Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #543 Hell and High Water: Cartoongate and the Dubai Ports Controversy

Lis­ten:
MP3 Side 1 | Side 2
RealAu­dio

Intro­duc­tion: This pro­gram ana­lyzes the con­tro­ver­sies sur­round­ing the acqui­si­tion of an impor­tant sea­port-man­age­ment com­pa­ny by a Dubai firm and the pub­li­ca­tion by a Dan­ish news­pa­per of car­toons por­tray­ing the Prophet Mohammed. (In Islam, it is sac­ri­le­gious to craft an image of the prophet Mohammed.) Both issues have focused atten­tion on the ques­tion of real or alleged dis­crim­i­na­tion against Mus­lims. In fact, there is much more to the issues than has been pop­u­lar­ly rep­re­sent­ed. Dubai (and the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates of which it is a part) have been pro­found­ly asso­ci­at­ed with Osama bin Laden and his milieu, in addi­tion to being the pri­ma­ry port of tran­sit for the A.Q. Khan nuclear smug­gling net­work. The fun­da­men­tal issue in the Dubai Ports World con­tro­ver­sy is one of nation­al secu­ri­ty ver­sus the dic­tates of eco­nom­ic glob­al­iza­tion. As was the case with the Axis pow­ers of World War II, the very real malev­o­lence of the Islam­o­fas­cists toward the Unit­ed States is viewed by the US cor­po­rate elite as sec­ondary in impor­tance to the eco­nom­ic ties between the Arab oil-pro­duc­ing nations and the Amer­i­can firms that ben­e­fit from con­tracts in this coun­try and the Mid­dle East.

The core issue in the Dubai ports con­tro­ver­sy is sim­i­lar to that in the Ptech inves­ti­ga­tion. The hunger on the part of the heav­i­ly-indebt­ed US pub­lic and pri­vate sec­tors for invest­ment by the petrodol­lar-gorged Arab economies has led to the for­ma­tion of dead­ly rela­tion­ships. Ptech is a soft­ware firm that devel­oped the threat-assess­ment soft­ware archi­tec­ture for the Air Force and Depart­ment of Defense. Ptech is a com­pa­ny that, for all intents and pur­pos­es is run by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, al Qae­da and the peo­ple and insti­tu­tions at the core of the Islamist financ­ing appa­ra­tus. The anom­alous per­for­mance of air-defense units on 9/11/2001 is almost cer­tain­ly due to Ptech’s efforts. Nonethe­less, because of the eco­nom­ic rela­tion­ships between rich Arab oil pro­duc­ers and cap­i­tal-hun­gry insti­tu­tions in the U.S., the Ptech case and Oper­a­tion Green Quest inves­ti­ga­tions have lan­guished. The “Car­toon­gate” imbroglio has also been mis­rep­re­sent­ed. The avail­able evi­dence sug­gests that ele­ments asso­ci­at­ed with the Islam­o­fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood delib­er­ate­ly dis­tort­ed the issue in order to inflame Mus­lim pub­lic opin­ion. An impor­tant ques­tion is whether, per­haps, the inci­dent was designed to fur­ther the Islam­o­fas­cist agen­da endorsed by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood as out­lined in FTR#537.) It is note­wor­thy that Euro­pean neo-fas­cist ele­ments that exploit­ed the Car­toon­gate con­tro­ver­sy in order to exac­er­bate anti-Mus­lim xeno­pho­bia in Europe have main­tained pro­fes­sion­al asso­ci­a­tions with the Islam­o­fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood ele­ments that have fanned the flames of opin­ion on the oth­er side of the issue.

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The extra­or­di­nary secre­cy sur­round­ing the Dubai Ports World deal; Dubai’s sup­port for the Tal­iban while they were shel­ter­ing Osama bin Laden; the UAE’s role in laun­der­ing mon­ey for the 9/11 attacks; Dubai’s cen­tral posi­tion in the smug­gling of nuclear tech­nol­o­gy; con­nec­tions between the lead­ers of the UAE and Osama bin Laden; the issue of the effect of the Dubai port con­tro­ver­sy on glob­al cap­i­tal flows; Dan­ish Mus­lim leader Abu-Laban’s prob­a­ble mem­ber­ship in the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood; Abu-Laban’s dis­tri­b­u­tion of delib­er­ate lies about Den­mark; Abu-Laban’s dis­tri­b­u­tion of provoca­tive car­toons of Muham­mad that were not pub­lished in the Dan­ish news­pa­per; the neo-Nazi Repub­li­can party’s exploita­tion of the Car­toon­gate con­tro­ver­sy; the asso­ci­a­tion between Repub­li­can par­ty leader (and SS offi­cer) Franz Schon­hu­ber and Bank Al Taqwa direc­tor Achmed Huber; the links between Huber and Holo­caust denier David Irv­ing; neo-fas­cist and Islam­o­fas­cist pro­mo­tion of the “Father­land” con­cept; an Iran­ian paper’s Holo­caust denial car­toon con­test.

1. In the con­tro­ver­sy sur­round­ing the Dubai Ports World acqui­si­tion of port man­ag­ing com­pa­ny P&O, many have over­looked the fact that P&O is in charge of the con­tain­ers that pass into the Unit­ed States. Those con­tain­ers would make an ide­al ship­ping vehi­cle for the entry into the U.S. of a weapon of mass destruc­tion. Although oth­er aspects of sea­port secu­ri­ty would con­tin­ue to be han­dled by U.S. insti­tu­tions, only a very small per­cent­age of con­tain­ers enter­ing into the Unit­ed States are inspect­ed. With the expe­ri­ence of Ptech behind us (see above), allow­ing a Dubai com­pa­ny to han­dle such a sen­si­tive role is very unwise. As will be seen below, Dubai has been a less than reli­able ally with regard to ter­ror­ism and relat­ed mat­ters.

“ . . . P&O’s role is to man­age dock­side ter­mi­nals, usu­al­ly along­side rival oper­a­tors such as Maer­sk. This gives the com­pa­ny con­trol over the con­tain­ers that pass through its facil­i­ties but all car­go is sub­ject to secu­ri­ty checks by the U.S. Coast Guard and Cus­toms. . . .”

(“Calmer Voic­es Drowned Out by Rhetoric on Secu­ri­ty Threat” by Andrew Ward, Stephanie Kirch­gaess­ner and Edward Alden; The Finan­cial Times; 2/13/2006; p.4.)

2. Exem­pli­fy­ing the con­flict between the dic­tates of eco­nom­ic glob­al­iza­tion and the need for secu­ri­ty, the deal with Dubai Ports World would afford that com­pa­ny an extra­or­di­nary degree of secre­cy and free­dom from scruti­ny by Amer­i­can offi­cials.

“With the Bush admin­is­tra­tion, it’s impor­tant to have in mind the old car­ni­val con­game. Keep your eye on the shell with the pea under it. Among the many curi­ous aspects of the administration’s approval of the Dubai Ports World takeover of oper­a­tions at six major ports (and as many as 21) is this exemp­tion from nor­mal­ly rou­tine restric­tions. The agree­ment does not require DP World to keep copies of its busi­ness records on U.S. soil, which would place them with­in the juris­dic­tion of Amer­i­can courts. Nor does it require the com­pa­ny to des­ig­nate an Amer­i­can cit­i­zen to accom­mo­date requests by the gov­ern­ment. [Empha­sis added.] So what’s that about? . . . .”

(“A Flood of Busi­ness Exemp­tions” by Mol­ly Ivins: San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 3/2/2006; p. B9.)

3. In addi­tion to the extra­or­di­nary degree of secre­cy afford­ed Dubai Ports World in the agree­ment, the actu­al nego­ti­at­ing process itself was con­duct­ed large­ly in secret. Again, the fun­da­men­tal con­flict between the need for nation­al secu­ri­ty and the dic­tates of eco­nom­ic glob­al­iza­tion are at the core of the debate about Dubai Ports World.

“ . . . Most Amer­i­cans had no idea that our government’s process of approv­ing for­eign takeovers of Amer­i­can com­pa­nies through the Com­mit­tee on For­eign Invest­ment in the Unit­ed States was entire­ly secret. When Rep. John Sweeney, R‑N.Y., asked Home­land Secu­ri­ty Sec­re­tary Michael Chertoff about the Dubai Ports deal at a hear­ing on Feb. 15, Chertoff declined to answer because the committee’s work was ‘clas­si­fied.’ Trea­sury Sec­re­tary John Snow told anoth­er con­gres­sion­al com­mit­tee that he was not per­mit­ted to dis­cuss spe­cif­ic trans­ac­tions con­sid­ered by the for­eign invest­ment pan­el. . . .”

(“Sea Change in Bush Cred­i­bil­i­ty” by E.J. Dionne, Jr.; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 2/24/2006; p. B11.)

4. Among the details that emerged in the con­tro­ver­sy was the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard had pro­found reser­va­tions about the wis­dom of the deal. There is abun­dant rea­son for that, as will be seen below.

“The U.S. Coast Guard, in charge of review­ing secu­ri­ty at ports oper­at­ed by a Dubai mar­itime com­pa­ny, warned the Bush admin­is­tra­tion it could not rule out that the company’s assets could be used for ter­ror­ist oper­a­tions, accord­ing to a doc­u­ment released Mon­day by a Sen­ate com­mit­tee. Dubai Ports World plans to com­plete its takeover of Lon­don-based Penin­su­lar and Ori­en­tal Steam Nav­i­ga­tion Co. (P&O) on Thurs­day, assum­ing own­er­ship of oper­a­tions at six major U.S. ports even as it pledges to hold off on assert­ing con­trol while the Bush admin­is­tra­tion reviews the nation­al secu­ri­ty impli­ca­tions of the deal. The White House has strong­ly argued that a pre­lim­i­nary review showed that the sale would pose no threat to nation­al secu­ri­ty.” House has strong­ly argued that a pre­lim­i­nary review showed that the sale would pose no threat to nation­al secu­ri­ty.”

(“Coast Guard Issued Warn­ing on Dubai Firm” by Jonathan Weis­man [Wash­ing­ton Post]; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 2/28/2006; p. A3.)

5. The “gaps” the Coast Guard feared are note­wor­thy, in light of the Islamist rela­tion­ship to ele­ments of the Dubai pow­er elite and the ship­ping secre­cy with which Dubai prides itself.

“ . . . But in a Dec. 13 intel­li­gence assess­ment of the com­pa­ny and its own­ers in the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates, the Coast Guard warned: ‘There are many intel­li­gence gaps, con­cern­ing the poten­tial for DPW or P&O assets to sup­port ter­ror­ist oper­a­tions, that pre­clude’ the com­ple­tion of a thor­ough threat assess­ment of the merg­er. ‘The breadth of the intel­li­gence gaps also infer poten­tial unknown threats against a large num­ber of poten­tial vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties,’ says the doc­u­ment, released by the Sen­ate Home­land Secu­ri­ty and Gov­ern­men­tal Affairs Com­mit­tee. . . .”

(Idem.)

6. Next, the pro­gram sets forth the numer­ous rea­sons why the Dubai Ports World deal was a real­ly, real­ly BAD idea—a bad idea sup­port­ed enthu­si­as­ti­cal­ly by George Bush. We should not fail to take note of the fact that Bush has numer­ous and pro­found con­nec­tions to the world of big Arab cap­i­tal. Dubai backed the Tal­iban while they were shel­ter­ing Osama bin Laden.

“ . . . Yeah, I know, to be the least bit queasy about turn­ing over our ports to guys who sup­port­ed the Tal­iban when that bunch of reli­gious mani­acs were har­bor­ing bin Laden is, as the Bush apol­o­gists tell us, just xeno­pho­bic. Dubai was not alone, Sau­di Ara­bia and Pak­istan, did the same, and they are now trust­ed allies. These are crazy times, and there are some unnerv­ing odd­i­ties in Bush’s for­eign pol­i­cy, but don’t wor­ry. As soon as Hus­sein is tried and hanged, democ­ra­cy will flower in the Arab world and the war on ter­ror­ism will be over. . . .”

(“Dubi­ous Dubai Deal” by Robert Scheer; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 3/1/2006; p. B11.)

7. Dubai was also a major trans­ship­ment point for Al Qae­da hero­in ship­ments leav­ing Afghanistan. As we will see below, the stun­ning­ly loose reg­u­la­tions on the des­ti­na­tions of car­go going through Dubai ports facil­i­tat­ed this kind of illic­it traf­fic.

“ . . . Car­go planes fly twice a week between the south­ern Afghan city of Kan­da­har and Dubai, one of the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates (UAE). Accord­ing to the Boston Globe, 3/26/2001; these planes fly south with drugs. The Finan­cial Times, 3/24/2001; report­ed a claim ‘that, at least up until six months ago, two flights a week were trav­el­ing from Dubai to Kan­da­har, Mr. bin Laden’s Afghan base, with box­es of dol­lar bills. . . .”

(“Al-Qae­da, the Tal­iban, the North­ern Alliance, and Drug-Traf­fick­ing” by Peter Dale Scott)

8. In addi­tion to the fact that UAE lead­ers were asso­ci­at­ing with bin Laden as recent­ly as 1999, that asso­ci­a­tion appears to have played a role in frus­trat­ing a cruise mis­sile strike against bin Laden.

“The Unit­ed States raised con­cerns with the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates sev­en years ago about pos­si­ble ties between offi­cials in that coun­try and Osama bin Laden, accord­ing to a sec­tion of the Sept. 11 commission’s report that details a pos­si­ble missed oppor­tu­ni­ty to kill the al Qae­da leader. The commission’s report released last year also raised con­cerns UAE offi­cials were direct­ly asso­ci­at­ing with bin Laden as recent­ly as 1999. The report states U.S. intel­li­gence believed that bin Laden was vis­it­ing an area in the Afghan desert in Feb­ru­ary 1999 near a hunt­ing camp used by UAE offi­cials, and that the U.S. mil­i­tary planned a mis­sile strike. Intel­li­gence from local trib­al sources indi­cat­ed that ‘bin Laden reg­u­lar­ly went from his adja­cent camp to the larg­er camp where he vis­it­ed the Emi­ratis,’ the report said.”

(“Sep­tem­ber 11 Report Ties Bin Laden to U.A.E.” by Eliz­a­beth White [AP]; USA Today; 2/24/2006.)

9. “The mis­sile attack was nev­er launched, and bin Laden moved on, the report said. A month lat­er, top White House coun­tert­er­ror­ism offi­cial Richard Clarke ‘called a UAE offi­cial to express his con­cerns about pos­si­ble asso­ci­a­tions between Emi­rati offi­cials and bin Laden,’ the report said. At a hear­ing of the Sen­ate Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee on Thurs­day, Sen. Carl Levin, the rank­ing Demo­c­rat, asked Deputy Trea­sury Sec­re­tary Robert Kim­mitt if he was aware of the 9/11 commission’s asser­tion that the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates rep­re­sents ‘a per­sis­tent coun­tert­er­ror­ism prob­lem for the Unit­ed States.’ Kim­mitt replied that admin­is­tra­tion fig­ures involved in the deci­sion to approve the deal ‘looked very care­ful­ly’ at infor­ma­tion from the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty. ‘Just raise your hand if any­body talked to the 9/11 com­mis­sion,’ Levin told the admin­is­tra­tion rep­re­sen­ta­tives at the wit­ness table. Nobody raised a hand.”

(Idem.)

10. Not only did some of the mon­ey laun­dered to finance the 9/11 attacks pass through Dubai, but that coun­try was the con­duit for much of the nuclear tech­nol­o­gy that was traf­ficked by the A.Q. Khan net­work.

“ . . . What kind of empire are we if we have to out­source our coast­line to a group of sheiks who don’t rec­og­nize Israel, in a coun­try where mon­ey was laun­dered for the 9/11 attacks? And that let A.Q. Khan, the Pak­istani nuclear sci­en­tist, smug­gle nuclear com­po­nents through its port to Libya, North Korea and Iran? It’s mind-bog­gling that Pres­i­dent Bush ever agreed to let an alliance of sev­en emirs be in charge of six of our ports. Although, as usu­al, Incu­ri­ous George didn’t even know about it until after the fact. (Nei­ther did Rum­my, even though he heads one of the agen­cies that green-light­ed the deal.) . . . .”

(“G.O.P. to W.: You’re Nuts!” by Mau­reen Dowd; The New York Times; 2/22/2006; p. A23.)

11. The lax­i­ty of the Dubai reg­u­la­tions on ship­ping and export­ing are stun­ning! Bear in mind that the mate­r­i­al shipped in this case was nuclear con­tra­band!! (For more about the A.Q. Khan net­work, see—among oth­er programs—FTR#395, 450, 524.)

“. . . Why ship through Dubai? Because it may be the eas­i­est place in the world to mask the real des­ti­na­tion of car­go. Con­sid­er how the Malaysian gov­ern­ment is mak­ing the case for the inno­cence of its man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pa­ny. ‘No doc­u­ment was traced that proved’ the com­pa­ny ‘deliv­ered or export­ed the said com­po­nents to Libya,’ accord­ing to the country’s inspec­tor gen­er­al of police. The real des­ti­na­tion, he said, ‘was out­side the knowl­edge’ of the pro­duc­er. One can be cer­tain that if the Khan ring’s Euro­pean sup­pli­ers are ever tracked down, they will offer a sim­i­lar expla­na­tion. Dubai pro­vides com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ments a vital asset: auto­mat­ic deni­a­bil­i­ty. Its cus­toms agency even brags that its pol­i­cy on re-export­ing ‘enables traders to tran­sit their ship­ments through Dubai with­out any has­sles.’ Next to Dubai’s main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for free­wheel­ing inter­na­tion­al com­pa­nies. . . .”

(“Nukes ‘R’ Us” by Gary Mil­hollin and Kel­ly Motz; The New York Times; 3/4/2004; p. 2.)

12. Address­ing the core con­sid­er­a­tion with regard to the Dubai Ports World deal, Trea­sury Sec­re­tary John Snow not­ed the fact that the deal might very well hurt the US econ­o­my by slow­ing or inter­dict­ing the flow of recy­cled petrodol­lars back into the [oth­er­wise bank­rupt] US econ­o­my. As not­ed above, this crit­i­cal aspect of eco­nom­ic glob­al­iza­tion places the US between a rock and a hard place—between ter­ror and eco­nom­ic destruc­tion.

“A rejec­tion by law­mak­ers of Dubai Ports World’s agreed acqui­si­tion of US con­tain­er ter­mi­nals would send a sig­nal that for­eign invest­ments ‘from cer­tain parts of the world aren’t wel­come,’ John Snow, the Trea­sury sec­re­tary yes­ter­day. . . .Wash­ing­ton insid­ers were left to guess yes­ter­day whether the White House or some of the most promi­nent law­mak­ers in Con­gress, includ­ing top Repub­li­cans in the House and Sen­ate, would be the first to com­pro­mise on the issue after Pres­i­dent George W. Bush warned on Tues­day that he would veto any leg­isla­tive effort to block the deal. In the mean­time, DP World has been buy­ing shares in P&O heav­i­ly this week as a show of con­fi­dence that the deal will not be derailed despite prob­lems in Wash­ing­ton and the strong like­li­hood that the deal will face a series of local bat­tles with port author­i­ties. An agree­ment to com­plete the trans­ac­tion is due to be approved by a Lon­don court on Mon­day. . . .”

(“Dubai Back­lash ‘Will Deter For­eign Investors” by Stephanie Kirch­gaess­ner, Hol­ly Yea­ger and Robin Wright; The Finan­cial Times; 2/23/2006; p. 4.)

13. Arabs have been rat­tling eco­nom­ic sabers over the rejec­tion of the Dubai Ports World deal. In addi­tion to the threat of reduc­ing the rein­vest­ment of petrodol­lars into the US econ­o­my, the Arabs have sug­gest­ed that US busi­ness inter­ests might not get con­tracts for the bur­geon­ing infra­struc­ture expan­sion being dri­ven by the rise in oil prices.

“ . . . David Hamod, NUSACC’s pres­i­dent, said the DP World saga had inter­vened just as Arab inter­est in the US mar­ket was pick­ing up again and stu­dents and busi­ness­men, deterred by visa restric­tions against Arab nation­als after the 2001 attacks on Wash­ing­ton and New York, had begun return­ing in greater num­bers. US com­pa­nies in the region are also wor­ried they may be penal­ized at a time that Arab states, flush with petrodol­lars, have ini­ti­at­ed huge infra­struc­ture projects. A group of US busi­ness­es from the Gulf took out an adver­tise­ment in the Capi­tol Hill news­pa­per Roll Call this week express­ing sol­i­dar­i­ty with DP World. ‘My con­cern is that US com­pa­nies may not be invit­ed to bid or if they are invit­ed they will be dealt with more skep­ti­cal­ly than in the past,’ with Mr. Hamod. That con­cern seems to have some foun­da­tion, with gov­ern­ment offi­cials in the region indig­nant that DP World has been sin­gled out for scruti­ny because of its Arab ori­gins. One senior offi­cial in Qatar, which like the UAE is a strong ally of the US, said the back­lash in Congress’had raised a lot of ques­tions.’ These include the pos­si­bil­i­ty that Amer­i­can com­pa­nies invest­ing in the region might race the same kind of scruti­ny as DP World in the US. Naguib Sawiris, chair­man of Egypt’s tele­coms multi­na­tion­al Oras­com, said ‘This could hin­der US firms who want to do acqui­si­tions in the Mid­dle East. You know, if you don’t allow us, we won’t allow you.’”

(“Ports Back­lash Makes Arab Investors Wary” by William Wal­lis; The Finan­cial Times; 3/2/2006; p. 6.)

14. One of the more dis­gust­ing­ly pre­dictable deriv­a­tives of the Ports World scan­dal is the litany com­ing out of cer­tain Arab cir­cles that the rejec­tion of the deal rep­re­sents big­otry against Arabs. Not want­i­ng to be killed does not rep­re­sent big­otry! Those who resort to this shal­low rhetor­i­cal gam­bit are over­look­ing the dis­turb­ing evi­dence about the Dubai/Islamist ter­ror con­nec­tion dis­cussed above.

“The polit­i­cal furor over the Bush administration’s plan to have an Arab com­pa­ny take over oper­a­tions in sev­er­al U.S. ports has frus­trat­ed Arab and Mus­lim Amer­i­cans, who fear the oppo­si­tion is fueled by racism and big­otry. ‘We’re very con­cerned about the lev­el of rhetoric and the way that there seems to be the assump­tion that because a com­pa­ny is Arab it can’t be trust­ed with our secu­ri­ty,’ said Kather­ine Abba­di, head of the Amer­i­can-Arab Anti-Dis­crim­i­na­tion Com­mit­tee of New York. . . .”

(“Arabs, Mus­lims Sense Big­otry in Port Dis­pute” by Deep­ti Hajela [AP]; San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 2/24/2006; p. A5.)

15. Mak­ing a tran­si­tion to dis­cus­sion of the con­tro­ver­sy sur­round­ing the pub­li­ca­tion of car­toons of the prophet Muham­mad by a Dan­ish news­pa­per, the broad­cast cites a Lon­don Times edi­to­r­i­al not­ing the politi­ciza­tion of Islam.

“It looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and flies like a duck. And yet it insists that it is not a duck. This is the image that comes to mind when watch­ing those anti-car­toon march­es in west­ern cap­i­tals, includ­ing Lon­don, in the name of Islam. Isn’t Islam sup­posed to be a reli­gion? Shouldn’t it be con­cerned with the broad­er issues of human exis­tence rather than with a set of car­toons, a Dutch tele­vi­sion doc­u­men­tary, the head-cov­ers of French school­girls or a nov­el by a British-Indi­an author? Today the vis­i­ble Islam, the loud­est Islam, is a polit­i­cal move­ment mas­querad­ing as a reli­gion. Many mosques in this coun­try have been trans­formed into polit­i­cal clubs where Kash­mir, Iraq and Pales­tine and ‘the mis­deeds of Anglo-Sax­on impe­ri­al­ism’ have replaced issues of reli­gious faith as the prin­ci­pal theme. . . .”

(“Focus: ‘We Don’t Do God, We Do Pales­tine and Iraq’” Amir Taheri; Lon­don Times; 2/12/2006.)

16. A Wall Street Jour­nal arti­cle sets forth the fun­da­men­tals of the “Car­toon­gate” scan­dal.

“ . . . The car­toon uproar has fed on wider racial and eco­nom­ic ten­sion in Europe between Mus­lim immi­grants and native cit­i­zens. Also at play is America’s pol­i­cy of pro­mot­ing democ­ra­cy, which has helped unleash a strug­gle with­in the Arab world between large­ly sec­u­lar regimes and increas­ing­ly pow­er­ful Islamist groups. In this volatile envi­ron­ment, a group of Dan­ish Islam­ic cler­ics angered by the car­toons suc­ceed­ed in enlist­ing help from Egypt’s sec­u­lar gov­ern­ment, which has been strug­gling to con­tain a potent Islamist oppo­si­tion. Sec­u­lar forces in the Arab world, eager to bur­nish their image as defend­ers of Islam, pro­vid­ed an impor­tant ini­tial impe­tus for the protests, but now are scram­bling to con­trol the fury. From his office at the Islam­ic Faith Soci­ety in Copen­hagen, Ahmed Abu-Laban, a fun­da­men­tal­ist Pales­tin­ian cler­ic, has been at the fore­front of a cam­paign to force an apol­o­gy from the paper. ‘This was the last drop in a cup of resent­ment, dis­ap­point­ment and exploita­tion,’ he says.”

(“How Mus­lim Cler­ics Stirred Arab World Against Den­mark” by Andrew Hig­gins; The Wall Street Jour­nal; 2/7/2006; p. A1.)

17. “Jyl­lands-Posten, a cen­ter-right news­pa­per, first wad­ed into these treach­er­ous waters last fall. Mr. Rose, alarmed by what he con­sid­ered a rise in self-cen­sor­ship relat­ing to Islam­ic issues, invit­ed Dan­ish car­toon­ists to ‘draw Muham­mad the way that they see him.’ Twelve sub­mit­ted draw­ings. One mocked a far-right Dan­ish leader, putting her in a police line-up with a tur­ban, and anoth­er ridiculed Mr. Rose and his news­pa­per, label­ing it a ‘reac­tionary provo­ca­teur.’ Oth­ers, though, poked fun at Islam. One depict­ed Muham­mad in a tur­ban shaped like a bomb. Anoth­er showed a tur­baned fig­ure in heav­en telling ascend­ing sui­cide bombers to stop because ‘we’ve run out of vir­gins,’ a ref­er­ence to a reward said to await Islam­ic mar­tyrs. The car­toons were pub­lished Sept. 30, which Mr. Rose and his col­leagues were unaware coin­cid­ed with the start of the Mus­lim holy month of Ramadan. Soon after the angry news­pa­per ven­dor called, a sec­ond-gen­er­a­tion immi­grant phoned the paper to make threats against the car­toon­ists. The caller, who was quick­ly found by police, turned out to be men­tal­ly ill. After a few days, Mr. Rose though the worst was over. Then cler­ics in Copen­hagen and else­where used their ser­mons to denounce the paper. Ambas­sadors from Egypt, Sau­di Ara­bia and nine oth­er Islam­ic coun­tries request­ed a meet­ing with Denmark’s cen­ter-right prime min­is­ter, Anders Fogh Ras­mussen. Mr. Ras­mussen declined, say­ing the state had no right to inter­fere with the country’s free press. Angry local Mus­lim lead­ers orga­nized ral­lies demand­ing an apol­o­gy. The paper refused. . . .”

(Idem.)

18. A brief bio­graph­i­cal sketch of Mr. Abu-Laban sug­gests the dis­tinct pos­si­bil­i­ty that he is a mem­ber of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. Note that he invit­ed Sheikh Rah­man to speak at an event in Den­mark, plac­ing Abu Laban in the Al Qae­da milieu.

“ . . . Mr. Abu-Laban, who grew up in Egypt and was arrest­ed there in the ear­ly 1980’s after being expelled from the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates for his preach­ing, took charge of writ­ing state­ments for the group and com­mu­ni­cat­ing with Mus­lim ambas­sadors. He denies hold­ing extrem­ist views, but acknowl­edges host­ing vis­its to Den­mark by Omar Abdel Rah­man, before his arrest in New York, where the blind sheik now is serv­ing a life sen­tence in con­nec­tion with the 1993 World Trade Cen­ter bomb­ing. [Empha­sis added.]. . .”

(Idem.)

19. A crit­i­cal detail of “Car­toon­gate” con­cerns the fact that the car­toons and text cir­cu­lat­ed in the [large­ly illit­er­ate] Mus­lim World were inac­cu­rate. Many of the car­toons of Muham­mad were delib­er­ate­ly insult­ing and provoca­tive and were NOT pub­lished in Mr. Rose’s paper. Some of the car­toons may have been sent by white suprema­cists and neo-Nazis to delib­er­ate­ly inflame ten­sions. As will be seen below, there are oper­a­tional links between ele­ments of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and Euro­pean Nazi and fas­cist ele­ments.

“ . . . From sev­er­al sources, we now know that word of the car­toons was then car­ried sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly through the Mus­lim world—to prin­ci­pal mosques, madras­sahs, and gov­ern­ment offices start­ing in Egypt. This was done by del­e­ga­tions sent by Ahmed Abu-Laban, the Sau­di-sup­port­ed Imam of Copen­hagen. And in addi­tion to the dozen car­toons that had actu­al­ly appeared in that obscure provin­cial newspaper—most fair­ly inno­cent, and one actu­al­ly sat­i­riz­ing oppo­si­tion to Islam—the del­e­ga­tions’ ‘media kits’ includ­ed as many as 30 graph­ics that had nev­er appeared, and by their nature would nev­er appear, in a West­ern main­stream news­pa­per. For instance, a pho­to of a man dressed as a pig, over the cap­tion, ‘This is the real Moham­mad.’ The fake pic­tures not only out­num­bered the real ones, they were much nas­ti­er. Many were in the style of anti-Semit­ic car­toons that appear fre­quent­ly in Arab papers, but turned around to tar­get Mus­lims instead of Jews. And the cov­er­ing let­ter, which I have read in trans­la­tion, was full of out­ra­geous lies about events in Den­mark, and mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tions of what had been said by Dan­ish jour­nal­ists and politi­cians. [Empha­sis added.]”

(“Orga­nized Apoplexy” by David War­ren; Ottawa Cit­i­zen; 2/8/2006.)

20. “It is this doc­u­ment, and not any copy of Jyl­lands-Posten from Sept. 30th 2005, that is at the root of the Mus­lim riots, the Sau­di-spon­sored p[an-Arab boy­cott of Dan­ish goods, and var­i­ous fat­was and oth­er acts that put Danes and oth­er Euro­peans, who had nev­er pre­vi­ous­ly hears of Jyl­lands-Posten, in per­il for their lives. . . .”

(Idem.)

21. “ . . . For the whole point of this exer­cise is to enhance the pow­er and pres­tige of rad­i­cal Islam, over the great num­ber of Mus­lims who have not been look­ing for trou­ble. Sim­ply by rec­og­niz­ing the least rea­son­able Mus­lim voic­es as the legit­i­mate rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Islam, ter­ri­ble dam­age is done to mod­er­ate inter­ests. It is utter­ly wrong to appease an Abu-Laban. Here is a man who gave an inter­view on Dan­ish tele­vi­sion, pre­tend­ing great dis­tress, and con­demn­ing the excess­es of the inter­na­tion­al cam­paign against Dan­ish per­sons, prop­er­ty, and prod­ucts. But he also gave an inter­view to Al-Jazeera, in Ara­bic, cheer­ful­ly con­grat­u­lat­ing the world’s Mus­lims on putting a scare into the Danes, and gloat­ing over the suc­cess of the boy­cott. Alas for him, the Dan­ish tele­vi­sion net­work, DR, has now shown excerpts from the Al-Jazeera inter­view, trans­lat­ed into Dan­ish. This has to be spelled out very plain­ly to peo­ple in the West who don’t get it, includ­ing igno­rant scribes in the U.S. State Depart­ment, the British For­eign Office, and the Vat­i­can, who have added their offi­cial voic­es in con­dem­na­tion of those irrel­e­vant Dan­ish car­toons. Every time we refuse a rad­i­cal Mus­lim demand, by stick­ing to our sound West­ern prin­ci­ples, we strength­en rea­son­able Mus­lims against the fanat­ics. Every time we relent, we strength­en the fanat­ics.”

(Idem.)

22. A very sage obser­va­tion indeed was made by a Pak­istani man—the father of an op-ed colum­nist in The New York Times. The extrem­ists on both sides of the Muham­mad car­toons issue should not be seen as con­sti­tut­ing the pri­ma­ry ele­ment of their respec­tive social groups. As we will see, the two extremes are work­ing togeth­er!

“ . . . ‘Lis­ten,’ said my father. ‘The most impor­tant thing here is not to con­fuse a group with­in an enti­ty for the enti­ty itself. Euro­peans, Mus­lims, Euro­pean Muslims—most peo­ple just want to live in peace. For us to start believ­ing Europe is rep­re­sent­ed by its right-wing fanat­ics would be as wrong as for them to believe Islam is rep­re­sent­ed by our right-wing fanat­ics.’ . . .”

(“Agent Provo­ca­teur’ by Kami­la Sham­sie; The New York Times; 2/15/2006; p. A23.)

23. The Ger­man Repub­likan­er Partei, head­ed up by SS offi­cer Franz Schon­hu­ber, exploit­ed the Car­toon­gate affair to pro­mote racism and xeno­pho­bia.

“ . . . High­light­ing the risk of esca­la­tion, the Ger­man extreme-right Repub­li­can Par­ty said in a state­ment yes­ter­day that the out­rage marked ‘the begin­ning of open war between cul­tures in Europe,’ adding: ‘the door is now open for black­mail by the Mohammedans.’ . . .”

(“Mus­lim Out­rage Gath­ers Pace” by Bertrand Benoit and FT Reporters; The Finan­cial Times; 2/3/2006.)

24. Next, the pro­gram revis­its a point of infor­ma­tion dis­cussed in—among oth­er programs—FTRs 378, 456. In the spring of 2002, bank Al Taqwa direc­tor (“Report on Islamists, The Far Right, and Al Taqwa” by Kevin Coogan; pp. 14–15.)

25. Inter­est­ing­ly, Huber main­tains close rela­tions with Holo­caust deniers like David Irv­ing, recent­ly con­vict­ed of Holo­caust denial in Europe.

“ . . . In Ger­many, he [Huber] speaks often at events host­ed by the neo-Nazi Nation­al Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty, which pub­licly wel­comed the Sept. 11 ter­ror­ist attacks. Huber also befriend­ed British author David Irv­ing and oth­er Holo­caust deniers while fre­quent­ing ‘Revi­sion­ist’ con­claves. . . .”

(“The Swasti­ka & the Cres­cent” by Mar­tin A. Lee; Intel­li­gence Report; Spring 2002 [#105]; Pub­lished by the South­ern Pover­ty Law Cen­ter.)

26. A telling out­growth of the Car­toon­gate affair was an Iran­ian newspaper’s spon­sor­ship of a car­toon con­test lam­poon­ing the Holo­caust. That this would be seen as an appro­pri­ate response to the pub­li­ca­tion of images of Mohammed is sig­nif­i­cant. With the Iran­ian pres­i­dent him­self hav­ing called the Holo­caust a myth, the Iran­ian response is strong­ly sug­ges­tive of the notion that Jews dom­i­nate and secret­ly run West­ern soci­ety. This belief is very wide­spread in the Mus­lim world. In this con­text, one should also note that Huber is very close to the Iran­ian regime.

“An Iran­ian newspaper’s con­test for Holo­caust-relat­ed car­toons has drawn entries from 200 peo­ple, with some draw­ings mock­ing the World War II slaugh­ter: One entry shows Jews going into a gas pipeline. Most con­test entrants are Iran­ian, but six are Amer­i­cans and a few car­toons have been sub­mit­ted from such places as Indone­sia and Brazil, accord­ing to the Hamshahri news­pa­per. A few of the draw­ings have been post­ed online. Hamshahri began the con­test last month as a test of the West’s readi­ness to print car­toons about the Nazi killing of 6 mil­lion Jews in World War II. The con­test, which runs through May 15, comes in response to car­i­ca­tures of the prophet Muham­mad that sparked protests across much of the Mus­lim world. . . .”

(“Holo­caust Car­toon Con­test Draws 200” by Nass­er Kari­mi [AP]; The San Fran­cis­co Chron­i­cle; 3/14/2006; p. A7.)

Discussion

No comments for “FTR #543 Hell and High Water: Cartoongate and the Dubai Ports Controversy”

Post a comment

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

Martin BormannMartin Borman, Nazi in Exile by Paul Manning. German corporate capital flight program in the waning years of WWII.
Available for download. Read more about the Bormann Organizaton »