Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #450 9/11, Proxy War, and the Underground Reich: An Update

Record­ed March 14, 2004
MP3 Side 1 | Side 2

This pro­gram sup­ple­ments ear­li­er broad­casts about the Under­ground Reich’s use of the Mus­lim peo­ples of the “Earth Island” as proxy war­riors against the Unit­ed States. (For more about this con­cept, see—among oth­er programs—FTRs 395–400.) In par­tic­u­lar, the pro­gram high­lights the appar­ent role of Under­ground Reich–related ele­ments in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy around the world. The con­tin­u­ing pro­lif­er­a­tion of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy is par­tic­u­lar­ly dis­turb­ing when one con­sid­ers that the war on ter­ror­ist financ­ing appears to be failing—in part from the Bush admin­is­tra­tion’s delib­er­ate pol­i­cy of going soft on the Saud­is and part­ly because of a fail­ure of inter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion on the mat­ter. Soon­er or lat­er, the con­tin­u­ing flow of ter­ror­ist monies and the con­tin­u­ing avail­abil­i­ty of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy will com­bine to pro­duce a cat­a­stro­phe. In addi­tion, the pro­gram high­lights evi­den­tiary trib­u­taries run­ning between 9/11 and neo-Nazi ele­ments around the world.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Dis­cus­sion of the role of the Degus­sa firm in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy around the world; review of for­mer SS sci­en­tif­ic offi­cer Alfred Boettcher’s role with the Degus­sa firm and his posi­tion as attache for the export of nuclear mate­r­i­al with the West Ger­man gov­ern­ment; the role of Dubai in the traf­fick­ing of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy; the fail­ure of the first Bush admin­is­tra­tion to take action to stem Pak­istani nuclear tech­nol­o­gy and its glob­al spread; the alleged role of Tariq Ramadan (son of Mus­lim Broth­er­hood king­pin Said Ramadan) in ter­ror­ist-relat­ed activ­i­ties; the fail­ure to inter­dict the oper­a­tions of Youssef Nada and the asso­ci­at­ed insti­tu­tions of Bank Al Taqwa; the sec­ond Bush admin­is­tra­tion’s block­ing of an inves­ti­ga­tion into Pak­istani nuclear smug­gling; the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a nuclear 9/11; Okla­homa City Bomb­ing sus­pect Andreas Strass­meir’s attempts to buy a Boe­ing 747 from Lufthansa; a pas­sage from The Turn­er Diaries that appears to fore­shad­ow the attacks on the World Trade Cen­ter on 9/11.

1. The admin­is­tra­tion of the first Pres­i­dent Bush turned a blind eye to Pak­istan’s nuclear devel­op­ment, in order to help shield the Pak­istani role in the Afghan muja­hadeen war against the Sovi­ets. “Pak­istan warned the Unit­ed States 14 years ago that it might give nuclear tech­nol­o­gy to Iran, but the admin­is­tra­tion of Pres­i­dent Bush’s father did lit­tle to fol­low up, for­mer Pen­ta­gon offi­cials say. Word of the 1990 threat from Pak­istan’s top gen­er­al appar­ent­ly was not passed along to the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion when it took office three years lat­er, accord­ing to inter­views by the Asso­ci­at­ed Press. . . .” (“Pak­istan Threat­ened to Give Iran Nuclear Know-How in ‘90” by Matt Kel­ley [AP]; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 2/28/2004; p. A3.)

2. ” . . . But for­mer gov­ern­ment arms con­trol offi­cials and declas­si­fied doc­u­ments show the Unit­ed States knew about Pak­istan’s nuclear pro­cure­ment net­work since 1983 and sus­pect­ed the trans­fers to Iran since the mid-1980’s. The Unit­ed States had hints of the trans­fers to North Korea in the mid-1990’s, offi­cials say. The clear­est evi­dence of the Iran link came in Jan­u­ary 1990, when Pak­istan’s army chief of staff con­veyed his threat to arm Iran to a top Pen­ta­gon offi­cial. Hen­ry Rowen, at the time an assis­tant defense sec­re­tary, said Pak­istani Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg had issued the warn­ing in a face-to-face meet­ing in Pak­istan. . . .” (Idem.)

3. ” . . . Sokol­s­ki and Rowen said for­mer Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush’s admin­is­tra­tion had done lit­tle to fol­low up on Beg’s warn­ing. ‘In hind­sight, maybe before or after that they did make some trans­fers,’ Rowen said. . . .” (Idem.)

4. “While Islam­abad and Wash­ing­ton squab­bled about the evi­dence, the Khan net­work pro­vid­ed sophis­ti­cat­ed tech­nol­o­gy to Libya, North Korea and Iran, three coun­tries the Unit­ed States con­sid­ered among the most dan­ger­ous. A decade ear­li­er, the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion had looked the oth­er way on Pak­istan’s nuclear pro­gram, said Stephen Cohen, a State Depart­ment expert on the region from 1985 to 1987. Back then, Wash­ing­ton used Pak­istan as a con­duit for send­ing weapons and mon­ey to gueril­las fight­ing the Sovi­et inva­sion of Afghanistan. ‘They were cov­er­ing up our involve­ment in Afghanistan, pre­tend­ing we played no role in Afghanistan, so they expect­ed us to cov­er up their role in procur­ing a weapons sys­tem they saw as vital to their sur­vival,’ said Cohen, now with the Brook­ings Insti­tu­tion.” (Idem.)

5. Next, the pro­gram turns to recent dis­clo­sures of a nuclear smug­gling ring, involv­ing Pak­istan’s “father of the bomb” Dr. A.Q. Khan and the ele­ments who helped him smug­gle the nuclear tech­nol­o­gy to oth­er coun­tries. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion blocked inves­ti­ga­tion of this oper­a­tion, once again to pro­tect the Saud­is, who were help­ing to finance the cre­ation of the so-called “Islam­ic Bomb.” “On November7, 2001, BBC TV and The Guardian of Lon­don report­ed that the Bush admin­is­tra­tion thwart­ed inves­ti­ga­tions of Dr. A.Q. Khan, who this week con­fessed sell­ing atom­ic secrets to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. The Bush Admin­is­tra­tion has expressed shock at the dis­clo­sures that Pak­istan, our ally in the war on ter­ror, has been run­ning a nuclear secrets bazaar. In fact, accord­ing to the British news team’s sources, Bush did not know of these facts because, short­ly after his inau­gu­ra­tion, his Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency (NSA) effec­tive­ly stymied the probe of Khan Research Lab­o­ra­to­ries. CIA and oth­er agents could not inves­ti­gate the spread of ‘Islam­ic Bombs’ through Pak­istan because fund­ing appeared to orig­i­nate in Sau­di Ara­bia.” (“Khan Job: Bush Spiked Probe of Pak­istan’s Dr. Strangelove, BBC Report­ed in 2001” by Greg Palast; Gregpalast.com; 2/9/2004.)

6. “Accord­ing to both sources and doc­u­ments obtained by the BBC, the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion ‘Spike’ of the inves­ti­ga­tion of Dr. Khan’s Lab fol­lowed from a wider pol­i­cy of pro­tect­ing key Sau­di Ara­bi­ans includ­ing the bin Laden Fam­i­ly. Despite these tan­ta­liz­ing facts, Abdul­lah and his oper­a­tions were A‑OK with the FBI chiefs, if not their work­ing agents. Just a dumb SNAFU? Not accord­ing to a top-lev­el CIA oper­a­tive who spoke with us on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty. After Bush took office, he said, ‘there was a major pol­i­cy shift’ at the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency. Inves­ti­ga­tors were ordered to ‘back off’ from any inquiries into Sau­di Ara­bi­an financ­ing of ter­ror net­works, espe­cial­ly if they touched on Sau­di roy­als and their retain­ers. That put the bin Ladens, a fam­i­ly worth a report­ed $12 bil­lion and a vir­tu­al arm of the Sau­di roy­al house­hold, off lim­its for inves­ti­ga­tion. Osama was the excep­tion; he remained a want­ed man, but agents could not look too close­ly at how he filled his pig­gy bank. The key rule of any inves­ti­ga­tion, ‘fol­low the mon­ey,’ was now vio­lat­ed, and investigations—at least before Sep­tem­ber 11-began to die.” (Idem.)

7. “And there was a lot to investigate—or, in the case of the CIA and FBI under Bush—a lot to ignore. Through well-known inter­na­tion­al arms deal­ers (I’m sor­ry, but in this busi­ness, sin­ners are bet­ter sources than saints) our team was tipped off to a meet­ing of Sau­di bil­lion­aires at the Hotel Royale Mon­ceau in Paris in May 1996 with the finan­cial rep­re­sen­ta­tive of Osama bin Laden’s net­work. The Saud­is, includ­ing a key Sau­di prince joined by Mus­lim and non-Mus­lim gun traf­fick­ers, met to deter­mine who would pay how much to Osama. This was not so much an act of sup­port but of protection—a pay-off to keep the mad bomber away from Sau­di Ara­bia.” (Idem.)

8. “The cru­cial ques­tion here is that, if I could learn about this meet­ing, how did the CIA miss it? In fact, since the first edi­tion of this book [The Best Democ­ra­cy Mon­ey Can Buy], oth­er sources have dis­closed that the meet­ing was mon­i­tored by French intel­li­gence. Since U.S. intel­li­gence was thus like­ly informed, the ques­tion becomes why did­n’t the gov­ern­ment imme­di­ate­ly move against the Saud­is?” (Idem.)

9. “I probed our CIA con­tact for specifics of inves­ti­ga­tions that were ham­pered by orders to back off of the Saud­is. He told us that the Khan Lab­o­ra­to­ries inves­ti­ga­tion had been effec­tive­ly on hold.” (Idem.)

10. Next, the pro­gram turns to the role of Euro­pean ele­ments in the Dr. A.Q. Khan net­work. “The Pak­istani sci­en­tist Abdul Qadeer Khan has been demo­nized in the West for sell­ing atom­ic secrets and equip­ment around the world, but the trade began in Europe, not Islam­abad, accord­ing to court doc­u­ments and experts who mon­i­tor pro­lif­er­a­tion. The records show that indus­try sci­en­tists and West­ern intel­li­gence agen­cies have known for decades that nuclear tech­nol­o­gy ws pour­ing out of Europe despite nation­al export con­trol efforts to con­tain it. Many of the names that have turned up among lists of sup­pli­ers and mid­dle­men who fed equip­ment, mate­ri­als and knowl­edge to nuclear pro­grams in Pak­istan and oth­er aspir­ing nuclear nations are well-known play­ers in Europe’s ura­ni­um enrich­ment indus­try, a crit­i­cal part of many nuclear weapons pro­grams. Some have been con­vict­ed of ille­gal exports before. . . . ”

11. ” . . . The prob­lem began with the 1970 Treaty of Alme­lo, under which Britain, Ger­many and the Nether­lands agreed to devel­op cen­trifuges to enrich ura­ni­um joint­ly, ensur­ing their nuclear pow­er indus­try a fuel source inde­pen­dent of the Unit­ed States. Ure­n­co, or the Ura­ni­um Enrich­ment Com­pa­ny, was estab­lished the next year with its pri­ma­ry enrich­ment plant at Alme­lo, the Nether­lands.” (Ibid.; pp. 1–2.)

12. “Secu­ri­ty at Ure­n­co was by most accounts slip­shod. The con­sor­tium relied on a net­work of research cen­ters and sub­con­trac­tors to build its cen­trifuges, and top-secret blue­prints were passed out to com­pa­nies bid­ding on ten­ders, giv­ing engi­neers across Europe an oppor­tu­ni­ty to appro­pri­ate designs. Dr. Khan, who worked for a Ure­n­co Dutch sub­con­trac­tor, Physics Dynam­ic Research Lab­o­ra­to­ry, was giv­en access to the most advanced designs, even though he came from Pak­istan, which has already known to har­bor nuclear ambi­tions. A 1980 report by the Dutch gov­ern­ment on his activ­i­ties said he vis­it­ed the Alme­lo fac­to­ry in May 1972 and by late 1974 had an office there. . . .” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

13. ” . . . That same year [1987], despite Amer­i­can warn­ings to Ger­many that such a sale was immi­nent, a Ger­man firm export­ed to Pak­istan a plant for the recov­ery of tri­tium, a volatile gas used to increase the pow­er of nuclear bombs. The com­pa­ny sim­ply called the plant some­thing else to obtain an export license. ‘The export con­trol office did­n’t even inspect the goods,’ said Rein­hard Hueb­n­er, the Ger­man pros­e­cu­tor who han­dled the sub­se­quent tri­al of the com­pa­ny’s chief, Rudolf Ort­may­ers, and Peter Finke, a Ger­man physi­cist who went to Pak­istan to train engi­neers there to oper­ate the equip­ment. Both men were sen­tenced to jail for vio­lat­ing export con­trol laws.” (Idem.)

14. The pro­gram notes that designs of nuclear facil­i­ties held by the Iraqis have not been ful­ly account­ed for in the wake of the war. “David Albright, a for­mer weapons inspec­tor for the Inter­na­tion­al Atom­ic Ener­gy Agency, said he helped retrieve a full set of blue­prints from Iraq after the major com­bat oper­a­tions end­ed last year. Unit­ed State inspec­tors have not found evi­dence that Mr. Hus­sein had restart­ed his nuclear pro­gram, but Mr. Albright said there were still draw­ings unac­count­ed for. ‘It’s an unnerv­ing issue,’ said Mr. Albright, who is pres­i­dent of the Insti­tute for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tion­al Secu­ri­ty. ‘A lot of nuclear weapons design stuff could be miss­ing in Iraq.’ ” (Ibid.; pp. 2–3.)

15. “As recent­ly as last year, Ger­man cus­toms agents seized high-ten­sile-strength alu­minum tubes made by a Ger­man com­pa­ny and bound for North Korea. The tubes matched the spec­i­fi­ca­tions for the hous­ings of Ure­n­co’s ura­ni­um-enrich­ing cen­trifuges.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

16. This descrip­tion fea­tures a recap of infor­ma­tion about Karl –Heinz Schaab from FTR#395. The Schaab/Urenco/Khan con­nec­tion will be explored at greater length in a future pro­gram. “Steal­ing the Fire is an inves­tiga­tive film that pro­vides stag­ger­ing evi­dence show­ing how a Ger­man sci­en­tist, Karl Heinz Schaab, who helped devel­op the cen­trifuges nec­es­sary to extract weapons-grade Ura­ni­um 235, sold clas­si­fied doc­u­ments in the ear­ly 1990’s to Iraq.” (“Steal­ing the Fire;” Eye Spy; Issue 13; p. 18.)

17. It is inter­est­ing to note that the co-pro­duc­er of the film dis­cov­ered the “clan­des­tine nuclear trail” while work­ing on a PBS show about the BCCI. The BCCI scan­dal is inex­tri­ca­bly linked with the sub­ject of Sau­di Ara­bia and the events of 9/11. (For a sum­ma­ry account of the sig­nif­i­cance of the BCCI scan­dal in the con­text of 9/11, see FTR#391 and the pro­grams ref­er­enced in that pro­gram.) ” . . . The inves­ti­ga­tion start­ed many, many years ago. In 1992, Eric Nadler an inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ist, began research­ing mate­r­i­al on the under­ground traf­fick­ing of nuclear weapons. Ten years lat­er, he and co-pro­duc­er, John S. Fried­man, the founder of the Doc­u­men­tary Cen­ter at Colom­bia Uni­ver­si­ty have released their find­ings. Nadler told Paper­clips mag­a­zine. ‘I was work­ing for Front­line on PBS, and I was doing a sto­ry about the BCCI scan­dal, which was a crooked bank based in Pak­istan. I was doing a sto­ry called ‘The Arm­ing of Sau­di Ara­bia’ about the hid­den his­to­ry of Unit­ed States/Saudi rela­tions. I got very dis­turbed about the hid­den his­to­ry, espe­cial­ly about nuclear sto­ries that weren’t being cov­ered . . .” (Ibid.; pp. 18–19.)

18. Accord­ing to Mr. Nadler, Sau­di Ara­bia was heav­i­ly involved in financ­ing Sad­dam Hus­sein’s quest for the bomb. Like the Saud­is and the Bush fam­i­ly, Sad­dam Hus­sein’s own his­to­ry is inex­tri­ca­bly linked with that of the Third Reich. The For The Record series presents the view that Al Qae­da, the Wah­habi mil­i­tants, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the Iraqis and the PLO con­sti­tute “proxy war­riors” for the Under­ground Reich, against the USA, Britain and Israel. (For dis­cus­sion of the Sau­di links to the Third Reich, see the dis­cus­sion and ref­er­ences in FTR#391.) “. . . And I pro­duced for Front­line some­thing that aired in 1992, in which our team got clas­si­fied CIA and DIA doc­u­ments, which said the fol­low­ing: ‘We know that Sau­di Ara­bia has giv­en $5 bil­lion to Sad­dam Hus­sein’s nuclear pro­gram for the express pur­pose of build­ing a nuclear bomb.’ My inves­tiga­tive team at Front­line got the banks, we got the dates, we got the mon­ey trans­fers, and we put this on Amer­i­can tele­vi­sion. [We showed] that Amer­i­ca’s biggest ally in the Gulf had giv­en $5 bil­lion to the Hitler of the Gulf to build nuclear weapons. And though USA Today put it on their tele­vi­sion page, it caused bare­ly a rip­ple in the pop­u­lar cul­ture. I was inter­est­ed in secret nuclear sto­ries from that moment on . . .” (Ibid.; p. 19.)

19. In Steal­ing the Fire, the cen­tral fig­ure in the Iraqi/German nuclear con­nec­tion was one Karl Heinz Schaab. ” . . . He was fas­ci­nat­ed by Iraq’s deter­mined efforts to cre­ate nuclear weapons. By exam­in­ing the inves­ti­ga­tion of the Unit­ed Nations weapons inspec­tors, he came across a ‘mys­te­ri­ous man’-Karl Heinz Schaab. Nadler and Fried­man thought that by research­ing Schaab, this would open oth­er doors and reveal the com­pa­nies behind the ‘covert nuclear trad­ing deals . . .’ ” (Idem.)

20. Schaab was a pro­tégé of Dr. Ger­not Zippe, one of the prin­ci­pal fig­ures involved with devel­op­ing the Third Reich’s nuclear pro­gram. “Schaab was a stu­dent of Dr. Ger­not Zippe, an Aus­tri­an physi­cist often referred to as the ‘father of the cen­trifuge.’ And Steal­ing the Fire is as much about the cen­trifuge as the di

rty deals done to get the tech­nol­o­gy to Iraq. Nadler says the equip­ment orig­i­nat­ed in the research lab­o­ra­to­ries of wartime Ger­many. Hence the infor­ma­tion sup­plied by Schaab in 1989 to the Iraqis basi­cal­ly orig­i­nat­ed from the failed Nazi atom­ic bomb pro­gram.” (Idem.)

21. After dis­cussing Zippe’s cap­ture by the Sovi­ets and his work for the U.S.S.R. on nuclear mat­ters, the pro­gram sets forth his return to Degus­sa, the firm which pro­duced the Zyk­lon B for the gas cham­bers in World War II. (For more on Degus­sa, see—among oth­er programs—FTRs 87, 292, 294, 388.) “The nuclear sci­en­tist worked at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Vir­ginia for a while, and de-briefed the Pen­ta­gon on the Russ­ian cen­trifuge. How­ev­er, he got home­sick and soon returned to Ger­many and found work at Degus­sa.” (Idem.)

22. Zippe was not the only Third Reich alum­nus asso­ci­at­ed with Degus­sa’s nuclear export oper­a­tions. Boettch­er was “nuclear export attache for the West Ger­man Gov­ern­ment.” [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.] “Dr. Alfred Boettch­er was an SS sci­en­tif­ic offi­cer who head­ed the pre­cious met­als divi­sion at Degus­sa in the post­war years. He lat­er became nuclear export attache for the West Ger­man Gov­ern­ment. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.]” (Ibid.; p. 21.)

23. Degus­sa sub­sidiary NUKEM was the divi­sion involved with the traf­fick­ing of nuclear mate­r­i­al to Iraq, as well as oth­er coun­tries attempt­ing to man­u­fac­ture nuclear weapons. Boettch­er and Zippe were joined by yet anoth­er Third Reich alum­nus in Ger­many’s work on behalf of Iraq’s nuclear efforts—Degussa chair­man Her­mann Schloss­er. (For more on NUKEM, see Mis­cel­la­neous Archive Show M‑8.) “Two trans­ac­tions that spring height­ened fears that Iraq intend­ed to use the Osir­ak reac­tor to pro­duce bomb-grade plu­to­ni­um. An Ital­ian com­pa­ny, in a semi-clan­des­tine deal, sold Iraq six tons of deplet­ed ura­ni­um pur­chased from the West Ger­man nuclear con­sor­tium NUKEM. Fear­ing that NUKEM might not deliv­er the ura­ni­um if they knew it was intend­ed for Iraq, the Ital­ians claimed it was for domes­tic use in Italy. But they need­n’t have wor­ried about NUKEM’s scru­ples. The con­sor­tium was a whol­ly owned sub­sidiary of the Ger­man chem­i­cals giant Degus­sa, which had invent­ed and man­u­fac­tured Zyk­lon B, the pow­er­ful cyanide gas that streamed out of the show­er­heads in Hitler’s death camps, killing mil­lions of Euro­pean Jews. Degus­sa had also played a key role in the Nazi effort to build an atom bomb, stopped only when its Oranien­burg works near Berlin were flat­tened by U.S. bombers in 1945. That same year, the Third Reich was going up in flames, Degus­sa’s chair­man, Her­mann Schloss­er, donat­ed 45,000 reichs­marks to Hitler’s SS. Thir­ty-five years lat­er Schloss­er was still on the Degus­sa board, and in 1987 he was award­ed the Ger­man Fed­er­al Mer­it Cross for his ser­vices to indus­try. One of Schlosser’s ser­vices was ship­ping nuclear equip­ment and mate­ri­als to almost every devel­op­ing nation that was known to have a clan­des­tine bomb pro­gram. Anoth­er was open­ing the vast Iraqi mar­ket to Ger­man firms. His readi­ness to sup­ply nuclear mate­ri­als to both India and Pak­istan had impressed on Sad­dam Hus­sein that this was a man he could do busi­ness with.” (The Death Lob­by: How the West Armed Iraq; Ken­neth Tim­mer­man; Copy­right 1991 [HC]; Houghton Mif­flin Com­pa­ny; p. 70.) (For more on the arm­ing of Iraq, see RFA-20, FTR s 16, 24, 31, 52, 87, 287, 295.)

24. “Nadler called Degus­sa ‘the worst com­pa­ny ever.’ The inves­ti­ga­tor believes the direc­tors of the com­pa­ny were ‘not pros­e­cut­ed because of their inter­na­tion­al con­nec­tions to sev­er­al major US cor­po­ra­tions.’ ” (Eye Spy; Issue #13; p. 20.)

25. It is sig­nif­i­cant that, accord­ing to Nadler, the Iraqis received soft­ware, not hard­ware. This com­pli­cates the issue con­sid­er­ably. As will be not­ed in future pro­grams, just what hap­pened to this soft­ware is a source for con­cern. In the con­text of the Under­ground Reich (heav­i­ly involved with Latin Amer­i­ca as well as the Mid­dle East), it is worth not­ing that Schaab was also involved with deals with mem­bers of the Brazil­ian armed forces. “Schaab’s name was actu­al­ly found on doc­u­ments recov­ered by UN weapons inspec­tors in Iraq. He had been sell­ing the cen­trifuge secrets to Bagh­dad. Eye Spy asked Nadler just what exact­ly the Iraqis received for their mon­ey, ‘soft­ware not hard­ware,’ he said. He then con­firmed that with this data Iraq could eas­i­ly build a factory—a pro­duc­tion line-for nuclear bombs. The inves­ti­ga­tors tracked Schaab to Brazil, where he tem­porar­i­ly fled to avoid pros­e­cu­tion. Here also was the loca­tion of fur­ther obscure deals with high rank­ing offi­cials of the Brazil­ian armed forces.” (Ibid.; p. 20.)

26. Nadler notes the role of Ger­many as the great­est exporter of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy in the post­war peri­od. Bear in mind that for part of this time, the West Ger­man attache for nuclear export was Alfred Boettch­er, a “for­mer” SS sci­en­tif­ic offi­cer. (The Ger­man role in the devel­op­ment of the Pak­istani bomb is dis­cussed in FTR#336. There is doc­u­ment­ed sym­pa­thy among some of the cre­ators of the Pak­istani bomb for the Tal­iban regime.) ” . . . .The inves­ti­ga­tor’s research tends to sup­port the British intel­li­gence brief on Iraq’s WMD, and high­lights a con­tro­ver­sial deal between a NATO coun­try and Iraq. Nadler said that between 1945 and 1990, Ger­many was the ‘great­est pro­lif­er­a­tor of nuclear weapons tech­nol­o­gy in the world . . .’ ” (Idem.)

27. Schaab appears to have been oper­at­ing with the bless­ings of the Ger­man gov­ern­ment. (For more on the Ger­man government—and Under­ground Reich–connection to the Iraqi nuclear pro­gram, as well as the Brazil­ian and Latin Amer­i­can con­nec­tions to the Schaab oper­a­tion, see FTR#155.) ” . . . On the Ger­man Gov­ern­men­t’s light sen­tence for Schaab, and the sug­ges­tion oth­er peo­ple might be involved, Nadler was diplo­mat­ic: ‘Schaab had a sto­ry and he stuck to it. He said that two oth­er men who are now dead were involved. But it’s quite clear that all this activ­i­ty had to be mon­i­tored and known by the Ger­mans. We can safe­ly say that the case was woe­ful­ly under-inves­ti­gat­ed, and, as one per­son says in our film, the Ger­man gov­ern­ment just want­ed it to go away. . .’ ” (Idem.)

28. ” . . . Schaab took the secret plans of the cen­trifuge and sold hun­dreds of blue­prints to the Iraqis. And on a recent tele­vi­sion news pro­gram on Fox, Nadler said it is pos­si­ble that Iraq may have sold the plans to al-Qae­da. ‘The fact remains that the clas­si­fied plans for ura­ni­um enrich­ment tech­nol­o­gy were stolen and sold to the Iraqis; what they do with it is a mys­tery. . . .”’ (Idem.)

29. Next, the pro­gram focus­es on the piv­otal role of the nation of Dubai in nuclear export­ing from Ger­many to Third World coun­tries. Note the role of for­mer Nazi Alfred Hempel in the dis­cus­sion that fol­lows. Was he one of the peo­ple work­ing with Karl-Heinz Schaab? “. . . Why ship through Dubai? Because it may be the eas­i­est place in the world to mask the real des­ti­na­tion of car­go. Con­sid­er how the Malaysian gov­ern­ment is mak­ing the case for the inno­cence of its man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pa­ny. ‘No doc­u­ment was traced that proved’ the com­pa­ny ‘deliv­ered or export­ed the said com­po­nents to Libya,’ accord­ing to the coun­try’s inspec­tor gen­er­al of police. The real des­ti­na­tion, he said, ‘was out­side the knowl­edge’ of the pro­duc­er. One can be cer­tain that if the Khan ring’s Euro­pean sup­pli­ers are ever tracked down, they will offer a sim­i­lar expla­na­tion.” (“Nukes ‘R’ Us” by Gary Mil­hollin and Kel­ly Motz; The New York Times; 3/4/2004; p. 2.)

30. “Dubai pro­vides com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ments a vital asset: auto­mat­ic deni­a­bil­i­ty. Its cus­toms agency even brags that its pol­i­cy on re-export­ing ‘enables traders to tran­sit their ship­ments through Dubai with­out any has­sles.’ Next to Dubai’s main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for free­wheel­ing inter­na­tion­al com­pa­nies. Our orga­ni­za­tion has d

ocu­ment­ed 264 firms from Iran and 44 from rogue regimes like Syr­ia and North Korea.” (Idem.)

31. “With the lax­i­ty of the emi­rates’ laws, there is sim­ply no way to know how many weapon com­po­nents have passed through. But con­sid­er some inci­dents that our orga­ni­za­tion has tallied—based on ship­ping records, gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tions, court doc­u­ments, intel­li­gence reports and oth­er sources—over the last 20 years.” (Idem.)

32. Among the “for­mer” Nazis appear­ing on the Iraqi nuclear stage is Alfred Hempel. “In 1982, a Ger­man exporter and for­mer Nazi, Alfred Hempel, sent 70 tons of heavy water, a com­po­nent for nuclear reac­tors, from Sinochem in Chi­na to Dubai. The ship­ping labels were then changed to mask the trans­ac­tion and 60 tons of the heavy water were for­ward­ed to India, where it enabled the gov­ern­ment to use its ener­gy-pro­duc­ing reac­tors to cre­ate plu­to­ni­um for its atom­ic weapons pro­gram. The oth­er 10 tons went to Argenti­na, which was inter­est­ed in atom­ic weapons at the time.” (Idem.)

33. “In 1983, Mr. Hempel sent 15 tons of heavy water from Nor­way’s Norsk Hydro, and 6.7 tons from Tech­snab­ex­port in the Sovi­et Union, through the emi­rates to India. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Hempel sent 12 more tons of Sovi­et heavy water to India that were used to start the Dhru­va reac­tor, devot­ed to mak­ing plu­to­ni­um for atom­ic bombs. (The details of these trans­ac­tions come from Ger­man and Nor­we­gian gov­ern­ment audits, but Mr. Hempel, who died in 1989, was nev­er con­vict­ed of a crime. . . .” (Idem.)

34. Con­tem­plat­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ties of nuclear ter­ror­ism in the Unit­ed States, the pro­gram exam­ines a pos­si­ble “nuclear 9/11”. “A 10-kilo­ton nuclear bomb (a pip­squeak in weapons terms) is smug­gled into Man­hat­tan and explodes at Grand Cen­tral. Some 500,000 peo­ple are killed, and the U.S. suf­fers $1 tril­lion in direct eco­nom­ic dam­age. That sce­nario, cit­ed in a report last year from the John F. Kennedy School of Gov­ern­ment at Har­vard, could be a glimpse of our future. We urgent­ly need to con­trol nuclear mate­ri­als to fore­stall that threat, but in this war on pro­lif­er­a­tion, we’re now slip­ping back­ward. Pres­i­dent Bush (after ignor­ing the issue before 9/11) now force­ful­ly says the right things—but still does­n’t do enough. ‘We’re los­ing the war on pro­lif­er­a­tion,’ Andrew F. Kre­pinevich Jr., a mil­i­tary expert and exec­u­tive direc­tor of the Cen­ter for Strate­gic and Bud­getary Assess­ments, says blunt­ly. . . .” (“A Nuclear 9/11” by Nicholas D. Kristof; The New York Times; 3/10/2004; p. 1; accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/10/opinion/10KRIS.html?ex=1079970740&ei=1&en=4c05b779b8f61534 .)

35. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion is not suc­ceed­ing at effec­tive­ly com­bat­ing nuclear pro­lif­er­a­tion. [See Above.] As a result, the risks of such an event are increas­ing. ” . . . But all in all, the risks of a nuclear 9/11 are increas­ing. ‘I would­n’t be at all sur­prised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years,’ said Bruce Blair, pres­i­dent of the Cen­ter for Defense Infor­ma­tion, ‘first and fore­most by a ter­ror­ist group that gets its hands on a Russ­ian nuclear weapon or a Pak­istani nuclear weapon.’ ” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

36. “One of our biggest set­backs is in North Korea. Thanks to the inep­ti­tude of hard-lin­ers in Mr. Bush’s admin­is­tra­tion, and their refusal to engage in mean­ing­ful nego­ti­a­tions, North Korea is going all-out to make war­heads. It may have just made six new nuclear weapons. Then there’s Iran, which has sought nuclear weapons since the days of the shah, and whose nuclear pro­gram seems to have pub­lic sup­port. ‘I’m not sure there is a way to get an Iran­ian gov­ern­ment to give it up,’ a senior Amer­i­can offi­cial said.” (Idem.)

37. “Final­ly, there’s the real rogue nation of pro­lif­er­a­tion, Pak­istan. We know that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Islamist father of Pak­istan’s bomb, ped­dled mate­ri­als to Libya and North Korea, and we don’t know who else. ‘It may be that A.Q. Khan & Asso­ciates already have passed bomb-grade nuclear fuel to the Qae­da, and we are in for the worst,’ warns Paul Lev­en­thal, found­ing pres­i­dent of the Nuclear Con­trol Insti­tute.” (Idem.)

38. “It’s mys­ti­fy­ing that the admin­is­tra­tion has­n’t leaned on Pak­istan to make Dr. Khan avail­able for inter­ro­ga­tion to ensure that his net­work is entire­ly closed. Sev­er­al experts on Pak­istan told me they believe that the admin­is­tra­tion has been so restrained because its top pri­or­i­ty isn’t com­bat­ing nuclear proliferation—it’s get­ting Pres­i­dent Per­vez Mushar­raf’s help in arrest­ing Osama bin Laden before the Novem­ber elec­tion.” (Idem.)

39. “Anoth­er puz­zle is why an admin­is­tra­tion that spends hun­dreds of bil­lions of dol­lars in Iraq does­n’t try hard­er to secure ura­ni­um and plu­to­ni­um in Rus­sia and else­where. The bipar­ti­san pro­gram to secure weapons of mass destruc­tion is starved for funds—but Mr. Bush is propos­ing a $41 mil­lion cut in ‘coop­er­a­tive threat reduc­tion’ with Rus­sia.” (Idem.)

40. ” ‘We’re at this cru­cial point,’ warns Joseph Cir­in­cione of the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace. ‘And how we han­dle these sit­u­a­tions in the next cou­ple of years will tell us whether the nuclear threat shrinks or explodes. Per­haps lit­er­al­ly. . . .” (Idem.)

41. Turn­ing to the sub­ject of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the broad­cast exam­ines reports from Euro­pean intel­li­gence agen­cies that Tariq Ramadan, son of key Broth­er­hood patri­arch Said Ramadan, is not as far removed from oper­a­tional ter­ror­ist ele­ments as he claims. (For more about the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, see—among oth­er programs—FTRs 343, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 371, 377, 378, 381, 382, 425, 433, 435, 439, 4423, 447.) Euro­pean intel­li­gence sources point to an alleged famil­ial rela­tion­ship between Ramadan and Omar Abdel Rah­man. It is also alleged by the same sources that Tariq is much more heav­i­ly involved with the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood than he claims. “For sev­er­al weeks, a Fed­er­al judge in the state of Wash­ing­ton has had on his desk reports from Euro­pean intel­li­gence ser­vices impli­cat­ing Tariq Ramadan in sev­er­al inves­ti­ga­tions into the activ­i­ties of Al Qae­da. Accord­ing to our sources, these reports were obtained by lawyers act­ing on behalf of the fam­i­lies of the vic­tims of the attack on the World Trade Cen­ter of Sep­tem­ber 11, 2001. A law­suit is cur­rent­ly being brought on behalf of 5,600 plain­tiffs seek­ing dam­ages and inter­est against the per­sons or groups sus­pect­ed of hav­ing sup­port­ed Osama bin Laden’s orga­ni­za­tion. Accord­ing to Jean-Charles Bris­ard, for­mer mem­ber of the intel­li­gence ser­vices and now a pri­vate inves­ti­ga­tor hired by the vic­tims’ fam­i­lies, this inter­na­tion­al inves­ti­ga­tion has obtained the polit­i­cal and law-enforce­ment coop­er­a­tion of thir­ty coun­tries. Since the end of 2002, the Gene­va Islam­ic Cen­ter, where Tariq Ramadan sits on the board of direc­tors, and of which broth­er Hani Ramadan is the direc­tor, appears among the orga­ni­za­tions under inves­ti­ga­tion.” (“Tariq Ramadan, Tar­get for Euro­pean Intel­li­gence Ser­vices” by Christophe Dubois; Le Parisien; 11/14/2003; accessed at: http://watch.windsofchange.net/themes_71.htm .)

42. “Sev­er­al of the new­er ele­ments of this inves­ti­ga­tion per­son­al­ly impli­cate the star preach­er to young French Mus­lims. Accord­ing to doc­u­ments pro­vid­ed to Amer­i­can law-enforce­ment offi­cials, Tariq Ramadan is alleged­ly the nephew of Omar Abdel Rah­man, the plan­ner of the first attack on the World Trade Cen­ter, sen­tenced to life in prison in the Unit­ed States. Grand son of the founder of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, Has­san al-Ban­na, in 1993, Ramadan was alleged­ly put in charge of the Daawa (preach­ing for Europe by that Islamist orga­ni­za­tion. Ramadan denies the charges: ‘I am not relat­ed to Omar Abdel Rah­man and have no organ­ic ties to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood.’ ” (Idem.)

43. “More­over, the name of the Mus­lim intel­lec­tu­al was cit­ed in sev­er­al anti-ter­ror­ist inves­ti­ga­tions. As part of an inves­ti­ga­tion into an Al-Qae­da cell in Spain, he was named as one of the ‘usu­al con­tacts’ for Ahmed

Brahim, con­sid­ered to be one of al-Qaeda’s trea­sur­ers indict­ed in April 2003 by mag­is­trate Gar­zon. In par­tic­u­lar, his name is men­tioned dur­ing a tele­phone con­ver­sa­tion of April 22, 1999, of which Le Parisien has a copy, between Ahmed Brahim and an offi­cial at the Tawhid book­store in Lyon, which pub­lished Ramadan’s books. The con­ver­sa­tion con­cerns the acqui­si­tion of blank audio cas­settes and the invi­ta­tion extend­ed to young French cit­i­zens in Major­ca to ‘work for the path of Allah.’ The Swiss intel­lec­tu­al is also named in the tri­al in France of a group sus­pect­ed of hav­ing planned an attack against the US embassy. Dja­mal Beghal, con­sid­ered to be net­work leader, told the inves­ti­gat­ing mag­is­trate Jean-Louis Bruguiere on Octo­ber 1, 2001: ‘In 1994, I fol­lowed cours­es taught by Tarik Ramadan.’ The preacher’s response” ‘I do not know Ahmed Brahim. My name was sim­ply men­tioned over the course of two harm­less con­ver­sa­tions . . . . More­over, I did­n’t begin teach­ing in Paris until 1997.’ Anoth­er charge against him: accord­ing to the inves­ti­ga­tions con­duct­ed by the lawyers act­ing on behalf of the fam­i­lies of the World Trade Cen­ter vic­tims, the Ramadan fam­i­ly address appears in a reg­is­ter at the Al Taqwa bank, which is on the Amer­i­can State depart­men­t’s list of orga­ni­za­tions accused of sup­port­ing Islamist ter­ror­ism. . . .” (Idem.)

44. It is also alleged by the same Euroo­pean intel­li­gence sources that Ramadan was in oper­a­tional con­tact with Al Qaeda’s #2 man—Ayman al-Zawahiri. “The last item record­ed by the intel­li­gence ser­vices: Tariq Ramadan and his broth­er alleged­ly orga­nized a 1991 meet­ing in a Gene­va hotel at which both Ayman al-Zawahiri, cur­rent al-Qae­da num­ber 2, and Omar Abdel Rah­man were present. What of these ‘liaisons dan­gereuses’? ‘I have nev­er met these peo­ple.’ So many denials that do not impress Jean-Charles Bris­ard: ‘To-day there is a real stack of evi­dence point­ing to Tariq Ramadan’s hav­ing had rela­tions with sev­er­al ter­ror­ists,’ he says. ‘He has renounced the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood but he shares their her­itage. Under the cov­er of mod­er­a­tion, he is accu­mu­lat­ing a rad­i­cal­ism that may encour­age Jihad.’ ” (Idem.)

45. Numer­ous broad­casts have focused on the Bank Al Taqwa—the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood finan­cial hub oper­at­ed by for­mer Third Reich intel­li­gence oper­a­tive Youssef Nada. (For more about Al Taqwa, see—among oth­er pro­grams.) FTRs 343, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 377, 378, 382, 423, 425, 432, 433, 435, 442, 447.) The broad­cast sets forth the fail­ure of the inter­na­tion­al inves­ti­ga­tion against Bank Al Taqwa. “An Egypt­ian-born busi­ness­man-accused more than two years ago by U.S. author­i­ties of financ­ing inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism from the heart of Europe—has evad­ed efforts to shut down his oper­a­tions and is con­tin­u­ing to con­duct busi­ness under new cor­po­rate iden­ti­ties accord­ing to Euro­pean and Unit­ed Nations offi­cials.” (“ ‘Nobody’s Nagging’—Why the Unit­ed States Is Los­ing the Bat­tle against Financiers of Inter­na­tion­al Ter­ror­ism” by Mark Hosen­ball and Michael Isikoff; Newsweek; 3/3/2004; p. 1; accessed at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4441187 .)

46. “The fal­ter­ing inves­ti­ga­tion of Youssef M. Nada, the noto­ri­ous for­mer head of a Swiss-and Bahamas-based Islam­ic finan­cial net­work called Al-Taqwa, is the lat­est exam­ple of how the Bush admin­is­tra­tion’s much-pub­li­cized cam­paign to dis­man­tle the financiers of inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism appears to be los­ing steam amid wan­ing sup­port from some for­eign gov­ern­ments, the offi­cials say.” (Idem.)

47. “Nada and sev­er­al oth­er direc­tors of Al-Taqwa and relat­ed com­pa­nies, includ­ing a mys­te­ri­ous Eritre­an-born asso­ciate named Ahmed Idris Nasred­din, were for­mal­ly des­ig­nat­ed ter­ror­ist financiers and, in Novem­ber 2001, were placed on sanc­tions lists start­ed by the U.S. Trea­sury Depart­ment after the Sep­tem­ber 11 ter­ror attacks. Although they have nev­er pub­licly dis­closed much of their evi­dence against Nada, U.S. offi­cials have said they act­ed on the basis of intel­li­gence reports indi­cat­ing that he served as the cen­tral banker for the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, a secre­tive net­work of Islam­ic rad­i­cals that helped spawn Osama bin Laden’s Al Qae­da move­ment and oth­er vio­lent Islam­ic jiha­di net­works. Nada and his asso­ciates were also placed on sim­i­lar lists main­tained by the Unit­ed Nations, sig­nal­ing what was sup­posed to be a coor­di­nat­ed inter­na­tion­al effort to freeze his assets and close down his busi­ness­es.” (Ibid.; pp. 1–2.)

48. “But today, offi­cials tell Newsweek, some of Nada’s var­i­ous busi­ness oper­a­tions appear to be very much alive. Swiss author­i­ties, who had raid­ed Nada’s offices and opened up a major crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tion, are on the verge of clos­ing down the case-appar­ent­ly unable to devel­op enough evi­dence to bring nada to court, Euro­pean law-enforce­ment offi­cials say.” (Ibid.; p. 2.)

49. “In the mean­time, Nada has main­tained busi­ness inter­ests in Italy, Switzer­land and Liecht­en­stein. Nasred­din, his busi­ness part­ner, is believed to main­tain his inter­ests in lux­u­ry hotels in Milan, Italy. One way the two men have been able to con­tin­ue oper­at­ing is by exploit­ing loop­holes in the inter­na­tion­al sanc­tions regime. Nada, for exam­ple, was sup­posed to have been barred from trav­el­ing out­side his city of res­i­dence, a tiny enclave of Ital­ian ter­ri­to­ry called Cam­pi­one d’I­talia that is sur­round­ed on three sides by Switzer­land and by a lake on the fourth. But the U.N. report­ed last year that Nada had trav­eled to Liechtenstein—a jour­ney that he could only have made by tran­sit­ing through Swiss ter­ri­to­ry, from which he had been banned. Nada’s trip was focused on start­ing pro­ceed­ings to change the names of two of the com­pa­nies des­ig­nat­ed by the U.N. and the Unit­ed States as ter­ror­ist-financ­ing enti­ties.” (Idem.)

50. “U.N. and Euro­pean law-enforce­ment sources said they could see no rea­son for Nada to seek to change the names of his com­pa­nies unless they were still active­ly engaged in busi­ness or con­trolled some valu­able assets and prop­er­ty. To try to find out what Nada was up to, author­i­ties in Liecht­en­stein attempt­ed to wrest con­trol of one of the com­pa­nies from Nada by forcibly appoint­ing a for­mer Liecht­en­stein gov­ern­ment offi­cial as liq­uida­tor of the cor­po­ra­tion. But law-enforce­ment sources tell Newsweek that Liecht­en­stein’s plan to take over the com­pa­ny failed, and Nada remains in charge of the oper­a­tion.” (Idem.)

51. “The Liecht­en­stein effort against Nada isn’t the only one that fiz­zled. Swiss author­i­ties last year served Nada with a for­mal notice that he can no longer enter Swiss ter­ri­to­ry, Newsweek has learned. The­o­ret­i­cal­ly, because the Ital­ian enclave where Nada lives is vir­tu­al­ly sur­round­ed by Switzer­land, the only way he can leave is either by boat or air. But author­i­ties acknowl­edge that Switzer­land’s bor­ders with Cam­pi­one d’I­talia are rarely if ever patrolled and that Nada has vir­tu­al­ly carte blanche to leave when he pleas­es.” (Idem.)

52. “In a tele­phone inter­view from Cam­pi­one d’I­talia this week, Nada insist­ed that he had no finan­cial ties to ter­ror­ists and defi­ant­ly seemed to mock the efforts to keep him bot­tled up in his home­town. ‘I nev­er financed Osama bin Laden’s ter­ror­ist group,’ Nada said. ‘There is no way any­one ever had any evi­dence of that . I nev­er broke any law in my life.’ ” (Idem.)

53. “As for the Swiss attempts to ban him from trav­el­ing through the coun­try’s ter­ri­to­ry, Nada stat­ed: ‘if any deci­sion [like that] is made, there must be a way to enforce it.’ He then point­ed­ly not­ed there was ‘no bor­der con­trol’ between Cam­pi­one d’I­talia and Switzer­land. Nasred­din could not be locat­ed for com­ment, though in the past his lawyers have emphat­i­cal­ly denied that he had any involve­ment in the financ­ing of ter­ror­ism.” (Ibid.; p. 3.)

54. “Vic­tor Com­ras, a for­mer U.S. gov­ern­ment sanc­tions expert and a mem­ber of a recent­ly expired Unit­ed Nations task force on inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism, said the Nada case is symp­to­matic of the loop­holes and weak­ness­es in inter­na­tion­al ef

forts to shut down ter­ror­ist financiers. He said for­eign inter­est in the issue appears to be fading—as does Unit­ed States lead­er­ship in push­ing for vig­or­ous action. ‘This is an issue which requires con­stant nag­ging,’ said Com­ras, and ‘nobody’s nag­ging.’ ” (Idem.)

55. “But there may be oth­er issues at play, some inter­na­tion­al experts say. Much of the evi­dence against Nada and oth­er accused ter­ror­ist financiers is still based on secret intel­li­gence that U.S. author­i­ties have been extreme­ly reluc­tant to share with for­eign gov­ern­ments. U.S. trea­sury offi­cials have pushed those gov­ern­ments, in Europe and the Mid­dle East, to act on loos­er stan­dards, say­ing it is sim­ply unrea­son­able to expect judi­cial stan­dards of proof when deal­ing with the shad­owy world of ter­ror­ist financ­ing, said one for­mer U.S. offi­cial who was involved in the antiter­ror cam­paign. But gov­ern­ments in Europe and else­where have been reluc­tant to adopt the low­er U.S. stan­dards, lead­ing to dia­logue in which the com­mu­ni­ca­tions are ‘lost in trans­la­tion,’ the for­mer offi­cial said.” (Idem.)

56. The pro­gram con­cludes with a look at infor­ma­tion sup­ple­ment­ing the exam­i­na­tion of neo-Nazi con­nec­tions to the events of 9/11. Specif­i­cal­ly, the pro­gram devel­ops infor­ma­tion sup­ple­men­tal to FTR#443, detail­ing con­nec­tions between the 1993 World Trade Cen­ter bomb­ing, the Okla­homa City bomb­ing, and 9/11. Andreas Strass­meir, the alleged mas­ter­mind of the OKC bomb­ing and Tim­o­thy McVeigh’s alleged supe­ri­or in the oper­a­tional aspects of the attack is alleged in a 5/10/1995 FBI mem­o­ran­dum to have sought the pur­chase of a Boe­ing 747 from Lufthansa. The pos­si­bil­i­ty that this may be an indi­ca­tion that neo-Nazis and Islamists were coop­er­a­tive­ly plot­ting attacks like 9/11 in the mid-1990’s is not one to be too read­i­ly dis­missed. ” . . . Extrem­ists resid­ing at Elo­him City received mil­i­tary-style train­ing from a num­ber of sources. One of the train­ers there was Andreas Carl Strass­meir of Ger­many, a neo-Nazi and the son of Guenter Strass­meir, a chief aide of dis­graced for­mer Ger­man chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Kohl. The elder Strass­meir is wide­ly regard­ed as the archi­tect of Kohl’s reuni­fi­ca­tion plan that merged the for­mer East Ger­many with the Fed­er­al Repub­lic in 1991. And Guenter’s father was one of the orig­i­nal mem­bers of the Nazi Par­ty in the ear­ly 1920’s.” (“Al Qaeda’s Neo-Nazi Con­nec­tions” by William Grim; The Jew­ish Press; p. 3; accessed at: http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/news/infocus/?disp_feature=Ev2ztq.var .)

57. “Andreas Strass­meir is impor­tant to this sto­ry because he not only became a close friend and con­fi­dant of Tim­o­thy McVeigh, but also because he is regard­ed by many inves­ti­ga­tors as John Doe #2, the unknown per­son assist­ing McVeigh and Ter­ry Nichols at the scene of the Okla­homa City bomb­ing who was seen by a num­ber of eye­wit­ness­es.” (Ibid.; pp. 3–4.)

58. “In addi­tion to train­ing var­i­ous neo-Nazi and mili­tia groups, Strass­meir was involved in a num­ber of very curi­ous activ­i­ties. Accord­ing to an FBI report dat­ed May 10, 1995, ‘Addi­tion­al doc­u­ments reveal that at one time Strass­meir was attempt­ing to pur­chase a 747 air­craft from Lufthansa; how­ev­er, the rea­son for the pur­chase is not reflect­ed in the doc­u­ments.’ In 1995 it would not have been unrea­son­able for an FBI inves­ti­ga­tor to give Strass­meir’s abort­ed air­lin­er pur­chase gives one pause and rais­es the real pos­si­bil­i­ty that 9/11 type attacks were being planned as far back as 1995 by insid­ers in the neo-Naz­i/Is­lam­ic ter­ror­ist net­work. . . .” (Ibid.; p. 4.)

59. A Ger­man paper on the neo-Naz­i/Is­lamist con­nec­tion dis­cuss­es dia­logue writ­ten by Pierce in The Turn­er Diaries. The pro­tag­o­nist of this book (express­ing the views of William Pierce, the book’s author) rants about his desire to see the “100 floors of the sky­scraper fall.” The book also has an episode about a low-lev­el, sui­cide aer­i­al attack on the Pen­ta­gon. Note that Pierce fore­shad­owed the 9/11 attacks in 1998. See FTR#443.) “47 years lat­er the Hitler wor­ship­per William Pierce (born 1933) tells in his right-wing ter­ror­ist nov­el “The Turn­er Diaries” of a right-wing extrem­ist Kamikaze-ing an air­plane into the Pen­ta­gon. In an apoc­a­lyp­tic scene Pierce rejoic­es over the destruc­tion of the cen­ter of the world cap­i­tal-con­t­a­m­i­nat­ed, Jew­ish-dom­i­nat­ed New York. The neo-Nazi, writ­ing under the alias Andrew Mac­Don­ald, says he desires to see the ‘100 floors of the sky­scraper’ fall. Pierce’s book [The Turn­er Diaries] is a utopi­an fan­ta­sy, pro­mot­ed as a neo-nazi Bible world-wide, as the pub­li­ca­tion of the diaries of the US-Amer­i­can right-wing extrem­ist Earl Turn­er found in the years 2091 dur­ing exca­va­tions of the ruins of Wash­ing­ton, 100 years after the nation­al rev­o­lu­tion of 1991–93.” (“The Unholy Alliance Between the Swasti­ka and the Cres­cent, Part I—Neo Nazis and Fun­da­men­tal­ist Islam” by Anton Maegerle; 12/12/2001; p. 2.)


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