Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #523 Catching Up With Daniel Hopsicker

Record­ed August 21, 2005
REALAUDIO

Bring­ing up to date the hero­ic work of Daniel Hop­sick­er, this pro­gram sets forth more attempts to dis­cred­it Hopsicker’s hero­ic inves­ti­ga­tion in Flori­da, as well as infor­ma­tion that cor­rob­o­rates Hopsicker’s research into 9/11 hijack­er Mohamed Atta’s activ­i­ties there. In addi­tion, the broad­cast updates Daniel’s on-the ‑ground work in the Sun­shine State. It appears that Mohamed Atta’s father was in charge of the hijack­ers in Flori­da. Much of the pro­gram is devot­ed to Mr. Emory’s pon­tif­i­ca­tion about the Carl Dusi­berg Gesellschaft (CDS)—the orga­ni­za­tion that was traf­fick­ing Atta around in Ger­many and (pos­si­bly) Flori­da. Specif­i­cal­ly, the pro­gram focus­es on the CDS’s links to the Alfa Group, a Russ­ian con­glom­er­ate with strong links to crim­i­nal activ­i­ty on a glob­al scale.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The FBI’s splic­ing of a video sur­veil­lance tape to elim­i­nate the footage of Atta’s father in Flori­da; the Ger­man indus­tri­al fig­ures on the board of direc­tors of the CDS; the Alfa Group’s links to Cheney’s Hal­libur­ton Oil com­pa­ny; the Alfa Group’s links to Iraq­gate arms traf­fick­ing; the Alfa Group’s links to the oil-for-food scan­dal in Iraq; Alfa’s links to the Cali cocaine car­tel of Colom­bia; Alfa’s links to hero­in traf­fick­ing.

1. Fol­low­ing on the heels of nui­sance law­suits and the float­ing of bogus sto­ries about a “sec­ond Mohamed” in Flori­da [not 9/11 hijack­er Mohamed Atta], Daniel Hop­sick­er has been the focal point of a “hit piece” in The Sara­so­ta Her­ald Tri­bune. The arti­cle mis­rep­re­sent­ed Hopsicker’s work and was clear­ly aimed at dis­cred­it­ing the impor­tant research in his book Wel­come to Ter­ror­land. (For more about Daniel’s book, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#’s 477, 482, 483, 484. For more about attempts at dis­cred­it­ing Daniel’s work, see FTR#516.) “The news­pa­per in Flori­da cov­er­ing the town where Mohamed Atta’s cadre of ter­ror­ist hijack­ers cavort­ed unmo­lest­ed before the 9/11 attack made an effort recent­ly to hitch a ride aboard the clue­train and inves­ti­gate some­thing about the sto­ry which played out before them almost unno­ticed. But if you weren’t aware of the Sara­so­ta Her­ald Tribune’s sin­gu­lar­ly lack­lus­ter cov­er­age of the biggest sto­ry of the nascent 21st cen­tu­ry, much of which tran­spired in their own back­yard, the tar­get of their inves­tiga­tive scruti­ny might seem a lit­tle odd . . . in a snarky, mis­take-filled (they even got the cor­rec­tion wrong) hit piece long on noth­ing but atti­tude, they decid­ed to (sigh) inves­ti­gate me. Imag­ine my sur­prise. . . .”
(“Ter­ror­ists’ Home­town Paper Dis­cov­ers 9/11” by Daniel Hop­sick­er; Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews; 8/28/2005.)

2. “ . . . But what we did find sur­pris­ing in an arti­cle in a news­pa­per owned by the pres­ti­gious New York Times were the appar­ent­ly freely made-up quotes. We thought they’d decid­ed, after Jayson Blair, that that was a jour­nal­is­tic no-no. We may have been mis­in­formed. The July 11, 2005 sto­ry by Her­ald Tri­bune reporter Lau­ren Glenn, head­lined ‘Venice Author Ques­tions 9/11 Find­ings in Con­tro­ver­sial Book,’ began this way: ‘Don’t ques­tion him too hard. In fact, try to elim­i­nate any tones of doubt from your voice. He doesn’t have to explain him­self if he doesn’t want to. Daniel Hop­sick­er is sit­ting in a cof­fee shop in Venice, talk­ing to a reporter and drink­ing a lat­te because that is exact­ly what he wants to be doing.’” (Idem.)

3. “ ‘I’m not here to give you my resume, hon­ey,’ said Hop­sick­er, his voice loud enough that oth­er peo­ple in the Bel­la Luna Cof­fee Shop in Mia­mi Avenue turn and stare for a moment.’ Ques­tion: What kind of churl­ish boor calls a female reporter ‘hon­ey?’ Answer: Any­one the Sara­so­ta Her­ald Tri­bune doesn’t like. ‘Report­ing’ doesn’t get any more cheesy—or dishonest—than this. The dis­like itself is under­stand­able (tra­di­tion­al media jeal­ousy guard­ing their monop­oly on what becomes ‘news.’) But if we’d called a female reporter ‘hon­ey’ you can bet that we would also be describ­ing her arti­cle as ‘bitchy.’ But we’re not like that. So we used ‘snarky’ instead. . . .” (Idem.)

4. “ . . . The real ques­tion is: what was the point of doing a snarky hit piece on an obscure writer who couldn’t get on ‘Hard­ball’ with pic­tures of our cur­rent Pres­i­dent alone in a room doing some­thing inap­pro­pri­ate with a bat and a ele­phant? I mean, if you’re too lazy to deliv­er any hit: For an answer, we turned to some­one not per­son­al­ly involved. . . ‘Espe­cial­ly fun­ny was her por­trait of flight school oper­a­tor Rudi Dekkers as a vic­tim, and Hop­sick­er as an evil man out to crush the ‘Naples busi­ness­man,’ chor­tled local polit­i­cal writer John Pat­ten. Call­ing the arti­cle ‘an inter­est­ing rib job,’ he wrote, ‘Locals will long remem­ber Dekkers’ face get­ting plas­tered all over out tele­vi­sion sets when it was revealed that he had taught Mohamed Atta how to fly right here in Venice. Vene­tians were hor­ri­fied, but Dekkers, thrilled with all of the atten­tion, turned his Warho­lian 15 min­utes (that stretched out to an ungod­ly four or five days) into an ad for his flight school.’ That image alone, that of Dekkers as vic­tim, made me throw down the arti­cle in dis­gust.’” (Idem.)

5. In addi­tion to dis­parag­ing Hop­sick­er, the hit piece cod­dled Rudi Dekkers whose flight school/intelligence front was the vehi­cle through which Atta and oth­er 9/11 hijack­ers infil­trat­ed. “ . . . . ‘Rudi Dekkers . . . said Hopsicker’s accu­sa­tions have tak­en a toll on his busi­ness and caused for­mer cus­tomers to stop asso­ci­at­ing with him. ‘This S.O.B., he doesn’t real­ize he destroys fam­i­lies and peo­ple,’ Dekkers said in a tele­phone inter­view Thurs­day. ‘I have seen noth­ing that’s the truth. He fan­ta­sizes. He fan­ta­sizes sto­ries, and names,’ report­ed the Her­ald Tri­bune. ‘If I had the mon­ey, would I sue him? Into hell,’ added Dekkers, a Dutch immi­grant who now char­ters air­planes from Naples. ‘I would sue him into hell.’ Well now. I’d con­tribute $20: Should we take up a col­lec­tion so poor Mr. Dekkers can have his day in court? What are the odds he’d make it to a depo­si­tion with­out expe­ri­enc­ing the ‘old David Fer­rie ‘night before tes­ti­fy­ing heart attack?’ . . . .” (Idem.)

6. Next, the pro­gram turns to the sub­ject of the Able Dan­ger intel­li­gence oper­a­tion, which alleged­ly detect­ed the pres­ence of Atta and com­pa­ny in the Unit­ed States before Bush became pres­i­dent. Repub­li­can Curt Wel­don has attempt­ed to paint the Clin­ton Admin­is­tra­tion as respon­si­ble for the 9/11 attacks—a man­i­fest absur­di­ty in, and of, itself. As we have seen in the pro­grams cit­ed above, sup­port for the Hilliard/Dekkers flight schools through which Atta and com­pa­ny infil­trat­ed the Unit­ed States came from Jeb Bush and Kather­ine Har­ris. Mil­i­tary intel­li­gence was inves­ti­gat­ing Ham­burg-based hero­in traf­fick­ing linked to Al Qae­da as far back as 1991, when the elder Bush was Pres­i­dent. “Mohamed Atta was pro­tect­ed from offi­cial scruti­ny as part of an offi­cial­ly-pro­tect­ed cocaine and hero­in traf­fick­ing net­work with ties to top polit­i­cal fig­ures, includ­ing Repub­li­can offi­cials Jeb Bush and Kather­ine Har­ris, and it was this fact-and not the ‘ter­ri­ble laps­es’ of ‘weak on ter­ror’ Clin­ton Admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials cit­ed by Repub­li­can Con­gress­man Curt Weldon—which shield­ed him from being appre­hend­ed before the 9/11 attack. Wel­don alleges that Pen­ta­gon lawyers reject­ed the mil­i­tary intel­li­gence unit’s rec­om­men­da­tion to appre­hend Atta because he was in the coun­try legal­ly, and there­fore infor­ma­tion on him could not be shared with law enforce­ment.”
(“Able Dan­ger Intel Expos­es Pro­tect­ed Hero­in Traf­fick­ing” by Daniel Hop­sick­er; Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews; 8/17/2005.)

7. “But the ‘ter­ri­ble laps­es’ cit­ed by Wel­don do not stem from the non­sen­si­cal asser­tion that Atta had a green card (he did not) which ren­dered him immune from mil­i­tary inves­ti­ga­tion but were the result of an offi­cial­ly-pro­tect­ed hero­in traf­fick­ing oper­a­tion being con­duct­ed on planes like those of Wal­ly Hilliard, whose Lear jet flew ‘milk runs’ down and back to Venezuela every week for 39 weeks in a row before final­ly run­ning afoul of local DEA agents not clued-in on the ‘joke.’ More­over the secret mil­i­tary intel­li­gence oper­a­tion which iden­ti­fied Mohamed Atta and three oth­er hijack­ers as a threat a year before the 9/11 attack, called Able Dan­ger, was by no means the first mil­i­tary intel­li­gence inves­ti­ga­tion into the activ­i­ties of the Ham­burg cadre.” (Idem.)

8. Hop­sick­er notes that Ham­burg (Ger­many) based hero­in traf­fick­ing had been the focal point of mil­i­tary intel­li­gence inves­ti­ga­tors as far back as 1991. At the core of this traf­fic was Al Qae­da. “As far back as 1991, mil­i­tary inves­ti­ga­tors had been detailed to Ham­burg Ger­many, track­ing what one mil­i­tary inves­ti­ga­tor who was there told us were ‘Al Qae­da hero­in flows’ from Afghanistan to the West. A two-year inves­ti­ga­tion in Venice, Fl. Into the flight school attend­ed by Atta and his body­guard Mar­wan Al-She­hhi and which pro­vid­ed them with their ‘cov­er’ while in the U.S. unearthed the amaz­ing fact that dur­ing the same month the two men began fly­ing lessons at Huff­man Avi­a­tion, July of 2000, the flight school’s owner’s Lear jet was seized on the run­way of Orlan­do Exec­u­tive Air­port by Fed­er­al Agents who found 43 pounds of hero­in onboard. 43 pounds of hero­in is known in the drug trade as ‘heavy weight.’ . . .”

9. A block­buster item con­cludes dis­cus­sion on the first side of the pro­gram. A sur­veil­lance video from a Venice (Flori­da) phar­ma­cy indi­cates that Mohamed Atta’s father was in Flori­da and appeared to be lead­ing the ter­ror­ist cadre. The video­tape appears to have been edit­ed by the FBI to elim­i­nate the footage of Atta, Sr. In FTR#521, we saw that Atta’s father endorsed the Lon­don tran­sit bomb­ings of July of 2001. “In the sec­ond major blow in as many weeks to the cred­i­bil­i­ty of the 9/11 Com­mis­sion report, the Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews has learned exclu­sive­ly that dur­ing final prepa­ra­tions for the Sept. 11 attack, Mohamed Atta’s father was ‘vis­it­ing’ his ter­ror­ist ring­leader son in Venice, Flori­da. More­over, the FBI knew about the U.S. vis­it of Cairo attor­ney Mohammed El-Amir almost imme­di­ate­ly after the attack, when, after see­ing him on tele­vi­sion deny­ing that his son had any­thing to do with the ter­ror­ist hijack­ings, a num­ber of cred­i­ble wit­ness­es called the Sara­so­ta office of the FBI to report they had seen Atta’s father in Venice with his son ten days to two weeks before the attack. In addi­tion closed cir­cuit video­tape pro­vid­ed to the FBI as evi­dence of Atta Senior’s pres­ence appears to have been inten­tion­al­ly erased. . . .”
(“Mohamed Atta Senior in U.S. Two Weeks Before 9/11 Attack” by Daniel Hop­sick­er; Mad­Cow­Morn­ingNews; 8/23/2005.)

10. “ . . . When a phar­ma­cy in Venice pro­vid­ed the Bureau with video­tapes from the store’s closed cir­cuit cam­eras as proof of the vis­it of Atta, his father, and Mar­wan Al-She­hhi to the store, it was returned 10 days lat­er, minus ‘exci­sions’ in the tape from the after­noon of August 28, 2001, the date of the three men’s vis­it to the store. We first learned of Atta Senior’s pres­ence in Venice in a casu­al con­ver­sa­tion with a Venice phar­ma­cist who has been known to us for over 25 years, since my par­ents bought a retire­ment home here after my father suf­fered a series of heart attacks. Accom­pa­nied by Mohamed Atta and his body­guard Mar­wan Al-She­hhi, the phar­ma­cist stat­ed that Mohamed Atta Senior had been in his phar­ma­cy sev­er­al weeks before the attack, to send a fax. ‘We have just about the only pub­lic fax in town,’ the phar­ma­cist stat­ed. ‘The fax went to a num­ber in New Jer­sey.’ . . . .” (Idem.)

11. For much of the rest of the pro­gram, Mr. Emory pon­tif­i­cat­ed about evi­den­tiary trib­u­taries run­ning between a num­ber of ele­ments, which—taken together—appear to form parts of a net­work that involves ele­ments of Ger­man heavy indus­try and finance, mas­sive drug traf­fick­ing, arms traf­fick­ing and Russ­ian crim­i­nal ele­ments. The net­work will be explored in greater detail in broad­casts to come. The point of depar­ture for this part of the dis­cus­sion is the Carl Duis­berg Gesellschaft, the orga­ni­za­tion that traf­ficked Atta around in Ger­many and pos­si­bly the Unit­ed States. As not­ed in FTR#477, Atta was asso­ci­at­ed with Ger­mans, Swiss and Aus­tri­ans in Flori­da. As not­ed in—among oth­er programs—FTR#492, the Ger­man BKA (the fed­er­al police of that coun­try) iden­ti­fied many of Atta’s asso­ciates as sons and daugh­ters of promi­nent Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists. In the past, Mr. Emory has spec­u­lat­ed about whether the Carl Duis­berg Gesellschaft might be an ele­ment of the Under­ground Reich. “ . . . ‘In the 1920’s, Carl Duis­berg, Gen­er­al Direc­tor of Bay­er AG in Ger­many, envi­sioned send­ing Ger­man stu­dents to the Unit­ed States on work-study pro­grams. Duis­berg was con­vinced that inter­na­tion­al prac­ti­cal train­ing was crit­i­cal to the growth of Ger­man indus­try. Many of the return­ing trainees lat­er rose to promi­nent posi­tions at AEG, Bay­er, Bosch, Daim­ler Benz, and Siemens, bring­ing with them new meth­ods for mass pro­duc­tion, new ideas, and new busi­ness prac­tices. Fol­low­ing World War II, alum­ni from the first exchanges found­ed the Carl Duis­berg Gesellschaft (CDG) in 1949 to help engi­neers, busi­ness­men and farm­ers gain inter­na­tion­al work expe­ri­ence nec­es­sary for the rebuild­ing of Ger­many . . . .”
(“His­to­ry of the Carl Duis­berg Soci­ety”)

12. Note the promi­nent Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists on the board of direc­tors of the Duis­berg Soci­ety: “Board of Direc­tors Carl Duis­berg Soci­ety: . . . Gerd D. Mueller (retired) [mem­ber of Bun­destag on CSU tick­et) Chair­man of the Board; Exec­u­tive Vice Pres­i­dent and CFO Bay­er Cor­po­ra­tion . . . . Dr. Hans W. Deck­er; Trea­sur­er of the Board; Professor—Columbia Uni­ver­si­ty . . . Robert Fen­ster­ma­ch­er; Exec­u­tive Direc­tor of CDS Inter­na­tion­al, Inc. (ex offi­cio) . . . Carl Geer­ck­en; Part­ner Alston & Bird LLP . . . Dr. Olaf J. Groth; Exec­u­tive Direc­tor, Strate­gic Analy­sis & Integration—Boeing Inter­na­tion­al Cor­po­ra­tion . . . Dr. H. Friedrich Holzapfel; Man­ag­ing Director—The Burling­ton Group . . . Dr. Gudrun Kochen­do­er­fer-Lucius; Man­ag­ing Director—InWEnt (Capac­i­ty Build­ing Inter­na­tion­al, Ger­many) . . . Fritz E. Kropatscheck; Mang­ing Director—Deutsche Bank, A.G. (retired) . . . Wolf­gang Linz (retired) Exec­u­tive Direc­tor CDS Inter­na­tion­al, Inc. . . . Dr. Karl M. May­er-Wittmann (retired); President—WEFA, Inc. . . . Frances McCaf­frey; Man­ag­er, Cen­ter Development—BMW of North Amer­i­ca . . . Dr. Horst K. Saal­bach Vice Chair­man of the Board–Festo Cor­po­ra­tion . . . Dr. Nor­bert Schnei­der; Chief Exec­u­tive Officer—Carl Duis­berg Cen­tren GmbH . . . .”
(“Board of Direc­tors: Carl Duis­berg Soci­ety”)

13. Anoth­er of the fel­low­ship pro­grams that oper­ates under the aus­pices of the CDS is the Alfa Fel­low­ship, that func­tions on behalf of the Alfa com­pa­ny, a Russ­ian oil com­pa­ny with more links than a switch­board. Among the con­nec­tions of the Alfa group are pro­found links to cocaine and hero­in traf­fick­ing, Hal­libur­ton Oil (Dick Cheney’s for­mer firm), and the oil-for-food scam in Iraq. The Iraqi oil scam, in turn, appears to be linked to Car­los Car­doen, one of the prin­ci­pal arms traf­fick­ers involved in the Iraq­gate scan­dal presided over by the elder George Bush. (For more about the elder George Bush’s involve­ment in the Iraq­gate scan­dal, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#384.) Is this Russ­ian part of the net­work con­nect­ed to the net­work that was traf­fick­ing Atta around in Flori­da? “ALFA FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM: Near­ly fif­teen years after the fall of the Sovi­et Union, Cold War-era poli­cies and con­cepts con­tin­ue to affect U.S. rela­tions with Rus­sia. . . . The Alfa Fel­low­ship Pro­gram is designed to address this prob­lem . . . .”
(“ALFA FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM”; Page on the Carl Duis­berg Soci­ety web site.)

14. Dick Cheney’s for­mer firm—Halliburton—is con­nect­ed to the Alfa com­pa­ny. “Under the guid­ance of Richard Cheney, a get-the-gov­ern­ment-out-of-my-face con­ser­v­a­tive, Hal­libur­ton Com­pa­ny over the past five years has emerged as a cor­po­rate wel­fare hog, ben­e­fit­ing from at least $3.8 bil­lion in fed­er­al con­tracts and tax­pay­er-insured loans. One of these loans was approved in April by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. It guar­an­teed $489 mil­lion in cred­its to a Russ­ian oil com­pa­ny whose roots are imbed­ded in a lega­cy of KGB and Com­mu­nist Par­ty cor­rup­tion, as well as drug traf­fick­ing and orga­nized crime funds, accord­ing to Russ­ian and U.S. sources and doc­u­ments.”
(“Cheney Led Hal­libur­ton to Feast at Fed­er­al Trough: State Depart­ment Ques­tioned Deal with Firm Linked to Russ­ian Mob” by Knut Royce and Nathaniel Heller [Cen­ter for Pub­lic Integri­ty]; 8/2/2000.)

15. “Those claims are hot­ly dis­put­ed by the Russ­ian oil firm’s hold­ing com­pa­ny. Hal­libur­ton, which lob­bied for the Ex-Im loan after the State Depart­ment ini­tial­ly assert­ed that the deal would run counter to the ‘nation­al inter­est,’ will receive $292 mil­lion of those funds to refur­bish a mas­sive Siber­ian oil field owned by the Russ­ian com­pa­ny, the Tyu­men Oil Co., which is con­trolled by a con­glom­er­ate called the Alfa Group. . . .” (Idem.)

16. Note that a Russ­ian intel­li­gence offi­cer iden­ti­fies Chechens as behind the Alfa Group-con­nect­ed hero­in traf­fic. Al Qae­da and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood are strong­ly con­nect­ed to the groups active in Chech­nya. Again, is this oper­a­tion con­nect­ed to Atta’s activ­i­ties in Flori­da? “ . . . That doc­u­ment and the FSB report claim that Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s largest and most prof­itable, as well as Alfa Eko, a trad­ing com­pa­ny, had been deeply involved in the ear­ly 1990’s in laun­der­ing of Russ­ian and Colom­bian drug mon­ey and in traf­fick­ing drugs from the Far East to Europe. The for­mer KGB major, who with the fall of com­mu­nism in the late 1980’s had him­self been involved in the plan by the KGB and Com­mu­nist Par­ty to loot state enter­pris­es, said that Alfa Bank was found­ed with par­ty and KGB funds, and quick­ly attract­ed rogue agents who had served in anti-orga­nized-crime units. ‘They (the rogue agents on the bank’s pay­roll) quick­ly deter­mined that deal­ing in drugs would bring the high­est prof­its with lit­er­al­ly no risk in Rus­sia,’ accord­ing to the for­mer KGB offi­cer. He claimed that a ‘large chan­nel of hero­in tran­sit was estab­lished from Bur­ma through Laos, Viet­nam, to the Far East [Siberia].’ From there the drugs were cam­ou­flaged as flour and sug­ar ship­ments and for­ward­ed on to Ger­many. The drug oper­a­tion was con­trolled by a Chechen mob fam­i­ly, he said. [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s] . . .”

17. The Cali cartel—connected to the Iran-Con­tra drug traf­fick­ing net­works that were linked to Atta’s oper­a­tions in Florida—is linked to the Alfa Group’s crim­i­nal activ­i­ties. “ . . . The FSB doc­u­ment claims that at the end of 1993, a top Alfa offi­cial met with Gilber­to Rodriguez Ore­juela, the now-impris­oned finan­cial mas­ter­mind of Columbia’s noto­ri­ous Cali car­tel, ‘to include an agree­ment about the trans­fer of mon­ey into Alfa Bank from off­shore zones such as the Bahamas, Gibral­tar and oth­ers, The plan was to insert it back into the Russ­ian econ­o­my through the pur­chase of stock in Russ­ian com­pa­nies.’ The account from the for­mer KGB offi­cer is unclear about Alfa’s alleged role with Rodriguez, but appar­ent­ly con­firms that ‘in 1993–94 there were attempts of the so-called Chess Play­er [Rodriguez’s nick­name] to laun­der and legal­ize large amounts of crim­i­nal mon­ey in Rus­sia. He report­ed that there was evi­dence ‘regard­ing [Alfa Bank’s] involve­ment with the mon­ey laun­der­ing of . . . Latin Amer­i­can drug car­tels.’ . . .” (Idem.)

18. The pro­gram high­lights links between Alfa and peo­ple linked to the lead­er­ship of the Repub­li­can Par­ty: “ . . . Tyu­men could have sig­nif­i­cant access to the White House should the Bush-Cheney tick­et win in the Novem­ber pres­i­den­tial elec­tions. Tyumen’s lead attor­ney at Akin Gump is James C. Lang­don Jr., a man­ag­ing part­ner at the firm. He is also one of George W. Bush’s ‘Pio­neers,’ one of the elite fund rais­ers who have brought in at least $100,0000 for the Repub­li­can pres­i­den­tial hope­ful. . . .” (Idem.)

19. The dis­cus­sion con­cludes with the links of Alfa Group to the Iraqi oil-for-food scam and the Iraq­gate weapons traf­fick­ing of the 1980’s. “ . . . One out­fit that par­tic­i­pat­ed in the Iraqi oil trade is the Alfa Group, a Moscow firm with hold­ings in bank­ing, tele­com, oil and com­modi­ties trad­ing, run by bil­lion­aire Mikhail Frid­man. Alfa quite legal­ly pumped the price of its cheap Iraqi crude by trad­ing it to a suc­ces­sion of affil­i­ates and friends with ques­tion­able pasts. [includ­ing Alfa sub­sidiary Crown Trade & Finance] The daisy chain, known inter­nal­ly as a ‘ron­do,’ boost­ed Alfa’s pro­ceeds and also made the mon­ey hard­er to trace. Alfa deposit­ed funds in a Gibral­tar tax haven. . . .”
(“The Sad­dam Shuf­fle” by Michael Maiel­lo; Forbes; 11/15/2004.)

20. “ . . . A favorite ron­do customer—and a point of entry to the U.S. market—was a Hous­ton com­pa­ny, Bay­oil. It par­tic­i­pat­ed in 32 Iraqi oil trades with Alfa com­pa­nies between August 1999 and Decem­ber 2000. Bay­oil also bought direct­ly from Sad­dam. Sad­dam had been deal­ing with Bay­oil own­er David Bay Chalmers Jr. before. Dur­ing the 1980’s Iran-Iraq war Bay­oil appar­ent­ly got a fee of $2 a bar­rel for bro­ker­ing 20 mil­lion bar­rels of Iraqi oil to the Chilean arms deal­er Car­los Car­doen. . . .” (Idem.)

Discussion

6 comments for “FTR #523 Catching Up With Daniel Hopsicker”

  1. Add one more to the list of pre-911 “intel­li­gence fail­ures”: Oper­a­tion Fox­den:

    US act­ed to con­ceal evi­dence of intel­li­gence fail­ure before 9/11

    Oper­a­tion Fox­den, delayed by turf war between the FBI and the CIA, giv­en green light three days before the al-Qai­da attacks

    Ian Cobain
    guardian.co.uk, Tues­day 27 March 2012 15.26 EDT

    The US gov­ern­ment shut down a series of court cas­es aris­ing from a mul­ti­mil­lion pound busi­ness dis­pute in order to con­ceal evi­dence of a damn­ing intel­li­gence fail­ure short­ly before the 9/11 attacks, MPs were told.

    More­over, the UK gov­ern­ment is now seek­ing sim­i­lar pow­ers that could be used to pre­vent evi­dence of ille­gal acts and embar­rass­ing fail­ures from emerg­ing in court, David Davis, the for­mer shad­ow home sec­re­tary, told the Com­mons.

    The Jus­tice and Secu­ri­ty green paper being put for­ward by Ken Clarke’s jus­tice min­istry has already faced wide­spread crit­i­cism from civ­il rights groups, media rep­re­sen­ta­tives and lawyers work­ing with­in the secret tri­bunal sys­tem that hears ter­ror­ism-relat­ed immi­gra­tion cas­es.

    Davis demand­ed to know how its pro­pos­als could be pre­vent­ed from being used to cov­er up crimes and errors. “In light of pre­vi­ous rev­e­la­tions about the UK gov­ern­men­t’s com­plic­i­ty in tor­ture and ren­di­tion of detainees to loca­tions like of Libya, Afghanistan, or ille­gal­ly into Amer­i­can hands ” how will the Gov­ern­ment pre­vent the Jus­tice and Secu­ri­ty green paper pro­pos­als being mis­used in a sim­i­lar way to cov­er up ille­gal acts and embar­rass­ments rather than pro­tect nation­al secu­ri­ty?”

    Davis said that in 1998 the FBI seized upon an oppor­tu­ni­ty to eaves­drop on every land­line and tele­phone call into and out of Afghanistan in a bid to build intel­li­gence on the Tal­iban. The Bureau dis­cov­ered that the Tal­iban regime had award­ed a major tele­phone net­work con­tract to a joint US-UK ven­ture, run by an Amer­i­can entre­pre­neur, Ehsanol­lah Bay­at and two British busi­ness­men, Stu­art Ben­tham and Lord Michael Cecil.

    “The plan was sim­ple” Davis said. “Because the Tal­iban want­ed Amer­i­can equip­ment for their new phone net­work, this would allow the FBI and NSA, the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency, to build extra cir­cuits into all the equip­ment before it was flown out to Afghanistan for use. Once installed, these extra cir­cuits would allow the FBI and NSA to record or lis­ten live to every sin­gle land­line and mobile phone call in Afghanistan. The FBI would know the time the call was made and its dura­tion. They would know the caller’s name, the num­ber dialled, and even the caller’s PIN.”

    But the plan, Oper­a­tion Fox­den, was delayed by a turf war, dur­ing which “the FBI and the CIA spent more than a year fight­ing over who should be in charge”, he said.

    The oper­a­tion was even­tu­al­ly giv­en the green light on 8 Sep­tem­ber 2001 — three days before the al-Qai­da attacks. “A huge oppor­tu­ni­ty was missed,” Davis said.

    He added that when Ben­tham and Cecil sued Bay­at in the New York courts, and Bay­at lodged a legal claim against the two Britons, the case was struck out and all records removed from the courts pub­lic data­base on the grounds of State Secrets Priv­i­lege, a legal doc­trine that per­mits the US gov­ern­ment to shut down lit­i­ga­tion on the grounds of nation­al secu­ri­ty. The Britons attempt­ed to sue in Lon­don, Davis said, but the case failed because “so long is the reach of the Amer­i­can State Secrets Priv­i­lege” that they were pre­vent­ed from dis­cussing key details of the US case.

    ...

    Reprieve’s Exec­u­tive Direc­tor, Clare Algar, direc­tor of the legal char­i­ty Reprieve, said: “This demon­strates just how ready the intel­li­gence ser­vices are to cry nation­al secu­ri­ty in order to cov­er up their own embar­rass­ment. It is yet anoth­er com­pelling exam­ple — if one were need­ed — of why we can­not let the UK Gov­ern­men­t’s plans for secret jus­tice go ahead.”

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | March 29, 2012, 6:24 pm
  2. Note that Oper­a­tion Fox­den was first pub­licly revealed in this Van­i­ty Fair peice last year and it sounds like the CIA was the pri­ma­ry oppo­nent of the plan due to con­cerns over the MI6’s involve­ment. It also sounds like the CIA may have been the even­tu­al win­ner of the turf war when they got to set up a telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions net­work in Afghanistan very sim­i­lar to the one pro­posed in Oper­a­tion Fox­den, post-911...

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | March 29, 2012, 6:31 pm
  3. @Pterrafractyl: Thanks for the info. I’d sus­pect that there may have been some delib­er­ate sub­terfuge going on there, and not just incom­pe­tence. Yes, a huge oppro­tu­ni­ty was indeed missed.....=(

    Posted by Steven L. | March 30, 2012, 11:03 am
  4. http://www.browardbulldog.org/2013/06/mystery-of-sarasota-saudis-deepens-as-justice-moves-end-foi-lawsuit-citing-national-security/

    June 3, 2013 at 5:59 am
    Mys­tery of Sara­so­ta Saud­is deep­ens as Jus­tice moves to end FOI law­suit cit­ing nation­al secu­ri­ty
    Filed under 9/11, A1 Top Sto­ry {5 com­ments}

    By Dan Chris­tensen and Antho­ny Sum­mers, BrowardBulldog.org

    A senior FBI offi­cial has told a Fort Laud­erdale fed­er­al judge that dis­clo­sure of cer­tain clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion about Saud­is who hur­ried­ly left their Sara­so­ta area home short­ly before 9/11 “would reveal cur­rent spe­cif­ic tar­gets of the FBI’s nation­al secu­ri­ty inves­ti­ga­tions.”

    Records Sec­tion Chief David M. Hardy’s asser­tion is con­tained in a sworn 33-page dec­la­ra­tion filed in sup­port of a Jus­tice Depart­ment motion that seeks to end a Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion law­suit filed last year by BrowardBulldog.org.

    The government’s lat­est court fil­ings, thick with veiled ref­er­ences to for­eign coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence oper­a­tions and tar­gets, deep­en the mys­tery about a once-secret FBI inves­ti­ga­tion of Esam and Deb­o­rah Ghaz­za­wi and their ten­ants, son-in-law and daugh­ter, Abdu­laz­iz and Anoud al-Hijji.

    The fil­ings by Mia­mi Assis­tant U.S. Attor­ney Car­ole M. Fer­nan­dez also seek to jus­ti­fy in the name of nation­al secu­ri­ty numer­ous dele­tions of infor­ma­tion from FBI records about the decade-old inves­ti­ga­tion that were released recent­ly amid the ongo­ing lit­i­ga­tion.

    They do not, how­ev­er, explain why an inves­ti­ga­tion the FBI has said found no con­nec­tion between those Saud­is and the Sept. 11th attacks that killed near­ly 3,000 peo­ple involves infor­ma­tion so secret its dis­clo­sure “could be expect­ed to cause seri­ous dam­age to nation­al secu­ri­ty.”

    The inves­ti­ga­tion, which the FBI did not dis­close to Con­gress or the 9/11 Com­mis­sion, was first report­ed in a Sep­tem­ber 2011 sto­ry pub­lished simul­ta­ne­ous­ly by BrowardBulldog.org and The Mia­mi Her­ald.

    It began after neigh­bors in the gat­ed com­mu­ni­ty of Prestancia report­ed the al-Hijjis had sud­den­ly depart­ed their home at 4224 Escon­di­to Cir­cle about two weeks before the attacks. They left per­son­al belong­ings and fur­ni­ture, includ­ing three new­ly reg­is­tered cars – one of them brand new.

    Accord­ing to a coun­tert­er­ror­ism offi­cer and Prestancia’s for­mer admin­is­tra­tor Lar­ry Berberich, gate­house log books and pho­tographs of license tags were lat­er used by the FBI to deter­mine that vehi­cles used by the hijack­ers had vis­it­ed the al-Hijji home.

    The FBI lat­er con­firmed the exis­tence of the probe, but said it found no evi­dence con­nect­ing the Ghaz­za­w­is or the al-Hijjis to the hijack­ers or the 9/11 plot.

    RECORDS CONTRADICT DENIALS

    The new­ly released FBI records con­tra­dict the FBI’s pub­lic denials. One dat­ed April 4, 2002 says the inves­ti­ga­tion “revealed many con­nec­tions” between the Saud­is who fled Sara­so­ta and “indi­vid­u­als asso­ci­at­ed with the ter­ror­ist attacks on 9/11/2001.”

    The report goes on to list three of those indi­vid­u­als and con­nect them to the Venice, Flori­da flight school where sui­cide hijack­ers Mohamed Atta and Mar­wan al-She­hhi trained. The names of those indi­vid­u­als were not made pub­lic.

    The FBI removed addi­tion­al infor­ma­tion in the report, cit­ing a pair of nation­al secu­ri­ty exemp­tions to the Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion Act.

    In his dec­la­ra­tion to U.S. Dis­trict Judge William J. Zloch, the FBI’s Hardy sought to explain those dele­tions and oth­ers. He said infor­ma­tion was with­held “to pro­tect an intel­li­gence method uti­lized by the FBI for gath­er­ing intel­li­gence data.” Such meth­ods include con­fi­den­tial infor­mants.

    Hardy, who stat­ed that he has been des­ig­nat­ed a “declas­si­fi­ca­tion author­i­ty” by Attor­ney Gen­er­al Eric Hold­er, said redac­tions regard­ing the Sara­so­ta inves­ti­ga­tion were also made to pro­tect “actu­al intel­li­gence activ­i­ties and meth­ods used by the FBI against spe­cif­ic tar­gets of for­eign coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence inves­ti­ga­tions or oper­a­tions.”

    “The infor­ma­tion obtained from the intel­li­gence activ­i­ties or meth­ods is very spe­cif­ic in nature, pro­vid­ed dur­ing a spe­cif­ic time peri­od and known to very few indi­vid­u­als,” Hardy said.

    DAMAGE TO NATIONAL SECURITY?

    No details were pro­vid­ed, but Hardy said the infor­ma­tion was “com­piled regard­ing a spe­cif­ic indi­vid­ual or orga­ni­za­tion of nation­al secu­ri­ty inter­est.” He added that its dis­clo­sure “rea­son­ably could be expect­ed to cause seri­ous dam­age to the nation­al secu­ri­ty.”

    Dis­clo­sure would reveal the FBI’s “cur­rent spe­cif­ic tar­gets” and “allow hos­tile enti­ties to dis­cov­er the cur­rent intel­li­gence gath­er­ing meth­ods used and reveal the cri­te­ria and pri­or­i­ties assigned to cur­rent intel­li­gence or coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence inves­ti­ga­tions,” Hardy said.

    “With the aid of this detailed infor­ma­tion, hos­tile enti­ties could devel­op coun­ter­mea­sures which would, in turn, severe­ly dis­rupt the FBI’s intel­li­gence gath­er­ing capa­bil­i­ties” and dam­age efforts “to detect and appre­hend vio­la­tors of the Unit­ed States’ nation­al secu­ri­ty and crim­i­nal laws.”

    For months, the FBI claimed it had no respon­sive doc­u­ments regard­ing its Sara­so­ta inves­ti­ga­tion. But on March 28, Hardy unex­pect­ed­ly announced the Bureau had locat­ed and reviewed 35 pages of records. It released 31 of them.

    Pros­e­cu­tor Fer­nan­dez now con­tends the FBI con­duct­ed a “rea­son­able search” and that “no agency records are being improp­er­ly with­held.”

    Her motion asks the court to grant sum­ma­ry judg­ment in the government’s favor.

    Dan Chris­tensen is the edi­tor of Broward Bull­dog. Antho­ny Sum­mers is co-author with Rob­byn Swan of “The Eleventh Day: The Full Sto­ry of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden,”published by Bal­lan­tine Books, which was a Final­ist for the Pulitzer Prize for His­to­ry in 2012.

    Posted by Vanfield | June 8, 2013, 11:13 pm
  5. @Vanfield–

    Note the stat­ed pre-occu­pa­tion of pro­tect­ing cur­rent tar­gets of inves­ti­ga­tions and con­fi­den­tial infor­mants.

    That, cou­pled with the ref­er­ence to Huff­man Avi­a­tion which you high­light­ed, makes me won­der of Rudi Dekkers may be pro­vid­ing infor­ma­tion on the folks in Venice.

    We’ll explore this more in a future post.

    Best,

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | June 9, 2013, 5:40 pm
  6. Fol­low­ing up on the lat­est round of utter­ly damn­ing 9/11 rev­e­la­tions — the 21-page dec­la­ra­tion by Don Canes­traro, a lead inves­ti­ga­tor for the Office of Mil­i­tary Com­mis­sions — that make clear US intel­li­gence was not just ful­ly aware of the 9/11 hijack­ers’ activ­i­ties in the US but were pro­tect­ing them from law enforce­ment, it’s worth not­ing just had damn­ing these lat­est rev­e­la­tions are in the con­text of the Able Dan­ger intel­li­gence pro­gram.

    Recall how much like Alec Sta­tion was a high­ly-clas­si­fied joint CIA-FBI oper­a­tion tasked with track­ing al Qae­da set up in 1996, Able Dan­ger was sim­i­lar­ly a high­ly clas­si­fied Pen­ta­gon intel­li­gence oper­a­tion set up in 1999 with the focused task of sur­veilling al Qaeda’s activ­i­ties. And as we’re going to see, Alec Sta­tion and Able Dan­ger did­n’t just have sim­i­lar goals. They were also track­ing the same al Qae­da cell. Or at least parts of the same same: the ‘Brook­lyn cell’ con­sist­ing of lead 9/11 hijack­er Moham­mad Atta, Mar­wan al-She­hhi, Khalid al-Mihd­har and Nawaf al-Haz­mi. As we just saw in those damn­ing rev­e­la­tions, it was al-Mihd­har and al-Haz­mi who the Alec Sta­tion had not only iden­ti­fied as al Qae­da oper­a­tives but appeared to pro­tect from dis­cov­ery by the rest of the FBI. Also recall how Alec Sta­tion had the high­ly unusu­al dual role of both sur­veilling al Qae­da and also recruit­ing assets, lead­ing to obvi­ous ques­tions as to whether or not the pro­tect­ed pair had been recruit­ed as CIA assets. So as we digest these new rev­e­la­tions, it’s going to be impor­tant to keep in mind that this same pro­tect­ed pair were also iden­ti­fied by the Able Dan­ger by the sum­mer of 2000 as being mem­bers of an al Qae­da cell with Moham­ma Atta.

    And as we’ve also seen from Daniel Hop­sick­er’s report­ing on Atta’s activ­i­ties in Flori­da and the inter­na­tion­al net­work of asso­ciates that went well beyond jihadists and includ­ed fig­ures like Wolf­gang Bohringer, when we’re talk­ing about Moham­mad Atta’s activ­i­ties in the US we’re like­ly talk­ing about anoth­er pro­tect­ed intel­li­gence oper­a­tion that suf­fered from a sim­i­lar post‑9/11 coverup.

    So with all that in mind, here’s an August 2005, New York Times piece describ­ing the then-new rev­e­la­tions about the Able Dan­ger pro­gram. Rev­e­la­tions from 2005 that make a lot more sense in light of all new rev­e­la­tions 18 years lat­er. And look a lot more damn­ing:

    The New York Times

    4 in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied To Qae­da in ’00

    By Dou­glas Jehl

    Aug. 9, 2005

    WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — More than a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, a small, high­ly clas­si­fied mil­i­tary intel­li­gence unit iden­ti­fied Mohammed Atta and three oth­er future hijack­ers as like­ly mem­bers of a cell of Al Qae­da oper­at­ing in the Unit­ed States, accord­ing to a for­mer defense intel­li­gence offi­cial and a Repub­li­can mem­ber of Con­gress.

    In the sum­mer of 2000, the mil­i­tary team, known as Able Dan­ger, pre­pared a chart that includ­ed visa pho­tographs of the four men and rec­om­mend­ed to the mil­i­tary’s Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand that the infor­ma­tion be shared with the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion, the con­gress­man, Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Curt Wel­don of Penn­syl­va­nia, and the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said Mon­day.

    The rec­om­men­da­tion was reject­ed and the infor­ma­tion was not shared, they said, appar­ent­ly at least in part because Mr. Atta, and the oth­ers were in the Unit­ed States on valid entry visas. Under Amer­i­can law, Unit­ed States cit­i­zens and green-card hold­ers may not be sin­gled out in intel­li­gence-col­lec­tion oper­a­tions by the mil­i­tary or intel­li­gence agen­cies. That pro­tec­tion does not extend to visa hold­ers, but Mr. Wel­don and the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said it might have rein­forced a sense of dis­com­fort com­mon before Sept. 11 about shar­ing intel­li­gence infor­ma­tion with a law enforce­ment agency.

    A for­mer spokesman for the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion, Al Felzen­berg, con­firmed that mem­bers of its staff, includ­ing Philip Zelikow, the exec­u­tive direc­tor, were told about the pro­gram on an over­seas trip in Octo­ber 2003 that includ­ed stops in Afghanistan and Pak­istan. But Mr. Felzen­berg said the briefers did not men­tion Mr. Atta’s name.

    The report pro­duced by the com­mis­sion last year does not men­tion the episode.

    Mr. Wel­don first spoke pub­licly about the episode in June, in a lit­tle-noticed speech on the House floor and in an inter­view with The Times-Her­ald in Nor­ris­town, Pa. The mat­ter resur­faced on Mon­day in a report by GSN: Gov­ern­ment Secu­ri­ty News, which is pub­lished every two weeks and cov­ers domes­tic-secu­ri­ty issues. The GSN report was based on accounts pro­vid­ed by Mr. Wel­don and the same for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial, who was inter­viewed on Mon­day by The New York Times in Mr. Wel­don’s office.

    In a tele­phone inter­view from his home in Penn­syl­va­nia, Mr. Wel­don said he was bas­ing his asser­tions on sim­i­lar ones by at least three oth­er for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cers with direct knowl­edge of the project, and said that some had first called the episode to his atten­tion short­ly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

    The account is the first asser­tion that Mr. Atta, an Egypt­ian who became the lead hijack­er in the plot, was iden­ti­fied by any Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment agency as a poten­tial threat before the Sept. 11 attacks. Among the 19 hijack­ers, only Khalid al-Mihd­har and Nawaf al-Haz­mi had been iden­ti­fied as poten­tial threats by the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency before the sum­mer of 2000, and infor­ma­tion about them was not pro­vid­ed to the F.B.I. until the spring of 2001.

    ...

    The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty, say­ing he did not want to jeop­ar­dize polit­i­cal sup­port and the pos­si­ble financ­ing for future data-min­ing oper­a­tions by speak­ing pub­licly. He said the team had been estab­lished by the Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand in 1999, under a clas­si­fied direc­tive issued by Gen. Hugh Shel­ton, then the chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assem­ble infor­ma­tion about Al Qae­da net­works around the world.

    “Ulti­mate­ly, Able Dan­ger was going to give deci­sion mak­ers options for tak­ing out Al Qae­da tar­gets,” the for­mer defense intel­li­gence offi­cial said.

    He said that he deliv­ered the chart in sum­mer 2000 to the Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand head­quar­ters in Tam­pa, Fla., and said that it had been based on infor­ma­tion from unclas­si­fied sources and gov­ern­ment records, includ­ing those of the Immi­gra­tion and Nat­u­ral­iza­tion Ser­vice.

    “We knew these were bad guys, and we want­ed to do some­thing about them,” the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said.

    ...

    Mr. Wel­don is an out­spo­ken fig­ure who is a vice chair­man of both the House Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee and the House Home­land Secu­ri­ty Com­mit­tee. He said he had rec­og­nized the sig­nif­i­cance of the episode only recent­ly, when he con­tact­ed mem­bers of the mil­i­tary intel­li­gence team as part of research for his book, “Count­down to Ter­ror: The Top-Secret Infor­ma­tion That Could Pre­vent the Next Ter­ror­ist Attack on Amer­i­ca and How the C.I.A. Has Ignored It.”

    Mr. Wel­don’s book prompt­ed one vet­er­an C.I.A. case offi­cer to strong­ly dis­pute the reli­a­bil­i­ty of one Iran­ian source cit­ed in the book, say­ing the Iran­ian “was a waste of my time and resources.”

    Mr. Wel­don said that he had dis­cussed the Able Dan­ger episode with Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Peter Hoek­stra, the Michi­gan Repub­li­can who is chair­man of the House Intel­li­gence Com­mit­tee, and that at least two Con­gres­sion­al com­mit­tees were look­ing into the episode.

    In the inter­view on Mon­day, Mr. Wel­don said he had been aware of the episode since short­ly after the Sept. 11 attack, when mem­bers of the team first brought it to his atten­tion. He said he had told Stephen J. Hadley, then the deputy nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, about it in a con­ver­sa­tion in Sep­tem­ber or Octo­ber 2001, and had been sur­prised when the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion report made no men­tion of the oper­a­tion.

    Col. Samuel Tay­lor, a spokesman for the mil­i­tary’s Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand, said no one at the com­mand now had any knowl­edge of the Able Dan­ger pro­gram, its mis­sion or its find­ings. If the pro­gram exist­ed, Colonel Tay­lor said, it was prob­a­bly a high­ly clas­si­fied “spe­cial access pro­gram” on which only a few mil­i­tary per­son­nel would have been briefed.

    Dur­ing the inter­view in Mr. Wel­don’s office, the for­mer defense intel­li­gence offi­cial showed a floor-sized chart depict­ing Al Qae­da net­works around the world that he said was a larg­er, more detailed ver­sion sim­i­lar to the one pre­pared by the Able Dan­ger team in the sum­mer of 2000.

    He said the orig­i­nal chart, like the new one, had includ­ed the names and pho­tographs of Mr. Atta and Mar­wan al-She­hhi, as well as Mr. Mihd­har and Mr. Haz­mi, who were iden­ti­fied as mem­bers of what was described as an Amer­i­can-based “Brook­lyn” cell, as one of five such Al Qae­da cells around the world.

    The offi­cial said the link to Brook­lyn was meant as a term of art rather than to be inter­pret­ed lit­er­al­ly, say­ing that the unit had pro­duced no firm evi­dence link­ing the men to the bor­ough of New York City but that a com­put­er analy­sis seek­ing to estab­lish pat­terns in links between the four men had found that “the soft­ware put them all togeth­er in Brook­lyn.”

    Accord­ing to the com­mis­sion report, Mr. Mihd­har and Mr. Haz­mi were first iden­ti­fied in late 1999 or 2000 by the C.I.A. as Qae­da mem­bers who might be involved in a ter­ror­ist oper­a­tion. They were tracked from Yemen to Malaysia before their trail was lost in Thai­land. Nei­ther man was put on a State Depart­ment watch list before they flew to Los Ange­les in ear­ly 2000. The F.B.I. was not warned about them until the spring of 2001, and no efforts to track them were made until August 2001.

    Nei­ther Mr. She­hhi nor Mr. Atta was iden­ti­fied by the Amer­i­can intel­li­gence agen­cies as a poten­tial threat, the com­mis­sion report said. Mr. She­hhi arrived in Newark on a flight from Brus­sels on May 29, 2000, and Mr. Atta arrived in Newark from Prague on June 3 that year.

    The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said the first Able Dan­ger report iden­ti­fied all four men as mem­bers of a “Brook­lyn” cell, and was pro­duced with­in two months after Mr. Atta arrived in the Unit­ed States. The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said he was among a group that briefed Mr. Zelikow and at least three oth­er mem­bers of the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion staff about Able Dan­ger when they vis­it­ed the Afghanistan-Pak­istan region in Octo­ber 2003.

    The offi­cial said he had explic­it­ly men­tioned Mr. Atta as a mem­ber of a Qae­da cell in the Unit­ed States. He said the staff encour­aged him to call the com­mis­sion when he returned to Wash­ing­ton at the end of the year. When he did so, the ex-offi­cial said, the calls were not returned.

    Mr. Felzen­berg, the for­mer Sept. 11 com­mis­sion spokesman, said on Mon­day that he had talked with some of the for­mer staff mem­bers who par­tic­i­pat­ed in the brief­ing.

    “They all say that they were not told any­thing about a Brook­lyn cell,” Mr. Felzen­berg said. “They were told about the Pen­ta­gon oper­a­tion. They were not told about the Brook­lyn cell. They said that if the briefers had men­tioned any­thing that star­tling, it would have got­ten their atten­tion.”

    As a result of the brief­ing, he said, the com­mis­sion staff filed doc­u­ment requests with the Pen­ta­gon for infor­ma­tion about the pro­gram. The Pen­ta­gon com­plied, he said, adding that the staff had not hid­den any­thing from the com­mis­sion­ers.

    “The com­mis­sion­ers were cer­tain­ly told of the doc­u­ment requests and what the find­ings were,” Mr. Felzen­berg said.

    ———–

    “4 in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied To Qae­da in ‘00”
    By Dou­glas Jehl; The New York Times; 08/09/2005

    “The account is the first asser­tion that Mr. Atta, an Egypt­ian who became the lead hijack­er in the plot, was iden­ti­fied by any Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment agency as a poten­tial threat before the Sept. 11 attacks. Among the 19 hijack­ers, only Khalid al-Mihd­har and Nawaf al-Haz­mi had been iden­ti­fied as poten­tial threats by the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency before the sum­mer of 2000, and infor­ma­tion about them was not pro­vid­ed to the F.B.I. until the spring of 2001.

    It was 2005 when we first learned about Able Dan­ger, the Pen­tagon’s secret sur­veil­lance pro­gram that had iden­ti­fied an al Qae­da cell with four mem­bers that includ­ed not just the appar­ent leader of the oper­a­tion, Mohammed Atta, but also Khalid al-Mihd­har and Nawaf al-Haz­mi, the two fig­ures we now know Alec Sta­tion was basi­cal­ly run­ning cov­er for dur­ing this peri­od. As we can see, they even had visa pho­tographs on the four. Recall how the CIA was sur­veilling al-Mihd­har and al-Haz­mi in Jan­u­ary of 2000 dur­ing their trip to Malaysia and even broke into al-Mihd­har’s hotel room and pho­to­copied his pass­port show­ing a mul­ti-entry US visa. Were al-Mihd­har and al-Haz­mi CIA assets at this point? We still have no idea. We just know the Alec Sta­tion did­n’t want US intel­li­gence mess­ing around with this pair. That’s a huge part of the con­text of what what know about the Able Dan­gler pro­gram and the intel­li­gence-shar­ing chal­lenges it ran into. By the sum­mer of 2000, Able Dan­ger had not just already col­lect­ed infor­ma­tion on this al Qae­da cell, includ­ing visa pho­tographs, but it was already rec­om­mend­ing that the infor­ma­tion be shared with the FBI. And yet, as with Alec Sta­tion, that intel­li­gence shar­ing nev­er hap­pened. It was one of the most damn­ing episodes of pre‑9/11 intel­li­gence ‘fail­ures’, so of course it was left out of the 2004 9/11 Com­mis­sion report:

    ...
    In the sum­mer of 2000, the mil­i­tary team, known as Able Dan­ger, pre­pared a chart that includ­ed visa pho­tographs of the four men and rec­om­mend­ed to the mil­i­tary’s Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand that the infor­ma­tion be shared with the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion, the con­gress­man, Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Curt Wel­don of Penn­syl­va­nia, and the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said Mon­day.

    The rec­om­men­da­tion was reject­ed and the infor­ma­tion was not shared, they said, appar­ent­ly at least in part because Mr. Atta, and the oth­ers were in the Unit­ed States on valid entry visas. Under Amer­i­can law, Unit­ed States cit­i­zens and green-card hold­ers may not be sin­gled out in intel­li­gence-col­lec­tion oper­a­tions by the mil­i­tary or intel­li­gence agen­cies. That pro­tec­tion does not extend to visa hold­ers, but Mr. Wel­don and the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said it might have rein­forced a sense of dis­com­fort com­mon before Sept. 11 about shar­ing intel­li­gence infor­ma­tion with a law enforce­ment agency.

    ...

    The report pro­duced by the com­mis­sion last year does not men­tion the episode.

    ...

    In a tele­phone inter­view from his home in Penn­syl­va­nia, Mr. Wel­don said he was bas­ing his asser­tions on sim­i­lar ones by at least three oth­er for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cers with direct knowl­edge of the project, and said that some had first called the episode to his atten­tion short­ly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
    ...

    Also note how, much like Alec Sta­tion appeared to be a joint CIA-FBI oper­a­tion oper­at­ing out­side the nor­mal chan­nels of com­mand tasked with track­ing al Qae­da, the Able Dan­ger pro­gram was estab­lished in 1999 under a clas­si­fied direc­tive with the same sur­veil­lance mis­sion. Although it’s worth not­ing that it does­n’t appear that Able Dan­ger was also tasked with asset recruit­ment. Recall how that was one of the bizarre aspects of Alec Sta­tion: not only were its ana­lysts issu­ing orders to case offi­cers in the field out­side of nor­mal pro­to­col, but it was tasked with both sur­veil­lance and asset recruit­ment. Alec Sta­tion was not a nor­mal intel­li­gence enti­ty. And here we find that Able Dan­ger was sim­i­lar­ly so secret that the spokesman for the mil­i­tary’s Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand insist­ed that no one at the com­mand had any knowl­edge of the pro­gram and it was prob­a­bly a high­ly clas­si­fied “spe­cial access pro­gram”:

    ...

    The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty, say­ing he did not want to jeop­ar­dize polit­i­cal sup­port and the pos­si­ble financ­ing for future data-min­ing oper­a­tions by speak­ing pub­licly. He said the team had been estab­lished by the Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand in 1999, under a clas­si­fied direc­tive issued by Gen. Hugh Shel­ton, then the chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assem­ble infor­ma­tion about Al Qae­da net­works around the world.

    “Ulti­mate­ly, Able Dan­ger was going to give deci­sion mak­ers options for tak­ing out Al Qae­da tar­gets,” the for­mer defense intel­li­gence offi­cial said.

    He said that he deliv­ered the chart in sum­mer 2000 to the Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand head­quar­ters in Tam­pa, Fla., and said that it had been based on infor­ma­tion from unclas­si­fied sources and gov­ern­ment records, includ­ing those of the Immi­gra­tion and Nat­u­ral­iza­tion Ser­vice.

    “We knew these were bad guys, and we want­ed to do some­thing about them,” the for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said.

    ...

    Mr. Wel­don said that he had dis­cussed the Able Dan­ger episode with Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Peter Hoek­stra, the Michi­gan Repub­li­can who is chair­man of the House Intel­li­gence Com­mit­tee, and that at least two Con­gres­sion­al com­mit­tees were look­ing into the episode.

    In the inter­view on Mon­day, Mr. Wel­don said he had been aware of the episode since short­ly after the Sept. 11 attack, when mem­bers of the team first brought it to his atten­tion. He said he had told Stephen J. Hadley, then the deputy nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, about it in a con­ver­sa­tion in Sep­tem­ber or Octo­ber 2001, and had been sur­prised when the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion report made no men­tion of the oper­a­tion.

    Col. Samuel Tay­lor, a spokesman for the mil­i­tary’s Spe­cial Oper­a­tions Com­mand, said no one at the com­mand now had any knowl­edge of the Able Dan­ger pro­gram, its mis­sion or its find­ings. If the pro­gram exist­ed, Colonel Tay­lor said, it was prob­a­bly a high­ly clas­si­fied “spe­cial access pro­gram” on which only a few mil­i­tary per­son­nel would have been briefed.
    ...

    Also note how, in this 2005 report, we are told that al-Mihd­har and al-Haz­mi were tracked from Yemen to Malaysia before their trail was lost in Thai­land. And then we are told the FBI was only warned about the pair in the spring of 2001 and no efforts were made to track them until August of 2001. That appears to be a ref­er­ence to the CIA sur­veil­lance oper­a­tion in Malaysia where they broke into al-Mihd­har’s hotel, pho­tographed his pass­ports, and learned he has a mul­ti-entry US visa. And yet none of this infor­ma­tion was shared with the FBI at the time. It was only on August 23, 2001, when an FBI agent, “CS-12”, stum­bled across an elec­tron­ic com­mu­ni­ca­tion from FBI head­quar­ters iden­ti­fy­ing al-Haz­mi and al-Mihd­har as as al Qae­da oper­a­tives in the US. When CS-12 con­tact the FBI agent work­ing at Alec Sta­tion who authored the com­mu­ni­ca­tion, Dina Cor­si, they were ordered to delete the memo “imme­di­ate­ly”. The next day, CS-12 was ordered to “stand down” and “cease look­ing” into the mat­ter. It as on August 26, 2001, when Alec Sta­tion final­ly for­mal­ly informed the FBI that al-Haz­mi and al-Mihd­har were in the US. So when we read this 2005 report telling us that “no efforts to track them were made until August 2001”, it’s impor­tant to keep in mind all of the rev­e­la­tions we’ve since learned. Rev­e­la­tions that indi­cat­ed al-Haz­mi and al-Mihd­har were not only being tracked by US intel­li­gence but active­ly pro­tect­ed:

    ...
    Dur­ing the inter­view in Mr. Wel­don’s office, the for­mer defense intel­li­gence offi­cial showed a floor-sized chart depict­ing Al Qae­da net­works around the world that he said was a larg­er, more detailed ver­sion sim­i­lar to the one pre­pared by the Able Dan­ger team in the sum­mer of 2000.

    He said the orig­i­nal chart, like the new one, had includ­ed the names and pho­tographs of Mr. Atta and Mar­wan al-She­hhi, as well as Mr. Mihd­har and Mr. Haz­mi, who were iden­ti­fied as mem­bers of what was described as an Amer­i­can-based “Brook­lyn” cell, as one of five such Al Qae­da cells around the world.

    The offi­cial said the link to Brook­lyn was meant as a term of art rather than to be inter­pret­ed lit­er­al­ly, say­ing that the unit had pro­duced no firm evi­dence link­ing the men to the bor­ough of New York City but that a com­put­er analy­sis seek­ing to estab­lish pat­terns in links between the four men had found that “the soft­ware put them all togeth­er in Brook­lyn.”

    Accord­ing to the com­mis­sion report, Mr. Mihd­har and Mr. Haz­mi were first iden­ti­fied in late 1999 or 2000 by the C.I.A. as Qae­da mem­bers who might be involved in a ter­ror­ist oper­a­tion. They were tracked from Yemen to Malaysia before their trail was lost in Thai­land. Nei­ther man was put on a State Depart­ment watch list before they flew to Los Ange­les in ear­ly 2000. The F.B.I. was not warned about them until the spring of 2001, and no efforts to track them were made until August 2001.
    ...

    And that active coverup appar­ent­ly con­tin­ued post‑9/11, with the 2004 9/11 Com­mis­sion report assert­ing that US intel­li­gence had­n’t iden­ti­fied Atta or She­hhi as poten­tial threats. But as one for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial tells us, the Able Dan­ger pro­gram iden­ti­fied all four of the ‘Brook­lyn’ cell mem­bers with­in two months of Atta’s arrive in June of 2000. And accord­ing to this offi­cial, mem­bers of the 9/11 Com­mis­sion were def­i­nite­ly informed about the Able Dan­ger pro­gram and what it found about all four cell mem­bers. It’s a coverup. Impor­tant­ly, it’s a coverup that only some in the US intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty want­ed cov­ered up. There’s no short­age of anony­mous intel­li­gence offi­cials giv­ing damn­ing details for this sto­ry:

    ...
    Nei­ther Mr. She­hhi nor Mr. Atta was iden­ti­fied by the Amer­i­can intel­li­gence agen­cies as a poten­tial threat, the com­mis­sion report said. Mr. She­hhi arrived in Newark on a flight from Brus­sels on May 29, 2000, and Mr. Atta arrived in Newark from Prague on June 3 that year.

    The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said the first Able Dan­ger report iden­ti­fied all four men as mem­bers of a “Brook­lyn” cell, and was pro­duced with­in two months after Mr. Atta arrived in the Unit­ed States. The for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial said he was among a group that briefed Mr. Zelikow and at least three oth­er mem­bers of the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion staff about Able Dan­ger when they vis­it­ed the Afghanistan-Pak­istan region in Octo­ber 2003.

    The offi­cial said he had explic­it­ly men­tioned Mr. Atta as a mem­ber of a Qae­da cell in the Unit­ed States. He said the staff encour­aged him to call the com­mis­sion when he returned to Wash­ing­ton at the end of the year. When he did so, the ex-offi­cial said, the calls were not returned.
    ...

    And yet, despite that intel­li­gence offi­cials asser­tion that the 9/11 com­mis­sion mem­bers were def­i­nite­ly informed about Able Dan­ger’s iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of Mohammed Atta as an al Qae­da cell mem­ber, the for­mer spokesman for the com­mis­sion, Al Felzen­berg, insists that, while com­mis­sion mem­bers were indeed told about Able Dan­ge, they weren’t told Atta had been specif­i­cal­ly iden­ti­fied or any­thing at all about the Brook­lyn cell. It’s quite a con­tra­dic­tion:

    ...
    A for­mer spokesman for the Sept. 11 com­mis­sion, Al Felzen­berg, con­firmed that mem­bers of its staff, includ­ing Philip Zelikow, the exec­u­tive direc­tor, were told about the pro­gram on an over­seas trip in Octo­ber 2003 that includ­ed stops in Afghanistan and Pak­istan. But Mr. Felzen­berg said the briefers did not men­tion Mr. Atta’s name.

    ...

    Mr. Felzen­berg, the for­mer Sept. 11 com­mis­sion spokesman, said on Mon­day that he had talked with some of the for­mer staff mem­bers who par­tic­i­pat­ed in the brief­ing.

    “They all say that they were not told any­thing about a Brook­lyn cell,” Mr. Felzen­berg said. “They were told about the Pen­ta­gon oper­a­tion. They were not told about the Brook­lyn cell. They said that if the briefers had men­tioned any­thing that star­tling, it would have got­ten their atten­tion.”

    As a result of the brief­ing, he said, the com­mis­sion staff filed doc­u­ment requests with the Pen­ta­gon for infor­ma­tion about the pro­gram. The Pen­ta­gon com­plied, he said, adding that the staff had not hid­den any­thing from the com­mis­sion­ers.

    “The com­mis­sion­ers were cer­tain­ly told of the doc­u­ment requests and what the find­ings were,” Mr. Felzen­berg said.
    ...

    Will we ever get an clar­i­ty on what the com­mis­sion was actu­al­ly told and why an men­tion of Able Dan­gle was left out of 9/11 Com­mis­sion report? Pre­sum­ably not. Just as we’ll like­ly nev­er get any clar­i­ty on why the intel­li­gence col­lect­ed by Able Dan­ger was nev­er ade­quate­ly shared. It’s just going to be one damn­ing rev­e­la­tion after anoth­er. And one big damn­ing col­lec­tive yawn in response.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | April 22, 2023, 4:34 pm

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