Lis­ten: Side 1 | Side 2

The title derives from a con­cept intro­duced in ear­ly August of 1998, and devel­oped at length in Jan­u­ary 2003. Cur­rent­ly being man­i­fest­ed in the Iraqi war, this geopo­lit­i­cal strug­gle is a con­tin­u­a­tion of World War II, with an eco­nom­ic con­test between the dol­lar and the euro at the cen­ter of the strug­gle. Employ­ing proxy war in the Mid­dle East, “diplo­ma­cy as a con­tin­u­a­tion of war by oth­er means” and the eco­nom­ic the­o­ries of pan-Ger­man the­o­reti­cian Friedrich List, a Third Reich gone under­ground and its French and Islam­o­fas­cist allies are fight­ing against the US and UK.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Review of the “Bat­tle of Men­with Hill” and reprise of the ini­tial For The Record dis­cus­sion of the EU/German attack on the Ech­e­lon net­work and the Men­with Hill lis­ten­ing sta­tion; an alleged Pak­istani ter­ror­ist mon­ey laun­der­er’s con­nec­tions to the World Mus­lim Con­gress; the WMC’s fas­cist her­itage under the Grand Mufti; the indict­ment of Bush polit­i­cal ally Sami Al-Ari­an for ter­ror­ist sup­port activ­i­ties; Al-Ari­an’s con­nec­tions to Sheik Rah­man (con­nect­ed to the first World Trade Cen­ter attack); the activ­i­ties of Bush busi­ness asso­ciate Khalid Bin Mah­fouz in con­junc­tion with Al Qae­da; the arrest of a key Al Qae­da financier in Pak­istan; the sud­den rever­sal of field by the defense in the case of the 3/20/2002 Oper­a­tion Green Quest Raids; the con­nec­tions of the 3/20 Green Quest raids to the Sami Al-Ari­an case; Mohammed Atta’s Ger­man asso­ciates; the Ger­man elite con­nec­tions of Atta’s Ger­man friends; the two Flori­da flight schools owned by the “Fly­ing Dutch­men” at which the 9/11 pilots trained; the res­ig­na­tion of a top White House coun­tert­er­ror­ism offi­cial; Al Qae­da nego­ti­a­tions with Sad­dam Hus­sein to act as a “back-up unit” to Sad­dam Hus­sein.

1. The broad­cast begins with (and takes its title from) an excerpt from FTR 103, record­ed in ear­ly August of 1998, dis­cussing the German/EU pro­pa­gan­da attack on the Men­with Hill lis­ten­ing sta­tion and the asso­ci­at­ed Ech­e­lon net­work. In that pre­scient broad­cast, Mr. Emory char­ac­ter­ized the sto­ry as “a block­buster . . . for all intents and pur­pos­es an act of war . . . a reform­ing of the bat­tle lines of World War II . . . in effect, “Anglo-Sax­o­nia ver­sus Ger­ma­nia.” (“EU Sim­mers Over Men­with Lis­ten­ing Post” by Simon Davies; Elec­tron­ic Tele­graph; 7/16/1998.)

2. Con­tin­u­ing to pur­sue Oper­a­tion Green Quest—the ongo­ing intel­li­gence effort aimed at inter­dict­ing ter­ror­ist financing—federal agents arrest­ed a Pak­istani nation­al (con­nect­ed to that coun­try’s polit­i­cal elite). That indi­vid­ual, in turn, was asso­ci­at­ed with the World Mus­lim Con­gress, an orga­ni­za­tion with an “Islam­o­fas­cist” her­itage. ” . . . The most fas­ci­nat­ing case involved Sha­heen Khalid Butt, a Pak­istan native arrest­ed late Thurs­day for laun­der­ing mon­ey, sell­ing fake immi­gra­tion papers and skirt­ing cur­ren­cy report­ing laws from the Man­hat­tan For­eign Exchange, an unli­censed mon­ey trans­fer firm he ran from the base­ment of the Kash­mir Restau­rant in mid­town Man­hat­tan. . . .Pak­istani press report­ed Butt has orga­nized pro-sep­a­ratist ral­lies out­side the Unit­ed Nations as pres­i­dent of the Kash­mir Cen­ter and is a long­time friend of oust­ed Pak­istani Prime Min­is­ter Nawaz Sharif. A 2001 Unit­ed Nations con­fer­ence on ‘least-devel­oped nations’ iden­ti­fied a man by that name as a U.S. rep­re­sen­ta­tive from the World Mus­lim Con­gress, a non­govern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tion.” (“9 Arrest­ed for Alleged Mon­ey Smug­gling” by Alan Gath­right; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 3/22/2003; pp. A1-A14.)

3. Review­ing the his­to­ry of the World Mus­lim Con­gress, the broad­cast details some of its fas­cist his­to­ry. “Anoth­er favorite IHR speak­er and col­lab­o­ra­tor was Issah Nakleh of the World Mus­lim Con­gress (WMC). Based in Pak­istan, the WMC was ini­tial­ly head­ed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who, like his friend H. Kei­th Thomp­son, stood by the Third Reich until his death in 1974. A few years lat­er, the WMC, then head­ed by Pak­istani Dr. Ina­mul­lah Kahn, mailed Holo­caust-denial lit­er­a­ture to every mem­ber of the U.S. Con­gress and the British Par­lia­ment. The WMC’s offi­cial mouth­piece, Mus­lim World, car­ried the ads for The Pro­to­cols of the Elders of Zion and Hen­ry Ford’s The Inter­na­tion­al Jew. Dr. Khan’s con­gress also pub­lished Freema­son­ry, a book warn­ing that Jews were using lodge mem­bers to extend secret con­trol over reli­gion and society—a para­noid the­o­ry that has long been pop­u­lar among Lib­er­ty Lob­by sup­port­ers and neo-Nazi groups around the world. Acknowl­edg­ing their polit­i­cal kin­ship, WMC sec­re­tary-gen­er­al Khan sent a let­ter to the Spot­light prais­ing its ‘superb in-depth analy­sis’ and stat­ing that the paper deserved ‘the thanks of all right-mind­ed peo­ple.’ Dr. Khan also served as an advi­sor to the Sau­di Ara­bi­an roy­al fam­i­ly, which lav­ished funds on the WMC. In addi­tion, the Sau­di Ara­bi­an gov­ern­ment retained the ser­vices of Amer­i­can neo-nazi William Grim­stead as a Wash­ing­ton lob­by­ist. . .Soon, the World Mus­lim Con­gress began work­ing close­ly with U.S. intel­li­gence and Pak­istani mil­i­tary offi­cials, who were covert­ly sup­port­ing the Afghan mujahideen in their fight against the Sovi­et-installed regime in Kab­ul. This effort was strong­ly endorsed by Dr. Khan, who served for many years as the Pak­istani rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Nazi-infest­ed World Anti-Com­mu­nist League, which played an impor­tant role in the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion’s ‘secret war’ in the Gold­en Cres­cent.” (The Beast Reawak­ens; Mar­tin A. Lee; Copy­right 1997 [HC]; Lit­tle, Brown & Co.; ISBN 0–316-51959–6; pp. 225–226.)

4. The length of time and the his­to­ry of this orga­ni­za­tion are illus­trat­ed by a quote from a book pub­lished in 1952.) “In Feb­ru­ary 1951 he [the Grand Mufti] sud­den­ly reap­peared in Karachi, Pak­istan to meet old friends who had sup­port­ed his cause in Iraq and to pre­side over a twelve-day World Moslem Con­gress. In a typ­i­cal inflam­ma­to­ry address, he called for a ‘full strug­gle’ by the Moslems ‘to meet the aggressor’—meaning, in this instance, the non-Moslem Hin­dus of India. He assured the del­e­gates: ‘We shall meet next with sword in hand on the soil of either Kash­mir or Pales­tine.’ ” (Cairo to Dam­as­cus; John Roy Carl­son; p. 423.)

5. An impor­tant mem­ber of the Sau­di elite and part of the busi­ness milieu to which George W. Bush (and his father) belong, Khalid Bin Mah­fouz has been linked to the fund­ing of Al Qae­da. FTR#403 details Mr. Bin Mah­fouz’s nui­sance law­suit against Jean-Charles Bris­ard, co-author of a vital book about 9/11. (For more about Bin Mah­fouz, seethe pro­grams ref­er­enced in FTR#391.) “A cache of al Qae­da doc­u­ments seized last year by U.S. agents in Bosnia iden­ti­fies some of Sau­di Ara­bi­a’s rich­est and most influ­en­tial fam­i­lies as among the first finan­cial sup­port­ers of Osama bin Laden, and shows how al Qae­da used char­i­ta­ble arms of the Sau­di gov­ern­ment. An account of the roots of al Qae­da found on a com­put­er used by a sus­pect­ed al Qae­da front group con­tains a 1988 mem­o­ran­dum list­ing 20 Sau­di finan­cial back­ers of Mr. bin Laden—‘the Gold­en Chain,’ as the bin Laden orga­ni­za­tion called it. The list includes the fam­i­lies of three bil­lion­aire Sau­di bank­ing mag­nates, sev­er­al top indus­tri­al­ists and at least one for­mer gov­ern­ment min­is­ter.” (“Al Qae­da List Points to Sau­di File” by Glenn R. Simp­son; The Wall Street Jour­nal; 3/18/2003; p. A7.)

6. “The Gold­en Chain list, which does­n’t indi­cate the size of the dona­tions, was drawn up at a time when sup­port­ing the Afghan revolt against Sovi­et invaders—Mr. bin Laden’s cause at the time—was a top U.S. for­eign-pol­i­cy objec­tive, as well as a Sau­di nation­al cause with deep patri­ot­ic and reli­gious over­tones. The list does­n’t show any con­tin­u­ing sup­port for al Qae­da after the orga­ni­za­tion began tar­get­ing Amer­i­cans, but a num­ber of the Saud­is on it have been under scruti­ny by U.S. offi­cials as to whether they have sup­port­ed ter­ror­ism in recent years. . .” (Idem.)

7. ” The Gold­en Chain list was con­firmed by U.S. offi­cials and trans­lat­ed from Ara­bic by the Jus­tice Depart­ment. It names bil­lion­aire bankers Saleh Kamel and Khalid bin Mah­fouz, as well as the Al-Rajhi fam­i­ly, anoth­er bank­ing fam­i­ly, and Mr. bin Laden’s own broth­ers. A num­ber of the Saud­is on the list, includ­ing the bin Mah­fouz, Al-Rajhi and Kamel fam­i­lies, are among those under U.S. scruti­ny. A bank con­trolled by the Al-Rajhi fam­i­ly is in lit­i­ga­tion in the Unit­ed King­dom against the pub­lish­er of The Wall Street Jour­nal Europe, for an arti­cle that iden­ti­fied the bank as being mon­i­tored by Sau­di bank­ing author­i­ties. . .” (Idem.)

8. ” . . . Al Qae­da was found­ed in 1988, the year the list was com­piled and about the time Mr. bin Laden was in tran­si­tion from being a U.S. ally to its sworn ene­my. The al Qae­da doc­u­ments were obtained from fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in Chica­go by French ter­ror­ism researcher Jean Charles Bris­ard, who per­suad­ed the Bosn­ian Supreme Court to demand them back from the U.S. Mr. Bris­ard is a con­sul­tant to tri­al lawyer Ronald Mot­ley, who is rep­re­sent­ing many vic­tims of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in a civ­il suit against al Qaeda’s alleged finan­cial sup­port­ers.” (Idem.)

9. Next, the broad­cast notes the con­nec­tions of George W. Bush to Sami Al-Ari­an, the focal point of a law­suit by the hero­ic John Lof­tus. That law­suit direct­ly pre­cip­i­tat­ed the 3/20/2002 Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids. ” . . . Pros­e­cu­tors in Tam­pa and Wash­ing­ton did­n’t see the com­bined evi­dence against Al-Ari­an from secret phone and fac­sim­i­le wire­taps until last Novem­ber. That’s when a spe­cial appeals court gave the Jus­tice Depart­ment approval to use the Patri­ot Act to its fullest extent. A U.S. offi­cial said Thurs­day that evi­dence gath­ered by intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment agents was shared in ‘dribs and drabs’ after Con­gress the law in the fall of 2001. ‘But the spig­ot opened after the appeals court rul­ing,’ he said. The result is the most rich­ly detailed indict­ment yet in the domes­tic war on ter­ror­ism, a pos­si­ble har­bin­ger of future cas­es against ter­ror­ists and their bankrollers.” (“Pro­fes­sor Was Watched Through­out the 1990’s” by Toni Locy; USA Today; p. 4A.)

10. Among Al-Ari­an’s alleged asso­ciates is Sheik Rah­man, con­nect­ed to the milieu of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Cen­ter and Al Qae­da. ” . . . The indict­ment says Al-Ari­an also had con­nec­tions to promi­nent ter­ror­ists, includ­ing Omar Abdel-Rah­man, ‘the Blind Sheik,’ who is serv­ing a life sen­tence for con­spir­ing to blow up New York land­marks.” (Idem.)

11. More about the Bush/Al-Ari­an asso­ci­a­tion: “. . . Al Ari­an lat­er told friends he even used the occa­sion to press Bush on a key issue among Mus­lim Amer­i­cans: the Jus­tice Depart­men­t’s use of secret evi­dence to deport accused ter­ror­ists. In those pre‑9/11 days, Bush was eager­ly court­ing the grow­ing Mus­lim vote and more than will­ing to lis­ten to seem­ing­ly sin­cere activists like Al-Ari­an. When he debat­ed Al Gore lat­er in the year, Bush even made a point of bring­ing up the secret-evi­dence issue. Al-Ari­an was thrilled and began reg­is­ter­ing local Mus­lims for the Repub­li­can Par­ty and prais­ing bush at local mosques. ‘I think I per­son­al­ly played a big role in elect­ing Bush, he boast­ed at a Mus­lim Amer­i­can din­ner last April . . . ’ ” (“Did a Mus­lim Pro­fes­sor Use Activism as a Cloak for Ter­ror?” by Michael Isikoff; Newsweek; 3/3/2003; p. 1.)

12. When Khalid Sheik Mohammed (alleged mas­ter­mind of the 9/11 attacks) took place recent­ly, the raids also net­ted a key Al Qae­da mon­ey man—a wealthy Sau­di. ” . . . The author­i­ties also arrest­ed anoth­er man in the apart­ment, a 34-year-old Sau­di they could­n’t imme­di­ate­ly iden­ti­fy. It was­n’t until the next day that they dis­cov­ered was Mustafa Ahmed al-Haw­sawi, anoth­er most-want­ed Qae­da ter­ror­ist believed to be one of the 9/11 plot’s key ‘pay­mas­ters.’ Offi­cials tell Newsweek that Mohammed and al-Haw­sawi are both under intense inter­ro­ga­tion, pos­si­bly at the U.S. air base in Baghram, Afghanistan. If they talk, the men could pro­vide answers to many key ques­tions about the Sep­tem­ber plot that inves­ti­ga­tors have yet to fig­ure out: Whose idea was it? Who issued the go-ahead? And who sup­plied the mon­ey to finance the attacks? That last puz­zle is espe­cial­ly impor­tant, since it could help author­i­ties unrav­el the all-impor­tant world­wide net­work of wealthy indi­vid­u­als, char­i­ties and gov­ern­ments that enable Osama bin Laden to make his dead­ly fan­tasies come true. (On Sat­ur­day, author­i­ties scored anoth­er vic­to­ry, arrest­ing Abu Jazir al-Jaziri, described by intel­li­gence sources as an ‘impor­tant Al Qae­da fig­ure’ who han­dled logis­tics.) Few peo­ple know more about the cash end of the busi­ness than al-Haw­sawi. . .” (“Al Qaeda’s Mon­ey Man” by Mark Hosen­ball and Michael Isikoff; Newsweek; 3/24/2003; p. 38.)

13. ” . . .The account was flush with cash. Not long after al-Haw­sawi opened it, some­one made a series of deposits total­ing $102,000. (Intel­li­gence sources say al-Haw­sawi, who comes from a well-off Sau­di fam­i­ly, may have put up some of the mon­ey him­self.) Al-Haw­saw­i’s work was­n’t done. Accord­ing to inter­nal FBI reports obtained by Newsweek, two weeks after al-Haw­sawi opened the account, he—or some­one using his cell-phone number—wired $15,000 to Ham­burg, Ger­many: The per­son who went to col­lect the mon­ey was Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an alleged top 9/11 plot­ter who was cap­tured last Sep­tem­ber. With­in days, offi­cials say, bin al-Shibh wired $14,000 to Zacarias Mous­saoui in the Unit­ed States . . . And wad­ing through the cache of evi­dence found at the apart­ment has been slow and dif­fi­cult. But U.S. offi­cials say they have clas­si­fied evi­dence link­ing al-Haw­sawi to oth­er ter­ror­ist plots.” (Idem.)

14. Stem­ming from the Al-Ari­an indict­ment, the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/20/2002 con­tin­ue to have reper­cus­sions. A promi­nent Mus­lim schol­ar dis­cussed in FTR#398 was named as an unin­dict­ed co-con­spir­a­tor in ter­ror­ist-sup­port activ­i­ties. “Fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors in Vir­ginia have impli­cat­ed a promi­nent U.S. Mus­lim reli­gious schol­ar in pos­si­ble involve­ment with ter­ror­ism fund­ing. In a fil­ing late Fri­day with the U.S. Dis­trict Court for East­ern Vir­ginia, pros­e­cu­tors dis­closed that one sub­ject of their probe is also an unin­dict­ed co-con­spir­a­tor in a sep­a­rate ter­ror­ism inves­ti­ga­tion in Flori­da involv­ing for­mer Uni­ver­si­ty of South Flori­da pro­fes­sor Sami Al-Ari­an and his asso­ciates. A fed­er­al grand jury in Tam­pa, Fla., recent­ly hand­ed up a 50-count indict­ment that charges ter­ror­ism financ­ing and rack­e­teer­ing against Mr. Ari­an and sev­en asso­ciates accused of belong­ing to or sup­port­ing the ter­ror group Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad.” (“U.S. Links Schol­ar to Ter­ror Fund­ing” by Glenn R. Simp­son; The Wall Street Jour­nal; 3/17/2003; p. A4.)

15. “The unin­dict­ed co-con­spir­a­tor isn’t named in the new fil­ing, but the Ari­an indict­ment and oth­er records indi­cate the per­son is reli­gious schol­ar Taha Alawani, a wide­ly respect­ed reli­gious leader I the U.S. Mus­lim com­mu­ni­ty. Mr. Alawani was recent­ly fea­tured in a page-one arti­cle in The Wall Street Jour­nal for his role in train­ing Mus­lim chap­lains serv­ing in the U.S. mil­i­tary and U.S. pris­ons, some of whom have been accused of spread­ing anti-West­ern Islam­ic the­ol­o­gy. Mr. Alawani’s home and offices were raid­ed last year by fed­er­al antiter­ror­ism agents, but in a sub­se­quent inter­view he strong­ly denied any involve­ment in import­ing ter­ror­ism . . .” (Idem.)

16. ” . . . The new Jus­tice Depart­ment fil­ing pro­pos­es a par­tial unseal­ing of the search-war­rant affi­davit at the behest of the news media. It states that the Ari­an probe in Flori­da ‘was one of the inves­ti­ga­tions out­side the East­ern Dis­trict of Vir­ginia described in the search war­rant affi­davit which we sought to safe­guard by seal­ing the affi­davit,’ U.S. attor­ney Paul McNul­ty told the court. Now that Mr. Ari­an has been indict­ed, the secre­cy is no longer nec­es­sary, Mr. McNul­ty said . . .” (Idem.)

17. It is pro­found­ly inter­est­ing to note the sud­den change that the defen­dants took in this case. Their coun­sel has now asked that the orig­i­nal fil­ing be sealed. Mr. Emory asks the ques­tion: “Is this because of the arrest of al-Haw­sawi in Pak­istan? Did those raids uncov­er some­thing impor­tant that would incrim­i­nate the defen­dants? “The fil­ing also dis­clos­es a major twist in the legal bat­tle over the search war­rant. The sub­jects of the North­ern Vir­ginia probe, a group of Mus­lim busi­ness­men and polit­i­cal activists who con­sti­tute much of the cream of the U.S. Mus­lim polit­i­cal estab­lish­ment, long have sought to unseal the affi­davit. But last week they sud­den­ly reversed them­selves, and Ms. Luque asked the Fourth Cir­cuit to keep the doc­u­ment sealed in its entire­ty.” (Idem.)

18. The NSC’s top counter-ter­ror­ist offi­cial has resigned after a few month on the job. “The top Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil offi­cial in the war on ter­ror resigned this week for what a NSC spokesman said were per­son­al rea­sons, but intel­li­gence sources say the move reflects con­cern that the loom­ing war with Iraq is hurt­ing the fight against ter­ror­ism. Rand Beers would not com­ment for this arti­cle, but he and sev­er­al sources close to him were emphat­ic that the res­ig­na­tion was not a protest against an inva­sion of Iraq. But the same sources, and oth­er cur­rent and for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cials described a broad con­sen­sus in the anti-ter­ror­ism and intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty that an inva­sion of Iraq would divert crit­i­cal resources from the war on ter­ror. Beers has served as the NSC’s senior direc­tor for counter-ter­ror­ism only since August. White House said Wednes­day that he offi­cial­ly remains on the job and has yet to set a depar­ture date.” (“Top White house Anti-Ter­ror Boss Resigns” by p. Mitchell Prothero; 3/19/2003; (UPI); p. 1.)

19. A crit­i­cal­ly impor­tant arti­cle detail­ing Mohammed Atta’s Ger­man asso­ciates is fea­tured on the web­site main­tained by Daniel Hop­sick­er. Be sure to check out this and oth­er alle­ga­tions researched by Mr. Hop­sick­er. “A year-long Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews inves­ti­ga­tion has uncov­ered evi­dence that at least sev­en of Mohamed Atta’s clos­est asso­ciates in Flori­da dur­ing the year lead­ing up to the 9/11 attack were not Arab, but Ger­man. The names of the sev­en, all pilots, have not sur­faced in any press accounts of Atta’s stay in the U.S., nor has their exis­tence been men­tioned or allud­ed to in offi­cial state­ments. Trav­el­ing with Atta, or meet­ing him around the state, Atta’s Ger­man friends appeared to share a rela­tion­ship with him of long-stand­ing, accord­ing to eye­wit­ness­es, dat­ing back to his days in Ham­burg. The meet­ings, in places like key West and Mia­mi, were appar­ent­ly very seri­ous busi­ness; when they returned, said some­one who was there, Atta and his Ger­man asso­ciates ‘always came back glum.’ Only one of the sev­en is still in the U.S.; five live in Ger­many or Switzer­land. The sev­enth, with whom Atta report­ed­ly trav­eled exten­sive­ly, has a crim­i­nal record in Ger­many, and today lives in Sau­di Ara­bia. The iden­ti­ties of the sev­en Ger­man nation­als were pieced togeth­er from infor­ma­tion gleaned in inter­views with Atta’s one-time Amer­i­can girl­friend, cor­rob­o­rat­ed by inde­pen­dent avi­a­tion sources in Venice and Naples, FL. . .” (“9/11: The Ger­man Con­nec­tion” by Daniel Hop­sick­er; MadCowProd.com)

20. The arti­cle stress­es the struc­tur­al sim­i­lar­i­ty of Atta’s Ger­man asso­ciates with the back­ground of Andreas Strass­meir, alleged mas­ter­mind of the Okla­homa City bomb­ing and asso­ciate of Tim­o­thy McVeigh. ” . . . Strass­meir’s father was once a top aide to Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Kohl; Atta’s Ger­man friends are all chil­dren of the Ger­man elite. But before delv­ing fur­ther into Atta’s Ger­man con­nec­tions, there were two oth­er relat­ed devel­op­ments in Flori­da last week. In the first, the for­mer own­er of the ter­ror flight school in Venice, FL., Rudi Dekkers, was arrest­ed last week on a sin­gle count of felony fraud, and booked into the Col­lier Coun­ty jail in Naples, FL.” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

21. Both of the men run­ning the fly­ing schools in Flori­da that trained the hijack­ers were Dutch nation­als. Might this have some con­nec­tion to the Thyssen-Borne­misza link to the Nether­lands described in FTR#370? “As the Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews has been report­ing, sus­pi­cious and often ille­gal activ­i­ties were com­mon­place occur­rences at Dekkers-owned flight schools at the same time the schools were train­ing a ver­i­ta­ble ‘Who’s Who’ of Ham­burg cadre ter­ror­ists. Now the arrest of the con­tro­ver­sial Dutch nation­al comes amid indi­ca­tions from author­i­ties that Fed­er­al agen­cies involved in the 9/11 inves­ti­ga­tion are tak­ing a clos­er look at Dekker’s busi­ness activ­i­ties in Flori­da dur­ing the past decade, fuel­ing spec­u­la­tion he might become the first non-Arab charged in a wider 9/11 con­spir­a­cy than has so-far been revealed. . . .Pos­ing for a new mug shot is the lat­est in a series of rever­sals suf­fered recent­ly by the Venice ‘Mag­ic Dutch Boy,’ so-called because he is one of two Dutch nation­als who owned flight schools at the Venice Air­port which each—by appar­ent freak coincidence—ended up train­ing ter­ror­ists to fly. . .” (Idem.)

22. Is some­one work­ing to silence Dekkers and Kruithof? ” . . . Then, too Dekker’s heli­copter crashed recent­ly, while he was en route to a show­down meet­ing with part­ner Wal­ly Hilliard over con­trol of Huff­man Avi­a­tion. In anoth­er freak coin­ci­dence, own­er of the sec­ond Dutch-owned flight school at the Venice Air­port, Arne Kruithof, also suf­fered a near-fatal avi­a­tion mishap last sum­mer when his plane fell from a hun­dred feet in the air onto the run­way of the Venice Air­port. It appears as if both would be well-advised to stay away from open win­dows.” (Ibid.; pp. 2–3.)

23. “The Ger­man ele­ment arrived in Flori­da with ‘Wolf­gang’ in 1996. Pri­or to arriv­ing in Naples he was asso­ci­at­ed with an orga­ni­za­tion called ‘The Fly­ing Club of Munich.’ ‘Wolf­gang showed up from Munich in the mid-1990’s and imme­di­ate­ly began oper­at­ing a flight school ille­gal­ly in ’96,’ stat­ed an avi­a­tion source in Naples. ‘He’s half Swiss, half Ger­man.’ Wolf­gang was instru­men­tal in bring­ing anoth­er of Atta’s Ger­man asso­ciates to Flori­da, a pilot named ‘Stephan,’ who we were to learn has done jail time in Ger­many, was on parole there when he came to the U.S., and recent­ly spent a year in Gun­dog­du, Turkey.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

24. “While reg­u­lar Ger­man flight stu­dents strug­gle to obtain the nec­es­sary visas, Wolf­gang and Stephan appar­ent­ly had inside con­nec­tions which smoothed their progress. ‘Some­times it makes me mad that a crim­i­nal gets pref­er­ence,’ stat­ed one Ger­man nation­al flight instruc­tor in Naples with obvi­ous bit­ter­ness. ‘Wolf­gang signed off on Stephan’s books, and Stephan also got in on a fraud­u­lent busi­ness investor’s visa.’ ‘Wolf­gang was in his thir­ties,’ says Aman­da Keller, who lived with Atta dur­ing March and April of 2001. ‘He and Wolf­gang were very tight, they went every­where togeth­er. When he came into the pic­ture they were togeth­er all the time. . .’ ” (Idem.)

25. “Strange­ly, Keller also states that Atta always spoke Ger­man with Wolf­gang, a state­ment con­tra­dict­ed by the tes­ti­mo­ny of Rudi Dekkers, who told a Con­gres­sion­al Com­mit­tee that when he addressed him in Ger­man, Atta had mere­ly looked at him strange­ly . . . Newsweek says its sources say the unnamed coun­try is Sau­di Ara­bia. That may prove to be at least part­ly cor­rect; still, there are few, if any, Saud­is named ‘Wolf­gang.’ Newsweek should keep dig­ging.” (Ibid.; pp. 3–4.)

26. The broad­cast clos­es with dis­turb­ing indi­ca­tions of Sad­dam Hus­sein’s pos­si­ble recruit­ment of Al Qae­da as a “back­up unit” in the event of an Amer­i­can inva­sion. Is this part of the Under­ground Reich’s con­spir­a­cy against the Unit­ed States? Are we walk­ing into a trap? “It appears, how­ev­er, that this ver­sion is only the pub­licly admis­si­ble one, the one that can pass polit­i­cal muster. Accord­ing to the same sources, there was anoth­er sce­nario more in keep­ing with the cal­cu­lat­ing men­tal­i­ty of Sad­dam Hus­sein and his secret ser­vices. In 1998, after declin­ing all offers that had to them through offi­cial diplo­mat­ic chan­nels, those ser­vices are report­ed to have estab­lished a secret oper­a­tional ‘con­nec­tion’ with bin Laden in Mani­la and in Kash­mir. It was indeed dif­fi­cult for Iraq to ignore an Arab like Osama bin Laden who ‘so effec­tive­ly humil­i­at­ed the Amer­i­cans.’ Colonel Khairal­lah al Takir­i­ti, broth­er of the head of Mukkhabarat, the intel­li­gence ser­vices, is report­ed to have been named case offi­cer for the con­nec­tion. The arrest of two Mor­roc­can asso­ciates of bin Laden in Rabat on Novem­ber 11, 1998, made it pos­si­ble to estab­lish to estab­lish the link with cer­tain­ty. Accord­ing to West­ern sources, the Iraqi ser­vices have sought to secure the assis­tance of bin Laden’s net­works, in case Iraq were again to be attacked by the Unit­ed States, in order to car­ry out attacks against Amer­i­can tar­gets in Arab coun­tries.” (In the Name of Osama Bin Laden; by Roland Jacquard; Copy­right 2002 [SC]; Duke Uni­ver­si­ty Press; ISBN 0–8223-2991–3; pp. 112–113.)

27. “Accord­ing to Arab sources, in antic­i­pa­tion of a fore­see­able rever­sal of alliances in Kab­ul, bin Laden had been in dis­creet con­tact since Sep­tem­ber 2000 with asso­ciates of Oudai Hus­sein, anoth­er of Sad­dam’s sons; the ground for agree­ment was the anti-Israeli and anti-Amer­i­can bat­tle. Bin Laden and the Iraqis are said to have exchanged infor­ma­tion about chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal weapons, despite the oppo­si­tion of some of the Bagh­dad lead­er­ship, includ­ing Tarik Aziz.” (Ibid.; p. 113.)