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NB: This is a recycled broadcast containing updated material, but includes the original broadcast in its entirety.
For some time, Mr. Emory has accessed the work of the remarkable Paul Manning. Part of the CBS news team that covered World War II (along with the late Edward R. Murrow), Manning authored the landmark title Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile (Lyle Stuart, copyright 1981), detailing the post-war career of Martin Bormann, Hitler’s most important aide.
Long rumored to have been killed at the end of the war, Bormann escaped to Latin America with all of the liquid wealth of the Third Reich at his disposal. Bormann has used that wealth to finance (literally) an Underground Reich, an institution that wields profound (though largely unrecognized) influence in the contemporary world. Mr. Emory believes that (barring a significant change in political reality) the Bormann group will prove to be the decisive element in human affairs.
This broadcast details Manning’s last published work: the Bormann organization’s initiation of joint nuclear weapons development between Germany, Argentina and South Africa and its promotion of the Condor II missile project, jointly developed by Iraq, Egypt and Argentina. (It should be noted that Manning’s second book on the Bormann organization was never published. His son Jerry was murdered at that time, in retribution for his work on the Bormann group, according to Manning’s intelligence contacts.) The joint weapons development was intended to give Germany nuclear and intercontinental missile technology that it was officially forbidden from possessing.
Shortly after World War II, the discovery of uranium in Argentina spurred the clandestine nuclear development program. At the time, Argentina was ruled by Juan Peron, who was very close to Bormann and the Nazi emigre community in Argentina.
Instigated by the Bormann group, the program was greatly assisted by the Siemens Corporation’s development of two nuclear reactors for Argentina. The Condor II missile project would have given Sadam Hussein a greatly expanded missile capability, had the U.S. not secretly intervened with Argentina to interdict the missile’s progress. Much of the information accessed by Manning came from Leon Grunbaum, a Holocaust survivor and nuclear scientist. Grunbaum was subsequently murdered.
Program highlights include: the close relationship between Nazi Germany and Iraq during World War II; the perpetuation of the Nazi-Iraqi link in the decades after the war; the close links between Egypt and the Bormann group; details of the hierarchical structure of the Bormann group (allegedly headed, in the early 1990s, by Bormann’s son Adolph Martin and his sister Neumi); the rigorous surveillance of and harassment of Leon Grunbaum (culminating in his murder); the theft of Grunbaum’s notes while he was visiting Switzerland; remarkable similarities between the reality of the Bormann group as reported by Manning and the portrayal of the organization in the Nazi tract Serpent’s Walk.
Uncle Sam and Il Duce
See also:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_Incident
Describes an unexplained 1979 nuclear test, with the possible responsible party as apartheid-era South Africa.
I am seeking if there is a link between the great leader of Atomic Energy in Argentina Abel Julio Gonzalez and the attempt of ultra rightists to develop an atomic military complex in Argentina with the help of german scientists.
If one was to design a next-generation nuclear power plant design, what features might one want to include in that of technology? That’s the question that’s suddenly become much more topical now that Bill Gates and Warren Buffet have selected a location in Wyoming for their joint next-generation Natrium reactor nuclear power plant. As we might expect, the new sodium-cooled design is cheaper and have a simpler than traditional nuclear power plants. That’s due, in part, to a reliance on sodium and molten-salt, instead of water, for transferring the heat from the reactor a steam reactor or save the heat for later use. That brings us to another feature of the new design, which is that the plant’s generating capacity can be rapidly brought up or down depending on demand. And due to the simplified design, the cost of these plants could come in at around $1 billion, a fraction of the cost of traditional plants. It all sounds great so far, right?
Well, how about the fuel? Are these the kind of next-generation nuclear reactors that rely on far less dangerous sources of nuclear fuel like thorium reactors? Nope. They use uranium. Not only that, they use highly enriched uranium. Yep. While the traditional water-cooled reactor relies on fuel with around 3.5% uranium-235 content, the fuel for these Natrium reactors uses 20% uranium-235 material, making the fuel for these plants tempting for groups seeking weapons-grade enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. 20% enrichment is the threshold for “highly enriched uranium”. While weapons-grade uranium is going to typically be enriched at levels exceeding 85%, note that it is technically possible to build a nuclear bomb with fuel as low as 20%. So the fact that these new nuclear reactors rely on 20% enriched uranium fuel is kind of a big deal.
Also keep in mind that, thanks to the simplified design, the plants also require 80% less expensive reinforced concrete. So if any terror groups decide to wage an attack on one of these Natrium reactors, it’s going to be a lot easier to pull that attack off. Recall the plans by the Florida-based Atomwaffen cell to trigger a nuclear meltdown at a Miami-area nuclear plant by mortal attack. Those kinds of attacks sound like they will be a lot more viable in a plant that uses 80% less reinforced concrete. So let’s hope the simpler design of these plants helps mitigate the consequences of successful attack on the structure. Because while there are definitely some benefits to these Natrium reactor designs, it sounds like the main benefits are in the cheaper costs to build the plants. Cheaper and simpler is is nice, but not necessearily the top priority when considering nuclear power:
“Nuclear power experts have warned that advanced reactors could have higher risks than conventional ones. Fuel for many advanced reactors would have to be enriched at a much higher rate than conventional fuel, meaning the fuel supply chain could be an attractive target for militants looking to create a crude nuclear weapon, a recent report said.”
Anyone looking to build a nuclear bomb? Head on over to the new Natrium plant in Wyoming. That’s the implicit advertisement that comes with this technology, so while these types of plants may be simpler and cheaper to build, that ‘cheaper and simpler’ approach better not be applied to plant security.
But it sounds like there is one advantage to this highly enriched uranium fuel: it requires fewer refueling stops. So it sounds like there are fewer opportunities to interdict the nuclear fuel on the way to, or from, the plant. That said, it also means fueling these plants will involve the regular shipping of weapons-grade uranium. So let’s hope these refueling cycles are extremely high-security events:
“Both reactors would also depart from conventional designs in using a fuel that is more highly enriched in uranium-235, the fissile isotope that is key to generating a chain reaction. To minimize the risk that the fuel, fresh or spent, could be diverted to create a nuclear weapon, water-cooled power reactors run on fuel that it is 3.5% uranium-235. The Natrium and Xe-100 reactors would use fuel enriched to 20%, which would enable them to run longer on a batch of fuel and extract more energy from it. Such fuel isn’t currently produced in the United States, but current manufacturers could make it relatively easily, Finan says. The fuel would also be difficult to divert to weapons, she says, in part because it would require fewer refueling stops.”
Don’t worry about the fact that these reactors use highly enriched uranium that could be stolen to use for nuclear weapons because there won’t be a large number of opportunities for theft. Those are the kinds of assurances we’re getting. Non-assuring assurances that ignore the reality that, whether or not these reactors have infrequent refueling cycles, there’s still going to be the need for the nuclear fuel industry to start producing, storing, and shipping this kind of weapons-usable fuel if this type of nuclear technology becomes popular. There’s no denying that making weapons-grade uranium the standard fuel for new nuclear power plants is going to inevitably make weapons-grade uranium more plentiful and available for loss and theft.
Of course, while the threat of lost weapons-grade uranium is an obvious huge risk with this technology, there’s also the obvious huge risk of a meltdown. Which raises the question: does this sodium-cooled reactor technology have a history of meltdowns? Yep. A largely under-recognized history that includes the worst nuclear accident in US history. And it doesn’t sound like there’s anything in this new sodium reactor design that has somehow avoided the risk of future meltdowns. They would presumably be touting new safety features if such features were available.
So as we can see, this new nuclear technology being advanced by Warren Buffet and Bill Gates appears to have one distinct advantage: the plants are cheaper to produce. That’s the big advantage. Cheaper nuclear power infrastructure. Which seems like the kind of advantage that’s mostly just a short-term advantage with a lot of long-term costs.