Recorded August 28, 2005
REALAUDIO
Since 9/11, there has been a heightened level of discussion on the possibility of nuclear terrorism, particularly in light of the A.Q. Khan network and the smuggling of nuclear technology from Pakistan to a number of other countries. This broadcast sets forth information that demonstrates the complicity of the Safari Club in the development of the “Islamic Bomb.” An outsourcing of U.S. intelligence functions to Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan, the network was the principal element in the CIA’s support network for the Muslim mujahideen that drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Of course, it was that conflict that spawned Osama bin Laden as a warrior. In this program, the development of the Pakistani “Islamic Bomb” by the A.Q. Khan network is seen as a quid pro quo for Pakistani and Saudi help in fighting the Soviets. In addition to the fact that the Saudis were in effective to control of the A.Q. Khan network’s operations, the show demonstrates that CIA assets associated with that network were allowed to operate in the United States until well after 9/11!
Program Highlights Include: The important role of the BCCI in the financing of the A.Q. Khan network’s operations (the BCCI milieu is deeply involved in the events in, and around, 9/11); U.S. pressure on British investigators to abandon their investigation of the A.Q. Khan network; the operations of Nazir Ahmed Vaid, an apparent CIA asset whose operations on behalf of the A.Q. Khan network continued in the United States until after 9/11; the George W. Bush administration’s relaxing of sanctions imposed on Pakistan by the Clinton administration because of its efforts at promoting the spread of nuclear technology; the participation by the Theodor Shackley/Thomas Clines/Edwin Wilson network in the Afghan Mujahideen support effort.
1. The broadcast begins by presenting background information on the Safari Club. That information is contained in FTR#522. Underwritten by Saudi Arabia, the Safari Club entailed the outsourcing of U.S. intelligence operations to the Saudis and other countries. It is in the context of the Safari Club that the Saudi-funded Islamic Development Bank undertook much of the financing of the A.Q. Khan network and its development of the Islamic bomb.
“The same leadership that promulgated the Safari Club—the Saudi royals—also strongly funded and supported the Islamic Development Bank. Begun in 1973, the IDB now has 55 member states, with Saudi Arabia dominating, with 27.33 percent of the bank’s funding. As a comparison, Egypt contributes 9.48% and Pakistan just 3.41% of the bank’s total capital. It was through the bank’s scientific and economic development efforts that huge amounts were funneled into Pakistan, which ended up in the hands of A.Q. Khan and his now-infamous nuclear bomb-building syndicate.”
2. U.S. involvement with the A.Q. Khan network’s development of the Islamic bomb was a quid pro quo for Pakistani cooperation with the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—the same war that spawned Osama bin Laden.
“The effort that began prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and that President Carter’s National Security Adviser warned was a serious effort to build the first Islamic bomb—was deliberately ignored by Carter in order to secure Saudi and Pakistani cooperation for the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan. Like almost everything about the anti-Soviet effort, the Reagan administration expanded on it; and the CIA directly assisted the Pakistani nuclear effort by allowing Pakistani nationals to procure hardware for the program in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
(Idem.)
3. In RFA’s 4, 29, 30—available from Spitfire—we examined the privatized intelligence network developed to extend U.S. intelligence operations beyond the oversight of Congress. Utilizing the talents of Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, this network was operated principally by Theodore Shackley and Thomas Clines, two of the leading figures in CIA covert operations throughout much of the agency’s existence. This network was deeply involved with the Afghan support effort. It should be noted that the elder George Bush was deeply involved with the Wilson-Shackley-Clines operations, as well as the Safari Club. As we saw in FTR#522, the Safari Club, in turn, subsumed the operations of the Wilson-Shackley-Clines network to a considerable extent.
“ ‘There was nothing more important than propping up a free Afghanistan. One of the things I did was try to get the Afghan king, then living in exile in Italy, to come back to Afghanistan so we could build a new government,’ Tom Clines recalled. Although he was out of the CIA and officially retired, ‘I was trying to do my part in keeping Afghanistan in our column. . . .Shackley was working with the Royal families in the Gulf . . . all were contributing to the effort in the early 1980’s.’”
(Idem.)
4.
“Clines conceded that the off-the-books intelligence operations had been melded into the Afghan war effort. ‘We worked for who was helping the United States the most. The Saudis worked very closely with us.’ Clines recalled how Bernard Houghton, who had run Nugan Hand Bank in Saudi Arabia until it ran out of money, played a key role, working with Prince Turki and the Saudi GID.”
(Idem.)
5. Out of the enormous amounts of money the Saudis and the Safari Club channeled to the Afghan mujahideen support effort, the Pakistanis diverted a large sum in order to underwrite the cost of their nuclear network.
“What many people do not know was that the Safari Club had made a deal with Pakistan at the expense of the Afghan people. The Safari Club was run by the Saudis. It was a club to serve their purposes through the CIA. Shackley and Wilson were not members; only nations could belong. Shackley and Wilson were men who served the club in exchange for power, influence, and money. Pakistani Intelligence would handle all the money going to facilitate the proxy war against the Soviets. That meant that hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States and Saudi Arabia were being run through Pakistan with no accountability. ‘Unfortunately,’ said Robert Crowley, ‘the Pakistanis knew exactly where their cut of the money was to go.’ Where the money went was into an Islamic nuclear-weapons program supported by Saudi Arabia and accepted by the United States.”
(Ibid.; p. 314.)
6. Despite U.S. claims to the contrary, this country did not interdict the A.Q. Khan network. On the contrary, the U.S. blocked British attempts at interdicting A.Q. Khan’s operations
“During the early 1990’s, British Customs began looking closely at the United States—Pakistan nuclear network. One of their top agents was an Arabic-speaking Muslim who traveled the world tracking down A.Q. Khan’s network. The British soon learned that the United States had no interest in shutting down the network, which had been operating for years. The Muslim customs agent, whose identity must be protected for his own safety, was actually confronted by Khan in Dubai, where the agent had traced a number of Khan’s front companies. The agent testified in a trial involving associates of Khan’s that the father of the Pakistani bomb confronted the Muslim customs agent and called him ‘a traitor to Muslim people’ for uncovering the nuclear network that was supplying weapons equipment to Libya, Iran, Malaysia, and North Korea.”
(Idem.)
7.
“A top French Intelligence official, who asked that his name be withheld from publication, described the U.S.—Pakistani cover-up of the Khan network as having ‘an important precedent. Just as the U.S. allowed Israel to develop nuclear weapons, under pressure from the Saudis, the U.S. allowed Pakistan to be Saudi Arabia’s proxy as the first Islamic nuclear state. The Saudis put up the cash and have clean hands as Pakistan builds the bomb for its supposed defense against India over Kashmir . . . but my country and the British received no cooperation starting in the 1980’s when we discovered traces of Khan’s network. The U.S. did not want to discuss it.’”
(Ibid.; pp. 314–315.)
8. The U.S. actually shipped some of the hardware to A.Q. Khan’s operation!
“A senior source in the British government, who asks not to be named, confirms that Khan ran the network and that parts for the nuclear-weapons program came from the United States. Khan’s daughter, attending school in England, was being tutored, and at the ends of faxes dealing with logistics for her education, Khan would sometimes write, in his own hand, items he needed for the nuclear program.”
(Ibid.; p. 315.)
9. Next, the program details some of the history and background of the Pakistani nuclear effort:
“Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons had begun some fifteen years earlier. Shortly after taking office in 1972, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiker Ali Bhutto expressed his determination to develop a nuclear capability. His purpose was two fold: to offset the inherent threat posed by Pakistan’s much larger neighbor and avowed enemy, India; and to make his country a leader of the Islamic world. After India detonated its first atomic weapon on the Pakistani border in 1974, Bhutto pushed his nuclear program into high gear. To lead the effort, he tapped Abdul Qadeer Khan, an accomplished metallurgist and businessman with a strong desire for wealth. To finance his ambitious program, Bhutto turned to his country’s oil-rich ally, Saudi Arabia, and to Libya. China also pledged assistance. By 1976, when George Bush served as CIA Director, U.S. intelligence estimates reported, in a secret CIA report on Pakistan, that Pakistan was engaged in ‘a crash program to develop nuclear weapons.’”
(Idem.)
10. As mentioned above, the U.S. “signed on” with the Pakistani nuke program after the start of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
“In 1979, while awaiting execution following his overthrow, Bhutto wrote in his memoirs that his goal as prime minister had been to put the ‘Islamic Civilization’ on an even footing with ‘Christian, Jewish and Hindu Civilizations’ by creating a ‘full nuclear capability’ for the Islamic world. The man who overthrew Bhutto, General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, carried on that effort. In April 1979, when President Zia refused to halt work on the ‘Islamic Bomb,’ President Jimmy Carter cut off American economic and military aid to Pakistan. Just eight months later, however, following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Carter struck the ultimate Faustian bargain in order to win Zia’s approval for using Pakistan as a base of operations for the mujahideen. Zia’s fortunes further improved following the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.”
(Ibid.; pp. 315–316.)
11.
“With the covert U.S. war in Afghanistan intensifying, the Pakistani dictator gained significant advantage and used it. In addition to winning large economic and military-aid packages for his country, he extracted a promise from the Reagan-Bush administration that there would be no U.S. interference in Pakistan’s ‘internal affairs.’ That meant no complaints about Zia’s dictatorial rule and no obstruction of his efforts to build an Islamic Bomb. To keep up appearances, Zia publicly maintained that he was not developing nuclear weapons. However, in 1983, a secret State Department briefing memo revealed that there was ‘unambiguous evidence’ that Pakistan was ‘actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program’ and that China was providing technological assistance. At the time, U.S. law prohibited providing assistance to any country that was importing certain nuclear-weapons technology. The Reagan-Bush administration simply ignored the legislation, arguing that cutting off aid to Pakistan would harm U.S. national interests.”
(Ibid.; p. 316.)
12. Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson was a major backer of the Afghan mujahideen and actively encouraged the Pakistanis to continue to develop their nuclear program.
“Throughout the 1980’s, Congressman Charlie Wilson, the former Ed Wilson associate, acting in concert with the CIA, repeatedly blocked Congressional efforts to halt American funding of Pakistan in order to protect a key ally in the covert Afghan war. Wilson went so far as to tell Zia, ‘Mr. President, as far as I’m concerned you can make all the bombs you want.’ Zia privately assured the congressman that Pakistan’s nuclear program was peaceful and that it would never build a delivery system. ‘The truth was the Americans had little choice,’ [Dawud] Salahuddin said. ‘Zia was worshipped by the mujahideen. He was the only foreign leader who attracted universal admiration amongst them, even though they were well aware that his ISI [Inter Service Intelligence] guys were taking what the Afghans figured was a 60-percent cut on all that was being sent to them. None of that took any glow off Zia’s halo. He was the only one to open his country to the Afghan resistance, allowed training camps, and there were always more Afghan refugees in Pakistan than in Iran. The Iranians did nothing of the sort or the scale in the military sphere. . . .The guy was almost saint-like for the resistance.’”
(Ibid.; pp. 316–317.)
13. American complicity with the program was assisted by Pakistani president Zia’s equivocation about the goals of their nuclear program, which he maintained were peaceful.
“Zia continued to deceive the United States about his nuclear-weapons ambitions. In the mid-1980’s, he flatly told the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters, that Pakistan was not building a bomb. When senior State Department officials later confronted him about the misrepresentation, Zia told them, ‘It is permissible to lie for Islam.’ He eventually gave up the pretense, telling Time magazine in 1987 that ‘Pakistan has the capability of building the bomb.’”
(Ibid.; p. 317.)
14.
“By 1985, the Saudi royal family had succeeded in drawing the United States into an Islamic morass. Over the years, the Wahhabi sect, a radical form of anti-Western Islam, had increasingly caused the high-living royal family political problems at home. To deal with this, the royal family gave the Wahhabi leaders free rein and paid lip service to their diatribes against the West and Israel. But after the fall of the Peacock Throne in Iran, religious divisions surfaced within the royal family, contributing to a schizophrenia in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy: with one hand the Saudis supported the secular Saddam Hussein against the Islamic regime in Iran, and with the other they dispatched Osama bin Laden and others as members of Saudi Intelligence to work with the most radical Islamic elements fighting to secure control of Afghanistan. The anti-Communist Reagan-Bush policy makers focused only on the goal of weakening the Soviet Union, ignoring the threat of radical Islam.”
(Idem.)
15. The Pakistani nuclear effort was subsidized through the BCCI—a vehicle for much of the covert operating of the 1980s. Current FBI director Robert Mueller led the official “investigation” into BCCI, and covered up much of what was there to be discovered.
“The efforts by the Saudis, Reagan, Casey, and Bush to destabilize the Soviet Union through the war in Afghanistan carried a huge price in terms of both money and the number of Afghan lives lost. Hundreds of millions of dollars poured into Pakistani Intelligence from the United States, with almost no control on how the funds were spent. The same BCCI bank accounts being used to fund the Afghan resistance were also used to fund the Pakistani nuclear-bomb program, according to a Senate report on BCCI.”
(Idem.)
16.
“The Reagan-Bush policy violated both American law and international nonproliferation treaties. But this type of violation was not unprecedented: the United States had allowed covert aid to Israel to help with their nuclear-weapons program in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In 1964, Lyndon Johnson had given James Angleton permission to assist Israel in further developing its nuclear-weapons program. Now the Reagan administration was leveling the playing field. The Saudis claimed that Israel had directly aided India in developing its program and had thus created a dangerous imbalance in the region. Allowing Pakistan to develop a weapon, but not to deploy it, seemed like a workable compromise and, the Saudis argued, the only solution. The 1979 memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter—had warned that the price of luring the Soviets might include abandoning efforts to stop nuclear proliferation in Pakistan. Just six years later, the Reagan-Bush team played a huge role in making the first Islamic nuclear weapon possible.”
(Ibid.; pp. 317–318.)
17. CIA Soviet analyst Melvin Goodman was among those few American intelligence analysts who noted that we were backing the wrong Islamic groups in Afghanistan. Arms dealer Sarkis Soghanlian (deeply involved with the Bush-Reagan-Safari Club clandestine operations of the 1980’s) maintains that the A.Q. Khan network was at all times directed by the Saudis.
“By the mid-1980’s, so much money was flowing through the Pakistani ISI that the CIA did not have a handle on where it ws going, according to Melvin Goodman, a former CIA analyst on the Soviet Union. ‘They were funding the wrong Islamic groups . . . ‚’ said Goodman, ‘and had little idea where the money was going or how it was being spent.’ Sarkis Soghanalian, who profited from providing arms for the secret-aid program, put it bluntly: ‘As in Iraq, the U.S. did not want to get its hands dirty. So the Saudis’ money and the U.S. money was handled by ISI. I can tell you that more than three quarters of the money was skimmed off the top. What went to buy weapons for the Afghan fighters was peanuts.’ According to Soghanalian, the funds were first laundered through various BCCI accounts before being disbursed to ISI and into an elaborate network run by A.Q. Khan. ‘Khan’s network was controlled by the Saudis, not Khan and not Pakistan,’ Soghanalian said. [Emphasis added.] ‘The Saudis were in on every major deal including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Malaysia.’”
(Ibid.; p. 318.)
18.
“After two decades of silence on Pakistan’s nuclear-proliferation network, the CIA went public in 2004, taking credit for uncovering the network. After A.Q. Khan’s bizarre confession, apology, and subsequent pardon (‘There was never any kind of authorization for these activities by the government,’ Khan said on Pakistani television. ‘I take full responsibility for my actions and seek your pardon’), the CIA claimed it had successfully exposed Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. In fact, Khan’s network was only the tip of a huge nuclear-technology iceberg.”
(Ibid.; pp. 318–319.)
19. Recent claims by the CIA that they had “uncovered” and “interdicted” the A.Q. Khan network are as disingenuous as Khan’s preposterous public proclamation that he alone—and not the Pakistani government—was responsible for the operation. That’s right, A.Q. Khan was a “lone nut!”
“The truth of how much the CIA and the private intelligence network knew in the 1980’s and what their actual role might have been is suggested by a pair of criminal cases—one in London and one in Houston. In each case, the defendant received very kind treatment from authorities, who allowed the nuclear-proliferation network to continue operating.”
(Ibid.; p. 319.)
20. Much of the rest of the program is devoted to a chilling discussion of the myriad operations of Nazir Ahmed Vaid, one of the A.Q. Khan network’s principal operatives. In addition to the fact that Vaid’s operations appear to have been conducted while he functioned as a CIA asset, it is vitally important to note that his U.S.-based activities were allowed to continue after 9/11!! The George W. Bush administration turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear efforts as yet another quid pro quo—this one in exchange for Pakistan’s “cooperation” in “the war on terror.” As was the case with much of the rest of the Khan network’s efforts, Vaid’s activities were also conducted through the BCCI, to a certain extent.
“In June 1984, the U.S. federal agents arrested Nazir Ahmed Vaid, a thirty-three-year-old Pakistani, as he attempted to smuggle out of Houston fifty high-speed electronic switches of a kind used to trigger nuclear bombs. At the time of the arrest, U.S. Customs agents seized several letters directly linking Vaid to S.A. Butt, the director of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission. Butt was already well known to U.S. and European arms control officials as ‘they key operative in Pakistan’s successful attempts in Europe in the 1970’s to obtain the technology and resources for the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium.’ Vaid reportedly offered to pay for the switches in gold, later determined to have been supplied by BCCI. U.S. federal officials, however, never informed the prosecutors that the letters connected Vaid to the Pakistani bomb program. Instead, a very special deal was worked out.”
(Idem.)
21. Note the evidence of U.S. complicity in Vaid’s activities!!
“Vaid ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of illegally attempting to export the switches, known as krytrons, without a license. U.S. District Judge James DeAnda sentenced Vaid to five years’ probation, the minimum possible sentence. At Vaid’s sentencing, both Judge DeAnda and the prosecutor agreed that Vaid was not a foreign agent. DeAnda described him simply as a businessman ‘trying to expedite what he thought was a business deal.’ Just three weeks later, Vaid was deported. According to reporter Seymour Hersh, Arnold Raphel, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, later revealed that there had been a ‘fix in’ on the Vaid case and that the CIA had arranged for the matter to be handled quietly.”
(Ibid.; pp. 319–320.)
22.
“Because of his conviction and deportation, Vaid was prohibited from returning to the United States. His name appears on a U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) database of banned individuals. Nevertheless, according to an ICE spokesman, Vaid has entered the country more than a half dozen times during the past several years. By simply dropping his last name and becoming ‘Nazir Ahmed,’ Vaid ‘fraudulently’ obtained multiple visas from the U.S. State Department, according to ICE.”
(Ibid.; p. 320.)
23.
“During his recent visits—some after the September 11, 2001, attacks—Vaid has established, in Texas, a string of companies with foreign affiliations. Three in particular stand out. On July 22, 2002, Vaid, using the name Nazir Ahmed, and his brother, Mohammed Iqbal Vaid, incorporated Najood Trading, Inc., and Idafa Investments, Inc. The sole shareholder in Majood is a company of the same name based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The Emirates are known to have been used as a transshipment point by the Khan network. The Dubai company identifies itself as being engaged in, among other things, ‘Building Service Materials Trading, Construction Materials Trading, Roofing Materials & Accessories.’ The directors of the Texas company are ‘Nazir Ahmed’ and Ahmed Ali, whose address is the same as that of the Dubai parent company.”
(Idem.)
24.
“The sole shareholder in Idafa Investments is an Islamic investment firm of the same name based in Mumbai, India. The Web site for the parent company identifies it as a broad-based investment advisory and management firm that operates on Quranic principles. The founder of the Indian company is listed as Ashraf Abdul-Haq Mohamedy. One of the directors of the Texas company is Ashraf Abdulhak [sic] Mohamedy. The others are Mohamed Ashraf Abdulhak Mohamedy, Mohammad [sic] Vaid, and ‘Nazir Ahmed.’ The Indian company’s Web site provides a link to Islamic Quest, an organization ‘established to present the correct position of Islam to Non-Muslims.’ The contact person for Islamic Quest is listed as Ashraf Abdulhaq Mohemedy.”
(Idem.)
25.
“Mohammed Vaid signed the incorporation papers for both Majood and Idafa on the same day, July 19, 2002, and before the same notary public. On that same day, and before the same notary. ‘Nazir Ahmed’ signed the incorporation papers for yet another company, MEC Enterprises (USA), Inc. (The signature above the printed words ‘Nazir Ahmed’ appears to read simply ‘Vaid.’) The sole shareholder in the company is MEC Engineering is a metals machining and manufacturing company. Its many ‘functions,’ as listed on its Web site, include: ‘Tanks Vessels & Shells,’ ‘Pharmaceutical Machineries & Equipment,’ ‘Waste Water Treatment,’ and ‘Engineering Pipeline Construction.’ The owners of MEC Engineering are Abdul Qavi Qureshi and Abdul Majid Qureshi. The directors of the Texas subsidiary, MEC Enterprises, are ‘Nazir Ahmed’ and Mohammed Aslam Qureshi of Karachi.”
(Ibid.; p. 321.)
26.
“As recently revealed, Khan’s middleman, B.S.A. Tahir, helped establish a subsidiary of a Malaysian metal machining company and used it to manufacture parts for high-speed centrifuges for enriching uranium. The parts were transshipped through Tahir’s Dubai-based front companies to end users such as Libya.”
(Idem.)
27.
“The first known U.S. company the Vaids set up following Nazir’s deportation was Finatra Communications, Inc. The company was incorporated by a third party, Ameen M. Ali of Houston, in August 1996. The shareholders were Mohammed Vaid, 20 percent, and ‘Nazir Ahmed,’ 80 percent. Both listed residential addresses in Houston. In 1999, the Vaids changed the name of the company to Finatra Group of Companies.”
(Idem.)
28.
“Nazir Vaid also operates a branch of Finatra in Pakistan. A 1997 article in Pakistan & Gulf Economist refers to ‘Nazir Ahmed Vaid’ as the chief executive of Finatra’s Cybercafe in Karachi, reportedly the first such establishment in Pakistan. The parent of the Cyber-café is the Finatra Group of Companies, also based in Karachi. Finatra Group controls several businesses, including a Web-hosting service, and energy-generation company, phone and cell-phone mental agencies, and a prepaid calling card dealer called Finatra Communications Private Limited. In 1998, Finatra Communications signed a contract with Pakistan’s official phone company, Pakistan Telecommunications Company Ltd., to provide prepaid phone-card service in Pakistan. The service also allows direct international dialing. All of these businesses could be useful to an intelligence service or a terrorist organization. In 2004, U.S. Customs was planning to detain Vaid on his next trip to the United States after being warned by a reporter that Vaid was traveling freely between the U.S. and Pakistan. In the fall of 2004, a U.S. Customs agent inexplicably told Vaid’s son that there was a detention order out on his father. That incident raises major questions about Vaid’s relationship with the United States government—and about security in the Customs Service.”
(Ibid.; pp. 321–322.)
29. Again, note that Vaid was able to function in the U.S. after 9/11!
“According to an ICE spokesman, Vaid last left the United States on November 1, 2002. More than one CIA source said that Nazir Vaid is a CIA ‘asset.’ In a telephone interview, Vaid flatly denied working for U.S. or Pakistani Intelligence. He also insists he is not engaged in the trade or shipment of nuclear technology.”
(Ibid.; p. 322.)
30. The George W. Bush administration was “shocked, shocked!” to learn of Pakistan’s Islamic bomb program. Note that the Clinton administration had imposed sanctions on Pakistan because of its nuclear activities. The Bush administration lifted those sanctions two weeks after 9/11!
“The George W. Bush administration expresses shock at the fact that Pakistan’s declared Islamic Bomb program became just that—a pan-Islamic nuclear-weapons supermarket. This is the same Bush administration that, in an eerily familiar move—just two weeks after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—lifted the sanctions that had been imposed by the Clinton administration on Pakistan because of its nuclear-weapons activities. The Bush change was to win Islamabad’s assistance in the new war in Afghanistan—the ‘war on terrorism.’ This is also the same administration that—publicly, at least—accepts A.Q. Khan’s absurd confession that he is responsible personally—and not as an agent of the Pakistani government—for disseminating nuclear weapons know-how to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.”
(Idem.)
31.
“The fact that the United States had protected the Islamic Bomb program also emerged in the Edwin Wilson case. During the time Wilson was fugitive, the former CIA front man sent the Reagan White House and the CIA detailed information about the Libyan nuclear program. The memorandum went from Wilson in Libya, through his lawyers, to Ted Shackley and the National Security Adviser. Wilson would later say he was never asked or questioned about what he had learned about the Libyan nuclear program. . . .”
(Ibid.; pp. 322–323.)
Banking with Bin Laden
There are reports that one of the US military bases that handles about a third of the nuclear missile arsenal failed its latest inspection. It would be interesting to know what the “tactical-level errors” were during the exercises? Like, was it a nun-related incident gone awry? An AI existential angst-induced mishap? Hopefully it wasn’t that bad, but this doesn’t sound good:
It’s worth noting that the House of Representatives passed a law last year that would address the longstanding security concerns at the various US nuclear laboratories as part of the House Defense Authorization Bill for 2013. It seems to focus on deregulation and reducing oversight as the answer:
Stories about nuclear power plants getting decommissioned early due to massive mechanical failures and safety concerns serve as reminders of the dangers of nuclear power and society’s addiction to unsafe sources of energy. But it turns out there’s an even scarier possibility lurking out there: the nuclear power plant operators might lose money! *gasp*
Here’s an article that’s a reminder that attempts to stop a country from developing nuclear weapons are also attempts to stop that country’s avowed enemies from obtaining nukes too:
No one ever said riding the blowback would be easy. Or ethical:
Hey, so if anyone knows of something humanity could use as a “you really don’t want to F@#k with us!”-deterrent that doesn’t threaten life on Earth, please forward your ideas to the Pentagon:
Ideas? Something to replace nukes as an overwhelmingly scary deterrent? Anyone?
Hmmmmm...does anyone happen to have a tribble lying around? That might be a nice non-violent yet effective deterrent to violent conflict. Well, hopefully.
And if the tribble deterrent doesn’t pan out there are still alternatives.
The War Nerd has a new piece on the growing Saudi involvement in the civil war in Yemen that highlights a recent event that raises some interesting questions related to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East: The Saudis had apparently been hoping the Pakistanis would provide the ground troops for an operation in Yemen. And the Pakistani parliament had a response. No:
Part of what makes the refusal of Pakistani to act as the Saudis ground force so interesting is that, as the article points out, the Saudi and Pakistani militaries have deep, long-standing ties to each other. So deep that it’s generally assumed that the Pakistan would basically give the Saudis some nukes in the event of a major conflict.
At least that was the widely held assumption. And, until now, there was no compelling reason to doubt that assumption.
But given Pakistan’s refusal to act as the Saudis’ foot soldiers, you have to wonder how willing the Saudis are going to continue relying on Pakistanis as as reliable nuclear vending machine. Now, presumably the Saudis wouldn’t go ahead and actually develop a nuclear weapons program of their own, although given the deep involvement in Pakistan’s program the technical capability is probably there. But with the Saudis aleady threatening to go nuclear if Tehran ever does the same, it will be interesting to see if Pakistan remains as Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons storage depot going forward or if the Saudis decide to take things (nukes) into their own hands.
Will a government that’s absolutely terrified of its own populace rising up someday decide to in-house its nukes program if it starts losing faith in its current nuclear buddy? That can’t be an easy decision.
Here’s one of those headlines that would be reserved for bad dystopian fiction if our world wasn’t already so badly dystopian:
“The U.N.‘s reversal follows its controversial decision in September to cancel an investigation into human rights abuses in the Yemen conflict — a decision that followed soon after Saudi Arabia was chosen to head a key U.N. human rights panel.”
It would be nice if this was surprising. And unfortunately the global community will have plenty more chances to help make up for this to children of Yemen. Why unfortunately? Because don’t forget that Yemen is scheduled to basically run out of water in a few years, so even if the war in Yemen was miraculously ended peacefully tomorrow, the Yemeni people are still scheduled to watch their economy and environment jointly collapse from thirst over the next couple of decades. So those Yemeni kids that survive today’s civil war are going to be the Yemeni adults dying from hunger and thirst a decade from now and for the foreseeable future.
Will the world care when it’s not war but an endless drought killing Yemenis? Probably not, but the opportunity to care will certainly be there. Increasingly and indefinitely.
It looks like the Doomsday Clock, which was recently set at “two minutes to midnight” for 2019 based on the twin mega-threats of climate change and nuclear war, is tragically running right on time: military tensions have flared up between India and Pakistan following the terrorist attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir. India pledged to retaliate and, sure enough, both Indian and Pakistan to have shot each other’s jets down following a series of retaliatory strikes from both sides. So now two of the world’s nuclear powers are running bombing raids against each other.
With that chilling unfolding situation, it’s worth noting one of the potential regional repurrcussions this conflict could have: Pakistan is arguably moving closer to becoming a client state of both Saudi Arabia and China. And as a result of becoming a Saudi client state, Pakistan is getting much closer to adopting the Saudi anti-Iranian line that it has long been resisting (Pakistan has a large Shia population). So while war between India and Pakistan should clearly be a top concern at this point, it’s possible that the tensions with India is also making a regional Sunni-Shia conflict more likely too:
“Pakistan is clearly relinquishing not inconsiderable control over its foreign policy and military resources, and reaffirming its diminished status as a client state of both superpowers. But Imran Khan’s government clearly assesses that’s a small price to pay for economic salvation and the gift of solid cover to continue to nourish jihadists as key geostrategic assets.”
It’s a common bargain between nation states: the wealthier state makes a bunch of investments and the poorer state implicitly relinquishes some control of its foreign policy. And Pakistan appears to be in the process of making that kind of bargain with both the Saudis and China. And as a consequence, it appears that Pakistan is joining the Sunni axis against Iran, something it previously hesitated in part due to the fact that Pakistan has the world’s second largest Shia population:
The timing of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman trip to Pakistan almost couldn’t have been better in terms of cementing these ties: MBS’s two day trip to Pakistan took place days after the terror attack in Kashmir, giving MBS a great opportunity to show diplomatic support for Pakistan in the midst of the crisis. Diplomatic support that followed $20 billion in deals:
Saudi Arabia’s fortuitous timing has another dimension: with Donald Trump in the White House, the Saudis have a US administration that is very in line with its anti-Tehran stance. So if the Saudis can somehow manage to arrange for a conflict with Iran that involves the Saudi Islamic Counter Terrorism Military Coalition (IMCTC), having Pakistan as a member of that coalition provides with military power and very convenient geography given Pakistan’s shared border with Iran:
So it’s going to be grimly fascinating to see if Saudi Arabia can successfully use Pakistan’s conflict with India and financial woes to turn Pakistan into the kind of client state that will actually use its military in a conflict with Iran. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have long had close ties, but they appear to be even closer now.
And that brings us to one of the other chilling aspects of this situation: we’ve already seen how the Saudis are VERY interested in acquiring the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon and actively trying to find a country that will build nuclear plants in the country that leave open the option of nuclear fuel enrichment. And it’s long been clear that the Saudis viewed the Pakistani nuclear program as a kind of ‘plan B’ for acquiring nuclear weapons (i.e., just get Pakistan to hand over some nukes). So it seems like a pretty safe bet that the transfer of nuclear technology is one of the topics under discussion at this point. One of the things about being a client state is that it’s pretty hard to say ‘no’. Will that extend to not being able to say ‘no nukes’? We’ll see.
With Turkey signaling it’s ready to resume its ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish-held regions of northeast Syria following the brief ‘pause’ in the ironically-named “Operation Peace Spring”, it’s worth noting one of the other grand ironies here: there’s one big ambition shared by not only the Kurds and Erdogan, but also actors like ISIS and John Bolton. That’s the ambition of redrawing the borders created during WWI via the Sykes-Picot agreement. The Kurds understandably blame the Sykes-Picot agreement on leaving the Kurds out of having a homeland and scattering them across multiple new countries. And as we’ve seen, Erdogan also wants to see those border redrawn, albeit definitely not for the benefit of the Kurds. ISIS used to put out videos called “The End of Sykes Pico”, and even John Bolton called for the creation of a “Sunni-stan” in eastern Syria as a counter to ISIS. It’s one big reason Erodogan has for military’s crushing the Kurd’s right now and portraying them as terrorists. Because if the borders in the region are to be redrawn, setting a Kurdish homeland is an obvious choice that much of the world could get behind and Erdogan’s government wants to avoid at all costs.
So given that context for the restart of Turkey’s “Operation Peace Spring” ethnic cleansing operation, here’s a a reminder that this ethnic cleansing operation is dramatically fueling those long-held ‘greater Turkey’ ambitions:
“At home, however, Erdogan’s supporters and aligned ideologues have been singing a significantly different — and more telling — tune. In assorted op-ed columns and media appearances, backers of the Turkish government’s Syria strategy depicted the “green light” given to Erdogan by President Trump as a historical moment in which their country should seize the initiative and impose its vision on the region.”
Trump didn’t just give Erdogan a “green light” to ethnically cleanse the Kurds out of northeastern Syria. He handed Turkey an opportunity to seize the initiative and impose its vision on the region. That sure sounds a lot like Erdogan’s dreams of effectively redrawing the borders of the region. Dreams that are mutually exclusive from the Kurds’ own dreams of redrawing the borders of the region. Time will tell if “Operation Peace Spring” morphs into “Operation Great Turkey”.
But as the following article makes clear, these ambitions for a great Turkey aren’t limited to redrawing borders and expanding Turkey’s sphere of influence. The ambitions also involve nukes. And those ambitions may have already been boosted by the A.Q. Khan nuclear network:
“In the weeks leading up to his order to launch the military across the border to clear Kurdish areas, Mr. Erdogan made no secret of his larger ambition. “Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads,” he told a meeting of his governing party in September. But the West insists “we can’t have them,” he said. “This, I cannot accept.””
Was this proclamation by Erdogan last month about the unacceptable nature of Turkey’s lack of nuclear weapons just more anti-American bluster in front of the same kind of party stalwarts that are now pushing for a ‘great Turkey’ regional imperial project? That’s what some experts have concluded:
But as the article lays out, if there’s more than just bluster behind Erdogan’s nuclear sentiments, Turkey may not be the far off from turning that bluster into a reality. Not only doesn’t Turkey have an existing nuclear power program, with more Russian-built plants on the way, but evidence suggests it may have been a participant and customer of none other than A.Q. Khan’s nuclear weapons trafficking network and now possesses the centrifuges required for enrichment:
So far now, this idea that Turkey has nuclear designs is just speculation. And a major factor tempering that speculation is Turkey’s relationship with NATO. But it’s speculation based on not just Erdogan’s recent comments but also the reality Turkey’s future relationship with NATO is increasingly in question and will be even more in question if Turkey decides to go on some sort of imperial adventure and Erdogan moves more and more into turning Turkey into an undemocratic dictarship.
So if the chest-thumping coming out of Ankara about the need to seize the initiative and expand the “Operation Peace Spring” ethnic cleansing operation into a larger effort to create a ‘greater Turkey’ buffer zone actually manifests as a more extensive ethnic cleansing war on the Kurds that carves up Syria and Erdogan uses that as an opportunity to consolidate power and home and erode even more of Turkey’s democracy, well, at that point Turkey might as well go nuclear. And it just might be able to do so sooner than expected, thanks in part to the A.Q. Khan network. Maybe. That part is still speculative. Kind of like how the question of whether or not this insane species is going to avoiding nuking itself into oblivion is still highly speculative.
Peace in the Middle East isn’t just a long-standing aspiration. It’s also a threat. At least that appears to be the sentiment felt by western policy-makers in response to the China-brokered peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A deal that promises to end the brutal civil war in Yemen that has devastated that population. As the following Moon of Alabama blog post from last week notes, the reports about Saudi and UAE forces pulling out of Yemen haven’t been met with relief in DC. Quite the contrary, with CIA director Bill Burns reportedly making an unannounced trip to Saudi Arabia to deliver a message of frustration over the fact that the deal was happening at all.
And as the blog post notes, this is all happening in the context of the ongoing inflaming of civil war inside Israel by the Netanyahu government. So at the same time we’re seeing Western opposition to the China-brokered peace deal, we’re also seeing Israel descend into some sort of ethno-sectarian fascist purge. And as we’re going to see, that fascist purge is more or less going to guarantee that the Saudis won’t be able to get on board with the other major diplomatic initiative in the Middle East currently getting negotiated: the US-backed Abraham Accords started under the Trump administration and continued under Joe Biden. The creation of Palestinian state is one of the core Saudi demands for the normalization of relations with Israel. Something that obviously can’t happen in the middle of a fascist sectarian purge.
But as we’re also going to see, there’s another Saudi demand that was recently issued in those Abraham Accord negotiations: the US backing in the development of a civilian nuclear energy program. As we’ve seen this is a long-standing Saudi ambition. And an area they’ve apparently made some progress on in recent years. Recall the reports about the secret orders by the Trump administration issued back in 2017 allowing for the transfer of nuclear technology to the Saudis despite the Saudis refusing to give up its right to enrich uranium. Who knows what exact technology was transferred and how far they are by now. But the Saudis clearly still want the US’s backing on this and those demands are in part of the Abraham Accords negotiations.
So as we wait to see how the China-brokered peace deal unfolds and the impact it has on the region, it’s going to be increasingly important to keep in mind that the Chinese diplomatic triumph is happening amidst the faltering US-backed Abraham Accord negotiations. Negotiations that now include Saudi nuclear demands.
Ok, first, here’s that Moon of Alabama blog post describing the apparent perceived threat posed by the China-brokered peace deal. The kind of threat that elicited the public announcement that the US was sending a nuclear-power sub to the Middle East. That’s where we’re at in response to this peace deal: nuclear sub ‘diplomacy’:
“Burns likely threatened to withhold U.S. intelligence on terrorist groups from the Saudis. The CIA could additionally push some of its ISIS assets to make some nasty appearances in Saudi Arabia to then offer ‘help’ to ‘fight terrorism’.”
What was the nature of that unannounced trip by the head of the CIA to Saudi Arabia earlier this month? It obviously wasn’t a courtesy call. What kind of leverage did Burns attempt to wield during those conversations? Might we see an uptick in terrorist attacks against the Kingdom? If so, it’s worth noting the profound irony of the possible use of Sunni-based terrorist groups against Saudi Arabia, long one of the chief sponsors of such groups. It’s a reflection of the still remarkable apparent divorce between the Saudi royal family and the Muslim Brotherhood that was one of the long-term consequences of the Arab Spring.
But as the following Foreign Policy piece makes clear, the CIA isn’t the only establishment entity freaking out about this China-brokered deal. The piece is authored by two scholars, Saeid Golkar and Kasra Aarabi. Both are senior fellows with the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, with Aarabi serving as the the Iran program lead. And as they put it, nothing good will come from this deal. The only thing that will be accomplished is a further emboldening of Iran and a furthering of its ambitions to restore an Islamic civilization with Shiia theocrats leading the way. Beyond that, Iran has plans to reorder the global with a new Iran-China-Russia axis of power. They even predict more attacks against Saudi Arabia by Houthi forces who will now be able to operate with a greater degree of plausible deniability for Iran. Beyond that, they predict that Iran will be so emboldened that Tehran and Moscow might end up waging a global campaign of non-state actors attacking Western interests. It’s a glimpse into the mindset of the Western policy-makers. A mindset that has concluded that a China-brokered peace deal can only lead to destabilization and global terror:
“But much of the analysis has missed a key point: For Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the deal is about far more than normalizing ties with the Saudi government in Riyadh. Instead, it is about further facilitating, along with China and Russia, the rise of a new anti-Western global order and excluding the United States from a new regional arrangement.”
The Chinese-delegate Saudi-Iranian peace deal isn’t a peace deal. Instead, it’s about the establishment of a new global order, with a Chinese/Russian/Iranian-led alternative axis of power capable of shaping global affairs in a manner long assumed to be the sole domain of the post-Cold War US. Beyond that, it’s part of the long-term theocratic goal of the Iranian government to restore an Islamic civilization with Shiite Islamists at the helm. Nothing good can come from it. That was the general assessment from the authors of this piece, both members and the Tony Blair Institute and Global Change. And while it’s hard to imagine the Sunni world sharing that goal, this is also a good time to recall how the Iranian revolution was carried out by members of the Shiite branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, the idea of some sort of Sunni-Shiia power sharing alliance under a Muslim Brotherhood umbrella may not be entirely inconceivable. That said, it would be even more unclear as to why the Saudis would be on board with that if we’re talking about a potential Sunni-Shiia Muslim Brotherhood led initiative given the anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance of the Saudis in recent years. But, according to these two authors, the Saudis are fully aware of these ambitions and are willing to play along:
Part of that presumed Saudi rationale is apparently the idea that as Iran ramps down its proxy militancy against Saudi Arabia, it will in turn ramp up attacks against US interests in the region. At the same time, these authors argue that the China-brokered peace deal will in the long run increase attacks against Saudi interests by increasing the plausible deniability Iran can claim about Houthi operations. Peace can only empower Iranian militancy. That’s their conclusion:
But it’s the warnings about Moscow and Tehran coordinating non-state attacks against Western interests worldwide that we should find most alarming. Peace in the Middle East = Global Terror. That’s the message:
The authors also caution that Iran is somehow using the peace deal to sabotage the US-negotiated Abraham Accords that would normalize relationships between Israel and a number of its neighbors. It’s not entirely clear how the China-brokered deal subverts the Abraham Accords but that’s the authors’ analysis:
And that warning about the China-brokered deal somehow disrupting the Abraham Accords brings us the following piece from a month ago about the demands the Saudis are issuing in relation to those accords. Demands that both the US and Israel may not be able to fulfill. For starters, there’s the demand for the creation of a Palestinian state. It’s hard to imagine the Netanyahu government — which currently seems intent on inflaming a civil war — would be willing to concede that demand. But that brings us to the second demand. A demand that’s really up to the US to fulfill: helping the Saudis building a nuclear energy program. As we’ve seen, it’s an area the Saudis have long had a keen interest in, culminating in the secret orders by the Trump administration issued back in 2017 allowing for the transfer of nuclear technology to the Saudis despite the Saudis refusing to give up its right to enrich uranium. That’s all part of the context of the current Western freak out over the China-brokered peace deal: with China brokering deals that can bring stability to the Middle east it arguably makes it easier for the Saudis to driving a harder bargain on alternative peace deals. A harder bargain that might include a US-backed nuclear program by the time this is over:
“News of the Saudi proposal emerged hours before a separate agreement, brokered by China, which paved the way for Riyadh to restore diplomatic relations with Iran for the first time in seven years. Some analysts called the deal evidence that Saudi Arabia had lost trust in the United States as a defender of its security and is drawing nearer to China while seeking to ease its longtime rivalry with Iran as a hedging strategy. The development could possibly create new urgency in the Biden administration to broker an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, but the immediate effects were unclear.”
The timing sure was interesting: literally hours before the China-brokered agreement was announce, news came out about Saudi demands in the ongoing Abraham Accords negotiations. Demands that have at their core the establishment of a Palestinian state. At least that’s the negotiating line the Saudis are going with. Whether or not the establishment of Palestinian state remains an hard line or softens as the negotiations play out remains to be seen, but the fact that 76 percent of the Saudi populace opposes the deal suggests it may not soften easily:
And that demand for a Palestinian state brings us to the other major demand: helping the Saudis set up a nuclear program. Recall how the Trump administration was trying to do exactly that, sell the Saudis civilian nuclear technology, over the opposition of US national security experts warning it was a recipe for a nuclear weapons program. So we have to ask: if a Palestinian state doesn’t end up getting established, would a US-backed nuclear program be enough to get the Saudis on board with the Accords?
Finally, note the caution that the Saudis don’t want to give Biden a major diplomatic victory at all. If true, you have to wonder just how much the US will have to give the Saudis in order to get a deal:
So are the Saudis open to the Abraham Accords but just not on Biden’s watch? Might was see another Saudi/UAE ‘intervention’ in the 2024 campaign on Trump’s behalf? Time will tell. But with all signs pointing towards Israel descending further into civil war it’s hard to imagine any sort of resolution to the Abraham Accords getting hammered out any time soon. Unless, of course, a US-backed nuclear program just happens to speed those negotiations up.
The classified documents controversy is back in the news following a leaked recording seemingly depicting former President Trump waving around a classified document describing potential war plans against Iran in front of a group of people while acknowledging on the tape that he recognized it was classified and couldn’t be shared. In other words, it’s another apparent ‘Trumpian consciousness of guilt’ episode, this time centered around his classified documents theft scandal.
So with the US’s leaky secrets once again in the news, it’s worth noting a Washington Post report from back in October that covers a closely related story about another possible source of systemic intelligence leaks to foreign powers who happen to have a good relationship with US officials in possession of those secrets: According to the WaPo report, over 500 retired senior US military personnel have gone on to work in consulting positions for foreign governments, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE making the vast majority of the hires. This is a good time to recall how three former US personnel apparently carried out hacks targeting the Democratic Party from January 2016 to November 2019, making this group obvious potential suspects for having actually carried out the DNC hacks of 2016.
So what kind of controls are put in place to regulate these kinds of potentially sensitive jobs? Basically nothing. Requests for approval are largely rubber-stamped. But that approval apparently isn’t even required and prosecution for taking such a position without getting the approval first is virtually non-existent.
Beyond that, it appears that the US government is actively encourage retired officials to take some of these positions. At least that was the claim made by retired Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO commander and Marine commandant, who began consulting for the Saudi government after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. His consulting firm now employs eight retired US generals and admirals in Riyadh and 32 lower-ranking U.S. military retirees. According to Jones, the US government encouraged him top keep working for the Saudis after the Khashoggi murder. It underscores how these positions aren’t just tolerated by the US government but seen as achieving some sort of strategic objective.
So with concerns about the security risk that former President Trump poses to the US once again in the news and part of a broader debate over the security of the US’s national security secrets, it’s going to be worth keeping in mind that the US military apparently has a policy of encouraging retired senior personnel to go take lucrative military contracting jobs with foreign governments:
“More than 500 retired U.S. military personnel — including scores of generals and admirals — have taken jobs as contractors and consultants for foreign governments since 2015, cashing in on their military expertise and political clout.”
How many is too many? It’s one of many troubling questions raised by the hundreds of retired US military personnel going to work for foreign governments since 2015 alone. And not low level personnel with limited knowledge and skills. Generals and admirals are being recruited for these jobs, for which US government approval is largely rubber-stamped. But that approval isn’t even necessary. People can just take these jobs at will apparently:
And in some cases, these positions were taken by retired admirals who were simultaneously working as paid consultants for the US Navy. So it doesn’t appear that the US military viewed these foreign consulting jobs as particularly high security risks:
And in the case of personnel going to work for Saudi Arabia, not only were they not dissuaded from taking these positions after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, but former NATO commander and Marine commandant Retired Gen. James L. Jones claims that the US government encouraged him to keep the job. In other words, these jobs aren’t seen as simply acceptable by the US government. Some sort of strategic objectives are being achieved:
And when we see 280 retired personnel having gone to work for the UAE, this is a good time to recall how three former US personnel apparently carried out hacks targeting the Democratic Party from January 2016 to November 2019, making this group obvious potential suspects for having actually carried out the DNC hacks of 2016. How many of those 280 hires ultimately ended up intervening in US politics on the UAE’s behalf? And what was the real extent of the US intelligence community’s awareness of these types of roles?
Finally, even Gen Jim Mattis was consulting for the UAE when it was tapped to become Trump’s secretary of defense. And then after resigning, he applied to consult for the UAE again. Going to working for the Saudis or UAE is apparently just kind of routine now for retired senior US military:
So do any of these retired senior personnel retain access to up-to-date US intelligence? It’s one of the giant still unanswered questions looming over this story. But either way, it’s pretty obvious that these retired senior officials are still going to be highly aware of all sort of valuable intelligence. How much of that ends up getting shared with their new employers? And does the US government even care or that happens? Are we looking at the infrastructure for informal inter-government intelligence-sharing backchannels? A new Safari Club? It would be nice to have answers to those questions. In addition to whether or not former President Trump or other senior Trump administration officials with access to sensitive intelligence have managed to quietly snag any foreign government consulting jobs. Perhaps one of those juicy lobbying positions?
Peace in the Middle East is just around the corner. A cease-fire is in place. A deal is imminent. It’s going to be the latest in a string of foreign policy ‘wins’ by the greatest, most successful US president in history. That’s more or less the spin we’re getting these days from the Trump administration, at the same we’re getting reports US intelligence has determined Iran can withstand the Straight of Hormuz blockade for months longer, large portions of Iran’s pre-war stockpile of weapons are still intact, and there was just an exchange of fire between US destroyers and Iranian forces. It’s not exactly a scenario that should induce optimism.
Sure, President Trump seems to desperately want to end the conflict as soon as possible, seemingly having been suckered into thinking this could be some sort of ‘shock and awe’ operation that would be wrapped up quickly. But he also desperately wants a clear ‘win’. And the longer this goes, the clearer that win has to ultimately be for him to safe face. And for the US’s partners in this operation — Israel and the Gulf Kingdoms in particular — anything less than regime change will be a major let down. The stakes started off incredibly high, and only seem to keep climbing.
And while regime change could involve US ‘boots on the ground’, it’s worth keeping in mind that a much more drawn out ‘arming the opposition’ regime change template is something the US is very familiar with, most notably with the US’s backing of the Saudi-led mujahedeen forces following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the civil war in Nicaragua that become a focal point of the Iran Contra affair. Years of ‘arming the opposition’ that ultimately resulted in the creation of al Qaeda and the Taliban.
It’s possible that the Trump administration could accept some sort of ‘win’ short of Iranian regime change that includes some sort of promise to abandon any nuclear ambitions, it’s hard to imagine the Iranian government isn’t more intent then ever on achieving a nuclear deterrent after everything that has happened. So with the Trump administration having seemingly led the US into a new military quagmire, possibly leading up to a regime change under the pretext of ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions once and for all, perhaps now is a good time to reflect back on the incredibly corrupt history of the US-backed ‘Islamic bomb’ covert nuclear procurement program that eventually resulted in Pakistan’s nuclear weapon. A history that makes clear that, while Pakistan may have been the primarily beneficiary of this covert agenda, it was very much a multi-national effort, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE playing especially significant roles. And the whole time, the US either turned a blind eye or actively facilitated the secret nuclear program. A new, wildly corrupt bank, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was formed and allowed to finance the secret nuclear program through Ponzi scheme accounting and the laundering of illicit profits from extensive arms and drugs trafficking.
As we’ll see in a New York Times piece below from back in 1998, it’s not that the US government didn’t have concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Those concerns existed. But they somehow evaporated after Pakistan agreed to play a central role in the arming and funding of the Afghan mujahedeen. In fact, two retired Pakistani intelligence officials told the NY Times that, when Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, was approached by US officials in the early 80s to express their concerns about the nuclear program, Zia told them he had the blessings of President Reagan and CIA director William Casey to build the bomb. In fact, not only did Pakistan have the Reagan administration’s blessings, but the US was also aware that it was China that was providing much of the technical know how to build the bomb. The US’s awareness of this Chinese-designed bomb was so extensive that a replica of the Pakistani bomb was built and stored in the Pentagon. In 1985, the US Congress passed a law requiring the president to certify that Pakistan was not building nuclear weapons in order to remain eligible for continuing military and economic aid. Reagan and George Bush signed that certification every year from 1985, until 1990, the year of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. All of a sudden, the US discovered Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Next, we’ll take a look at a pair of excerpt from a book published in 2023, The Bomb, The Bank, The Mullah and The Poppies by Iqbal Chand Malhotr, which lays out the history of BCCI’s key role in the Pakistani nuclear procurement program. A program that started back in 1972, when President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto arranged for a meeting of Pakistan’s nuclear scientists to put the nuclear procurement agenda in motion. By the end of the meeting, Butto decided to tap the Muslim Brotherhood to fund the secret program, and then left for a tour of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and other Arab nations to quietly seek out support. The tour ended with the a trip to China. Two leaders who openly expressed a desire help were Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, then the first president of the UAE. This is a good time to recall how Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan’s son, the UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), who made a joint offer, along with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), to the 2016 Trump campaign to assist in Trump’s presidential election using the services of the Israeli private intelligence firm Psy Group. It was apparently Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan who conceived of the need for a Ponzi-like financial institution that would ostensibly be financed by oil-rich Arab leaders but would, in reality, be secretly controlled by the governments of Pakistan and Abu Dhabi. It was at this point that Agha Hasan Abedi became seen as the person who could run this operation. But in order to do so, Abedi needed to distance himself from the Pakistani government was establishing credentials as a high profile banker. That’s where Dick van Oenen, the head of Bank of America’s Karachi office, comes into the picture, with Oenen invest $625,000 in the planned new financial institution in exchange for a 30% stake. In September of 1972, months after Bhutto’s initial meeting, BCCI was formally launched and the financial vehicle that would finance the covert creation of the ‘Islamic bomb’ was in place.
It was during this same period in the early 1970s that India-born Pakistani Muhajir called Abdul Qadir Khan (A.Q. Khan) was writing letters to Bhutto, expressing a desire to share his nuclear knowledge with the Pakistani government. In 1974, Khan met with Bhutto, sharing plans for a bomb that would cost only $60,000 to build and could be use the uranium ore that had been discovered in Pakistan’s Suleiman Mountains a decade earlier.
In June of 1976, Pakistan and China signed a secret nuclear protocol. Months later, in September, another organization joined in the effort: the Safari Club was formed after a meeting of the heads of intelligence for France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and Iran. Yes, it turns out pre-revolution Iran was a participant in the Safari Club, an organization that could be seen as a kind of outsourcing of US foreign policy. BCCI was tapped for the funding of the Safari Club’s covert operations.
It was in the late 70s and early 80s when the drug trafficking component of this illicit financing machine started manifesting in the form of large amounts of hashish and heroin hitting US streets. By 1984, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) identified Pakistan as the source of 31 per cent of the heroin in the US markets. This is, of course, a good time to recall the cocaine-trafficking component of the overlapping Iran Contra scandal that was playing out at the same time. There was A LOT of illicit narcotics trafficking during this period. To finance mujahedeen and the Pakistani bomb. Some might call that drug abuse.
But it wasn’t just that the US was turning a blind eye to all of this activity. The State Department had been actively facilitating the back-door procurement of nuclear technology through the issuance of approvals for the Pakistan embassy in Washington to export hi-tech equipment that the Commerce Department refused to approve over proliferation concerns. It turns out the Pakistani government was being tipped off by the State Department about CIA and US Customs operations that were set up to catch Pakistan in this technology trafficking. Of course, with the CIA being one of the main actors in the whole mujahedeen effort and Bill Casey having given his blessings, it’s hard to imagine the agency was actually irked by this.
None of this is new. It’s all review at this point. But it’s a chapter in history that has an abundance of lessons to be heeded today given the reality that the US appears to have bogged itself down into a quagmire that has long been sought by the US’s allies in the region. A history of the US passively and actively facilitating an international covert nuclear proliferation network heavily orchestrated by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the large Muslim Brotherhood international movement. And tolerating massive drug trafficking and financial crimes in the process.
But let’s not forget about another side of this larger story: the BCCI/Safari Club/Islamic bomb story isn’t just interwined and overlapping with the Iran Contra scandal. Let’s not forget that the 1980s was the same decade the whole PROMIS scandal played out. A scandal that, as we’ve seen, included Ghislaine Maxwell’s father and sister, Robert and Christine, who targeted the key US nuclear research institutions like Los Alamos Laboratory and Sandia National Labs with bugged versions of PROMIS that likely ultimately ended up feeding key nuclear secrets back to Israel. Now, it’s true that Israel is thought to have acquired its first nuclear device in the early 1970s, but that doesn’t mean that US’s nuclear secrets wouldn’t have been extremely valuable. That’s also all part of the context of this sordid chapter in history: at the same time the Reagan administration was turning a blind eye toward the outrageous conduct of this covert Pakistani nuclear proliferation network, the administration was also engaged in the PROMIS scandal and seemingly turning a blind eye to the activities of Robert and Christine Maxwell that seemingly involved the pilfering of the US’s nuclear secrets for the benefit of Israel.
It’s all just wildly corrupt. Too wildly corrupt to be digested and taken seriously, apparently. Oh, and keep in mind that, since the ‘Pakistani bomb’ was actually an international effort, we have every reason to suspect that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia or the UAE is probably A LOT easier to accomplish at this point than anyone would like to admit. Especially today, when the technology needed to build a bomb is likely much more accessible. So while it remains whether or not the Trump administration will be able to extract something that could be called a ‘win’ as the war with Iran continues to plays out,
try not to be surprised if it’s the kind of ‘win’ that results in a much more nuclear-armed Middle East. The covert work building towards a kind of mass-proliferation clusterf#ck started over 50 years, after all:
“The United States provided Pakistani nuclear scientists with technical training from the 1950s into the 1970s. And it turned a blind eye to the nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, because Pakistan was providing the crucial link in the CIA’s effort to smuggle billions of dollars of weapons to Afghan guerrillas attempting to drive out Soviet invaders.”
It’s not a secret. We’ve known about the US involvement in the Pakistani nuclear procurement network for decades. An arrangement directly tied to Pakistan’s key role in the CIA-backed efforts to back the jihadist in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were seen as a huge problem by the US national security state. Until the circumstances changed and suddenly the problems just went away:
And as we can see, when the State Department issued a report in 1983 showing unambiguous evidence that Pakistan was working with China in the development of a nuclear bomb and US government officials approached General Zia to express their extreme concern over this activity, Zia apparently indicated that he had the blessings of Ronald Reagan and Bill Casey to go ahead with the program. A claim seemingly backed up by the fact that the Reagan and George Bush repeatedly certified to Congress that Pakistan wasn’t building a bomb every year from 1985–1990. The US government wasn’t just aware of Pakistan’s nuclear program. It was complicit:
And that rather shocking 1998 piece in the New York Times — 5 years after the first attack on the World Trade Center and three and a half years before 9/11 — brings us top the following excerpt from a book published in 2023, The Bomb, The Bank, The Mullah and The Poppies. As the except makes clear, while BCCI was a key institution in facilitating this secret nuclear proliferation agenda, it was far from the only one. Other supporters inlcude Muammar Gaddafi and Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan, the first president of the UAE. And the head of the Bank of America’s Karachi branch even ended up investing in BCCI, acquiring a 30% stake and a seat on the board:
“Bhutto soon brought the meeting to a close. He had decided to tap the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world for funds. Pakistan was a defeated nation tottering on the verge of bankruptcy. That same day, Bhutto left on a whirlwind tour of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and other Arab nations. His last port of call was China. Bhutto went hat in hand looking for coppers to fill his coffers with so that he could embark upon his nuclear quest. Out of all the leaders he met, two responded with warmth and empathy towards another ‘brown Muslim’ whom they felt ought to be helped. These were Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi. The latter was also the first president of the newly minted United Arab Emirates, or UAE.”
The plan hatched in 1972 wasn’t just a Pakistani plot. This was a multi-national affair that relied on funds from both the Muslim Brotherhood but also Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan, then the first president of the UAE. Keep in mind that it was Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan’s son, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), who appears to have been actively involved with trying to tip the 2016 US presidential election in Donald Trump’s favor, along with MBS of Saudi Arabia, and who has an infamously close relationship with the Trump family. And as we can see, the UAE played a key role in laundering the financial assets used to capitalize the secret Pakistani nuclear program, with Agha Hasan Abedi, the banker who went on to found and run BCCI, serving as a central organizer of maintaining the necessary financial fictions:
But, of course, BCCI didn’t manage to pull of its years of mass fraud on its own. It had help from institutions look the Bank of America, with Dick van Oenen, the head of BoA’s Karachi office and ended up investing for a 30% stake in BCCI and a seat on the board, putting a BoA officer right in the middle the BCCI Ponzi scheme that was ultimately facilitating the clandestine nuclear program:
And as we’ll see in a second excerpt from The Bomb, The Bank, The Mullah and The Poppies, not only was there no disentangling of this covert nuclear agenda from the Afghan mujahedeen support efforts that got underway following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither was there any separate the extensive heroin trafficking that was playing a major role in providing the funding for these agendas. With the US turning a blind eye the entire time as new sources of heroin flooded US streets. Pakistan’s nuclear bomb was paid for with heroin:
“Meanwhile, on 1 September 1976, a covert group called Safari Club was created at a meeting at the famous Mt Kenya Safari Club resort in Nanyuki, about 200 kilometres from Nairobi. This resort was then owned by the British conglomerate Lonrho. The participants in this top-secret meeting formed a syndicate. They consisted of the following key heads of intelligence in five countries: 1. France—Alexandre de Marenches, director of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), France’s external intelligence agency 2. Saudi Arabia—Kamal Adham, director of intelligence, Al Mukhabarat Al A’amah (Saudi Intelligence) 3. Egypt—Gen. Kamal Hassan Ali, director of intelligence, Mukhabarat (Egyptian Intelligence) 4. Morocco—Gen. Ahmed Dlimi, director of intelligence and commander of the Royal Moroccan Army 5. Iran—Gen. Nematollah Nassiri of SAVAK (Iranian Intelligence).. The Safari Club played a secret role in political intrigues involving many countries, mostly in Africa and the Middle East, while being primarily funded through secret back-door deals, government banks and independent operations. One of the primary sources of funds for the club’s secret operations and tasks was the BCCI.”
As we can see, Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program had A LOT of help. It wasn’t just BCCI, or the CIA and BoA turning a blind eye. The Safari Club, formed in 1976, established another clandestine multinational intelligence effort whose covert agendas included both Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and, eventually, the CIA-backed mujahedeen support network in Afghanistan. A club consisting of the intelligence chiefs from not only France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco, but also pre-revolutionary Iran. And as we’ve seen, the Safari Club could be seen as a kind of outsourcing of US intelligence to Saudi Arabia. With BCCI serving as the group’s primary source of funds. And it gets worse. Because BCCI’s Ponzi-like operations weren’t the only sources of funding for this array of overlapping intelligence agendas, from the nuclear program to the arming of the Afghan mujahedeen. By the early 80s, large amounts of heroin were flowing out of Afghanistan and into US markets, with the Pakistani mafia ultimately controlling a third of that trade. Remarkably, the US State Department appears to have faciliated Pakistani diplomatics in their efforts to procure the hi-tech equipment needed to build the bomb, with the State Department repeatedly tipping off the Pakistani government about customs operations being run by US customs or the CIA:
By the mid-80s, BCCI was not only sponsoring the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, but BCCI officials were assisting ISI agents in the acquisition of nuclear technology through BCCI Canada. The US was well aware of this progress, even building a replicate of the Pakistani bomb that was kept at the Pentagon:
How many nukes does Pakistan have to spare today? It’s no longer a hidden nuclear program, after all. With approximately 170 nuclear weapons, Pakistan isn’t exactly lacking in nukes. It would be nice to think that Pakistan wouldn’t think of giving such a weapon to a group like al Qaeda, but what about all those sponsor states? If Saudi Arabia asked for a nuke, would Pakistan refuse? How about the UAE? Let’s hope we never have to find out. But with Iran probably more intent than ever on its own nuclear ambitions, it’s hard to see how the ‘Pakistani bomb’ doesn’t suddenly turn into the ‘BCCI investor bomb’ sooner or later. It always was, after all.