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FTR #1142 Deep Politics and the Death of Park Won-Soon, Part 3

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FTR #1142 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

NB: This descrip­tion has mate­r­i­al that was not in the orig­i­nal broad­cast.

Intro­duc­tion: Flesh­ing out the deep pol­i­tics under­ly­ing the life and death of Park Won-soon, this pro­gram builds on the foun­da­tion of first two pro­grams in the series. Park Won-soon’s crit­i­cism of Japan’s colo­nial occu­pa­tion of Korea, his advo­ca­cy of rec­on­cil­i­a­tion between the two Kore­as and his suit against the lead­er­ship of the fas­cist Shin­cheon­ji mind con­trol cult (over­lapped with the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church), all bear on the polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic dynam­ics of the Sec­ond World War, the Cold War, the Kore­an War, and the car­tel arrange­ments that con­sti­tute a crit­i­cal, though large­ly invis­i­ble, under­pin­ning of the events of the Twen­ti­eth and Twen­ty-First cen­turies.

Essen­tial to an under­stand­ing of these over­lap­ping events is the land­mark text Gold War­riors by Peg­gy and Ster­ling Sea­grave. (FTR #‘s 427, 428, 446, 451, 501, 688689, 1106, 1107 & 1108 deal with the sub­ject mate­r­i­al of that con­sum­mate­ly impor­tant book.)

Indeed, one can­not prop­er­ly ana­lyze the par­ti­tion of Korea after World War II, the Kore­an War and the Cold War as sep­a­rate events. They are inter­con­nect­ed and, in turn, are out­growths of the com­plex pol­i­tics of the Sec­ond World War and the actions and atti­tudes of Chi­ang Kai-shek’s nar­co-fas­cist dic­ta­tor­ship.

Although nom­i­nal­ly a mem­ber of the Allied nations, Chi­ang’s Kuom­intang gov­ern­ment was pri­mar­i­ly con­cerned with fend­ing off Mao Tse-Tung’s com­mu­nist armies and worked with the invad­ing Japan­ese in crit­i­cal areas. In par­tic­u­lar, the Kuom­intang’s pro­found involve­ment with the nar­cotics trade helped dri­ve its trad­ing with the Japan­ese.

The pro­gram begins with the obit­u­ary of gen­er­al Paik Sun-yup of Korea, whose ser­vice in the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Army dur­ing World War II has been a focal point of con­tro­ver­sy in South Korea. Gen­er­al Sun-yup embod­ied the ongo­ing con­tro­ver­sy in Korea over Japan’s occu­pa­tion and the sub­se­quent unfold­ing of events lead­ing up to, and includ­ing the Kore­an War.

Again, the Japan­ese occu­pa­tion of Korea was a major focal point of Park Won-soon’s crit­i­cism. “. . . . In 1941, he joined the army of Manchukuo, a pup­pet state that impe­r­i­al Japan had estab­lished in Manchuria, and served in a unit known for hunt­ing down Kore­an guer­ril­las fight­ing for inde­pen­dence . . .”

A lit­tle known fac­tor in the devel­op­ment of the Kore­an par­ti­tion and Cold War pol­i­tics in Asia was the involve­ment of Chi­ang Kai-shek, his wife (the for­mer Mei-Ling Soong, sis­ter of Chi­ang’s finance min­is­ter T.V. Soong–the wealth­i­est man in the world at the time) and advis­ers in the Cairo Con­fer­ence of 1943 and the sub­se­quent Tehran Con­fer­ence with Stal­in and Churchill.

Accord­ing to Colonel L. Fletch­er Prouty, who flew the Kuom­intang inter­ests to Tehran from Cairo, Chi­ang and com­pa­ny were a dri­ving force in set­ting the stage for war in Korea and Indochi­na.

While in Oki­nawa dur­ing Japan’s sur­ren­der in World War II, Colonel Prouty was wit­ness to the ear­ly com­mit­ment of deci­sive mil­i­tary resources to the wars that were to take place in Korea and Indochina/Vietnam. ” . . . . I was on Oki­nawa at that time, and dur­ing some busi­ness in the har­bor area I asked the har­bor­mas­ter if all that new mate­r­i­al was being returned to the States. His response was direct and sur­pris­ing: ‘Hell, no! They ain’t nev­er goin’ to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and sup­ply at least a hun­dred and fifty thou­sand men, is going to Korea, and the oth­er half is going to Indochi­na.’ In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first bat­tles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. mil­i­tary units in those two regions begin­ning in 1950 and 1965–yet that is pre­cise­ly what had been planned, and it is pre­cise­ly what hap­pened. Who made that deci­sion back in 1943–45? . . . .”

To appre­ci­ate Chi­ang’s influ­ence in the Cairo and Tehran con­fer­ences, it is impor­tant to under­stand that he was “work­ing both sides of the street” in World War II.

Amer­i­can mil­i­tary sup­plies flown over the Hump and/or sent along the Bur­ma Road at great risk and cost to Allied ser­vice­men found their way into the hands of the Japan­ese, cour­tesy of KMT gen­er­al Ku Chu-tung and his orga­nized crime broth­er.

Gen­er­al Ku Chu-Tung com­mand­ed a dev­as­tat­ing oper­a­tion against the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist New Fourth Army, illus­trat­ing why the Sea­graves called him “one of the most hat­ed men in Chi­na.”

Although obscured by the sands of time and pro­pa­gan­dized his­to­ry, Ku-Chu Tung’s actions illus­trate why Gen­er­al Joseph Stil­well held Chi­ang Kai-Shek in con­tempt. Still­well not only (cor­rect­ly) viewed Chi­ang Kai-Shek as a fas­cist, but (cor­rect­ly) saw him as an imped­i­ment to opti­miz­ing Chi­nese resis­tance to the hat­ed Japan­ese invaders.

Col­lab­o­rat­ing with Kodama Yoshio, the Japan­ese crime boss and Admi­ral of the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Navy, the Ku broth­ers swapped U.S. lend lease sup­plies for drugs.

It is impor­tant to note the role of the Black Drag­on Soci­ety in the ascent of Kodama Yoshio. Black Drag­on, along with Black Ocean, are key Japan­ese ultra-nation­al­ist soci­eties and the appar­ent fore­run­ners of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church and, pos­si­bly the over­lap­ping Shin­cheon­ji cult that was sued by Park Won-soon.

Kodama played a key role in the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church, as dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 291  and 970.

Acquir­ing key strate­gic raw mate­ri­als for the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Naval Air Force, Kodama bought many of these direct­ly from the chief of Kuom­intang secret ser­vice, Gen­er­al Tai Li, who was paid direct­ly in hero­in.

Before turn­ing to the sub­ject of the Kore­an War and its deci­sive influ­ence on the dis­po­si­tion of glob­al wealth and the resus­ci­ta­tion of the glob­al car­tel sys­tem, we recount the assas­si­na­tion of Kim Koo, an impor­tant Kore­an patri­ot, whose advo­ca­cy of reuni­fi­ca­tion for Korea placed him in the crosshairs of Amer­i­can Cold War strate­gists. (Park Won-soon was called a “com­mie” for advo­cat­ing rec­on­cil­i­a­tion between the Kore­as.) ” . . . . In June 1949, Gen­er­al Kim Chang-Yong, Rhee’s close advi­sor and Chief of Korea’s Counter-Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC)—found­ed by and pat­terned after the CIA—conspired with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence offi­cers and a young lieu­tenant to assas­si­nate Kim Koo. On June 26, 1949, while the sev­en­ty-three-year-old Kim was rest­ing in his sec­ond-floor bed­room, Lieu­tenant Ahn Do hi walked past three police­men stand­ing guard out­side, entered the house, pro­ceed­ed to Kim’s bed­room, and shot him to death. . . .”

On the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War, John Fos­ter Dulles was in Seoul with Kodama Yoshio. It is not known just what they were doing, but Fos­ter direct­ly fore­shad­owed the impend­ing (and alleged­ly unan­tic­i­pat­ed) North Kore­an inva­sion in a speech just before the com­mence­ment of hos­til­i­ties.

Kodama recruit­ed thou­sands of yakuza sol­diers and Japan­ese World War II vet­er­ans to fight for South Korea, dressed in Kore­an uni­forms.

Next, we high­light the 1951 “Peace” Treaty between the Allies and Japan, an agree­ment which false­ly main­tained that Japan had not stolen any wealth from the nations it occu­pied dur­ing World War II and that the (already) boom­ing nation was bank­rupt and would not be able to pay repa­ra­tions to the slave labor­ers and “com­fort women” it had pressed into ser­vice dur­ing the con­flict.

Japan was not bank­rupt at all when John Fos­ter Dulles nego­ti­at­ed the Treaty. U.S. bomb­ing left crit­i­cal infra­struc­ture intact, and the infu­sion of war loot helped boost the 1951 Japan­ese econ­o­my above its pre-World War II peak.

Fos­ter Dulles’s role in the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan, his curi­ous pres­ence in Seoul with Kodama Yoshio on the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War, his pre­scient fore­shad­ow­ing of the con­flict just before the North Kore­an inva­sion and the role of these events in shap­ing the post World War II glob­al eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal land­scapes may well have been designed to help jump­start the Japan­ese and Ger­man economies.

The Kore­an War did just that” . . . . A sub­stan­tial infu­sion of mon­ey into this new Fed­er­al Repub­lic econ­o­my result­ed from the Kore­an War in 1950. The Unit­ed States was not geared to sup­ply­ing all its needs for armies in Korea, so the Pen­ta­gon placed huge orders in West Ger­many and in Japan; from that point on, both nations winged into an era of boom­ing good times. . . .”

Indeed, John Fos­ter Dulles’s world view enun­ci­at­ed a phi­los­o­phy alto­geth­er con­sis­tent with those aims: ” . . . . He churned out mag­a­zine and news­pa­per arti­cles assert­ing that the ‘dynam­ic’ coun­tries of the world–Germany, Italy, and Japan–‘feel with­in them­selves poten­tial­i­ties which are sup­pressed’ . . .”

Those economies, the car­tels that dom­i­nat­ed them and the Dulles broth­ers Cold War strate­gic out­look are dom­i­nant fac­tors in the deep pol­i­tics under­ly­ing the life, and death, of Park Won-soon.

1.  The pro­gram begins with the obit­u­ary of gen­er­al Paik Sun-yup of Korea, whose ser­vice in the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Army dur­ing World War II has been a focal point of con­tro­ver­sy in South Korea. Gen­er­al Sun-yup embod­ied the ongo­ing con­tro­ver­sy in Korea over Japan’s occu­pa­tion and the sub­se­quent unfold­ing of events lead­ing up to, and includ­ing the Kore­an War. “. . . . In 1941, he joined the army of Manchukuo, a pup­pet state that impe­r­i­al Japan had estab­lished in Manchuria, and served in a unit known for hunt­ing down Kore­an guer­ril­las fight­ing for inde­pen­dence . . .”

“Paik Sun-yup, South Kore­an Gen­er­al Seen as Hero or Trai­tor, Dies at 99” by Choe Sang-Hun; The New York Times; 7/15/2020; p. A22.

Paik Sun-yup, South Kore­a’s first four-star gen­er­al, who was lion­ized as a Kore­an War hero by the South Kore­an and Unit­ed States mil­i­taries but dis­missed by many in his coun­try as a trai­tor, died here on Fri­day. He was 99. . . .

. . . . Though wide­ly cred­it­ed for lead­ing his troops in a piv­otal bat­tle of the Kore­an War, Mr. Paik was a divi­sive fig­ure in his home coun­try. In 2009, a South Kore­an pres­i­den­tial com­mit­tee put him on a list of “pro-Japan­ese and anti-nation” fig­ures who had col­lab­o­rat­ed with Japan­ese col­o­niz­ers dur­ing their rule of the Kore­an Penin­su­la. . . .

. . . . In 1941, he joined the army of Manchukuo, a pup­pet state that impe­r­i­al Japan had estab­lished in Manchuria, and served in a unit known for hunt­ing down Kore­an guer­ril­las fight­ing for inde­pen­dence, though Mr. Paik said he had nev­er engaged in bat­tles with them.

He was a first lieu­tenant when Japan was defeat­ed in World War II and Korea was lib­er­at­ed. After the coun­try was divid­ed into the pro-Amer­i­can South and the Com­mu­nist North, Mr. Paik was among the Kore­ans in Japan’s colo­nial mil­i­tary who were recruit­ed when the Unit­ed States was help­ing to build a mil­i­tary for the South. . . .

. . . . IF Paik Sun-yup is called a ‘hero,’ what does that make Kore­an inde­pen­dence fight­ers who lost their lives at the hand of his old Manchuria unit?” asked Kim Won-woong, the head of Her­itage of Kore­an Inde­pen­dence, a group rec­og­nized by the gov­ern­ment for its mem­bers’ strug­gle for inde­pen­dence.

“If he real­ly want­ed to be treat­ed like ‘a Kore­an War hero,’ he should at least have expressed repen­tance and remorse for his pro-Japan­ese deed,” Mr. Kim added, in an inter­view pub­lished last year. “But he nev­er has.”

2. The Cold War in Asia, includ­ing the Kore­an War and atten­dant insti­tu­tion­al­iza­tion of the Amer­i­can­iza­tion of Gold­en Lily prof­its had its gen­e­sis in the influ­ence of the Kuom­intang in the Cairo and Tehran talks dur­ing 1943.

In addi­tion to Chi­ang Kai-shek him­self, his wife (the for­mer Mei-Ling Soon, sis­ter of T.V. Soong) played an impor­tant part in the nego­ti­a­tions.

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; p. 13.

. . . . Although the alliance between the West and the Sovi­et Union dur­ing WWII had been weld­ed in the heat of bat­tle, it had nev­er been on too firm a foot­ing. This was espe­cial­ly true of its struc­ture in the Far East. The Chi­nese leader, Chi­ang Kai-shek, was as much a dic­ta­tor as either Hitler or Mus­soli­ni. . . .

. . . . In this cli­mate, Pres­i­dent Roo­sevelt maneu­vered to have Chi­ang Kai-shek join him in Cairo or a Novem­ber 22–26, 1943, meet­ing with Churchill. Roo­sevelt want­ed to cre­ate the atmos­phere of a “Big Four” by plac­ing Chi­ang on the world stage. Chi­ang appeared in Cairo, along with his attrac­tive and pow­er­ful wife, Madame Chi­ang Kai-shek—nee Mei- Ling Soong, daugh­ter of Char­lie Jones Soong and sis­ter of T.V. Soong, at that time the wealth­i­est man in the world [and Chi­ang Kai-shek’s finance minister—D.E.]. Few pic­tures pro­duce dur­ing WWII have been more strik­ing than those of Chi­ang and Roo­sevelt “appar­ent­ly” jok­ing with each oth­er on one side and an “appar­ent­ly” con­vivial Churchill and Madame Chi­ang smil­ing togeth­er on the oth­er. . . .

. . . . With the close of the Cairo Con­fer­ence, the Churchill and Roo­sevelt del­e­ga­tions flew to Tehran for their own first meet­ing with Mar­shal Stal­in. This much was released to the pub­lic. A fact that was not released, and that even to this day has rarely been made known, is that Chi­ang and the Chi­nese del­e­ga­tion were also present at the Tehran Con­fer­ence of Novem­ber 28-Decem­ber 1, 1943. . . .

3. After Franklin Roo­sevelt’s death in 1945, the role of Chi­ang Kai-shek and asso­ciates helped shape the post­war shape of Asia, set­ting the stage for the Kore­an War. Note that T.V. Soong was Chi­ang’s finance min­is­ter and the rich­est man in the world at that time.

His U.S. edu­cat­ed sis­ter was mar­ried to Chi­ang Kai-shek and wield­ed great influ­ence both in the Kuom­intang admin­is­tra­tion and in the Cairo and Tehran dis­cus­sion that set the stage for post-World War II in Asia.

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; p. xxvi­ii.

. . . . How many of us real­ize that back in Novem­ber 1943, when Win­ston Churchill and Franklin D. Roo­sevelt met in Cairo with Chi­ang Kai-shek, they were not only mak­ing plans for vic­to­ry over the Axis pow­ers in Europe, they were lay­ing the ground­work for a fol­low-on peri­od of war­fare in east­ern Asia, in Indochi­na (1945), Korea (1950 . . . . fol­low­ing the defeat of Japan?

Few his­to­ri­ans seem to recall that also in Cairo was Chi­ang Kai-shek’s wife Mei-Ling, the Amer­i­can-edu­cat­ed sis­ter of T.V. Soong, then the wealth­i­est man in the world, and she actu­al­ly took part in the work of the con­fer­ence along with activ­i­ties of T.V. Soong’s Chi­nese del­e­gates, who were Chiang’s advis­ers. . . .

. . . . Even more impor­tant­ly, after these del­e­gates of Chi­ang Kai-Shek and T. V. Soong had active­ly par­tic­i­pat­ed in Cairo in the plan­ning for the post-World War II activ­i­ties in the Far East, they flew on to Tehran . . . The fact that imme­di­ate­ly fol­low­ing the Cairo Con­fer­ence the Chi­nese del­e­ga­tion was in Teheran . . . . has not been record­ed in the his­to­ry books of this era. This is a most impor­tant omis­sion. I was pilot of the plane that flew them there from Cairo. Dur­ing the some­times heat­ed exchanges . . . . plans were made . . . . for a peri­od of con­tin­u­ing war­fare in Indochi­na, Korea, and Indone­sia under the guise of that Cold War “cov­er sto­ry.”. . .

4. Hav­ing been born in 1949, I grew up with World War II as a crit­i­cal ele­ment of my polit­i­cal, civic and cog­ni­tive upbring­ing. I vivid­ly remem­ber watch­ing the doc­u­men­tary “Vic­to­ry at Sea” on tele­vi­sion as a child. As I have grown old­er, more knowl­edge­able and wis­er, learn­ing the truth about World War II has been very sad and painful.

In FTR #1095, we not­ed the his­tor­i­cal back­ground to the ongo­ing con­flict with China–the bru­tal Japan­ese onslaught and the col­lab­o­ra­tion of Chi­ang Kai-shek’s Kuom­intang nar­co-dic­ta­tor­ship with Japan’s attack and occu­pa­tion.

As a boy, I was awed and moved by the hero­ism of Amer­i­can and Allied ser­vice per­son­nel who braved the dan­gers of fly­ing over the Hump to bring U.S. sup­plies to Chi­ang Kai-shek’s forces. Although offi­cial­ly allied with the U.S., Chi­ang Kai-shek’s forces were actu­al­ly work­ing “both sides of the street.”

We have encoun­tered noth­ing more grotesque­ly trag­ic and dis­il­lu­sion­ing than the aware­ness that Amer­i­can mil­i­tary sup­plies flown over the Hump and/or sent along the Bur­ma Road found their way into the hands of the Japan­ese, cour­tesy of KMT gen­er­al Ku Chu-tung and his orga­nized crime broth­er.

Col­lab­o­rat­ing with Kodama Yoshio, the Japan­ese crime boss and Admi­ral of the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Navy, the broth­ers swapped U.S. lend lease sup­plies for drugs.

In the pas­sage below, it is impor­tant to note the role of the Black Drag­on Soci­ety in the ascent of Kodama Yoshio. Black Drag­on, along with Black Ocean, are key Japan­ese ultra-nation­al­ist soci­eties and the appar­ent fore­run­ners of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church and, pos­si­bly the over­lap­ping Shin­cheon­ji cult.

Kodama played a key role in the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church, as dis­cussed in FTR #‘s 291  and 970.

Gold Warriors—America’s Secret Recov­ery of Yamashita’s Gold; by Ster­ling Sea­grave and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 41.

. . . . He [Kodama] was sprung from jail by [Gen­er­al] Doi­hara in April 1937, on the con­di­tion that he devot­ed his vio­lent ener­gies to loot­ing Chi­na’s under­world. This epiphany, the trans­for­ma­tion of Kodama from thug to super-patri­ot, was sug­gest­ed by Black Drag­on’s Toya­ma [Mit­su­ru], whose own stature as a patri­ot was affirmed in 1924 when he was a guest at Emper­or Hiro­hi­to’s wed­ding. . . .

. . . . All pro­ceeds were divert­ed from Chi­nese rack­e­teers to Gold­en Lily, minus a han­dling charge for Kodama him­self. Ulti­mate­ly, Kodama was respon­si­ble to Prince Chichibu, and to the throne.

Princes were not equipped to deal with gang­sters. Kodama saved them from soil­ing their hands. He con­vert­ed nar­cotics into bul­lion by the sim­ple method of trad­ing hero­in to gang­sters for gold ingots. How bro­kers got the ingots was not his con­cern. He closed a deal with water­front boss Ku Tsu-chuan to swap hero­in for gold through­out the Yangtze Val­ley. Thanks to Ku’s broth­er, KMT senior gen­er­al Ku Chu-tung, Japan also gained access to U.S. Lend-Lease sup­plies reach­ing west­ern Chi­na by way of the Bur­ma road, or on air­craft fly­ing over the Hump from India. Once in ware­hous­es in Kun­ming or Chungk­ing, the Lend-Lease was re-sold to the Japan­ese Army, with Kodama as pur­chas­ing agent. . . .

5. Gen­er­al Ku Chu-Tung com­mand­ed a dev­as­tat­ing oper­a­tion against the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist New Fourth Army, illus­trat­ing why the Sea­graves called him “one of the most hat­ed men in Chi­na.”

Although obscured by the sands of time and pro­pa­gan­dized his­to­ry, Ku-Chu Tung’s actions illus­trate why Gen­er­al Joseph Still­well held Chi­ang Kai-Shek in con­tempt. Still­well not only (cor­rect­ly) viewed Chi­ang Kai-Shek as a fas­cist, but (cor­rect­ly) saw him as an imped­i­ment to opti­miz­ing Chi­nese resis­tance to the hat­ed Japan­ese invaders.

Gold Warriors—America’s Secret Recov­ery of Yamashita’s Gold; by Ster­ling Sea­grave and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; pp. 300–301.

. . . . The Ku broth­ers had evil rep­u­ta­tions. In 1940, Gen­er­al Ku became one of China’s most hat­ed men. When the Chi­nese com­mu­nist New Fourth Army passed through his ter­ri­to­ry on their way to attack the Japan­ese held rail­way between Nanking and Shang­hai, Ku ambushed them and mas­sa­cred all but the head­quar­ters con­tin­gent, includ­ing many women cadres. All these women were sub­ject­ed to mass rape and kept in KMT army broth­els for the next 18 months, where a num­ber of them com­mit­ted sui­cide. As his reward, Gen­er­al Ku was pro­mot­ed to com­man­der in chief of the KMT armies. . . .

6. Next, we sup­ple­ment dis­cus­sion of the col­lab­o­ra­tion of Chi­ang Kai-shek’s regime with the Japan­ese. Once again, Kodama Yoshio is front and cen­ter. Acquir­ing key strate­gic raw mate­ri­als for the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Naval Air Force, Kodama bought many of these direct­ly from the chief of Kuom­intang secret ser­vice, Gen­er­al Tai Li, who was paid direct­ly in hero­in.

Note that the Strike South ref­er­enced in the quote below was the cam­paign of which the attack on Pearl Har­bor was a key part. The attack on Pearl Har­bor was designed to neu­tral­ize the U.S. Sev­enth Fleet, in order to facil­i­tate the Japan­ese cam­paign in the South Pacif­ic, chiefly the cap­ture of the Indone­sian oil fields.

The cap­ture of Indone­sia and the Strike South was neces­si­tat­ed by Franklin Delano Roo­sevelt’s cut-off of the sale of oil to Japan. Reflec­tive of the U.S/Japanese car­tel asso­ci­a­tion high­light­ed in FTR #905, the U.S. had fueled the bal­ance of the Japan­ese war effort up to that point.

Gold Warriors—America’s Secret Recov­ery of Yamashita’s Gold; by Ster­ling Sea­grave and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 42.

. . . . Offi­cial­ly, Kodama was in Shang­hai as a buy­er for the Impe­r­i­al Navy Air Force, under the rubric of the Kodama Kikan, or Kodama Agency. (Spe­cial Ser­vice Units were named after the offi­cer in charge and then called an agency.) On paper, his mis­sion was to locate and acquire sup­plies of cop­per, cobalt, nick­el and mica. In most cas­es he bought these direct­ly from KMT secret police chief Gen­er­al Tai Li, who was paid in hero­in. Accord­ing to U.S. intel­li­gence, the Kodama Agency took over the salt monop­oly, molyb­de­num mines, farms, fish­eries and muni­tions plants. . . .

. . . . Just before Pearl Har­bor and the Strike South, Kodama accom­pa­nied Prince Take­da to Japan’s south­ern mil­i­tary head­quar­ters in Saigon to con­fer with Field Mar­shal Ter­auchi, son of the gen­er­al who had loot­ed and bru­tal­ized Korea. Because the Strike South would involve Japan’s navy, and the navy would admin­is­ter the Malay Arch­i­pel­ago through which trea­sure ships must pass, Kodama was trans­ferred overnight from the army to the navy, and giv­en the rank of rear admi­ral. This was like mak­ing Al Capone a U.S. Navy admi­ral. Kodama’s rank enabled him to com­man­deer ships, and gave him lever­age with Chi­nese smug­glers who roved the arch­i­pel­ago. As Jonathan Mar­shall explains, “because the Japan­ese lacked a coastal navy, they grant­ed Chi­nese ‘pirates’ a monop­oly on smug­gling in return for infor­ma­tion . . . . The Japan­ese sold them nar­cotics for $1,600 an ounce, which the pirates in turn could sell along the coast for $6,000.”

Kodama returned to Shang­hai just in time for Pearl Har­bor . . . .

7. While in Oki­nawa dur­ing Japan’s sur­ren­der in World War II, Colonel L. Fletch­er Prouty was wit­ness to the ear­ly com­mit­ment of deci­sive mil­i­tary resources to the wars that were to take place in Korea and Indochina/Vietnam. ” . . . . I was on Oki­nawa at that time, and dur­ing some busi­ness in the har­bor area I asked the har­bor­mas­ter if all that new mate­r­i­al was being returned to the States. His response was direct and sur­pris­ing: ‘Hell, no! They ain’t nev­er goin’ to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and sup­ply at least a hun­dred and fifty thou­sand men, is going to Korea, and the oth­er half is going to Indochi­na.’ In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first bat­tles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. mil­i­tary units in those two regions begin­ning in 1950 and 1965–yet that is pre­cise­ly what had been planned, and it is pre­cise­ly what hap­pened. Who made that deci­sion back in 1943–45? . . . .”

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; pp. 17–18.

One of the best-kept and least-dis­cussed secrets of ear­ly Cold War plan­ning took place some­time before the sur­ren­der of Japan. It had a great impact upon the selec­tion of Korea and Indochi­na as the loca­tions of the ear­ly “Cold War” hos­til­i­ties between the Com­mu­nists and the anti-Com­mu­nists.

Despite the ter­rif­ic dam­age done to main­land Japan by aer­i­al bom­bard­ment, even before the use of atom­ic bombs, the inva­sion of Japan had been con­sid­ered to be an essen­tial pre­lude to vic­to­ry and to “uncon­di­tion­al” sur­ren­der. Plan­ning for this inva­sion had been under way for years. As soon as the island of Oki­nawa became avail­able as the launch­ing site for this oper­a­tion, sup­plies and equip­ment for an inva­sion force of at least half a mil­lion men began to be stacked up, fif­teen to twen­ty feet high, all over the island.

Then, with the ear­ly sur­ren­der of Japan, this mas­sive inva­sion did not occur, and the use of this enor­mous stock­pile of mil­i­tary equip­ment was not nec­es­sary. Almost imme­di­ate­ly, U.S. Navy trans­port ves­sels began to show up in Naha Har­bor, Oki­nawa. This vast load of war mate­r­i­al was reloaded onto those ships. I was on Oki­nawa at that time, and dur­ing some busi­ness in the har­bor area I asked the har­bor­mas­ter if all that new mate­r­i­al was being returned to the States.

His response was direct and sur­pris­ing: “Hell, no! They ain’t nev­er goin’ to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and sup­ply at least a hun­dred and fifty thou­sand men, is going to Korea, and the oth­er half is going to Indochi­na.”

In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first bat­tles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. mil­i­tary units in those two regions begin­ning in 1950 and 1965–yet that is pre­cise­ly what had been planned, and it is pre­cise­ly what hap­pened. Who made that deci­sion back in 1943–45? . . . .

8. Next, we set forth the assas­si­na­tion of Kore­an patri­ot Kim Koo. Advo­cat­ing the reuni­fi­ca­tion of Korea, he stood in the way of Cold War plan­ning. His assas­si­na­tion was, in all prob­a­bil­i­ty, engi­neered by the CIA. ” . . . . In June 1949, Gen­er­al Kim Chang-Yong, Rhee’s close advi­sor and Chief of Korea’s Counter-Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC)—found­ed by and pat­terned after the CIA—conspired with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence offi­cers and a young lieu­tenant to assas­si­nate Kim Koo. On June 26, 1949, while the sev­en­ty-three-year-old Kim was rest­ing in his sec­ond-floor bed­room, Lieu­tenant Ahn Do hi walked past three police­men stand­ing guard out­side, entered the house, pro­ceed­ed to Kim’s bed­room, and shot him to death. . . .”

The Judas Fac­tor: The Plot to Kill Mal­colm X by Karl Evanzz; Thun­der’s Mouth Press [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Karl Evanzz; ISBN 1–56025-049–6; pp. 55–56.

. . . . After World War II end­ed and Japan was eject­ed from Korea, U.S. Pres­i­dent Franklin D. Roo­sevelt and Joseph Stal­in of the Sovi­et Union reached an agree­ment at the Yal­ta con­fer­ence in Feb­ru­ary of 1945, under which Korea would be gov­erned by a joint trustee­ship. The Unit­ed States would gov­ern the south­ern half of the nation, while North Korea would be under the Sovi­et Union’s con­trol.

Enter Kim Koo. Kim, who had lived in Shang­hai dur­ing the war, returned to Korea after the Japan­ese occu­pa­tion end­ed. He opposed the joint trustee­ship fear­ing it would lead to a per­ma­nent divi­sion of his home­land. Kim became a folk hero to Kore­ans, but a fly in the oint­ment to the Unit­ed States . . . . Kim’s fears became real­i­ty when Gen­er­al John R. Hodge, Com­man­der of the U.S. Occu­pa­tion Forces, held a rigged elec­tion in which Kim and [U.S. pro­tégé] Syn­g­man Rhee became lead­ers of South Korea. In the inter­im, the Sovi­et Union installed Kim Il Sung in new­ly inde­pen­dent North Korea. Rhee opposed the pow­er-shar­ing plan in the South, par­tic­u­lar­ly since Kim Koo was press­ing for­ward with plans to reunite Korea.

In June 1949, Gen­er­al Kim Chang-Yong, Rhee’s close advi­sor and Chief of Korea’s Counter-Intel­li­gence Corps (CIC)—found­ed by and pat­terned after the CIA—conspired with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence offi­cers and a young lieu­tenant to assas­si­nate Kim Koo. On June 26, 1949, while the sev­en­ty-three-year-old Kim was rest­ing in his sec­ond-floor bed­room, Lieu­tenant Ahn Do hi walked past three police­men stand­ing guard out­side, entered the house, pro­ceed­ed to Kim’s bed­room, and shot him to death.

Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai, who had har­bored Kim for more than twen­ty years, were cer­tain that the assas­si­na­tion had been ordered by Rhee’s Amer­i­can advis­er, who also served as Rhee’s anti-espi­onage chief. Although there was evi­dence that the Amer­i­can was a CIA offi­cer . . .  no one was able to prove it, and Ahn wasn’t talk­ing. Short­ly after the assas­si­na­tion, Ahn’s fam­i­ly was spir­it­ed out of Korea and brought to Amer­i­ca. The Ahn family’s depar­ture only served to height­en spec­u­la­tion that Kim’s assas­si­na­tion was engi­neered by the CIA. Ahn tried to join his fam­i­ly in Amer­i­ca, but was [pre­vent­ed by forces loy­al to Kim. Today, June 26 is a nation­al day of mourn­ing in Korea. . . .

9.  In dis­cus­sion below, we high­light the 1951 “Peace” Treaty between the Allies and Japan, an agree­ment which false­ly main­tained that Japan had not stolen any wealth from the nations it occu­pied dur­ing World War II and that the (already) boom­ing nation was bank­rupt and would not be able to pay repa­ra­tions to the slave labor­ers and “com­fort women” it had pressed into ser­vice dur­ing the con­flict.

In the con­text of the fan­tas­tic sums loot­ed by Japan under the aus­pices of Gold­en Lily and the incor­po­ra­tion of that wealth with Nazi Gold to form the Black Eagle Trust, that 1951 treaty and the advent of the Kore­an War raise some inter­est­ing, unre­solved ques­tions.

One of the prin­ci­pal fig­ures in the loot­ing of occu­pied Asia dur­ing World War II was the remark­able Kodama Yoshio. Net­worked with the pow­er­ful Yakuza Japan­ese orga­nized crime milieu, the Black Drag­on soci­ety (the most pow­er­ful of the patri­ot­ic and ultra-nation­al­ist soci­eties), the Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese mil­i­tary and the Roy­al fam­i­ly of Emper­or Hiro­hi­to, Kodama loot­ed the Chi­nese under­world and traf­ficked in nar­cotics with Chi­ang Kai-shek’s fas­cist nar­co-dic­ta­tor­ship.

We can but won­der about Kodama Yosh­io’s pres­ence along with 1951 “Peace” Treaty author John Fos­ter Dulles at nego­ti­a­tions in Seoul on the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War.

As dis­cussed in numer­ous pro­grams in an inter­view with Daniel Junas, the Kore­an War was a huge eco­nom­ic boom for Japan, and gen­er­at­ed con­sid­er­able prof­it for Ger­man firms as well. Thyssen, for exam­ple, won lucra­tive con­tracts for mak­ing steel for the war effort. Is there some con­nec­tion between the Kodama/Dulles pres­ence in Seoul on the eve of the out­break of war linked to the Gold­en Lily/Black Eagle/1951 “Peace” Treaty nexus?

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 115.

 . . . . In Octo­ber of 1949, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Chi­na came into being. Eight months lat­er, in June of 1950, the Kore­an War broke out. Just before the war began, Kodama [Yoshio] accom­pa­nied John Fos­ter Dulles to nego­ti­a­tions in Seoul. The Dulles par­ty also includ­ed Kodama’s pro­tege Machii Hisayu­ki, boss of the Kore­an yakuza in Japan. Efforts to dis­cov­er under Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion what Kodama and Machii did dur­ing the trip with Dulles have run into a stone wall. In the MacArthur Memo­r­i­al archive we dis­cov­ered a per­son­al let­ter from Kodama to Gen­er­al MacArthur offer­ing to pro­vide thou­sands of yakuza and for­mer Japan­ese Army sol­diers to fight along­side Amer­i­can sol­diers in Korea. Accord­ing to sources in Korea and Japan, the offer was accept­ed and these men joined the Allied force on the Penin­su­la, pos­ing as Kore­an sol­diers. . . . 

10. Inter­est­ing­ly, and per­haps sig­nif­i­cant­ly, John Fos­ter Dulles made a star­tling­ly pre­scient speech in South Korea, augur­ing North Kore­a’s inva­sion short­ly there­after.

It would be inter­est­ing to know if Dulles and Kodama had been involved in delib­er­ate­ly lur­ing the North Kore­ans to invade, in a man­ner not unlike that in which U.S. Ambas­sador to Iraq April Glaspie appears to have bait­ed Sad­dam Hus­sein into invad­ing Kuwait.

Note, also, Dulles’s char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of Syn­g­man Rhee and Chi­ang Kai-shek as Chris­t­ian gen­tle­men. Chi­ang Kai-shek’s redemp­tion­ist cre­den­tials are high­light­ed in some of the pas­sages above.

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; pp. 38–39.

. . . . It was this same John Fos­ter Dulles in Korea, serv­ing as no more than a “bipar­ti­san con­sul­tant” to the Depart­ment of State in June 1950, who had said, “No mat­ter what you say about the pres­i­dent of Korea [Syn­g­man Rhee] and the pres­i­dent of Nation­al­ist Chi­na [Chi­ang Kai-shek], these two gen­tle­men are the equiv­a­lent of the founder of the church . . . . they are Chris­t­ian gen­tle­men.”

Then, while still in Korea, on June 19, 1950, John Fos­ter Dulles made a most unusu­al speech before the Kore­an par­lia­ment: “The Amer­i­can peo­ple wel­come you as an equal part­ner in the great com­pa­ny of those who make up the free world. . . . I say to you: You are not alone. You will nev­er be alone so long as you con­tin­ue to play worthi­ly your part in the great design of human free­dom.”

The Kore­ans, tak­en com­plete­ly by sur­prise, won­dered what he meant by those words. Less than one week lat­er, when the North Kore­ans invad­ed South Korea, they found out. On the very next Sun­day, while Dulles was still in Japan, the Kore­an War broke out with an attack on the south by the North Kore­ans. For some­one of his stature—a senior part­ner of the largest law firm in New York City, Sul­li­van & Cromwell, and a man who had found a world­wide plat­form in the World Coun­cil of Churches—these had been most unusu­al state­ments on many counts. They were sur­passed only by his “pre­dic­tion” of the out­break of the Kore­an War at that time. As for his oth­er state­ment about “Chris­t­ian gen­tle­men,” few there are who have held the same opin­ion of Pres­i­dent Rhee and Gen­er­alis­si­mo Chi­ang, par­tic­u­lar­ly the lat­ter. . . .

11. The hero­ism of Allied and U.S. com­bat­ants was deeply impressed on my per­son­al­i­ty and per­cep­tions, in sig­nif­i­cant mea­sure by watch­ing “Vic­to­ry at Sea” . Footage of U.S. air­men in com­bat with Ger­man and Japan­ese planes res­onates dif­fer­ent­ly now, under­scor­ing the tragedy of the events and the cyn­i­cism that appears to have dic­tat­ed strat­e­gy devised by key offi­cers and politi­cians.

In FTR #905, among oth­er broad­casts, we have detailed the pro­found cor­po­rate links between Amer­i­can oli­garchs and their coun­ter­parts in Japan. As the Sea­graves not­ed in an excerpt of The Yam­a­to Dynasty sum­ma­riz­ing the after­math of World War II in Asia: “. . . . Amer­i­ca’s oli­garchs had res­cued Japan’s oli­garchs. . . .”

The Amer­i­can air war against Japan may well have been selec­tive­ly con­duct­ed, with dev­as­tat­ing fire­bomb­ing raids dec­i­mat­ing the res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hoods of much of Japan, while spar­ing the infra­struc­ture vital to the zaibat­sus (giant con­glom­er­ates that dominated–and con­tin­ue to dominate–the Japan­ese econ­o­my) and the coun­try’s war-mak­ing capac­i­ty.

The pos­si­bly that this appar­ent­ly delib­er­ate strat­e­gy was designed to dec­i­mate that ele­ment of the Japan­ese pop­u­la­tion that might have sought a more egal­i­tar­i­an polit­i­cal and social struc­ture, while spar­ing the elite is one to be seri­ous­ly con­tem­plat­ed.

One should enter­tain the pos­si­bil­i­ty that the con­duct of the U.S. air war may have been strate­gi­cal­ly designed to posi­tion Japan for the 1951 peace treaty that insti­tu­tion­al­ized the Gold­en Lily incor­po­ra­tion into the glob­al econ­o­my and post­war intel­li­gence estab­lish­ment.

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; pp. 115–116.

. . . . Despite pro­pa­gan­da to the con­trary, Amer­i­can and Euro­peans who toured Japan imme­di­ate­ly after the sur­ren­der were sur­prised that infra­struc­ture, fac­to­ries, util­i­ties, and rail­ways were large­ly intact, thanks to selec­tive Amer­i­can bomb­ing. Fire­bomb­ing had destroyed tens of thou­sands of the tin­der­box homes of ordi­nary Japan­ese, giv­ing Tokyo the look of a dev­as­tat­ed city, but great estates, fac­to­ries and vital infra­struc­ture seemed mag­i­cal­ly to have been spared. John Dow­er notes: “Vast areas of poor peo­ple’s res­i­dences, small shops and fac­to­ries in the cap­i­tal were gut­ted . . . but a good num­ber of the homes of the wealthy in fash­ion­able neigh­bor­hoods sur­vived. . . Toky­o’s finan­cial dis­trict [was] large­ly undam­aged. Undam­aged, also, was the build­ing that housed much of the impe­r­i­al mil­i­tary bureau­cra­cy at war’s end. . . . Rail­ways still func­tioned more or less effec­tive­ly through­out the coun­try . . . U.S bomb­ing pol­i­cy . . . had tend­ed to reaf­firm exist­ing hier­ar­chies of for­tune.” . . . 

. . . . Dur­ing the occu­pa­tion, many ordi­nary Japan­ese worked two jobs to earn enough to buy one pota­to each day. Dur­ing the same peri­od, Hiro­hi­to was earn­ing $50-mil­lion a year in inter­est mere­ly on his Swiss bank accounts. . . .

12. As stat­ed above, in FTR #905, among oth­er broad­casts, we have detailed the pro­found cor­po­rate links between Amer­i­can oli­garchs and their coun­ter­parts in Japan. As the Sea­graves not­ed in an excerpt of The Yam­a­to Dynasty sum­ma­riz­ing the after­math of World War II in Asia: “. . . . Amer­i­ca’s oli­garchs had res­cued Japan’s oli­garchs. . . .”

Pre­vi­ous­ly, we not­ed that “. . . . U.S.bomb­ing pol­i­cy [in Japan]. . . had tend­ed to reaf­firm exist­ing hier­ar­chies of for­tune. . .”

The corporate/cartel links between Amer­i­can and Japan­ese oli­garchs, the Cold War strat­e­gy of using Japan as an anti-Com­mu­nist bul­wark, and the fun­da­men­tal posi­tion of the Gold­en Lily loot at the foun­da­tion of the Black Eagle Trust loom large in the scan­dalous terms of the 1951 peace treaty with Japan.

The treaty was nego­ti­at­ed by Sul­li­van & Cromwell’s John Fos­ter Dulles, who was serv­ing as an appoint­ed U.S. Sen­a­tor at the time. (Fos­ter became Sec­re­tary of State under Eisen­how­er, assum­ing office in Jan­u­ary of 1953, while his broth­er and fel­low Sul­li­van & Cromwell part­ner Allen Dulles head­ed the CIA.)

The treaty was found­ed on the myth of Japan being bank­rupt and not hav­ing plun­dered the ter­ri­to­ries it plun­dered in World War II. This myth was the jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for exempt­ing Japan from hav­ing to com­pen­sate those who had been enslaved as labor­ers and com­fort women.

“. . . . Wash­ing­ton insist­ed, begin­ning in 1945, that Japan nev­er stole any­thing, and was flat broke and bank­rupt when the war end­ed. Here was the begin­ning of many great dis­tor­tions which would become ter­ri­ble secrets. . . . Because the trea­sure amassed by Gold­en Lily and recov­ered by Wash­ing­ton had to be kept secret, cit­i­zens of Japan and Amer­i­ca were gross­ly deceived. The 1951 peace treaty with Japan and was skewed by these deceits, so thou­sands of POWs and civil­ians (who were forced to per­form slave labor for Japan­ese cor­po­ra­tions) received no com­pen­sa­tion for their suf­fer­ing. To shield Japan from demands for war repa­ra­tions, John Fos­ter Dulles met pri­vate­ly with three Japan­ese to work out the treaty terms in secret. . . . Accord­ing to arti­cle 14 of the treaty, ‘It is rec­og­nized that Japan should pay repa­ra­tions to the Allied Pow­ers for the dam­age and suf­fer­ing caused by it dur­ing the war. Nev­er­the­less it is also rec­og­nized that the resources of Japan are not present­ly suf­fi­cient.’ To rein­force the claim that Japan was broke, Arti­cle 14 stat­ed, ‘the Allied Pow­ers waive all repa­ra­tions claims of the Allied Pow­ers and their nation­als aris­ing out of any actions tak­en by Japan’. By sign­ing the treaty, Allied coun­tries con­curred that Japan’s plun­der had van­ished down a rab­bit hole, and all Japan’s vic­tims were out of luck. . . .”

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 6.

. . . . Wash­ing­ton insist­ed, begin­ning in 1945, that Japan nev­er stole any­thing, and was flat broke and bank­rupt when the war end­ed. Here was the begin­ning of many great dis­tor­tions which would become ter­ri­ble secrets.

Because the trea­sure amassed by Gold­en Lily and recov­ered by Wash­ing­ton had to be kept secret, cit­i­zens of Japan and Amer­i­ca were gross­ly deceived. The 1951 peace treaty with Japan and was skewed by these deceits, so thou­sands of POWs and civil­ians (who were forced to per­form slave labor for Japan­ese cor­po­ra­tions) received no com­pen­sa­tion for their suf­fer­ing. To shield Japan from demands for war repa­ra­tions, John Fos­ter Dulles met pri­vate­ly with three Japan­ese to work out the treaty terms in secret. One of the three Miyaza­wa Kiichi, lat­er served as Japan’s prime min­is­ter and repeat­ed­ly as its min­is­ter of finance. Accord­ing to arti­cle 14 of the treaty, “It is rec­og­nized that Japan should pay repa­ra­tions to the Allied Pow­ers for the dam­age and suf­fer­ing caused by it dur­ing the war. Nev­er­the­less it is also rec­og­nized that the resources of Japan are not present­ly suf­fi­cient.”

To rein­force the claim that Japan was broke, Arti­cle 14 stat­ed, “the Allied Pow­ers waive all repa­ra­tions claims of the Allied Pow­ers and their nation­als aris­ing out of any actions tak­en by Japan”. By sign­ing the treaty, Allied coun­tries con­curred that Japan’s plun­der had van­ished down a rab­bit hole, and all Japan’s vic­tims were out of luck.

In return for going along with the treaty, we doc­u­ment that Wash­ing­ton sent secret ship­ments of black gold recov­ered by San­ta Romana, to beef up the Allies’ exhaust­ed cen­tral banks. . . .

13. At the time of the treaty’s negotiation–1951–Japan’s econ­o­my was at its zenith, to date. This high­lights the appar­ent­ly strate­gi­cal­ly selec­tive nature of Amer­i­can bomb­ing dur­ing the war, as well as the fact that Japan was allowed to keep the Gold­en Lily plun­der that had been brought back to the home islands.”. . . . As we now know, Japan was not bank­rupt­ed by the war. By 1951, six years after the war, Japan’s econ­o­my was stronger than it had been dur­ing the best busi­ness years before the war. . . . Japan’s indus­tri­al activ­i­ty was 32 per­cent above pre-war lev­els, its fis­cal posi­tion showed a sur­plus, and its bal­ance of trade had moved into the black. In dis­cus­sions between U.S. mon­e­tary experts and Japan’s Finance Min­is­ter Ide­da Hay­a­to just before the peace con­fer­ence, he admit­ted to a bud­get sur­plus of over 100-bil­lion yen . . . .”

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 237.

. . . . As we now know, Japan was not bank­rupt­ed by the war. By 1951, six years after the war, Japan’s econ­o­my was stronger than it had been dur­ing the best busi­ness years before the war. [Ital­ics mine–D.E.] Car­los Romu­lo, head of the Philip­pine del­e­ga­tion to the peace con­fer­ence, “demol­ished the U.S. argu­ment that Japan lacked the abil­i­ty to pay for eco­nom­ic rea­sons”.  Japan’s indus­tri­al activ­i­ty was 32 per­cent above pre-war lev­els, its fis­cal posi­tion showed a sur­plus, and its bal­ance of trade had moved into the black. In dis­cus­sions between U.S. mon­e­tary experts and Japan’s Finance Min­is­ter Ide­da Hay­a­to just before the peace con­fer­ence, he admit­ted to a bud­get sur­plus of over 100-bil­lion yen and planned to use 40-bil­lion of it as a tax rebate to Japan­ese cit­i­zens. The gov­er­nor of the Bank of Japan plead­ed with U.S. author­i­ties to take cus­tody of $200-mil­lion worth of gold hold­ings because he feared “the Fil­ipinos might try to attach the gold as repa­ra­tions”. . . .

14. The pri­ma­ry con­sid­er­a­tion in assess­ing the career of John Fos­ter Dulles and the con­text for his actions in Asia fol­low­ing World War II con­cerns car­tels. Dulles and his Sul­li­van & Cromwell asso­ciate, broth­er and CIA direc­tor Allen Dulles were mid­wives of the car­tel sys­tem which, dur­ing the peri­od between the World Wars, saw the nation state, per se, super­seded by inter­na­tion­al cor­po­rate arrange­ments.

Fos­ter was the archi­tect of the I.G. Far­ben car­tel and the over­lap­ping inter­na­tion­al nick­el car­tel.

Fos­ter’s role as a mid­wife of the dom­i­na­tion of the glob­al econ­o­my by the car­tel sys­tem is reviewed below. His polit­i­cal ori­en­ta­tion is embod­ied in this pas­sage: ” . . . . He churned out mag­a­zine and news­pa­per arti­cles assert­ing that the ‘dynam­ic’ coun­tries of the world–Germany, Italy, and Japan–‘feel with­in them­selves poten­tial­i­ties which are sup­pressed’ . . .”

His actions with regard to the par­ti­tion of Korea, the gen­e­sis of the Kore­an War and the nego­ti­a­tion of the 1951 peace treaty with Japan insti­tu­tion­al­iz­ing Japan’s eco­nom­ic plun­der of Asia embody the phi­los­o­phy set forth above.

The Broth­ers: John Fos­ter Dulls, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War by Stephen Kinz­er; St. Mar­tin Grif­fin [SC]; Copy­right 2013 by Stephen Kinz­er; ISBN 978–1‑250–05312‑1; pp. 49–52.

. . . . Fos­ter had helped design the Dawes Plan of 1924, which restruc­tured Ger­many’s repa­ra­tion pay­ments in ways that opened up huge new mar­kets for Amer­i­can banks, and lat­er that year he arranged for five of them to lend $100 mil­lion to Ger­man bor­row­ers. In the sev­en years that fol­lowed, he and his part­ners bro­kered anoth­er $900 mil­lion in loans to Ger­many–the equiv­a­lent of more than $15 bil­lion in ear­ly-twen­ty-first cen­tu­ry dol­lars. This made him the pre­em­i­nent sales­man of Ger­man bonds in the Unit­ed States, prob­a­bly the world. He sharply reject­ed crit­ics who argued that Amer­i­can banks should invest more inside the Unit­ed States and protest­ed when the State Depart­ment sought to restrict loans to Ger­many that were unre­lat­ed to repa­ra­tion pay­ments or that sup­port­ed car­tels or monop­o­lies.

Fos­ter made much mon­ey build­ing and advis­ing car­tels, which are based on agree­ments among com­pet­ing firms to con­trol sup­plies, fix prices, and close their sup­ply and dis­tri­b­u­tion net­works to out­siders. Reform­ers in many coun­tries railed against these car­tels, but Fos­ter defend­ed them as guar­an­tors of sta­bil­i­ty that ensured prof­its while pro­tect­ing economies from unpre­dictable swings. Two that he shaped became glob­al forces.

Among Fos­ter’s pre­mier clients was the New Jer­sey-based Inter­na­tion­al Nick­el Com­pa­ny, for which he was not only coun­sel but also a direc­tor and mem­ber of the exec­u­tive board. In the ear­ly 1930s, he steered it, along with its Cana­di­an affil­i­ate, into a car­tel with France’s two major nick­el pro­duc­ers. In 1934, he brought the biggest Ger­man nick­el pro­duc­er, I.G. Far­ben, into the car­tel. This gave Nazi Ger­many access to the cartel’s resources. “With­out Dulles,” accord­ing to a study of Sul­li­van & Cromwell, “Ger­many would have lacked any nego­ti­at­ing strength with [Inter­na­tion­al Nick­el], which con­trolled the world’s sup­ply of nick­el, a cru­cial ingre­di­ent in stain­less steel and armor plate.”

I.G. Far­ben was also one of the world’s largest chem­i­cal companies–it would pro­duce the Zyk­lon B gas used at Nazi death camps–and as Fos­ter was bring­ing it into the nick­el car­tel, he also helped it estab­lish a glob­al chem­i­cal car­tel. He was a board mem­ber and legal coun­sel for anoth­er chem­i­cal pro­duc­er, the Solvay con­glom­er­ate, based in Bel­gium. Dur­ing the 1930s, he guid­ed Solvay, I. G. Far­ben, the Amer­i­can firm Allied Chem­i­cal & Dye, and sev­er­al oth­er com­pa­nies into a chem­i­cal car­tel just as potent as the one he had orga­nized for nick­el pro­duc­ers.

In mid-1931, a con­sor­tium of Amer­i­can banks, eager to safe­guard their invest­ments in Ger­many, per­suad­ed the Ger­man gov­ern­ment to accept a loan of near­ly $500 mil­lion to pre­vent default. Fos­ter was their agent. His ties to the Ger­man gov­ern­ment tight­ened after Hitler took pow­er at the begin­ning of 1933 and appoint­ed Fos­ter’s old friend Hjal­mar Schacht as min­is­ter of eco­nom­ics.

Allen [Dulles] had intro­duced the two men a decade ear­li­er, when he was a diplo­mat in Berlin and Fos­ter passed through reg­u­lar­ly on Sul­li­van & Cromwell busi­ness. They were imme­di­ate­ly drawn to each oth­er, Schacht spoke flu­ent Eng­lish and under­stood the Unit­ed States well. Like Dulles, he pro­ject­ed an air of brisk author­i­ty. He was tall, gaunt, and always erect, with close-cropped hair and high, tight col­lars. Both men had con­sid­ered enter­ing the cler­gy before turn­ing their pow­er­ful minds toward more remu­ner­a­tive pur­suits. Each admired the cul­ture that had pro­duced the oth­er. Both believed that a resur­gent Ger­many would stand against Bol­she­vism. Mobi­liz­ing Amer­i­can cap­i­tal to finance its rise was their com­mon inter­est.

Work­ing with Schacht, Fos­ter helped the Nation­al Social­ist state find rich sources of financ­ing in the Unit­ed States for its pub­lic agen­cies, banks, and indus­tries. The two men shaped com­plex restruc­tur­ings of Ger­man loan oblig­a­tions at sev­er­al “debt con­fer­ences” in Berlin–conferences that were offi­cial­ly among bankers, but were in fact close­ly guid­ed by the Ger­man and Amer­i­can governments–and came up with new for­mu­las that made it eas­i­er for the Ger­mans to bor­row mon­ey from Amer­i­can banks. Sul­li­van & Cromwell float­ed the first Amer­i­can bonds issued by the giant Ger­man steel­mak­er and arms man­u­fac­tur­er Krupp A.G., extend­ed I.G. Far­ben’s glob­al reach, and fought suc­cess­ful­ly to block Canada’s effort to restrict the export of steel to Ger­man arms mak­ers. Accord­ing to one his­to­ry, the firm “rep­re­sent­ed sev­er­al provin­cial gov­ern­ments, some large indus­tri­al com­bines, a num­ber of big Amer­i­can com­pa­nies with inter­ests in the Reich, and some rich indi­vid­u­als.” By anoth­er account it “thrived on its car­tels and col­lu­sion with the new Nazi regime.” The colum­nist Drew Pear­son glee­ful­ly list­ed the Ger­man clients of Sul­li­van & Cromwell who had con­tributed mon­ey to the Nazis, and described Fos­ter as chief agent for “the bank­ing cir­cles that res­cued Adolf Hitler from the finan­cial depths and set up his Nazi par­ty as a going con­cern.”

Although the rela­tion­ship between Fos­ter and Schacht began well and thrived for years, it end­ed bad­ly. Schacht con­tributed deci­sive­ly to Ger­man rear­ma­ment and pub­licly urged Jews to “real­ize that their influ­ence in Ger­many has dis­ap­peared for all time.” Although he lat­er broke with Hitler and left the gov­ern­ment, he would be tried at Nurem­berg for “crimes against peace.” He was acquit­ted, but the chief Amer­i­can pros­e­cu­tor, Robert Jack­son, called him “the facade of starched respon­si­bil­i­ty, who in the ear­ly days pro­vid­ed the win­dow dress­ing, the bait for the hes­i­tant.” He bait­ed no one more suc­cess­ful­ly than Fos­ter.

Dur­ing the mid-1930s, through a series of cur­ren­cy maneu­vers, dis­count­ed buy­backs, and oth­er forms of finan­cial war­fare, Ger­many effec­tive­ly default­ed on its debts to Amer­i­can investors. Fos­ter rep­re­sent­ed the investors in unsuc­cess­ful appeals to Ger­many, many of them addressed to his old friend Schacht. Clients who had fol­lowed Sul­li­van & Cromwell’s advice to buy Ger­man bonds lost for­tunes. That advice, accord­ing to one study, “cost Amer­i­cans a bil­lion dol­lars because Schacht seduced Dulles into sup­port­ing Ger­many for far too long.’ . . . .

. . . . Fos­ter had clear finan­cial rea­sons to col­lab­o­rate with the Nazi regime, and his ide­o­log­i­cal reason–Hitler was fierce­ly anti-Bolshevik–was equal­ly com­pelling. In lat­er years, schol­ars would ask about his actions in the world. Did he do it out of a desire to pro­tect eco­nom­ic priv­i­lege, or out of anti-Com­mu­nist fer­vor? The best answer may be that to him there was no dif­fer­ence. In his mind defend­ing multi­na­tion­al busi­ness and fight­ing Bol­she­vism were the same thing.

Since 1933, all let­ters writ­ten from the Ger­man offices of Sul­li­van & Cromwell had end­ed, as required by Ger­man reg­u­la­tions, with the salu­ta­tion Heil Hitler! That did not dis­turb Fos­ter. He churned out mag­a­zine and news­pa­per arti­cles assert­ing that the “dynam­ic” coun­tries of the world–Germany, Italy, and Japan–“feel with­in them­selves poten­tial­i­ties which are sup­pressed,” and that Hitler’s semi-secret rear­ma­ment project sim­ply showed that “Ger­many, by uni­lat­er­al action, has now tak­en back her free­dom of action.” . . . .

15. Fos­ter Dulles’s role in the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan, his curi­ous pres­ence in Seoul with Kodama Yoshio on the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War, his pre­scient fore­shad­ow­ing of the con­flict just before the North Kore­an inva­sion and the role of these events in shap­ing the post World War II glob­al eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal land­scapes may well have been designed to help jump­start the Japan­ese and Ger­man economies.

Those economies, the car­tels that dom­i­nat­ed them and the Dulles broth­ers Cold War strate­gic out­look are dom­i­nant fac­tors in the deep pol­i­tics under­ly­ing the life, and death, of Park Won-soon.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 235–236.

. . . .  A sub­stan­tial infu­sion of mon­ey into this new Fed­er­al Repub­lic econ­o­my result­ed from the Kore­an War in 1950. The Unit­ed States was not geared to sup­ply­ing all its needs for armies in Korea, so the Pen­ta­gon placed huge orders in West Ger­many and in Japan; from that point on, both nations winged into an era of boom­ing good times. . . .

16. The Japan­ese Prime Min­is­ter saw the Kore­an War as “a gift from the gods.”

The Yam­a­to Dynasty by Peg­gy and Ster­ling Sea­grave; Broad­way Books [HC]; Copy­right 1999 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 0–7679-0496–6; p. 233.

. . . . As a pre­cau­tion, the great zaibat­su did change their names for a while. Mit­subishi Bank tem­porar­i­ly became Chiy­o­da Bank, Yasu­da Bank became Fuji Bank, and so on. (The boom brought about by the Kore­an War, 1950–1953, quick­ly returned them to prof­itabil­i­ty, and made it pos­si­ble to resur­face their care­ful­ly hid­den assets with­out attract­ing atten­tion. Prime Min­is­ter Yoshi­da called the Kore­an War “a gift from the gods.”) . . . .

17. Karu­makar Gup­ta of the Uni­ver­si­ty of Lon­don has pro­duced research indi­cat­ing that the Kore­an War was actu­al­ly pre­cip­i­tat­ed by a South Kore­an attack on the North.

“Chi­na Appears Poised to Achieve through Coop­er­a­tion in the 21st Cen­tu­ry what Japan Sought to Achieve through Coer­cion in the 20th” by Jere­my Kuz­marov; Covert Action Mag­a­zine; 1/31/2023.

 . . . . In the ear­ly morn­ing hours of June 25, 1950, South Korea’s Office of Pub­lic Infor­ma­tion report­ed a South Kore­an mil­i­tary attack on the bor­der city of Hae­ju, which North Korea con­firmed but South Korea lat­er retract­ed.

A detailed study by his­to­ri­an Karunakar Gup­ta of the Uni­ver­si­ty of Lon­don found that South Kore­an gov­ern­ment claims that their attack on Hae­ju had occurred much lat­er were effec­tive­ly impos­si­ble and that a South Kore­an attack like­ly did occur to pre­cip­i­tate the war. . .

Discussion

6 comments for “FTR #1142 Deep Politics and the Death of Park Won-Soon, Part 3”

  1. https://thethaiger.com/coronavirus/south-korean-cult-leader-arrested-for-hiding-covid-19-data-embezzlement

    South Kore­an cult leader arrest­ed for hid­ing Covid-19 data, embez­zle­ment | The Thaiger

    Author­i­ties in South Korea this morn­ing arrest­ed the founder of a secre­tive Chris­t­ian sect at the cen­tre of the country’s largest out­break of Covid-19 infec­tions for alleged­ly con­ceal­ing cru­cial data from con­tact-trac­ers, and oth­er offences. Police nabbed Lee Man-hee, the pow­er­ful head of the Shin­cheon­ji Church of Jesus, which is linked to more than 5,200 coro­n­avirus infec­tions, or about 36% of South Korea’s total cas­es.

    Pros­e­cu­tors say the 89 year old con­spired with sect lead­ers in Feb­ru­ary to with­hold infor­ma­tion from author­i­ties dur­ing the peak of the out­break, among his more than 200,000 fol­low­ers. Lee, who describes the virus as the “devil’s deed” to stop the sect’s growth, alleged­ly hid details on mem­bers and their meet­ing places as author­i­ties tried to trace infec­tion routes, Yon­hap news agency reports. He’s also sus­pect­ed of embez­zling about 5.6 bil­lion won (US$4.7 mil­lion) in church funds, which he alleged­ly used to build a retreat.

    The sect released a state­ment say­ing Lee was con­cerned about gov­ern­ment demands for mem­bers’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion but nev­er tried to hide any­thing.

    Lee was arrest­ed imme­di­ate­ly after a court in Suwon Dis­trict, south of Seoul, approved the war­rant.

    Posted by CinqueAnon | August 3, 2020, 3:35 pm
  2. Check out how Don­ald Trump spent the 9/11 20th Anniver­sary: giv­ing a speech at a Uni­fi­ca­tion Church event. The near­ly 10-minute long vir­tu­al address for the event — a vir­tu­al event for every­one — is avail­able on YouTube. And while there’s plen­ty of dis­turb­ing con­tent in the speech filled with praise for the cult, per­haps the most dis­turb­ing part of this speech is how much is sounds like a cam­paign speech tout­ing Trump’s accom­plish­ments on the Kore­an Penin­su­la as pres­i­dent. In oth­er words, this was the lat­est hint of Trump 2024 run.

    But Trump was­n’t the only 2024 GOP hope­ful to speak at the event. Newt Gin­grich also spoke at the event. And as we’ll see, this was mere­ly the lat­est of a num­ber of Uni­fi­ca­tion Church “Ral­ly of Hope” events being held this year. It’s all part of a new Think Tank 2022 project launched by the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church ear­li­er this year. The 9/11 event was tech­ni­cal­ly the inau­gu­ra­tion of the “THINK TANK 2022 Asia-Pacif­ic Sec­re­tari­at”. As we’re going to see in the sec­ond arti­cle excerpt below, Think Tank 2022 was for­mal­ly launched at a May “Ral­ly of Hope” event attend­ed by Gin­grich, Mike Pom­peo, Mike Pence, for­mer Sec­re­tary of Defense Mark Esper, and even a son of Jer­ry Fal­well. Pence also attend­ed an ear­li­er Ral­ly of Hope event in March. He clear­ly wants the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church’s sup­port for 2024.

    As we’re going to also see, part of what makes the appear­ances by fig­ures like Pom­peo and Pence at events like these is how the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church is being increas­ing­ly cultish in recent years, as amaz­ing as that is. And cultish in exact­ly the kinds of ways one would expect to enrage the Evan­gel­i­cal Chris­t­ian base that Pom­peo and Pence rely. For exam­ple, in 2017, Michael Jenk­ins quot­ed Ms Moon as say­ing that Chris­tian­i­ty failed and, “The Chris­t­ian era has end­ed.” Jenk­ins is the pres­i­dent of the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, which host­ed the Ral­ly for Hope and cre­at­ed Think Tank 2022. Yes, the pres­i­dent of the group behind this entire Think Tank 2022 scheme let the world know that Ms Moon declared Chris­tian­i­ty failed and dead just four short years ago.

    So the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church is already car­ry­ing out what could be inter­pret­ed as the infor­mal open­ing of the GOP 2024 pres­i­den­tial pri­ma­ry. An infor­mal pri­ma­ry defined by acts of feal­ty deliv­ered to a pow­er­ful secre­tive cult with ambi­tions of glob­al dom­i­na­tion. Acts of feal­ty done to cur­ry that cult’s favor for the pur­pose of obtain­ing more pow­er. An anti-Chris­t­ian cult that seems to stand in oppo­si­tion to every­thing these politi­cians pro­fess to stand for and yet also seems to more or less res­onate with their pow­er-at-all-costs true moral char­ac­ter. So in that sense this is actu­al­ly a very the­mat­i­cal­ly fit­ting infor­mal open­ing to the GOP pres­i­den­tial pri­ma­ry:

    The Inde­pen­dent

    Trump gives vir­tu­al speech to event linked to con­tro­ver­sial reli­gious ‘cult’ on 9/11 anniver­sary

    Promi­nent GOP offi­cials includ­ing Mike Pence and Mike Pom­peo have also appeared at Uni­fi­ca­tion Church events
    Alex Wood­ward
    New York

    09/13/2021

    For­mer pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump has appeared in a vir­tu­al address for a con­tro­ver­sial reli­gious move­ment that aired on the 20th anniver­sary of the 9/11 ter­ror­ist attacks.

    In the video, Mr Trump appears to float against a vir­tu­al back­drop of clouds as he prais­es the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church, a move­ment that has long court­ed Repub­li­can offi­cials as part of an appar­ent pro­pa­gan­da cam­paign, and been dubbed a cult.

    The event was organ­ised by Hak Ja Han Moon, wid­ow of Uni­fi­ca­tion Church founder Sun Myung Moon, who claimed to be the mes­si­ah. With­in the move­ment, the Moons are con­sid­ered the “true father” and “truth moth­er” to humankind.

    Fol­low­ers are part of a sprawl­ing busi­ness and polit­i­cal enter­prise to pro­mote its goals, which include the uni­fi­ca­tion of North and South Korea into a sin­gle Chris­t­ian state.

    Mr Trump appeared at the “Ral­ly of Hope Think Tank” event spon­sored by the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, a group co-found­ed by the Moons in 2005 and aligned with the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment.

    In his remarks, the for­mer pres­i­dent praised the move­ment and the late Moon.

    “What they have achieved on the penin­su­la is just amaz­ing,” Mr Trump said of the move­ment. “In just a few decades, the inspi­ra­tion that they have caused for the entire plan­et is unbe­liev­able, and I con­grat­u­late you again and again. … Their exam­ple reminds all of us who strive for peace and a bet­ter future, that we should nev­er give up and nev­er, ever lose hope.

    In his remarks, he also appeared to take cred­it for peace on the Kore­an penin­su­la.

    “Look­ing back today, it’s easy to for­get how dan­ger­ous the sit­u­a­tion was when I was elect­ed,” he said. “Mis­siles were fly­ing, nuclear weapons were being test­ed, and pow­er­ful threats were being issued every sin­gle day … Under my lead­er­ship, the Unit­ed States adopt­ed a pol­i­cy of unprece­dent­ed strength.”

    He also praised the Moons for cre­at­ing the con­ser­v­a­tive news out­let The Wash­ing­ton Times, which Mr Trump called “an orga­ni­za­tion for which I have tremen­dous respect and admi­ra­tion”.

    The event, which coin­cid­ed with the 20th anniver­sary of the 9/11 ter­ror attacks, aimed to “pro­mote and facil­i­tate peace, dia­logue, medi­a­tion, and the strength­en­ing of the ecosys­tem of peace in the Asia Pacif­ic region,” accord­ing to organ­is­ers.

    In her address, Ms Moon claimed that “a new cul­ture of the Pacif­ic Rim civ­i­liza­tion will expand through­out Asia and around the world” fol­low­ing uni­fi­ca­tion, which can­not be a “sec­u­lar nation that can only focus on human inter­ests.”

    “It must become a nation that attends God as the heav­en­ly par­ent,” she said. “Not just polit­i­cal lead­ers.”

    The move­ment – which began in South Korea in 1954 before mov­ing to the US in 1971 – is known for its mass wed­ding cer­e­monies and ties to right-wing groups.

    Steve Has­san, a for­mer mem­ber of the move­ment and author of The Cult of Trump, said the for­mer president’s appear­ance is “pret­ty out­ra­geous, even for Trump”.

    The movement’s his­to­ry and affil­i­a­tions “are well doc­u­ment­ed,” he said. “There is no ambi­gu­i­ty here.”

    Crit­ic Jim Stew­art­son of the The Thinkin Project warned that the group’s appar­ent stag­ing of a glob­al peace event is “hard to over­state how deeply harm­ful and decep­tive this is”.

    “This is being pitched by a who’s who of estab­lish­ment extrem­ists as some sort of peace mis­sion to uni­fy Korea,” he said. “In real­i­ty it’s dan­ger­ous pro­pa­gan­da white­wash­ing a dan­ger­ous cult.”

    Mr Trump is not the only GOP fig­ure with ties to the move­ment.

    For­mer Repub­li­can House Speak­er Newt Gin­grich also appeared on video at the event. For­mer vice pres­i­dent Mike Pence and for­mer Sec­re­tary of State Mike Pom­peo have also appeared at Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion events.

    In May, Mr Pence claimed that Think Tank 2022 is “bring­ing the wis­dom of lead­ers in gov­ern­ment, busi­ness, reli­gion, civ­il soci­ety, ” accord­ing to Moth­er Jones.

    Mr Pom­peo, who was intro­duced as a “devout Chris­t­ian,” boast­ed about Mr Trump’s rela­tion­ship with North Kore­an leader Kim Jong Un.

    In the past Hyung Jin “Sean” Moon, the son of the Moons, cam­paigned for Mr Trump and attend­ed the US Capi­tol insur­rec­tion on 6 Jan­u­ary.

    Okay everyone.“Moonies,” the author­i­tar­i­an CULT I was a part of, lat­er escaped and have been speak­ing out against for the last 45+ years is trending.If you want a crash course on this cult & their ties to the mod­ern GOP, read these blogs of mine. They will catch you up. ??— Steven Has­san, PhD (@CultExpert) Sep­tem­ber 12, 2021

    ...

    Mr Trump did not appear at any for­mal 9/11 memo­r­i­al ser­vices on Sat­ur­day.

    He vis­it­ed a New York Police Depart­ment precinct near his Man­hat­tan build­ing, Trump Tow­er, where he took pho­tos with offi­cers and hint­ed at a run for the White House in 2024.

    He lat­er attend­ed an Evan­gel­i­cal Chris­t­ian con­cert in Wash­ing­ton DC. The two-day “Let Us Wor­ship” con­cert is part of an ongo­ing protest of Covid health guide­lines.

    On Sat­ur­day night, the for­mer pres­i­dent gave ring­side com­men­tary at a box­ing event in Flori­da.

    ———–

    “Trump gives vir­tu­al speech to event linked to con­tro­ver­sial reli­gious ‘cult’ on 9/11 anniver­sary” by Alex Wood­ward
    ; The Inde­pen­dent; 09/13/2021

    “Steve Has­san, a for­mer mem­ber of the move­ment and author of The Cult of Trump, said the for­mer president’s appear­ance is “pret­ty out­ra­geous, even for Trump”.”

    Attend­ing an event like this is pret­ty out­ra­geous, even for Trump. That’s how awful and dan­ger­ous this cult is. And Trump did­n’t just attend the event. He was gush­ing with praise for the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church and praise for its goals. It was essen­tial­ly a ring­ing endors­ing of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church agen­da merged with a Trump for­eign pol­i­cy stump speech:

    ...
    “What they have achieved on the penin­su­la is just amaz­ing,” Mr Trump said of the move­ment. “In just a few decades, the inspi­ra­tion that they have caused for the entire plan­et is unbe­liev­able, and I con­grat­u­late you again and again. … Their exam­ple reminds all of us who strive for peace and a bet­ter future, that we should nev­er give up and nev­er, ever lose hope.

    In his remarks, he also appeared to take cred­it for peace on the Kore­an penin­su­la.

    “Look­ing back today, it’s easy to for­get how dan­ger­ous the sit­u­a­tion was when I was elect­ed,” he said. “Mis­siles were fly­ing, nuclear weapons were being test­ed, and pow­er­ful threats were being issued every sin­gle day … Under my lead­er­ship, the Unit­ed States adopt­ed a pol­i­cy of unprece­dent­ed strength.”
    ...

    But this event was­n’t a cel­e­bra­tion of Trump. It was a cel­e­bra­tion of the Moons (now just Ms Moon) — the “True Par­ents” of human­i­ty and — and their agen­da to uni­fy the world under the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church. But more specif­i­cal­ly, it was the lat­est “Think Tank 2022” event, fol­low­ing the announce­ment of the for­ma­tion of Think Tank 2022 at a “Ral­ly of Hope” event back in April and the for­mal launch of the think tank at anoth­er Ral­ly of Hope event in May. As the church described in their PR releas­es about the 9/11 event, this was the inau­gu­ra­tion of the “THINK TANK 2022 Asia-Pacif­ic Sec­re­tari­at”, so this event was basi­cal­ly the for­mal begin­ning of the work of this mys­te­ri­ous new Uni­fi­ca­tion Church project:

    ...
    The event, which coin­cid­ed with the 20th anniver­sary of the 9/11 ter­ror attacks, aimed to “pro­mote and facil­i­tate peace, dia­logue, medi­a­tion, and the strength­en­ing of the ecosys­tem of peace in the Asia Pacif­ic region,” accord­ing to organ­is­ers.

    In her address, Ms Moon claimed that “a new cul­ture of the Pacif­ic Rim civ­i­liza­tion will expand through­out Asia and around the world” fol­low­ing uni­fi­ca­tion, which can­not be a “sec­u­lar nation that can only focus on human inter­ests.”

    “It must become a nation that attends God as the heav­en­ly par­ent,” she said. “Not just polit­i­cal lead­ers.”
    ...

    And Trump is far from the only promi­nent Repub­li­can speak­ing at these events. The Uni­fi­ca­tion Church has been get­ting a Who’s Who of GOP lumi­nar­ies this year alone:

    ...
    Mr Trump is not the only GOP fig­ure with ties to the move­ment.

    For­mer Repub­li­can House Speak­er Newt Gin­grich also appeared on video at the event. For­mer vice pres­i­dent Mike Pence and for­mer Sec­re­tary of State Mike Pom­peo have also appeared at Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion events.

    In May, Mr Pence claimed that Think Tank 2022 is “bring­ing the wis­dom of lead­ers in gov­ern­ment, busi­ness, reli­gion, civ­il soci­ety, ” accord­ing to Moth­er Jones.

    Mr Pom­peo, who was intro­duced as a “devout Chris­t­ian,” boast­ed about Mr Trump’s rela­tion­ship with North Kore­an leader Kim Jong Un.
    ...

    Final­ly, recall how Steve Ban­non spoke at the Octo­ber 2020 event by Hyung Jin “Sean” Moon’s Uni­fi­ca­tion Church off­shoot group, where Moon pledged a ‘1776 Take Two’ if Joe Biden won and imple­ment­ed gun con­trol laws. It’s a reminder that one of the rea­sons these fig­ures have an inter­est in court­ing the sup­port of these groups is for their even­tu­al sup­port dur­ing any upcom­ing vio­lent insur­rec­tions and/or civ­il wars:

    ...
    In the past Hyung Jin “Sean” Moon, the son of the Moons, cam­paigned for Mr Trump and attend­ed the US Capi­tol insur­rec­tion on 6 Jan­u­ary.
    ...

    And now here’s a Moth­er Jones about the May “Ral­ly of Hope” event where the Think Tank 2022 project was launch. Don­ald Trump was­n’t at this par­tic­u­lar event, but Newt Gin­grich was there, along with Mike Pomeo, Mike Pence, Mark Esper, and Jonathan Fal­well. An event host­ed by the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, led by Michael Jenk­ins, a key fig­ure in the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment. And it was just four short years ago when Jenk­ins quot­ed “Moth­er” Hak Ja Han Moon as say­ing Chris­tian­i­ty failed and the move­ment was in the process of replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty. So while the state goal of Think Thank 2022 is the uni­fi­ca­tion of the Kore­an Penin­su­la, the unstat­ed goals of this move­ment include replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty. That fig­ures like Pence and Pom­peo feel com­pelled to pub­licly show their feal­ty to a group like this is a demon­stra­tion of just how pow­er­ful this move­ment real­ly is in DC. This is a cult that will not be ignored:

    Moth­er Jones

    Pence and Pom­peo Head­lined an Event Mount­ed by a Group That Says the “Chris­t­ian Era Has End­ed”
    And they won’t say if they were paid for their speech­es.

    David Corn
    Wash­ing­ton, DC, Bureau Chief
    May 20, 2021

    On May 8, for­mer Vice Pres­i­dent Mike Pence and for­mer Sec­re­tary of State Mike Pom­peo head­lined a vir­tu­al ral­ly orga­nized by an off­shoot of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church, a con­tro­ver­sial reli­gious move­ment known for hold­ing mass wed­dings of its adher­ents and that has been accused of being a cult. Though Amer­i­can con­ser­v­a­tives have long made com­mon cause with the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church, the head of the out­fit that pulled togeth­er this event declared not too long ago that the “Chris­t­ian era has ended”—which means Pence and Pom­peo, whose self-pro­fessed reli­gious devo­tion is a promi­nent part of their respec­tive polit­i­cal pro­files, were (know­ing­ly or not) col­lab­o­rat­ing with and bol­ster­ing a group that says it is sup­plant­i­ng the Chris­tian­i­ty they embrace.

    The event—called the “Ral­ly of Hope”—was host­ed by Hak Ja Han Moon, the head of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church (whose mem­bers con­sid­er her and her late hus­band, Sun Myung Moon, the mes­si­ahs), and spon­sored by the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, a group co-found­ed by the Moons in 2005 and affil­i­at­ed with the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church (which now refers to itself as the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment). Accord­ing to the UPF, the gath­er­ing, put on before a social­ly dis­tanced audi­ence and sup­pos­ed­ly streamed to 1 mil­lion peo­ple in 194 nations, was held to launch a project called Think Tank 2022, which aims to reuni­fy the Kore­an Penin­su­la.

    The UPF says this new out­fit is a “glob­al mul­ti-sec­tor net­work of more than 2,000 experts” in busi­ness, acad­e­mia, and oth­er fields, though Think Tank 2022 does not yet have much (or any) online pres­ence. Still, Hak Ja Han Moon was able to draw an impres­sive amount of star pow­er for this kick-off, with the event fea­tur­ing speech­es from Pence, Pom­peo, for­mer House Speak­er Newt Gin­grich, for­mer Defense Sec­re­tary Mark Esper, past UN Sec­re­tary-Gen­er­al Ban Ki Moon, for­mer Repub­lic of Korea Prime Min­is­ter Chung Sye-Kyun, and Zanz­ibar Pres­i­dent Hus­sein Ali Mwinyi. Also among the speak­ers were Jonathan Fal­well, a pas­tor at Thomas Road Bap­tist Church in Vir­ginia and a son of Jer­ry Fal­well, the founder of the Moral Major­i­ty. Anoth­er fea­tured par­tic­i­pant was Hun Sen, the dic­ta­to­r­i­al, long­time leader of Cam­bo­dia, who has amassed a hor­rif­ic human rights record.

    The three-hour-long event was a cel­e­bra­tion of both Moons, with Hak Ja Han Moon referred to as the “moth­er of Peace” and “Heav­en­ly Par­ent.” Dur­ing his video­taped speech, Pence claimed that Think Tank 2022 is “bring­ing the wis­dom of lead­ers in gov­ern­ment, busi­ness, reli­gion, civ­il soci­ety” and that thanks to this new endeav­or, “the dream of peace­ful coop­er­a­tion and uni­ty will be clos­er to real­i­ty than ever before.” (Pence spoke at a pre­vi­ous and sim­i­lar Ral­ly of Hope in March.) Pom­peo, who was intro­duced as a “devout Chris­t­ian,” hailed for­mer Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s assort­ed engage­ments with Kim Jong Un, the tyran­ni­cal and mur­der­ous leader of North Korea. “We tried some­thing dif­fer­ent,” Pom­peo said. (For­eign pol­i­cy spe­cial­ists have tend­ed to note Trump’s over­ly pal­sy over­tures to Kim yield­ed no true progress.) Gin­grich praised the Moons, the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, Think Tank 2022, and the Wash­ing­ton Times, the con­ser­v­a­tive paper Sun Myung Moon found­ed. Esper not­ed that Hak Ja Han Moon has been “work­ing to help strength­en America’s role in the world.” He didn’t elab­o­rate on what he meant by that.

    The ral­ly end­ed with a cer­e­mo­ny that was staged to look like an offi­cial act. A col­or guard bran­dish­ing the flags of nations from around the world marched about. Then Hak Ja Han Moon came out to “receive” the “his­toric res­o­lu­tion” estab­lish­ing Think Tank 2022. She signed this doc­u­ment and then struck a gong to declare the project launched.

    It’s unclear what Think Tank 2022 is actu­al­ly doing. The group does not seem to have a web­site. A week after the ral­ly, the project was not men­tioned on the home page of the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion. Moth­er Jones sent Lar­ry Mof­fitt, a spokesper­son for UPF, an email with a list of ques­tions regard­ing Think Tank 2022—who are its 2,000 experts, who is run­ning this oper­a­tion, how much fund­ing does it have? The email also asked if Pence, Pom­peo, Esper, Gin­grich, and the oth­er speak­ers at the Ral­ly for Hope were paid for their par­tic­i­pa­tion. Reached by phone, Mof­fitt said he would look at that email “and get back to you.” He did not.

    ...

    The Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment has long sought to cul­ti­vate allies among Wash­ing­ton power­bro­kers, par­tic­u­lar­ly on the right. That was pre­sum­ably one moti­va­tion for Sun Myung Moon in 1982 to estab­lish the Wash­ing­ton Times, which has long been a mouth­piece for Repub­li­cans and con­ser­v­a­tives. In 2004, he man­aged to hold a bizarre crown­ing cer­e­mo­ny for him­self and his wife with­in a Sen­ate office build­ing, dur­ing which he declared in Kore­an that he was the Mes­si­ah. (Pres­i­dents and kings, he said, had ”declared to all heav­en and earth that Rev­erend Sun Myung Moon is none oth­er than humanity’s Sav­ior, Mes­si­ah, Return­ing Lord and True Par­ent.”) Some mem­bers of Con­gress who attend­ed the event—which was spon­sored by the Wash­ing­ton Times Foundation—insisted they had been duped.

    The rela­tion­ship between the right and the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment has long been curi­ous. Much of it has like­ly been influ­enced by the Wash­ing­ton Times and its stand­ing as a depend­able con­ser­v­a­tive out­let. But the the­ol­o­gy pushed by the Moons and their devo­tees chal­lenges the basic Chris­tian­i­ty embraced by so many con­ser­v­a­tives. The Moons’ claim to be the mes­si­ahs, of course, runs counter to main­stream Chris­tian­i­ty. And one Uni­fi­ca­tion tenet pro­mot­ed by a senior per­son in the move­ment is that Chris­tian­i­ty is essen­tial­ly over.

    In a 2017 video, Michael Jenk­ins, a main play­er in the Uni­fi­ca­tion movement’s cos­mos of non­prof­its and busi­ness­es, said, “The Chris­t­ian era has end­ed.” Jenk­ins is the pres­i­dent of the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, which host­ed the Ral­ly for Hope and cre­at­ed Think Tank 2022. He is also pres­i­dent of the Wash­ing­ton Times Foun­da­tion. (Accord­ing to its lat­est tax fil­ing, that foun­da­tion raised $242,303 in 2019 and only hand­ed out $2,595 in con­tri­bu­tions. It spent $256,005 on salaries and oth­er admin­is­tra­tive expens­es, includ­ing $93,400 in salary for Mof­fitt, the UPF spokesper­son, who is also the vice pres­i­dent of the foun­da­tion.)

    This video record­ed Jenk­ins giv­ing a talk at a Uni­fi­ca­tion Church in Colum­bus, Ohio, in which he quot­ed “Mother”—Hak Ja Han Moon—saying “Chris­tian­i­ty failed.” He not­ed that she had pro­claimed, “the New Tes­ta­ment era is over. The Chris­t­ian era has con­clud­ed.” He sug­gest­ed that the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church is in the process of replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty. Con­se­quent­ly, Pence and Pom­peo con­tributed their celebri­ty to an effort mount­ed by a move­ment that appears to con­sid­er Chris­tian­i­ty kaput. (The video was orig­i­nal­ly obtained by War­ren Throck­mor­ton, a pro­fes­sor at Grove City Col­lege in Penn­syl­va­nia who writes a blog that cov­ers reli­gious issues.)

    ...

    Pence’s and Pompeo’s appear­ances at the ral­ly were much appre­ci­at­ed by the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, which released a cel­e­bra­to­ry press release not­ing that “world-class lead­ers” had “affirmed and enhanced the con­cept of Think Tank 2022.” But if one goal was to gar­ner media atten­tion in the Unit­ed States for this ven­ture through the par­tic­i­pa­tion of Pence, Pom­peo, Gin­grich, and oth­ers, the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion fell short. It seems the only major Amer­i­can media out­let that cov­ered the event was the Wash­ing­ton Times.

    ————

    “Pence and Pom­peo Head­lined an Event Mount­ed by a Group That Says the “Chris­t­ian Era Has End­ed”” by David Corn; Moth­er Jones; 05/20/2021

    “The event—called the “Ral­ly of Hope”—was host­ed by Hak Ja Han Moon, the head of the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church (whose mem­bers con­sid­er her and her late hus­band, Sun Myung Moon, the mes­si­ahs), and spon­sored by the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, a group co-found­ed by the Moons in 2005 and affil­i­at­ed with the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church (which now refers to itself as the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment). Accord­ing to the UPF, the gath­er­ing, put on before a social­ly dis­tanced audi­ence and sup­pos­ed­ly streamed to 1 mil­lion peo­ple in 194 nations, was held to launch a project called Think Tank 2022, which aims to reuni­fy the Kore­an Penin­su­la.”

    The May 8 “Ral­ly of Hope” event was held with a spe­cif­ic goal: launch­ing the Think Tank 2022 project, which claims to have the goal of reuni­fy­ing the Kore­an Penin­su­la. How that’s going to hap­pen remains a mys­tery:

    ...
    The ral­ly end­ed with a cer­e­mo­ny that was staged to look like an offi­cial act. A col­or guard bran­dish­ing the flags of nations from around the world marched about. Then Hak Ja Han Moon came out to “receive” the “his­toric res­o­lu­tion” estab­lish­ing Think Tank 2022. She signed this doc­u­ment and then struck a gong to declare the project launched.

    It’s unclear what Think Tank 2022 is actu­al­ly doing. The group does not seem to have a web­site. A week after the ral­ly, the project was not men­tioned on the home page of the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion. Moth­er Jones sent Lar­ry Mof­fitt, a spokesper­son for UPF, an email with a list of ques­tions regard­ing Think Tank 2022—who are its 2,000 experts, who is run­ning this oper­a­tion, how much fund­ing does it have? The email also asked if Pence, Pom­peo, Esper, Gin­grich, and the oth­er speak­ers at the Ral­ly for Hope were paid for their par­tic­i­pa­tion. Reached by phone, Mof­fitt said he would look at that email “and get back to you.” He did not.
    ...

    But while it was unclear how Think Tank 2022 would go about uni­fy­ing the Kore­an Penin­su­la, it was abun­dant­ly clear the group had plen­ty of will and eager right-wing sup­port­ers. Mike Pence was at his sec­ond Ral­ly of Hope event this year, hav­ing spo­ken at anoth­er one in March. Pom­peo and Gin­grich were also there. And then there was for­mer Defense Sec­re­tary Mark Esper and even the son of Jer­ry Fal­well. Along with for­mer dic­ta­tor of Cam­bo­dia Hun Sen and for­mer UN Sec­re­tary-Gen­er­al Ban Ki Moon. It was quite the vir­tu­al mix­er:

    ...
    The UPF says this new out­fit is a “glob­al mul­ti-sec­tor net­work of more than 2,000 experts” in busi­ness, acad­e­mia, and oth­er fields, though Think Tank 2022 does not yet have much (or any) online pres­ence. Still, Hak Ja Han Moon was able to draw an impres­sive amount of star pow­er for this kick-off, with the event fea­tur­ing speech­es from Pence, Pom­peo, for­mer House Speak­er Newt Gin­grich, for­mer Defense Sec­re­tary Mark Esper, past UN Sec­re­tary-Gen­er­al Ban Ki Moon, for­mer Repub­lic of Korea Prime Min­is­ter Chung Sye-Kyun, and Zanz­ibar Pres­i­dent Hus­sein Ali Mwinyi. Also among the speak­ers were Jonathan Fal­well, a pas­tor at Thomas Road Bap­tist Church in Vir­ginia and a son of Jer­ry Fal­well, the founder of the Moral Major­i­ty. Anoth­er fea­tured par­tic­i­pant was Hun Sen, the dic­ta­to­r­i­al, long­time leader of Cam­bo­dia, who has amassed a hor­rif­ic human rights record.

    The three-hour-long event was a cel­e­bra­tion of both Moons, with Hak Ja Han Moon referred to as the “moth­er of Peace” and “Heav­en­ly Par­ent.” Dur­ing his video­taped speech, Pence claimed that Think Tank 2022 is “bring­ing the wis­dom of lead­ers in gov­ern­ment, busi­ness, reli­gion, civ­il soci­ety” and that thanks to this new endeav­or, “the dream of peace­ful coop­er­a­tion and uni­ty will be clos­er to real­i­ty than ever before.” (Pence spoke at a pre­vi­ous and sim­i­lar Ral­ly of Hope in March.) Pom­peo, who was intro­duced as a “devout Chris­t­ian,” hailed for­mer Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s assort­ed engage­ments with Kim Jong Un, the tyran­ni­cal and mur­der­ous leader of North Korea. “We tried some­thing dif­fer­ent,” Pom­peo said. (For­eign pol­i­cy spe­cial­ists have tend­ed to note Trump’s over­ly pal­sy over­tures to Kim yield­ed no true progress.) Gin­grich praised the Moons, the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, Think Tank 2022, and the Wash­ing­ton Times, the con­ser­v­a­tive paper Sun Myung Moon found­ed. Esper not­ed that Hak Ja Han Moon has been “work­ing to help strength­en America’s role in the world.” He didn’t elab­o­rate on what he meant by that.
    ...

    How much are these fig­ures being paid to speak at such an event? Are they being paid at all, or is this an audi­ence they want to court free of charge? The answer isn’t obvi­ous when you’re talk­ing about a group this polit­i­cal­ly tox­ic but also this polit­i­cal­ly pow­er­ful. Hav­ing good rela­tions with the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church is a pre­req­ui­site if you’re going to get the GOP nom­i­na­tion in 2024. The fact that Mike Pence, Mike Pom­peo, and all these oth­er self-pro­fessed super-Chris­tians are speak­ing at events held by a group has declared Chris­tian­i­ty dead and open­ly plans are effec­tive­ly replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty is a tes­ta­ment to the group’s gen­uine influ­ence. These vir­tu­al events, and the gross syco­phan­tic appear­ances of all these polit­i­cal fig­ures, are demon­stra­tions of very real pow­er:

    ...
    The rela­tion­ship between the right and the Uni­fi­ca­tion move­ment has long been curi­ous. Much of it has like­ly been influ­enced by the Wash­ing­ton Times and its stand­ing as a depend­able con­ser­v­a­tive out­let. But the the­ol­o­gy pushed by the Moons and their devo­tees chal­lenges the basic Chris­tian­i­ty embraced by so many con­ser­v­a­tives. The Moons’ claim to be the mes­si­ahs, of course, runs counter to main­stream Chris­tian­i­ty. And one Uni­fi­ca­tion tenet pro­mot­ed by a senior per­son in the move­ment is that Chris­tian­i­ty is essen­tial­ly over.

    In a 2017 video, Michael Jenk­ins, a main play­er in the Uni­fi­ca­tion movement’s cos­mos of non­prof­its and busi­ness­es, said, “The Chris­t­ian era has end­ed.” Jenk­ins is the pres­i­dent of the Uni­ver­sal Peace Fed­er­a­tion, which host­ed the Ral­ly for Hope and cre­at­ed Think Tank 2022. He is also pres­i­dent of the Wash­ing­ton Times Foun­da­tion. (Accord­ing to its lat­est tax fil­ing, that foun­da­tion raised $242,303 in 2019 and only hand­ed out $2,595 in con­tri­bu­tions. It spent $256,005 on salaries and oth­er admin­is­tra­tive expens­es, includ­ing $93,400 in salary for Mof­fitt, the UPF spokesper­son, who is also the vice pres­i­dent of the foun­da­tion.)

    This video record­ed Jenk­ins giv­ing a talk at a Uni­fi­ca­tion Church in Colum­bus, Ohio, in which he quot­ed “Mother”—Hak Ja Han Moon—saying “Chris­tian­i­ty failed.” He not­ed that she had pro­claimed, “the New Tes­ta­ment era is over. The Chris­t­ian era has con­clud­ed.” He sug­gest­ed that the Uni­fi­ca­tion Church is in the process of replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty. Con­se­quent­ly, Pence and Pom­peo con­tributed their celebri­ty to an effort mount­ed by a move­ment that appears to con­sid­er Chris­tian­i­ty kaput. (The video was orig­i­nal­ly obtained by War­ren Throck­mor­ton, a pro­fes­sor at Grove City Col­lege in Penn­syl­va­nia who writes a blog that cov­ers reli­gious issues.)
    ...

    Which Repub­li­can hope­fuls will end up demon­strat­ing their feal­ty at the next “Ral­ly of Hope”? Well Trump make a sec­ond appear­ance? Will Gin­grich and Pence a third appear­ance? How about more evan­gel­i­cal lead­ers like Jonathan Fal­well? Folks like Fal­well are prob­a­bly going to want to have a voice wit the group that’s going to replace Chris­tian­i­ty, after all.

    But giv­en that we have this con­ver­gence of the Trumpi­fied-GOP and Evan­gel­i­cal Chris­t­ian lead­ers with an anti-Chris­t­ian cult that’s intent on replac­ing Chris­tian­i­ty, it’s also keep­ing in mind that this sug­gests there’s an open­ing for new divine fig­ures in the yet-to-be-made Chris­tian­i­ty replace­ment. Recall how one of the more dis­turb­ing pat­terns of cultish behav­ior we’ve seen dur­ing the Trump era of the GOP is how Evan­gel­i­cal lead­ers have rou­tine­ly been imply­ing that Trump him­self is a divine­ly inspired fig­ure, like King Cyrus in the Bible. So we have to ask: are fig­ures like Trump, Pom­peo, and Pence jock­ey­ing for a posi­tion in the ‘New Uni­fied Chris­tian­i­ty’ neo-Bible? It’s one of the tru­ly unset­tling ques­tions we’re forced to ask with these stories...along with ques­tions about what par­tic­u­lar type of ‘End Times’ sce­nario they’re plan­ning on car­ry­ing out for the big show before the new reli­gion’s final roll out.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 13, 2021, 4:13 pm
  3. It could have gone worse, as far as abortive coups go. At least no one died. It’s one of the few pos­i­tive things one can say about now-failed coup attempt by South Kore­an Pres­i­dent Yoon. Pret­ty much every­one agrees by now that this was the act of a des­per­ate wannabe-pet­ty tyrant.

    Or almost every­one. As we’re going to see, there’s one very notable group of observers who have been very hes­i­tant to spin this as any­thing oth­er than a vic­to­ry for South Kore­an democ­ra­cy thanks to Yoon’s deci­sion to ‘to the right thing’ and call off the coup.: the Korea-focused DC think tank estab­lish­ment, where one think tank after anoth­er either pro­vid­ed some sort of pos­i­tive spin or had no com­ment at all on the mat­ter. And as the fol­low­ing arti­cle describes, it’s a hes­i­tan­cy to crit­i­cize Yoon root­ed in the fact that, while Yoon has been remark­ably unpop­u­lar with the South Kore­an pub­lic, he’s acquired a num­ber of huge fans in DC. Why the DC fan club? Because it was Yoon has has man­aged to smooth over rela­tions with Japan, open­ing the way for a his­toric anti-Chi­na tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty agree­ment between the US, South Korea, and Japan.

    As we’re also going to see, part of the rea­son Yoon was so unpop­u­lar in the first place before ini­ti­at­ing the coup — with polls putting his approval rat­ings in the 20s — was pre­cise­ly because of the con­ces­sions Yoon made to Japan in order to make this tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty arrange­ment a pos­si­bil­i­ty. Nation­al­ly humil­i­at­ing con­ces­sions on the decades-long dis­pute dis­pute between South Korea and Japan over the forced labor abus­es dur­ing Japan’s peri­od as a colo­nial pow­er. Yes, accord­ing to the agree­ment Yoon’s gov­ern­ment reached worth Japan back in March of 2023, the forced labor vic­tims would indeed get com­pen­sa­tion, but not from Japan. Instead, a fund would be estab­lished from dona­tions made by South Kore­an civil­ian dona­tions. There was also hope that South Kore­an and Japan­ese firms that ben­e­fit­ed from the forced labor would also vol­un­tar­i­ly donate to the fund. But it would be com­plete­ly up to them. Yoon’s pop­u­lar­i­ty plum­met­ed fol­low­ing the pub­lic back­lash over the deal. But he was very pop­u­lar in DC.

    So did any Japan­ese com­pa­nies end up donat­ing to the fund? It does­n’t sound like. At least that’s what we can infer from a report from May of this year when the head of the fund warned that it was “at a cross­roads” due to a lack of fund­ing, while express­ing hope that Japan­ese firms would end up con­tribut­ing. As they put it, “The solu­tion (of com­pen­sat­ing through the foun­da­tion) would gain the sup­port from the South Kore­an pub­lic only if Japan­ese busi­ness­es par­tic­i­pate in.”

    That’s all part of the con­text of Yoon’s dis­as­trous coup attempt. He had spent much of his term act­ing like a pawn of the US and Japan and we deeply unpop­u­lar as a result. It’s also part of the con­text of Yoon’s increas­ing­ly author­i­tar­i­an rhetoric. Rhetoric that the US was more than hap­py to ignore as long as Yoon was able to deliv­er on these secu­ri­ty arrange­ments. In fact, in an August 2023 speech giv­en days before a trip to Camp David, Yoon warned how the “forces of com­mu­nist total­i­tar­i­an­ism have always dis­guised them­selves as democ­ra­cy activists, human rights advo­cates, or pro­gres­sive activists while engag­ing in despi­ca­ble and uneth­i­cal tac­tics and false pro­pa­gan­da.” Very sim­i­lar rhetoric was used by Yoon dur­ing his dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law. So for all the loud sighs of relief heard from diplo­mats and capi­tols around the world over how things could have gone so much worse for South Kore­a’s still-young democ­ra­cy, keep in mind that Yoon had been build­ing towards this moment for over a year, in part as a price to be paid for the cre­ation of this new anti-Chi­na tri­lat­er­al agree­ment the US for­eign pol­i­cy estab­lish­ment des­per­ate­ly wants:

    Korea Pro

    Yoon’s mar­tial law cri­sis expos­es belt­way think tank blind spots

    D.C. experts’ mut­ed response to Yoon’s anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic actions reveals the lim­its of their crit­i­cal inde­pen­dence

    Chad O’Car­roll
    Decem­ber 6, 2024

    South Kore­an Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk-yeol stunned the world by abrupt­ly declar­ing mar­tial law in response to “pro-North Korea ele­ments” on Wednes­day — only to back down in the face of swift domes­tic and inter­na­tion­al back­lash.

    While the cri­sis was short-lived, it marked a dis­turb­ing depar­ture from demo­c­ra­t­ic norms in a nation that emerged from author­i­tar­i­an rule just decades ago. This came from a leader who recent­ly cham­pi­oned the impor­tance of “free­dom” some 39 times in a sin­gle speech.

    But the response from key fig­ures and insti­tu­tions in Washington’s Korea pol­i­cy elite has been strik­ing­ly mut­ed. Promi­nent D.C. think tanks with close ties to the South Kore­an gov­ern­ment offered mea­sured cri­tiques couched in praise for the ROK’s demo­c­ra­t­ic resilience, reveal­ing a trou­bling reluc­tance to con­demn author­i­tar­i­an actions by a key U.S. ally.

    CAUTIOUS BELTWAY RESPONSE

    CSIS’s Korea Chair Vic­tor Cha assumed a strik­ing­ly defen­sive pos­ture, telling CNN three times that Yoon “did the right thing” by revers­ing his mar­tial law dec­la­ra­tion — while side­step­ping the alarm­ing­ly thin jus­ti­fi­ca­tions for sus­pend­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance in the first place.

    An offi­cial CSIS com­men­tary hailed the “peace­ful res­o­lu­tion of yesterday’s cri­sis” as proof of the “matu­ri­ty and resilience” of South Kore­an democ­ra­cy, though it did acknowl­edge the inci­dent as a “sig­nif­i­cant set­back” for Yoon.

    Sim­i­lar­ly, the Wil­son Center’s video com­men­tary on the top­ic framed South Korea as “still a thriv­ing and expan­sive democ­ra­cy,” describ­ing Yoon’s rever­sal as a defense of the country’s “his­tor­i­cal lega­cy as a democ­ra­cy.”

    In a slight­ly more crit­i­cal vein, Korea Chair Andrew Yeo of the Brook­ings Insti­tu­tion com­ment­ed in a Korea Her­ald inter­view that the “sud­den, brash, and some­what inex­plic­a­ble deci­sion to declare mar­tial law” under­mines South Korea’s claims to val­ues-based diplo­ma­cy and its aspi­ra­tions as a “glob­al piv­otal state.” But even this cri­tique fell short of direct­ly fault­ing Yoon.

    Mean­while, the ROK-gov­ern­ment-fund­ed Korea Eco­nom­ic Insti­tute of Amer­i­ca — a key insti­tu­tion exclu­sive­ly cov­er­ing Korea — has pub­lished absolute­ly noth­ing on the mat­ter.

    BLUNT CONDEMNATION

    Skep­tics argue the light-touch treat­ment from many D.C. voic­es stems from cozy ties bind­ing Belt­way Korea hands to their South Kore­an coun­ter­parts.

    “The D.C. think tanks depen­dent on ROK gov­ern­ment largesse are now backpedal­ing to praise Yoon for doing the ‘right thing’ to lift the mar­tial law he declared by respect­ing the Nation­al Assem­bly over­ride vote,” wrote vet­er­an Korea watch­er Mark Bar­ry on Twit­ter.

    Some non-Belt­way Korea ana­lysts, such as Karl Fried­hoff and David Kang, attribute this response to an over­ly pos­i­tive atti­tude toward the Yoon admin­is­tra­tion in D.C. cir­cles.

    “If you’re any­where but D.C., Yoon’s pres­i­den­cy has been a dis­as­ter from the jump,” Fried­hoff wrote on BlueSky. “Folks in D.C. ignored his domes­tic train wreck because he was play­ing nice with Japan and sang a song at the White House.”

    Kang echoed these sen­ti­ments: “The Amer­i­can D.C. Blob loved this guy, for all the wrong rea­sons. The D.C. estab­lish­ment felt it had final­ly found a ‘rea­son­able’ Kore­an who des­per­ate­ly want­ed rap­proche­ment with Japan and was will­ing to sing a song at a White House din­ner — what more do you need in a Kore­an leader?”

    ...

    And oth­ers out­side of D.C. also chose not to hold back. “This is def­i­nite­ly an attempt­ed coup d’etat,” wrote Jef­frey Lewis of the Mid­dle­bury Insti­tute. “Yoon should go to prison for the rest of his life. Yoon is a fool.”

    Not all D.C. fig­ures avoid­ed tough crit­i­cism, but it should be not­ed that many of these indi­vid­u­als and orga­ni­za­tions are less con­nect­ed — polit­i­cal­ly or finan­cial­ly — to the incum­bent ROK gov­ern­ment.

    Bruce Klingn­er of the Her­itage Foun­da­tion, which does not accept gov­ern­ment fund­ing, described Yoon’s action as “a damn­ing rever­sal to decades of South Kore­an efforts to put its author­i­tar­i­an past behind it.”

    Sheena Gre­it­ens, writ­ing for the Carnegie Endow­ment, called it an “ill-planned pow­er grab” that “stunned observers around the world.” And Jen­ny Town of the Stim­son Cen­ter urged the U.S. to “con­demn the tyrant” for his “egre­gious abuse of pow­er.”

    These more can­did assess­ments stand in stark con­trast to the mea­sured tones of those think tanks more close­ly tied to South Korea’s gov­ern­ment.

    In pri­or­i­tiz­ing smooth rela­tions over thorny ques­tions of demo­c­ra­t­ic ero­sion, as many key insti­tu­tions and experts in D.C. appear to have done, Belt­way Korea experts showed a dis­con­nect with real­i­ties on the ground.

    “The D.C. crowd didn’t real­ize — or more like­ly, didn’t care — that Yoon was far out­side the medi­an Kore­an cit­i­zen on most things,” said USC pro­fes­sor David Kang. “Yoon hov­ered in the 20s for approval rat­ings. And his admin was demon­stra­bly ill-con­ceived and almost clown­ish.”

    CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE

    The reluc­tance of major think tanks to con­front the biggest polit­i­cal upheaval in South Korea in decades rais­es seri­ous ques­tions about inde­pen­dence. Many rely on these insti­tu­tions for clear-eyed, unvar­nished assess­ments of devel­op­ments on the Kore­an Penin­su­la.

    ...

    To his cred­it, Deputy Sec­re­tary of State Kurt Camp­bell pub­licly crit­i­cized Yoon’s mar­tial law deci­sion as “bad­ly mis­judged,” “deeply prob­lem­at­ic,” and “ille­git­i­mate.” This refresh­ing dis­play of diplo­mat­ic can­dor puts the Beltway’s Korea pol­i­cy elite to shame.

    But if the think tanks, pun­dits and opin­ion lead­ers who spe­cial­ize in Kore­an affairs prove unwill­ing to speak hard truths about the coun­try they study so close­ly, then pol­i­cy­mak­ers in Wash­ing­ton would be wise to approach their analy­sis with a more crit­i­cal eye.

    In a region as com­plex and con­se­quen­tial as North­east Asia, the U.S. can­not rely uncrit­i­cal­ly on assess­ments col­ored by access con­cerns or ide­o­log­i­cal affin­i­ty. Pulling punch­es on Yoon’s author­i­tar­i­an impuls­es today risks embold­en­ing would-be auto­crats tomor­row — a haz­ard the U.S. and its allies must take seri­ous­ly.

    ———–

    “Yoon’s mar­tial law cri­sis expos­es belt­way think tank blind spots” by Chad O’Car­roll; Korea Pro; 12/06/2024

    But the response from key fig­ures and insti­tu­tions in Washington’s Korea pol­i­cy elite has been strik­ing­ly mut­ed. Promi­nent D.C. think tanks with close ties to the South Kore­an gov­ern­ment offered mea­sured cri­tiques couched in praise for the ROK’s demo­c­ra­t­ic resilience, reveal­ing a trou­bling reluc­tance to con­demn author­i­tar­i­an actions by a key U.S. ally.”

    It’s not a sur­prise. But it is notable: DC’s key think tanks focused on the Kore­an penin­su­la were pal­pa­bly hes­i­tant in deliv­er­ing any sort of real crit­i­cism of Yoon’s coup attempt. Instead, it was all spun by focus­ing on how Yoon ‘did the right thing’ by even­tu­al­ly call­ing the coup off after it failed. And as observers note, beyond the fact that the many of these think-tanks accept mon­ey for the South Kore­an gov­ern­ment, it was Yoon’s com­mit­ment to a rap­proche­ment with Japan that appears to have solid­i­fied much of the DC estab­lish­men­t’s desire to not be too crit­i­cal of this failed coup. Despite Yoon hav­ing approval rat­ings in the 20s and being wide­ly seen by the South Kore­an pub­lic as a clown:

    ...
    Skep­tics argue the light-touch treat­ment from many D.C. voic­es stems from cozy ties bind­ing Belt­way Korea hands to their South Kore­an coun­ter­parts.

    “The D.C. think tanks depen­dent on ROK gov­ern­ment largesse are now backpedal­ing to praise Yoon for doing the ‘right thing’ to lift the mar­tial law he declared by respect­ing the Nation­al Assem­bly over­ride vote,” wrote vet­er­an Korea watch­er Mark Bar­ry on Twit­ter.

    Some non-Belt­way Korea ana­lysts, such as Karl Fried­hoff and David Kang, attribute this response to an over­ly pos­i­tive atti­tude toward the Yoon admin­is­tra­tion in D.C. cir­cles.

    “If you’re any­where but D.C., Yoon’s pres­i­den­cy has been a dis­as­ter from the jump,” Fried­hoff wrote on BlueSky. “Folks in D.C. ignored his domes­tic train wreck because he was play­ing nice with Japan and sang a song at the White House.”

    Kang echoed these sen­ti­ments: “The Amer­i­can D.C. Blob loved this guy, for all the wrong rea­sons. The D.C. estab­lish­ment felt it had final­ly found a ‘rea­son­able’ Kore­an who des­per­ate­ly want­ed rap­proche­ment with Japan and was will­ing to sing a song at a White House din­ner — what more do you need in a Kore­an leader?”

    ...

    In pri­or­i­tiz­ing smooth rela­tions over thorny ques­tions of demo­c­ra­t­ic ero­sion, as many key insti­tu­tions and experts in D.C. appear to have done, Belt­way Korea experts showed a dis­con­nect with real­i­ties on the ground.

    “The D.C. crowd didn’t real­ize — or more like­ly, didn’t care — that Yoon was far out­side the medi­an Kore­an cit­i­zen on most things,” said USC pro­fes­sor David Kang. “Yoon hov­ered in the 20s for approval rat­ings. And his admin was demon­stra­bly ill-con­ceived and almost clown­ish.”
    ...

    And that appar­ent detach­ment between the Kore­an-focused DC think tank estab­lish­ment and the peo­ple of South Korea over a desire to sup­port a South Kore­an pres­i­dent will­ing to ‘play nice’ with Japan, brings us to the fol­low­ing grim assess­ment about what was at stake with this coup attempt. Because for all of Yoon’s rhetoric about deep­en­ing strate­gic alliances with the US and Japan to oppose North Korea, there is a much larg­er tar­get in mind: Chi­na. A strate­gic tri­lat­er­al anti-Chi­na alliance that was only achieved after the Yoon gov­ern­ment basi­cal­ly capit­u­lat­ed entire­ly on the long-stand­ing dis­pute of repa­ra­tion pay­ments to South Kore­a’s forced labour­ers dur­ing Japan’s occu­pa­tion.

    And as the piece also notes, it’s not like Yoon’s coup attempt was a sur­prise giv­en the fact that he’s be call­ing his polit­i­cal oppo­nents secret agents of North Korea for over a year now. In fact, in an August 2023 speech, Yoon warned how the “forces of com­mu­nist total­i­tar­i­an­ism have always dis­guised them­selves as democ­ra­cy activists, human rights advo­cates, or pro­gres­sive activists while engag­ing in despi­ca­ble and uneth­i­cal tac­tics and false pro­pa­gan­da.” It was a speech giv­en just days before a trip to Camp David. And the same claims of “anti-state ele­ments” and North Korea sym­pa­thiz­ers were made as Yoon declared mar­tial law:

    The Nation

    South Kore­an Pro­test­ers Thwart­ed More Than Just a Coup Attempt

    The upris­ing against South Kore­an Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk Yeol pre­vent­ed him from seiz­ing dic­ta­to­r­i­al pow­ers. It may also help avoid a cold war with Chi­na.

    John Carl Bak­er
    Decem­ber 4, 2024

    In August 2023, US Pres­i­dent Joe Biden host­ed South Kore­an Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk Yeol and Japan­ese Prime Min­is­ter Kishi­da Fumio at Camp David, where the three cel­e­brat­ed their “shared demo­c­ra­t­ic val­ues.” This week—less than 18 months later—Yoon attempt­ed to seize dic­ta­to­r­i­al pow­er in a coup.

    How did we get here? And what hap­pened? Events are mov­ing quick­ly, but the cri­sis began when Yoon announced Tues­day night that he was imple­ment­ing emer­gency mar­tial law, cit­ing grid­lock in the Nation­al Assem­bly and the sub­ver­sive dan­ger posed by the oppo­si­tion. As tanks rolled through Seoul and heli­copters cir­cled, Yoon sent troops into the Assem­bly to poten­tial­ly arrest leg­is­la­tors. Police out­side attempt­ed to block oth­ers from enter­ing, since the oppo­si­tion has a siz­able major­i­ty and could over­turn his dec­la­ra­tion with a vote. The South Kore­an people—who have expe­ri­ence defeat­ing dic­ta­tors, prospec­tive or otherwise—sprang into action, mass­ing near the Assem­bly and help­ing leg­is­la­tors enter the build­ing. The Nation­al Assem­bly soon vot­ed 190–0 to rescind mar­tial law. After only a few hours, Yoon announced that he was stand­ing down. His attempt to seize pow­er had failed. He will like­ly be impeached.

    Yoon—a for­mer pros­e­cu­tor general—became pres­i­dent in 2022 after a razor-thin vic­to­ry over lib­er­al can­di­date Lee Jae Myung. His admin­is­tra­tion has since been plagued by numer­ous scan­dals and accu­sa­tions of cor­rup­tion, some involv­ing his wife, Kim Keon Hee. Yoon already faced a hos­tile leg­is­la­ture, but after an elec­toral rebuke this year in which the oppo­si­tion gained even more seats, Yoon espe­cial­ly strug­gled to enact pol­i­cy. Indeed, the trig­ger for the coup was the Nation­al Assembly’s cut­ting his pre­ferred bud­get and plan­ning to impeach the head of the state audit agency and pros­e­cu­tors who declined to indict the first lady. Yoon is extreme­ly unpop­u­lar in South Korea, and has been for much of his pres­i­den­cy. For con­text, a recent news arti­cle report­ed that Yoon’s approval rat­ing had risen for the sec­ond con­sec­u­tive week—which sounds like good news, until you real­ize that it rose to a mere 25.7 per­cent. His coup attempt failed in part because he lacks pop­u­lar sup­port.

    This shouldn’t be sur­pris­ing: Yoon is a pet­ty tyrant. He orga­nized the first mil­i­tary parade through Seoul since fel­low aspir­ing dic­ta­tor Park Geun Hye was run out of office by the Can­dle­light Rev­o­lu­tion of 2016–17. This year’s parade took a page from North Korea and show­cased a bal­lis­tic mis­sile, which is iron­ic since Yoon has repeat­ed­ly tarred his domes­tic oppo­si­tion as secret sup­port­ers of the North. In an August 2023 speech—a few days before he vis­it­ed Camp David—Yoon warned of a fifth col­umn of “anti-state forces” work­ing to destroy South Korea from the inside out. “The forces of com­mu­nist total­i­tar­i­an­ism,” he declared, “have always dis­guised them­selves as democ­ra­cy activists, human rights advo­cates, or pro­gres­sive activists while engag­ing in despi­ca­ble and uneth­i­cal tac­tics and false pro­pa­gan­da.” Yoon sim­i­lar­ly cit­ed the threat posed by “anti-state ele­ments” and North Korea sym­pa­thiz­ers when he announced the impo­si­tion of mar­tial law.

    Yoon’s author­i­tar­i­an bent has not gone unno­ticed. Reuters report­ed on his red-bait­ing of domes­tic crit­ics, and jour­nal­ist E. Tam­my Kim warned in The New York­er of Yoon’s demo­c­ra­t­ic back­slid­ing, par­tic­u­lar­ly on free­dom of the press—including raids against jour­nal­ists per­ceived to be hos­tile to the admin­is­tra­tion. The sit­u­a­tion is so bad that this year the V‑Dem Insti­tute, which pub­lish­es a report on the state of world democ­ra­cy, includ­ed South Korea in its top 10 list of “bell-turn” auto­c­ra­tiz­ers. In oth­er words, South Korea—which only tran­si­tioned to democ­ra­cy in the late 1980s and ’90s—is now going back­ward. One chart in the report shows a lit­er­al author­i­tar­i­an turn under Yoon.

    ...

    The sto­ry told about Yoon by Joe Biden and some US think tanks is that he’s a vision­ary peace­mak­er and com­mit­ted demo­c­rat who set aside his­toric South Korea–Japan ten­sions to fos­ter tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion and deter North Korea. The joint Camp David state­ment, for instance, says Biden “com­mend­ed Pres­i­dent Yoon and Prime Min­is­ter Kishi­da for their coura­geous lead­er­ship in trans­form­ing rela­tions between Japan and the ROK.” But Yoon was will­ing to expand coop­er­a­tion with Japan for an obvi­ous rea­son. He is a South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tive, and South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tives are soft on the lega­cy of Japan­ese impe­ri­al­ism. Why? Because many of them were col­lab­o­ra­tors.

    Yoon’s reproach­ment with Japan is con­tro­ver­sial in South Korea not because it’s with Japan per se but because he refus­es to hold Japan account­able for forced wartime labor. Indeed, the “set­tle­ment” that laid that the ground­work for secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion was real­ly Yoon putting South Korea—rather than Japan—on the hook to com­pen­sate the vic­tims of colo­nial occu­pa­tion. This is not ancient his­to­ry. Around 1,800 for­mer forced labor­ers are still alive in South Korea.

    And while South Korea and Japan are neigh­bors to North Korea and sub­ject to its mis­sile tests, tri­lat­er­al coop­er­a­tion has big­ger fish to fry. It is aimed at Chi­na, much like the AUKUS agree­ment to pro­vide Aus­tralia with attack sub­marines and Biden’s for­eign pol­i­cy gen­er­al­ly. Essen­tial­ly, Biden viewed Yoon as a con­ve­nient vehi­cle for his glob­al strat­e­gy of great-pow­er com­pe­ti­tion. Like most South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tives, Yoon aligns with the Unit­ed States on for­eign pol­i­cy and was seen as a reli­able part­ner against Chi­na. Since he took pow­er in 2022, the US has expand­ed its pres­ence in North­east Asia and engaged in near­ly con­stant mil­i­tary exercises—some of which are now tri­lat­er­al joint drills. Osten­si­bly, US-led secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion seeks to deter North Korea, but ulti­mate­ly it aims to estab­lish a region­al anti-Chi­na bloc.

    In the Unit­ed States, the Cold War was depict­ed as a bat­tle between com­mu­nism and “the free world.” But of course, the “free world” was a mis­nomer. Sure, the US bloc con­tained lib­er­al democ­ra­cies, but it also includ­ed coun­tries under dic­ta­to­r­i­al rule—like, for instance, South Korea. Wash­ing­ton propped up these dic­ta­tors because they were seen as reli­ably anti­com­mu­nist, allow­ing their coun­try to be used as a pawn in the larg­er game of check­ing Sovi­et pow­er.

    I dis­like facile Cold War com­par­isons, but here the con­nec­tion seems war­rant­ed. The Biden admin­is­tra­tion, deter­mined to counter Chi­na, papered over Yoon’s author­i­tar­i­an qual­i­ties because he was an asset in a great-pow­er com­pe­ti­tion. In an echo of Cold War rhetoric, Biden por­trayed an unpop­u­lar and tyran­ni­cal leader as a pro­po­nent of democ­ra­cy, gam­bling that Yoon would nev­er go so far as to bla­tant­ly expose the cha­rade. Biden was wrong.

    ...

    ———–
    “South Kore­an Pro­test­ers Thwart­ed More Than Just a Coup Attempt” by John Carl Bak­er; The Nation; 12/04/2024

    Yoon—a for­mer pros­e­cu­tor general—became pres­i­dent in 2022 after a razor-thin vic­to­ry over lib­er­al can­di­date Lee Jae Myung. His admin­is­tra­tion has since been plagued by numer­ous scan­dals and accu­sa­tions of cor­rup­tion, some involv­ing his wife, Kim Keon Hee. Yoon already faced a hos­tile leg­is­la­ture, but after an elec­toral rebuke this year in which the oppo­si­tion gained even more seats, Yoon espe­cial­ly strug­gled to enact pol­i­cy. Indeed, the trig­ger for the coup was the Nation­al Assembly’s cut­ting his pre­ferred bud­get and plan­ning to impeach the head of the state audit agency and pros­e­cu­tors who declined to indict the first lady. Yoon is extreme­ly unpop­u­lar in South Korea, and has been for much of his pres­i­den­cy. For con­text, a recent news arti­cle report­ed that Yoon’s approval rat­ing had risen for the sec­ond con­sec­u­tive week—which sounds like good news, until you real­ize that it rose to a mere 25.7 per­cent. His coup attempt failed in part because he lacks pop­u­lar sup­port.”

    It’s not hard to see why Pres­i­dent Yoon was hav­ing a dif­fi­cult time. He was a pres­i­dent who won with a razor-thin major­i­ty and went on to become deeply unpop­u­lar and faced with an oppo­si­tion-con­trolled par­lia­ment. And then the head of his state audit agency faced an impeach­ment threat over their deci­sion to not indict the first lady over a lux­u­ry hand­bag scan­dal. It’s not hard to see why Yoon was frus­trat­ed. But going on to cast his oppo­si­tion as “forces of com­mu­nist total­i­tar­i­an­ism” is much hard­er to under­stand. And yet, as we can see, Yoon had spent over a year doing just that, cast­ing his oppo­nents as North Kore­an sym­pa­thiz­ers just days before an August 2023 trip to Camp David. The coup attempt was a sur­prise, but it was­n’t a shock­ing sur­prise. Yoon has been hint­ing at his author­i­tar­i­an ten­den­cies for a while:

    ...
    This shouldn’t be sur­pris­ing: Yoon is a pet­ty tyrant. He orga­nized the first mil­i­tary parade through Seoul since fel­low aspir­ing dic­ta­tor Park Geun Hye was run out of office by the Can­dle­light Rev­o­lu­tion of 2016–17. This year’s parade took a page from North Korea and show­cased a bal­lis­tic mis­sile, which is iron­ic since Yoon has repeat­ed­ly tarred his domes­tic oppo­si­tion as secret sup­port­ers of the North. In an August 2023 speech—a few days before he vis­it­ed Camp David—Yoon warned of a fifth col­umn of “anti-state forces” work­ing to destroy South Korea from the inside out. “The forces of com­mu­nist total­i­tar­i­an­ism,” he declared, “have always dis­guised them­selves as democ­ra­cy activists, human rights advo­cates, or pro­gres­sive activists while engag­ing in despi­ca­ble and uneth­i­cal tac­tics and false pro­pa­gan­da.” Yoon sim­i­lar­ly cit­ed the threat posed by “anti-state ele­ments” and North Korea sym­pa­thiz­ers when he announced the impo­si­tion of mar­tial law.

    Yoon’s author­i­tar­i­an bent has not gone unno­ticed. Reuters report­ed on his red-bait­ing of domes­tic crit­ics, and jour­nal­ist E. Tam­my Kim warned in The New York­er of Yoon’s demo­c­ra­t­ic back­slid­ing, par­tic­u­lar­ly on free­dom of the press—including raids against jour­nal­ists per­ceived to be hos­tile to the admin­is­tra­tion. The sit­u­a­tion is so bad that this year the V‑Dem Insti­tute, which pub­lish­es a report on the state of world democ­ra­cy, includ­ed South Korea in its top 10 list of “bell-turn” auto­c­ra­tiz­ers. In oth­er words, South Korea—which only tran­si­tioned to democ­ra­cy in the late 1980s and ’90s—is now going back­ward. One chart in the report shows a lit­er­al author­i­tar­i­an turn under Yoon.
    ...

    But then we get to the gross ‘realpoli­tik’ angle to this sto­ry: while Yoon has been hint­ing at his author­i­tar­i­an­ism for over a year now, you would­n’t know it by lis­ten­ing to the US estab­lish­ment, which has been ham­mer­ing out a tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty agree­ment between South Korea and Japan. A tri­lat­er­al agree­ment that is effec­tive­ly an anti-Chi­na treaty. But that was­n’t the only dis­turb­ing part of this agree­ment. There’s also the fact that the agree­ment only hap­pened because the Yoon gov­ern­ment was will­ing to resolve the long-stand­ing dis­pute between South Korea and Japan over the forced labor abus­es dur­ing Japan’s peri­od as a colo­nial pow­er. A res­o­lu­tion that entailed pay­ing the South Kore­an vic­tims from funds raised vol­un­tar­i­ly in South Korea. It was basi­cal­ly capit­u­la­tion by South Korea on the issue. But high­ly strate­gic capit­u­la­tion when it comes to form­ing these tri­lat­er­al alliances. The US could­n’t have plau­si­bly real­ized its sought after anti-Chi­na tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty agree­ment were it not for Yoon’s shady gov­ern­ment:

    ...
    The sto­ry told about Yoon by Joe Biden and some US think tanks is that he’s a vision­ary peace­mak­er and com­mit­ted demo­c­rat who set aside his­toric South Korea–Japan ten­sions to fos­ter tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion and deter North Korea. The joint Camp David state­ment, for instance, says Biden “com­mend­ed Pres­i­dent Yoon and Prime Min­is­ter Kishi­da for their coura­geous lead­er­ship in trans­form­ing rela­tions between Japan and the ROK.” But Yoon was will­ing to expand coop­er­a­tion with Japan for an obvi­ous rea­son. He is a South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tive, and South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tives are soft on the lega­cy of Japan­ese impe­ri­al­ism. Why? Because many of them were col­lab­o­ra­tors.

    Yoon’s reproach­ment with Japan is con­tro­ver­sial in South Korea not because it’s with Japan per se but because he refus­es to hold Japan account­able for forced wartime labor. Indeed, the “set­tle­ment” that laid that the ground­work for secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion was real­ly Yoon putting South Korea—rather than Japan—on the hook to com­pen­sate the vic­tims of colo­nial occu­pa­tion. This is not ancient his­to­ry. Around 1,800 for­mer forced labor­ers are still alive in South Korea.

    And while South Korea and Japan are neigh­bors to North Korea and sub­ject to its mis­sile tests, tri­lat­er­al coop­er­a­tion has big­ger fish to fry. It is aimed at Chi­na, much like the AUKUS agree­ment to pro­vide Aus­tralia with attack sub­marines and Biden’s for­eign pol­i­cy gen­er­al­ly. Essen­tial­ly, Biden viewed Yoon as a con­ve­nient vehi­cle for his glob­al strat­e­gy of great-pow­er com­pe­ti­tion. Like most South Kore­an con­ser­v­a­tives, Yoon aligns with the Unit­ed States on for­eign pol­i­cy and was seen as a reli­able part­ner against Chi­na. Since he took pow­er in 2022, the US has expand­ed its pres­ence in North­east Asia and engaged in near­ly con­stant mil­i­tary exercises—some of which are now tri­lat­er­al joint drills. Osten­si­bly, US-led secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion seeks to deter North Korea, but ulti­mate­ly it aims to estab­lish a region­al anti-Chi­na bloc.

    In the Unit­ed States, the Cold War was depict­ed as a bat­tle between com­mu­nism and “the free world.” But of course, the “free world” was a mis­nomer. Sure, the US bloc con­tained lib­er­al democ­ra­cies, but it also includ­ed coun­tries under dic­ta­to­r­i­al rule—like, for instance, South Korea. Wash­ing­ton propped up these dic­ta­tors because they were seen as reli­ably anti­com­mu­nist, allow­ing their coun­try to be used as a pawn in the larg­er game of check­ing Sovi­et pow­er.

    I dis­like facile Cold War com­par­isons, but here the con­nec­tion seems war­rant­ed. The Biden admin­is­tra­tion, deter­mined to counter Chi­na, papered over Yoon’s author­i­tar­i­an qual­i­ties because he was an asset in a great-pow­er com­pe­ti­tion. In an echo of Cold War rhetoric, Biden por­trayed an unpop­u­lar and tyran­ni­cal leader as a pro­po­nent of democ­ra­cy, gam­bling that Yoon would nev­er go so far as to bla­tant­ly expose the cha­rade. Biden was wrong.
    ...

    And as the fol­low­ing Reuters piece from March of 2023 describes, that agree­ment between Japan and South Korea over the repa­ra­tions for the force labor­ers was­n’t just a com­plete vic­to­ry for Japan — requir­ing no pay­ments from Japan or any Japan­ese com­pa­nies — but a nation­al humil­i­a­tion too. And, obvi­ous­ly, deeply unpop­u­lar with the South Kore­an pub­lic, but a deci­sion Yoon made any­way to facil­i­tate the cre­ation of this strate­gic tri­lat­er­al anti-Chi­na alliance:

    Reuters

    South Kore­an plan aims to heal forced labor feud with Japan

    By KIM TONG-HYUNG and HYUNG-JIN KIM
    Pub­lished 4:57 AM CST, March 6, 2023

    SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea took a step toward improv­ing ties with its tra­di­tion­al rival Japan on Mon­day, announc­ing a plan to com­pen­sate Kore­ans who per­formed forced labor dur­ing Tokyo’s colo­nial rule that doesn’t require Japan­ese com­pa­nies to con­tribute to the repa­ra­tions.

    The plan reflects con­ser­v­a­tive Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk Yeol’s push to mend frayed ties with Japan and solid­i­fy secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion among Seoul, Tokyo and Wash­ing­ton to bet­ter cope with North Korea’s nuclear threats. Pres­i­dent Joe Biden quick­ly hailed it as “a ground­break­ing new chap­ter” of coop­er­a­tion between two of the Unit­ed States’ clos­est allies.

    The South Kore­an plan, which relies on mon­ey raised in South Korea, drew imme­di­ate, domes­tic back­lash from for­mer forced labor­ers and their sup­port­ers. They’ve demand­ed direct com­pen­sa­tion from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies and a fresh apol­o­gy from the Japan­ese gov­ern­ment.

    ...

    Many forced labor­ers are already dead and sur­vivors are in their 90s. Among the 15 vic­tims involved in 2018 South Kore­an court rul­ings that ordered two Japan­ese com­pa­nies — Nip­pon Steel and Mit­subishi Heavy Indus­tries — to com­pen­sate them, only three are still alive and they are all in their 90s.

    South Kore­an For­eign Min­is­ter Park Jin told a tele­vised news con­fer­ence the vic­tims would be com­pen­sat­ed through a local state-run foun­da­tion that would be fund­ed by civil­ian dona­tions. He said South Korea hopes that Japan­ese com­pa­nies would also make vol­un­tary con­tri­bu­tions to the foun­da­tion.

    “If we com­pare it to a glass of water, I think that the glass is more than half full with water. We expect that the glass will be fur­ther filled mov­ing for­ward based on Japan’s sin­cere response,” Park said.

    Lat­er Mon­day, Yoon called the South Kore­an step “a deter­mi­na­tion to move toward future-ori­ent­ed Korea-Japan ties.” He said both gov­ern­ments must strive to help their rela­tions enter a new era, accord­ing to Yoon’s office.

    South Kore­an offi­cials didn’t elab­o­rate on which com­pa­nies would finance the foun­da­tion. But in Jan­u­ary, Shim Kyu-sun, chair­per­son of the Foun­da­tion for Vic­tims of Forced Mobi­liza­tion by Impe­r­i­al Japan, which would be han­dling the repa­ra­tions, said the funds would come from South Kore­an com­pa­nies that ben­e­fit­ed from a 1965 Seoul-Tokyo treaty that nor­mal­ized their rela­tions.

    The 1965 accord was accom­pa­nied by hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars in eco­nom­ic aid and loans from Tokyo to Seoul that were used in devel­op­ment projects car­ried out by major South Kore­an com­pa­nies, includ­ing POSCO, now a glob­al steel giant. POSCO said Mon­day that it will active­ly con­sid­er a con­tri­bu­tion to the foun­da­tion if it receives an offi­cial request.

    Japan insists all wartime com­pen­sa­tion issues were set­tled under the 1965 treaty, and retal­i­at­ed for the South Kore­an court-ordered com­pen­sa­tion from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies by slap­ping export con­trols on chem­i­cals vital to South Korea’s semi­con­duc­tor indus­try in 2019.

    South Korea, then gov­erned by Yoon’s lib­er­al pre­de­ces­sor Moon Jae-in, accused Japan of weaponiz­ing trade and sub­se­quent­ly threat­ened to ter­mi­nate a mil­i­tary intel­li­gence-shar­ing agree­ment with Tokyo, a major sym­bol of their three-way secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion with Wash­ing­ton.

    Their feud­ing com­pli­cat­ed U.S. efforts to rein­force coop­er­a­tion with its two key Asian allies in the face of con­fronta­tions with Chi­na and North Korea. In his state­ment, Biden said that he looks for­ward to con­tin­u­ing to enhance the tri­lat­er­al ties, adding, “Our coun­tries are stronger — and the world is safer and more pros­per­ous — when we stand togeth­er.”

    ...

    On Mon­day, the U.S. flew a nuclear-capa­ble B‑52 bomber to the Kore­an Penin­su­la for a joint drill with South Kore­an war­planes. South Korea’s Defense Min­istry said in a state­ment the B‑52’s deploy­ment demon­strat­ed the allies’ “deci­sive, over­whelm­ing capac­i­ties” to deter North Kore­an aggres­sions.

    Dur­ing a par­lia­men­tary ses­sion on Mon­day, Japan­ese Prime Min­is­ter Fumio Kishi­da said he stands by Japan’s pre­vi­ous expres­sion of regrets and apolo­gies over its colo­nial wrong­do­ing but said that the restora­tion of trade ties is a sep­a­rate issue.

    Japan­ese For­eign Min­is­ter Yoshi­masa Hayashi told reporters that Japan “appre­ci­ates” the South Kore­an announce­ment as a step to restore good ties, but not­ed that it doesn’t require con­tri­bu­tions from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies.

    When asked about South Korea’s fail­ure to ensure that the Japan­ese com­pa­nies par­tic­i­pate in the com­pen­sa­tion of forced labor­ers, Park, the for­eign min­is­ter, said he doesn’t expect Japan’s gov­ern­ment to block “vol­un­tary dona­tions” by its civ­il sec­tor.

    Lat­er Mon­day, the South Kore­an and Japan­ese trade min­istries simul­ta­ne­ous­ly announced plans for talks to restore their trade rela­tions. South Korea’s Trade Min­istry said it decid­ed to sus­pend its dis­pute pro­ceed­ings with the World Trade Orga­ni­za­tion over the Japan­ese trade curbs.

    For­mer forced labor­ers, their sup­port­ers and lib­er­al oppo­si­tion law­mak­ers berat­ed the gov­ern­ment plan, call­ing it a diplo­mat­ic sur­ren­der. About 20–30 activists ral­lied near Seoul’s For­eign Min­istry, blow­ing horns and shout­ing slo­gans, “We con­demn (the Yoon gov­ern­ment)” and “With­draw (the announce­ment).”

    Lim Jae-sung, a lawyer for some of the plain­tiffs, called the South Kore­an plan an “absolute win by Japan, which insists it can­not spend 1 yen” on forced labor­ers. He said lawyers will press ahead with steps aimed at liq­ui­dat­ing the Japan­ese com­pa­nies’ assets in South Korea to secure the repa­ra­tions.

    The main lib­er­al oppo­si­tion Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty called on Yoon to imme­di­ate­ly stop what it called “a humil­i­at­ing diplo­ma­cy” toward Japan and with­draw its plan.

    The oppo­si­tion to the government’s announce­ment cast doubts on the prospects to end the dis­putes. When the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty led by Moon was in pow­er, it took steps to dis­solve a foun­da­tion fund­ed by Japan to com­pen­sate Kore­an women forced to work as sex slaves dur­ing World War II because it didn’t have the vic­tims’ con­sent.

    Despite the back­lash, Yoon has like­ly decid­ed to press ahead with steps to ease the dis­putes with Japan to bol­ster the alliance with the Unit­ed States because “there is no mag­ic solu­tion that can sat­is­fy every­one,” said Bong Young-shik, an expert at Seoul’s Yon­sei Insti­tute for North Kore­an Stud­ies. He said Yoon like­ly felt pres­sure to boost defense against North Korea’s advanc­ing mis­sile threats.

    Choi Eun-mi, a Japan expert at South Korea’s Asan Insti­tute for Pol­i­cy Stud­ies, said it has been obvi­ous that a third-par­ty reim­burse­ment of forced labor­ers was the only real­is­tic solu­tion for South Korea because there are “fun­da­men­tal” dis­agree­ments with Japan over the 2018 court rul­ings.

    ...

    ————-

    “South Kore­an plan aims to heal forced labor feud with Japan” By KIM TONG-HYUNG and HYUNG-JIN KIM; Reuters; 03/06/2024

    “The plan reflects con­ser­v­a­tive Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk Yeol’s push to mend frayed ties with Japan and solid­i­fy secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion among Seoul, Tokyo and Wash­ing­ton to bet­ter cope with North Korea’s nuclear threats. Pres­i­dent Joe Biden quick­ly hailed it as “a ground­break­ing new chap­ter” of coop­er­a­tion between two of the Unit­ed States’ clos­est allies.

    It was “a ground­break­ing new chap­ter” of coop­er­a­tion between two of the Unit­ed States’ clos­est allies. That’s how Pres­i­dent Biden framed the his­toric agree­ment back in March of 2023. An agree­ment that the lawyers for the plain­tiffs called an “absolute win by Japan, which insists it can­not spend 1 yen” on forced labor­ers, and South Kore­a’s polit­i­cal oppo­si­tion char­ac­ter­ized as “a humil­i­at­ing diplo­ma­cy” toward Japan. The US and Japan­ese gov­ern­ments clear­ly loved this agree­ment. The South Kore­an pub­lic, not so much:

    ...
    On Mon­day, the U.S. flew a nuclear-capa­ble B‑52 bomber to the Kore­an Penin­su­la for a joint drill with South Kore­an war­planes. South Korea’s Defense Min­istry said in a state­ment the B‑52’s deploy­ment demon­strat­ed the allies’ “deci­sive, over­whelm­ing capac­i­ties” to deter North Kore­an aggres­sions.

    Dur­ing a par­lia­men­tary ses­sion on Mon­day, Japan­ese Prime Min­is­ter Fumio Kishi­da said he stands by Japan’s pre­vi­ous expres­sion of regrets and apolo­gies over its colo­nial wrong­do­ing but said that the restora­tion of trade ties is a sep­a­rate issue.

    ...

    Lat­er Mon­day, the South Kore­an and Japan­ese trade min­istries simul­ta­ne­ous­ly announced plans for talks to restore their trade rela­tions. South Korea’s Trade Min­istry said it decid­ed to sus­pend its dis­pute pro­ceed­ings with the World Trade Orga­ni­za­tion over the Japan­ese trade curbs.

    For­mer forced labor­ers, their sup­port­ers and lib­er­al oppo­si­tion law­mak­ers berat­ed the gov­ern­ment plan, call­ing it a diplo­mat­ic sur­ren­der. About 20–30 activists ral­lied near Seoul’s For­eign Min­istry, blow­ing horns and shout­ing slo­gans, “We con­demn (the Yoon gov­ern­ment)” and “With­draw (the announce­ment).”

    Lim Jae-sung, a lawyer for some of the plain­tiffs, called the South Kore­an plan an “absolute win by Japan, which insists it can­not spend 1 yen” on forced labor­ers. He said lawyers will press ahead with steps aimed at liq­ui­dat­ing the Japan­ese com­pa­nies’ assets in South Korea to secure the repa­ra­tions.

    The main lib­er­al oppo­si­tion Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty called on Yoon to imme­di­ate­ly stop what it called “a humil­i­at­ing diplo­ma­cy” toward Japan and with­draw its plan.

    The oppo­si­tion to the government’s announce­ment cast doubts on the prospects to end the dis­putes. When the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty led by Moon was in pow­er, it took steps to dis­solve a foun­da­tion fund­ed by Japan to com­pen­sate Kore­an women forced to work as sex slaves dur­ing World War II because it didn’t have the vic­tims’ con­sent.

    Despite the back­lash, Yoon has like­ly decid­ed to press ahead with steps to ease the dis­putes with Japan to bol­ster the alliance with the Unit­ed States because “there is no mag­ic solu­tion that can sat­is­fy every­one,” said Bong Young-shik, an expert at Seoul’s Yon­sei Insti­tute for North Kore­an Stud­ies. He said Yoon like­ly felt pres­sure to boost defense against North Korea’s advanc­ing mis­sile threats.
    ...

    And it’s not hard to see why this agree­ment was so con­demned in South Korea: it lit­er­al­ly demand­ed zero in com­pen­sa­tion from Japan. Instead, vol­un­tary dona­tions were hoped for and South Kore­an com­pa­nies were expect­ed to donate the rest. It’s hard to argue with the plain­tiff’s lawyers. Japan absolute­ly won in this decades-long dis­pute in a man­ner that utter­ly humil­i­at­ed South Korea:

    ...
    South Kore­an For­eign Min­is­ter Park Jin told a tele­vised news con­fer­ence the vic­tims would be com­pen­sat­ed through a local state-run foun­da­tion that would be fund­ed by civil­ian dona­tions. He said South Korea hopes that Japan­ese com­pa­nies would also make vol­un­tary con­tri­bu­tions to the foun­da­tion.

    ...

    South Kore­an offi­cials didn’t elab­o­rate on which com­pa­nies would finance the foun­da­tion. But in Jan­u­ary, Shim Kyu-sun, chair­per­son of the Foun­da­tion for Vic­tims of Forced Mobi­liza­tion by Impe­r­i­al Japan, which would be han­dling the repa­ra­tions, said the funds would come from South Kore­an com­pa­nies that ben­e­fit­ed from a 1965 Seoul-Tokyo treaty that nor­mal­ized their rela­tions.

    The 1965 accord was accom­pa­nied by hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars in eco­nom­ic aid and loans from Tokyo to Seoul that were used in devel­op­ment projects car­ried out by major South Kore­an com­pa­nies, includ­ing POSCO, now a glob­al steel giant. POSCO said Mon­day that it will active­ly con­sid­er a con­tri­bu­tion to the foun­da­tion if it receives an offi­cial request.

    Japan insists all wartime com­pen­sa­tion issues were set­tled under the 1965 treaty, and retal­i­at­ed for the South Kore­an court-ordered com­pen­sa­tion from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies by slap­ping export con­trols on chem­i­cals vital to South Korea’s semi­con­duc­tor indus­try in 2019.

    South Korea, then gov­erned by Yoon’s lib­er­al pre­de­ces­sor Moon Jae-in, accused Japan of weaponiz­ing trade and sub­se­quent­ly threat­ened to ter­mi­nate a mil­i­tary intel­li­gence-shar­ing agree­ment with Tokyo, a major sym­bol of their three-way secu­ri­ty coop­er­a­tion with Wash­ing­ton.

    Their feud­ing com­pli­cat­ed U.S. efforts to rein­force coop­er­a­tion with its two key Asian allies in the face of con­fronta­tions with Chi­na and North Korea. In his state­ment, Biden said that he looks for­ward to con­tin­u­ing to enhance the tri­lat­er­al ties, adding, “Our coun­tries are stronger — and the world is safer and more pros­per­ous — when we stand togeth­er.”

    ...

    Japan­ese For­eign Min­is­ter Yoshi­masa Hayashi told reporters that Japan “appre­ci­ates” the South Kore­an announce­ment as a step to restore good ties, but not­ed that it doesn’t require con­tri­bu­tions from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies.

    When asked about South Korea’s fail­ure to ensure that the Japan­ese com­pa­nies par­tic­i­pate in the com­pen­sa­tion of forced labor­ers, Park, the for­eign min­is­ter, said he doesn’t expect Japan’s gov­ern­ment to block “vol­un­tary dona­tions” by its civ­il sec­tor.
    ...

    So did any Japan­ese com­pa­nies make any vol­un­tary dona­tions to the fund? It does­n’t appear so. At least that was the sta­tus as of May of this year, when the fund had to announce it was short of funds, at a cross­roads, and hope­ful that some Japan­ese firms might decide to chip in:

    Kyo­do News

    South Korea fund lacks mon­ey to com­pen­sate wartime labor vic­tims: report

    KYODO NEWS — May 27, 2024 — 22:38 | World, All

    A South Kore­an gov­ern­ment-backed foun­da­tion tasked with pay­ing com­pen­sa­tion to plain­tiffs who won law­suits over wartime labor dur­ing Japan’s colo­nial rule of the Kore­an Penin­su­la is short some 12 bil­lion won ($8.8 mil­lion) in pay­ing dam­ages to the plain­tiffs, the foun­da­tion’s chief said Mon­day.

    Shim Kyu Sun, direc­tor of the foun­da­tion, told Joon­gAng Ilbo, a South Kore­an news­pa­per, that he hopes the Japan­ese busi­ness sec­tor will con­tribute to the group so it can pay dam­ages to plain­tiffs, includ­ing those who won their law­suits recent­ly.

    In March last year, the gov­ern­ment of South Kore­an Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk Yeol decid­ed to com­pen­sate the plain­tiffs and bereaved fam­i­ly mem­bers with mon­ey from the gov­ern­ment-backed fund, rather than seek­ing resti­tu­tion direct­ly from the Japan­ese com­pa­nies that were sued, in a bid to improve ties with Japan.

    Due to the 12 bil­lion won short­fall, com­pen­sa­tion pay­ment by the Foun­da­tion for Vic­tims of Forced Mobi­liza­tion by Impe­r­i­al Japan is now “at a cross­roads,” Shim said.

    “The solu­tion (of com­pen­sat­ing through the foun­da­tion) would gain the sup­port from the South Kore­an pub­lic only if Japan­ese busi­ness­es par­tic­i­pate in” the fund­ing, Shim said, while also request­ing fur­ther dona­tions from South Kore­an com­pa­nies.

    The foun­da­tion has received 4 bil­lion won from South Kore­an steel­mak­er POSCO Co.

    Ties between Seoul and Tokyo dete­ri­o­rat­ed after South Kore­a’s top court in Octo­ber and Novem­ber 2018 upheld orders in sep­a­rate judg­ments against Nip­pon Steel Corp. and Mit­subishi Heavy Indus­tries Ltd., requir­ing that they pay dam­ages for forced labor dur­ing the colo­nial rule between 1910 and 1945.

    The top court in Decem­ber last year and Jan­u­ary this year made sim­i­lar rul­ings, order­ing sev­er­al Japan­ese com­pa­nies, includ­ing Nip­pon Steel and Mit­subishi Heavy, to pay dam­ages to South Kore­an plain­tiffs.

    ...

    ———-

    “South Korea fund lacks mon­ey to com­pen­sate wartime labor vic­tims: report”; Kyo­do News; 05/27/2024

    “Due to the 12 bil­lion won short­fall, com­pen­sa­tion pay­ment by the Foun­da­tion for Vic­tims of Forced Mobi­liza­tion by Impe­r­i­al Japan is now “at a cross­roads,” Shim said.”

    Well, it looks like the request for vol­un­tary Japan­ese cor­po­rate con­tri­bu­tions to the vic­tims’ fund was more a fan­ci­ful wish:

    ...
    Shim Kyu Sun, direc­tor of the foun­da­tion, told Joon­gAng Ilbo, a South Kore­an news­pa­per, that he hopes the Japan­ese busi­ness sec­tor will con­tribute to the group so it can pay dam­ages to plain­tiffs, includ­ing those who won their law­suits recent­ly.

    ...

    “The solu­tion (of com­pen­sat­ing through the foun­da­tion) would gain the sup­port from the South Kore­an pub­lic only if Japan­ese busi­ness­es par­tic­i­pate in” the fund­ing, Shim said, while also request­ing fur­ther dona­tions from South Kore­an com­pa­nies.
    ...

    Will we see Japan­ese firms final­ly mak­ing some vol­un­tary con­tri­bu­tions now that the Japan-friend­ly pres­i­dent of South Korea appears to be on the verge of get­ting removed from office? Time will tell. Either way, it’s going to be very inter­est­ing to see if this tri­lat­er­al secu­ri­ty arrange­ment can be sus­tained going for­ward. A wide­ly unpop­u­lar com­pen­sa­tion agree­ment reached by a soon-to-be-impeached wild­ly unpop­u­lar pres­i­dent isn’t exact­ly a sta­ble foun­da­tion.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | December 5, 2024, 9:33 pm
  4. @Pterrafractyl–

    Great work, as always!

    Best,

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | December 5, 2024, 10:47 pm
  5. It’s been rough­ly just a week after South Kore­a’s abortive coup, with inves­ti­ga­tions in full swing. Inves­ti­ga­tions that are already reveal­ing just how much worse this sit­u­a­tion could have been. In par­tic­u­lar, plans for provo­ca­tions against North Korea in recent months that appear to have been part of a larg­er plot to use some sort of mil­i­tary cri­sis with North Korea as the pre­text for mar­tial law. Those are the rev­e­la­tions recent­ly pub­licly revealed by oppo­si­tion Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­ers in recent days, with the now-for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun play­ing a lead­ing role in for­mu­lat­ing the provo­ca­tions accord­ing to the alle­ga­tions of these oppo­si­tion law­mak­ers.

    First, accord­ing to Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Park Beom-kye, a mil­i­tary whistle­blow­er told him about an appar­ent provo­ca­tion back in Octo­ber intend­ed to serve as the pre­text for a dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law: a series of unmanned drones sent to Pyongyang back in Octo­ber on the orders of for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun. The idea appeared to be that the unit­ed defense plans exe­cut­ed as part of the mil­i­tary response could include a simul­ta­ne­ous dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law. Plans that appear in a ref­er­ence doc­u­ment cre­at­ed back in Novem­ber under orders from now-for­mer head of Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand, Yeo In-hyeong. Yeo is also described as a high school class­mate of Kim Yong-hyun. It sounds like Kim had Yeo plan the specifics of the oper­a­tion. And as we’re going to see, North Korea did indeed accuse South Korea of mul­ti­ple unmanned drone flights in Pyongyang back in Octo­ber that includ­ed leaflet drops. The North threat­ened a “mer­ci­less offen­sive” if the flights con­tin­ued.

    Beyond that, Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Lee Ki-heon claimed to have received infor­ma­tion about orders giv­en by Kim Yong-hyun just a week before the dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law that seemed intend­ed to pro­voke such a mil­i­tary cri­sis. Orders giv­en to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair­per­son Adm. Kim Myung-soo to “fire warn­ing shots before strik­ing launch sites of North Korea’s trash-filled bal­loons” if any such bal­loons were seen float­ing in South Kore­an skies. This was in ref­er­ence to the thou­sands of trash bal­loon North Korea has launched into South Korea this year.

    Remark­ably, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff has denied such an order was issued by Kim Yong-hyun, it did admit that dis­cus­sions took place, with Kim Yong-hyun express­ing a desire to strike the bal­loon launch sights but Kim Myung-soo warn­ing that such a strike would be incon­sis­tent with exist­ing pol­i­cy that only allows for such a strike in response to tan­gi­ble harms. In oth­er words, trash bal­loons weren’t actu­al­ly a rea­son to start a war.

    So we have two provo­ca­tion plans already revealed, one of which — the unmanned drones — was actu­al­ly put into action. But there’s an addi­tion new twist to this inves­ti­ga­tion: Kim Yong-hyun report­ed­ly attempt­ed sui­cide while in cus­tody. He is now described as being in sta­ble con­di­tion.

    Was this a sui­cide attempt root­ed in shame? Or fear or some­thing much worse com­ing to light? That remains to be seen, but it’s worth not­ing that the first impeach­ment vote against Pres­i­dent Yoon has already failed after all but three mem­bers of his par­ty boy­cotted the vote. Yoon par­ty mem­bers explained how they secured Yoon’s agree­ment to stay out of state affairs and resign in an order­ly man­ner in exchange for not sup­port­ing his impeach­ment. The oppo­si­tion has likened the agree­ment to a “sec­ond coup”. So at the same time oppo­si­tion mem­bers are pub­licly reveal­ing evi­dence of a much larg­er plot to embroil South Korea in a mil­i­tary con­flict as a pre­text for mar­tial law, Yoon’s par­ty is cir­cling the wag­ons to pro­tect him. Which is, poten­tial­ly, a very grim con­text for the reports of for­mer Defence Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun sui­cide attempt while in cus­tody:

    Al Jazeera

    South Kore­an police raid pres­i­den­tial office, ex-min­is­ter attempts sui­cide

    Devel­op­ments come as oppo­si­tion par­ty pre­pares to make sec­ond bid to impeach Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk-yeol.

    Pub­lished On 11 Dec 2024

    South Kore­an police have raid­ed the pres­i­den­tial office as part of an inves­ti­ga­tion into Yoon Suk-yeol’s mar­tial law dec­la­ra­tion, while offi­cials told par­lia­ment the country’s for­mer defence chief attempt­ed sui­cide in cus­tody.

    The dra­mat­ic devel­op­ments on Wednes­day came after author­i­ties ear­li­er arrest­ed for­mer Defence Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun and the heads of the nation­al and Seoul met­ro­pol­i­tan police agen­cies over their alleged involve­ment in Pres­i­dent Yoon’s short-lived decree, which has plunged Asia’s fourth-largest econ­o­my into its biggest polit­i­cal cri­sis in decades.

    Shin Yong-hae, com­mis­sion­er-gen­er­al of the Korea Cor­rec­tion­al Ser­vice, told law­mak­ers dur­ing a par­lia­men­tary hear­ing that cor­rec­tion­al offi­cials had stopped Kim dur­ing his sui­cide attempt and that his con­di­tion was sta­ble.

    Jus­tice Min­is­ter Park Sung Jae con­firmed Kim’s attempt dur­ing the same hear­ing.

    Kim was arrest­ed on insur­rec­tion charges on Wednes­day after Seoul Cen­tral Dis­trict Court issued a war­rant at the request of pros­e­cu­tors.

    “We con­sid­ered the degree to which the charges are sup­port­ed, the grav­i­ty of the crime and con­cerns he will destroy evi­dence,” the court said in issu­ing the war­rant, the state-fund­ed Yon­hap news agency report­ed.

    Cho Ji-ho, the com­mis­sion­er-gen­er­al of the Kore­an Nation­al Police Agency, and Kim Bong-sik, the head of the Seoul Met­ro­pol­i­tan Police Agency, were also arrest­ed on insur­rec­tion charges.

    Cho and Kim, who were detained with­out war­rant, can be held for up to 48 hours before they are for­mal­ly arrest­ed.

    The lat­est devel­op­ments come as the main lib­er­al oppo­si­tion Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty is prepar­ing to make a sec­ond bid to impeach Yoon over his brief dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law, which has plunged Asia’s fourth-largest econ­o­my into its biggest polit­i­cal cri­sis in decades.

    The opposition’s ini­tial attempt to impeach Yoon failed after all but three mem­bers of Yoon’s Peo­ple Pow­er Par­ty boy­cotted the vote at the 300-mem­ber Nation­al Assem­bly on Sat­ur­day, depriv­ing the motion of the nec­es­sary two-thirds quo­rum.

    If a sec­ond impeach­ment motion were to be suc­cess­ful, Prime Min­is­ter Han Duck-soo would tem­porar­i­ly assume pres­i­den­tial respon­si­bil­i­ties.

    The Con­sti­tu­tion­al Court of Korea would then decide whether to con­firm Yoon’s removal from office or restore his pow­ers.

    The Peo­ple Pow­er Par­ty has said that it has secured Yoon’s agree­ment to stay out of state affairs and resign in an order­ly man­ner in exchange for not sup­port­ing his impeach­ment, an agree­ment the oppo­si­tion has likened to a “sec­ond coup”.

    Yoon, who has been slapped with an over­seas trav­el ban by pros­e­cu­tors, is also under crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion for alleged trea­son.

    On Tues­day, the Nation­al Assem­bly passed a bill to appoint an inde­pen­dent spe­cial coun­sel to inves­ti­gate Yoon and oth­er top offi­cials after the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty argued that pub­lic pros­e­cu­tors could not be trust­ed to con­duct a prop­er probe giv­en the president’s for­mer role as the country’s top pros­e­cu­tor.

    ...

    ————-

    “South Kore­an police raid pres­i­den­tial office, ex-min­is­ter attempts sui­cide”; Al Jazeera; 12/11/2024

    The lat­est devel­op­ments come as the main lib­er­al oppo­si­tion Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty is prepar­ing to make a sec­ond bid to impeach Yoon over his brief dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law, which has plunged Asia’s fourth-largest econ­o­my into its biggest polit­i­cal cri­sis in decades.”

    Well, round one of impeach­ing Pres­i­dent Yoon Suk-yeol was a bust after all but three of Yoon’s par­ty boy­cotted the vote. Yoon is def­i­nite­ly leav­ing office soon. But will he actu­al­ly be impeached? That remains to be seen:

    ...
    The opposition’s ini­tial attempt to impeach Yoon failed after all but three mem­bers of Yoon’s Peo­ple Pow­er Par­ty boy­cotted the vote at the 300-mem­ber Nation­al Assem­bly on Sat­ur­day, depriv­ing the motion of the nec­es­sary two-thirds quo­rum.

    If a sec­ond impeach­ment motion were to be suc­cess­ful, Prime Min­is­ter Han Duck-soo would tem­porar­i­ly assume pres­i­den­tial respon­si­bil­i­ties.

    The Con­sti­tu­tion­al Court of Korea would then decide whether to con­firm Yoon’s removal from office or restore his pow­ers.

    The Peo­ple Pow­er Par­ty has said that it has secured Yoon’s agree­ment to stay out of state affairs and resign in an order­ly man­ner in exchange for not sup­port­ing his impeach­ment, an agree­ment the oppo­si­tion has likened to a “sec­ond coup”.
    ...

    And at the same time Yoon is sur­viv­ing impeach­ment votes, we’re learn­ing about how is for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun and the heads of the nation­al and Seoul met­ro­pol­i­tan police agen­cies were not only arrest­ed, but Kim appar­ent­ly attempt­ed to com­mit sui­cide while in cus­tody:

    ...
    The dra­mat­ic devel­op­ments on Wednes­day came after author­i­ties ear­li­er arrest­ed for­mer Defence Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun and the heads of the nation­al and Seoul met­ro­pol­i­tan police agen­cies over their alleged involve­ment in Pres­i­dent Yoon’s short-lived decree, which has plunged Asia’s fourth-largest econ­o­my into its biggest polit­i­cal cri­sis in decades.

    Shin Yong-hae, com­mis­sion­er-gen­er­al of the Korea Cor­rec­tion­al Ser­vice, told law­mak­ers dur­ing a par­lia­men­tary hear­ing that cor­rec­tion­al offi­cials had stopped Kim dur­ing his sui­cide attempt and that his con­di­tion was sta­ble.

    Jus­tice Min­is­ter Park Sung Jae con­firmed Kim’s attempt dur­ing the same hear­ing.

    ...

    “We con­sid­ered the degree to which the charges are sup­port­ed, the grav­i­ty of the crime and con­cerns he will destroy evi­dence,” the court said in issu­ing the war­rant, the state-fund­ed Yon­hap news agency report­ed.
    ...

    Again, was this sui­cide attempt moti­vat­ed by shame? Or a desire to cov­er up some­thing even worse? Either way, it’s hard not to sus­pect it had some­thing to do with the schemes to pro­voke a mil­i­tary con­flict with North Korea that for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun is now accused of orches­trat­ing. Because based on this new evi­dence, it would appear that the Yoon gov­ern­men­t’s mar­tial law plans includ­ed at least two plans for provo­ca­tions intend­ed to spark some sort of mil­i­tary cri­sis with North Korea, with Kim orches­trat­ing the scheme. But North Korea did­n’t take the bait in one case and cool­er heads pre­vailed in the oth­er:

    Han­ky­oreh

    Ex-defense chief sus­pect­ed of plot­ting war with North Korea to jus­ti­fy mar­tial law

    Post­ed on : 2024-12-10 17:29 KST Mod­i­fied on : 2024-12-10 17:29 KST
    By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter

    There are mount­ing sus­pi­cions that for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun intend­ed to jus­ti­fy the dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law or a state of unit­ed defense by insti­gat­ing a mil­i­tary con­flict with North Korea by order­ing strikes on the sites from which the North was launch­ing trash-filled bal­loons and fly­ing unmanned drones to Pyongyang.

    Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Park Beom-kye revealed Mon­day that he received a tip-off from a mil­i­tary whistle­blow­er that the unmanned drones North Korea claimed Seoul had sent to Pyongyang in Octo­ber were indeed sent on orders of the South Kore­an mil­i­tary — more specif­i­cal­ly, on the orders of the for­mer defense min­is­ter.

    “The Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand, for­mer­ly led by Yeo In-hyeong, yet anoth­er high school class­mate of Kim’s, planned the specifics of the oper­a­tion,” Park claimed, sug­gest­ing that it was “clear that this plan was con­ceived to offer a pre­text for the invo­ca­tion of mar­tial law.”

    A ref­er­ence doc­u­ment on the oper­a­tion of mar­tial law troops and a joint inves­ti­ga­tion head­quar­ters issued in Novem­ber under the orders of Yeo, made pub­lic by the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty on Sun­day, show that the Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand reviewed the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the simul­ta­ne­ous dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law and unit­ed defense to exe­cute mil­i­tary respons­es and con­trol pub­lic order and secu­ri­ty in the event of a cri­sis, such as armed con­flict with North Korea.

    The doc­u­ment claimed that mar­tial law and unit­ed defense could be declared simul­ta­ne­ous­ly in the case of “ene­my infil­tra­tion, provo­ca­tion and domes­tic cir­cum­stances.”

    ...

    Before pub­li­ciz­ing the con­tents of the doc­u­ment, Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Lee Ki-heon claimed to have received infor­ma­tion on how, only one week pri­or to the dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law, Kim had ordered Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair­per­son Adm. Kim Myung-soo to “fire warn­ing shots before strik­ing launch sites of North Korea’s trash-filled bal­loons” if any such bal­loons were seen float­ing in South Kore­an skies.

    For that to hap­pen, South Kore­an sol­diers would have to attack North Korea’s south­west­ern Hwang­hae region, where the trash bal­loons are being sent from, which could eas­i­ly esca­late into a lim­it­ed war.

    In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied alle­ga­tions about such orders on Sat­ur­day, claim­ing that “no orders intend­ing to esca­late con­flict took place.” How­ev­er, it did not deny the dis­cus­sions on tar­get­ing launch sites, say­ing, “The mil­i­tary con­ducts dis­cus­sions on var­i­ous oper­a­tional sit­u­a­tions from time to time.”

    Accord­ing to mil­i­tary offi­cials, Kim Yong-hyun expressed a desire to strike the launch sites of North Korea’s trash bal­loons, but Kim Myung-soo respond­ed by say­ing that such a move would be incon­sis­tent with the cur­rent response pol­i­cy, which stip­u­lates that such strikes should only take place in case of tan­gi­ble harm.

    In Sep­tem­ber, as trash-filled bal­loons con­tin­ued to cross the bor­der, the Joint Chiefs had said that the South Kore­an mil­i­tary would take “deci­sive mil­i­tary action if it was deter­mined that seri­ous dam­age to our nation­al secu­ri­ty has occurred or if North Korea cross­es a line.”

    ...

    ————

    “Ex-defense chief sus­pect­ed of plot­ting war with North Korea to jus­ti­fy mar­tial law” By Kwon Hyuk-chul; Han­ky­oreh; 12/10/2024

    “Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Park Beom-kye revealed Mon­day that he received a tip-off from a mil­i­tary whistle­blow­er that the unmanned drones North Korea claimed Seoul had sent to Pyongyang in Octo­ber were indeed sent on orders of the South Kore­an mil­i­tary — more specif­i­cal­ly, on the orders of the for­mer defense min­is­ter.

    A drone-based provo­ca­tion with North Korea con­duct­ed back in Octo­ber on the order of for­mer Defense Min­is­ter Kim Yong-hyun. Those were the claims of this whistle­blow­er. Claims that, if they pan out, sug­gest the Yoon gov­ern­men­t’s plans for mar­tial law includ­ed the spark­ing of a con­flict with North Korea. Plans seem­ing­ly described in a doc­u­ment issue back in Novem­ber on the orders of yet anoth­er high school class­mate of the for­mer head of the Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand, Yeo In-hyeong, who is also a high school class­mate of Kim. The Yoon gov­ern­ment appears to have con­vinced itself that a dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law could be exec­u­tive simul­ta­ne­ous­ly with the mil­i­tary response to a new cri­sis with North Korea. In oth­er words, has North Korea tak­en the bait with the unmanned drones, Yoon’s coup plans may have suc­ceed­ed:

    ...
    “The Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand, for­mer­ly led by Yeo In-hyeong, yet anoth­er high school class­mate of Kim’s, planned the specifics of the oper­a­tion,” Park claimed, sug­gest­ing that it was “clear that this plan was con­ceived to offer a pre­text for the invo­ca­tion of mar­tial law.”

    A ref­er­ence doc­u­ment on the oper­a­tion of mar­tial law troops and a joint inves­ti­ga­tion head­quar­ters issued in Novem­ber under the orders of Yeo, made pub­lic by the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty on Sun­day, show that the Defense Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence Com­mand reviewed the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the simul­ta­ne­ous dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law and unit­ed defense to exe­cute mil­i­tary respons­es and con­trol pub­lic order and secu­ri­ty in the event of a cri­sis, such as armed con­flict with North Korea.

    The doc­u­ment claimed that mar­tial law and unit­ed defense could be declared simul­ta­ne­ous­ly in the case of “ene­my infil­tra­tion, provo­ca­tion and domes­tic cir­cum­stances.”
    ...

    But then we get to this very dis­turb­ing addi­tion­al rev­e­la­tion by a sec­ond law­mak­er, who claimed to have infor­ma­tion on orders giv­en by Kim Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair­per­son Adm. Kim Myung-soo to “fire warn­ing shots before strik­ing launch sites of North Korea’s trash-filled bal­loons” if any such bal­loons were seen float­ing in South Kore­an skies. And while the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied such an order was giv­en, it did admit that Kim Yong-hyun expressed a desire for those strikes but Kim Myung-soo coun­tered that such strikes vio­lat­ed exist­ing poli­cies that such strikes can only fol­low tan­gi­ble harm:

    ...
    Before pub­li­ciz­ing the con­tents of the doc­u­ment, Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty law­mak­er Lee Ki-heon claimed to have received infor­ma­tion on how, only one week pri­or to the dec­la­ra­tion of mar­tial law, Kim had ordered Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair­per­son Adm. Kim Myung-soo to “fire warn­ing shots before strik­ing launch sites of North Korea’s trash-filled bal­loons” if any such bal­loons were seen float­ing in South Kore­an skies.

    For that to hap­pen, South Kore­an sol­diers would have to attack North Korea’s south­west­ern Hwang­hae region, where the trash bal­loons are being sent from, which could eas­i­ly esca­late into a lim­it­ed war.

    In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied alle­ga­tions about such orders on Sat­ur­day, claim­ing that “no orders intend­ing to esca­late con­flict took place.” How­ev­er, it did not deny the dis­cus­sions on tar­get­ing launch sites, say­ing, “The mil­i­tary con­ducts dis­cus­sions on var­i­ous oper­a­tional sit­u­a­tions from time to time.”

    Accord­ing to mil­i­tary offi­cials, Kim Yong-hyun expressed a desire to strike the launch sites of North Korea’s trash bal­loons, but Kim Myung-soo respond­ed by say­ing that such a move would be incon­sis­tent with the cur­rent response pol­i­cy, which stip­u­lates that such strikes should only take place in case of tan­gi­ble harm.
    ...

    And to get an idea of just how provoca­tive those unmanned drone flights were back in Octo­ber, here’s a report from back in Octo­ber about those drone flights. Accord­ing to North Korea, the drones flew over Pyongyang at least three times that month, drop­ping leaflets, threat­en­ing a “mer­ci­less offen­sive” if such flights con­tin­ued. So if drones drop­ping leaflets was enough to trig­ger the threat of a mer­ci­less offen­sive, imag­ine what strikes on trash bal­loon launch sites would have done:

    Reuters

    North Korea blames South’s mil­i­tary for drone intru­sion

    By Hyon­hee Shin
    Octo­ber 28, 2024 2:45 AM CDT
    Updat­ed

    SEOUL, Oct 28 (Reuters) — North Kore­a’s defence min­istry blamed South Kore­a’s mil­i­tary for send­ing drones into its ter­ri­to­ry for polit­i­cal pur­pos­es, call­ing it an infringe­ment upon the coun­try’s sov­er­eign­ty, state media KCNA said on Mon­day.

    The min­istry announced final results of its inves­ti­ga­tion after claim­ing that South Kore­an drones flew over Pyongyang at least three times this month to dis­trib­ute anti-North leaflets. KCNA has also pub­lished pho­tos of what it described as a crashed South Kore­an mil­i­tary drone.

    Dur­ing an analy­sis of the drone’s flight con­trol pro­gramme, North Kore­an author­i­ties said they uncov­ered more than 230 flight plans and flight logs since June 2023, includ­ing a plan to scat­ter “polit­i­cal moti­va­tion­al rub­bish.”

    An Oct. 8 record showed that the drone had depart­ed the South’s bor­der island of Baengnyeong­do late at night and released leaflets over the for­eign and defence min­istry build­ings in Pyongyang a few hours lat­er.

    Seoul’s defence min­istry did not imme­di­ate­ly have com­ment but has said Pyongyang’s uni­lat­er­al claims were “not worth ver­i­fy­ing or a response.”

    A North Kore­an spokesper­son warned that the coun­try would respond with “mer­ci­less offen­sive” if such a case recurs, KCNA said.

    Ten­sions between the Kore­as have rekin­dled since the North began fly­ing bal­loons car­ry­ing trash into the South in late May, prompt­ing the South to restart loud­speak­er pro­pa­gan­da broad­casts.

    ...

    ———–


    North Korea blames South’s mil­i­tary for drone intru­sion” By Hyon­hee Shin; Reuters; 10/28/2024

    “A North Kore­an spokesper­son warned that the coun­try would respond with “mer­ci­less offen­sive” if such a case recurs, KCNA said.”

    These unmanned drones were clear­ly provoca­tive. At least provoca­tive enough to trig­ger threats of a “mer­ci­less offen­sive”. And yes, as we saw, no “mer­ci­less offen­sive” fol­lowed. Instead, as we saw, it was just a month lat­er, a week before the coup attempt, when Kim Yong-hyun was appar­ent­ly push­ing for mil­i­tary strikes on trash bal­loon launch sites. The kind of move basi­cal­ly guar­an­teed to illic­it some sort of mil­i­tary response.

    That’s all part of the grim con­text of this seem­ing­ly short-lived coup plot. The coup itself may have last­ed less than a day. The plot itself is much old­er and, the more we learn, far more scan­dalous.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | December 11, 2024, 6:50 pm
  6. @Pterrafractyl–

    Bril­liant!

    Dave Emory

    Posted by Dave Emory | December 11, 2024, 9:40 pm

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