Crimea first give their apart­ments to rob­bers to rent.”

    But Arte­menko is not the only Ukrain­ian politi­cian to reach out to the White House behind Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko’s back.

    Yulia Tymoshenko, the for­mer prime min­is­ter and leader of Batkivshchy­na Par­ty, had a brief meet­ing with U.S. Pres­i­dent Don­ald J. Trump before the Nation­al Prayer Break­fast in Wash­ing­ton on Feb. 3, dur­ing which Trump report­ed­ly promised her that he would “not aban­don Ukraine.”

    And Valen­tyn Naly­vaichenko, the for­mer head of the Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice of Ukraine and a polit­i­cal ally of Tymoshenko, says he vis­it­ed the U.S. in Decem­ber and Jan­u­ary.

    Naly­vaichenko told the Kyiv Post he met there with for­mer Repub­li­can Sen­a­tor Jim DeMint, a Trump advi­sor and pres­i­dent of the con­ser­v­a­tive the Her­itage Foun­da­tion, a con­ser­v­a­tive think tank, and Bob Cork­er, a Repub­li­can sen­a­tor from Ten­nessee and Sen­ate For­eign Rela­tions Com­mit­tee chair­man.

    Naly­vaichenko said he deliv­ered to the U.S. Depart­ment of Jus­tice proof of “polit­i­cal cor­rup­tion by (Ukraine’s) top offi­cials.” He said also deliv­ered to Ukraine’s Pros­e­cu­tor General’s Office mate­ri­als about alleged mon­ey laun­der­ing and the ille­gal use of off­shore com­pa­nies by Poroshenko’s busi­ness part­ner and law­mak­er Ihor Kononenko.

    Back in 2015, Naly­vaichenko gave the com­pro­mis­ing mate­ri­als on Poroshenko to Arte­menko, which he claimed to also give to the U.S. author­i­ties.

    At the same time, Naly­vaichenko called Artemenko’s idea of leas­ing Crimea to Rus­sia unac­cept­able, and said he had brought to the U.S. his own peace plan.

    Many peace­mak­ers

    Arte­menko, who stays in the Rada as an inde­pen­dent par­lia­men­tar­i­an, told the Kyiv Post on Feb. 22 that he saw his plan as the only rea­son­able alter­na­tive to the failed Min­sk peace process.

    “Min­sk doesn’t work – that’s obvi­ous,” Arte­menko said, adding that it was espe­cial­ly obvi­ous after Rus­sia said on Feb. 18 it rec­og­nized the “pass­ports” issued by the Luhan­sk and Donet­sk-based sep­a­ratists who call the ter­ri­to­ries they occu­py “republics.”

    Arte­menko is not the only one to sug­gest an alter­na­tive to Min­sk. Since Decem­ber, sug­ges­tions to aban­don the failed Min­sk peace deal have also been made by oli­garch Vic­tor Pinchuk, busi­ness­man and for­mer gov­er­nor of Donet­sk Oblast Ser­hiy Taru­ta, Vadym Chernysh, the min­is­ter for the tem­porar­i­ly occu­pied ter­ri­to­ries, and Andriy Yer­mo­layev, the head of Nova Ukraina think tank, which is close to Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, a top law­mak­er from the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and ex-pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych’s for­mer chief of staff.

    Like Pinchuk or Arte­menko, Yer­mo­layev pro­posed Ukraine adopt a neu­tral sta­tus and also launch a direct dia­logue between Ukraine and the sep­a­ratist author­i­ties. Under the plan, the sep­a­ratist-held zone would be demil­i­ta­rized and placed under the con­trol of UN peace­keep­ers and armed mon­i­tors from the Orga­ni­za­tion for Secu­ri­ty and Coop­er­a­tion in Europe.

    Lyashko lat­er claimed the Krem­lin was behind Artemenko’s plan. He said that Arte­menko worked on the plan with Lyovochkin, Oppo­si­tion Bloc fac­tion leader Yuriy Boyko, and Ukrain­ian politi­cian and close friend of Putin Vik­tor Medved­chuk.

    Medvedchuk’s spokesper­son Oleg Baban­in told the Kyiv Post on Feb. 22 that the politi­cian had had noth­ing to do with Artemenko’s plan. He described Lyashko’s claims as “not seri­ous.”

    Arte­menko con­firmed that he worked on the plan with sev­er­al Ukrain­ian law­mak­ers, but said they are now afraid to admit this because of the neg­a­tive pub­lic reac­tion to the pro­posed deal.

    ...

    ———-

    “Arte­menko goes from obscu­ri­ty to noto­ri­ety” BY VERONIKA MELKOZEROVA, OKSANA GRYTSENKO; Kyiv Post; 02/24/2017

    “Arte­menko is not the only one to sug­gest an alter­na­tive to Min­sk. Since Decem­ber, sug­ges­tions to aban­don the failed Min­sk peace deal have also been made by oli­garch Vic­tor Pinchuk, busi­ness­man and for­mer gov­er­nor of Donet­sk Oblast Ser­hiy Taru­ta, Vadym Chernysh, the min­is­ter for the tem­porar­i­ly occu­pied ter­ri­to­ries, and Andriy Yer­mo­layev, the head of Nova Ukraina think tank, which is close to Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, a top law­mak­er from the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and ex-pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych’s for­mer chief of staff.

    First, recall that Ser­hiy Taru­ta was involved in that bizarre fake con­gres­sion­al hear­ing and was using the ser­vices of Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca-spin­off AIQ to do it.

    Was there just one ‘peace plan’ or mul­ti­ple? And if there were mul­ti­ple schemes, which ones were Man­afort and Kil­imnik work­ing on? Is it pos­si­ble that Man­afort and Kil­imnik were actu­al­ly work­ing on a com­plete­ly dif­fer­ent plan from Sater and Cohen? That would be pret­ty amaz­ing, but giv­en how com­part­men­tal­ized the lives of these peo­ple are we can’t rule it out.

    So that all adds some addi­tion­al mys­tery in terms of what exact­ly Man­afort was up to. But it’s worth keep­ing in mind that one of Man­afort’s spe­cial­ties as a polit­i­cal con­sult­ing was read­ing polls. That’s what he did for a liv­ing and the osten­si­ble rea­son he was hired to be Trump’s cam­paign man­ag­er. And his long-time part­ner in that job was Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik. And that points towards one obvi­ous pos­si­bil­i­ty for giv­ing this kind of polling data — most of which was pub­lic — to Kil­imnik: So Kil­imnik could ana­lyze it and give a sec­ond opin­ion. Sure, not being an Amer­i­can would pre­sum­ably com­pli­cate the analy­sis. But don’t for­get that Man­afort’s spe­cial­ty was going into coun­tries he did­n’t know and act­ing as a poll-dri­ven polit­i­cal con­sul­tant. So Man­afort’s own resume is a tes­ti­mo­ny to fact that this kind of work does­n’t have to be done by some­one very famil­iar with the coun­try where the cam­paign­ing is tak­ing place. Might that have been one of the rea­sons for hand­ing this data off to Kil­imnik? Per­haps, but that still leaves the mys­tery of why Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov would have found it use­ful, espe­cial­ly since they appar­ent­ly owed Man­afort mil­lions.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | January 10, 2019, 1:00 pm
  13. Now that the rela­tion­ship between Paul Man­afort and Sergei Lovochkin (Lyvochkin/Lyovochkin) has become a key area of inquiry in the #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion fol­low­ing the rev­e­la­tion that Man­afort passed polling infor­ma­tion in the spring of 2016 to Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik and request­ed that Kil­imnik pass the infor­ma­tion along to Rinat Akhme­tov and Sergei Lyovochkin, it worth not­ing that the ques­tions swirling around Man­afort, Lovochkin, and the twin peri­ods of vio­lence that pre­cip­i­tat­ed the col­lapse of the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment — the Decem­ber 2013 attack by the Ukrain­ian secu­ri­ty forces on the pro­test­ers who emerged right after the pull­out of the EU trade agree­ment nego­ti­a­tions that sparked the Maid­an protests and the Feb­ru­ary 2014 sniper attacks dur­ing the Maid­an protests — are now ques­tions at the heart of the #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion.

    Because if Man­afort and Lovochkin were engaged in some sort of high-risk gam­bit in the 2016 cam­paign, the pos­si­bil­i­ty that the two may have engaged in a high risk regime change gam­bit in Ukraine two years ear­li­er is obvi­ous­ly high­ly rel­e­vant. And since that high risk regime change gam­bit in Ukraine appeared to be a pro-EU gam­bit, that makes the Manafort/Lovochkin coor­di­na­tion in Ukraine a par­tic­u­lar­ly impor­tant chap­ter of his­to­ry for under­stand­ing what Man­afort may have been up to in 2016.

    Along those lines, giv­en the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence that Man­afort and Lovochkin were involved in insti­gat­ing the ini­tial Decem­ber 2013 police crack­down on the pro­tes­tors — evi­dence in the form of Lovochk­in’s tele­vi­sion sta­tion sud­den­ly giv­ing the protests wall-to-wall cov­er­age sym­pa­thet­ic to the pro­tes­tors at the same time Lovochkin resigned as chief of staff and Paul Man­afort’s daugh­ters hacked text mes­sages claim­ing that it was her dad’s idea “to send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered. Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts [sic] and what not […] As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.” — here’s anoth­er inter­est­ing piece of evi­dence: It turns out that one of the two Ukrain­ian offi­cials who inves­ti­ga­tors focused on who alleged­ly gave direct orders for the 2013 crack­down — Vladimir Sivkovych — worked in the Kyiv offices of Paul Man­afort’s firm, Davis Man­afort:

    Kyiv Post

    In Manafort’s World, Every­one Had A Price

    By Josh Koven­sky.
    Pub­lished Oct. 12, 2018. Updat­ed Oct. 12 2018 at 10:40 am

    For the first few months Paul Man­afort worked in Ukraine, his home was a lux­u­ry hotel in down­town Donet­sk – the Don­bass Palace. There, on assign­ment for local tycoon Rinat Akhme­tov in ear­ly 2005, Man­afort would work from the room, reached by asso­ciates via the hotel tele­phone.

    But when an Ukrain­s­ka Prav­da reporter called through to his room, Man­afort hung up, refus­ing to talk to the reporter, who lat­er described him in a sto­ry as “famous for an indis­crim­i­nate assort­ment of clients.”

    As his­to­ry has since shown, by that time Man­afort was already wind­ing up his work with this broad “assort­ment of clients,” focus­ing instead on one. From then on, Man­afort would work for the Par­ty of Regions, bur­nish­ing the image of then-Prime Min­is­ter Vik­tor Yanukovych in Ukraine and in West­ern cap­i­tals while run­ning errands for the party’s wealthy back­ers around the world.

    Doc­u­ments from the court cas­es that have dogged Man­afort since then, and inter­views with those who encoun­tered him dur­ing this peri­od, tell a marked­ly dif­fer­ent sto­ry about his time in Ukraine than has pre­vi­ous­ly been por­trayed. He comes off as a man inti­mate­ly acquaint­ed with post-Sovi­et deal­mak­ing, lead­ing him to break the law in run­ning an ille­gal pro-West­ern lob­by­ing cam­paign to con­vince the Euro­pean Union to sign an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment with Ukraine.

    Man­afort pitched the cam­paign to Yanukovych in prac­ti­cal terms — “to ensure that you nev­er have to deal with a 2004 sce­nario again” — a ref­er­ence to the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, which saw Yanukovych lose in a repeat sec­ond-round pres­i­den­tial vote to Vik­tor Yushchenko.

    Man­afort plead­ed guilty to fail­ing to reg­is­ter as a for­eign agent in Sep­tem­ber after being con­vict­ed of tax and bank fraud in an August tri­al. He has agreed to coop­er­ate with the inves­ti­ga­tion of Spe­cial Coun­sel Robert Mueller, appoint­ed to inves­ti­gate Russ­ian med­dling in the 2016 U.S. pres­i­den­tial elec­tion.

    The big three

    While court doc­u­ments and tri­al tes­ti­mo­ny show that six Ukrain­ian oli­garchs and pub­lic offi­cials financed Manafort’s work, three peo­ple stand out as play­ing the biggest roles dur­ing his time in Ukraine.

    They are Akhme­tov, Yanukovych Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion Chief Ser­hiy Lovochkin, and bil­lion­aire gas trad­er Dmytro Fir­tash.

    Each has his own dis­tinct inter­ests, shaped by their sep­a­rate back­grounds.

    Akhme­tov

    Akhme­tov emerged from the bloody world of Donet­sk in the 1990s as the bil­lion­aire head of Sys­tem Cap­i­tal Man­age­ment — a steel and ener­gy con­glom­er­ate span­ning all of Ukraine, but with a focus in the country’s east.

    With huge cash flows, Akhme­tov began to invest in pol­i­tics, sup­port­ing the can­di­da­cy of Vik­tor Yanukovych in the 2004 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion.

    Yanukovych lost in a runoff elec­tion to Vik­tor Yushchenko, after mass vot­ing fraud pro­voked protests known as the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion.

    It was in this tumult that Man­afort first came to Ukraine, arriv­ing in Decem­ber 2004 osten­si­bly to work on a poten­tial IPO for SCM.

    But in a 2010 memo to Yanukovych, Man­afort him­self says that his work for SCM was a front.

    “As we did in the ear­ly days, with SCM being my tech­ni­cal client while I, in fact, focused on your pro­gram, we would find anoth­er client (prefer­ably not SCM since they have had this bur­den already), who would pay for my ser­vices under a mul­ti-year con­tract,” Man­afort wrote.

    An Akhme­tov spokesman denied the verac­i­ty of Manafort’s state­ment in the memo, say­ing that SCM had not worked with Man­afort since 2005. Pros­e­cu­tors accused Man­afort in his first tri­al of oper­at­ing undis­closed shell com­pa­nies in Cyprus to receive mon­ey from his Ukrain­ian clients, sup­pos­ed­ly on the advice of for­mer deputy Prime Min­is­ter and Akhme­tov ally Borys Kolesnikov.

    Kolesnikov dis­put­ed the notion that Man­afort would have need­ed help.

    “So Paul Man­afort, arriv­ing in Ukraine after 80 elec­tion cam­paigns in 20 coun­tries of the world, need­ed someone’s advice???” Kolesnikov wrote in a Face­book mes­sage.

    “It’s as ridicu­lous as the black ledger,” he added, refer­ring to the hand­writ­ten ledger of secret pay­ments alleged to have been made by Yanukovych’s Par­ty of Regions, found after the for­mer pres­i­dent fled Ukraine.

    Lovochkin

    The vast major­i­ty of Manafort’s pay­ments — in the order of around $40 mil­lion — end­ed up com­ing from Lovochkin, a tall, well-con­nect­ed Kyi­van who came out of the country’s polit­i­cal elite.

    His father, Volodymyr, was a long­time offi­cial in Ukraine’s Inte­ri­or Min­istry. Volodymyr Lovochkin worked as direc­tor of the prison service’s pun­ish­ment enforce­ment depart­ment at the same time that his son was scal­ing the Kyiv polit­i­cal lad­der — a use­ful posi­tion in a world where Yanukovych, a con­vict­ed felon who served time in Sovi­et pris­ons, was play­ing a king­mak­er role in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics.

    The younger Lovochkin entered pol­i­tics in the 1990s through the bank­ing sec­tor, before becom­ing an aide in the Kuch­ma gov­ern­ment and an advi­sor to then-Donet­sk Oblast Gov­er­nor Yanukovych.

    Lovochkin quick­ly earned him­self a rep­u­ta­tion as a deal­mak­er. Accord­ing to Oppo­si­tion Bloc Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment Nestor Shufrich, a for­mer Par­ty of Regions mem­ber, “in Decem­ber 2004, and at the end of Novem­ber, the ‘Orange’ pro­tes­tors had access to Kuch­ma pre­cise­ly through (Lovochkin).” The two sides “reached an agree­ment through Lovochkin,” he added.

    By 2006, Lovochkin had become an offi­cial in Yanukovych’s Cab­i­net of Min­is­ters, while the Ukrain­ian press began to link him with oli­garch Fir­tash.

    Fir­tash

    From a small vil­lage in Ukraine’s west, Fir­tash began to pop up in the ear­ly 2000s as a busi­ness­man deliv­er­ing gas from Turk­menistan while buy­ing up fer­til­iz­er plants.

    His empire metas­ta­sized through­out the decade, cul­mi­nat­ing in RosUkrEn­er­go: a mid­dle­man com­pa­ny formed to move gas from Rus­sia, through Ukraine, to West­ern Europe that lat­er dis­solved amid accu­sa­tions of mafia involve­ment and price infla­tion.

    The RosUkrEn­er­go case drew the atten­tion of the U.S. gov­ern­ment, while Fir­tash con­tin­ued to play a king­mak­ing role in the Par­ty of Regions specif­i­cal­ly, and in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics as a whole.

    Fir­tash and Lovochkin con­trol the Inter TV chan­nel, one of Ukraine’s most influ­en­tial media sources, and a use­ful tool for their polit­i­cal projects.

    Nar­o­d­niy Front Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment Ser­hiy Vysot­sky told the Kyiv Post last month that Lovochkin would pro­vide access to Fir­tash in exchange for financ­ing.

    “Lovochkin guar­an­teed entrance to the nec­es­sary offices… under Yanukovych or (Vik­tor) Yushchenko, and Fir­tash worked out the busi­ness schemes. And through the busi­ness schemes he bought influ­ence, through Inter, the Par­ty of Regions, and lat­er the Oppo­si­tion Bloc,” he said.

    Turn­ing to EU

    Man­afort worked with the above-men­tioned three up through the 2010 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, which saw Yanukovych beat Yulia Tymoshenko in a runoff.

    In a meet­ing with U.S.Ambassador John Tefft in the runup to the elec­tion, Man­afort pur­port­ed­ly said that he had “a dou­ble-dig­it lead” against Tymoshenko, who was “mov­ing to dis­cred­it the elec­tion process as the only means of stop­ping Yanukovych.”

    After Yanukovych’s elec­tion, Man­afort turned his sights on the government’s for­eign out­reach. In a memo to Yanukovych two weeks after his vic­to­ry, Man­afort laid out a strat­e­gy in which he would be the “man­ag­er” of “a plan to man­age strat­e­gy, pub­lic rela­tions and inter­na­tion­al affairs for Pres­i­dent Yanukovych.”

    The doc­u­ment calls for the gov­ern­ment to “devel­op advo­cates with­in the diplo­mat­ic and polit­i­cal com­mu­ni­ties of Europe and the Unit­ed States” in order “to ensure that you nev­er have to deal with a 2004 sce­nario again.”

    A big part of the cam­paign was man­ag­ing Ukraine’s move towards sign­ing an Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment and trade agree­ment with the EU.

    Caught by a mix­ture of geog­ra­phy, his­to­ry, and pol­i­tics between Rus­sia and Europe, Ukraine would use the deal to edge towards EU acces­sion and away from Krem­lin influ­ence.

    Mem­os released by pros­e­cu­tors after Manafort’s plea deal show him mas­ter­mind­ing a covert lob­by­ing cam­paign in favor of Ukraine tak­ing a Euro­pean path.

    In one June 2012 memo to asso­ciates Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, Rick Gates, and Alan Fried­man, Man­afort said it was nec­es­sary “to aggres­sive­ly pro­mote Ukraine’s com­pli­ance with (West­ern) demands and make the case that Ukraine is com­mit­ted to build­ing a demo­c­ra­t­ic soci­ety.”

    Offi­cials work­ing in Ukraine’s Min­istry of For­eign Affairs at the time told the Kyiv Post that the government’s main pri­or­i­ties were tamp­ing down crit­i­cism of the 2011 pros­e­cu­tion and impris­on­ment of Tymoshenko, vet­ting a new crim­i­nal code writ­ten by Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion aide Andriy Port­nov, and por­tray­ing the 2012 par­lia­men­tary elec­tions as free and fair.

    “We should make the case that if the West is seri­ous about help­ing to build a rule of law soci­ety, it should stop attack­ing Ukraine and begin to work with the gov­ern­ment to train and assist in the imple­men­ta­tion of the new laws,” Man­afort wrote in the memo, adding that he intend­ed “to assem­ble a small group of high-lev­el Euro­pean high­ly influ­en­cial (sic) cham­pi­ons and polit­i­cal­ly cred­i­ble friends who can act infor­mal­ly and with­out any vis­i­ble rela­tion­ship to the Gov­ern­ment of Ukraine.”

    The cam­paign con­tin­ued through 2013, with most of the financ­ing com­ing from Lovochkin. A report in BNE Intellinews shows that Man­afort flew around Europe for the cam­paign on Lovochkin’s air­craft.

    By the time the Novem­ber 2013 EU sum­mit in Vil­nius came around, Brus­sels was ready to ink the agree­ment. But Yanukovych, sus­cep­ti­ble to buy­outs, was not — he refused to sign the deal, spark­ing protests on Kyiv’s Maid­an Neza­lezh­nos­ti Square.

    The protests start­ed small, with stu­dents hud­dled on Maid­an. But in the ear­ly morn­ing of Nov. 30, a Berkut unit bru­tal­ly attacked the stu­dents, spark­ing huge demon­stra­tions the next day which lat­er snow­balled into a rev­o­lu­tion that took down Yanukovych.

    It’s not clear who ordered the cat­alyz­ing attack on the stu­dents, but one the­o­ry — sup­port­ed by Inte­ri­or Min­is­ter Arsen Avakov and oli­garch Ihor Kolo­moisky — holds Lovochkin respon­si­ble for the attack.

    Lovochkin denies the accu­sa­tion, telling the Kyiv Post in a state­ment “let me remind you that I sub­mit­ted my res­ig­na­tion because of Pres­i­dent Yanukovych’s deci­sion to refuse to sign the (free trade agree­ment with the EU) at the East­ern Part­ner­ship Sum­mit in Vil­nius in Novem­ber 2013, and (because of) the use of force against peace­ful pro­test­ers in Kyiv fol­low­ing it.” His press ser­vice said inves­ti­ga­tors had found no evi­dence of his involve­ment.

    Inves­ti­ga­tions have focused on two offi­cials who alleged­ly gave direct orders for the purge — one is Vladimir Sivkovych, a for­mer KGB agent who worked with the Davis Man­afort firm in Kyiv, and the oth­er is then-Kyiv City Admin­is­tra­tion Chair­man Olek­san­dr Popov.

    In a leaked phone call with Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment Mustafa Nayyem, Kolo­moisky called Popov “Lovochkin’s,” adding “I think there’s a ques­tion. Who owned Popov?”

    Shufrich, the for­mer Par­ty of Regions mem­ber of par­lia­ment, said in Decem­ber 2017 that “it couldn’t have hap­pened with­out Lovochkin and Sivkovych.”

    Con­crete details of who ordered the attack — and whether Man­afort had any role or knowl­edge of it — remain unknown. Those direct­ly involved have scat­tered. Sivkovych fled to Rus­sia in 2014, while Popov was fired over the beat­ings in Decem­ber 2013, before being exon­er­at­ed.

    But an excerpt of hacked texts from Manafort’s daugh­ters have lent more cre­dence to the the­o­ry that the attack could have fig­ured in a broad­er polit­i­cal cam­paign.

    “To send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered,” wrote one of Manafort’s daugh­ters to the oth­er. “Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts (sic) and what­not?”

    “As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.”

    She lat­er called mon­ey her father had made in Ukraine, “blood mon­ey.”

    Cops on the take

    Yulia Tymoshenko was sen­tenced to sev­en years in prison after Kyiv Judge Rodi­on Kireyev found her guilty of abus­ing her author­i­ty on Oct. 11, 2011.

    The inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty con­demned the ver­dict, with observers at the time see­ing it as a major step away from accept­ing the legal norms required for even­tu­al EU acces­sion.

    Man­afort sprang into action, bring­ing in pres­ti­gious U.S. law firm Skad­den, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom to write a report white­wash­ing the pros­e­cu­tion. Head­ing the team was a for­mer White House Coun­sel to Barack Oba­ma, Gre­go­ry Craig.

    Manafort’s plea agree­ment reveals, how­ev­er, that Skad­den was involved much more deeply than was pre­vi­ous­ly known, and that an unnamed oli­garch financed many of the firm’s activ­i­ties.

    The firm “was retained to rep­re­sent Ukraine itself, includ­ing in con­nec­tion with the Tymoshenko case and to pro­vide train­ing to the tri­al team pros­e­cut­ing Tymoshenko,” Manafort’s plea agree­ment reads.

    A law­suit filed by Tymoshenko against Fir­tash in New York City claimed that Fir­tash financed the Tymoshenko report. A judge dis­missed the for­mer Prime Minister’s case with prej­u­dice, and Tymoshenko did not raise the claim else­where.

    At the same time, Andriy Port­nov was work­ing on updat­ing Ukraine’s crim­i­nal code from the 1962 Sovi­et ver­sion on which it was then based.

    Ukrain­ian diplo­mats were faced with the task of con­vinc­ing Euro­pean bod­ies like the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion and the Par­lia­men­tary Assem­bly of the Coun­cil of Europe that the legal changes were legit­i­mate and in line with Euro­pean prin­ci­ples.

    Man­afort sent Port­nov — who fled to Rus­sia after Euro­Maid­an, before receiv­ing res­i­den­cy in Aus­tria — to Wash­ing­ton D.C. in Feb­ru­ary 2013. In a memo to Lovochkin about the vis­it, Man­afort wrote “(the tone) was gen­uine­ly pos­i­tive, open-mind­ed, con­struc­tive, and did not focus on (Yulia Tymoshenko).”

    Port­nov con­tin­ues to use his mas­tery of the country’s crim­i­nal code to defend Ukraini­ans from afar.

    “He knows how to use the crim­i­nal code — he cre­at­ed it,” said Kyiv polit­i­cal ana­lyst Volodymyr Fes­enko.

    The enablers

    None of this — nei­ther Manafort’s mass move­ment of unde­clared cash into the Unit­ed States nor the lob­by­ing cam­paign to legit­imize Yanukovych — would have been pos­si­ble with­out the help of rich, polit­i­cal­ly con­nect­ed West­ern­ers.

    The Haps­burg Group was con­ceived specif­i­cal­ly to wield the influ­ence that such peo­ple — in this case for­mer Pol­ish Pres­i­dent Alek­san­dr Kwas­niews­ki, for­mer Aus­tri­an Chan­cel­lor Alfred Gusen­bauer, and for­mer Ital­ian Prime Min­is­ter Romano Pro­di — could pro­vide.

    A sec­tion of one Feb­ru­ary 2013 memo to Yanukovych — enti­tled “back-chan­nel diplo­ma­cy” — describes the Haps­burg Group’s efforts to “final­ize the (EU Asso­ci­a­tion) agree­ment.”

    Man­afort wrote in the memo that the Haps­burg strat­e­gy had been suc­cess­ful in dis­pelling con­cerns over Tymoshenko’s pros­e­cu­tion and oth­er issues, because “the par­tic­i­pants are sig­nif­i­cant Euro­pean lead­ers who are viewed as objec­tive regard­ing Ukraine. This has allowed them to make their points with­out any appar­ent self-inter­est, thus giv­ing their com­ments more weight and impact.”

    On the U.S. side, Skadden’s Greg Craig is under inves­ti­ga­tion for fail­ing to reg­is­ter as a for­eign agent as part of his engage­ment, U.S. media reports indi­cate.

    He left the law firm in April 2018 amid the inves­ti­ga­tion. Skad­den refund­ed the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment $567,000 in June 2017 over pay­ment issues from the $4 mil­lion report.

    ...

    ———-

    “In Manafort’s World, Every­one Had A Price” by Josh Koven­sky; Kyiv Post; 10/12/2018

    “Inves­ti­ga­tions have focused on two offi­cials who alleged­ly gave direct orders for the purge — one is Vladimir Sivkovych, a for­mer KGB agent who worked with the Davis Man­afort firm in Kyiv, and the oth­er is then-Kyiv City Admin­is­tra­tion Chair­man Olek­san­dr Popov.”

    It’s quite an intrigu­ing fun fact: Vladimir Sivkovych, one of the two Ukrain­ian offi­cials sus­pect­ed of giv­ing direct orders to attack the pro­tes­tors in 2013, worked with the Davis Man­afort firm in Kyiv.

    While it remains unknown who actu­al­ly gave the order, the oth­er sus­pect, then–Kyiv City Admin­is­tra­tion Chair­man Olek­san­dr Popov, appears to have been exon­er­at­ed and Oppo­si­tion Bloc Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment Nestor Shufrich claims the attack could­n’t have hap­pened with­out Lovochkin and Sivkovych:

    ...
    Shufrich, the for­mer Par­ty of Regions mem­ber of par­lia­ment, said in Decem­ber 2017 that “it couldn’t have hap­pened with­out Lovochkin and Sivkovych.”

    Con­crete details of who ordered the attack — and whether Man­afort had any role or knowl­edge of it — remain unknown. Those direct­ly involved have scat­tered. Sivkovych fled to Rus­sia in 2014, while Popov was fired over the beat­ings in Decem­ber 2013, before being exon­er­at­ed.
    ...

    Then there’s the claims of Ihor Kolo­moisky that Lovochkin as direct­ly respon­si­ble. Keep in mind that Kolo­moisky, or real­ly any of these fig­ures, isn’t exact­ly a trust­wor­thy indi­vid­ual on these mat­ters. But note Lovochk­in’s rebut­tal: he points out that he resigned as Yanukovy­ch’s chief of staff specif­i­cal­ly because Yanukovych pulled out of the EU trade agree­ment talks and because of the attacks on the pro­tes­tors. It, again, high­lights how Lovochkin appeared to be ful­ly on board with the push to shift Ukraine towards a Euro­pean path. Which, iron­i­cal­ly, is part of the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence point­ing towards Lovochkin being behind those orders to attack the pro­tes­tors:

    ...
    By the time the Novem­ber 2013 EU sum­mit in Vil­nius came around, Brus­sels was ready to ink the agree­ment. But Yanukovych, sus­cep­ti­ble to buy­outs, was not — he refused to sign the deal, spark­ing protests on Kyiv’s Maid­an Neza­lezh­nos­ti Square.

    The protests start­ed small, with stu­dents hud­dled on Maid­an. But in the ear­ly morn­ing of Nov. 30, a Berkut unit bru­tal­ly attacked the stu­dents, spark­ing huge demon­stra­tions the next day which lat­er snow­balled into a rev­o­lu­tion that took down Yanukovych.

    It’s not clear who ordered the cat­alyz­ing attack on the stu­dents, but one the­o­ry — sup­port­ed by Inte­ri­or Min­is­ter Arsen Avakov and oli­garch Ihor Kolo­moisky — holds Lovochkin respon­si­ble for the attack.

    Lovochkin denies the accu­sa­tion, telling the Kyiv Post in a state­ment “let me remind you that I sub­mit­ted my res­ig­na­tion because of Pres­i­dent Yanukovych’s deci­sion to refuse to sign the (free trade agree­ment with the EU) at the East­ern Part­ner­ship Sum­mit in Vil­nius in Novem­ber 2013, and (because of) the use of force against peace­ful pro­test­ers in Kyiv fol­low­ing it.” His press ser­vice said inves­ti­ga­tors had found no evi­dence of his involve­ment.

    ...

    In a leaked phone call with Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment Mustafa Nayyem, Kolo­moisky called Popov “Lovochkin’s,” adding “I think there’s a ques­tion. Who owned Popov?”

    ...

    And, of course, there’s the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence of Andrea Man­afort’s hacked text mes­sages where she explic­it­ly describes her dad orches­trat­ing some sort of vio­lence against the Ukrain­ian pro­tes­tors to grab the world’s atten­tion. We don’t know if he was refer­ring to the 2013 attacks or the 2014 sniper attacks, but she was clear­ly refer­ring to one of those events:

    ...
    But an excerpt of hacked texts from Manafort’s daugh­ters have lent more cre­dence to the the­o­ry that the attack could have fig­ured in a broad­er polit­i­cal cam­paign.

    “To send those peo­ple out and get them slaugh­tered,” wrote one of Manafort’s daugh­ters to the oth­er. “Do you know whose strat­e­gy that was to cause that Revolts (sic) and what­not?”

    “As a tac­tic to out­rage the world and get focus on Ukraine.”

    She lat­er called mon­ey her father had made in Ukraine, “blood mon­ey.”
    ...

    So there was already a good deal of cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence point­ing towards Man­afort and Lovochkin both play­ing key roles in insti­gat­ing the Decem­ber 2013 attack by the Berkut on the pro­tes­tors, and we can add Vladimir Sivkovy­ch’s work at the Kyiv offices of Man­afort Davis to that cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence.

    And as the fol­low­ing arti­cle about the tes­ti­mo­ny of Rick Gates notes, Gates explic­it­ly tes­ti­fied that Sivkovych was work­ing for Man­fort Davis dur­ing his tes­ti­mo­ny.

    The arti­cle also gives more infor­ma­tion on the group of Ukrain­ian oli­garchs behind the ‘Haps­burg Group’. Accord­ing to gates, there were six oli­garchs involved with the effort, each play­ing dif­fer­ent roles. Lovochkin played the largest role in pay­ing Man­afort dur­ing the lob­by­ing effort peri­od peri­od. The arti­cle notes that U.S. gov­ern­ment exhibits show off­shore accounts linked to Lovochkin fun­nel­ing $42,042,307 to Man­afort from 2010 to 2013.

    There’s Sergey Tigip­ko. Accord­ing to Gates, Tigip­ko was behind the actu­al financ­ing of the ‘Haps­burg Group’ through a Cyprus firm Tigip­ko con­trolled called Dresler Hold­ings.

    Borys Kolesnikov, Ukraine’s for­mer infra­struc­ture min­is­ter, ini­tial­ly advis­ing Man­afort and Gates to use the Cypri­ot pay­ment struc­ture.

    Andriy Klyuyev, a for­mer sec­re­tary of Ukraine’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil and the brief, final head of Yanukovych’s Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, was respon­si­ble for financ­ing “polling work” as well as “polit­i­cal cam­paigns” for the Par­ty of Regions, accord­ing to Gates. Gov­ern­ment exhibits show pay­ments of $4,190,111 for the work.

    Then there’s Vic­tor Pinchuk. Accord­ing to US pros­e­cu­tors, Man­afort received $5 mil­lion from Pinchuk through a Cypri­ot com­pa­ny called Ply­mouth Con­sul­tants Lim­it­ed. Recall how Pinchuk is a financier of the Atlantic Coun­cil and has been one of the loud­est advo­cates for a ‘New Cold War’ with Rus­sia. Pinchuk still sits on the advi­so­ry board of the Atlantic Coun­cil. Recall how Dmitri Alper­ovitch, the founder of Crowd­Strike and the lead­ing fig­ure behind the ini­tial con­clu­sion that Russ­ian gov­ern­ment hack­ers were behind the DNC hack, is also a senior fel­low at the Atlantic Coun­cil.

    And there was anoth­er rather stun­ning rev­e­la­tion in Gates’s tes­ti­mo­ny: accord­ing to Gates, in the sum­mer of 2014, the FBI start­ed inves­ti­gat­ing the Cyprus mon­ey-laun­der­ing oper­a­tion used to finance the ‘Haps­burg Group’ efforts. Gates and Man­afort were inter­viewed by the FBI and told them all about it. Inex­plic­a­bly, the alle­ga­tions — and admis­sions — that Man­afort and Gates made to U.S. inves­ti­ga­tors went untouched until 2017. So that’s all part of the con­text of what the US gov­ern­ment knew about Man­afort’s work in Ukraine.

    So from the pros­e­cu­tion and tes­ti­mo­ny of Rick Gates we learned a lot more about who was behind Man­afort’s work in Ukraine dur­ing the ‘Haps­burg Group’ years, fig­ures like Vic­tor Pinchuk in addi­tion to Lovochkin and Akhme­tov. We also learn that Gates and Man­afort told FBI inves­ti­ga­tors in teh sum­mer of 2014 about the Cyprus mon­ey laun­der­ing used to finance the Haps­burg Group but this went untouched by inves­ti­ga­tors until 2017. And we also got con­fir­ma­tion that Vladimir Sivkovych was indeed work­ing for Man­afort Davis:

    Kyiv Post

    Dirty Mon­ey: Man­afort tri­al expos­es seedy real­i­ties of Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics

    By Josh Koven­sky.
    Pub­lished Aug. 10, 2018. Updat­ed Aug. 10 2018 at 10:37 am

    After the 2014 Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion sent his for­mer boss flee­ing to Rus­sia, Amer­i­can polit­i­cal con­sul­tant Paul Man­afort — who raked in $65 mil­lion from ex-Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych’s Par­ty of Regions — was both­ered by one ques­tion: Why didn’t he have enough mon­ey?

    One Man­afort asso­ciate fran­ti­cal­ly tried to have for­mer Par­ty of Regions king­mak­er Ser­hiy Lovochkin wire $500,000 to Man­afort “to calm Paul down.”

    When his 2014 tax bill came in, Man­afort pan­icked, call­ing a half-mil­lion dol­lar increase a “dis­as­ter” and writ­ing “WTF?”

    Grub­bing for cash would prove to be a theme for Man­afort, U.S. Pres­i­dent Don­ald J. Trump’s for­mer cam­paign man­ag­er. He is on tri­al in North­ern Vir­ginia this week on mul­ti­ple fed­er­al fraud charges that he con­cealed mil­lions in pro­ceeds from his polit­i­cal con­sult­ing busi­ness from U.S. tax author­i­ties and laun­dered the cash into Amer­i­ca through lux­u­ry pur­chas­es.

    But doc­u­ments, emails, and tes­ti­mo­ny from his for­mer part­ner, Rick Gates, has left Man­afort and his for­mer Ukrain­ian back­ers scram­bling as the cov­er was lift­ed from the opaque and dirty world of Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal financ­ing.

    “If non-reg­is­tered mon­ey was used for the pay­ment, then this can be qual­i­fied as tax eva­sion,” said for­mer spe­cial inves­ti­ga­tions unit chief pros­e­cu­tor Ser­hiy Gor­batyuk. “If an inves­ti­ga­tion estab­lish­es that the mon­ey for the pay­ment was stolen, then it could also be embez­zle­ment.”

    Yanukovych’s for­mer back­ers, includ­ing for­mer pres­i­den­tial chief of staff Lovochkin and bil­lion­aire oli­garch Rinat Akhme­tov, rushed to deny Gates’ claims that they were among the Ukrain­ian tycoons who financed the Man­afort oper­a­tion.

    “The state­ments made by Mr. Gates over the course of the court hear­ings total­ly under­mine the cred­i­bil­i­ty of Mr. Gates as a trust­ed wit­ness,” a Lovochkin spokes­woman told the Kyiv Post, while Akhme­tov spokes­woman Katery­na Ostroushko denied that Akhmetov’s SCM financed Manafort’s work in Ukraine.

    Gates tes­ti­fied to a scheme that saw six Ukrain­ian oli­garchs and politi­cians — Lovochkin, Akhme­tov, Sergey Tigip­ko, Borys Kolesnikov, Vic­tor Pinchuk and Andriy Klyuyev — pay Man­afort mil­lions of dol­lars through Cyprus-locat­ed off­shores in exchange for “build­ing the Par­ty of Regions.”

    Man­afort ben­e­fit­ed hand­some­ly from the arrange­ment, using the funds to buy lux­u­ry items like a $15,000 ostrich leather jack­et and alleged­ly laun­der­ing mil­lions of dol­lars through U.S. real estate pur­chas­es.

    When fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tor Greg Andres asked Gates what the Ukrain­ian side expect­ed to receive for their ‘invest­ment,’ the answer was clear:

    “They ben­e­fit­ed finan­cial­ly through con­tracts or own­er­ship of cer­tain com­pa­nies or per­cent­ages of com­pa­nies,” Gates said.

    Man­afort is being pros­e­cut­ed by U.S. Spe­cial Coun­sel Robert Mueller, who was tasked with inves­ti­gat­ing Russ­ian med­dling in the 2016 U.S. pres­i­den­tial elec­tion and any relat­ed crimes.

    Most of the oli­garchs and politi­cians named by Gates as pay­ing Man­afort issued blan­ket denials to the Kyiv Post.

    Man­afort faces a max­i­mum sen­tence of 305 years in prison, if con­vict­ed and not sub­se­quent­ly par­doned. Jurors could go to delib­er­a­tions as ear­ly as next Fri­day.

    A sec­ond tri­al in Wash­ing­ton DC will test claims that Man­afort failed to reg­is­ter as a lob­by­ist for Ukraine.

    Gates takes the stand

    Gates joined Man­afort in Ukraine in 2007, help­ing to rebuild the Par­ty of Regions as a polit­i­cal force after its dis­as­trous fall in 2004, when the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion and the Ukrain­ian Supreme Court can­celled a rigged pres­i­den­tial elec­tion in Yanukovych’s favor that year. In a revote on Dec. 26, 2004, Vik­tor Yushchenko won the pres­i­den­cy.

    After the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, Yanukovych and his back­ers were left in the polit­i­cal wilder­ness. In response, Gates said, Akhme­tov and oth­ers hired Man­afort to help cat­a­pult them back into pow­er.

    Call­ing Man­afort “one of the most, you know, polit­i­cal­ly bril­liant strate­gists I’ve ever worked with,” Gates tes­ti­fied that Akhme­tov had tasked Man­afort with help­ing cre­ate the Par­ty of Regions.

    “The rela­tion­ship was such that Mr. Man­afort, in essence, brought [Yanukovych] back from the prover­bial polit­i­cal dead,” Gates said.

    Manafort’s com­pa­ny — DMP Inter­na­tion­al — brought on a team of around a dozen peo­ple for the Par­ty of Regions con­tracts. That includ­ed Phil Grif­fin and Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, a for­mer Russ­ian mil­i­tary intel­li­gence (GRU) offi­cer who worked as Manafort’s trans­la­tor.

    Gates also tes­ti­fied that Vladimir Sivkovych, a for­mer Ukrain­ian politi­co, also worked at DMP’s Kyiv office.

    Sivkovych fled to Moscow amid accu­sa­tions that he orga­nized a vio­lent dis­per­sal of Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion pro­test­ers on Nov. 30, 2013.

    Six Ukraini­ans and one Russ­ian — met­als tycoon Oleg Deri­pas­ka — stand accused of financ­ing Manafort’s work.

    Man­afort and Gates set up sev­er­al Cyprus-based off­shore accounts through a local law firm.

    The Ukraini­ans would send them mon­ey with­in Cyprus from their own off­shores. Pros­e­cu­tors allege that Man­afort con­cealed the income from U.S. tax author­i­ties, and then laun­dered it back into the U.S. through direct deb­it pay­ments on lux­u­ry pur­chas­es.

    Gates tes­ti­fied that the Cyprus pay­ments were struc­tured via direct meet­ings with “the rel­e­vant lead­ers of the par­ty.”

    “They would craft a bud­get for the polit­i­cal cam­paign for any giv­en year,” Gates said. “They would agree to an amount and typ­i­cal­ly agree to a pay­ment struc­ture.”

    A cer­tain divi­sion of labor appears to have emerged among the dif­fer­ent oli­garchs.

    Tigip­ko

    Tigip­ko, for exam­ple, was tasked with financ­ing the Par­ty of Regions’ lob­by­ing efforts for the Euro­pean Union and the U.S., Gates tes­ti­fied, through a Cyprus firm he con­trolled called Dresler Hold­ings.

    Gov­ern­ment exhibits show Dresler pay­ing an off­shore con­trolled by Man­afort $5.3 mil­lion in 2012.

    At the time, the Yanukovych admin­is­tra­tion had set up a Brus­sels-based non­govern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tion called the Euro­pean Cen­tre for a Mod­ern Ukraine. That com­pa­ny orga­nized a lob­by­ing cam­paign in Wash­ing­ton D.C. and across Euro­pean cap­i­tals in part through a group called the “Haps­burg Group.”

    Com­posed of for­mer Aus­tri­an Chan­cel­lor Alfred Gusen­bauer, for­mer Pol­ish Pres­i­dent Alexan­der Kwas­niews­ki, and for­mer Ital­ian Prime Min­is­ter Romano Pro­di, the group had one main task: To con­vince West­ern pol­i­cy­mak­ers that the Yanukovych administration’s pros­e­cu­tion of for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Yulia Tymoshenko was not polit­i­cal, and that it shouldn’t inter­fere with Ukraine join­ing Euro­pean insti­tu­tions.

    One for­mer Man­afort asso­ciate who request­ed anonymi­ty to speak freely spec­u­lat­ed that Tigipko’s role in financ­ing the lob­by­ing effort was in exchange “for oth­er ben­e­fits he could gain from Yanukovych.”

    Oleg Voloshyn, a for­mer For­eign Affairs Min­istry spokesman, not­ed that Tigip­ko had been “charged with rais­ing par­lia­men­tary sup­port for pro-EU leg­is­la­tion need­ed for visa lib­er­al­iza­tion and [the polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic Asso­ci­a­tion Agree­ment].”

    ...

    Lovochkin

    Gates said that Lovochkin, the for­mer head of the Yanukovych’s Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, played the largest role in pay­ing Man­afort.

    U.S. gov­ern­ment exhibits show off­shores linked to Lovochkin fun­nelling $42,042,307 to Man­afort from 2010 to 2013 — around two-thirds of the total that Man­afort is doc­u­ment­ed to have received for his Par­ty of Regions work.

    Gates tes­ti­fied that Akhme­tov and Lovochkin part­nered after the 2014 Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion to finance the cre­ation of Oppo­si­tion Bloc, for which Man­afort was paid an addi­tion­al $5 mil­lion.

    ...

    Kolesnikov

    Borys Kolesnikov, Ukraine’s for­mer infra­struc­ture min­is­ter, appears in tes­ti­mo­ny and state­ments from pros­e­cu­tors as ini­tial­ly advis­ing Man­afort and Gates to use the Cypri­ot pay­ment struc­ture.

    In sum, gov­ern­ment exhibits show Kolesnikov pay­ing $8,716,184 to Man­afort between 2010 and 2013 through a series of Cypri­ot off­shores.

    ...

    Klyuyev

    Andriy Klyuyev, a for­mer sec­re­tary of Ukraine’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil and the brief, final head of Yanukovych’s Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, appears in Gates’ tes­ti­mo­ny as well.

    Gates told the jury that Klyuyev was respon­si­ble for financ­ing “polling work” as well as “polit­i­cal cam­paigns” for the Par­ty of Regions. Gov­ern­ment exhibits show pay­ments of $4,190,111 for the work, through a com­pa­ny called Novirex Sales LLP.

    Klyuyev could not be reached for com­ment. A for­mer busi­ness asso­ciate and attor­ney for him, Rein­hard Proksch, did not reply to mul­ti­ple requests for com­ment.

    Pinchuk

    Pros­e­cu­tors, sup­port­ed by tes­ti­mo­ny from Gates, said that Man­afort received $5 mil­lion from bil­lion­aire oli­garch Pinchuk through a Cypri­ot com­pa­ny called Ply­mouth Con­sul­tants Lim­it­ed.

    Pinchuk has eked out a role for him­self as a savvy posi­tion­er in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. He mar­ried the daugh­ter of for­mer Pres­i­dent Leonid Kuch­ma, and found ways to chan­nel mon­ey to both can­di­dates before the 2016 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion.

    Gates tes­ti­fied that the mon­ey came for work on a “legal project.”

    ...

    Cyprus cash, Kyiv spin

    After Yanukovych fled to Rus­sia amid the 2014 Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion, Man­afort was left with­out clients.

    He appar­ent­ly began to scram­ble for new work to cov­er cash short­falls left by a life of lux­u­ry. At one point, he turned towards the fledg­ling cam­paign of cur­rent Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko.

    Bloc Petro Poroshenko mem­ber of par­lia­ment Ihor Hryniv told Ukrain­ian media that Man­afort had “tried to offer his ser­vices,” but that the engage­ment involved noth­ing more than a “three-hour con­ver­sa­tion.”

    Man­afort end­ed up work­ing for Oppo­si­tion Bloc in 2014, cor­re­spond­ing with both Akhme­tov and Lovochkin over strat­e­gy for the par­ty. In many ways, it was a repeat of Manafort’s posi­tion 10 years before, when Akhme­tov asked him to build a polit­i­cal par­ty in the after­math of the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion.

    But this time the FBI had begun to take a look.

    In the sum­mer of 2014, amid an FBI probe into assets alleged­ly stolen by Yanukovych, Gates flew to France to “noti­fy” Lovochkin that he and Man­afort would meet with inves­ti­ga­tors. Gates tes­ti­fied that he want­ed to receive more infor­ma­tion about the Cyprus pay­ment struc­tures before the FBI inter­view took place.

    Gates said that he and Man­afort told FBI agents about some of the Cyprus accounts and off­shores used in the pay­ment schemes.

    And inex­plic­a­bly, the alle­ga­tions — and admis­sions — that Man­afort and Gates made to U.S. inves­ti­ga­tors went untouched until 2017.

    Ball in Ukraine’s court

    Exhibits filed by pros­e­cu­tors, as well as Gates’s tes­ti­mo­ny, appear to lead to a litany of wrong­do­ing by some of Ukraine’s most pow­er­ful fig­ures.

    One com­pa­ny that Gates linked to Lovochkin — Tel­mar Invest­ments — does not appear on his offi­cial asset dec­la­ra­tion, for exam­ple.

    “Mr. Lovochkin has nev­er owned a com­pa­ny named Tel­mar Invest­ments,” his spokes­woman said in a state­ment. “In accor­dance with Ukrain­ian leg­is­la­tion, Mr. Lovochkin has declared all his prop­er­ty and assets and this infor­ma­tion is pub­licly avail­able.”

    When asked about the mat­ter, a spokes­woman for the Nation­al Agency on Cor­rup­tion Pre­ven­tion declined to say whether the agency would look into the new infor­ma­tion.

    “This is a mat­ter for the Gen­er­al Prosecutor’s Office,” she said.

    Yury Bezschas­ny, act­ing head of the prosecutor’s spe­cial inves­ti­ga­tions divi­sion, said that he could only use doc­u­ments received via offi­cial legal requests, which have so far gone unan­swered.

    “We need offi­cial respons­es and doc­u­ments from the Amer­i­cans,” Bezschas­ny said. “The name Lovochkin on a doc­u­ment alone is not enough for us to draw an con­clu­sion.”

    Nation­al Anti-Cor­rup­tion Bureau of Ukraine spokes­woman Dary­na Manzhu­ra did not reply to repeat­ed requests for com­ment.

    NABU, which con­firmed that Man­afort fig­ured into an inves­ti­ga­tion into Par­ty of Regions “black account­ing” before the 2016 U.S. pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, issued a state­ment in May 2018 say­ing that it “is not autho­rized to con­duct an offi­cial inves­ti­ga­tion into Paul Manafort’s involve­ment in receiv­ing funds from the Par­ty of Regions.”

    Gor­batyuk, the for­mer spe­cial inves­ti­ga­tions pros­e­cu­tor, doubt­ed that any inves­ti­ga­tion would reach a con­clu­sion.

    “Even if a crim­i­nal case is reg­is­tered, that doesn’t mean that it will actu­al­ly be inves­ti­gat­ed,” he said. When asked what the like­li­hood of a real case would be based on the alle­ga­tions, he replied, “low.”

    ———-

    “Dirty Mon­ey: Man­afort tri­al expos­es seedy real­i­ties of Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics” by Josh Koven­sky; Kyiv Post; 08/10/2018

    “Gates tes­ti­fied to a scheme that saw six Ukrain­ian oli­garchs and politi­cians — Lovochkin, Akhme­tov, Sergey Tigip­ko, Borys Kolesnikov, Vic­tor Pinchuk and Andriy Klyuyev — pay Man­afort mil­lions of dol­lars through Cyprus-locat­ed off­shores in exchange for “build­ing the Par­ty of Regions.””

    It was­n’t just Akhme­tov and Lovochkin behind the Haps­burg Group lob­by­ing effort. Oli­garchs like Sergey Tigip­ko, Borys Kolesnikov, Andriy Klyuyev, and Vic­tor Pinchuk were also involved in the financ­ing and plan­ning of the effort. That was all part of Rick Gates’s tes­ti­mo­ny, in addi­tion to Gates con­firm­ing that Vladimir Sivkovych worked at the Kyiv office of Davis Man­afort:

    ...
    Gates takes the stand

    Gates joined Man­afort in Ukraine in 2007, help­ing to rebuild the Par­ty of Regions as a polit­i­cal force after its dis­as­trous fall in 2004, when the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion and the Ukrain­ian Supreme Court can­celled a rigged pres­i­den­tial elec­tion in Yanukovych’s favor that year. In a revote on Dec. 26, 2004, Vik­tor Yushchenko won the pres­i­den­cy.

    ...

    Manafort’s com­pa­ny — DMP Inter­na­tion­al — brought on a team of around a dozen peo­ple for the Par­ty of Regions con­tracts. That includ­ed Phil Grif­fin and Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, a for­mer Russ­ian mil­i­tary intel­li­gence (GRU) offi­cer who worked as Manafort’s trans­la­tor.

    Gates also tes­ti­fied that Vladimir Sivkovych, a for­mer Ukrain­ian politi­co, also worked at DMP’s Kyiv office.

    Sivkovych fled to Moscow amid accu­sa­tions that he orga­nized a vio­lent dis­per­sal of Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion pro­test­ers on Nov. 30, 2013.
    ...

    Lovochkin paid for the bulk of Gates’s and Man­afort’s work­ing for the Par­ty of Region from 2010–2013, with ~$42 mil­lion going to him dur­ing this peri­od from Lovochk­in’s off­shore enti­ties. Anoth­er $5 mil­lion was paid to man­afort in 2014 fol­low­ing the Maid­an protests for Man­afort’s work in form­ing the new Oppo­si­tion Bloc:

    ...
    Lovochkin

    Gates said that Lovochkin, the for­mer head of the Yanukovych’s Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, played the largest role in pay­ing Man­afort.

    U.S. gov­ern­ment exhibits show off­shores linked to Lovochkin fun­nelling $42,042,307 to Man­afort from 2010 to 2013. — around two-thirds of the total that Man­afort is doc­u­ment­ed to have received for his Par­ty of Regions work.

    Gates tes­ti­fied that Akhme­tov and Lovochkin part­nered after the 2014 Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion to finance the cre­ation of Oppo­si­tion Bloc, for which Man­afort was paid an addi­tion­al $5 mil­lion.
    ...

    Sergey Tigip­ko appears to be the oli­garch who actu­al­ly financed the Haps­burg Group efforst, using a Cyprus firm he alleged­ly con­trolled, Dresler Hold­ings:

    ...
    Tigip­ko

    Tigip­ko, for exam­ple, was tasked with financ­ing the Par­ty of Regions’ lob­by­ing efforts for the Euro­pean Union and the U.S., Gates tes­ti­fied, through a Cyprus firm he con­trolled called Dresler Hold­ings.

    Gov­ern­ment exhibits show Dresler pay­ing an off­shore con­trolled by Man­afort $5.3 mil­lion in 2012.
    ...

    Borys Kolesnikov advised Man­afort on how to use the Cypri­ot pay­ment struc­ture, and also appears to have paid Man­afort $8.7 mil­lion from 2010–2013:

    ...
    Kolesnikov

    Borys Kolesnikov, Ukraine’s for­mer infra­struc­ture min­is­ter, appears in tes­ti­mo­ny and state­ments from pros­e­cu­tors as ini­tial­ly advis­ing Man­afort and Gates to use the Cypri­ot pay­ment struc­ture.

    In sum, gov­ern­ment exhibits show Kolesnikov pay­ing $8,716,184 to Man­afort between 2010 and 2013 through a series of Cypri­ot off­shores.
    ...

    Andriy Klyuyev financed Man­afort’s polling work and oth­er pay­ments for “polit­i­cal cam­paigns” for the Par­ty of Regions, pay­ing Man­afort $4.1 mil­lion. It’s a reminder that Man­afort must have a pret­ty top notch polling oper­a­tion in Ukraine, which is worth keep­ing in mind giv­en that the pass­ing of polling infor­ma­tion to Man­afort’s Ukrain­ian clients is now part of the #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion. It would be inter­est­ing to know how well-staffed that polling oper­a­tion was in the spring of 2016 after Man­afort joined the Trump cam­paign:

    ...
    Klyuyev

    Andriy Klyuyev, a for­mer sec­re­tary of Ukraine’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil and the brief, final head of Yanukovych’s Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, appears in Gates’ tes­ti­mo­ny as well.

    Gates told the jury that Klyuyev was respon­si­ble for financ­ing “polling work” as well as “polit­i­cal cam­paigns” for the Par­ty of Regions. Gov­ern­ment exhibits show pay­ments of $4,190,111 for the work, through a com­pa­ny called Novirex Sales LLP.
    ...

    And then there’ Vic­tor Pinchuk, who sits on the advi­so­ry board of the Atlantic Coun­cil. Pinchuk paid Man­afort $5 mil­lion, although it’s unclear what ser­vices were ren­dered for that mon­ey:

    ...
    Pinchuk

    Pros­e­cu­tors, sup­port­ed by tes­ti­mo­ny from Gates, said that Man­afort received $5 mil­lion from bil­lion­aire oli­garch Pinchuk through a Cypri­ot com­pa­ny called Ply­mouth Con­sul­tants Lim­it­ed.

    Pinchuk has eked out a role for him­self as a savvy posi­tion­er in Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics. He mar­ried the daugh­ter of for­mer Pres­i­dent Leonid Kuch­ma, and found ways to chan­nel mon­ey to both can­di­dates before the 2016 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion.

    Gates tes­ti­fied that the mon­ey came for work on a “legal project.”
    ...

    So that’s a more expan­sive look at who Man­afort was work­ing with on the Haps­burg Group efforts. Inter­est­ing­ly, when those efforts failed, result­ing in the Maid­an protests (pos­si­bly sparked by Man­afort) and the col­lapse of the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment, Man­afort offered to work for Petro Poroshenko’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign in 2014. In one sense, tt’s quite a turn of events. But when viewed in the con­text of the Haps­burg Group, it’s a very log­i­cal turn of events:

    ...
    Cyprus cash, Kyiv spin

    After Yanukovych fled to Rus­sia amid the 2014 Euro­Maid­an Rev­o­lu­tion, Man­afort was left with­out clients.

    He appar­ent­ly began to scram­ble for new work to cov­er cash short­falls left by a life of lux­u­ry. At one point, he turned towards the fledg­ling cam­paign of cur­rent Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko.

    Bloc Petro Poroshenko mem­ber of par­lia­ment Ihor Hryniv told Ukrain­ian media that Man­afort had “tried to offer his ser­vices,” but that the engage­ment involved noth­ing more than a “three-hour con­ver­sa­tion.”
    ...

    Poroshenko did­n’t end up tak­ing Man­afort up on his offer, so Man­afort went back to work­ing on the cre­ation of the new Oppo­si­tion Bloc for Akhme­tov and Lovochkin. And it was around this time, in the sum­mer of 2014, that the FBI’s inves­ti­ga­tion into the assets alleged­ly stolen by Yanukovych led the FBI to ques­tion Gates and Man­afort about the Cyprus mon­ey-laun­der­ing to finance the Haps­burg Group. Gates tes­ti­fied that he and Man­afort told the FBI all about this, but the inves­ti­ga­tion was dropped until 2017:

    ...
    Man­afort end­ed up work­ing for Oppo­si­tion Bloc in 2014, cor­re­spond­ing with both Akhme­tov and Lovochkin over strat­e­gy for the par­ty. In many ways, it was a repeat of Manafort’s posi­tion 10 years before, when Akhme­tov asked him to build a polit­i­cal par­ty in the after­math of the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion.

    But this time the FBI had begun to take a look.

    In the sum­mer of 2014, amid an FBI probe into assets alleged­ly stolen by Yanukovych, Gates flew to France to “noti­fy” Lovochkin that he and Man­afort would meet with inves­ti­ga­tors. Gates tes­ti­fied that he want­ed to receive more infor­ma­tion about the Cyprus pay­ment struc­tures before the FBI inter­view took place.

    Gates said that he and Man­afort told FBI agents about some of the Cyprus accounts and off­shores used in the pay­ment schemes.

    And inex­plic­a­bly, the alle­ga­tions — and admis­sions — that Man­afort and Gates made to U.S. inves­ti­ga­tors went untouched until 2017.
    ...

    So that’s all part of what we know about the fig­ures behind Man­afort’s work in Ukraine and the Haps­burg Group lob­by­ing effort. Vladimir Sivkovych, one of the two main sus­pects in order­ing the attacks on the pro­tes­tors in 2013, actu­al­ly worked at the Man­afort Davis Kyiv office. And fig­ures like Vic­tor Pinchuk, a mem­ber of the Atlantic Coun­cil advi­so­ry board, paid Man­afort at least $5 mil­lion for ser­vices. Two facts that have becom­ing increas­ing­ly rel­e­vant to under­stand­ing the nature of the rela­tion­ship between Man­afort, Lovochk­ing, Akhme­tov, and the pos­si­ble rea­sons for Man­afort’s shar­ing of US polling data with them in the spring of 2016.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | January 12, 2019, 4:48 pm
  14. There was a recent piece in the New York Times about the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion look­ing into the sur­pris­ing num­ber of Ukraini­ans who end­ed up end­ed the Trump inau­gu­ra­tion. As we should expect, the inves­ti­ga­tion also includes a num­ber of ques­tions about basic crim­i­nal­i­ty in how the Trump inau­gu­ra­tion fund was oper­at­ed. Did the Trump Org self-enrich by rent­ing its own prop­er­ties and ser­vices at inflat­ed prices? Was the inau­gu­ra­tion fund accept­ing mon­ey from for­eign­ers? Did it accept secret dona­tions? Those are some of the ques­tions inves­ti­ga­tors are report­ed­ly ask­ing.

    Part of what makes this par­tic­u­lar angle of the #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion poten­tial­ly very explo­sive is that Ivan­ka Trump might be impli­cat­ed in the deci­sion to over­charge the inau­gu­ra­tion fund for the use of Trump prop­er­ties and ser­vices. It’s the kind of crime that is large­ly inde­pen­dent of any ques­tions of for­eign col­lu­sion, so it’s sort of ‘low hang­ing fruit’ legal­ly. How will Trump respond to ‘low hang­ing’ legal fruit that might impli­cate Ivan­ka? We’ll see, but it’s not like Don Jr. is poten­tial­ly in trou­ble here. This is Ivan­ka.

    Anoth­er part of this sto­ry that should be poten­tial­ly quite explo­sive is the fact that the Ukraini­ans who were in atten­dance that the inau­gur­al par­ties are the same Ukraini­ans we’ve seen who don’t appear to be Krem­lin cronies but quite the oppo­site.

    Andrei Arte­menko is one of the Ukrain­ian fig­ures who was in Wash­ing­ton dur­ing the inau­gu­ra­tion. He claims he did­n’t attend any of the inau­gur­al fes­tiv­i­ties and instead met with Repub­li­cans to dis­cuss his peace plan. Recall how Arte­menko helped found the vir­u­lent­ly anti-Russ­ian neo-Nazi Right Sec­tor par­ty. For­eign Pol­i­cy described Arte­menko as “Tall and brawny, Arte­menko is a pop­ulist politi­cian with ties to the far-right Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary-polit­i­cal group “Right Sec­tor” and a mem­ber of the pro-West­ern oppo­si­tion par­lia­men­tary coali­tion led by for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Yulia Tymoshenko’s par­ty. In Kiev, he’s known for being out­spo­ken and polit­i­cal­ly ambi­tious.” Also recall how the mid­dle-man who intro­duced Arte­menko to Felix Sater and Michael Cohen was Alexan­der Oronov, Michael Cohen’s broth­er’s father-in-law, Alexan­der Oronov, was a Ukrain­ian oli­garch who co-owned an ethanol com­pa­ny with Vik­tor Topolov. Topolov and Arte­menko are close asso­ciates. And that “peace plan” he was nego­ti­at­ing with Felix Sater and Michael Cohen includ­ed a scheme for upgrad­ing Ukraine’s nuclear pow­er plants to ween Ukraine off of Russ­ian elec­tric­i­ty, with the goal of dis­con­nect­ing Ukraine from Rus­si­a’s pow­er grid by 2025. It’s typ­i­cal­ly called a “pro-Russ­ian” peace plan because it would have involved the lift­ing of sanc­tions, as is the case in the New York Times arti­cle below, which ignores the fact that any peace plan, whether or came from pro-Russ­ian or pro-EU forces, would involve the lift­ing of sanc­tions. Because of course that would be part of it. Oth­er­wise it would­n’t be much of a peace plan.

    Anoth­er Ukrain­ian oli­garch at the inau­gu­ra­tion was Ser­hiy Lyovochkin (Lovochkin/Lyvochkin), the for­mer chief of staff of Vik­tor Yanukovych. Recall how Lyovochkin was Paul Man­afort’s key part­ner in financ­ing and orches­trat­ing the ‘Haps­burg Group’ lob­by­ing effort, which hap­pened to be an effort to pull Ukraine out of the Krem­lin’s orbit and towards the EU by over­com­ing EU and US oppo­si­tion to Ukraine join­ing the EU Trade Asso­ci­a­tion agree­ment. Also recall how Lyovochkin and Man­afort are the two key sus­pects of being behind the orders for the Berkut to vio­lent­ly crack­down and sweep away the pro­tes­tors who gath­ered fol­low­ing the col­lapse of the EU Trade Asso­ci­a­tion talks in Decem­ber of 2013. Lyovoshk­in’s tele­vi­sion sta­tion gave the pro­tes­tors exten­sive and very sym­pa­thet­ic cov­er­age, help­ing to spark the broad­er Maid­an protests that cul­mi­nat­ed the in sniper attacks and the col­lapse of the Yanukoych gov­ern­ment in Feb­ru­ary of 2014.Lyovochkin was rumored to have con­sid­ered resign­ing around this time and was fired by Yanukovitch in Jan­u­ary 2014.

    So, despite the fre­quent media char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of Lyovochkin as ‘pro-Russ­ian’, he’s clear­ly a pro-EU Ukrain­ian oli­garch and he’s one of the atten­dees of the Trump inau­gur­al Lib­er­ty Ball that inves­ti­ga­tors are look­ing into. That includes look­ing into pos­si­ble cam­paign finance mon­ey-laun­der­ing crimes.

    And don’t for­get about that recent report about Paul Man­afort hand­ing US polling data off to Kil­imnik in the spring of 2016. It was ini­tial­ly report­ed that Man­afort asked Kil­imnik to hand that data off to Krem­lin oli­garch Oleg Deri­pas­ka but that was lat­er cor­rect­ed when it was revealed that Man­afort had actu­al­ly asked Kil­imnik to hand the polling data off to Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov.

    Relat­ed to Lyovochk­in’s atten­dance at these inau­gur­al events is the sto­ry about GOP con­sul­tant Sam Pat­ten plead­ing guilty to fun­nel­ing $50,000 to the Trump inau­gur­al fund using an Amer­i­can straw buy­er for four tick­ets. And it was Lyovochkin who paid for the four tick­ets. That’s how he attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball. The oth­er three tick­ets were giv­en to Kil­imnik, Pat­ten, and an unknown Ukrain­ian. Pat­ten formed a con­sult­ing com­pa­ny in the US with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik. Both Pat­ten and Kil­imnik had pre­vi­ous­ly worked for the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute. It was through this con­sult­ing com­pa­ny that Pat­ten pro­vid­ed ser­vices to Lovochkin that he didn’t dis­close, hence the FARA vio­la­tion charge. Pat­ten also worked at Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca and SCL and played a cen­tral role in SCL’s 2015 work the Niger­ian gov­ern­ment that involved obtain­ing hacked doc­u­ments. So Sam Pat­ten is like a GOP dirty tricks spe­cial­ist who was also a spe­cial­ist at work­ing with Ukrain­ian oli­garchs, mak­ing him per­fect for a task like set­ting up a straw buy­er to get Lyovochkin, Kil­imnik, and Pat­ten him­self tick­ets to the inau­gur­al events.

    One of the oth­er Ukrain­ian oli­garchs who attend­ed the inau­gur­al events that inves­ti­ga­tors are look­ing into is Pavel Fuks (Fuchs). Recall how Fuks and is the Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian oli­garch who as a Moscow prop­er­ty devel­op­er and was involved with one of Trump’s ear­li­er attempts to build a Trump Tow­er Moscow back in 2008. He relo­cat­ed to Ukraine in 2017 and has been sanc­tioned by Rus­sia. Fuchs is quite close to the may­or of Kharkiv, Gen­nady Kernes. In May of 2017, Rudolph Giu­liani was hired by the city of Khar­viv to do some sort of cyber­se­cu­ri­ty work for the city through his com­pa­ny Giu­liani Secu­ri­ty. Giu­liani was also work­ing on cre­at­ing “a U.S. office for sup­port­ing invest­ment in the city.”

    As the New York Times arti­cle below points out, Fuks stayed at Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel and spent time with Vitaliy Kho­mu­tyn­nik, a Ukrain­ian MP and wealthy busi­ness­man. Kho­mu­tyn­nik had been a Par­ty of Regions mem­ber until Feb­ru­ary 21, 2014, when 28 Par­ty of Regions mem­bers left the par­ty after two days of sniper attacks at the Maid­an. That group of Par­ty of Regions mem­bers that left in the days fol­low­ing the sniper vio­lence cre­at­ed the Revival (Vidrodzhen­nia) par­ty and Kho­mu­tyn­nik became its leader. These Revival par­ty mem­bers were described by one expert as a group of oli­garchs aligned with Ihor Kolo­moisky, a pow­er­ful Ukrain­ian oli­garch who fun­der of the vol­un­teer bat­tal­ions includ­ing the Azov bat­tal­ion. So nei­ther Fuks nor Kohmu­tyn­nik appear to be par­tic­u­lar­ly Krem­lin-aligned these days. Accord­ing the New York Times arti­cle below, Fuks and Kho­mu­tyn­nik talked with Repub­li­can Rep­re­sen­ta­tives Kevin McCarthy and Ed Royce dur­ing the inau­gu­ra­tion. McCarthy was the Major­i­ty Leader at the time and Royce was head of the House For­eign Affairs com­mit­tee.

    The New York Times arti­cle below lists a pair of Ukrain­ian oli­garch who haven’t real­ly shown up in any of the pre­vi­ous #TrumpRus­sia-relat­ed sto­ries: Ser­hiy Kival­ov and Borislav Bereza. Both attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball, but would­n’t say how they got their tick­ets. Bereza claimed he got his tick­ets free from some­one “con­nect­ed to Illi­nois,” though he said, “I don’t remem­ber for sure.”

    Kival­ov is a for­mer Par­ty of Regions par­lia­men­tary mem­ber who is now part of the Oppo­si­tion Bloc. Kival­ov is known for head­ing the 2004 elec­tions com­mis­sion that ini­tial­ly declared Vik­tor Yanukovych the win­ner of that elec­tion over Vik­tor Yuschenko, lead­ing to the Orange Rev­o­lu­tion protests. Kival­ov is also known for spon­sor­ing a 2012 law that made the Russ­ian lan­guage (and 18 oth­er region­al lan­guages) offi­cial lan­guages in the Ukrain­ian states where a large enough por­tion of the pop­u­lace speaks those lan­guages. Kival­ov tout­ed the law as being in keep­ing with the EU’s ded­i­ca­tion to sup­port­ing minor­i­ty rights. So Kival­ov is clear­ly in the Par­ty of Regions/Opposition Bloc camp. But as fig­ures like Lyovochkin, Fuks, and Kohmu­tyn­nik make clear, that camp has a pro-EU fac­tion and it was this fac­tion that was well-rep­re­sent­ed at the inau­gur­al events. Is Kival­ov also part of that fac­tion? That’s unclear at this point, but it’s quite notable that vir­tu­al­ly all of the oth­er Ukrain­ian politi­cians at the inau­gur­al events that we know of at this point were appear to be of the pro-EU vari­ety. Of course, as we’ll see in the New York Times arti­cle, they are all described as “pro-Russ­ian”, gen­er­al­ly by ref­er­enc­ing their past asso­ci­a­tions with the Par­ty of Regions, as is the unfor­tu­nate norm across the media in the cov­er­age of this sto­ry.

    Borislav Bereza is a Ukrain­ian mem­ber of par­lia­ment as an inde­pen­dent can­di­date and a for­mer spokesper­son for Right Sec­tor. He’s also Ortho­dox Jew­ish which is remark­able giv­en how filled that par­ty is with neo-Nazis, but that might explain why he was cho­sen as the group’s spokesper­son because he’s per­fect for white­wash­ing the nature of the group. There’s a fas­ci­nat­ing 2014 inter­view of Bereza in Tablet mag­a­zine where he simul­ta­ne­ous­ly asserts that Right Sec­tor itself isn’t the far right big­ot­ed it’s por­trayed as being but is instead a cross-sec­tion of Ukrain­ian soci­ety at the same time he acknowl­edges that the par­ty is filled with anti-Semi­tes and homo­phobes (that’s quite a cross-sec­tion). So Bereza, like Arte­menko, is pret­ty clear­ly a far right politi­cian asso­ci­at­ed with one of the most anti-Russ­ian par­ties in Ukraine, albeit an unusu­al one. Bereza char­ac­ter­ized the ball as “a place where, over a glass of cham­pagne, you are intro­duced to peo­ple who have influ­ence in the new admin­is­tra­tion of the White House. These are the tra­di­tions of the Unit­ed States,” on Face­book. He also attrib­uted the claims about Ukraini­ans’ pay­ing for tick­ets to jeal­ousy from those who were not invit­ed in response to Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko accus­ing rivals of pay­ing as much as $200,000 for inau­gur­al tick­ets.

    So that’s what we know about the Ukraini­ans that inves­ti­ga­tors are look­ing into regard­ing Trump inau­gur­al actions. But before we get that New York Times arti­cle, here’s a look at a ProP­ub­li­ca report from last month that describes anoth­er key area of inquiry by inves­ti­ga­tors: whether or not there were cam­paign finance mon­ey-laun­der­ing crimes com­mit­ted by the Trump team in order to both self-enrich off of the record amounts of mon­ey that was flow­ing into the Trump inau­gur­al fund and hide the full scope of the dona­tions that were pour­ing in.

    The pos­si­ble crimes also include obscur­ing for­eign dona­tions. Obscur­ing for­eign mon­ey flow­ing into the inau­gur­al fund is, of course, exact­ly what Sam Pat­ten engaged in when he set up an Amer­i­can straw buy­er to pur­chase four tick­ets to the Lib­er­ty Ball using $50,000 of Lyovochk­in’s mon­ey. But as the fol­low­ing arti­cle describes, the poten­tial for for­eign mon­ey secret­ly flow­ing into the inau­gur­al funds looks to be poten­tial­ly much more exten­sive and Rick Gates, Paul Man­afort’s long-time con­sult­ing part­ner in Ukraine and the deputy to the chair­man of the inau­gur­al, appeared to be play­ing a key role. Accord­ing to some ven­dors pro­vid­ing ser­vices for the inau­gu­ra­tion, Gates was ask­ing donors to make dona­tions direct­ly to the ven­dors. The expla­na­tion Gates gave to these ven­dors was that the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee had received more mon­ey than was ini­tial­ly tar­get­ed, and, there­fore, he wished to reduce the pub­licly report­ed sum raised. So Rick Gates, who worked hand in glove with Man­afort dur­ing Man­fort’s time in Ukraine, was also set­ting up an inau­gur­al dona­tion back chan­nel in order to hide dona­tions. So in addi­tion to Amer­i­can straw buy­ers, we know there was a poten­tial back chan­nel avail­able for mak­ing effec­tive­ly secret dona­tions to the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    As the ProP­ub­li­ca report also points out, the ques­tion of whether or not the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion was self-enrich­ing by over­charg­ing for fees and ser­vices (fees like charg­ing exor­bi­tant prices for rent­ing Trump’s prop­er­ties where the events were held and over­pay­ing for Trump Org staffers involved with the event) could become a true legal night­mare for Pres­i­dent Trump. Why? Because Ivan­ka Trump might be at the cen­ter of those self-enrich­ment deci­sions. So while many of the ques­tions swirling around the Trump inau­gu­ra­tion and the Ukrain­ian lob­by­ing effort that appeared to be tak­ing place are the kinds of ques­tions that Trump him­self might not fear too much because the answers point in the direc­tion of Man­afort’s work with the pro-EU fac­tion of Ukraini­ans, we still should­n’t be too sur­prised if Trump starts act­ing extra insane as the inves­ti­ga­tion into the inau­gu­ra­tion plays out giv­en the Ivan­ka angle and the fact that Rick Gates appar­ent­ly led the scheme to hide dona­tions and he’s now a coop­er­at­ing wit­ness:

    ProP­ub­li­ca

    Trump’s Inau­gu­ra­tion Paid Trump’s Com­pa­ny — With Ivan­ka in the Mid­dle
    As the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee planned the land­mark cel­e­bra­tion, inter­nal con­cerns were raised about whether Trump’s Wash­ing­ton hotel was over­charg­ing for event space. The spend­ing could be a vio­la­tion of the law.

    by Ilya Mar­ritz, WNYC, and Justin Elliott
    Dec. 14, 2018, 1:19 p.m. EST

    When it came out this year that Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s inau­gur­al com­mit­tee raised and spent unprece­dent­ed amounts, peo­ple won­dered where all that mon­ey went.

    It turns out one ben­e­fi­cia­ry was Trump him­self.

    The inau­gu­ra­tion paid the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion for rooms, meals and event space at the company’s Wash­ing­ton hotel, accord­ing to inter­views as well as inter­nal emails and receipts reviewed by WNYC and ProP­ub­li­ca.

    Dur­ing the plan­ning, Ivan­ka Trump, the president-elect’s eldest daugh­ter and a senior exec­u­tive with the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion, was involved in nego­ti­at­ing the price the hotel charged the 58th Pres­i­den­tial Inau­gur­al Com­mit­tee for venue rentals. A top inau­gur­al plan­ner emailed Ivan­ka and oth­ers at the com­pa­ny to “express my con­cern” that the hotel was over­charg­ing for its event spaces, wor­ry­ing of what would hap­pen “when this is audit­ed.”

    If the Trump hotel charged more than the going rate for the venues, it could vio­late tax law. The inau­gur­al committee’s pay­ments to the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion and Ivan­ka Trump’s role have not been pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed or dis­closed in pub­lic fil­ings.

    “The fact that the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee did busi­ness with the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion rais­es huge eth­i­cal ques­tions about the poten­tial for undue enrich­ment,” said Mar­cus Owens, the for­mer head of the divi­sion of the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice that over­sees non­prof­its.

    Inau­gur­al work­ers had oth­er mis­giv­ings. Rick Gates, then the deputy to the chair­man of the inau­gur­al, asked some ven­dors to take pay­ments direct­ly from donors, rather than through the com­mit­tee, accord­ing to two peo­ple with direct knowl­edge. The ven­dors felt the request was unusu­al and con­cern­ing, accord­ing to these peo­ple, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because they signed con­fi­den­tial­i­ty agree­ments. It is not clear whether any ven­dors took him up on his request.

    The rev­e­la­tions about the inauguration’s finances show how Trump blurred the lines between his polit­i­cal and busi­ness lives, as the real estate mogul ascend­ed to the pres­i­den­cy.

    On Thurs­day, The Wall Street Jour­nal report­ed that fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in New York have opened a crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion into whether the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee mis­spent mon­ey and whether donors gave in return for polit­i­cal favors, cit­ing peo­ple famil­iar with the mat­ter. In addi­tion, The New York Times report­ed that pros­e­cu­tors are exam­in­ing whether for­eign­ers ille­gal­ly fun­nelled mon­ey to the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    ...

    Trump’s 2017 inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee, which was chaired by his friend the busi­ness­man Tom Bar­rack, raised near­ly $107 mil­lion from donors includ­ing the casi­no mag­nate Shel­don Adel­son and AT&T. The Jan­u­ary 2017 fes­tiv­i­ties cost almost twice Pres­i­dent Obama’s 2009 inau­gu­ra­tion, pre­vi­ous­ly the most expen­sive. The non­prof­it that planned Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion booked many spaces in the Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel, locat­ed in the Old Post Office build­ing near the White House, includ­ing a ball­room, hotel rooms and work spaces, as well as pay­ing for meals there, accord­ing to sev­er­al peo­ple who worked on the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    How the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee man­aged to spend all the mon­ey it raised remains a mys­tery, near­ly two years after the event. While groups that sup­port polit­i­cal can­di­dates or issues must pub­licly detail their spend­ing, an inau­gur­al com­mit­tee is required to list only its top five con­trac­tors. That leaves about $40 mil­lion unac­count­ed for.

    ...

    If the Trump hotel charged the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee above-mar­ket rates, it could vio­late tax rules, accord­ing to Owens, the non­prof­it tax expert who is now a part­ner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb.

    If a per­son with “sub­stan­tial influ­ence” over a non­prof­it group charges the group above-mar­ket rates in a trans­ac­tion with their out­side busi­ness, the IRS can impose steep fines. In this case, Don­ald Trump could qual­i­fy as a per­son with such influ­ence. Should the tax agency find that a vio­la­tion occurred, the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion would have to refund any over­charge and the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee would be hit with a 25 per­cent tax on the mon­ey, Owens said.

    Owens added that IRS audits of non­prof­its are increas­ing­ly rare. Since the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee was incor­po­rat­ed in Vir­ginia, the state attor­ney gen­er­al there could also have stand­ing to inves­ti­gate its oper­a­tions.

    ...

    The inau­gur­al com­mit­tee spent mon­ey at the Trump Inter­na­tion­al in Wash­ing­ton in oth­er ways as well. Many work­ers came from Cal­i­for­nia and New York and stayed at the hotel, eat­ing their meals there and hold­ing meet­ings. Receipts reviewed by WNYC and ProP­ub­li­ca show they typ­i­cal­ly paid about $350 a night. Accord­ing to an inau­gur­al work­er, 15 to 20 inau­gur­al work­ers stayed at the hotel most nights for rough­ly a month in the run-up to the inau­gu­ra­tion, at a total cost of what could be more than $200,000.

    ...

    The day before Trump’s swear­ing in, the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee host­ed a Lead­er­ship Lun­cheon in the hotel’s Pres­i­den­tial Ball­room, fea­tur­ing his cab­i­net nom­i­nees and major donors. “This is a gor­geous room,” the pres­i­dent-elect told the crowd. “A total genius must have built this place.” And the night of the inau­gu­ra­tion itself, Trump’s fam­i­ly and close allies such as Sean Han­ni­ty cel­e­brat­ed into the ear­ly morn­ing at an exclu­sive after-par­ty in the Trump hotel’s grand lob­by. Thou­sands of red, white and blue bal­loons were released from the rafters.

    Some ven­dors for the inau­gu­ra­tion became con­cerned when Gates, a top inau­gur­al com­mit­tee offi­cial, asked them to take pay­ments out­side of the nor­mal com­mit­tee invoic­ing process, accord­ing to two peo­ple with knowl­edge of what hap­pened. He pro­posed that they be paid for their work direct­ly from a would-be donor rather than by the com­mit­tee. Gates told the ven­dors that the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee had received pledges of more mon­ey than was ini­tial­ly tar­get­ed, and, there­fore, he wished to reduce the pub­licly report­ed sum raised.

    ...

    In a sep­a­rate episode this year, a U.S. lob­by­ist plead­ed guilty to help­ing a Ukrain­ian busi­ness­man and mem­ber of Par­lia­ment buy tick­ets to the inau­gu­ra­tion, in vio­la­tion of rules bar­ring the com­mit­tee from tak­ing for­eign mon­ey. The inau­gur­al com­mit­tee was not accused of wrong­do­ing in that case.

    ———-

    “Trump’s Inau­gu­ra­tion Paid Trump’s Com­pa­ny — With Ivan­ka in the Mid­dle” by Ilya Mar­ritz, WNYC, and Justin Elliott; ProP­ub­li­ca; 12/14/2018

    “The inau­gu­ra­tion paid the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion for rooms, meals and event space at the company’s Wash­ing­ton hotel, accord­ing to inter­views as well as inter­nal emails and receipts reviewed by WNYC and ProP­ub­li­ca.”

    Imag­ine that: Hav­ing the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion run the inau­gu­ra­tion turned out to be a giant cor­rupt mess. And Ivan­ka appears to be at the cen­ter of the ques­tions involv­ing the Trump Org’s self-enrich­ment. But there’s also the ques­tion of for­eign donors ille­gal­ly fun­nel­ing mon­ey into the inau­gu­ra­tion. It’s a mul­ti-faceted cor­rupt mess:

    ...
    Dur­ing the plan­ning, Ivan­ka Trump, the president-elect’s eldest daugh­ter and a senior exec­u­tive with the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion, was involved in nego­ti­at­ing the price the hotel charged the 58th Pres­i­den­tial Inau­gur­al Com­mit­tee for venue rentals. A top inau­gur­al plan­ner emailed Ivan­ka and oth­ers at the com­pa­ny to “express my con­cern” that the hotel was over­charg­ing for its event spaces, wor­ry­ing of what would hap­pen “when this is audit­ed.”

    If the Trump hotel charged more than the going rate for the venues, it could vio­late tax law. The inau­gur­al committee’s pay­ments to the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion and Ivan­ka Trump’s role have not been pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed or dis­closed in pub­lic fil­ings.

    ...

    On Thurs­day, The Wall Street Jour­nal report­ed that fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in New York have opened a crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion into whether the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee mis­spent mon­ey and whether donors gave in return for polit­i­cal favors, cit­ing peo­ple famil­iar with the mat­ter. In addi­tion, The New York Times report­ed that pros­e­cu­tors are exam­in­ing whether for­eign­ers ille­gal­ly fun­nelled mon­ey to the inau­gu­ra­tion.
    ...

    And it was none oth­er than coop­er­at­ing wit­ness Rick Gates who appears to be lead­ing the efforts to secret­ly direct dona­tions into inau­gu­ra­tion. Gate’s strat­e­gy was sim­ple: have the donor direct­ly pay the ven­dors. But there’s a prob­lem with that plan: the ven­dors now know about it. And some of them are talk­ing:

    ...
    “The fact that the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee did busi­ness with the Trump Orga­ni­za­tion rais­es huge eth­i­cal ques­tions about the poten­tial for undue enrich­ment,” said Mar­cus Owens, the for­mer head of the divi­sion of the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice that over­sees non­prof­its.

    Inau­gur­al work­ers had oth­er mis­giv­ings. Rick Gates, then the deputy to the chair­man of the inau­gur­al, asked some ven­dors to take pay­ments direct­ly from donors, rather than through the com­mit­tee, accord­ing to two peo­ple with direct knowl­edge. The ven­dors felt the request was unusu­al and con­cern­ing, accord­ing to these peo­ple, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because they signed con­fi­den­tial­i­ty agree­ments. It is not clear whether any ven­dors took him up on his request.

    ...

    Some ven­dors for the inau­gu­ra­tion became con­cerned when Gates, a top inau­gur­al com­mit­tee offi­cial, asked them to take pay­ments out­side of the nor­mal com­mit­tee invoic­ing process, accord­ing to two peo­ple with knowl­edge of what hap­pened. He pro­posed that they be paid for their work direct­ly from a would-be donor rather than by the com­mit­tee. Gates told the ven­dors that the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee had received pledges of more mon­ey than was ini­tial­ly tar­get­ed, and, there­fore, he wished to reduce the pub­licly report­ed sum raised.
    ...

    So how much mon­ey was secret­ly donat­ing to the inau­gur­al funds and secret­ly embez­zled by the Trump Org? We don’t know. But of the record $107 mil­lion in report­ed dona­tions, $40 mil­lion remains unac­count­ed for:

    ...
    Trump’s 2017 inau­gu­ra­tion com­mit­tee, which was chaired by his friend the busi­ness­man Tom Bar­rack, raised near­ly $107 mil­lion from donors includ­ing the casi­no mag­nate Shel­don Adel­son and AT&T. The Jan­u­ary 2017 fes­tiv­i­ties cost almost twice Pres­i­dent Obama’s 2009 inau­gu­ra­tion, pre­vi­ous­ly the most expen­sive. The non­prof­it that planned Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion booked many spaces in the Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel, locat­ed in the Old Post Office build­ing near the White House, includ­ing a ball­room, hotel rooms and work spaces, as well as pay­ing for meals there, accord­ing to sev­er­al peo­ple who worked on the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    How the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee man­aged to spend all the mon­ey it raised remains a mys­tery, near­ly two years after the event. While groups that sup­port polit­i­cal can­di­dates or issues must pub­licly detail their spend­ing, an inau­gur­al com­mit­tee is required to list only its top five con­trac­tors. That leaves about $40 mil­lion unac­count­ed for.
    ...

    And as the report notes, in a sep­a­rate, a U.S. lob­by­ist (Sam Pat­ten) plead­ed guilty to help­ing a Ukrain­ian busi­ness­man and mem­ber of Par­lia­ment (Ser­hei Lyovochkin) buy tick­ets to the inau­gu­ra­tion (tick­ets used by Pat­ten, Lyovochkin, Kil­imnik, and an still unknown Ukrain­ian to attend the Lib­er­ty Ball):

    ...
    In a sep­a­rate episode this year, a U.S. lob­by­ist plead­ed guilty to help­ing a Ukrain­ian busi­ness­man and mem­ber of Par­lia­ment buy tick­ets to the inau­gu­ra­tion, in vio­la­tion of rules bar­ring the com­mit­tee from tak­ing for­eign mon­ey. The inau­gur­al com­mit­tee was not accused of wrong­do­ing in that case.
    ...

    And as we’ve seen, when you pan out and look at the big­ger pic­ture, the case of Sam Pat­ten’s straw buy­ing isn’t real­ly a sep­a­rate episode. It’s all part of the larg­er ques­tion of the nature of the Ukrain­ian del­e­ga­tion that attend­ed the inau­gu­ra­tion and the role this pro-EU Ukrain­ian net­work may have played in the whole #TrumpRuss­ian 2016 cam­paign activ­i­ties.

    Now here’s the recent New York Times arti­cle that describes that pro-EU fac­tion of Ukraini­ans who attend­ed the inau­gu­ra­tion. Of course, they are all described as “pro-Russ­ian” Ukraini­ans despite all the evi­dence to the con­trary, so keep in mind all of the evi­dence to the con­trary that does­n’t get men­tioned:

    The New York Times

    Pros­e­cu­tors Exam­in­ing Ukraini­ans Who Flocked to Trump Inau­gur­al

    By Ken­neth P. Vogel, Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Iuli­ia Mendel

    Jan. 10, 2019

    WASHINGTON — Hours after he was sworn in as America’s 45th pres­i­dent, Don­ald J. Trump and his wife, Mela­nia, swayed togeth­er to a ren­di­tion of the Frank Sina­tra clas­sic “My Way,” as hun­dreds of their wealth­i­est and most influ­en­tial sup­port­ers held aloft smart­phones to cap­ture the Trumps’ first dance fol­low­ing the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    Ser­hiy Kival­ov, a Ukrain­ian law­mak­er known for pro-Russ­ian ini­tia­tives, took pho­tos of the dance, as well as of his cov­et­ed tick­ets and pass­es to the soiree where it took place, the Lib­er­ty Ball at the Wal­ter E. Wash­ing­ton Con­ven­tion Cen­ter, post­ing them on Face­book and declar­ing that “it was an hon­or” to attend.

    He was one of at least a dozen Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal and busi­ness fig­ures who made their way to Wash­ing­ton for the inau­gu­ra­tion, sev­er­al of whom attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball. Most had more on their dance cards than just par­ties.

    They attend­ed meet­ings and orches­trat­ed encoun­ters at Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel with influ­en­tial Repub­li­can mem­bers of Con­gress and close allies of Pres­i­dent Trump. Rep­re­sent­ing a range of views, includ­ing a con­tin­gent seen as sym­pa­thet­ic to Moscow, they posi­tioned them­selves as bro­kers who could help solve one of the thorni­est for­eign pol­i­cy prob­lems fac­ing the new admin­is­tra­tion — the ugly mil­i­tary stale­mate between Rus­sia and Ukraine and the tough sanc­tions imposed on Moscow fol­low­ing its seizure of Crimea.

    The tran­si­tion of pow­er in Wash­ing­ton attract­ed offi­cials and busi­ness exec­u­tives from around the world seek­ing entree and influ­ence with the new admin­is­tra­tion. While many par­ties and oth­er gath­er­ings dur­ing that peri­od were open to any­one, pack­ages for more exclu­sive events orga­nized by Mr. Trump’s pres­i­den­tial inau­gur­al com­mit­tee start­ed at $25,000 for two tick­ets to one of the offi­cial black tie balls and oth­er events, accord­ing to a brochure list­ing inau­gur­al com­mit­tee “under­writer ben­e­fits.”

    Evi­dence of the Ukraini­ans’ pres­ence even­tu­al­ly prompt­ed inter­est from the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III, as he inves­ti­gat­ed Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tion, and has spawned a num­ber of relat­ed inquiries by fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors. The inves­ti­ga­tions are play­ing out against grow­ing indi­ca­tions that some of the Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton for the inau­gur­al, or their allies, were pro­mot­ing grand bar­gains, or “peace” plans, that aligned with Russia’s inter­ests, includ­ing by lift­ing sanc­tions.

    Such a deal would not just have giv­en the new admin­is­tra­tion addi­tion­al flex­i­bil­i­ty to bring Moscow into Amer­i­can diplo­mat­ic efforts in the Mid­dle East, but could also have eased the way for a cast of char­ac­ters with ties to Mr. Trump — some of whom in turn had ties to the Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton — to move ahead on busi­ness deals that had been com­pli­cat­ed by the sanc­tions.

    ...

    As recent­ly as last month, pros­e­cu­tors were ask­ing wit­ness­es about ille­gal for­eign lob­by­ing relat­ed to Ukraine. Anoth­er sub­ject of ques­tions has been whether for­eign­ers from Ukraine and oth­er coun­tries used straw donors to dis­guise dona­tions to the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee. Fed­er­al law pro­hibits for­eign­ers from con­tribut­ing to an inau­gur­al com­mit­tee, although they can attend events if Amer­i­cans buy the tick­ets.

    Ele­ments of the inves­ti­ga­tions have got­ten new vis­i­bil­i­ty in recent weeks.

    Lawyers for Paul Man­afort, the for­mer Trump cam­paign chair­man who was paid tens of mil­lions of dol­lars over the last dozen years by Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian inter­ests, inad­ver­tent­ly revealed on Tues­day that he had com­mu­ni­cat­ed about a Ukraine-Rus­sia peace plan with a busi­ness asso­ciate believed to have ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence.

    The asso­ciate, Kon­stan­tin V. Kil­imnik, is a Russ­ian cit­i­zen who has been charged by Mr. Mueller with obstruc­tion of jus­tice for try­ing to shape the tes­ti­mo­ny of wit­ness­es to the events that led to charges of ille­gal for­eign lob­by­ing against Mr. Man­afort.

    Mr. Kil­imnik was said in the inad­ver­tent­ly dis­closed por­tions of the court fil­ing to have received polit­i­cal polling data from Mr. Man­afort in 2016. Mr. Man­afort relayed a request to have Mr. Kil­imnik pass the polling data to two Ukrain­ian oli­garchs who had arranged or pro­vid­ed financ­ing for Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ties for which Mr. Man­afort had worked. One of the oli­garchs, Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball, accord­ing to one per­son famil­iar with the guest list and anoth­er who saw him there.

    Last month, pros­e­cu­tors made a move that was seen as sig­nal­ing the con­tin­u­ing coop­er­a­tion of Sam Pat­ten, an Amer­i­can con­sul­tant who had worked with Mr. Kil­imnik and Rus­sia-aligned Ukraini­ans look­ing to build ties to the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

    Mr. Pat­ten had plead­ed guilty in late August to charges includ­ing fun­nel­ing $50,000 in mon­ey from an unnamed for­eign­er who matched the descrip­tion of Mr. Lyovochkin but was described in court papers only as “a promi­nent Ukraine oli­garch” to buy tick­ets to exclu­sive Trump inau­gu­ra­tion events for the oli­garch, Mr. Kil­imnik and some­one described only as “anoth­er Ukrain­ian.”

    Oth­er Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton dur­ing the inau­gu­ra­tion said pros­e­cu­tors had been ask­ing wide-rang­ing ques­tions.

    “I have been inter­ro­gat­ed twice by the F.B.I. and Mr. Mueller,” said Andrii V. Arte­menko, who came to the inau­gu­ra­tion as a Ukrain­ian mem­ber of Par­lia­ment bear­ing a peace pro­pos­al that was lat­er crit­i­cized as pro-Russ­ian.

    Mr. Arte­menko said he had tes­ti­fied before Mr. Mueller’s grand jury last sum­mer and had answered ques­tions from the Mueller team “about what is my pur­pose of this trip, how I can get there, and what I did, how I got invi­ta­tions and tick­ets and stuff.”

    On Capi­tol Hill, inves­ti­ga­tors from the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee, now under Demo­c­ra­t­ic con­trol, are look­ing into Michael T. Fly­nn, Mr. Trump’s first nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, who was a cen­tral play­er in the effort to build a new rela­tion­ship with Pres­i­dent Vladimir V. Putin of Rus­sia.

    How active a role Mr. Fly­nn played in the dis­cus­sions about a peace plan for Ukraine is unclear, but con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors have been pur­su­ing whether he or his for­mer busi­ness part­ners might have gained finan­cial­ly if the sanc­tions on Rus­sia were end­ed.

    The com­mit­tee, whose chair­man is Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Eli­jah E. Cum­mings of Mary­land, is con­tin­u­ing to pur­sue its inves­ti­ga­tion of Mr. Flynn’s busi­ness deal­ings and “his poten­tial mis­use of his pub­lic posi­tion when he was nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er,” a com­mit­tee spokes­woman said.

    In 2017, a whis­tle-blow­er told com­mit­tee inves­ti­ga­tors that Mr. Fly­nn had men­tioned to a busi­ness asso­ciate around the time of the inau­gu­ra­tion that the Rus­sia sanc­tions would be “ripped up” as one of the administration’s first acts. Mr. Fly­nn believed that end­ing the sanc­tions could allow a busi­ness project he had once par­tic­i­pat­ed in to move for­ward, accord­ing to the whis­tle-blow­er.

    Mr. Fly­nn had been part of a busi­ness ven­ture to part­ner with Rus­sia to build nuclear pow­er plants in the Mid­dle East until June 2016, but after his direct involve­ment end­ed, he remained close with peo­ple involved in the project..

    In a Decem­ber 2017 let­ter to the Over­sight Com­mit­tee, an offi­cer of the com­pa­ny that hired Mr. Fly­nn as an advis­er on the project, ACU Strate­gic Part­ners, said that the alle­ga­tions of the whis­tle-blow­er were “false and unfound­ed.”

    Mr. Fly­nn sub­se­quent­ly inter­sect­ed with one of the Ukrain­ian efforts to resolve the prob­lems with Rus­sia.

    Mr. Arte­menko, the for­mer Ukrain­ian law­mak­er, said in an inter­view that he did not attend any inau­gur­al balls or oth­er events that required paid tick­ets. Instead, he said he watched Mr. Trump’s inau­gur­al address, which was free, and met with var­i­ous Repub­li­cans to dis­cuss his peace plan, which would have lift­ed sanc­tions against Rus­sia and which he said had some sup­port from the Krem­lin.

    Days after the inau­gu­ra­tion, Mr. Arte­menko trav­eled to New York to dis­cuss his peace plan with Michael D. Cohen, who was then Mr. Trump’s lawyer, and a for­mer busi­ness part­ner of the president’s, Felix H. Sater, who had helped Mr. Trump scout deals in Rus­sia. Mr. Cohen sub­se­quent­ly hand-deliv­ered the peace plan to Mr. Fly­nn a week before Mr. Fly­nn was forced to resign after being caught lying about his own dis­cus­sion of sanc­tions with the Russ­ian ambas­sador.

    With­in days of the inau­gu­ra­tion, the White House made inquiries to the State Depart­ment and Con­gress about what might be required to ease the sanc­tions. Reset­ting rela­tions with the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment and Mr. Putin had been cen­tral to Mr. Trump’s for­eign pol­i­cy approach dur­ing the cam­paign, the tran­si­tion and the first days of the new admin­is­tra­tion, and it is unclear what role, if any, the back-chan­nel Ukrain­ian entreaties might have played.

    The offi­cial inquiries about an abrupt pol­i­cy shift set off alarms at the State Depart­ment and in Con­gress.

    “I heard from var­i­ous sources that there was a plan to sum­mar­i­ly lift sanc­tions on Rus­sia,” said Daniel Fried, a vet­er­an diplo­mat who stayed on for the first sev­er­al weeks of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as the State Department’s coor­di­na­tor for sanc­tions pol­i­cy. “I was approached by peo­ple who were ner­vous that the Unit­ed States was about to do some­thing irre­triev­ably stu­pid.”

    Sev­er­al oth­er offi­cials, some of whom would speak only on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty, also recalled jar­ring ques­tions from the new Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil under Mr. Fly­nn, includ­ing whether Ukraine was real­ly part of Rus­sia and whether Crimea want­ed to be part of Rus­sia.

    Even among Repub­li­cans, the idea of eas­ing sanc­tions found lit­tle sup­port. “If there’s any coun­try in the world that doesn’t deserve sanc­tions relief, it’s Rus­sia,” Sen­a­tor Mitch McConnell, the major­i­ty leader, said in an inter­view with Politi­co a week after the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    By March 2017, the White House’s sanc­tions relief tri­al bal­loon had wilt­ed amid oppo­si­tion from con­gres­sion­al lead­ers.

    But that has not stopped the pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al scruti­ny of those push­ing plans to lift the sanc­tions around the inau­gu­ra­tion, and their roles in prospec­tive busi­ness deals that might have ben­e­fit­ed from the lift­ing of the sanc­tions.

    Mr. Cohen has plead­ed guilty to a num­ber of charges, includ­ing lying to con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors about nego­ti­a­tions to build a Trump sky­scraper in Moscow. While Mr. Cohen had ini­tial­ly echoed Mr. Trump’s claim that talks about the Moscow project had end­ed before the 2016 pres­i­den­tial cam­paign, Mr. Cohen admit­ted in his guilty plea that they extend­ed into the sum­mer of 2016.

    ...

    The sanc­tions posed a poten­tial obsta­cle for the Trump Tow­er Moscow project, in which Mr. Sater, who is Russ­ian-Amer­i­can, had posi­tioned him­self as a key play­er. Mr. Sater and Mr. Cohen dis­cussed financ­ing from two Russ­ian banks, VTB and Gen­Bank, but the sanc­tions pro­hib­it­ed Amer­i­can cit­i­zens and com­pa­nies from doing busi­ness with either of them, accord­ing to report­ing by The New York Times and Buz­zFeed.

    Anoth­er promi­nent busi­ness­man who had worked with Mr. Trump years ear­li­er to try to erect a Trump build­ing in Moscow, the Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian devel­op­er Pavel Fuks, also was in Wash­ing­ton for the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    Mr. Fuks, who has since fall­en out of favor in Moscow and was placed under sanc­tions by the Krem­lin, stayed at Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel, and spent time with Vitaliy Kho­mu­tyn­nik, a busi­ness­man and par­lia­men­tar­i­an who had been a mem­ber of the Rus­sia-aligned par­ty for which Mr. Man­afort worked. Mr. Fuks and Mr. Kho­mu­tyn­nik talked with Rep­re­sen­ta­tives Kevin McCarthy and Ed Royce, both influ­en­tial Cal­i­for­nia Repub­li­cans at the time.

    Mr. Khomutynnik’s par­ty post­ed pho­tos of him with the con­gress­men on Face­book, and sug­gest­ed that he extract­ed assur­ances that Amer­i­can-Ukrain­ian rela­tions would grow stronger under Mr. Trump, with­out detail­ing any spe­cif­ic pol­i­cy dis­cus­sions.

    Mr. McCarthy’s office said that the encounter was ran­dom, and that the con­ver­sa­tion was brief and per­func­to­ry, and not­ed that Mr. McCarthy has sup­port­ed sanc­tions against Rus­sia.

    In Ukraine, a par­lia­men­tar­i­an affil­i­at­ed with the pres­i­dent, Petro Poroshenko, who is gen­er­al­ly regard­ed as pro-West­ern, accused rival politi­cians of pay­ing as much as $200,000 for inau­gur­al tick­ets.

    Mr. Kival­ov, the Ukrain­ian law­mak­er who post­ed pho­tos of the Trumps’ dance, did not respond to requests for com­ment about how he got his tick­ets to the Lib­er­ty Ball. Borislav Bereza, a Ukrain­ian law­mak­er who post­ed a pho­to of him­self in a tuxe­do at the ball, said he got his tick­ets free from some­one “con­nect­ed to Illi­nois,” though he said, “I don’t remem­ber for sure.”

    He attrib­uted the claims about Ukraini­ans’ pay­ing for tick­ets to jeal­ousy from those who were not invit­ed, and in a Face­book post he char­ac­ter­ized the ball as “a place where, over a glass of cham­pagne, you are intro­duced to peo­ple who have influ­ence in the new admin­is­tra­tion of the White House. These are the tra­di­tions of the Unit­ed States.”

    ———

    “Pros­e­cu­tors Exam­in­ing Ukraini­ans Who Flocked to Trump Inau­gur­al” by Ken­neth P. Vogel, Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Iuli­ia Mendel; The New York Times; 01/10/2019

    “The tran­si­tion of pow­er in Wash­ing­ton attract­ed offi­cials and busi­ness exec­u­tives from around the world seek­ing entree and influ­ence with the new admin­is­tra­tion. While many par­ties and oth­er gath­er­ings dur­ing that peri­od were open to any­one, pack­ages for more exclu­sive events orga­nized by Mr. Trump’s pres­i­den­tial inau­gur­al com­mit­tee start­ed at $25,000 for two tick­ets to one of the offi­cial black tie balls and oth­er events, accord­ing to a brochure list­ing inau­gur­al com­mit­tee “under­writer ben­e­fits.”

    $25,000 for two tick­ets to the offi­cial black tie balls and oth­er events. That was the price of get­ting to min­gle with the incom­ing admin­is­tra­tion. And it’s a price plen­ty of Ukraini­ans were will­ing to pay. And the fact that these Ukraini­ans tend­ed to either have a past his­to­ry of work­ing with Paul Man­afort (like Ser­hiy Lyovochkin) or were engaged in secret nego­ti­a­tions and schemes with Michael Cohen and Felix Sater dur­ing the cam­paign (like Andrei Arte­menko) is what made these ques­tions about pos­si­ble cam­paign finance crimes involv­ing the inau­gur­al fund the kinds of ques­tions the Mueller team is inter­est­ed in:

    ...
    They attend­ed meet­ings and orches­trat­ed encoun­ters at Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel with influ­en­tial Repub­li­can mem­bers of Con­gress and close allies of Pres­i­dent Trump. Rep­re­sent­ing a range of views, includ­ing a con­tin­gent seen as sym­pa­thet­ic to Moscow, they posi­tioned them­selves as bro­kers who could help solve one of the thorni­est for­eign pol­i­cy prob­lems fac­ing the new admin­is­tra­tion — the ugly mil­i­tary stale­mate between Rus­sia and Ukraine and the tough sanc­tions imposed on Moscow fol­low­ing its seizure of Crimea.

    ...

    Evi­dence of the Ukraini­ans’ pres­ence even­tu­al­ly prompt­ed inter­est from the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III, as he inves­ti­gat­ed Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 elec­tion, and has spawned a num­ber of relat­ed inquiries by fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors. The inves­ti­ga­tions are play­ing out against grow­ing indi­ca­tions that some of the Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton for the inau­gur­al, or their allies, were pro­mot­ing grand bar­gains, or “peace” plans, that aligned with Russia’s inter­ests, includ­ing by lift­ing sanc­tions.

    Such a deal would not just have giv­en the new admin­is­tra­tion addi­tion­al flex­i­bil­i­ty to bring Moscow into Amer­i­can diplo­mat­ic efforts in the Mid­dle East, but could also have eased the way for a cast of char­ac­ters with ties to Mr. Trump — some of whom in turn had ties to the Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton — to move ahead on busi­ness deals that had been com­pli­cat­ed by the sanc­tions.

    ...

    As recent­ly as last month, pros­e­cu­tors were ask­ing wit­ness­es about ille­gal for­eign lob­by­ing relat­ed to Ukraine. Anoth­er sub­ject of ques­tions has been whether for­eign­ers from Ukraine and oth­er coun­tries used straw donors to dis­guise dona­tions to the inau­gur­al com­mit­tee. Fed­er­al law pro­hibits for­eign­ers from con­tribut­ing to an inau­gur­al com­mit­tee, although they can attend events if Amer­i­cans buy the tick­ets.
    ...

    The arti­cle notes how Man­afort received was paid tens of mil­lions of dol­lars over the last dozen years by “Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian inter­ests”. Again, keep in mind that these “Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian inter­ests” includ­ed the Haps­burg Group lob­by­ing effort Man­afort was run­ning with Ser­hiy Lyovochkin to get Ukraine allowed into the EU Trade Asso­ci­a­tion. Also keep in mind that Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik spent a decade work­ing for the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute (IRI) — a US gov­ern­ment-backed think-tank — and even worked for the Moscow branch of the IRI before team­ing up with Man­afort to work in Ukraine. So when we are remind­ed that Man­afort hand­ed polling data to Kil­imnik and asked that the data be giv­en to Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, that should­n’t real­ly be seen as an exam­ple of Man­afort work­ing with “Russ­ian-aligned Ukrain­ian inter­ests”:

    ...
    Lawyers for Paul Man­afort, the for­mer Trump cam­paign chair­man who was paid tens of mil­lions of dol­lars over the last dozen years by Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian inter­ests, inad­ver­tent­ly revealed on Tues­day that he had com­mu­ni­cat­ed about a Ukraine-Rus­sia peace plan with a busi­ness asso­ciate believed to have ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence.

    The asso­ciate, Kon­stan­tin V. Kil­imnik, is a Russ­ian cit­i­zen who has been charged by Mr. Mueller with obstruc­tion of jus­tice for try­ing to shape the tes­ti­mo­ny of wit­ness­es to the events that led to charges of ille­gal for­eign lob­by­ing against Mr. Man­afort.

    Mr. Kil­imnik was said in the inad­ver­tent­ly dis­closed por­tions of the court fil­ing to have received polit­i­cal polling data from Mr. Man­afort in 2016. Mr. Man­afort relayed a request to have Mr. Kil­imnik pass the polling data to two Ukrain­ian oli­garchs who had arranged or pro­vid­ed financ­ing for Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ties for which Mr. Man­afort had worked. One of the oli­garchs, Ser­hiy Lyovochkin, attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball, accord­ing to one per­son famil­iar with the guest list and anoth­er who saw him there.
    ...

    Then the arti­cle men­tions how it was GOP con­sul­tant Sam Pat­ten who found the Amer­i­can straw buy­er to buy four tick­ets for $50,000 using mon­ey donat­ed by Lyovochkin. Pat­ten, Kil­imnik, Lyovochkin, and an unknown Ukrain­ian attend­ed the Lib­er­ty Ball with those tick­ets:

    ...
    Last month, pros­e­cu­tors made a move that was seen as sig­nal­ing the con­tin­u­ing coop­er­a­tion of Sam Pat­ten, an Amer­i­can con­sul­tant who had worked with Mr. Kil­imnik and Rus­sia-aligned Ukraini­ans look­ing to build ties to the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

    Mr. Pat­ten had plead­ed guilty in late August to charges includ­ing fun­nel­ing $50,000 in mon­ey from an unnamed for­eign­er who matched the descrip­tion of Mr. Lyovochkin but was described in court papers only as “a promi­nent Ukraine oli­garch” to buy tick­ets to exclu­sive Trump inau­gu­ra­tion events for the oli­garch, Mr. Kil­imnik and some­one described only as “anoth­er Ukrain­ian.”
    ...

    There there’s the pres­ence of Andrei Arte­menko, who also attend­ed the inau­gu­ra­tion and was push­ing the peace plan he had been nego­ti­at­ing with Michael Cohen and Felix Sater. Unlike most of the oth­er Ukraini­ans who attend­ed the inau­gu­ra­tion, Arte­menko has no his­to­ry with the Par­ty of Regions or Oppo­si­tion Bloc. Instead, his his­to­ry is with Yulia Tymoshenko’s par­ty, the Rad­i­cal Par­ty, and the vir­u­lent­ly anti-Russ­ian Right Sec­tor. In oth­er words, Arte­menko is an unam­bigu­ous­ly West-lean­ing Ukrain­ian politi­cian. Arte­menko claims he nev­er actu­al­ly attend­ed any of the inau­gur­al events that required expen­sive tick­ets and instead met with var­i­ous Repub­li­cans to dis­cuss his peace plan:

    ...
    Oth­er Ukraini­ans who came to Wash­ing­ton dur­ing the inau­gu­ra­tion said pros­e­cu­tors had been ask­ing wide-rang­ing ques­tions.

    “I have been inter­ro­gat­ed twice by the F.B.I. and Mr. Mueller,” said Andrii V. Arte­menko, who came to the inau­gu­ra­tion as a Ukrain­ian mem­ber of Par­lia­ment bear­ing a peace pro­pos­al that was lat­er crit­i­cized as pro-Russ­ian.

    Mr. Arte­menko said he had tes­ti­fied before Mr. Mueller’s grand jury last sum­mer and had answered ques­tions from the Mueller team “about what is my pur­pose of this trip, how I can get there, and what I did, how I got invi­ta­tions and tick­ets and stuff.”

    ...

    Mr. Arte­menko, the for­mer Ukrain­ian law­mak­er, said in an inter­view that he did not attend any inau­gur­al balls or oth­er events that required paid tick­ets. Instead, he said he watched Mr. Trump’s inau­gur­al address, which was free, and met with var­i­ous Repub­li­cans to dis­cuss his peace plan, which would have lift­ed sanc­tions against Rus­sia and which he said had some sup­port from the Krem­lin.

    Days after the inau­gu­ra­tion, Mr. Arte­menko trav­eled to New York to dis­cuss his peace plan with Michael D. Cohen, who was then Mr. Trump’s lawyer, and a for­mer busi­ness part­ner of the president’s, Felix H. Sater, who had helped Mr. Trump scout deals in Rus­sia. Mr. Cohen sub­se­quent­ly hand-deliv­ered the peace plan to Mr. Fly­nn a week before Mr. Fly­nn was forced to resign after being caught lying about his own dis­cus­sion of sanc­tions with the Russ­ian ambas­sador.
    ...

    Pavel Fuks, the Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian Moscow prop­er­ty devel­op­er who worked on teh 2008 attempt to build Trump Tow­er Moscow (but since fall­en out of favor with the Krem­lin and relo­cat­ed to Ukraine), was also at the inau­gu­ra­tion and also met with Repub­li­cans. Fuks was there with Vitaliy Kho­mu­tyn­nik, the leader of the “Revival” fac­tion of for­mer Par­ty of Regions politi­cians who broke off from the par­ty in the days fol­low­ing the Maid­an sniper attacks:

    ...
    Anoth­er promi­nent busi­ness­man who had worked with Mr. Trump years ear­li­er to try to erect a Trump build­ing in Moscow, the Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian devel­op­er Pavel Fuks, also was in Wash­ing­ton for the inau­gu­ra­tion.

    Mr. Fuks, who has since fall­en out of favor in Moscow and was placed under sanc­tions by the Krem­lin, stayed at Trump Inter­na­tion­al Hotel, and spent time with Vitaliy Kho­mu­tyn­nik, a busi­ness­man and par­lia­men­tar­i­an who had been a mem­ber of the Rus­sia-aligned par­ty for which Mr. Man­afort worked. Mr. Fuks and Mr. Kho­mu­tyn­nik talked with Rep­re­sen­ta­tives Kevin McCarthy and Ed Royce, both influ­en­tial Cal­i­for­nia Repub­li­cans at the time.

    Mr. Khomutynnik’s par­ty post­ed pho­tos of him with the con­gress­men on Face­book, and sug­gest­ed that he extract­ed assur­ances that Amer­i­can-Ukrain­ian rela­tions would grow stronger under Mr. Trump, with­out detail­ing any spe­cif­ic pol­i­cy dis­cus­sions.

    Mr. McCarthy’s office said that the encounter was ran­dom, and that the con­ver­sa­tion was brief and per­func­to­ry, and not­ed that Mr. McCarthy has sup­port­ed sanc­tions against Rus­sia.
    ...

    Then we learn that Ser­hiy Kival­ov and Borislav Bereza were both at the Liv­er­ty ball based on ther Face­book posts. They don’t say how they got the tick­ets. Kival­ov is described as a “a Ukrain­ian law­mak­er known for pro-Russ­ian ini­tia­tives.” Keep in mind that one of main laws Kival­ov is known for is 2012 lan­guage law that would have made Russ­ian an offi­cial lan­guage in states where a large por­tion of the pop­u­lace speaks Russ­ian. It’s one of the main accom­plish­ments Kival­ov is known for. So when read­ing that Kival­ov is known for push­ing “pro-Russ­ian” ini­tia­tives, that’s prob­a­bly a ref­er­ence to his spon­sor­ing a law that was lit­er­al­ly pro-the Russ­ian lan­guage, which should­n’t be seen as the sure-tell sign of a Krem­lin stooge in a coun­try where a large por­tion of the pop­u­lace speaks Russ­ian. And Bereza is a for­mer spokesper­son for Right Sec­tor:

    ...
    Ser­hiy Kival­ov, a Ukrain­ian law­mak­er known for pro-Russ­ian ini­tia­tives, took pho­tos of the dance, as well as of his cov­et­ed tick­ets and pass­es to the soiree where it took place, the Lib­er­ty Ball at the Wal­ter E. Wash­ing­ton Con­ven­tion Cen­ter, post­ing them on Face­book and declar­ing that “it was an hon­or” to attend.

    ...

    Mr. Kival­ov, the Ukrain­ian law­mak­er who post­ed pho­tos of the Trumps’ dance, did not respond to requests for com­ment about how he got his tick­ets to the Lib­er­ty Ball. Borislav Bereza, a Ukrain­ian law­mak­er who post­ed a pho­to of him­self in a tuxe­do at the ball, said he got his tick­ets free from some­one “con­nect­ed to Illi­nois,” though he said, “I don’t remem­ber for sure.”
    ...

    The arti­cle notes that, with­in days of the inau­gu­ra­tion, the White House was mak­ing inquiries with the State Depart­ment and Con­gress about the eas­ing of sanc­tions. Inter­est­ing­ly, it quotes Daniel Fried, described as a vet­er­an diplo­mat who stayed on for the first sev­er­al weeks of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as the State Department’s coor­di­na­tor for sanc­tions pol­i­cy. Recall how Fried expressed a sense of betray­al towards Paul Man­afort, claim­ing that Man­afort had for years assured the State Depart­ment that Vik­tor Yanukovych was going to be “the guy” to bring Ukraine into the West­ern orbit. Man­afort obvi­ous­ly failed at this, but keep in mind how the EU made Ukraine a real­ly bad offer that would have con­demned Ukraine to intense aus­ter­i­ty, with no prospects of even­tu­al EU mem­ber­ship, that Yanukovych ulti­mate­ly reject­ed. So it’s kind of hard to blame Man­afort for not liv­ing up to his promis­es to the State Depart­ment but the fact that he was mak­ing such promis­es were made in the first place tells us a lot about the nature of Man­afort’s work in Ukraine:

    ...
    With­in days of the inau­gu­ra­tion, the White House made inquiries to the State Depart­ment and Con­gress about what might be required to ease the sanc­tions. Reset­ting rela­tions with the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment and Mr. Putin had been cen­tral to Mr. Trump’s for­eign pol­i­cy approach dur­ing the cam­paign, the tran­si­tion and the first days of the new admin­is­tra­tion, and it is unclear what role, if any, the back-chan­nel Ukrain­ian entreaties might have played.

    The offi­cial inquiries about an abrupt pol­i­cy shift set off alarms at the State Depart­ment and in Con­gress.

    “I heard from var­i­ous sources that there was a plan to sum­mar­i­ly lift sanc­tions on Rus­sia,” said Daniel Fried, a vet­er­an diplo­mat who stayed on for the first sev­er­al weeks of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as the State Department’s coor­di­na­tor for sanc­tions pol­i­cy. “I was approached by peo­ple who were ner­vous that the Unit­ed States was about to do some­thing irre­triev­ably stu­pid.”
    ...

    Final­ly, the arti­cle notes how inves­ti­ga­tors are also look­ing into what sort of role Michael Fly­nn may have played in attempt­ing to reboot the US’s rela­tion­ship with Rus­sia. While the role Fly­nn may have played in the peace plan dis­cus­sions is still unclear, inves­ti­ga­tors are look­ing into whether or not Fly­nn and his busi­ness part­ners may have finan­cial ben­e­fit­ed from a lift­ing of Russ­ian sanc­tions. The arti­cle also notes how a whis­tle-blow­er told con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors that Fly­nn believed that end­ing the sanc­tions would allow a busi­ness project in he involved in to move for­ward. That project appears to be a scheme that would have involved part­ner­ing with Rus­sia to build­ing and main­tain nuclear pow­er plants across the Mid­dle East. Recall how this scheme would have involved Sau­di Ara­bia pay­ing for the bulk of this nuclear pow­er plant con­struc­tion and was large­ly and appeared to have been large­ly pushed by Fly­n­n’s US nuclear indus­try clients, includ­ing ex-US gen­er­als, going back to 2015. So when we’re talk­ing about Fly­n­n’s pos­si­ble involve­ment in the Ukrain­ian peace plan scheme and the ear­ly moves by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion to lift Russ­ian sanc­tions, keep in mind this is tied to a scheme involv­ing Sau­di Ara­bia and US nuclear pow­er com­pa­nies to enlist Rus­sia in a scheme to build nuclear pow­er plants across the Mid­dle East and cap­ture that emerg­ing mar­ket:

    ...
    On Capi­tol Hill, inves­ti­ga­tors from the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee, now under Demo­c­ra­t­ic con­trol, are look­ing into Michael T. Fly­nn, Mr. Trump’s first nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, who was a cen­tral play­er in the effort to build a new rela­tion­ship with Pres­i­dent Vladimir V. Putin of Rus­sia.

    How active a role Mr. Fly­nn played in the dis­cus­sions about a peace plan for Ukraine is unclear, but con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors have been pur­su­ing whether he or his for­mer busi­ness part­ners might have gained finan­cial­ly if the sanc­tions on Rus­sia were end­ed.

    ...

    In 2017, a whis­tle-blow­er told com­mit­tee inves­ti­ga­tors that Mr. Fly­nn had men­tioned to a busi­ness asso­ciate around the time of the inau­gu­ra­tion that the Rus­sia sanc­tions would be “ripped up” as one of the administration’s first acts. Mr. Fly­nn believed that end­ing the sanc­tions could allow a busi­ness project he had once par­tic­i­pat­ed in to move for­ward, accord­ing to the whis­tle-blow­er.

    Mr. Fly­nn had been part of a busi­ness ven­ture to part­ner with Rus­sia to build nuclear pow­er plants in the Mid­dle East until June 2016, but after his direct involve­ment end­ed, he remained close with peo­ple involved in the project..
    ...

    And we can’t for­get that this this scheme to enlist Rus­sia as a part­ner in build­ing nuclear pow­er plants across the Mid­dle East is just one of numer­ous instances where we have Mid­dle East­ern gov­ern­ments get­ting involved in the 2016 elec­tion. Includ­ing the crown princes of Sau­di Ara­bia and the UAE offer­ing to help Trump’s cam­paign win using Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca-style social media manip­u­la­tion. We also can’t for­get that the whole Sey­chelles “back chan­nel” meet­ing was coor­di­nat­ed by the UAE and appeared to involve get­ting Rus­sia to agree to some sort of ‘grand bar­gain’ that would have realigned Rus­sia more towards Saudi/UAE inter­ests.

    In oth­er words, the ques­tion of what Michael Fly­nn may have been secret­ly up to dur­ing the 2016 cam­paign and dur­ing the tran­si­tion peri­od are ques­tions heav­i­ly cen­tered around his work on behalf of his non-Russ­ian clients and ques­tions about what role the Sau­di and UAE gov­ern­ments may have played in the 2016 cam­paign. And that since this whole inau­gur­al mess involves ques­tions about ille­gal secret for­eign dona­tions, that obvi­ous­ly rais­es a lot ques­tions about pos­si­ble Mid­dle East­ern ille­gal secret inau­gur­al dona­tions. For­tu­nate­ly, it sounds like inves­ti­ga­tors are look­ing into that too, so hope­ful­ly we’ll even­tu­al­ly learn more about that.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | January 19, 2019, 5:08 pm
  15. There was a big new update to that New York Times sto­ry from last month cre­at­ed when Paul Man­afort’s lawyers acci­den­tal­ly filed a legal response to the courts that revealed a bunch of text. Text about Man­afort and Rick Gates giv­ing polling data to Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik in the spring of 2016 and ask­ing him to give it to their key Ukrain­ian clients, Sergei Lyovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov. And at this meet­ing, Man­afort and Kil­imnik dis­cussed a Ukrain­ian peace plan.

    The updates to this sto­ry are pret­ty sig­nif­i­cant in some ways. First, we’re learn­ing that the meet­ing between Man­afort, Gates, and Kil­imnik did­n’t hap­pen in the spring of 2016. It hap­pened on August 2, 2016 in the Grand Havana Room in Man­hat­tan. So instead of the polling data hand off hap­pen­ing dur­ing the pri­maries it hap­pened at the start of the gen­er­al elec­tion after Trump and Hillary got their nom­i­na­tions.

    And that date for this meet­ing, August 2, is rais­ing the ques­tion of whether or not it real­ly was Oleg Deri­pas­ka who received the polling data, not Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov. Recall that the New York Times report last month orig­i­nal­ly report­ed Oleg Deri­pas­ka as the per­son he asked Kil­imnik to give the polling data to before they cor­rect­ed the arti­cle and named Lyovochkin and Ahk­me­tov as the recip­i­ent.

    But it turns out Deri­paska’s pri­vate jet did hap­pen to make a three hour stop over in Newark right after mid­night on August 3, a few hours after the end of the meet­ing. Many are ask­ing of Kil­imnik flew back on Deri­paska’s plane. Deri­pas­ka denies this and goes as far as claim­ing that he’s nev­er met Kil­imnik, which seems kind of hard to believe giv­en that Deri­pas­ka was a client of Man­afort and Kil­imnik’s ser­vices for years. So the shift of the date of this meet­ing from the “spring” of 2016 to August 2 of 2016 puts it right around the time of a mys­te­ri­ous Deri­pas­ka-owned plane trip to the NYC area, rekin­dling the sus­pi­cions that the meet­ing involved the han­dover of polling data to a Krem­lin con­nect­ed indi­vid­ual. And as the fol­low­ing Wash­ing­ton Post arti­cle describes, the pre­sumed hand off of Trump polling data at that meet­ing to peo­ple that are assumed to be work­ing for the Krem­lin has become cen­tral to the Mueller team’s inves­ti­ga­tion. In oth­er words, the Mueller team is either now assum­ing Deri­pas­ka was the ulti­mate recip­i­ent of the polling data or the Muller team is assum­ing that Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov were work­ing with the Krem­lin.

    Anoth­er new piece of infor­ma­tion that are lead­ing many to con­clude that Deri­pas­ka was the intend­ed recip­i­ent of the polling data is that Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik report­ed­ly con­tact­ed Man­afort on July 29, 2016, say­ing he had spent 5 hours talk­ing with the man who had giv­en Man­afort “the biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago,” and that he had impor­tant mes­sages to relay to Man­afort as a result. The ref­er­ence to “black caviar” is assumed to be a ref­er­ence mon­ey, and many are con­clud­ing that this points fur­ther in the direc­tion of Deri­pas­ka. The obvi­ous prob­lem with that analy­sis is that “sev­er­al years ago” at that time would have been a ref­er­ence to 2013, which is right in the mid­dle of the ‘Haps­burg Group’ lob­by­ing effort when Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov were pay­ing Man­afort mil­lions of dol­lars to man­age the secret lob­by­ing cam­paign to get Ukraine allowed into the EU trade asso­ci­a­tion agree­ment. Plus, Man­afort’s and Kil­imnik’s deal­ings with Deri­pas­ka large­ly end­ed by 2010 after Deri­pas­ka accused them of embez­zling his mon­ey.

    So that “biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago” com­ment from Kil­imnik strong­ly points towards ref­er­ence to Lyovochkin mean­ing that, once again, we find that one of the clues point­ing toward Man­afort engag­ing in col­lu­sion with the Krem­lin in fact points towards col­lu­sion with Lyovochkin and the pro-West­ern fac­tion of Ukraine’s oli­garchy. Plus, there’s been no retrac­tion of the New York Times cor­rec­tion that it was Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov, and not Deri­pas­ka, who received the polling data.

    So is the Deri­pas­ka flight to New York the sole basis for the new assess­ment that Deri­pas­ka got the data? Not quite. The change in the date of this Man­hat­tan meet­ing, from the “spring of 2016” to August 2, has raised ques­tions about the source for last mon­th’s arti­cle claim­ing Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov were the real recip­i­ents of hte polling data.

    But there’s anoth­er rea­son for new sus­pi­cions that Deri­pas­ka was the recip­i­ent of the polling data, although there are big prob­lems with that the­o­ry as we’ll see: Mar­cy Wheel­er recent­ly had a post on her emp­ty­wheel blog that dis­cussed the tran­scripts of a court hear­ing regard­ing the Mueller pros­e­cu­tion team’s charges that Man­afort broke his coop­er­a­tion agree­ment by con­tin­u­ing to lie to them released ear­li­er this month. And as Wheel­er not­ed, the redac­tions in the sec­tion of that tran­script where pros­e­cu­tors are talk­ing about the hand off of the polling data might hint at Deri­pas­ka being the real intend­ed recip­i­ent of the polling data, imply­ing the source for the New York Times report was feel­ing incor­rect infor­ma­tion to the reporters when they claimed Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov were the recip­i­ents. What is the basis for Wheel­er’s infer­ence that the redact­ed name of the polling data recip­i­ent was actu­al­ly “Deri­pas­ka”? The num­ber of char­ac­ters in the redact­ed name, which is 9. “Deri­pas­ka” has 9 let­ters, “Akhme­tov” 8 and “Lyovochkin” 10 let­ters. So when you com­bine that with the new rev­e­la­tion about the hand off of the data tak­ing place in Man­hat­tan hours before Deri­paska’s plane land­ed in New York City it’s tempt­ing to con­clude that, yes, Oleg Deri­pas­ka was the actu­al intend­ed recip­i­ent of that polling data.

    But that analy­sis is flawed in one key way: there are mul­ti­ple ways to spell Lyovochk­in’s last name and some of those vari­ants are 9‑letters (Lyovochkin, Lyvochkin, Lovochkin, Liovochkin). You can find plent of arti­cles spelling his name using any of those four vari­a­tions, although “Lyovochkin” and “Lovochkin” appear to be used the most. Crit­i­cal­ly, Lyovochkin him­self appears to use the 9‑letter ver­sion “Lovochkin”. We can con­clude that based on the fact that his per­son­al web­site is lovochkin.org. There is no lyovochkin.org or liovochkin.org or lyovochkin.org. Only lovochkin.org. In oth­er words, tech­ni­cal­ly we should always be refer­ring to him as Lovochkin, not Lyovochkin.

    So if we assume that US courts are using the spelling that Lovochkin him­self uses, the 9‑letter redact­ed name would con­tin­ue to be con­sis­tent with Lovochkin being one of the intend­ed recip­i­ents of that polling data. There’s still the ques­tions raised by Deri­paska’s plane coin­ci­dence and the fact that the source for last months arti­cle claimed the polling data took place in the spring of 2016, which is very dif­fer­ent from the August 2 date we now have. But there’s still been no retrac­tion by the New York Times of that cor­rec­tion that Lyovochkin and Akhme­tov, and not Deri­pas­ka, were the actu­al recip­i­ents of the polling data.

    Anoth­er cir­cum­stan­tial fac­tor point­ing in the direc­tion of Lovochkin being the recip­i­ent of the polling data is the fact that Man­afort and Kil­imnik had a long, close, and ongo­ing work­ing rela­tion­ship with Lovochkin at that point. Plus, as we learned from the ear­li­er report, Lovochkin still owed Man­afort mil­lions of dol­lars for ser­vices he had been pro­vid­ing. And as we’re going to see, there was a New York Times report from August 1, 2016, that raised the ques­tion of whether or not Man­afort was still a client of Lovochkin at that point even after becom­ing Trump’s cam­paign man­ag­er.

    So Lovochkin owed Man­afort mon­ey for past ser­vices and may have hand­ed Lovochkin polling data. Might the pur­pose of hand­ing off the polling data to Lovochkin have been for the pur­pose of hav­ing the Oppo­si­tion Bloc Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal machin­ery under Lovochk­in’s com­mand assist the 2016 Trump cam­paign as a form of pay­ing back Man­afort? Who knows, but the real­i­ty is that Lovochkin and Akhme­tov ran the polit­i­cal machine that Man­afort helped rebuild fol­low­ing the 2014 Maid­i­an protests and the col­lapse of the Par­ty of Regions. Did that Oppo­si­tion Bloc polit­i­cal machine include an online dirty tricks team that could have secret­ly been used by the Trump cam­paign? It’s a pos­si­bil­i­ty worth keep­ing in mind.

    It’s also worth keep­ing in mind that one day after this August 2 meet­ing between Man­afort, Gates, and Kil­imnik in Man­hat­tan there was the August 3, 2016, Trump Tow­er meet­ing with Don­ald Trump Jr., Erik Prince, George Nad­er, and Joel Zamen in to secret­ly inform Trump that the crown princes of the UAE and Sau­di Ara­bia (MBZ and MBS) want­ed to help Trump beat Hillary using Zamen’s Psy-Group to run a dig­i­tal dirty tricks cam­paign. So at almost the same time Man­afort was hand­ing polling data over to either Lovochkin or Deri­pas­ka, Trump Jr. was meet­ing about the UAE and Sau­di secret psy op sup­port. The Trump cam­paign clear­ly hit its for­eign col­lu­sion stride in ear­ly August.

    Anoth­er aspect of this August 2 meet­ing that pros­e­cu­tors appear to have fix­at­ed on regard­ing the poten­tial signs of Trump cam­paign col­lu­sion with the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment is the fact that Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik is involved and his his­to­ry with the GRU. The fact that Kil­imnik’s GRU ties appear to be large­ly lim­it­ed to going to a Sovi­et lan­guage school with GRU ties does­n’t appear to be fac­tored in. And the fact that Kil­imnik went on to work for the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute from 1994 — 2005 and then spent the sub­se­quent years work­ing with Paul Man­afort as the two tried to move Ukraine and the Par­ty of Regions into the West­’s orbit (work­ing close­ly with Lovochkin for much of this) also appears to be com­plete­ly ignored. So a high­ly sus­pect inter­pre­ta­tion of Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik appears to now be at the “heart” of the Mueller team’s inves­ti­ga­tion into Trump team Russ­ian col­lu­sion

    Final­ly, the Mueller teams report­ed­ly views the fact that Man­afort and Kil­imnik and Gates report­ed­ly dis­cussed a Ukrain­ian peace plan at the August 2 meet­ing as high­ly sus­pi­cious, espe­cial­ly because the plan would have involved the lift­ing of sanc­tions on Rus­sia. Which seems like a rather odd hangup since a peace plan would prob­a­bly involve the lift­ing of Russ­ian sanc­tions. For instance, there was the peace plan put for­ward by Ukrain­ian oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk in Decem­ber 2016 that angered much of the Ukrain­ian estab­lish­ment when called for painful com­pro­mis­es to find peace, includ­ing putting aside the issue of Crimea and Ukrain­ian mem­ber­ship in the EU and Nato. Recall how Pinchuk is a mem­ber of the Atlantic Coun­cil, a vocal advo­cate for a new Cold War with Rus­sia, and one of the financiers the ‘Haps­burg Group’ ini­tia­tive. Even Pinchuk would be seen as a Russ­ian spy based on his peace plan by the stan­dards of the Mueller team.

    Ok, let’s start off with this Wash­ing­ton Post report from a few days ago describ­ing how Mueller’s pros­e­cu­tors now view that August 2 meet­ing and the poten­tial hand-off of the polling data to Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik as being at the “heart” of their ongo­ing inves­ti­ga­tion into Russ­ian col­lu­sion with the Trump cam­paign:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    How Manafort’s 2016 meet­ing with a Russ­ian employ­ee at New York cig­ar club goes to ‘the heart’ of Mueller’s probe

    By Ros­alind S. Hel­der­man and Tom Ham­burg­er
    Feb­ru­ary 12, 2019 at 4:43 PM

    The 2016 nom­i­nat­ing con­ven­tions had recent­ly con­clud­ed and the pres­i­den­tial race was hit­ting a new lev­el of inten­si­ty when Paul Man­afort, Don­ald Trump’s cam­paign chair­man, ducked into an unusu­al din­ner meet­ing at a pri­vate cig­ar room a few blocks away from the campaign’s Trump Tow­er head­quar­ters in Man­hat­tan.

    Court records show that Man­afort was joined at some point by his cam­paign deputy, Rick Gates, at the ses­sion at the Grand Havana Room, a mahogany-pan­eled space with floor-to-ceil­ing win­dows offer­ing panoram­ic views of the city.

    The two Amer­i­cans met with an over­seas guest, a long­time employ­ee of their inter­na­tion­al con­sult­ing busi­ness who had flown to the Unit­ed States for the gath­er­ing: a Russ­ian polit­i­cal oper­a­tive named Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik.

    The Aug. 2, 2016, encounter between the senior Trump cam­paign offi­cials and Kil­imnik, who pros­e­cu­tors allege has ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence, has emerged in recent days as a poten­tial ful­crum in spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III’s inves­ti­ga­tion.

    It was at that meet­ing that pros­e­cu­tors believe Man­afort and Kil­imnik may have exchanged key infor­ma­tion rel­e­vant to Rus­sia and Trump’s pres­i­den­tial bid. The encounter goes “very much to the heart of what the spe­cial counsel’s office is inves­ti­gat­ing,” pros­e­cu­tor Andrew Weiss­mann told a fed­er­al judge in a sealed hear­ing last week.

    One sub­ject the men dis­cussed was a pro­posed res­o­lu­tion to the con­flict over Ukraine, an issue of great inter­est to the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment, accord­ing to a par­tial­ly redact­ed tran­script of the Feb. 4 hear­ing.

    Dur­ing the hear­ing, the judge also appeared to allude to anoth­er pos­si­ble inter­ac­tion at the Havana Room gath­er­ing: a hand­off by Man­afort of inter­nal polling data from Trump’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign to his Russ­ian asso­ciate.

    The new details pro­vide a rare hint at what Mueller is exam­in­ing in the final stretch of his near­ly 21-month-old inves­ti­ga­tion — and under­score his deep inter­est in the Grand Havana Room gath­er­ing, which end­ed with the three men leav­ing through sep­a­rate doors, as Judge Amy Berman Jack­son not­ed.

    Weiss­mann said in the hear­ing that one of the spe­cial counsel’s main tasks is to exam­ine con­tacts between Amer­i­cans and Rus­sia dur­ing the 2016 race and deter­mine whether Trump asso­ciates con­spired with the Russ­ian-backed inter­fer­ence cam­paign.

    “That meet­ing — and what hap­pened at that meet­ing — is of sig­nif­i­cance to the spe­cial coun­sel,” he said point­ed­ly.

    The hear­ing was held in a closed court­room, and only a par­tial tran­script was released because the spe­cial coun­sel has argued that pub­lic dis­clo­sure of the issues dis­cussed could harm “ongo­ing law enforce­ment inves­ti­ga­tions.”

    ...

    In a 2017 state­ment to The Wash­ing­ton Post, he denied any con­nec­tion to Russ­ian intel­li­gence. Kil­imnik said the Grand Havana Room meet­ing had noth­ing to do with pol­i­tics or the pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. Instead, he called the ses­sion a “pri­vate” vis­it, dur­ing which he and Man­afort gos­siped about “bills unpaid by our clients” and the polit­i­cal scene in Ukraine, where Man­afort had worked as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant for a decade before join­ing Trump’s cam­paign.

    ‘An unusu­al time’

    There have long been ques­tions about why Man­afort would break away from his duties run­ning Trump’s cam­paign to meet with his Russ­ian employ­ee, an encounter The Post first report­ed in 2017.

    ...

    Pros­e­cu­tors have alleged that among the false state­ments Man­afort made to inves­ti­ga­tors dur­ing his inter­views in recent months were key lies about the Aug. 2 meet­ing and oth­er inter­ac­tions with Kil­imnik.

    Manafort’s lawyers have acknowl­edged he gave incom­plete and some­times con­flict­ing infor­ma­tion dur­ing 12 inter­views and two ses­sions in front of a grand jury. But they said he did not intend to lie, but was instead con­fused and at times for­get­ful.

    Jack­son told the lawyers she will prob­a­bly rule Wednes­day on whether she believes that Man­afort lied to pros­e­cu­tors, a deci­sion that could impact his sen­tenc­ing in March.

    The Grand Havana Room meet­ing took place dur­ing a crit­i­cal moment in the 2016 race.

    Less than two weeks ear­li­er, the issue of Russia’s role in the cam­paign explod­ed into view when Wik­iLeaks pub­lished thou­sands of emails stolen from the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Nation­al Com­mit­tee. Demo­c­ra­t­ic can­di­date Hillary Clinton’s sup­port­ers imme­di­ate­ly fin­gered Rus­sia in the hack, a view lat­er embraced by U.S. intel­li­gence agen­cies.

    Instead of con­demn­ing the Krem­lin, Trump mock­ing­ly asked Rus­sia to find emails Clin­ton had delet­ed while serv­ing as sec­re­tary of state. “Rus­sia, if you’re lis­ten­ing, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are miss­ing,” he said at a July 27 news con­fer­ence.

    Trump also made a series of pub­lic state­ments in July that appeared to echo Krem­lin talk­ing points on for­eign pol­i­cy. In an inter­view with the New York Times, he ques­tioned the U.S. com­mit­ment to defend­ing NATO part­ners from Russ­ian aggres­sion. Then he promised to look into rec­og­niz­ing Russia’s inva­sion of Crimea.

    “You know, the peo­ple of Crimea, from what I’ve heard, would rather be with Rus­sia than where they were,” he said in an ABC News inter­view July 31.

    In court last week, pros­e­cu­tors focused on Manafort’s choice to meet with Kil­imnik in per­son dur­ing this peri­od.

    “There is an in-per­son meet­ing at an unusu­al time for some­body who is the cam­paign chair­man to be spend­ing time and to be doing it in per­son,” Weiss­mann said.

    At the same time, Man­afort was strate­giz­ing about how to use his promi­nent role with the Trump cam­paign to halt a per­son­al finan­cial spi­ral, court records show. He owed mil­lions in prop­er­ty tax­es and for home improve­ments, insur­ance poli­cies, cred­it cards and oth­er debts, accord­ing to doc­u­ments intro­duced dur­ing his tri­al in Vir­ginia last sum­mer.

    Man­afort viewed Kil­imnik — his liai­son to high-lev­el Ukrain­ian politi­cians and Russ­ian bil­lion­aire Oleg Deri­pas­ka — as key to lever­ag­ing his unpaid role as Trump’s cam­paign chair­man, emails reviewed by The Post show. The two were in fre­quent con­tact dur­ing Manafort’s tenure at Trump’s cam­paign, accord­ing to court records.

    A Russ­ian army vet­er­an who had trained at a mil­i­tary lan­guage acad­e­my known as a feed­er school for the intel­li­gence ser­vices, Kil­imnik had worked for Man­afort since 2005, when he began serv­ing as a trans­la­tor for Manafort’s Ukraine oper­a­tion.

    In doc­u­ments filed in court last year, Mueller’s pros­e­cu­tors wrote that Gates, Manafort’s deputy, said Kil­imnik told him he had for­mer­ly been an offi­cer in the GRU, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary intel­li­gence unit accused of engi­neer­ing the 2016 elec­tion inter­fer­ence. Pros­e­cu­tors said the FBI has assessed that Kilimnik’s intel­li­gence ties con­tin­ued into 2016.

    Kil­imnik was also well known at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, and offi­cials there met with him fre­quent­ly to dis­cuss Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics, accord­ing to peo­ple famil­iar with his work. Dur­ing last week’s hear­ing, pros­e­cu­tors acknowl­edged there was “no ques­tion” Kil­imnik had been in com­mu­ni­ca­tion with State Depart­ment offi­cials.

    Man­afort told the Times in Feb­ru­ary 2017 he had nev­er “know­ing­ly” spo­ken to a Russ­ian intel­li­gence offi­cer. “It’s not like these peo­ple wear badges that say, ‘I’m a Russ­ian intel­li­gence offi­cer,’?” he added.

    ‘Tues­day would be best’

    In April 2016, Man­afort emailed Kil­imnik to ask if the “OVD oper­a­tion” had seen the pos­i­tive press Man­afort was receiv­ing for his Trump work, The Post pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed. That was an appar­ent ref­er­ence to Deri­pas­ka, a one­time Man­afort busi­ness part­ner.

    “How do we use to get whole?” Man­afort wrote.

    Kil­imnik has told The Post he came to the Unit­ed States and met with Man­afort on May 7 to dis­cuss busi­ness issues. Then, on July 7, Man­afort emailed Kil­imnik, ask­ing him to inform Deri­pas­ka that if he need­ed “pri­vate brief­in­gs” about the cam­paign, “we can accom­mo­date.”

    A Deri­pas­ka spokes­woman has said he was nev­er offered nor received cam­paign brief­in­gs. Man­afort spokesman Jason Mal­oni also said no brief­in­gs for Deri­pas­ka took place, telling The Post in 2017 the email ex­changes reflect­ed an “innocu­ous” effort to col­lect past debts.

    On July 29, 2016, Kil­imnik wrote Man­afort a cryp­tic note.

    Kil­imnik told Man­afort he had met that day with the man who had giv­en Man­afort “the biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago.” The Post has pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed that con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors believed Kilimnik’s ref­er­ence to “black caviar” was a code for mon­ey.

    Kil­imnik wrote that he and the man had talked for five hours and he had impor­tant mes­sages to relay to Man­afort as a result. Kil­imnik asked when Man­afort would be avail­able to meet.

    “Tues­day would be best,” Man­afort respond­ed. The fol­low­ing Tues­day was Aug. 2.

    When they saw each oth­er days lat­er at the Grand Havana Room, one top­ic the men dis­cussed was a peace pro­pos­al for Ukraine, an agen­da item Rus­sia was seek­ing as a key step to lift pun­ish­ing eco­nom­ic sanc­tions, accord­ing to court records.

    Pros­e­cu­tors have accused Man­afort of lying to them about how fre­quent­ly he and Kil­imnik dis­cussed the mat­ter — ini­tial­ly telling inves­ti­ga­tors he would not “coun­te­nance” the idea because he viewed it as a “back­door” of some kind. Despite Manafort’s claim of dis­in­ter­est, pros­e­cu­tors said he and Kil­imnik con­tin­ued to pur­sue the sub­ject in sev­er­al sub­se­quent meet­ings, includ­ing one in Jan­u­ary 2017 when the Russ­ian was in Wash­ing­ton for Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion.

    In court, Manafort’s lawyers con­tend­ed that he was can­did about the dis­cus­sions when remind­ed by pros­e­cu­tors and denied that his account has been incon­sis­tent.

    ‘An extreme­ly sen­si­tive issue’

    There are also indi­ca­tions in the tran­script of last week’s hear­ing that pros­e­cu­tors have explored whether it was at the Man­hat­tan cig­ar bar that Man­afort shared polling data relat­ed to the 2016 White House race with Kil­imnik — anoth­er top­ic about which Man­afort lied, they allege.

    The shar­ing of that data was first dis­closed, appar­ent­ly inad­ver­tent­ly, in a court fil­ing by Manafort’s attor­neys last month. At the time, it was unclear when Man­afort passed along the infor­ma­tion to his Russ­ian employ­ee — as well as the sub­stance of the mate­r­i­al.

    Dur­ing last week’s hear­ing, the judge devot­ed a sig­nif­i­cant por­tion of time to dis­cussing what appeared to be the polling data — some­thing she not­ed Man­afort ini­tial­ly said “just was pub­lic infor­ma­tion.”

    Weiss­mann said Man­afort had a motive to lie about shar­ing mate­r­i­al with Kil­imnik as he was run­ning Trump’s cam­paign. “It’s obvi­ous­ly an extreme­ly sen­si­tive issue,” the pros­e­cu­tor said, adding, “We can see what it is that he would be wor­ried about.”

    What exact­ly might have been shared with Kil­imnik at the Grand Havana Room appears to be a mat­ter of dis­pute.

    On the day of the gath­er­ing, Man­afort sent Gates an email ask­ing him to print mate­r­i­al for a meet­ing, accord­ing to court records. The sub­stance of the mate­r­i­al has not been pub­licly dis­closed.

    An attor­ney for Gates declined to com­ment.

    Jack­son indi­cat­ed in the hear­ing that Gates has tes­ti­fied that the mate­r­i­al was shared at the Grand Havana Room gath­er­ing. “Didn’t he say it hap­pened at the meet­ing?” she asked.

    “I don’t believe so,” respond­ed Richard W. West­ling, an attor­ney for Man­afort.

    West­ling not­ed that the email Gates print­ed did not specif­i­cal­ly ref­er­ence Kil­imnik, imply­ing the mate­r­i­al may not have been for the Russ­ian. And he argued that Gates has offered incon­sis­tent accounts and should not be believed.

    Manafort’s defense team also sug­gest­ed that the infor­ma­tion was too detailed to be help­ful and would have been use­less to Kil­imnik. “It frankly, to me, is gib­ber­ish ... It’s not eas­i­ly under­stand­able,” West­ling said.

    Jack­son appeared skep­ti­cal. “That’s what makes it sig­nif­i­cant and unusu­al,” the judge said.

    As a long­time aide to Man­afort, Kil­imnik had expe­ri­ence using pub­lic sur­veys. In a Feb­ru­ary 2017 inter­view, Kil­imnik described to Radio Free Europe the key role polling has played in Manafort’s polit­i­cal con­sult­ing.

    “I’ve seen him work in dif­fer­ent coun­tries, and he real­ly just does, you know, takes very seri­ous­ly his polling and, you know, he can stand, you know, two weeks going through the data, and he’ll come with the best strat­e­gy you can ever have, and he’ll put it on the table of the can­di­date,” Kil­imnik said.

    It is unclear how long Kil­imnik remained in the Unit­ed States after the Grand Havana Room meet­ing.

    Flight records show that a pri­vate plane belong­ing to Deri­pas­ka land­ed at Newark Lib­er­ty Inter­na­tion­al Air­port short­ly after mid­night on Aug. 3, just hours after Kil­imnik and Man­afort met. The plane spent only a few hours on the ground before tak­ing off again and return­ing to Moscow.

    Laris­sa Belyae­va, a spokes­woman for Deri­pas­ka, said the plane car­ried only mem­bers of his fam­i­ly.

    “We can con­firm that Mr. Deri­pas­ka has nev­er lent his pri­vate jet to Mr. Kil­imnik nor has ever had any inter­ac­tion with him,” she said.

    ...

    ———–

    “How Manafort’s 2016 meet­ing with a Russ­ian employ­ee at New York cig­ar club goes to ‘the heart’ of Mueller’s probe” by Ros­alind S. Hel­der­man and Tom Ham­burg­er; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 02/12/2019

    “It was at that meet­ing that pros­e­cu­tors believe Man­afort and Kil­imnik may have exchanged key infor­ma­tion rel­e­vant to Rus­sia and Trump’s pres­i­den­tial bid. The encounter goes “very much to the heart of what the spe­cial counsel’s office is inves­ti­gat­ing,” pros­e­cu­tor Andrew Weiss­mann told a fed­er­al judge in a sealed hear­ing last week.

    It’s the “heart” of the inves­ti­ga­tion at this point. An August 2 meet­ing in Man­hat­tan between Man­afort, Gates, and Kil­imnik, with the tan­ta­liz­ing pos­si­bil­i­ty of a hand off of polling data:

    ...
    The Aug. 2, 2016, encounter between the senior Trump cam­paign offi­cials and Kil­imnik, who pros­e­cu­tors allege has ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence, has emerged in recent days as a poten­tial ful­crum in spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III’s inves­ti­ga­tion.

    ...

    One sub­ject the men dis­cussed was a pro­posed res­o­lu­tion to the con­flict over Ukraine, an issue of great inter­est to the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment, accord­ing to a par­tial­ly redact­ed tran­script of the Feb. 4 hear­ing.

    Dur­ing the hear­ing, the judge also appeared to allude to anoth­er pos­si­ble inter­ac­tion at the Havana Room gath­er­ing: a hand­off by Man­afort of inter­nal polling data from Trump’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign to his Russ­ian asso­ciate.

    The new details pro­vide a rare hint at what Mueller is exam­in­ing in the final stretch of his near­ly 21-month-old inves­ti­ga­tion — and under­score his deep inter­est in the Grand Havana Room gath­er­ing, which end­ed with the three men leav­ing through sep­a­rate doors, as Judge Amy Berman Jack­son not­ed.

    Weiss­mann said in the hear­ing that one of the spe­cial counsel’s main tasks is to exam­ine con­tacts between Amer­i­cans and Rus­sia dur­ing the 2016 race and deter­mine whether Trump asso­ciates con­spired with the Russ­ian-backed inter­fer­ence cam­paign.

    “That meet­ing — and what hap­pened at that meet­ing — is of sig­nif­i­cance to the spe­cial coun­sel,” he said point­ed­ly.
    ...

    Many have not­ed that Trump also made some com­ments regard­ing the sit­u­a­tion in Ukraine around that time that are viewed as pro-Krem­lin. Like his com­ments that he’s heard that many of the peo­ple of Crimea would pre­fer the coun­try be part of Rus­sia over Ukraine. And while it may have been high­ly polit­i­cal­ly incor­rect for Trump to say that, it actu­al­ly appears be true based on polling and should­n’t real­ly be a sur­prise giv­en the demo­graph­ics of Crimea and its his­to­ry. That does­n’t excuse the annex­a­tion of Crimea from an inter­na­tion­al law per­spec­tive but it is a notable com­pli­ca­tion in any sort of peace plan when it comes to the fate of Crimea. And as we’ll see below, even viru­ent­ly anti-Russ­ian Ukrain­ian oli­garchs like Vik­tor Pinchuk were push­ing peace plans that did­n’t involve the return of Crimea:

    ...
    Trump also made a series of pub­lic state­ments in July that appeared to echo Krem­lin talk­ing points on for­eign pol­i­cy. In an inter­view with the New York Times, he ques­tioned the U.S. com­mit­ment to defend­ing NATO part­ners from Russ­ian aggres­sion. Then he promised to look into rec­og­niz­ing Russia’s inva­sion of Crimea.

    “You know, the peo­ple of Crimea, from what I’ve heard, would rather be with Rus­sia than where they were,” he said in an ABC News inter­view July 31.
    ...

    And note how Man­afort’s deci­sion to meet­ing with Kil­imnik is viewed as high­ly sus­pect by pros­e­cu­tors under the assump­tion that Kil­imnik was a GRU spy, which seems to ignore the real­i­ty that Man­afort were long-time part­ners and were report­ed­ly in fre­quent con­tact through­out Man­afort’s time work­ing on the Trump cam­paign:

    ...
    In court last week, pros­e­cu­tors focused on Manafort’s choice to meet with Kil­imnik in per­son dur­ing this peri­od.

    ...

    Man­afort viewed Kil­imnik — his liai­son to high-lev­el Ukrain­ian politi­cians and Russ­ian bil­lion­aire Oleg Deri­pas­ka — as key to lever­ag­ing his unpaid role as Trump’s cam­paign chair­man, emails reviewed by The Post show. The two were in fre­quent con­tact dur­ing Manafort’s tenure at Trump’s cam­paign, accord­ing to court records.
    ...

    Also note how there’s no men­tion by pros­e­cu­tors of Kil­imnik’s decade of work at the DC-based Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute before team­ing up with Man­afort. And even the US Embassy in Kiev admit­ted that Kil­imnik met with offi­cials there fre­quent­ly to dis­cuss Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics:

    ...
    A Russ­ian army vet­er­an who had trained at a mil­i­tary lan­guage acad­e­my known as a feed­er school for the intel­li­gence ser­vices, Kil­imnik had worked for Man­afort since 2005, when he began serv­ing as a trans­la­tor for Manafort’s Ukraine oper­a­tion.

    In doc­u­ments filed in court last year, Mueller’s pros­e­cu­tors wrote that Gates, Manafort’s deputy, said Kil­imnik told him he had for­mer­ly been an offi­cer in the GRU, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary intel­li­gence unit accused of engi­neer­ing the 2016 elec­tion inter­fer­ence. Pros­e­cu­tors said the FBI has assessed that Kilimnik’s intel­li­gence ties con­tin­ued into 2016.

    Kil­imnik was also well known at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, and offi­cials there met with him fre­quent­ly to dis­cuss Ukrain­ian pol­i­tics, accord­ing to peo­ple famil­iar with his work. Dur­ing last week’s hear­ing, pros­e­cu­tors acknowl­edged there was “no ques­tion” Kil­imnik had been in com­mu­ni­ca­tion with State Depart­ment offi­cials.
    ...

    Regard­ing the sus­pi­cion about Deri­pas­ka, we do have to acknowl­edge the April 2016 email Man­afort sent to Kil­imnik ask­ing of the “OVD oper­a­tion” (Deri­pas­ka) had seen the pos­i­tive press he was get­ting and ask­ing “how do we use to get whole?”, which is pre­sum­ably a ref­er­ence to the ongo­ing dis­pute Deri­pas­ka had with Man­afort and Kil­imnik going back to their work for him in 2008–2010. Giv­en that Lovochkin and Ahk­me­tov report­ed­ly owned Man­afort mil­lions in 2016, you have to won­der if have those two pay off Deri­pas­ka direct­ly (they pay back Man­afort by pay­ing Deri­pas­ka) was part of the plan to “get whole” :

    ...
    ‘Tues­day would be best’

    In April 2016, Man­afort emailed Kil­imnik to ask if the “OVD oper­a­tion” had seen the pos­i­tive press Man­afort was receiv­ing for his Trump work, The Post pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed. That was an appar­ent ref­er­ence to Deri­pas­ka, a one­time Man­afort busi­ness part­ner.

    “How do we use to get whole?” Man­afort wrote.

    Kil­imnik has told The Post he came to the Unit­ed States and met with Man­afort on May 7 to dis­cuss busi­ness issues. Then, on July 7, Man­afort emailed Kil­imnik, ask­ing him to inform Deri­pas­ka that if he need­ed “pri­vate brief­in­gs” about the cam­paign, “we can accom­mo­date.”

    A Deri­pas­ka spokes­woman has said he was nev­er offered nor received cam­paign brief­in­gs. Man­afort spokesman Jason Mal­oni also said no brief­in­gs for Deri­pas­ka took place, telling The Post in 2017 the email ex­changes reflect­ed an “innocu­ous” effort to col­lect past debts.
    ...

    And then there’s the July 29, 2016 email Kil­imnik sent to Man­afort that trig­gered the August 2 meet­ing. Crit­i­cal­ly, Kil­imnik refers to the the man who had giv­en Man­afort “the biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago,” which would have been right in the mid­dle of the ‘Haps­burg Group’ lob­by­ing cam­paign Lovochkin, Pinchuk, and oth­er pro-West­ern Ukrain­ian oli­garchs were secret­ly financ­ing. So Kil­imnik appar­ent­ly had a 5 hour meet­ing with Lovochkin and then con­tact­ed Man­afort about the need to relay the mes­sages:

    ...
    On July 29, 2016, Kil­imnik wrote Man­afort a cryp­tic note.

    Kil­imnik told Man­afort he had met that day with the man who had giv­en Man­afort “the biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago.” The Post has pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed that con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors believed Kilimnik’s ref­er­ence to “black caviar” was a code for mon­ey.

    Kil­imnik wrote that he and the man had talked for five hours and he had impor­tant mes­sages to relay to Man­afort as a result. Kil­imnik asked when Man­afort would be avail­able to meet.

    “Tues­day would be best,” Man­afort respond­ed. The fol­low­ing Tues­day was Aug. 2.
    ...

    The August 2 meet­ing hap­pens, and it involves the dis­cus­sion of a peace plan. A peace plan that seems like­ly to have been Lovochk­in’s design giv­en the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence. The plan involved the lift­ing of Russ­ian sanc­tions, which is seen as high­ly sus­pect despite the fact that any peace plan would almost cer­tain­ly involve the lift­ing of sanc­tions. It’s as if main­tain­ing those sanc­tions at all costs is seen as a nation­al secu­ri­ty issue for the US which is some­what bizarre:

    ...
    When they saw each oth­er days lat­er at the Grand Havana Room, one top­ic the men dis­cussed was a peace pro­pos­al for Ukraine, an agen­da item Rus­sia was seek­ing as a key step to lift pun­ish­ing eco­nom­ic sanc­tions, accord­ing to court records.

    Pros­e­cu­tors have accused Man­afort of lying to them about how fre­quent­ly he and Kil­imnik dis­cussed the mat­ter — ini­tial­ly telling inves­ti­ga­tors he would not “coun­te­nance” the idea because he viewed it as a “back­door” of some kind. Despite Manafort’s claim of dis­in­ter­est, pros­e­cu­tors said he and Kil­imnik con­tin­ued to pur­sue the sub­ject in sev­er­al sub­se­quent meet­ings, includ­ing one in Jan­u­ary 2017 when the Russ­ian was in Wash­ing­ton for Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion.

    In court, Manafort’s lawyers con­tend­ed that he was can­did about the dis­cus­sions when remind­ed by pros­e­cu­tors and denied that his account has been incon­sis­tent.
    ...

    Impor­tant­ly, as we’re going to see below, the par­tic­u­lar peace plan dis­cussed by Kil­imnik and Man­afort does not appear to be the same peace plan being pushed by Felix Sater and Andrei Arte­menko.

    Then there’s the hand­off of the polling data. One of the new details we’re learn­ing is that the non-pub­lic polling data hand­ed over was appar­ent­ly much more detailed than pre­vi­ous­ly acknowl­edged, mak­ing it the kind of data that could be poten­tial­ly use­ful for use in manip­u­lat­ing the 2016 elec­tion:

    ...
    ‘An extreme­ly sen­si­tive issue’

    There are also indi­ca­tions in the tran­script of last week’s hear­ing that pros­e­cu­tors have explored whether it was at the Man­hat­tan cig­ar bar that Man­afort shared polling data relat­ed to the 2016 White House race with Kil­imnik — anoth­er top­ic about which Man­afort lied, they allege.

    The shar­ing of that data was first dis­closed, appar­ent­ly inad­ver­tent­ly, in a court fil­ing by Manafort’s attor­neys last month. At the time, it was unclear when Man­afort passed along the infor­ma­tion to his Russ­ian employ­ee — as well as the sub­stance of the mate­r­i­al.

    Dur­ing last week’s hear­ing, the judge devot­ed a sig­nif­i­cant por­tion of time to dis­cussing what appeared to be the polling data — some­thing she not­ed Man­afort ini­tial­ly said “just was pub­lic infor­ma­tion.”

    Weiss­mann said Man­afort had a motive to lie about shar­ing mate­r­i­al with Kil­imnik as he was run­ning Trump’s cam­paign. “It’s obvi­ous­ly an extreme­ly sen­si­tive issue,” the pros­e­cu­tor said, adding, “We can see what it is that he would be wor­ried about.”

    ...

    Manafort’s defense team also sug­gest­ed that the infor­ma­tion was too detailed to be help­ful and would have been use­less to Kil­imnik. “It frankly, to me, is gib­ber­ish ... It’s not eas­i­ly under­stand­able,” West­ling said.

    Jack­son appeared skep­ti­cal. “That’s what makes it sig­nif­i­cant and unusu­al,” the judge said.
    ...

    Final­ly, the fact that Oleg Deri­paska’s plane did in fact arrive at Newark Lib­er­ty Inter­na­tion­al Air­port short­ly after mid­night on August 3 for a few hours does remain a high­ly sus­pi­cious event:

    ...
    It is unclear how long Kil­imnik remained in the Unit­ed States after the Grand Havana Room meet­ing.

    Flight records show that a pri­vate plane belong­ing to Deri­pas­ka land­ed at Newark Lib­er­ty Inter­na­tion­al Air­port short­ly after mid­night on Aug. 3, just hours after Kil­imnik and Man­afort met. The plane spent only a few hours on the ground before tak­ing off again and return­ing to Moscow.

    Laris­sa Belyae­va, a spokes­woman for Deri­pas­ka, said the plane car­ried only mem­bers of his fam­i­ly.

    “We can con­firm that Mr. Deri­pas­ka has nev­er lent his pri­vate jet to Mr. Kil­imnik nor has ever had any inter­ac­tion with him,” she said.
    ...

    This has led to the under­stand­able spec­u­la­tion that Kil­imnik returned to Moscow on that plane. And Deri­paska’s com­plete denials don’t exact­ly ease those sus­pi­cions. Because as the fol­low­ing arti­cle notes, not only does Deri­pas­ka claim that Kil­imnik was not on the plane back to Moscow, he claims that he’s nev­er actu­al­ly met Kil­imnik. And that seems rather hard to believe giv­en the fact that he was a client of Man­afort of Kil­imnik and Kil­imnik was appar­ent Man­afort’s con­tact for Deri­pas­ka.

    Although as the fol­low­ing arti­cle also notes, Kil­imnik’s emails do indi­cate that his out­reach to Deri­pas­ka gen­er­al­ly ran through a Deri­pas­ka aide named “Vic­tor” – or, as Kil­imnik referred to him occa­sion­al­ly, “V.” This is a ref­er­ence to Vic­tor Boyarkin. So it’s pos­si­ble that the Manafort/Kilimnik past rela­tion­ship with Deri­pas­ka was always done through Vic­tor Boyarkin and Deri­pas­ka nev­er met Kil­imnik in per­son. But it’s a denial that’s beside the point when it comes to whether or not Deri­pas­ka was involved in that August 2 meet­ing giv­en the old busi­ness rela­tion­ship between Man­afort, Kil­imnik, and Deri­pas­ka. It’s one of the com­pli­ca­tions with this whole mess: all of the play­ers lack cred­i­bil­i­ty so their denials are large­ly meang­in­g­less. That does­n’t mean that we can con­clude that Kil­imnik was on that plane, but Deri­paska’s over-the-top denial of ever meet­ing Kil­imnik ever does­n’t lend cred­i­bil­i­ty to his denial about the plane trip:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    A Russ­ian oli­garch offers a sig­nif­i­cant denial in the Mueller probe

    Oleg Deri­pas­ka denies he ever inter­act­ed with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, Paul Manafort’s asso­ciate in Ukraine. Some have sug­gest­ed Kil­imnik might have met with the Putin ally and relayed his mes­sages to Man­afort.

    By Aaron Blake
    Feb­ru­ary 12, 2019 at 5:55 PM

    The Wash­ing­ton Post’s Ros­alind S. Hel­der­man and Tom Ham­burg­er are out with a must-read recon­struc­tion of the Aug. 2, 2016, meet­ing between Paul Man­afort and his asso­ciate in Ukraine, Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik. This is the increas­ing­ly intrigu­ing meet­ing that spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III has zeroed in on in his Rus­sia col­lu­sion probe, accord­ing to court doc­u­ments.

    And at the end, they include a new and note­wor­thy denial from the Oleg Deri­pas­ka, the Russ­ian oli­garch whose ties to Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin and Man­afort have put him at the cen­ter of it all.

    “We can con­firm that Mr. Deri­pas­ka has nev­er lent his pri­vate jet to Mr. Kil­imnik, nor has ever had any inter­ac­tion with him,” Deri­pas­ka spokes­woman Laris­sa Belyae­va said.

    Some media reports have sug­gest­ed that Deri­pas­ka might have lent his per­son­al jet to Kil­imnik around the time of the Aug. 2 meet­ing in New York. Flight records show it land­ed in Newark short­ly after mid­night on Aug. 3 and took off a few hours lat­er. Deripaska’s team has denied that part before.

    What’s new here, though, is the sec­ond part of the denial: Deri­pas­ka say­ing he’s nev­er even spo­ken with Kil­imnik.

    That’s sig­nif­i­cant because Kil­imnik was report­ed to have been a liai­son between Man­afort and Deri­pas­ka. There have even been sug­ges­tions that Kil­imnik might have met with Deri­pas­ka short­ly before his meet­ing with Man­afort on Aug. 2.

    ...

    Deri­pas­ka, though, has now com­plete­ly denied that he ever met with Kil­imnik. It’s pos­si­ble that he’s lying, but a five-hour meet­ing between Kil­imnik and a huge Russ­ian tycoon is poten­tial­ly some­thing Mueller’s team could find out about – espe­cial­ly on a spe­cif­ic date.

    Let’s assume for a moment that this denial is accu­rate — that Kil­imnik wasn’t refer­ring in his July 29 email to meet­ing with Deri­pas­ka, but rather some­one else. That actu­al­ly makes some log­i­cal sense. At oth­er points in his emails, Kil­imnik ref­er­ences how his out­reach to Deri­pas­ka gen­er­al­ly ran through an aide named “Vic­tor” – or, as Kil­imnik referred to him occa­sion­al­ly, “V.” (Time mag­a­zine has iden­ti­fied this aide as Vic­tor Boyarkin, who, like Kil­imnik, has alleged ties to the Russ­ian intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty.)

    ...

    ———-

    “A Russ­ian oli­garch offers a sig­nif­i­cant denial in the Mueller probe” by Aaron Blake; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 02/12/2019

    Some media reports have sug­gest­ed that Deri­pas­ka might have lent his per­son­al jet to Kil­imnik around the time of the Aug. 2 meet­ing in New York. Flight records show it land­ed in Newark short­ly after mid­night on Aug. 3 and took off a few hours lat­er. Deripaska’s team has denied that part before.”

    It’s undoubt­ed­ly a tempt­ing area of spec­u­la­tion: why did Deri­paska’s plane show up short­ly after this meet­ing? Did Kil­imnik fly back on that plane to Moscow? If so, that would have been an incred­i­ble risk to take from an oper­a­tional secu­ri­ty stand­point if Kil­imnik real­ly was in the mid­dle of a Trump cam­paign-Krem­lin col­lu­sion effort giv­en all the var­i­ous ways this trip could have been dis­cov­ered. After all, there are flight records.

    But what’s most remark­able is Deri­paska’s denial that he’s ever spo­ken with Kil­imnik. Although, as the arti­cle notes, Kil­imnik’s emails have ref­er­ences to how his out­reach to Deri­pas­ka went through a Deri­pas­ka aide, Vic­tor Boyarkin:

    ...
    What’s new here, though, is the sec­ond part of the denial: Deri­pas­ka say­ing he’s nev­er even spo­ken with Kil­imnik.

    That’s sig­nif­i­cant because Kil­imnik was report­ed to have been a liai­son between Man­afort and Deri­pas­ka. There have even been sug­ges­tions that Kil­imnik might have met with Deri­pas­ka short­ly before his meet­ing with Man­afort on Aug. 2.

    ...

    Let’s assume for a moment that this denial is accu­rate — that Kil­imnik wasn’t refer­ring in his July 29 email to meet­ing with Deri­pas­ka, but rather some­one else. That actu­al­ly makes some log­i­cal sense. At oth­er points in his emails, Kil­imnik ref­er­ences how his out­reach to Deri­pas­ka gen­er­al­ly ran through an aide named “Vic­tor” – or, as Kil­imnik referred to him occa­sion­al­ly, “V.” (Time mag­a­zine has iden­ti­fied this aide as Vic­tor Boyarkin, who, like Kil­imnik, has alleged ties to the Russ­ian intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty.)
    ...

    So that over-the-top denial by Deri­pas­ka just adds to the mys­tery.

    But, again, we can’t ignore the facts that when Kil­imnik emailed Man­afort on July 29 to set up that meet­ing, say­ing he had spent five hours speak­ing “with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar sev­er­al years ago” is almost cer­tain­ly a ref­er­ence to some­one pay­ing him in 2013 for his work on the Haps­burg Group lob­by­ing effort that that strong­ly points towards Sergei Lovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov, as the New York Times report­ed last month. The Deri­pas­ka flight adds to the intrigue but it does­n’t negate all of those facts that Lovochkin and Ackhme­tov appear to be the indi­vid­u­als who spoke with Kilminik and prompt­ed that August 2 meet­ing.

    Next, here’s a July 31, 2016, New York Times arti­cle (pub­lished August 1, 2016) about Man­afort’s his­to­ry of work in Ukraine. And as it notes at the end, the ques­tion of whether or not Man­afort and Kil­imnik were still work­ing for Sergei Lovochkin at that point in time remained an open ques­tion:

    The New York Times

    How Paul Man­afort Wield­ed Pow­er in Ukraine Before Advis­ing Don­ald Trump
    Paul Man­afort, Don­ald J. Trump’s cam­paign chair­man, last month in Cleve­land before the

    By Steven Lee Myers and Andrew E. Kramer
    July 31, 2016

    WASHINGTON — Few polit­i­cal con­sul­tants have had a client fail quite as spec­tac­u­lar­ly as Paul Manafort’s did in Ukraine in the win­ter of 2014.

    ...

    It is not clear that Mr. Manafort’s work in Ukraine end­ed with his work with Mr. Trump’s cam­paign. A com­mu­ni­ca­tions aide for Mr. Lyovochkin, who financed Mr. Manafort’s work, declined to say whether he was still on retain­er or how much he had been paid.

    Mr. Man­afort has not reg­is­tered as a lob­by­ist rep­re­sent­ing Ukraine, which would require dis­clos­ing his earn­ings, though at least one com­pa­ny he sub­con­tract­ed, the pub­lic rela­tions firm Edel­man, did in 2008. It received a retain­er of $35,000 a month to pro­mote Mr. Yanukovych’s efforts as prime min­is­ter “toward mak­ing Ukraine a more demo­c­ra­t­ic coun­try.”

    ———-

    “How Paul Man­afort Wield­ed Pow­er in Ukraine Before Advis­ing Don­ald Trump” by Steven Lee Myers and Andrew E. Kramer; The New York Times; 07/31/2016

    It is not clear that Mr. Manafort’s work in Ukraine end­ed with his work with Mr. Trump’s cam­paign. A com­mu­ni­ca­tions aide for Mr. Lyovochkin, who financed Mr. Manafort’s work, declined to say whether he was still on retain­er or how much he had been paid.”

    Yep, as of August of 2016, it remained unclear if Man­afort was­n’t still work­ing for Sergei Lovochkin. So when Kil­imnik tells Man­afort on July 29 that he had a five hour meet­ing with the “black caviar” man, he may have been refer­ring to some­one Man­afort and Kil­imnik were still doing work for.

    Ok, now regard­ing the fix­a­tion on the lift­ing of sanc­tions as part of a peace plan that inves­ti­ga­tors appear to view as high­ly sus­pi­cious, here’s an arti­cle from Feb­ru­ary of 2017, in the wake of the ini­tial reports on the Sater/Artkemenko peace plan, that describe the var­i­ous peace plans that had been talked about in recent months. One of those plans was Kil­imnik’s plan, which appeared to focus on rein­cor­po­rat­ing the sep­a­ratist regions into Ukraine by hav­ing the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and oth­er oppo­si­tion par­ties lead a dia­logue. It also men­tioned the pos­si­bil­i­ty of Vik­tor Yanukovych play­ing a role. And while such a move is wide­ly viewed as sus­pect in the West, the fact that Yanukovych appeared to be intent on mov­ing Ukraine into the West­’s orbit (which is the Haps­burg Group lob­by­ing effort was all about) can’t be ignored. If the EU had sim­ply not made a hor­ri­ble offer to Ukraine that large­ly involved mass aus­ter­i­ty it would prob­a­bly would already have Ukraine in the trade agree­ment right now. Plus, the sep­a­ratist regions broke away after what they per­ceived to be a coup against a legit­i­mate­ly elect­ed pres­i­dent. So the idea of bring­ing Yanukovych back to lead the peace talks actu­al­ly makes a great deal of sense if vol­un­tar­i­ly rein­cor­pat­ing the sep­a­ratist regions real­ly is the goal.

    And then there’s Vik­tor Pinchuk’s plan from Decem­ber of 2016. Pinchuk’s plan involved explic­it­ly putting aside the ques­tion of the fate of Crimea and the incre­men­tal lift­ing of sanc­tions on Rus­sia in order to achieve peace. And this was the plan from an Atlantic Coun­cil and one of Ukraine’s biggest voic­es for a New Cold war against Rus­sia. So as inves­ti­ga­tors vix­ate on peace plans and talks of lift­ing sanc­tions as a sign of Krem­lin col­lu­sion, keep in mind Pinchuk’s peace plan:

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty

    Every­one Seems To Have A Peace Plan For Ukraine

    By Christo­pher Miller
    Feb­ru­ary 23, 2017 17:52 GMT

    KYIV — It seems that peace plans for Ukraine are every­where these days.

    Amid a recent surge in vio­lence in east­ern Ukraine and yet anoth­er failed cease-fire in the near­ly 3‑year-old con­flict are a wave of new pro­pos­als to bring peace to the cri­sis-strick­en nation — and from some unex­pect­ed places.

    ...

    Each new plan — made by a mix of known politi­cians and shad­owy oper­a­tives — has sparked fierce debate in Kyiv polit­i­cal cir­cles and among the Ukrain­ian pub­lic.

    And the sus­pect­ed moti­va­tions behind the peace offer­ings run the gamut, from per­son­al ambi­tion to a Krem­lin plot to destroy Ukraine.

    Bal­azs Jara­bik, a non­res­i­dent schol­ar at the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace, told RFE/RL that he thinks the main rea­son for the peace plans seems to be to weak­en Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko, who remains in lim­bo between the increas­ing­ly dis­par­aged Min­sk agree­ments and “vic­to­ry.”

    “Min­sk is unpop­u­lar, peace is not. Peo­ple are fed up with the war and the cor­rup­tion [among gov­ern­ment offi­cials],” Jara­bik said.

    ...

    The Kil­imnik Plan

    The most recent of the new peace plans came from Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian polit­i­cal oper­a­tive Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, the one-time assis­tant in Kyiv to U.S. Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man, Paul Man­afort.

    Call­ing his plan the Mar­i­upol Plan after the south­east­ern Ukrain­ian city that is the largest in the Donet­sk region con­trolled by the gov­ern­ment and which sits smack against the front line — Kil­imnik envis­ages it replac­ing the cur­rent Min­sk agree­ments and Nor­mandy for­mat talks between Ukraine, Rus­sia, Ger­many, and France.

    Despite his con­nec­tion to Man­afort, who lived in Ukraine and worked as an advis­er to Yanukovych for years, Kil­imnik empha­sized that the Amer­i­can strate­gist has had no part in this plan, which he says remains flu­id.

    The plan, he said, was raised by “many peo­ple who are will­ing to start [a] dia­logue” between east­ern Ukraine and the rest of the coun­try “and this should be one of the roles of the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and oth­er oppo­si­tion par­ties, which under­stand the neces­si­ty of bring­ing Don­bas back into Ukraine.” The Oppo­si­tion Bloc is the revamped, pro-Moscow polit­i­cal fac­tion once called the Par­ty of Regions and led by Yanukovych..

    Right now, there is no dia­logue between Ukraine and the lead­ers of the sep­a­ratist-held areas, Alek­san­dr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plot­nit­sky. Kyiv con­sid­ers them “ter­ror­ists” and Kil­imnik said they “have blood on their hands, [so] it will be very dif­fi­cult for Poroshenko and oth­ers to nego­ti­ate with them.”

    How­ev­er, “in the­o­ry, a fig­ure rep­re­sent­ing Don­bas, such as Yanukovych or some­one else who has at least not killed peo­ple and can stop the war and fix the local econ­o­my, might be an option,” Kil­imnik explained.

    Many Ukraini­ans, though, believe the for­mer president’s hands are drip­ping with blood as they hold him respon­si­ble for the deaths of more than 100 pro­test­ers shot by riot police dur­ing the Euro­maid­an protests in Kyiv in 2014. Ukraine has charged Yanukovych with trea­son — an alle­ga­tion he denies.

    Peace in Ukraine “is up for Ukraini­ans to fig­ure out, and the only way to pro­ceed is a nation­al con­sen­sus and dia­logue,” Kil­imnik said.

    The Yanukovych Plan

    Yanukovych, in an inter­view with a group of West­ern reporters on Feb­ru­ary 21, shared his own 10-page pro­pos­al, which he said he has sent to Trump and the lead­ers of Rus­sia, Ger­many, France, and Poland, accord­ing to The Wall Street Jour­nal and Der Spiegel.

    Der Spiegel said the plan has six points lead­ing to a res­o­lu­tion of the con­flict.

    “Four relate to the ‘inves­ti­ga­tion into the crimes com­mit­ted on the Maid­an in Feb­ru­ary 2014,’ for which he pro­pos­es a spe­cial com­mis­sion to be estab­lished by the Coun­cil of Europe,” the Ger­man news out­let report­ed.

    Yanukovych also called for the sep­a­ratist lead­ers in Donet­sk and Luhan­sk to be includ­ed in nego­ti­a­tions with Ukrain­ian offi­cials. The sixth point out­lines a plan for a ref­er­en­dum to be held on the sta­tus of the Don­bas if Kyiv doesn’t ful­fill its part of the Min­sk deal.

    The Arte­menko Plan

    Anoth­er peace plan has caused a scan­dal in Wash­ing­ton and Kyiv.

    This one, pro­posed by Ukrain­ian law­mak­er Andriy Arte­menko, is the most detailed and is believed to have land­ed on the desk of Michael Fly­nn, who resigned as U.S. nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er on Feb­ru­ary 13 after alleged mis­lead­ing state­ments about con­ver­sa­tions with the Russ­ian ambas­sador in Wash­ing­ton in Decem­ber.

    ...

    The Taru­ta Plan

    Ser­hiy Taru­ta, the Ukrain­ian bil­lion­aire indus­tri­al­ist and for­mer gov­er­nor of Donet­sk, pro­posed at the end of Jan­u­ary his “three prin­ci­ples” plan to restore legit­i­ma­cy, secu­ri­ty, and trust.

    It calls for rein­stat­ing the last legit­i­mate­ly elect­ed Don­bas offi­cials from 2010 and appeal­ing to the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to rec­og­nize them. A UN peace­keep­ing con­tin­gent would keep the region secure while those offi­cials work to rein­te­grate it with greater Ukraine.

    ...

    The Pinchuk Plan

    Bil­lion­aire oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk caused a stir in Kyiv when he pro­posed a plan in an op-ed in The Wall Street Jour­nal in late Decem­ber.

    The arti­cle was head­lined: Ukraine Must Make Painful Com­pro­mis­es For Peace With Rus­sia, and the plan laid out in the paper sug­gest­ed that Kyiv set aside the issue of Crimea and hopes of Euro­pean Union and per­haps even NATO mem­ber­ship in exchange for peace in the Don­bas.

    “We should also make clear that we are ready to accept an incre­men­tal roll­back of sanc­tions on Rus­sia as we move toward a solu­tion for a free, unit­ed, peace­ful, and secure Ukraine,” Pinchuk wrote. “The Ukrain­ian lives that will be saved are worth the painful com­pro­mis­es I have pro­posed.”

    Mustafa Nayyem, a law­mak­er and vocal crit­ic of the pro­pos­al, said in doing this that “we will not save thou­sands of lives, but with our sup­port and recog­ni­tion, doom mil­lions of peo­ple to legal­ized slav­ery.”

    ...

    ———–

    “Every­one Seems To Have A Peace Plan For Ukraine” by Christo­pher Miller; Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty; 02/23/2017

    “Bal­azs Jara­bik, a non­res­i­dent schol­ar at the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace, told RFE/RL that he thinks the main rea­son for the peace plans seems to be to weak­en Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko, who remains in lim­bo between the increas­ing­ly dis­par­aged Min­sk agree­ments and “vic­to­ry.””

    That sen­ti­ment expressed by Bal­azs Jara­bik, a non­res­i­dent schol­ar at the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace, seems to cap­ture the views of many in the West regard­ing any peace plan for Ukraine: that they are all designed to weak­en Kiev and a capit­u­la­tion to the Krem­lin. It’s a sen­ti­ment that the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tors appear to share, which is a rather big com­pli­ca­tion for peace.

    Kil­imnik’s plan appears to focus on using the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and oth­er oppo­si­tion par­ties to essen­tial­ly lead a dia­logue that can bring the sep­a­ratist regions back into Ukraine peace­ful­ly. Vik­tor Yanukovych could even play a role accord­ing to Kil­imnik’s plan:

    ...
    The Kil­imnik Plan

    ...

    Call­ing his plan the Mar­i­upol Plan after the south­east­ern Ukrain­ian city that is the largest in the Donet­sk region con­trolled by the gov­ern­ment and which sits smack against the front line — Kil­imnik envis­ages it replac­ing the cur­rent Min­sk agree­ments and Nor­mandy for­mat talks between Ukraine, Rus­sia, Ger­many, and France.

    Despite his con­nec­tion to Man­afort, who lived in Ukraine and worked as an advis­er to Yanukovych for years, Kil­imnik empha­sized that the Amer­i­can strate­gist has had no part in this plan, which he says remains flu­id.

    The plan, he said, was raised by “many peo­ple who are will­ing to start [a] dia­logue” between east­ern Ukraine and the rest of the coun­try “and this should be one of the roles of the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and oth­er oppo­si­tion par­ties, which under­stand the neces­si­ty of bring­ing Don­bas back into Ukraine.” The Oppo­si­tion Bloc is the revamped, pro-Moscow polit­i­cal fac­tion once called the Par­ty of Regions and led by Yanukovych..

    Right now, there is no dia­logue between Ukraine and the lead­ers of the sep­a­ratist-held areas, Alek­san­dr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plot­nit­sky. Kyiv con­sid­ers them “ter­ror­ists” and Kil­imnik said they “have blood on their hands, [so] it will be very dif­fi­cult for Poroshenko and oth­ers to nego­ti­ate with them.”

    How­ev­er, “in the­o­ry, a fig­ure rep­re­sent­ing Don­bas, such as Yanukovych or some­one else who has at least not killed peo­ple and can stop the war and fix the local econ­o­my, might be an option,” Kil­imnik explained.
    ...

    And then there was Vik­tor Pinchuk’s plan, which left unre­solved the sta­tus of Crimea and opened the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the incred­men­tal roll­back of sanc­tions on Rus­sia. This is com­ing from one of the most pro-West­ern oli­garchs in Ukraine:

    ...
    The Pinchuk Plan

    Bil­lion­aire oli­garch Vik­tor Pinchuk caused a stir in Kyiv when he pro­posed a plan in an op-ed in The Wall Street Jour­nal in late Decem­ber.

    The arti­cle was head­lined: Ukraine Must Make Painful Com­pro­mis­es For Peace With Rus­sia, and the plan laid out in the paper sug­gest­ed that Kyiv set aside the issue of Crimea and hopes of Euro­pean Union and per­haps even NATO mem­ber­ship in exchange for peace in the Don­bas.

    “We should also make clear that we are ready to accept an incre­men­tal roll­back of sanc­tions on Rus­sia as we move toward a solu­tion for a free, unit­ed, peace­ful, and secure Ukraine,” Pinchuk wrote. “The Ukrain­ian lives that will be saved are worth the painful com­pro­mis­es I have pro­posed.”

    Mustafa Nayyem, a law­mak­er and vocal crit­ic of the pro­pos­al, said in doing this that “we will not save thou­sands of lives, but with our sup­port and recog­ni­tion, doom mil­lions of peo­ple to legal­ized slav­ery.”
    ...

    So that’s all part of the con­text of now noto­ri­ous August 2, 2016, meet­ing in Man­hat­tan. Increas­ing­ly, it looks like Sergei Lovochkin and Rinat Akhme­tov were the intend­ed recip­i­ents of the polling data, although we still don’t know what exact­ly Oleg Deri­paska’s role was or if it was a coin­ci­dence that his plane just hap­pened to be in the area at that time.

    And regard­ing Deri­pas­ka, keep in mind the reports about how the FBI had been try­ing to flip Deri­pas­ka from 2014–2016 and that Christo­pher Steele and Bruce Ohr were the two peo­ple direct­ly to flip him. So when we’re won­der­ing what Deri­paska’s plane was doing in the US at that point in 2016, the fact that the FBI was try­ing to flip him that year should be kept in mind.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | February 16, 2019, 5:31 pm
  16. Here’s a rather fas­ci­nat­ing fun fact about Sam Pat­ten, one of the more inter­est­ing fig­ures who got caught up in the #TrumpRus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion over his work in Ukraine with Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik and mon­ey-laun­der­ing alle­ga­tions revolv­ing around for­eign dona­tions to Pres­i­dent Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion: The var­i­ous let­ters writ­ten in sup­port of Pat­ten dur­ing his sen­tenc­ing are pub­lic. One of those let­ters is from Pat­ten’s wife, Lau­ra Pat­ten. Accord­ing to her let­ter, Lau­ra worked as a CIA covert oper­a­tions offi­cer over­seas and, lat­er, as the Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Divi­sion Direc­tor at the Depart­ment of Ener­gy. And in her last gov­ern­ment posi­tion she was a Senior Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Offi­cer at the FBI’s Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Divi­sion, Transna­tion­al Orga­nized Crime (East) which cov­ers Ukraine. So that’s, uh, inter­est­ing.

    First, recall how Pat­ten and Kil­imnik set up a polit­i­cal con­sult­ing busi­ness with Kil­imnik in 2015 in Ukraine. Pat­ten met Kil­imnik when they both worked at the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute (IRI). Their con­sult­ing clients includ­ed the Oppo­si­tion Bloc and Sergei Lovochkin was the per­son they answered to for this work. And it was work for Lovochkin that was what part of led to the charges of vio­la­tions of the For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act (FARA) when Pat­ten appar­ent­ly act­ed as a straw buy­er for tick­ets to Trump’s inau­gur­al ball on behalf of a Ukrain­ian. That Ukrain­ian turned out to be Sergei Lovochkin. Pat­ten paid the Trump inau­gu­ra­tion fund $50,000 for four tick­ets. Pat­ten also plead guilty to lying to the Sen­ate about his for­eign lob­by­ing work and then lat­er destroy­ing the evi­dence. Pat­ten also worked for Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca in 2014 and Cam­bridge Ana­lyt­i­ca’s par­ent com­pa­ny, SCL, in 2015. Pat­ten appar­ent­ly played a cen­tral role in SCL’s 2015 work in Nige­ria that involved the use of a hack­ing team to obtain hacked doc­u­ments on their clien­t’s polit­i­cal oppo­nent.

    Also recall how Pat­ten’s work in Ukraine in 2015 also includ­ed con­sult­ing for Vitalii Klitschko, one of the lead­ers of the Maid­an protests.

    So Pat­ten is clear­ly a high­ly intrigu­ing fig­ure in this entire affair because he touch­es upon so many aspects of it but does so in a way that under­mines the pre­vail­ing nar­ra­tive. And now we’re learn­ing that Pat­ten’s wife was an FBI and CIA coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cial who’s work cov­ered Ukraine.

    Ok, first, here’s an arti­cle about Pat­ten receiv­ing a rather light sen­tence of just three years of pro­ba­tion, 500 hours of com­mu­ni­ty ser­vice, and a $5,000 fine. This sen­tence came down from U.S. Dis­trict Judge Amy Berman Jack­son, the same judge that sen­tenced Paul Man­afort. Jack­son accept­ed the pros­e­cu­tors’ request for lenien­cy while Pat­ten’s defense team cit­ed his sub­stan­tial assis­tance in sev­er­al ongo­ing, undis­closed inves­ti­ga­tions:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    W. Samuel Pat­ten sen­tenced to pro­ba­tion after steer­ing Ukrain­ian mon­ey to Trump inau­gur­al

    By Spencer S. Hsu
    April 12, 2019 at 12:28 PM

    An Amer­i­can polit­i­cal con­sul­tant whose guilty plea marked the first con­fir­ma­tion that ille­gal for­eign mon­ey was used to help fund Don­ald Trump’s inau­gur­al com­mit­tee was sen­tenced to pro­ba­tion Fri­day by a fed­er­al judge who cit­ed his coop­er­a­tion with U.S. pros­e­cu­tors.

    W. Samuel Pat­ten, 47, in August admit­ted steer­ing $50,000 from a pro-Russ­ian Ukrain­ian politi­cian to Trump’s com­mit­tee in an inves­ti­ga­tion spun off from spe­cial coun­sel Robert S. Mueller III’s probe of Russ­ian inter­fer­ence in the 2016 U.S. elec­tion. Pat­ten acknowl­edged he was helped by a Russ­ian nation­al who is a long­time asso­ciate of for­mer Trump cam­paign chair­man Paul Man­afort, and the case was referred to pros­e­cu­tors with the U.S. attorney’s office in Wash­ing­ton and the Jus­tice Department’s nation­al secu­ri­ty divi­sion.

    Before he was sen­tenced, Pat­ten, accom­pa­nied in court by his wife, sis­ter and friends and neigh­bors, thanked the judge for her han­dling of his case and asked for a sen­tence that would per­mit him to “con­tin­ue in what­ev­er way I can to serve my coun­try.”

    In spar­ing Pat­ten from prison, U.S. Dis­trict Judge Amy Berman Jack­son accept­ed pros­e­cu­tors’ request for lenien­cy and not­ed no fed­er­al sen­tenc­ing guide­line direct­ly applies to his offense of fail­ing to reg­is­ter as a for­eign lob­by­ist, which is pun­ish­able by up to five years in prison. Patten’s defense sought pro­ba­tion cit­ing the sub­stan­tial assis­tance he pro­vid­ed in sev­er­al ongo­ing, undis­closed inves­ti­ga­tions.

    He was sen­tenced to three years of pro­ba­tion, 500 hours of com­mu­ni­ty ser­vice and fined $5,000.

    Patten’s offens­es were “not a tech­ni­cal­i­ty, and not an over­sight,” Jack­son said in court, but seri­ous offens­es cal­cu­lat­ed to influ­ence pub­lic pol­i­cy and opin­ion in the Unit­ed States for a for­eign gov­ern­ment “with­out telling the Amer­i­can peo­ple that it was those very Ukraini­ans pay­ing you to do the talk­ing.”

    “The whole point, and only point, of the FARA (For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act) statute is to ensure trans­paren­cy in the pub­lic pol­i­cy and the polit­i­cal process,” Jack­son said. “If peo­ple don’t have the facts, then democ­ra­cy doesn’t work.”

    Pat­ten “earned the trust of the gov­ern­ment and became a reli­able and valu­able resource” for Mueller’s Rus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion and pros­e­cu­tors with the U.S. attorney’s office, Patten’s attor­ney Stu­art A. Sears said in sen­tenc­ing papers.

    Jack­son referred to that assis­tance, not­ing Pat­ten did not try to jus­ti­fy or blame his actions on oth­ers, “and more impor­tant­ly, you’ve done every­thing in your pow­er to make amends” by assist­ing pros­e­cu­tors.

    “This is not a pic­ture of some­one who’s moti­vat­ed by greed, some­one who sells his ser­vices to the high­est bid­der, or some­one who’s look­ing for a cushy or com­fort­able sit­u­a­tion,” Jack­son said.

    Pat­ten has been released on his own recog­ni­zance since plead­ing guilty Aug. 31.

    With­out that coop­er­a­tion in the case, Jack­son said she would have con­sid­ered some prison time for Patten’s lying in the Senate’s Rus­sia probe.

    The judge also dis­tin­guished his case from Mueller defen­dant Paul Manafort’s. The for­mer Trump cam­paign chair­man was giv­en a 7 1/2- year prison term for hid­ing tens of mil­lions of dol­lars of income from undis­closed lob­by­ing work for a pro-Russ­ian Ukrain­ian politi­cian. Manafort’s term includes 30 months that Jack­son imposed for con­spir­a­cy to defraud the Unit­ed States by abus­ing FARA and oth­er laws.

    “Just to clar­i­fy, my pri­or sen­tence for Paul Man­afort was not” just for con­spir­ing to vio­late FARA, but also to vio­late for­eign bank account reg­is­tra­tion require­ments, income tax and mon­ey laun­der­ing laws, Jack­son said.

    Assis­tant U.S. Attor­ney Fer­nan­do Cam­poamor-Sanchez agreed, say­ing Pat­ten “real­ly is in a dif­fer­ent posi­tion [from oth­er FARA cas­es], we believe in a pos­i­tive way.”

    Pat­ten admit­ted in court doc­u­ments that he failed to reg­is­ter with the Jus­tice Depart­ment while he worked on behalf of a Rus­sia-aligned Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal par­ty. Pat­ten acknowl­edged arrang­ing for an Amer­i­can to act as a “straw donor” to give the $50,000 in exchange for four Trump inau­gu­ra­tion tick­ets for a Ukrain­ian busi­ness­man.

    Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion, which raised a record $100 mil­lion, was attend­ed by an unusu­al­ly large num­ber of promi­nent for­eign busi­ness lead­ers, par­tic­u­lar­ly Russ­ian moguls, but for­eign­ers are barred from con­tribut­ing to the event.

    Fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in Man­hat­tan, the attor­neys gen­er­al for the Dis­trict and New Jer­sey, and the House Intel­li­gence and Judi­cia­ry com­mit­tees have launched sep­a­rate inves­ti­ga­tions into the Trump com­mit­tee and top offi­cials in probes focused on dona­tions and spend­ing.

    Sears not­ed his client’s past work pro­mot­ing democ­ra­cy abroad and his promis­ing start as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant. “With­out a doubt, Mr. Pat­ten earned his felony con­vic­tion in this case, the attor­ney said, but also earned a non-incar­cer­a­tion sen­tence. “He had a choice to make in this case, between his career and assist­ing the gov­ern­ment. He chose his coun­try. ... He sac­ri­ficed his career ... in order to help the gov­ern­ment and coop­er­ate in this case.”

    In plea papers, Pat­ten said he formed a com­pa­ny with a Russ­ian nation­al, iden­ti­fied as “For­eign­er A,” to engage in lob­by­ing and polit­i­cal con­sult­ing ser­vices.

    The com­pa­ny had received about $1 mil­lion since 2015 for its Ukraine con­sult­ing work, which includ­ed advis­ing a Ukrain­ian par­ty known as the Oppo­si­tion Bloc as well as some of its mem­bers, one of whom is a promi­nent Ukrain­ian busi­ness exec­u­tive iden­ti­fied only as “For­eign­er B.”

    Pros­e­cu­tors said Pat­ten helped the busi­ness exec­u­tive get meet­ings to lob­by mem­bers of Con­gress in 2015 and helped him author an op-ed in Feb­ru­ary 2017 that appears to match a U.S. News & World Report arti­cle argu­ing that Ukraine would do fine under Pres­i­dent Trump.

    The descrip­tion of “For­eign­er A” match­es Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik, a long­time Man­afort asso­ciate charged in Wash­ing­ton along with Man­afort with obstruc­tion of jus­tice and wit­ness tam­per­ing. Pros­e­cu­tors have said they believe that Kil­imnik has ties to Russ­ian intel­li­gence. Kil­imnik has denied any such ties, and Pat­ten said he had no idea such links were alleged.

    The descrip­tion of “For­eign­er B” match­es Ser­hiy Lovochkin, a Ukrain­ian busi­ness exec­u­tive and politi­cian who served as a top aide to for­mer Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych, a pro-Russ­ian politi­cian who was Manafort’s chief client.

    Pat­ten told pros­e­cu­tors that he worked with Kil­imnik to help Lovochkin route the ille­gal dona­tion to Trump’s inau­gu­ra­tion. Pros­e­cu­tors do not say whether Kil­imnik attend­ed.

    Pat­ten also agreed that he mis­led the Sen­ate Intel­li­gence Com­mit­tee when he tes­ti­fied before the pan­el in Jan­u­ary.

    Lovochkin’s office has said he attend­ed the inau­gu­ra­tion but did not make the $50,000 pay­ment.

    Pat­ten acknowl­edged to the Sen­ate Intel­li­gence Com­mit­tee that he false­ly min­i­mized his con­tact with U.S. offi­cials on behalf of for­eign clients and man­u­al­ly delet­ed 200,000 emails from his Gmail archive fold­er, his attor­ney said in court fil­ings. But he vol­un­tar­i­ly pro­vid­ed mate­ri­als that incrim­i­nat­ed him, includ­ing more than 1,300 pages of doc­u­ments, Sears wrote.

    ...

    U.S. Attor­ney Gen­er­al William P. Barr announced that Mueller con­clud­ed his probe March 27 with­out fur­ther indict­ments, but the spe­cial coun­sel had been refer­ring sev­er­al mat­ters to oth­er pros­e­cu­tors, includ­ing the U.S. attorney’s office for the Dis­trict.

    Pat­ten worked in the oil sec­tor in Kaza­khstan in the mid- to late 1990s and served as Maine cam­paign direc­tor for George W. Bush’s 2000 pres­i­den­tial run. He also briefly worked at the State Depart­ment under Bush and as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant in Iraq assist­ing offi­cials there in the post-Sad­dam Hus­sein peri­od.

    In a 2017 inter­view with The Post, Pat­ten said he met Kil­imnik in Moscow more than 15 years ago, when Kil­imnik was an employ­ee of the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute, a pro-democ­ra­cy group affil­i­at­ed with the U.S. Repub­li­can Par­ty. Pat­ten ran the office from 2001 to 2004. “I relied on him,” Pat­ten said in the inter­view.

    Kil­imnik left the IRI around 2005 to work for Man­afort in Kiev, the Ukrain­ian cap­i­tal, even­tu­al­ly being named man­ag­er of Manafort’s Ukraine office. Pat­ten praised Kil­imnik at the time as a per­son who helped Man­afort nav­i­gate the com­pli­cat­ed Ukrain­ian polit­i­cal scene.

    ———-

    “W. Samuel Pat­ten sen­tenced to pro­ba­tion after steer­ing Ukrain­ian mon­ey to Trump inau­gur­al” by Spencer S. Hsu; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 04/12/2019

    “He was sen­tenced to three years of pro­ba­tion, 500 hours of com­mu­ni­ty ser­vice and fined $5,000.”

    Three years of pro­ba­tion. That was what Pat­ten got for a crime that could have been pun­ish­able for up to five years in prison. Pros­e­cu­tors asked for lenien­cy and the defense cit­ed “the sub­stan­tial assis­tance he pro­vid­ed in sev­er­al ongo­ing, undis­closed inves­ti­ga­tions”:

    ...
    Before he was sen­tenced, Pat­ten, accom­pa­nied in court by his wife, sis­ter and friends and neigh­bors, thanked the judge for her han­dling of his case and asked for a sen­tence that would per­mit him to “con­tin­ue in what­ev­er way I can to serve my coun­try.”

    In spar­ing Pat­ten from prison, U.S. Dis­trict Judge Amy Berman Jack­son accept­ed pros­e­cu­tors’ request for lenien­cy and not­ed no fed­er­al sen­tenc­ing guide­line direct­ly applies to his offense of fail­ing to reg­is­ter as a for­eign lob­by­ist, which is pun­ish­able by up to five years in prison. Patten’s defense sought pro­ba­tion cit­ing the sub­stan­tial assis­tance he pro­vid­ed in sev­er­al ongo­ing, undis­closed inves­ti­ga­tions.

    ...

    Patten’s offens­es were “not a tech­ni­cal­i­ty, and not an over­sight,” Jack­son said in court, but seri­ous offens­es cal­cu­lat­ed to influ­ence pub­lic pol­i­cy and opin­ion in the Unit­ed States for a for­eign gov­ern­ment “with­out telling the Amer­i­can peo­ple that it was those very Ukraini­ans pay­ing you to do the talk­ing.”

    “The whole point, and only point, of the FARA (For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act) statute is to ensure trans­paren­cy in the pub­lic pol­i­cy and the polit­i­cal process,” Jack­son said. “If peo­ple don’t have the facts, then democ­ra­cy doesn’t work.”

    Pat­ten “earned the trust of the gov­ern­ment and became a reli­able and valu­able resource” for Mueller’s Rus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion and pros­e­cu­tors with the U.S. attorney’s office, Patten’s attor­ney Stu­art A. Sears said in sen­tenc­ing papers.

    Jack­son referred to that assis­tance, not­ing Pat­ten did not try to jus­ti­fy or blame his actions on oth­ers, “and more impor­tant­ly, you’ve done every­thing in your pow­er to make amends” by assist­ing pros­e­cu­tors.

    “This is not a pic­ture of some­one who’s moti­vat­ed by greed, some­one who sells his ser­vices to the high­est bid­der, or some­one who’s look­ing for a cushy or com­fort­able sit­u­a­tion,” Jack­son said.
    ...

    So that’s pret­ty notable that there are sev­er­al ongo­ing, undis­closed inves­ti­ga­tions and Pat­ten has pro­vid­ed sub­stan­tial assis­tance.

    And keep in mind that Pat­ten and Kil­imnik met while they were both work­ing at the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute, a pro-democ­ra­cy group affil­i­at­ed with the U.S. Repub­li­can Par­ty. It’s quite a resume item for Kil­imnik, some­one who is rou­tine­ly referred to as a GRU agent these days:

    ...
    Pat­ten worked in the oil sec­tor in Kaza­khstan in the mid- to late 1990s and served as Maine cam­paign direc­tor for George W. Bush’s 2000 pres­i­den­tial run. He also briefly worked at the State Depart­ment under Bush and as a polit­i­cal con­sul­tant in Iraq assist­ing offi­cials there in the post-Sad­dam Hus­sein peri­od.

    In a 2017 inter­view with The Post, Pat­ten said he met Kil­imnik in Moscow more than 15 years ago, when Kil­imnik was an employ­ee of the Inter­na­tion­al Repub­li­can Insti­tute, a pro-democ­ra­cy group affil­i­at­ed with the U.S. Repub­li­can Par­ty. Pat­ten ran the office from 2001 to 2004. “I relied on him,” Pat­ten said in the inter­view.
    ...

    Ok, now here’s an excerpt from the let­ter Pat­ten’s wife, Lau­ra Pat­ten, wrote in sup­port of Sam where she describes how she worked as a CIA covert oper­a­tions offi­cer over­seas and, lat­er, as the Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Divi­sion Direc­tor at the Depart­ment of Ener­gy. And in her last gov­ern­ment posi­tion she was a Senior Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Offi­cer at the FBI’s Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Divi­sion, Transna­tion­al Orga­nized Crime (East) which cov­ers Ukraine:

    Case 1:18-cr-00260-ABJ Doc­u­ment 37–1 Filed 04/08/19

    March 12, 2019

    Dear Judge Jack­son,

    My name is Lau­ra Pat­ten and I write in sup­port of William Samuel Pat­ten, Jr., who awaits sen­tenc­ing in your court for his fail­ure under the For­eign Agent Reg­is­tra­tion Act (FARA). I write as a wife, an Amer­i­ca, and a Unit­ed States nation­al secu­ri­ty expert.

    I have devot­ed the bulk of my adult life to pro­mot­ing U.S. inter­ests and pro­tect­ing our nation from for­eign adver­saries, first as a Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency covert oper­a­tions offi­cer over­seas, and lat­er as an overt Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Divi­sion Direc­tor at the Depart­ment of Ener­gy here in Wash­ing­ton. In my last gov­ern­ment posi­tion, I served as a Senior Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Offi­cer detailed to the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion’s Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Divi­sion, Transna­tion­al Orga­nized Crime (East), which cov­ers Ukraine and broad swaths of the for­mer Sovi­et empire. In 2017, I joined a pri­vate firm where I still work. I hold a Mas­ter’s in Inter­na­tion­al Affairs from Colum­bia Uni­ver­si­ty, and am pur­su­ing a Ph.D.

    ...

    Described as a ‘lob­by­ist’ in the media, most of Sam’s pro­fes­sion­al activ­i­ties have involved pro­vid­ing strate­gic cam­paign and com­mu­ni­ca­tions advice to polit­i­cal can­di­dates, busi­ness lead­ers, and human rights advo­cates. He is a vocal oppo­nent of Vladimir Putin and oth­er author­i­tar­i­ans. Over the years, Sam devel­oped an exper­tise sup­port­ing clients strug­gling against cor­rupt regimes in chal­leng­ing for­eign envi­ron­ments. Sam so pas­sion­ate­ly believes in giv­ing voice to the voice­less, that I lost track of how many times he accept­ed pro-bono clients.

    ...

    Before he was charged, I wit­nessed Sam share with Admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials, Con­gres­sion­al Mem­bers and staff, aca­d­e­mics, jour­nal­ists, and mil­i­tary offi­cers, his insights and obser­va­tions from work­ing over­seas. Sam was forth­com­ing about his work with any­one who asked. Respect­ed thought-lead­ers fre­quent­ed our home and solicit­ed Sam’s analy­sis of com­plex events relat­ed to the for­mer Sovi­et Union, includ­ing his work in Ukraine — a small aspect of which he failed to reg­is­ter and caused him to be charged. In that vein, as far back as 2014, I wrote and spoke to my FBI super­vi­sors, as well as to Spe­cial Agents assigned to Wash­ing­ton Field Office coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence squads, about Sam’s abil­i­ty and will­ing­ness to help them access and ana­lyze for­eign sub­jects of inves­tiga­tive val­ue — includ­ing those that are per­ti­nent to this case. This illus­trates that, while Sam’s fail­ure to for­mal­ly reg­is­ter is his respon­si­bil­i­ty, and his respon­si­bil­i­ty alone, the omis­sion was not intend­ed to hide his for­eign asso­ci­a­tions from the US gov­ern­ment.

    Recent­ly, the gov­ern­ment announced it believes that Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian cit­i­zen, For­eign­er A, was in the throes of a Russ­ian intel­li­gence agency dur­ing the peri­od in which he worked with Sam. This news, if cor­rect, is dev­as­tat­ing to me and Sam. Gen­er­a­tions of our fam­i­ly have stood against Russ­ian aggres­sion, both pro­fes­sion­al­ly and per­son­al­ly. One does not have to look as far back as Sam’s pater­nal step-grand­fa­ther’s well-doc­u­ment­ed resis­tance to Russ­ian black­mail. Once could look at my gov­ern­ment career, in which I spent years, and received awards for, active­ly coun­ter­ing Russ­ian intel­li­gence agen­cies both here and abroad. Or one could look at the reports that I made to prop­er fed­er­al author­i­ties after Sam and I appear to have been poi­soned dur­ing a 2016 FBI-autho­rized trip to Rus­sia — reports that I filed through offi­cial gov­ern­ment chan­nels and for which there was zero fol­low-up from author­i­ties.

    As a coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cer, I was aware of, and engaged in, mul­ti­ple efforts to warn Amer­i­can cit­i­zens when a spe­cif­ic for­eign threat actor tar­get­ed him or her. Thus, I am left won­der­ing what would have hap­pened had our gov­ern­ment warned us, per nor­mal and cus­tom­ary nation­al secu­ri­ty pro­to­cols, about what it believes if For­eign­er A’s affil­i­a­tion with Russ­ian intel­li­gence? Cer­tain­ly, had we known what the gov­ern­ment believed, in light of my pro­fes­sion Sam would have ceased his asso­ci­a­tion with For­eign­er A and not part­nered with him for busi­ness in the Unit­ed States, where FARA applies, or any­where else in the world. We also may have been able to help the gov­ern­ment, in some small way, thwart Russ­ian inter­fer­ence.

    ...

    ———–

    “I have devot­ed the bulk of my adult life to pro­mot­ing U.S. inter­ests and pro­tect­ing our nation from for­eign adver­saries, first as a Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency covert oper­a­tions offi­cer over­seas, and lat­er as an overt Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Divi­sion Direc­tor at the Depart­ment of Ener­gy here in Wash­ing­ton. In my last gov­ern­ment posi­tion, I served as a Senior Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Offi­cer detailed to the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion’s Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Divi­sion, Transna­tion­al Orga­nized Crime (East), which cov­ers Ukraine and broad swaths of the for­mer Sovi­et empire. In 2017, I joined a pri­vate firm where I still work. I hold a Mas­ter’s in Inter­na­tion­al Affairs from Colum­bia Uni­ver­si­ty, and am pur­su­ing a Ph.D.”

    It’s quite a back­ground for the wife of one of the fig­ures who is alleged­ly at the heart of a Krem­lin col­lu­sion scheme. And note the ref­er­ence to Lau­ra appar­ent­ly speak­ing with the FBI in 2014 (the year of the Maid­an protests and down­fall of the Yanukovych gov­ern­ment) about Sam’s abil­i­ty and will­ing­ness to help them access and ana­lyze for sub­jects of inves­tiga­tive val­ue — includ­ing those that are per­ti­nent to this case:

    ...
    Before he was charged, I wit­nessed Sam share with Admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials, Con­gres­sion­al Mem­bers and staff, aca­d­e­mics, jour­nal­ists, and mil­i­tary offi­cers, his insights and obser­va­tions from work­ing over­seas. Sam was forth­com­ing about his work with any­one who asked. Respect­ed thought-lead­ers fre­quent­ed our home and solicit­ed Sam’s analy­sis of com­plex events relat­ed to the for­mer Sovi­et Union, includ­ing his work in Ukraine — a small aspect of which he failed to reg­is­ter and caused him to be charged. In that vein, as far back as 2014, I wrote and spoke to my FBI super­vi­sors, as well as to Spe­cial Agents assigned to Wash­ing­ton Field Office coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence squads, about Sam’s abil­i­ty and will­ing­ness to help them access and ana­lyze for­eign sub­jects of inves­tiga­tive val­ue — includ­ing those that are per­ti­nent to this case. This illus­trates that, while Sam’s fail­ure to for­mal­ly reg­is­ter is his respon­si­bil­i­ty, and his respon­si­bil­i­ty alone, the omis­sion was not intend­ed to hide his for­eign asso­ci­a­tions from the US gov­ern­ment.
    ...

    Also note Lau­ra’s appar­ent­ly befud­dle­ment at the gov­ern­men­t’s charges that “For­eign­er A” (Kon­stan­tin Kil­imnik) was “in the throes of a Russ­ian intel­li­gence agency dur­ing the peri­od in which he worked with Sam”. High­ly under­stand­able befud­dle­ment giv­en that Kil­imnik was an IRI employ­ee for ten year. But it must be espe­cial­ly befud­dling giv­en that Lau­ra was an FBI and CIA coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cer whose work includ­ed Ukraine. One would think this assess­ment of Kil­imnik as a GRU agent would have come up dur­ing the course of her work before now:

    ...
    Recent­ly, the gov­ern­ment announced it believes that Ukrain­ian-Russ­ian cit­i­zen, For­eign­er A, was in the throes of a Russ­ian intel­li­gence agency dur­ing the peri­od in which he worked with Sam. This news, if cor­rect, is dev­as­tat­ing to me and Sam. Gen­er­a­tions of our fam­i­ly have stood against Russ­ian aggres­sion, both pro­fes­sion­al­ly and per­son­al­ly. One does not have to look as far back as Sam’s pater­nal step-grand­fa­ther’s well-doc­u­ment­ed resis­tance to Russ­ian black­mail. Once could look at my gov­ern­ment career, in which I spent years, and received awards for, active­ly coun­ter­ing Russ­ian intel­li­gence agen­cies both here and abroad. Or one could look at the reports that I made to prop­er fed­er­al author­i­ties after Sam and I appear to have been poi­soned dur­ing a 2016 FBI-autho­rized trip to Rus­sia — reports that I filed through offi­cial gov­ern­ment chan­nels and for which there was zero fol­low-up from author­i­ties.

    As a coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cer, I was aware of, and engaged in, mul­ti­ple efforts to warn Amer­i­can cit­i­zens when a spe­cif­ic for­eign threat actor tar­get­ed him or her. Thus, I am left won­der­ing what would have hap­pened had our gov­ern­ment warned us, per nor­mal and cus­tom­ary nation­al secu­ri­ty pro­to­cols, about what it believes if For­eign­er A’s affil­i­a­tion with Russ­ian intel­li­gence? Cer­tain­ly, had we known what the gov­ern­ment believed, in light of my pro­fes­sion Sam would have ceased his asso­ci­a­tion with For­eign­er A and not part­nered with him for busi­ness in the Unit­ed States, where FARA applies, or any­where else in the world. We also may have been able to help the gov­ern­ment, in some small way, thwart Russ­ian inter­fer­ence.
    ...

    “As a coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence offi­cer, I was aware of, and engaged in, mul­ti­ple efforts to warn Amer­i­can cit­i­zens when a spe­cif­ic for­eign threat actor tar­get­ed him or her. Thus, I am left won­der­ing what would have hap­pened had our gov­ern­ment warned us, per nor­mal and cus­tom­ary nation­al secu­ri­ty pro­to­cols, about what it believes if For­eign­er A’s affil­i­a­tion with Russ­ian intel­li­gence?

    Why did­n’t the US gov­ern­ment warn Lau­ra that her hus­band’s busi­ness part­ner is a GRU agent? It’s a pret­ty mas­sive ques­tion that will pre­sum­ably remain offi­cial­ly unad­dressed. And that’s all part of what makes the remark­ably lenient sen­tenc­ing for Sam Pat­ten so notable.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | April 12, 2019, 1:20 pm
  17. There was nev­er real­ly any ques­tion as to whether or not the tes­ti­mo­ny of Attor­ney Gen­er­al Bill Barr before the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee would be a dis­as­ter. The ques­tion was what kind of dis­as­ter. And now we know what kind of dis­as­ter: a con­sti­tu­tion­al cri­sis dis­as­ter where Barr repeat­ed­ly argues that pres­i­dents can legal­ly obstruct inves­ti­ga­tions into them­selves that they view as unfair and they are being false­ly accused:

    Talk­ing Points Memo
    Five Points

    Barr’s Most Absurd Defens­es Of Trump’s Obstruc­tive Con­duct

    By Alle­gra Kirk­land
    May 1, 2019 3:59 pm

    By now, it’s pret­ty clear that Attor­ney Gen­er­al Bill Barr thinks there was noth­ing unusu­al — let alone poten­tial­ly crim­i­nal — about Pres­i­dent Trump’s inter­ven­tion in the fed­er­al Rus­sia inves­ti­ga­tion. Not the repeat­ed push­es to fire spe­cial coun­sel Robert Mueller, not the pub­lic fum­ing about being the inno­cent vic­tim of a fed­er­al “witch hunt,” not the tweet­ed threats to the fam­i­ly of his for­mer per­son­al attor­ney.

    Trump was just upset that he was a tar­get of an inves­ti­ga­tion he felt to be “unfair,” Barr said again dur­ing a Wednes­day hear­ing before the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee.

    But Barr also offered some new cre­ative jus­ti­fi­ca­tions of Trump’s con­duct — one of which was so far-fetched that it prompt­ed laugh­ter in the hear­ing room.

    Here are the instances that stuck out to us.

    1 Trump didn’t have a “cor­rupt motive”; he was just frus­trat­ed by Mueller’s con­flicts!

    In Barr’s under­stand­ing, Trump only ordered his White House Coun­sel Don McGahn to fire Mueller because he was con­cerned about Mueller’s sup­posed con­flicts of inter­ests.

    “If the Pres­i­dent is being false­ly accused — and the evi­dence now sug­gests that the accu­sa­tions against him were false — and he knew they were false, and he felt that this inves­ti­ga­tion was unfair, pro­pelled by his polit­i­cal oppo­nents, and was ham­per­ing his abil­i­ty to gov­ern, that is not a cor­rupt motive for replac­ing an inde­pen­dent coun­sel,” Barr tes­ti­fied.

    McGahn told Mueller that the con­flicts Trump cit­ed were “sil­ly” and “not real.” They include the life­long Repub­li­can ex-FBI director’s efforts to get reim­bursed from Trump’s Vir­ginia golf club after can­celling his mem­ber­ship over a decade ago. Oth­er sup­posed con­flicts: sev­er­al mem­bers of Mueller’s large team had donat­ed to Demo­c­ra­t­ic politi­cians.

    2 Trump has the “con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty” to end probes he thinks are bogus

    Barr expand­ed on this the­o­ry in a lat­er round of ques­tion­ing, when Sen. Patrick Leahy (D‑VT) asked about Trump’s pos­si­ble motives for obstruc­tion.

    Barr admit­ted that Trump could have such motives even if there was no “under­ly­ing crime” i.e. that Mueller did not prove that Trump’s cam­paign express­ly vio­lat­ed the law by con­spir­ing with Rus­sia. But then he said it was with­in Trump’s “con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty” to han­dle the probe as he saw fit.

    “In this sit­u­a­tion with the Pres­i­dent who has con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty to super­vise pro­ceed­ings, if, in fact, a pro­ceed­ing was not well-found­ed, if it was a ground­less pro­ceed­ing, or based on false alle­ga­tions, the Pres­i­dent does not have to sit there con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly and allow it to run its course,” Barr said.

    “The Pres­i­dent could ter­mi­nate that pro­ceed­ing and it would not be a cor­rupt intent because he was being false­ly accused,” Barr con­tin­ued. “And he would be wor­ried about the impact on his admin­is­tra­tion. That is impor­tant because most of the obstruc­tion claims that are being made here, or episodes, do involve the exer­cise of the President’s con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty and we now know that he was being false­ly accused.”

    3 The McGahn inci­dents were just about spin­ning the press

    Barr was ques­tioned repeat­ed­ly about Trump’s orders that McGahn fire Mueller in June 2017, then lie about the inci­dent some six months lat­er — even cre­at­ing a false White House record deny­ing the whole thing ever hap­pened.

    Barr tes­ti­fied that Trump could have gen­uine­ly believed that the press, led by the New York Times, mis­re­port­ed this sto­ry and that he sim­ply want­ed McGahn to cor­rect the record.

    “There is evi­dence that the Pres­i­dent actu­al­ly thought and believed that the Times arti­cle was wrong,” Barr said. “That is evi­dence on the P resident’s side of the ledger that he actu­al­ly thought it was wrong and was ask­ing for its cor­rec­tion. It is also pos­si­ble, the report says, that the President’s intent was direct­ed at the pub­lic­i­ty and the press. The gov­ern­ment has to prove things beyond a rea­son­able doubt.”

    4 Dis­cour­ag­ing flip­ping isn’t obstruc­tion

    When Trump dis­cour­aged his asso­ciates from coop­er­at­ing with the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment, he was prob­a­bly just try­ing to make sure they didn’t lie to get a bet­ter deal, Barr said.

    Trump’s many tweets, pub­lic com­ments and pri­vate exhor­ta­tions to Michael Cohen, Roger Stone, Michael Fly­nn, Paul Man­afort and oth­ers to remain “strong” and not “flip” were “not obstruc­tion,” Barr said.

    “The evi­dence, I think what the President’s lawyers would say, is that the President’s state­ments about flip­ping are quite clear and express and uni­form­ly the same which is, by flip­ping he meant suc­cumb­ing to pres­sure on unre­lat­ed cas­es to lie and com­pose in order to get lenient treat­ment,” Barr tes­ti­fied. “That is not — it’s a dis­cour­ag­ing flip­ping in that sense, it’s not obstruc­tion.”

    TPM’s Tier­ney Sneed report­ed that this rhetor­i­cal back­flip­ping prompt­ed laugh­ter in the hear­ing room.

    5 Barr still doesn’t get Mueller’s rea­son­ing on obstruc­tion

    After pour­ing over the 488-page report, over­see­ing its redac­tion, and repeat­ed­ly offer­ing his pub­lic assess­ment of it, Barr said Wednes­day that he still doesn’t quite get what Mueller had to say about the Trump obstruc­tion ques­tion.

    Asked by Sen. John Kennedy (R‑LA) why Mueller didn’t reach a con­clu­sion on this top­ic, Barr said he “real­ly couldn’t reca­pit­u­late it.”

    “The deputy was with me, the prin­ci­ple asso­ciate deputy,” Barr said, describ­ing a March 5 meet­ing with Mueller to dis­cuss the final report. “We didn’t real­ly get a clear under­stand­ing of the rea­son­ing. And the report, I’m not sure exact­ly what the full line of rea­son­ing is and that’s one of the rea­sons I didn’t want to try to put words in Bob Mueller’s mouth.”

    Mueller relays in the report that he adhered to Jus­tice Depart­ment pol­i­cy that a sit­ting pres­i­dent can’t be indict­ed, in part because they are unable to defend them­selves in court. The spe­cial coun­sel express­ly said that he would have exon­er­at­ed Trump on this issue if he could, but could not. He laid out mul­ti­ple rea­sons why Trump would want to obstruct this par­tic­u­lar inves­ti­ga­tion, includ­ing the fear that Mueller would dis­cov­er evi­dence of a crime.

    ...

    ———–

    “Barr’s Most Absurd Defens­es Of Trump’s Obstruc­tive Con­duct” by Alle­gra Kirk­land; Talk­ing Points Memo; 05/01/2019

    ““If the Pres­i­dent is being false­ly accused — and the evi­dence now sug­gests that the accu­sa­tions against him were false — and he knew they were false, and he felt that this inves­ti­ga­tion was unfair, pro­pelled by his polit­i­cal oppo­nents, and was ham­per­ing his abil­i­ty to gov­ern, that is not a cor­rupt motive for replac­ing an inde­pen­dent coun­sel,” Barr tes­ti­fied.”

    It’s not cor­rupt for a pres­i­dent to replace the inde­pen­dent coun­sel inves­ti­gat­ing them as long as the pres­i­dent knows the accu­sa­tions are false. That’s seri­ous­ly what the attor­ney gen­er­al argue in front of Con­gress. Beyond that, Barr went on to argue that Trump would­n’t just have the con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty to replace an inde­pen­dent coun­sel. Trump could shut the entire thing down, as long as he feels he’s being false­ly accused and the inves­ti­ga­tion is ground­less:

    ...
    Barr expand­ed on this the­o­ry in a lat­er round of ques­tion­ing, when Sen. Patrick Leahy (D‑VT) asked about Trump’s pos­si­ble motives for obstruc­tion.

    Barr admit­ted that Trump could have such motives even if there was no “under­ly­ing crime” i.e. that Mueller did not prove that Trump’s cam­paign express­ly vio­lat­ed the law by con­spir­ing with Rus­sia. But then he said it was with­in Trump’s “con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty” to han­dle the probe as he saw fit.

    “In this sit­u­a­tion with the Pres­i­dent who has con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty to super­vise pro­ceed­ings, if, in fact, a pro­ceed­ing was not well-found­ed, if it was a ground­less pro­ceed­ing, or based on false alle­ga­tions, the Pres­i­dent does not have to sit there con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly and allow it to run its course,” Barr said.

    “The Pres­i­dent could ter­mi­nate that pro­ceed­ing and it would not be a cor­rupt intent because he was being false­ly accused,” Barr con­tin­ued. “And he would be wor­ried about the impact on his admin­is­tra­tion. That is impor­tant because most of the obstruc­tion claims that are being made here, or episodes, do involve the exer­cise of the President’s con­sti­tu­tion­al author­i­ty and we now know that he was being false­ly accused.”
    ...

    So that’s obvi­ous­ly a huge dis­as­ter. Because now it’s no longer a ques­tion about whether or not the obstruc­tion of jus­tice alle­ga­tions in the Mueller report (and the obstruc­tion of jus­tice Trump engaged in pub­licly) con­sti­tute impeach­able offens­es for Trump. Barr just made impeach­ment of him­self a polit­i­cal issue. Arguably an urgent polit­i­cal issue. And that more or less guar­an­tees that impeach­ment is going to be a cen­tral issue head­ing into 2020.

    But as with so much of this #Rus­si­a­Gate sto­ry, the open obstruc­tion of jus­tice on the part of the Trump team does­n’t negate the many prob­lems with the under­ly­ing nar­ra­tive we are told about what hap­pened in 2016. And those under­ly­ing prob­lems can, in turn, feed into the Trump team’s charges that they were com­plete­ly set up and are total­ly inno­cent. So as the impeach­ment inves­ti­ga­tions grow in scope and seri­ous­ness, the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a seri­ous reex­am­i­na­tion of the facts sur­round­ing this case is going to grow as a result of the Trump team adopt­ing a “Trump can legal­ly obstruct as long as he was false­ly accused” defense strat­e­gy.

    And that’s all what makes the fol­low­ing sto­ry so poten­tial­ly explo­sive: Remem­ber those sto­ries from mid-2014, short­ly after the Maid­an protests top­pled the gov­ern­ment in Ukraine, about how Ukraine has about a quar­ter of the nat­ur­al gas reserves in Europe and a nat­ur­al gas com­pa­ny with big stakes in Ukraine, Buris­ma, had hired Hunter Biden, who hap­pens to be the son of then-vice pres­i­dent Joe Biden? Well, that sto­ry is now back in the news. For rather con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly omi­nous rea­sons: it turns out that Ukraine’s new gov­ern­ment opened an inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma in 2014. Flash for­ward to March of 2016 and Joe Biden showed up in Kiev and threat­ened to with­hold $1 bil­lion in loans for Ukraine if the gov­ern­ment did­n’t fire Shokin. Shokin was fired lat­er that day and the probe into Buris­ma was sub­se­quent­ly dropped. This sequence of events is unsur­pris­ing­ly now being spun by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as a move by Joe to pro­tect Hunter’s com­pa­ny.

    But the Trump admin­is­tra­tion isn’t just spec­u­lat­ing as to whether or not Biden may have pushed for the fir­ing of Shokin to protest Buris­ma and Hunter. No, it turns out Trump has been send­ing Rudolph Giu­liani to Ukraine to have him meet with offi­cials there to talk about this case and encour­age the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment to reopen the case against Buris­ma. Recall how Giu­lian­i’s firm has been by the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment to do cyber­se­cu­ri­ty work and Giu­liani appears to be close to Ukrain­ian oli­garch Pavel Fuks (Fuchs).

    The probe of Buris­ma was reopened in March of this year by the same pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al who closed it in 2016, Yuriy Lut­senko. It was seen by many at the time as a move by the Poroshenko admin­is­tra­tion to get the sup­port of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion in the midst of a tough reelec­tion bid.

    So, as we saw with Ukraine’s inves­ti­ga­tions into Paul Man­afort, we have anoth­er Ukrain­ian inves­ti­ga­tion that could have a big impact on US pol­i­tics. But in this instance we have the Trump admin­is­tra­tion open­ly push­ing for Ukraine to reopen an inves­ti­ga­tion pri­mar­i­ly to embar­rass Joe Biden, a poten­tial 2020 oppo­nent. But it’s also being done in the mid­dle of a Trump dri­ve to absolve him­self of obstruc­tion of jus­tice charges by some­how prov­ing that inves­ti­ga­tion against him was ille­git­i­mate and that makes any­thing that rais­es ques­tions about the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion’s inter­ac­tions with the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment poten­tial­ly use­ful for Trump’s defense.

    In addi­tion, Giu­liani is open­ly admit­ting that he got involved with this because he’s seek­ing to counter the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion with evi­dence that Democ­rats con­spired with sym­pa­thet­ic Ukraini­ans to trig­ger the ini­tial inves­ti­ga­tion of the Trump cam­paign in 2016. Giu­liani explains that his inter­est in the Buris­ma inves­ti­ga­tion was an out­growth of that. So this push by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion to reex­am­ine what role Ukraine played in the 2016 fias­co is like­ly to only deep­en as this because a fun­da­men­tal part of Trump’s defense against obstruc­tion of jus­tice.

    Now, as we’re going to see, when you look at the broad­er con­text of the fir­ing of Vik­tor Shokin, it’s pret­ty clear that Biden was sim­ply deliv­er­ing a mes­sage that not just the US gov­ern­ment but EU gov­ern­ments had been push­ing for for many months before the fir­ing. There were even push­es with­in the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion for its own inves­ti­ga­tions into Buris­ma and Biden report­ed­ly did­n’t get involved in that. And those calls from West­ern gov­ern­ments for Shok­in’s fir­ing was part of a much larg­er demand by Ukraine’s west­ern back­ers for a larg­er gov­ern­ment over­haul after Ukraine failed to imple­ment an ambi­tious reform and anti-cor­rup­tion agen­da (in part because that agen­da involved mass pri­va­ti­za­tions and aus­ter­i­ty). But that broad­er con­text is large­ly left out of the pub­lic under­stand­ing of the Buris­ma inves­ti­ga­tion and the role Biden played in the fir­ing of Shokin at this point, mak­ing this a polit­i­cal­ly potent sto­ry for now. So it’s going to be inter­est­ing to see if the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s attempts to whip of a new Ukrain­ian inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma leads to more focus on the actu­al his­to­ry of Ukraine dur­ing the post-Maid­an peri­od. Because if there’s one cen­tral area where the entire #Rus­si­a­Gate sto­ry falls apart it’s the parts of the sto­ry involv­ing Ukraine, espe­cial­ly Paul Man­afort’s role in Ukraine but not lim­it­ed to that. It’s also going to be inter­est­ing to say what kind of pay back the Trump admin­stra­tion gives to Ukraine in exchange for reopen­ing this inves­ti­ga­tion. More mis­siles?

    The New York Times

    Biden Faces Con­flict of Inter­est Ques­tions That Are Being Pro­mot­ed by Trump and Allies

    By Ken­neth P. Vogel and Iuli­ia Mendel
    May 1, 2019

    WASHINGTON — It was a for­eign pol­i­cy role Joseph R. Biden Jr. enthu­si­as­ti­cal­ly embraced dur­ing his vice pres­i­den­cy: brow­beat­ing Ukraine’s noto­ri­ous­ly cor­rupt gov­ern­ment to clean up its act. And one of his most mem­o­rable per­for­mances came on a trip to Kiev in March 2016, when he threat­ened to with­hold $1 bil­lion in Unit­ed States loan guar­an­tees if Ukraine’s lead­ers did not dis­miss the country’s top pros­e­cu­tor, who had been accused of turn­ing a blind eye to cor­rup­tion in his own office and among the polit­i­cal elite.

    The pres­sure cam­paign worked. The pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, long a tar­get of crit­i­cism from oth­er West­ern nations and inter­na­tion­al lenders, was soon vot­ed out by the Ukrain­ian Par­lia­ment.

    Among those who had a stake in the out­come was Hunter Biden, Mr. Biden’s younger son, who at the time was on the board of an ener­gy com­pa­ny owned by a Ukrain­ian oli­garch who had been in the sights of the fired pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al.

    Hunter Biden was a Yale-edu­cat­ed lawyer who had served on the boards of Amtrak and a num­ber of non­prof­its and think tanks, but lacked any expe­ri­ence in Ukraine and just months ear­li­er had been dis­charged from the Navy Reserve after test­ing pos­i­tive for cocaine. He would be paid about $50,000 per month for his work for the com­pa­ny, Buris­ma Hold­ings.

    The broad out­lines of how the Bidens’ roles inter­sect­ed in Ukraine have been known for some time. The for­mer vice president’s cam­paign said that he had always act­ed to car­ry out Unit­ed States pol­i­cy with­out regard to any activ­i­ties of his son, that he had nev­er dis­cussed the mat­ter with Hunter Biden and that he learned of his son’s role with the Ukrain­ian ener­gy com­pa­ny from news reports.

    But new details about Hunter Biden’s involve­ment, and a deci­sion this year by the cur­rent Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al to reverse him­self and reopen an inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma, have pushed the issue back into the spot­light just as the senior Mr. Biden is begin­ning his 2020 pres­i­den­tial cam­paign.

    They show how Hunter Biden and his Amer­i­can busi­ness part­ners were part of a broad effort by Buris­ma to bring in well-con­nect­ed Democ­rats dur­ing a peri­od when the com­pa­ny was fac­ing inves­ti­ga­tions backed not just by domes­tic Ukrain­ian forces but by offi­cials in the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion. Hunter Biden’s work for Buris­ma prompt­ed con­cerns among State Depart­ment offi­cials at the time that the con­nec­tion could com­pli­cate Vice Pres­i­dent Biden’s diplo­ma­cy in Ukraine, for­mer offi­cials said.

    “I have had no role what­so­ev­er in rela­tion to any inves­ti­ga­tion of Buris­ma, or any of its offi­cers,” Hunter Biden said Wednes­day in a state­ment. “I explic­it­ly lim­it­ed my role to focus on cor­po­rate gov­er­nance best prac­tices to facil­i­tate Burisma’s desire to expand glob­al­ly.”

    Hunter Biden, who left Burisma’s board last month, was one of many polit­i­cal­ly promi­nent Amer­i­cans of both major par­ties who made mon­ey in Ukraine over the last decade. In sev­er­al cas­es — most notably that of Paul Man­afort, Pres­i­dent Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man — that busi­ness came under crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion that exposed a seedy side of the lucra­tive West­ern con­sult­ing indus­try in Ukraine.

    But the renewed scruti­ny of Hunter Biden’s expe­ri­ence in Ukraine has also been fanned by allies of Mr. Trump. They have been eager to pub­li­cize and even encour­age the inves­ti­ga­tion, as well as oth­er Ukrain­ian inquiries that serve Mr. Trump’s polit­i­cal ends, under­scor­ing the Trump campaign’s con­cern about the elec­toral threat from the for­mer vice president’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign.

    The Trump team’s efforts to draw atten­tion to the Bidens’ work in Ukraine, which is already yield­ing cov­er­age in con­ser­v­a­tive media, has been led part­ly by Rudolph W. Giu­liani, who served as a lawyer for Mr. Trump in the inves­ti­ga­tion by the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III. Mr. Giuliani’s involve­ment rais­es ques­tions about whether Mr. Trump is endors­ing an effort to push a for­eign gov­ern­ment to pro­ceed with a case that could hurt a polit­i­cal oppo­nent at home.

    Mr. Giu­liani has dis­cussed the Buris­ma inves­ti­ga­tion, and its inter­sec­tion with the Bidens, with the oust­ed Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al and the cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor. He met with the cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor mul­ti­ple times in New York this year. The cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al lat­er told asso­ciates that, dur­ing one of the meet­ings, Mr. Giu­liani called Mr. Trump excit­ed­ly to brief him on his find­ings, accord­ing to peo­ple famil­iar with the con­ver­sa­tions.

    Mr. Giu­liani declined to com­ment on any such phone call with Mr. Trump, but acknowl­edged that he has dis­cussed the mat­ter with the pres­i­dent on mul­ti­ple occa­sions. Mr. Trump, in turn, recent­ly sug­gest­ed he would like Attor­ney Gen­er­al William P. Barr to look into the mate­r­i­al gath­ered by the Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tors — echo­ing repeat­ed calls from Mr. Giu­liani for the Jus­tice Depart­ment to inves­ti­gate the Bidens’ Ukrain­ian work and oth­er con­nec­tions between Ukraine and the Unit­ed States.

    Mr. Giu­liani said he got involved because he was seek­ing to counter the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion with evi­dence that Democ­rats con­spired with sym­pa­thet­ic Ukraini­ans to help ini­ti­ate what became the spe­cial counsel’s inquiry.

    “I can assure you this all start­ed with an alle­ga­tion about pos­si­ble Ukrain­ian involve­ment in the inves­ti­ga­tion of Russ­ian med­dling, and not Biden,” Mr. Giu­liani said. “The Biden piece is col­lat­er­al to the big­ger sto­ry, but must still be inves­ti­gat­ed, but with­out the pre­judg­ments that infect­ed the col­lu­sion sto­ry.”

    The deci­sion to reopen the inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma was made in March by the cur­rent Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, who had cleared Hunter Biden’s employ­er more than two years ago. The announce­ment came in the midst of Ukraine’s con­tentious pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, and was seen in some quar­ters as an effort by the pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, Yuriy Lut­senko, to cur­ry favor from the Trump admin­is­tra­tion for his boss and ally, the incum­bent pres­i­dent, Petro O. Poroshenko.

    Mr. Poroshenko lost his re-elec­tion bid in a land­slide last month. While the incom­ing pres­i­dent, Volodymyr Zelen­sky, has said he will replace Mr. Lut­senko as pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, Mr. Zelen­sky has not said whether the pros­e­cu­tors he appoints will be asked to con­tin­ue the inves­ti­ga­tion.

    Kos­tiantyn H. Kulyk, a deputy for Mr. Lut­senko who was han­dling the cas­es before being reas­signed last month, told The New York Times that he was scru­ti­niz­ing mil­lions of dol­lars of pay­ments from Buris­ma to the firm that paid Hunter Biden.

    No evi­dence has sur­faced that the for­mer vice pres­i­dent inten­tion­al­ly tried to help his son by press­ing for the pros­e­cu­tor general’s dis­missal. Some of his for­mer asso­ciates, more­over, said Mr. Biden nev­er did any­thing to deter oth­er Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials who were push­ing for the Unit­ed States to sup­port crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions by Ukrain­ian and British author­i­ties — and poten­tial­ly to start its own inves­ti­ga­tion — into Buris­ma and its own­er, Myko­la Zlochevsky, for pos­si­ble mon­ey laun­der­ing and abuse of office.

    The Biden cam­paign cast the revival of the Ukrain­ian inves­ti­ga­tion as polit­i­cal­ly moti­vat­ed and point­ed to the involve­ment of Mr. Giu­liani to ques­tion the motives behind the new scruti­ny.

    ...

    After grad­u­at­ing from Yale Law School, Hunter Biden took on a num­ber of roles that inter­sect­ed with his father’s polit­i­cal career, includ­ing work­ing with a Delaware-based cred­it card issuer, work­ing at the Com­merce Depart­ment under Pres­i­dent Bill Clin­ton and work­ing as a lob­by­ist on behalf of var­i­ous uni­ver­si­ties, asso­ci­a­tions and com­pa­nies.

    When his father was select­ed as Barack Obama’s run­ning mate in 2008, Hunter Biden ter­mi­nat­ed his lob­by­ing reg­is­tra­tions, which at the time includ­ed a com­pa­ny that had lob­bied the staff of the Sen­ate Judi­cia­ry Com­mit­tee, on which his father had served, about online gam­bling issues.

    Months after his father became vice pres­i­dent, Mr. Biden joined with Christo­pher Heinz, the step­son of John Ker­ry, then a sen­a­tor, and Devon Archer, a Ker­ry fam­i­ly friend, to cre­ate a net­work of invest­ment and con­sult­ing firms with vari­a­tions of the name Rose­mont Seneca. Mr. Ker­ry would go on to become sec­re­tary of state.

    The firms and their part­ners pur­sued busi­ness with inter­na­tion­al enti­ties that had a stake in Amer­i­can for­eign pol­i­cy deci­sions, often in coun­tries where con­nec­tions implied polit­i­cal influ­ence and pro­tec­tion.

    Among the com­pa­nies they did work for was Buris­ma, a nat­ur­al gas com­pa­ny owned by Mr. Zlochevsky. Mr. Zlochevsky had served near­ly four years in the gov­ern­ment of the for­mer Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Vik­tor F. Yanukovych, who stepped down in ear­ly 2014 and fled amid mass street protests.

    In the months after the col­lapse of Mr. Yanukovych’s gov­ern­ment, Mr. Zlochevsky also fled the coun­try as Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tors opened mul­ti­ple inves­ti­ga­tions into him and his busi­ness­es. Britain’s Seri­ous Fraud Office froze Lon­don accounts linked to Mr. Zlochevsky con­tain­ing $23 mil­lion, declar­ing it was con­nect­ed to mon­ey laun­der­ing and Yanukovych-era cor­rup­tion. (The British pros­e­cu­tion lat­er col­lapsed because of what Amer­i­can offi­cials said was a lack of coop­er­a­tion from the office of the Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al who pre­ced­ed Mr. Shokin.)

    When Mr. Shokin became pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al in Feb­ru­ary 2015, he inher­it­ed sev­er­al inves­ti­ga­tions into the com­pa­ny and Mr. Zlochevsky, includ­ing for sus­pi­cion of tax eva­sion and mon­ey laun­der­ing. Mr. Shokin also opened an inves­ti­ga­tion into the grant­i­ng of lucra­tive gas licens­es to com­pa­nies owned by Mr. Zlochevsky when he was the head of the Ukrain­ian Min­istry of Ecol­o­gy and Nat­ur­al Resources. Mr. Zlochevsky and Buris­ma have always vig­or­ous­ly dis­put­ed the accu­sa­tions against them.

    Views about the role of the Bidens in the mat­ter depend to some degree on ques­tions about Mr. Shokin’s motives. Among both Ukrain­ian and Amer­i­can offi­cials, there is con­sid­er­able debate about whether Mr. Shokin was intent on pur­su­ing a legit­i­mate inquiry into Buris­ma or whether he was mere­ly using the threat of pros­e­cu­tion to solic­it a bribe, as Mr. Zlochevsky’s defend­ers assert.

    Con­cerns about Mr. Shokin notwith­stand­ing, the cas­es against Buris­ma had high-lev­el sup­port from the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion. In April 2014, it sent top offi­cials to a forum on Ukrain­ian asset recov­ery, co-spon­sored by the Unit­ed States gov­ern­ment, in Lon­don, where Mr. Zlochevsky’s case was high­light­ed.

    Ear­ly that year, Mr. Archer, the Ker­ry fam­i­ly friend, and Hunter Biden were part of a wave of Amer­i­cans who would come from across the Atlantic to help Buris­ma both with its sub­stan­tive legal issues and its image. Their sup­port allowed Buris­ma to cre­ate the per­cep­tion that it was backed by pow­er­ful Amer­i­cans at a time when Ukraine was espe­cial­ly depen­dent on aid and strate­gic back­ing from the Unit­ed States and its allies, accord­ing to peo­ple who worked in Ukraine at the time.

    First, Mr. Archer joined Burisma’s board. Around the same time, the com­pa­ny start­ed pay­ing the New York law firm Boies Schiller Flexn­er, where Hunter Biden was work­ing.

    The firm, which Mr. Biden left at the end of 2017, declined to describe the nature of Boies Schiller’s work for Buris­ma. But pre­vi­ous­ly unre­port­ed finan­cial data from the Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor general’s office show the com­pa­ny paid $283,000 to Boies Schiller for legal ser­vices in 2014.

    Soon after Mr. Archer joined Burisma’s board, Hunter Biden fol­lowed, despite being warned by asso­ciates who had expe­ri­ence in Ukraine to stay away from Mr. Zlochevsky, accord­ing to a per­son famil­iar with the con­ver­sa­tions.

    A news release from the com­pa­ny said Hunter Biden would “be in charge of the hold­ings’ legal unit and will pro­vide sup­port for the com­pa­ny among inter­na­tion­al orga­ni­za­tions.” Mr. Biden said the news release mis­char­ac­ter­ized his role with Buris­ma. “At no time was I in charge of the company’s legal affairs,” he said.

    Among the Amer­i­cans brought in by Hunter Biden’s Amer­i­can busi­ness part­ners to help fend off the inves­ti­ga­tions was Blue Star Strate­gies, a con­sult­ing firm run by Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion vet­er­ans that had done sub­stan­tial work in Ukraine.

    A team from Blue Star, and an Amer­i­can lawyer Blue Star hired, John D. Buret­ta, who had served as a senior offi­cial in the Oba­ma Jus­tice Depart­ment, held two pre­vi­ous­ly unre­port­ed meet­ings in Kiev, Ukraine’s cap­i­tal, with Mr. Lut­senko, who took office in May 2016 after Mr. Shokin’s dis­missal, accord­ing to peo­ple with direct knowl­edge of the meet­ings. Mr. Lut­senko denied attend­ing the meet­ing.

    Mr. Lut­senko ini­tial­ly took a hard line against Buris­ma. But with­in 10 months after he took office, Buris­ma announced that Mr. Lut­senko and the courts had “ful­ly closed” all “legal pro­ceed­ings and pend­ing crim­i­nal alle­ga­tions” against Mr. Zlochevsky and his com­pa­nies, and that the oli­garch had been removed by a Ukrain­ian court from “the want­ed list.” Mr. Zlochevsky returned to the coun­try.

    ...

    Amos J. Hochstein, who worked with Vice Pres­i­dent Biden on Ukraine issues as the State Department’s coor­di­na­tor for inter­na­tion­al ener­gy affairs, said the Oba­ma administration’s sup­port for pros­e­cut­ing Mr. Zlochevsky con­tra­dicts any impli­ca­tion that the elder Mr. Biden was seek­ing to oust Mr. Shokin in order to pro­tect his son or Mr. Zlochevsky.

    “I was in almost every sin­gle meet­ing that Vice Pres­i­dent Biden had with Pres­i­dent Poroshenko, I was on every trip, and I was on most of the phone calls, and there was nev­er a dis­cus­sion about his son, or Buris­ma,” Mr. Hochstein said. “None of these issues ever came up.”

    ...

    ———-

    “Biden Faces Con­flict of Inter­est Ques­tions That Are Being Pro­mot­ed by Trump and Allies” by Ken­neth P. Vogel and Iuli­ia Mendel;
    The New York Times; 05/01/2019

    “But new details about Hunter Biden’s involve­ment, and a deci­sion this year by the cur­rent Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al to reverse him­self and reopen an inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma, have pushed the issue back into the spot­light just as the senior Mr. Biden is begin­ning his 2020 pres­i­den­tial cam­paign.”

    Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the inves­ti­ga­tion of Buris­ma has sud­den­ly become quite top­i­cal fol­low­ing the deci­sion by Joe Biden to jump into the 2020 race. Part of this is dri­ven by new details on that inves­ti­ga­tion. But com­pli­cat­ing the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s nar­ra­tive is that the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion appears to have been push­ing for inves­ti­ga­tions into Buris­ma:

    ...
    They show how Hunter Biden and his Amer­i­can busi­ness part­ners were part of a broad effort by Buris­ma to bring in well-con­nect­ed Democ­rats dur­ing a peri­od when the com­pa­ny was fac­ing inves­ti­ga­tions backed not just by domes­tic Ukrain­ian forces but by offi­cials in the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion. Hunter Biden’s work for Buris­ma prompt­ed con­cerns among State Depart­ment offi­cials at the time that the con­nec­tion could com­pli­cate Vice Pres­i­dent Biden’s diplo­ma­cy in Ukraine, for­mer offi­cials said.

    “I have had no role what­so­ev­er in rela­tion to any inves­ti­ga­tion of Buris­ma, or any of its offi­cers,” Hunter Biden said Wednes­day in a state­ment. “I explic­it­ly lim­it­ed my role to focus on cor­po­rate gov­er­nance best prac­tices to facil­i­tate Burisma’s desire to expand glob­al­ly.”

    Hunter Biden, who left Burisma’s board last month, was one of many polit­i­cal­ly promi­nent Amer­i­cans of both major par­ties who made mon­ey in Ukraine over the last decade. In sev­er­al cas­es — most notably that of Paul Man­afort, Pres­i­dent Trump’s for­mer cam­paign chair­man — that busi­ness came under crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion that exposed a seedy side of the lucra­tive West­ern con­sult­ing indus­try in Ukraine.
    ...

    But despite that, Pres­i­dent Trump has made Rudolph Giu­liani his point man on push­ing this sto­ry. But it’s just one aspect of a larg­er Trump admin­is­tra­tion strat­e­gy of pro­mot­ing the idea that the Democ­rats col­lud­ed with Ukraine in 2016. Trump is even ask­ing Bill Barr to look into the mate­ri­als gath­ered by Ukrain­ian inves­ti­ga­tors. And, again, this is all hap­pen­ing in the con­text of Trump and Barr push­ing a defense against obstruc­tion of jus­tice charges that argue that it’s not obstruc­tion if it was obstruct­ing a case based on a false accu­sa­tion. So if this Buris­ma case ends up get­ting spun as an exam­ple of the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion col­lud­ing with the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment in 2016 it could could end up becom­ing a big part of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s obstruc­tion of jus­tice defense:

    ...
    But the renewed scruti­ny of Hunter Biden’s expe­ri­ence in Ukraine has also been fanned by allies of Mr. Trump. They have been eager to pub­li­cize and even encour­age the inves­ti­ga­tion, as well as oth­er Ukrain­ian inquiries that serve Mr. Trump’s polit­i­cal ends, under­scor­ing the Trump campaign’s con­cern about the elec­toral threat from the for­mer vice president’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign.

    The Trump team’s efforts to draw atten­tion to the Bidens’ work in Ukraine, which is already yield­ing cov­er­age in con­ser­v­a­tive media, has been led part­ly by Rudolph W. Giu­liani, who served as a lawyer for Mr. Trump in the inves­ti­ga­tion by the spe­cial coun­sel, Robert S. Mueller III. Mr. Giuliani’s involve­ment rais­es ques­tions about whether Mr. Trump is endors­ing an effort to push a for­eign gov­ern­ment to pro­ceed with a case that could hurt a polit­i­cal oppo­nent at home.

    Mr. Giu­liani has dis­cussed the Buris­ma inves­ti­ga­tion, and its inter­sec­tion with the Bidens, with the oust­ed Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al and the cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor. He met with the cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor mul­ti­ple times in New York this year. The cur­rent pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al lat­er told asso­ciates that, dur­ing one of the meet­ings, Mr. Giu­liani called Mr. Trump excit­ed­ly to brief him on his find­ings, accord­ing to peo­ple famil­iar with the con­ver­sa­tions.

    Mr. Giu­liani declined to com­ment on any such phone call with Mr. Trump, but acknowl­edged that he has dis­cussed the mat­ter with the pres­i­dent on mul­ti­ple occa­sions. Mr. Trump, in turn, recent­ly sug­gest­ed he would like Attor­ney Gen­er­al William P. Barr to look into the mate­r­i­al gath­ered by the Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tors — echo­ing repeat­ed calls from Mr. Giu­liani for the Jus­tice Depart­ment to inves­ti­gate the Bidens’ Ukrain­ian work and oth­er con­nec­tions between Ukraine and the Unit­ed States.

    Mr. Giu­liani said he got involved because he was seek­ing to counter the Mueller inves­ti­ga­tion with evi­dence that Democ­rats con­spired with sym­pa­thet­ic Ukraini­ans to help ini­ti­ate what became the spe­cial counsel’s inquiry.

    “I can assure you this all start­ed with an alle­ga­tion about pos­si­ble Ukrain­ian involve­ment in the inves­ti­ga­tion of Russ­ian med­dling, and not Biden,” Mr. Giu­liani said. “The Biden piece is col­lat­er­al to the big­ger sto­ry, but must still be inves­ti­gat­ed, but with­out the pre­judg­ments that infect­ed the col­lu­sion sto­ry.”
    ...

    It’s also worth not­ing how the deci­sion by Ukraine’s pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al to reopen the case in March has been wide­ly seen as an attempt by the Poroshenko gov­ern­ment to cur­ry favor with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion:

    ...
    The deci­sion to reopen the inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma was made in March by the cur­rent Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, who had cleared Hunter Biden’s employ­er more than two years ago. The announce­ment came in the midst of Ukraine’s con­tentious pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, and was seen in some quar­ters as an effort by the pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, Yuriy Lut­senko, to cur­ry favor from the Trump admin­is­tra­tion for his boss and ally, the incum­bent pres­i­dent, Petro O. Poroshenko.
    ...

    Also note how the new pres­i­dent, Volodymyr Zelen­sky, has­n’t indi­cat­ed whether he’s going to keep the case open, so it’s pre­sum­ably going to remain a means for Ukraine to please Trump:

    ...
    Mr. Poroshenko lost his re-elec­tion bid in a land­slide last month. While the incom­ing pres­i­dent, Volodymyr Zelen­sky, has said he will replace Mr. Lut­senko as pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al, Mr. Zelen­sky has not said whether the pros­e­cu­tors he appoints will be asked to con­tin­ue the inves­ti­ga­tion.

    Kos­tiantyn H. Kulyk, a deputy for Mr. Lut­senko who was han­dling the cas­es before being reas­signed last month, told The New York Times that he was scru­ti­niz­ing mil­lions of dol­lars of pay­ments from Buris­ma to the firm that paid Hunter Biden.
    ...

    Adding to the intrigue of whether or not the Trump team ends up turn­ing this case into a polit­i­cal foot­ball is the fact that Biden does have facts on his side to defend him­self. Facts like the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion show­ing an inter­est­ing in its own inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma:

    ...
    No evi­dence has sur­faced that the for­mer vice pres­i­dent inten­tion­al­ly tried to help his son by press­ing for the pros­e­cu­tor general’s dis­missal. Some of his for­mer asso­ciates, more­over, said Mr. Biden nev­er did any­thing to deter oth­er Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials who were push­ing for the Unit­ed States to sup­port crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions by Ukrain­ian and British author­i­ties — and poten­tial­ly to start its own inves­ti­ga­tion — into Buris­ma and its own­er, Myko­la Zlochevsky, for pos­si­ble mon­ey laun­der­ing and abuse of office.

    The Biden cam­paign cast the revival of the Ukrain­ian inves­ti­ga­tion as polit­i­cal­ly moti­vat­ed and point­ed to the involve­ment of Mr. Giu­liani to ques­tion the motives behind the new scruti­ny.
    ...

    There also appears to have been a real debate in Ukraine as to whether or not the inves­ti­ga­tion into Buris­ma was part of a shake­down scheme by Shokin to get a bribe. But despite that debate, the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion was appar­ent­ly ful­ly sup­port­ive of the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­men­t’s inves­ti­ga­tion:

    ...
    Among the com­pa­nies they did work for was Buris­ma, a nat­ur­al gas com­pa­ny owned by Mr. Zlochevsky. Mr. Zlochevsky had served near­ly four years in the gov­ern­ment of the for­mer Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Vik­tor F. Yanukovych, who stepped down in ear­ly 2014 and fled amid mass street protests.

    In the months after the col­lapse of Mr. Yanukovych’s gov­ern­ment, Mr. Zlochevsky also fled the coun­try as Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tors opened mul­ti­ple inves­ti­ga­tions into him and his busi­ness­es. Britain’s Seri­ous Fraud Office froze Lon­don accounts linked to Mr. Zlochevsky con­tain­ing $23 mil­lion, declar­ing it was con­nect­ed to mon­ey laun­der­ing and Yanukovych-era cor­rup­tion. (The British pros­e­cu­tion lat­er col­lapsed because of what Amer­i­can offi­cials said was a lack of coop­er­a­tion from the office of the Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al who pre­ced­ed Mr. Shokin.)

    When Mr. Shokin became pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al in Feb­ru­ary 2015, he inher­it­ed sev­er­al inves­ti­ga­tions into the com­pa­ny and Mr. Zlochevsky, includ­ing for sus­pi­cion of tax eva­sion and mon­ey laun­der­ing. Mr. Shokin also opened an inves­ti­ga­tion into the grant­i­ng of lucra­tive gas licens­es to com­pa­nies owned by Mr. Zlochevsky when he was the head of the Ukrain­ian Min­istry of Ecol­o­gy and Nat­ur­al Resources. Mr. Zlochevsky and Buris­ma have always vig­or­ous­ly dis­put­ed the accu­sa­tions against them.

    Views about the role of the Bidens in the mat­ter depend to some degree on ques­tions about Mr. Shokin’s motives. Among both Ukrain­ian and Amer­i­can offi­cials, there is con­sid­er­able debate about whether Mr. Shokin was intent on pur­su­ing a legit­i­mate inquiry into Buris­ma or whether he was mere­ly using the threat of pros­e­cu­tion to solic­it a bribe, as Mr. Zlochevsky’s defend­ers assert.

    Con­cerns about Mr. Shokin notwith­stand­ing, the cas­es against Buris­ma had high-lev­el sup­port from the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion. In April 2014, it sent top offi­cials to a forum on Ukrain­ian asset recov­ery, co-spon­sored by the Unit­ed States gov­ern­ment, in Lon­don, where Mr. Zlochevsky’s case was high­light­ed.

    ...

    Amos J. Hochstein, who worked with Vice Pres­i­dent Biden on Ukraine issues as the State Department’s coor­di­na­tor for inter­na­tion­al ener­gy affairs, said the Oba­ma administration’s sup­port for pros­e­cut­ing Mr. Zlochevsky con­tra­dicts any impli­ca­tion that the elder Mr. Biden was seek­ing to oust Mr. Shokin in order to pro­tect his son or Mr. Zlochevsky.
    ...

    So just went you look at the avail­able details sur­round­ing the Buris­ma case, it’s not like this is a black and white sto­ry. It’s murky.

    What’s unam­bigu­ous­ly clear is that the push for the fir­ing of Vik­tor Shokin was­n’t some pet project of Joe Biden in 2016. It was just one part of a much larg­er push for an over­haul in Ukraine’s by Ukraine’s West­ern back­ers that had been going on for months. For exam­ple, here’s an arti­cle from Feb­ru­ary of 2016, a month before Shok­in’s fir­ing, when the Deputy Gen­er­al Pros­e­cu­tor Vitaliy Kasko resigned, declar­ing the pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al’s office a “hotbed of cor­rup­tion”. Kasko’s res­ig­na­tion fol­lowed the res­ig­na­tion of Econ­o­my Min­is­ter Aivaras Abro­mavi­cius, who declared that the Poroshenko gov­ern­ment was inter­fer­ing with his reforms. Recall how Abro­mavi­cius was one of the offi­cials import­ed from a dif­fer­ent coun­try (Lithua­nia) under the the­o­ry that Ukraine’s cor­rup­tion could be addressed with for­eign lead­er­ship. So when Abro­mavi­cius and Kasko were resign­ing in protest, it was part of a West­ern-backed protest of Ukraine’s lack of anti-cor­rup­tion reform (and also a lack of harm­ful aus­ter­i­ty and pri­va­ti­za­tion reforms that the West demand­ed). And that’s the crit­i­cal con­text of the fir­ing of the Vik­tor Shokin the fol­low­ing month:

    Reuters

    Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor quits over cor­rup­tion as gov­ern­ment teeters

    Natalia Zinets, Pavel Poli­tyuk
    Feb­ru­ary 15, 2016 / 7:00 AM

    KIEV (Reuters) — A senior Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor resigned on Mon­day, call­ing the office he worked for a “hotbed of cor­rup­tion”, anoth­er blow to gov­ern­ment attempts to clean up the judi­cia­ry, a cru­cial step to unlock more West­ern aid.

    The res­ig­na­tion, the sec­ond exit of a West­ern-backed reformer in under a fort­night, came a day before a pos­si­ble no con­fi­dence vote in par­lia­ment that could top­ple Prime Min­is­ter Arse­ny Yat­se­niuk and lead to a snap elec­tion.

    Fail­ure to tack­le endem­ic cor­rup­tion has derailed a $40 bil­lion aid pro­gram that keeps the war-torn coun­try afloat. If Yat­se­niuk falls, it would fur­ther delay nego­ti­a­tions with the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund for the next tranche of mon­ey, $1.7 bil­lion, which has been on hold since Octo­ber.

    “Today, the Gen­er­al Prosecutor’s office is a brake on the reform of crim­i­nal jus­tice, a hotbed of cor­rup­tion, an instru­ment of polit­i­cal pres­sure, one of the key obsta­cles to the arrival of for­eign invest­ment in Ukraine,” Deputy Gen­er­al Pros­e­cu­tor Vitaliy Kasko said in a tele­vised state­ment.

    Kasko’s move fol­lows the exit of Econ­o­my Min­is­ter Aivaras Abro­mavi­cius, who accused vest­ed inter­ests, includ­ing a close ally of Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko, of med­dling in his min­istry and try­ing to siphon off state funds.

    Kasko’s accu­sa­tion that there was mere­ly a facade of change in the pros­e­cu­tion ser­vice is dam­ag­ing to Poroshenko, who has resist­ed pres­sure to fire Gen­er­al Pros­e­cu­tor Vik­tor Shokin. Vladislav Kut­senko, an aide to Shokin, dis­missed Kasko’s res­ig­na­tion as self-pub­lic­i­ty.

    But U.S. Ambas­sador Geof­frey Pyatt called Kasko “a cham­pi­on for change”.

    “His res­ig­na­tion is a blow to #Ukraine’s reform progress ... #Ukraine deserves a clean judi­cia­ry. Will require top-to-bot­tom rule of law reform to address per­va­sive cor­rup­tion + crony­ism,” he tweet­ed.

    ...

    ———-

    “Ukrain­ian pros­e­cu­tor quits over cor­rup­tion as gov­ern­ment teeters” by Natalia Zinets, Pavel Poli­tyuk; Reuters; 02/15/2016

    “Fail­ure to tack­le endem­ic cor­rup­tion has derailed a $40 bil­lion aid pro­gram that keeps the war-torn coun­try afloat. If Yat­se­niuk falls, it would fur­ther delay nego­ti­a­tions with the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund for the next tranche of mon­ey, $1.7 bil­lion, which has been on hold since Octo­ber.”

    Threats of derail­ing Ukraine’s $40 bil­lion IMF loan pack­age if Ukraine did­n’t tack­le its cor­rup­tion. That’s the crit­i­cal con­text in Shok­in’s fir­ing. A con­text that includ­ed the res­ig­na­tions of two key West­ern-backed Ukrain­ian offi­cials: Deputy Gen­er­al Pros­e­cu­tor Vitaliy Kasko and Econ­o­my Min­is­ter Aivaras Abro­mavi­cius:

    ...
    Kasko’s move fol­lows the exit of Econ­o­my Min­is­ter Aivaras Abro­mavi­cius, who accused vest­ed inter­ests, includ­ing a close ally of Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko, of med­dling in his min­istry and try­ing to siphon off state funds.

    Kasko’s accu­sa­tion that there was mere­ly a facade of change in the pros­e­cu­tion ser­vice is dam­ag­ing to Poroshenko, who has resist­ed pres­sure to fire Gen­er­al Pros­e­cu­tor Vik­tor Shokin. Vladislav Kut­senko, an aide to Shokin, dis­missed Kasko’s res­ig­na­tion as self-pub­lic­i­ty.

    But U.S. Ambas­sador Geof­frey Pyatt called Kasko “a cham­pi­on for change”.

    “His res­ig­na­tion is a blow to #Ukraine’s reform progress ... #Ukraine deserves a clean judi­cia­ry. Will require top-to-bot­tom rule of law reform to address per­va­sive cor­rup­tion + crony­ism,” he tweet­ed.
    ...

    Adding to that con­text is the fact that Kasko’s res­ig­na­tion hap­pened one day before a no-con­fi­dence vote in the par­lia­ment that could have top­pled Prime Min­is­ter Arse­ny Yat­se­niuk and lead to a snap elec­tion. That’s how much tur­moil there was in Ukraine’s gov­ern­ment at that point:

    ...
    The res­ig­na­tion, the sec­ond exit of a West­ern-backed reformer in under a fort­night, came a day before a pos­si­ble no con­fi­dence vote in par­lia­ment that could top­ple Prime Min­is­ter Arse­ny Yat­se­niuk and lead to a snap elec­tion.
    ...

    Now, it turns out Yat­se­niuk nar­row­ly sur­vived that no-con­fi­dence vote, but as the fol­low­ing arti­cle notes, it was none oth­er than Petro Poroshenko who was also call­ing for the fir­ing of Vik­tor Shokin at that time. There was even some con­fu­sion at that point as to whether or not Shokin had already resigned (he had­n’t). So, basi­cal­ly, Poroshenko, who was under mas­sive pres­sure from the West for the lack of anti-cor­rup­tion reforms, was redi­rect­ing some of that blame to Shokin. Beyond that, Poroshenko was call­ing for a “full cab­i­net reload” in response to pres­sure which is also part of the con­text of the fire of Shokin. As Poroshenko declared fol­low­ing the no-con­fi­dence vote: “The moment for a par­tial reshuf­fle of the cab­i­net of min­is­ters has been lost...The dis­cus­sion about it has been so long that the issue itself got lost in it. The demand for a full cab­i­net reload is obvi­ous now.”:

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty

    Ukraine PM Yat­senyuk Sur­vives No-Con­fi­dence Vote In Par­lia­ment

    By RFE/RL’s Ukrain­ian Ser­vice
    Feb­ru­ary 16, 2016 13:49 GMT

    Ukrain­ian Prime Min­is­ter Arseniy Yat­senyuk has sur­vived a no-con­fi­dence vote in par­lia­ment, hours after Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko called on him to resign “in order to restore trust in the gov­ern­ment.”

    A total of 194 law­mak­ers vot­ed for the res­o­lu­tion, 32 shy of the 226 votes need­ed to pass the mea­sure that was intro­duced ear­li­er in the day by Yuriy Lut­senko, leader of Poroshenko’s own par­ty in the 450-seat Verk­hov­na Rada.

    The vote came amid what opin­ion polls sug­gest is grow­ing dis­en­chant­ment among Ukraini­ans with the pro-West­ern gov­ern­ment that took pow­er fol­low­ing the ouster of Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yanukovych in Feb­ru­ary 2014.

    ...

    A pres­i­den­tial state­ment ear­li­er in the day said Yat­senyuk’s gov­ern­ment had lost the sup­port of the rul­ing coali­tion, which includes the Poroshenko Bloc.

    In a tele­vised address, Poroshenko said that in order “to restore [pub­lic] trust” in Ukraine, “ther­a­py is no longer suf­fi­cient — it takes surgery.”

    “The moment for a par­tial reshuf­fle of the cab­i­net of min­is­ters has been lost,” he said. “The dis­cus­sion about it has been so long that the issue itself got lost in it. The demand for a full cab­i­net reload is obvi­ous now.”

    ...

    Shokin ‘Res­ig­na­tion’

    Poroshenko also called for the res­ig­na­tion of Pros­e­cu­tor-Gen­er­al Vik­tor Shokin, who has been seen by many reform­ers, and even West­ern diplo­mats, as an imped­i­ment to clean­ing up ram­pant cor­rup­tion

    The Ukrain­s­ka Prav­da news­pa­per and the lb.ua news por­tal cit­ed uniden­ti­fied sources, includ­ing one in the Prosecutor-General’s office, as say­ing that Shokin had already resigned fol­low­ing Poroshenko’s request.

    Pro-West­ern law­mak­er Mustafa Nayyem also wrote on Twit­ter that Shokin had resigned but did not indi­cate a source for this infor­ma­tion, which could not be imme­di­ate­ly con­firmed.

    Deputy Pros­e­cu­tor-Gen­er­al Yuriy Sevruk, mean­while, was quot­ed as say­ing that Shokin had not resigned but in fact had tak­en a three-day vaca­tion begin­ning Feb­ru­ary 15.

    He said he was serv­ing as act­ing pros­e­cu­tor-gen­er­al in Shok­in’s absence.

    “Vik­tor Niko­layevich [Shokin] appoint­ed me on Feb­ru­ary 12 when he sub­mit­ted [a notice] for a three-day vaca­tion,” the news por­tal UNN cit­ed Sevruk as say­ing on Feb­ru­ary 16.

    The col­lapse of the gov­ern­ment would dis­may Ukraine’s inter­na­tion­al back­ers, who have invest­ed much cash and polit­i­cal cap­i­tal sup­port­ing the gov­ern­ment in the stand­off with Rus­sia over the fight­ing in the east as well as Moscow’s annex­a­tion of the Crimea penin­su­la.

    The push to elim­i­nate prob­lems like bribery, kick­backs, and pref­er­en­tial hir­ing for wealthy insid­ers has pro­ceed­ed at a slow pace, result­ing in grow­ing frus­tra­tion both inside Ukraine and among West­ern offi­cials and lenders.

    Shokin, a con­tro­ver­sial appoint­ment in 2014 who had served in pre­vi­ous admin­is­tra­tions, has faced accu­sa­tions of stalling high-pro­file cor­rup­tion cas­es against allies of Yanukovych who was top­pled by pro-Euro­pean protests in Feb­ru­ary 2014.

    He was called out by name ear­li­er this month by Lithuan­ian-born Econ­o­my Min­is­ter Aivaras Abro­mavi­cius, who announced his res­ig­na­tion and cit­ed a “sharp esca­la­tion in efforts to block sys­temic and impor­tant reforms.”

    ...

    ———–

    “Ukraine PM Yat­senyuk Sur­vives No-Con­fi­dence Vote In Par­lia­ment” by RFE/RL’s Ukrain­ian Ser­vice; Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib­er­ty; 02/16/2016

    “The moment for a par­tial reshuf­fle of the cab­i­net of min­is­ters has been lost...The dis­cus­sion about it has been so long that the issue itself got lost in it. The demand for a full cab­i­net reload is obvi­ous now.”

    A full cab­i­net reload in the wake of a near col­lapse of the gov­ern­ment. This was was Petro Poroshenko was call­ing for in the weeks before Biden’s trip to Kiev where he made the demand that Shokin be fired. Shok­in’s depar­ture was so expect­ed that there was con­fu­sion as to whether or not he had already resigned at that point:

    ...
    Poroshenko also called for the res­ig­na­tion of Pros­e­cu­tor-Gen­er­al Vik­tor Shokin, who has been seen by many reform­ers, and even West­ern diplo­mats, as an imped­i­ment to clean­ing up ram­pant cor­rup­tion

    The Ukrain­s­ka Prav­da news­pa­per and the lb.ua news por­tal cit­ed uniden­ti­fied sources, includ­ing one in the Prosecutor-General’s office, as say­ing that Shokin had already resigned fol­low­ing Poroshenko’s request.

    Pro-West­ern law­mak­er Mustafa Nayyem also wrote on Twit­ter that Shokin had resigned but did not indi­cate a source for this infor­ma­tion, which could not be imme­di­ate­ly con­firmed.

    Deputy Pros­e­cu­tor-Gen­er­al Yuriy Sevruk, mean­while, was quot­ed as say­ing that Shokin had not resigned but in fact had tak­en a three-day vaca­tion begin­ning Feb­ru­ary 15.

    He said he was serv­ing as act­ing pros­e­cu­tor-gen­er­al in Shok­in’s absence.

    “Vik­tor Niko­layevich [Shokin] appoint­ed me on Feb­ru­ary 12 when he sub­mit­ted [a notice] for a three-day vaca­tion,” the news por­tal UNN cit­ed Sevruk as say­ing on Feb­ru­ary 16.
    ...

    And as the fol­low­ing arti­cle notes, when Shokin was even­tu­al­ly fired the fol­low­ing month, the Euro­pean Union offi­cial­ly wel­comed the deci­sion. That’s how wide­spread the push was for his removal. As the fol­low­ing arti­cle also notes, one of the last acts of Shokin before his fir­ing was the sack­ing o his deputy, Davit Sak­vare­lidze. Sak­vare­lidze was anoth­er one of the non-Ukraini­ans import­ed into the coun­try (he’s from Geor­gia) under the the­o­ry that Ukraine need­ed for­eign­ers to clean up its gov­ern­ment. It high­lights how the fir­ing of Shokin appeared to be part of a broad­er fight between the Ukrain­ian estab­lish­ment and its West­ern back­ers. That’s the agen­da Joe Biden was push­ing when he called for Shok­in’s fir­ing:

    The Irish Times

    EU hails sack­ing of Ukraine’s pros­e­cu­tor Vik­tor Shokin
    Polit­i­cal cri­sis con­tin­ues as deals on a new coali­tion and pre­mier prove elu­sive

    Daniel McLaugh­lin in Kiev
    Tue, Mar 29, 2016, 18:41

    The Euro­pean Union has wel­comed the dis­missal of Ukraine’s scan­dal-rid­den pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al and called for a crack­down on cor­rup­tion, even as the country’s polit­i­cal cri­sis deep­ened over efforts to form a new rul­ing coali­tion and appoint a new prime min­is­ter.

    Ukraine’s par­lia­ment vot­ed over­whelm­ing­ly to fire Vik­tor Shokin, rid­ding the belea­guered prosecutor’s office of a fig­ure who is accused of block­ing major cas­es against allies and influ­en­tial fig­ures and stymy­ing moves to root out graft.

    “This deci­sion cre­ates an oppor­tu­ni­ty to make a fresh start in the pros­e­cu­tor general’s office. I hope that the new pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al will ensure that [his] office . . . becomes inde­pen­dent from polit­i­cal influ­ence and pres­sure and enjoys pub­lic trust,” said Jan Tombin­s­ki, the EU’s envoy to Ukraine.

    “There is still a lack of tan­gi­ble results of inves­ti­ga­tions into seri­ous cas­es . . . as well as inves­ti­ga­tions of high-lev­el offi­cials with­in the pros­e­cu­tor general’s office,” he added.

    Mr Tombin­s­ki said the EU was also con­cerned about the res­ig­na­tion or dis­missal of sev­er­al “reform-ori­ent­ed” pros­e­cu­tors and reports that Mr Shokin’s office was inves­ti­gat­ing a “high­ly-respect­ed” anti-cor­rup­tion group – an obvi­ous ref­er­ence to Kiev’s Anti-Cor­rup­tion Action Cen­tre, which had fierce­ly crit­i­cised Mr Shokin.

    In what appeared to be his last act before dis­missal, Mr Shokin sacked his deputy, Davit Sak­vare­lidze, who had repeat­ed­ly called for his boss to be fired.

    Mr Sak­vare­lidze, a Geor­gian who was also chief pros­e­cu­tor in the Odessa region, said his dis­missal by Mr Shokin was part of “a cleans­ing of peo­ple who are pre­pared every day to fight cor­rup­tion and the old guard with­out com­pro­mise”.

    Crime and cor­rup­tion

    “In this case, the pres­i­dent, as guar­an­tor of the con­sti­tu­tion, should express his opin­ion explic­it­ly, clear­ly and sharply,” Mr Saakashvili said.

    “And not because it will ben­e­fit any one of us, but for the sake of the state­hood, integri­ty and glo­ri­ous future of Ukraine.”

    Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko is under huge pres­sure to appoint a new pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al with a strong anti-cor­rup­tion rep­u­ta­tion, and to back inves­ti­ga­tions into the shad­owy affairs of major busi­ness­men and politi­cians.

    The EU and Unit­ed States are demand­ing as much, amid a polit­i­cal cri­sis that has paral­ysed reforms in Ukraine and jeop­ar­dised vital fund­ing from inter­na­tion­al lenders.

    ...

    ———-

    “EU hails sack­ing of Ukraine’s pros­e­cu­tor Vik­tor Shokin” by Daniel McLaugh­lin; The Irish Times; 03/29/2016

    ““This deci­sion cre­ates an oppor­tu­ni­ty to make a fresh start in the pros­e­cu­tor general’s office. I hope that the new pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al will ensure that [his] office . . . becomes inde­pen­dent from polit­i­cal influ­ence and pres­sure and enjoys pub­lic trust,” said Jan Tombin­s­ki, the EU’s envoy to Ukraine.”

    So the EU had an offi­cial stance on Ukraine’s fir­ing of is pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al. An offi­cial stance of approval, which makes sense giv­en the exten­sive West­ern-backed demands to fire Shokin that had been going on for months as part of a broad­er push to over­haul the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment. West­ern demands that includ­ed the implic­it threat of cut­ting off Ukraine from inter­na­tion­al finan­cial sup­port:

    ...
    Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko is under huge pres­sure to appoint a new pros­e­cu­tor gen­er­al with a strong anti-cor­rup­tion rep­u­ta­tion, and to back inves­ti­ga­tions into the shad­owy affairs of major busi­ness­men and politi­cians.

    The EU and Unit­ed States are demand­ing as much, amid a polit­i­cal cri­sis that has paral­ysed reforms in Ukraine and jeop­ar­dised vital fund­ing from inter­na­tion­al lenders.
    ...

    And that whole chap­ter of Ukraine’s recent his­to­ry is all cen­tral to the sto­ry of Joe Biden’s trip to Kiev that got Shokin fired. It’s obvi­ous that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion isn’t going to be inter­est­ed in hav­ing that broad­er con­text under­stood by the Amer­i­can pub­lic as Giu­lian­i’s attempts to pump the Buris­ma inves­ti­ga­tion plays out.

    So, to sum­ma­rize, the Trump admin­is­tra­tion appears to be cor­rupt­ly push­ing for Ukraine to reopen an inves­ti­ga­tion that could embar­rass Joe Biden in order to build up the false nar­ra­tive that Biden was cor­rupt­ing try­ing to close that inves­ti­ga­tion. And this anti­dote to all of this is a thor­ough reex­am­i­na­tion of the actu­al recent his­to­ry of Ukraine. A recent his­to­ry that has large­ly been cor­rupt­ed by spin on all sides for years.

    At the same time, it’s not like there isn’t going to be plen­ty of con­tent for the Trump team to work with when search­ing for evi­dence of Ukraine work­ing to hurt Trump in 2016. For instance, there’s the sto­ry of Andrea Chalu­pa get­ting infor­ma­tion about Paul Man­afort. And there’s also all of the ques­tions about the verac­i­ty of the “black ledger” scan­dal that impli­cat­ed Man­afort and whether or not the release of those doc­u­ments in 2016 were an attempt by ele­ments of the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment to harm the Trump cam­paign. So if the Trump team is going to be focus­ing on alleged col­lu­sion between Ukraine and the US gov­ern­ment in 2016 as part of his defense against obstruc­tion of jus­tice it’s not like there isn’t going to be con­tent for them to work with when they build that nar­ra­tive. This sto­ry of Joe Biden, Buris­ma, and the fir­ing of Vik­tor Shokin, how­ev­er, does­n’t appear to play into that nar­ra­tive very well and risks back­fir­ing giv­en that Giu­liani appears to be solic­it­ing that inves­ti­ga­tion by Ukraine which presents obvi­ous mas­sive con­flicts of inter­est.

    It was always clear that the 2020 race would include a debate over whether or not the Trump had col­lud­ed with a for­eign gov­ern­ment to get dirt on his polit­i­cal oppo­nents. It’s just a lit­tle sur­pris­ing that Rudy Giu­liani open­ly solic­it­ing this infor­ma­tion from the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment is part of that for­eign col­lu­sion sto­ry.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 4, 2019, 4:07 pm

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