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FTR #705 Update on 9/11 and Related Matters

MP3 Side 1 [1] | Side 2 [2]

Intro­duc­tion: The pro­gram begins with an FBI infor­man­t’s con­tention that the Bureau missed a chance to inter­dict 9/11 hijack­er Moham­mad [3]Atta’s activ­i­ties. As we have seen in our many vis­its with the hero­ic Daniel Hop­sick­er [4], Atta was part of an intelligence/fascist milieu in Flori­da that was, past a point, untouch­able to law enforce­ment.


Wel­come to Ter­ror­land

Very, very dis­turb­ing in light of Hop­sick­er’s inves­ti­ga­tions is news that a large, sophis­ti­cat­ed avi­a­tion net­wor [6]k is linked to Latin Amer­i­can and African drug smug­gling net­works, as well as Mus­lim Broth­er­hood net­works asso­ci­at­ed with al-Qaeda.The net­work is fly­ing Boe­ing 727 jets, capa­ble of car­ry­ing up to 10 tons of car­go. They are return­ing to the Amer­i­c­as, with car­go. The pos­si­bil­i­ty that they could, ulti­mate­ly, fer­ry-in WMD’s is an unset­tling but very real prospect.

Turn­ing to the crash of Air France flight 447 [7], the pro­gram notes that the plane appears to have bro­ken up in mid-air, sug­gest­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a bomb. Two of the vic­tims of the crash are note­wor­thy for present pur­pos­es. Argen­tine cam­paign­er Pablo Drey­fus and Swiss col­league Ronald Drey­er [8] had been bat­tling the over­lap­ping arms and drug trade in South Amer­i­ca, two areas in which the nexus of orga­nized crime and Islamist ter­ror­ism may be found. There were also reports of pos­si­ble Islam­ic mil­i­tant [9]s on board the doomed air­craft.

Much of the pro­gram deals with the GOP/Muslim Brotherhood/terrorist axis. After not­ing that Pres­i­dent Bush enter­tained Faizul Khan [10]–an imam who min­is­tered to the Fort Hood shoot­er [11] and who is close­ly affil­i­at­ed with the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood milieu, [12] the pro­gram turns to the top­ic of GOP king­pin Grover Norquist. At the recent Con­ser­v­a­tive Polit­i­cal Action Con­fer­ence, Norquist, one of the major archi­tects of the GOP/Muslim Broth­er­hood link [13], dis­missed any notion that Islamists are a threat as a con­coc­tion of “The Israel Lob­by.”

Pro­gram High­lights Include: Mus­lim gangs’ con­trol of the British under­world [14]; the U.S. Attor­ney in New York’s deci­sion [15] to merge inves­ti­ga­tions of drug traf­fick­ing and Islam­ic ter­ror­ism; GOP sen­a­to­r­i­al hope­ful Tom Camp­bel­l’s [15] sup­port for Sami al-Ari­an; 9/11 hijack­ers’ imam Anwar Awlak­i’s [16] close asso­ci­a­tion with Major Hasan, the Fort Hood shoot­er.

1. The pro­gram begins with an FBI infor­man­t’s con­tention that the Bureau missed a chance to inter­dict 9/11 hijack­er Moham­mad Atta’s activ­i­ties. As we have seen in our many vis­its with the hero­ic Daniel Hop­sick­er, Atta was part of an intelligence/fascist milieu in Flori­da that was, past a point, untouch­able to law enforce­ment. Whether the bureau bun­gled or was delib­er­ate­ly put off the trail of Atta and com­pa­ny is a sub­ject for spec­u­la­tion.

On the eve of the eight year anniver­sary of the 9/11 attacks, an FBI infor­mant who infil­trat­ed alleged ter­ror­ist cells in the U.S. tells ABC News the FBI missed a chance to stop the al Qae­da plot because they focused more on under­cov­er stings than on the man who would lat­er become known as 9/11 ring­leader Mohammed Atta.

In an exclu­sive inter­view to be broad­cast tonight on ABC World News with Charles Gib­son and Night­line, for­mer under­cov­er oper­a­tive Elie Assaad says he spot­ted and became sus­pi­cious of Atta in ear­ly 2001, when he was sent by the FBI to infil­trate a small mosque out­side Mia­mi. Atta was there with Adnan Shukru­ju­man, an al Qae­da fugi­tive who now has a $5 mil­lion U.S. reward on his head.

“There was some­thing wrong with these guys,” Assaad, a 36-year-old Catholic native of Lebanon who pre­tend­ed to be an Islam­ic extrem­ist, says. . . .

. . . Accord­ing to Assaad, Shukru­jumah, whose father ran the mosque, invit­ed the under­cov­er FBI oper­a­tive to meet him at his home, but the FBI told him to stay away. Instead, Assad says the agency assigned him to set up and sting what he calls wannabe ter­ror­ists, end­ing any hope of infil­trat­ing the real al Qae­da ter­ror­ists.

For­mer nation­al secu­ri­ty offi­cial Richard Clarke, now an ABC News con­sul­tant, said the case is “yet anoth­er exam­ple of the way the sys­tem broke down pri­or to 9/11.”

“If the sys­tem had worked,” Clarke said, “we might have been able to iden­ti­fy these peo­ple before the attacks.”

“FBI Infor­mant Says Agents Missed Chance to Stop 9/11 Ring­leader Mohammed Atta” by Bri­an Ross and Vic Wal­ter; ABC News; 9/10/2009. [3]

2. Lis­ten­ers famil­iar with Hop­sick­er’s work will find the fol­low­ing arti­cle gen­uine­ly chill­ing. The above-men­tioned fascist/intelligence milieu was deeply involved with drug-smug­gling. The pos­si­bil­i­ty that a WMD might find its way into one of the rogue net­work’s aircraft–perhaps a 727–is a chill­ing pos­si­biltiy. Note that in the Nazi tract Ser­pen­t’s Walk, the Unit­ed States is destroyed by ter­ror­ist attacks using WMD’s smug­gled in through drug net­works!

In ear­ly 2008, an offi­cial at the U.S. Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty sent a report to his supe­ri­ors detail­ing what he called “the most sig­nif­i­cant devel­op­ment in the crim­i­nal exploita­tion of air­craft since 9/11.“The doc­u­ment warned that a grow­ing fleet of rogue jet air­craft was reg­u­lar­ly criss­cross­ing the Atlantic Ocean. On one end of the air route, it said, are cocaine-pro­duc­ing areas in the Andes con­trolled by the left­ist Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Armed Forces of Colom­bia. On the oth­er are some of West Africa’s most unsta­ble coun­tries.

The report, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters, was ignored, and the prob­lem has since esca­lat­ed into what secu­ri­ty offi­cials in sev­er­al coun­tries describe as a glob­al secu­ri­ty threat.

The clan­des­tine fleet has grown to include twin-engine tur­bo­props, exec­u­tive jets and retired Boe­ing 727s that are fly­ing mul­ti-ton loads of cocaine and pos­si­bly weapons to an area in Africa where fac­tions of al Qae­da are believed to be facil­i­tat­ing the smug­gling of drugs to Europe, the offi­cials say.

Al Qae­da in the Islam­ic Maghreb (AQIM) has been held respon­si­ble for car and sui­cide bomb­ings in Alge­ria and Mau­ri­ta­nia.

Gun­men and ban­dits with links to AQIM have also stepped up kid­nap­pings of Euro­peans for ran­som, who are then passed on to AQIM fac­tions seek­ing ran­som pay­ments.

The air­craft hop­scotch across South Amer­i­can coun­tries, pick­ing up tons of cocaine and jet fuel, offi­cials say. They then soar across the Atlantic to West Africa and the Sahel, where the drugs are fun­neled across the Sahara Desert and into Europe.

An exam­i­na­tion of doc­u­ments and inter­views with offi­cials in the Unit­ed States and three West African nations sug­gest that at least 10 air­craft have been dis­cov­ered using this air route since 2006. Offi­cials warn that many of these air­craft were detect­ed pure­ly by chance. They cau­tion that the real num­ber involved in the net­works is like­ly con­sid­er­ably high­er.

Alexan­dre Schmidt, region­al rep­re­sen­ta­tive for West and Cen­tral Africa for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, cau­tioned in Dakar this week that the avi­a­tion net­work has expand­ed in the past 12 months and now like­ly includes sev­er­al Boe­ing 727 air­craft.

“When you have this high capac­i­ty for trans­port­ing drugs into West Africa, this means that you have the capac­i­ty to trans­port as well oth­er goods, so it is def­i­nite­ly a threat to secu­ri­ty any­where in the world,” said Schmidt.

The “oth­er goods” offi­cials are most wor­ried about are weapons that mil­i­tant orga­ni­za­tions can smug­gle on the jet air­craft. A Boe­ing 727 can han­dle up to 10 tons of car­go.

The U.S. offi­cial who wrote the report for the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty said the al Qae­da con­nec­tion was unclear at the time.

The offi­cial is a counter-nar­cotics avi­a­tion expert who asked to remain anony­mous as he is not autho­rized to speak on the record. He said he was dis­mayed by the lack of atten­tion to the mat­ter since he wrote the report.

“You’ve got an estab­lished ter­ror­ist con­nec­tion on this side of the Atlantic. Now on the Africa side you have the al Qae­da con­nec­tion and it’s extreme­ly dis­turb­ing and a lit­tle bit mys­ti­fy­ing that it’s not one of the top pri­or­i­ties of the gov­ern­ment,” he said.

Since the Sep­tem­ber 11 attacks, the secu­ri­ty sys­tem for pas­sen­ger air traf­fic has been ratch­eted up in the Unit­ed States and through­out much of the rest of the world, with the lat­est mea­sures imposed just weeks ago after a failed bomb attempt on a Detroit-bound plane on Decem­ber 25.

“The bad guys have respond­ed with their own avi­a­tion net­work that is out there every­day fly­ing loads and mov­ing con­tra­band,” said the offi­cial, “and the gov­ern­ment seems to be obliv­i­ous to it.”

The upshot, he said, is that mil­i­tant orga­ni­za­tions — includ­ing groups like the FARC and al Qae­da — have the “pow­er to move peo­ple and mate­r­i­al and con­tra­band any­where around the world with a cou­ple of fuel stops.”

The lucra­tive drug trade is already hav­ing a dele­te­ri­ous impact on West African nations. Local author­i­ties told Reuters they are increas­ing­ly out­gunned and unable to stop the smug­glers.

And sig­nif­i­cant­ly, many experts say, the drug traf­fick­ing is bring­ing in huge rev­enues to groups that say they are part of al Qae­da. It’s swelling not just their cof­fers but also their ranks, they say, as drug mon­ey is becom­ing an effec­tive recruit­ing tool in some of the world’s most des­per­ate­ly poor regions.

U.S. Pres­i­dent Barack Oba­ma has chid­ed his intel­li­gence offi­cials for not pool­ing infor­ma­tion “to con­nect those dots” to pre­vent threats from being real­ized. But these dots, scat­tered across two con­ti­nents like flar­ing traces on a radar screen, remain large­ly uncon­nect­ed and the fleets them­selves are still fly­ing.


The dead­ly cocaine trade always fol­lows the mon­ey, and its cash-flush traf­fick­ers seek out the routes that are the most­ly light­ly policed.

Beset by cor­rup­tion and pover­ty, weak coun­tries across West Africa have become stag­ing plat­forms for trans­port­ing between 30 tons and 100 tons of cocaine each year that ends up in Europe, accord­ing to U.N. esti­mates.

Drug traf­fick­ing, though on a much small­er scale, has exist­ed here and else­where on the con­ti­nent since at least the late 1990s, accord­ing to local author­i­ties and U.S. enforce­ment offi­cials.

Ear­li­er this decade, sea inter­dic­tions were stepped up. So smug­glers devel­oped an air fleet that is able to trans­port tons of cocaine from the Andes to African nations that include Mau­ri­ta­nia, Mali, Sier­ra Leone and Guinea Bissau.What these coun­tries have in com­mon are numer­ous dis­used land­ing strips and makeshift run­ways — most with­out radar or police pres­ence. Guinea Bis­sau has no avi­a­tion radar at all. As fleets grew, so, too, did the drug trade.

The DEA says all air­craft seized in West Africa had depart­ed Venezuela. That nation’s loca­tion on the Caribbean and Atlantic seaboard of South Amer­i­ca makes it an ide­al take­off place for drug flights bound for Africa, they say.

A num­ber of air­craft have been retro­fit­ted with addi­tion­al fuel tanks to allow in-flight refu­el­ing — a tech­nique inno­vat­ed by Mex­i­co’s drug smug­glers. (Car­tel pilots there have been known to stretch an air­craft’s flight range by putting a water mat­tress filled with avi­a­tion fuel in the cab­in, then stack­ing car­goes of mar­i­jua­na bun­dles on top to act as an impro­vised fuel pump.)

Ploys used by the car­tel avi­a­tors to mask the flights include fraud­u­lent pilot cer­tifi­cates, false reg­is­tra­tion doc­u­ments and altered tail num­bers to steer clear of law enforce­ment look­out lists, inves­ti­ga­tors say. Some air­craft have also been found with­out air-wor­thi­ness cer­tifi­cates or log books. When smug­glers are forced to aban­don them, they torch them to destroy foren­sic and oth­er evi­dence like ser­i­al num­bers.

The evi­dence sug­gests that some Africa-bound cocaine jets also file a region­al flight plan to avoid arous­ing sus­pi­cion from inves­ti­ga­tors. They then sub­se­quent­ly change them at the last minute, con­fi­dent that their switch will go unde­tect­ed.

One Gulf­stream II jet, wait­ing with its engines run­ning to take on 2.3 tons of cocaine at Mar­gari­ta Island in Venezuela, request­ed a last-minute flight plan change to war-rav­aged Sier­ra Leone in West Africa. It was nabbed moments lat­er by Venezue­lan troops, the report seen by Reuters showed.

Once air­borne, the planes soar to alti­tudes used by com­mer­cial jets. They have lit­tle fear of inter­dic­tion as there is no long-range radar cov­er­age over the Atlantic. Cur­rent detec­tion efforts by U.S. author­i­ties, using fixed radar and P3 air­craft, are lim­it­ed to tra­di­tion­al Caribbean and north Atlantic air and marine tran­sit cor­ri­dors.

The air­craft land at air­ports, dis­used run­ways or impro­vised air strips in Africa. One bear­ing a false Red Cross emblem touched down with­out autho­riza­tion onto an unlit strip at Lun­gi Inter­na­tion­al Air­port in Sier­ra Leone in 2008, accord­ing to a U.N. report.

Late last year a Boe­ing 727 land­ed on an impro­vised run­way using the hard-packed sand of a Tuareg camel car­a­van route in Mali, where local offi­cials said smug­glers offloaded between 2 and 10 tons of cocaine before dous­ing the jet with fuel and burn­ing it after it failed to take off again.

For years, traf­fick­ers in Mex­i­co have bribed offi­cials to allow them to land and offload cocaine flights at com­mer­cial air­ports. That’s now hap­pen­ing in Africa as well. In July 2008, troops in coup-prone Guinea Bis­sau secured Bis­sau inter­na­tion­al air­port to allow an unsched­uled cocaine flight to land, accord­ing to Edmun­do Mendes, a direc­tor with the Judi­cial Police.

“When we got there, the sol­diers were pro­tect­ing the air­craft,” said Mendes, who tried to nab the Gulf­stream II jet packed with an esti­mat­ed $50 mil­lion in cocaine but was blocked by the mil­i­tary.

“The sol­diers ver­bal­ly threat­ened us,” he said. The cocaine was nev­er recov­ered. Just last week, Reuters pho­tographed two air­craft at Osval­do Vieira Inter­na­tion­al Air­port in Guinea Bis­sau — one had been dis­patched by traf­fick­ers from Sene­gal to try to repair the oth­er, a Gulf­stream II jet, after it devel­oped mechan­i­cal prob­lems. Police seized the sec­ond air­craft.


One of the clear­est indi­ca­tions of how much this avi­a­tion net­work has advanced was the dis­cov­ery, on Novem­ber 2, of the burned out fuse­lage of an aging Boe­ing 727. Local author­i­ties found it rest­ing on its side in rolling sands in Mali. In sev­er­al ways, the use of such an air­craft marks a sig­nif­i­cant advance for smug­glers.

Boe­ing jet­lin­ers, like the one dis­cov­ered in Mali, can fly a car­go of sev­er­al tons into remote areas. They also require a three-man crew — a pilot, co pilot and flight engi­neer, pri­mar­i­ly to man­age the com­plex fuel sys­tem dat­ing from an era before automa­tion.

Hun­dreds of miles to the west, in the sul­try, for­mer Por­tuguese colony of Guinea Bis­sau, nation­al Inter­pol direc­tor Cal­vario Ahukharie said sev­er­al aban­doned air­fields, includ­ing strips used at one time by the Por­tuguese mil­i­tary, had recent­ly been restored by “drug mafias” for illic­it flights.

“In the past, the planes com­ing from Latin Amer­i­ca usu­al­ly land­ed at Bis­sau air­port,” Ahukharie said as a gen­er­a­tor churned the fee­ble air-con­di­tion­ing in his office dur­ing one of the city’s fre­quent black­outs.

“But now they land at air­ports in south­ern and east­ern Bis­sau where the judi­cial police have no pres­ence.”

Ahukharie said drug flights are land­ing at Cacine, in east­ern Bis­sau, and Bubaque in the Bija­gos Arch­i­pel­ago, a chain of more than 80 islands off the Atlantic coast. Inter­pol said it hears about the flights from locals, although they have been unable to seize air­craft, cit­ing a lack of resources.

The drug trade, by both air and sea, has already had a dev­as­tat­ing impact on Guinea Bis­sau. A dis­pute over traf­fick­ing has been linked to the assas­si­na­tion of the mil­i­tary chief of staff, Gen­er­al Batista Tagme Na Wai in 2009. Hours lat­er, the coun­try’s pres­i­dent, Joao Bernar­do Vieira, was hacked to death by machete in his home.

Asked how seri­ous the issue of air traf­fick­ing remained for Guinea Bis­sau, Ahukharie was unam­bigu­ous: “The prob­lem is grave.”

The sit­u­a­tion is poten­tial­ly worse in the Sahel-Sahara, where cocaine is arriv­ing by the ton. There it is fed into well-estab­lished over­land traf­fick­ing routes across the Sahara where gov­ern­ment influ­ence is lim­it­ed and where fac­tions of al Qae­da in the Islam­ic Maghreb have become increas­ing­ly active.

The group, pre­vi­ous­ly known as the Salafist Group for Preach­ing and Com­bat, is rais­ing mil­lions of dol­lars from the kid­nap of Euro­peans.

Ana­lysts say mil­i­tants strike deals of con­ve­nience with Tuareg rebels and smug­glers of arms, cig­a­rettes and drugs. Accord­ing to a grow­ing pat­tern of evi­dence, the group may now be deriv­ing hefty rev­enues from facil­i­tat­ing the smug­gling of FARC-made cocaine to the shores of Europe.


In Decem­ber, Anto­nio Maria Cos­ta, the exec­u­tive direc­tor of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, told a spe­cial ses­sion of the UN Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil that drugs were being trad­ed by “ter­ror­ists and anti-gov­ern­ment forces” to fund their oper­a­tions from the Andes, to Asia and the African Sahel.

“In the past, trade across the Sahara was by car­a­vans,” he said. “Today it is larg­er in size, faster at deliv­ery and more high-tech, as evi­denced by the debris of a Boe­ing 727 found on Novem­ber 2nd in the Gao region of Mali — an area affect­ed by insur­gency and ter­ror­ism.”

Just days lat­er, U.S. Drug Enforce­ment Admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials arrest­ed three West African men fol­low­ing a sting oper­a­tion in Ghana. The men, all from Mali, were extra­dit­ed to New York on Decem­ber 16 on drug traf­fick­ing and ter­ror­ism charges.

Oumar Issa, Harouna Toure, and Idriss Abel­rah­man are accused of plot­ting to trans­port cocaine across Africa with the intent to sup­port al Qae­da, its local affil­i­ate AQIM and the FARC. The charges pro­vid­ed evi­dence of what the DEA’s top offi­cial in Colom­bia described to a Reuters reporter as “an unholy alliance between South Amer­i­can nar­co-ter­ror­ists and Islam­ic extrem­ists.”

Some experts are skep­ti­cal, how­ev­er, that the men are any more than crim­i­nals. They ques­tioned whether the drug deal­ers over­sold their al Qae­da con­nec­tions to get their hands on the cocaine.

In its crim­i­nal com­plaint, the DEA said Toure had led an armed group affil­i­at­ed to al Qae­da that could move the cocaine from Ghana through North Africa to Spain for a fee of $2,000 per kilo for trans­porta­tion and pro­tec­tion.

Toure dis­cussed two dif­fer­ent over­land routes with an under­cov­er infor­mant. One was through Alge­ria and Moroc­co; the oth­er via Alge­ria to Libya. He told the informer that the group had worked with al Qae­da to trans­port between one and two tons of hashish to Tunisia, as well as smug­gle Pak­istani, Indi­an and Bangladeshi migrants into Spain.

In any event, AQIM has been gain­ing in noto­ri­ety. Secu­ri­ty ana­lysts warn that cash stem­ming from the trans-Saha­ran coke trade could trans­form the orga­ni­za­tion — a small, agile group whose south­ern-Sahel wing is esti­mat­ed to num­ber between 100 and 200 men — into a more potent threat in the region that stretch­es from Mau­ri­ta­nia to Niger. It is an area with huge for­eign invest­ments in oil, min­ing and a pos­si­ble trans-Sahara gas pipeline.

“These groups are going to have a lot more mon­ey than they’ve had before, and I think you are going to see them with much more sophis­ti­cat­ed weapons,” said Dou­glas Farah, a senior fel­low at the Inter­na­tion­al Assess­ment Strat­e­gy Cen­ter, a Wash­ing­ton based secu­ri­ty think-tank.


The Tim­buk­tu region cov­ers more than a third of north­ern Mali, where the parched, scrub­by Sahel shades into the end­less, rolling dunes of the Sahara Desert. It is an area sev­er­al times the size of Switzer­land, much of it beyond state con­trol.

Moulaye Haidara, the cus­toms offi­cial, said the sharp influx of cocaine by air has trans­formed the area into an “indus­tri­al depot” for cocaine.

Sit­ting in a cool, dark, mud-brick office build­ing in the city where nomadic Tuareg min­gle with Arabs and African Song­hay, Fulani and Mande peo­ples, Haidara express­es alarm at the chal­lenge local law enforce­ment faces.

Using prof­its from the trade, the smug­glers have already bought “auto­mat­ic weapons, and they are very deter­mined,” Haidara said. He added that they “call them­selves Al Qae­da,” though he believes the group had noth­ing to do with reli­gion, but used it as “an ide­o­log­i­cal base.”

Local author­i­ties say four-wheel-dri­ve Toy­ota SUVs out­fit­ted with GPS nav­i­ga­tion equip­ment and satel­lite tele­phones are stan­dard issue for smug­glers. Res­i­dents say traf­fick­ers deflate the tires to gain bet­ter trac­tion on the loose Saha­ran sands, and can trav­el at speeds of up to 70 miles-per-hour in con­voys along routes to North Africa.

Tim­buk­tu gov­er­nor, Colonel Mamadou Man­gara, said he believes traf­fick­ers have air-con­di­tioned tents that enable them to oper­ate in areas of the Sahara where sum­mer tem­per­a­tures are so fierce that they “scorch your shoes.” He added that the army lacked such equip­ment. A grow­ing num­ber of peo­ple in the impov­er­ished region, where trans­port by don­key cart and camel are still com­mon, are being drawn to the trade. They can earn 4 to 5 mil­lion CFA Francs (rough­ly $9–11,000) on just one coke run.

“Smug­gling can be attrac­tive to peo­ple here who can make only $100 or $200 a month,” said Mohamed Ag Hamalek, a Tuareg tourist guide in Tim­buk­tu, whose fam­i­ly until recent­ly earned their keep haul­ing rock salt by camel train, using the stars to nav­i­gate the Sahara.

Haidara described north­ern Mali as a no-go area for the cus­toms ser­vice. “There is now a red line across north­ern Mali, nobody can go there,” he said, sketch­ing a map of the coun­try on a scrap of paper with a ball­point pen. “If you go there with fee­ble means ... you don’t come back.”


Speak­ing in Dakar this week, Schmidt, the U.N. offi­cial, said that grow­ing clan­des­tine air traf­fic required urgent action on the part of the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty.

“This should be the high­est con­cern for gov­ern­ments ... For West African coun­tries, for West Euro­pean coun­tries, for Rus­sia and the U.S., this should be very high on the agen­da,” he said.

Stop­ping the trade, as the traf­fick­ers are undoubt­ed­ly aware, is a huge chal­lenge — diplo­mat­i­cal­ly, struc­tural­ly and eco­nom­i­cal­ly.

Venezuela, the take­off or refu­el­ing point for air­craft mak­ing the trip, has a con­fronta­tion­al rela­tion­ship with Colom­bia, where Pres­i­dent Alvaro Uribe has focused on crush­ing the FAR­C’s 45-year-old insur­gency. The nation’s left­ist leader, Hugo Chavez, won’t allow in the DEA to work in the coun­try.

In a mea­sure of his hos­til­i­ty to Wash­ing­ton, he scram­bled two F16 fight­er jets last week to inter­cept an Amer­i­can P3 air­craft — a plane used to seek out and track drug traf­fick­ers — which he said had twice vio­lat­ed Venezue­lan air­space. He says the Unit­ed States and Colom­bia are using anti-drug oper­a­tions as a cov­er for a planned inva­sion of his oil-rich coun­try. Wash­ing­ton and Bogo­ta dis­miss the alle­ga­tion.

In terms of curb­ing traf­fick­ing, the DEA has by far the largest over­seas pres­ence of any U.S. fed­er­al law enforce­ment, with 83 offices in 62 coun­tries. But it is spread thin in Africa where it has just four offices — in Nige­ria, Ghana, Egypt and South Africa — though there are plans to open a fifth office in Kenya.

Law enforce­ment agen­cies from Europe as well as Inter­pol are also at work to curb the trade. But local­ly, offi­cials are quick to point out that Africa is los­ing the war on drugs.

The most glar­ing prob­lem, as Mal­i’s exam­ple shows, is a lack of resources. The only arrests made in con­nec­tion with the Boe­ing came days after it was found in the desert — and those incar­cer­at­ed turned out to be desert nomads can­ni­bal­iz­ing the plane’s alu­minum skin, prob­a­bly to make cook­ing pots. They were soon released.

Police in Guinea Bis­sau, mean­while, told Reuters they have few guns, no mon­ey for gas for vehi­cles giv­en by donor gov­ern­ments and no high secu­ri­ty prison to hold crim­i­nals.

Cor­rup­tion is also a prob­lem. The army has freed sev­er­al traf­fick­ers charged or detained by author­i­ties seek­ing to tack­le the prob­lem, police and rights groups said.

Seri­ous ques­tions remain about why Malian author­i­ties took so long to report the Boe­ing’s dis­cov­ery to the inter­na­tion­al law enforce­ment com­mu­ni­ty.

What is par­tic­u­lar­ly wor­ry­ing to U.S. inter­ests is that the net­works of air­craft are not just fly­ing one way — haul­ing coke to Africa from Latin Amer­i­ca — but are also fly­ing back to the Amer­i­c­as.

The inter­nal Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty mem­o­ran­dum reviewed by Reuters cit­ed one instance in which an air­craft from Africa land­ed in Mex­i­co with pas­sen­gers and unex­am­ined car­go.

The Gulf­stream II jet arrived in Can­cun, by way of Mar­gari­ta Island, Venezuela, en route from Africa. The air­craft, which was on an avi­a­tion watch list, car­ried just two pas­sen­gers. One was a U.S. nation­al with no lug­gage, the oth­er a cit­i­zen of the Repub­lic of Con­go with a diplo­mat­ic pass­port and a brief­case, which was not searched.

“The obvi­ous huge con­cern is that you have a trans­porta­tion sys­tem that is capa­ble of trans­port­ing tons of cocaine from west to east,” said the avi­a­tion spe­cial­ist who wrote the Home­land Secu­ri­ty report.

“But it’s reck­less to assume that noth­ing is com­ing back, and when there’s ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions on either side of this pipeline, it should be a high pri­or­i­ty to find out what is com­ing back on those air­planes.”

“Al Qae­da Linked to Rogue Avi­a­tion Net­work” by Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Dial­lo; Reuters; 1/13/2010. [6]

3. Turn­ing to the crash of Air France flight 447, the pro­gram notes that the plane appears to have bro­ken up in mid-air, sug­gest­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a bomb.

Autop­sies reveal­ing frac­tures in the legs, hips and arms of Air France dis­as­ter vic­tims, cou­pled with the large pieces of wreck­age pulled from the Atlantic, strong­ly sug­gest the plane broke up in the air.

With more than 400 bits of debris recov­ered from the ocean’s sur­face, the top French inves­ti­ga­tor expressed opti­mism about dis­cov­er­ing what brought down Flight 447, but he also called the con­di­tions — far from land in very deep waters — “one of the worst sit­u­a­tions ever known in an acci­dent inves­ti­ga­tion.”

French inves­ti­ga­tors are begin­ning to form “an image that is pro­gres­sive­ly less fuzzy,” Paul-Louis Arslan­ian, who runs the French air acci­dent inves­ti­ga­tion agency BEA, told a news con­fer­ence out­side Paris.

“We are in a sit­u­a­tion that is a bit more favor­able than the first days,” Arslan­ian said. “We can say there is a lit­tle less uncer­tain­ty, so there is a lit­tle more opti­mism. ... (but) it is pre­ma­ture for the time being to say what hap­pened.”

A spokesman for Brazil­ian med­ical exam­in­ers said that frac­tures were found in autop­sies on an undis­closed num­ber of the 50 bod­ies recov­ered so far.

“Typ­i­cal­ly, if you see intact bod­ies and mul­ti­ple frac­tures — arm, leg, hip frac­tures — it’s a good indi­ca­tor of a mid­flight break up,” said Frank Ciac­co, a for­mer foren­sic expert at the US Nation­al Trans­porta­tion Safe­ty Board.

“Espe­cial­ly if you’re see­ing large pieces of air­craft as well.”

The pat­tern of frac­tures was first report­ed by Brazil’s O Esta­do de S Paulo news­pa­per, which cit­ed unnamed inves­ti­ga­tors. The paper also report­ed that some vic­tims were found with lit­tle or no cloth­ing, and had no signs of burns.

That lack of cloth­ing could be sig­nif­i­cant, said Jack Casey, an avi­a­tion safe­ty con­sul­tant in Wash­ing­ton, who is a for­mer acci­dent inves­ti­ga­tor. “In an in-air break up like we are sup­pos­ing here, the clothes are just torn away.”

Casey also said mul­ti­ple frac­tures are con­sis­tent with a midair breakup of the plane, which was cruis­ing at about 10,500m when it went down.

“Get­ting eject­ed into that kind of wind­stream is like hit­ting a brick wall — even if they stay in their seats, it is a crush­ing effect,” Casey said. “Most of them were long dead before they hit the water would be my guess.”

When a jet crash­es into water most­ly intact — such as the Egypt Air plane that hit the Atlantic Ocean after tak­ing off from New York in 1999 — debris and bod­ies are gen­er­al­ly bro­ken into small pieces, Ciac­co said. . . .

“Autop­sies Sug­gest Downed Jet Broke Up in Sky” [AP]; stuff.co.nz; 6/18/2009. [7]

4. Two of the vic­tims of the crash are note­wor­thy for present pur­pos­es. Argen­tine cam­paign­er Pablo Drey­fus and Swiss col­league Ronald Drey­er had been bat­tling the over­lap­ping arms and drug trade in South Amer­i­ca, two areas in which the nexus of orga­nized crime and Islamist ter­ror­ism may be found. Were the vic­tims becom­ing over­ly trou­ble­some to some of the mangers of these are­nas of black com­merce?

Of par­tic­u­lar sig­nif­i­cance in this con­text is the so-called tri-bor­der area [17] between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina–a major area where Islamist ter­ror­ism, the arms traf­fic, drug smug­gling and fas­cist ele­ments over­lap.

Note, also, that weapons left over from African civ­il wars and Brazil­ian com­pa­nies that had pur­chased Euro­pean muni­tions com­pa­nies. For vet­er­an lis­ten­ers to this show, the German/Latin Amer­i­can link will bring to mind the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work [18].

Ard­genti­na: Argen­tine cam­paign­er Pablo Drey­fus and Swiss col­league Ronald Drey­er bat­tled South Amer­i­can arms and drug traf­fick­ingFrom Andrew McLeod

Amid the media fren­zy and spec­u­la­tion over the dis­ap­pear­ance of Air France’s ill-fat­ed Flight 447, the loss of two of the world’s most promi­nent fig­ures in the war on the ille­gal arms trade and inter­na­tion­al drug traf­fick­ing has been vir­tu­al­ly over­looked.

Pablo Drey­fus, a 39-year-old Argen­tine who was trav­el­ling with his wife Ana Car­oli­na Rodrigues aboard the doomed flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, had worked tire­less­ly with the Brazil­ian author­i­ties to stem the flow of arms and ammu­ni­tion that for years has fuelled the bloody turf wars waged by drug gangs in Rio’s sprawl­ing fave­las.

Also trav­el­ling with Drey­fus on the doomed flight was his friend and col­league Ronald Drey­er, a Swiss diplo­mat and co-ordi­na­tor of the Gene­va Dec­la­ra­tion on Armed Vio­lence who had worked with UN mis­sions in El Sal­vador, Mozam­bique, Azer­bai­jan, Koso­vo and Ango­la. Both men were con­sul­tants at the Small Arms Sur­vey, an inde­pen­dent think tank based at Geneva’s Grad­u­ate Insti­tute of Inter­na­tion­al Stud­ies. The Sur­vey said on its web­site that Dry­er had helped mobilise the sup­port of more than 100 coun­tries to the cause of dis­ar­ma­ment and devel­op­ment.

Buenos Aires-born Drey­fus had been liv­ing in Rio since 2002, where he and his soci­ol­o­gist wife worked with the Brazil­ian NGO Viva Rio.

“Pablo will be remem­bered as a gen­tle and sen­si­tive man with an upbeat sense of humour,” said the Small Arms Sur­vey. “He dis­played an intel­lec­tu­al curios­i­ty and a deter­mined work eth­ic that excit­ed and enthused all who worked with him.”

Accord­ing to the Inter­na­tion­al Action Net­work on Small Arms Con­trol (IANSA), Drey­fus’s work was instru­men­tal in the intro­duc­tion of land­mark small arms leg­is­la­tion in Brazil in 2003. Under this leg­is­la­tion, an online link was cre­at­ed between army and police data­bas­es list­ing pro­duc­tion, imports and exports of arms and ammu­ni­tion in Brazil.

Drey­fus was an advo­cate of the strin­gent labelling of ammu­ni­tion by weapons firms, argu­ing that by clear­ly iden­ti­fy­ing ammu­ni­tion not only by its pro­duc­er but also its pur­chas­er, the like­li­hood of weapons being sourced by crim­i­nals from cor­rupt police or armed forces per­son­nel is great­ly reduced.

Though a Brazil­ian ref­er­en­dum on the right to bear arms was reject­ed in 2005, Viva Rio says the cam­paign should be con­sid­ered a suc­cess because half a mil­lion weapons were vol­un­tar­i­ly hand­ed in to the author­i­ties. Anti-gun activists put the ref­er­en­dum defeat down to fears crim­i­nals would cir­cum­vent the law and con­tin­ue to gain access to small arms the usu­al way — through Paraguay and oth­er bor­der­ing coun­tries. This was not an irra­tional fear: until 2004, when Paraguay bowed to Brazil­ian pres­sure, even for­eign tourists were allowed to pur­chase small arms sim­ply by pre­sent­ing a pho­to­copy of their iden­ti­ty card. Drey­fus knew that many of the weapons from the so-called tri-bor­der area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argenti­na were reach­ing Rio drug gangs.

When uniden­ti­fied gun­men made off with a stash of hand grenades from an Argen­tine mil­i­tary gar­ri­son in 2006, Drey­fus deplored what he said was lax secu­ri­ty at mil­i­tary depots across the world. “If a super­mar­ket can keep con­trol of the amount of peas it has in stock, sure­ly a mil­i­tary organ­i­sa­tion could and should be able to do the same with equal if not greater effi­cien­cy with its weapons,” he said. “The key words are logisitics, con­trol, secu­ri­ty.”

When Rio agents smashed a cell of drug traf­fick­ers who had sourced their weapons from the tri-bor­der area, Drey­fus not­ed its lead­ers were promi­nent busi­ness­men liv­ing in apart­ments in the plush Rio sub­urbs of Ipane­ma and Sao Cor­ra­do, “not in the fave­las”.

In a recent report post­ed on the Brazil­ian web­site Comu­nidade Segu­ra (Safe Com­mu­ni­ty), Drey­fus not­ed that the Brazil­ian arms firm CBC (Com­pan­hia Brasileira de Car­tu­chos) had become one of the world’s biggest ammu­ni­tion pro­duc­ers by pur­chas­ing Ger­many’s Met­all­w­erk Elisen­hutte Nas­sau (MEN) in 2007, and Sel­l­i­er & Bel­lot (S&B) of the Czech Repub­lic in March. This would not be par­tic­u­lar­ly note­wor­thy but for the fact that CBC’s exports had tapered off in recent years due to leg­is­la­tion restrict­ing exports to Paraguay, arms that often found their way back into Brazil and on to the Rio drug gangs — the “boomerang effect”, as Drey­fus called it. “The com­mer­cial export of weapons and ammu­ni­tion from Brazil to the bor­der­ing coun­tries stopped in 2001,” wrote Drey­fus. “CBC lost com­mer­cial mar­kets in Latin Amer­i­ca, but Brazil won in pub­lic secu­ri­ty.”

How­ev­er, man­u­fac­tur­ers from oth­er coun­tries had moved in to fill the void, and before its pur­chase by CBC, S&B was already “one of the marks most cur­rent­ly appre­hend­ed” by Brazil­ian police. Drey­fus said that, in view of the fact the Czech Repub­lic was bound by the EU Code of Con­duct on weapons exports — which states that EU coun­tries must “eval­u­ate the exis­tence of the risk that the arma­ment can be divert­ed to unde­sir­able final des­ti­na­tions”, CBC should “con­sid­er the risk that some of these exports end up, via diver­sions, feed­ing vio­lence in Brazil”.

Though his focus was on Latin Amer­i­ca, Drey­fus also advised the gov­ern­ment of Mozam­bique and at the time of his death was prepar­ing to do the same for the gov­ern­ment of Ango­la, where stock­piles of weapons left over from the civ­il war con­tin­ue to pose a secu­ri­ty prob­lem.

Drey­fus and Drey­er were on their way to Gene­va to present the lat­est edi­tion of the Small Arms Sur­vey hand­book, of which Drey­fus was a joint edi­tor. It was to have been their lat­est step in their relent­less fight against evil.

“Key Fig­ures in Glob­al­Vat­tle Against Ille­gal Arms Trade Lost in Air France Crash”; Her­ald [Scot­land]; 6/6/2009. [8]

5. There were also reports of pos­si­ble Islam­ic mil­i­tants on board the doomed air­craft.

A French sub­ma­rine with advanced sonar equip­ment began search­ing yes­ter­day for the flight recorders of the Air France air­lin­er that crashed into the Atlantic last week, killing all 228 pas­sen­gers and crew.

It was claimed yes­ter­day by the French week­ly L’Ex­press that two names on the flight’s pas­sen­ger list “cor­re­spond to peo­ple known for links to Islamist ter­ror­ism” by French intel­li­gence ser­vices.

The French nuclear sub­ma­rine Emer­aude was sent to the area to hunt for the air­craft’s “black box” flight-data recorders, which might help to explain the dis­as­ter. They are believed to lie on the ocean floor.

The Air France flight is believed to have run into trou­ble when it hit a vio­lent storm mid­way over the Atlantic Ocean.

Prob­lems with air-speed sen­sors have become one of the focal points of the inquiry.

But oth­er caus­es have not been ruled out. . . .

” ‘Sus­pect Names’ Air France Flight”; timeslive.co.za; 9/1/2009. [9]

6. Under-report­ed is the pro­found con­nec­tion between Islamism and orga­nized crime. There is an entire chap­ter in “Dol­lars for Ter­ror” by Richard Labeviere [19] titled “Islamist Deal-Mak­ing and Orga­nized Crime.” Our vis­its with Daniel Hop­sick­er have high­light­ed this link, to an extent.

In fact, much of the income derived by groups like Al-Qae­da, the Tal­iban and oth­er Islamist cadres comes from arms and drug sales.

A chill­ing arti­cle from the UK under­lines the extent to which Mus­lim gangs dom­i­nate the British under­world. Although they are described as not being reli­gious by mem­bers, one should bear in mind the eco­nom­ic sup­port that groups like this have, and the extent to which that influ­ence is ampli­fied by their alliance with Mus­lim Broth­er­hood sub­groups.

NB: “Asian” in pop­u­lar British lex­i­con gen­er­al­ly refers to peo­ple from Pak­istan and India, not Chi­nese, Viet­namese, Thai, etc.

In tra­di­tion­al Islam­ic head­gear, Asian ex-gang mem­ber Amir pos­es with his sword and issues the stark warn­ing: “Britain’s under­world belongs to the Mus­lims.”

The 21-year-old, whose organ­i­sa­tion turned over thou­sands of pounds a day from drug-deal­ing and cred­it card scams, claims a post‑9/11 fear of ter­ror­ism has allowed Mus­lims to devel­op a stran­gle­hold on our crim­i­nal com­mu­ni­ty.

Through Islam, he says, they have num­bers which can­not be matched, and rival gangs are being forced out by ruth­less Islam­ic crim­i­nals who only deal with each oth­er.

They recruit black and white mem­bers in Britain’s jails, tempt­ing them to con­vert to Islam in exchange for a cushi­er life inside.

Once released, the con­vert­ed cons have access to an entire­ly new net­work of Mus­lim crim­i­nal con­tacts — and are trust­ed because they pray to Allah.

Amir claims that Britain’s under­world will soon be com­plete­ly dom­i­nat­ed by Islam­ic gangs — and he says the West­’s para­noia over ter­ror­ism is to blame. “Peo­ple don’t f*** with us because they think we’re all in al-Qae­da,” he explains.

“Our sta­tus in the crim­i­nal hier­ar­chy changed lit­er­al­ly the day the Twin Tow­ers went down.

“From then, Asians have been asso­ci­at­ed with ter­ror­ism. Peo­ple, includ­ing oth­er crim­i­nals, think if you’re Asian you’ll blow up a Tube train or bomb an aero­plane.

“In the past 20 years we’ve cap­i­talised on that. If we’re going to be thought of as extrem­ists, why not use that fear?

“The real­i­ty is that Asian gangs don’t give much of [a] toss about reli­gion, but with Islam comes fear, and with fear comes pow­er. . . . ”

“How Mus­lims Took over the British Under­world” by Nick Fran­cis; The Sun [UK]; 2/15/2010. [14]

7. The Unit­ed States attor­ney in Man­hat­tan is merg­ing the two units in his office that pros­e­cute ter­ror­ism and inter­na­tion­al nar­cotics cas­es, say­ing that he wants to focus more on extrem­ist Islam­ic groups whose mem­bers he believes are increas­ing­ly turn­ing to the drug trade to finance their activ­i­ties.

The Unit­ed States attor­ney in Man­hat­tan is merg­ing the two units in his office that pros­e­cute ter­ror­ism and inter­na­tion­al nar­cotics cas­es, say­ing that he wants to focus more on extrem­ist Islam­ic groups whose mem­bers he believes are increas­ing­ly turn­ing to the drug trade to finance their activ­i­ties.

Some West­ern law enforce­ment and intel­li­gence agen­cies have long point­ed to what they say are the sym­bi­ot­ic rela­tion­ships that some­times exist between ter­ror­ist groups and nar­cotics traf­fick­ers, from Al Qae­da in Afghanistan and Hezbol­lah in the Mid­dle East to the Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Armed Forces of Colom­bia, or FARC.

But the move by the Unit­ed States attor­ney, Preet Bharara, comes as Unit­ed States offi­cials have sug­gest­ed that some mem­bers of Islam­ic extrem­ist groups, includ­ing Al Qae­da and some of its affil­i­ates, are more fre­quent­ly turn­ing to the drug trade — as well as kid­nap­ping and oth­er crim­i­nal activ­i­ties — to help finance their oper­a­tions.

It is, they say, part­ly a response to increased pres­sure on oth­er finan­cial sources, like Islam­ic char­i­ties and pri­vate donors.

By merg­ing the units, Ter­ror­ism and Nation­al Secu­ri­ty and Inter­na­tion­al Nar­cotics Traf­fick­ing, Mr. Bharara said he is com­bin­ing two groups that have devel­oped many of the same skills — work­ing over­seas, often using clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion, to build com­plex cas­es against sophis­ti­cat­ed tar­gets.

The new unit, he said, would be bet­ter able to bring drug charges to bear against some ter­ror­ists, as well as use a new law that gives fed­er­al drug agents the author­i­ty to pur­sue nar­cotics and ter­ror­ism crimes com­mit­ted any­where in the world if they can estab­lish a link between a drug offense and a ter­ror­ist act or group. . . .

“Unit­ed States Attor­ney Plans Drug-Ter­ror­ism Unit” by William K. Rash­baum; The New York Times; 1/18/2009. [15]

8a. Sad­ly, obser­va­tions like this come almost exclu­sive­ly from a hand­ful of con­ser­v­a­tive blogs and com­men­ta­tors, some of whom are will­ing to set forth the Bush/GOP/Islamist con­nec­tion [20]. The Bush admin­is­tra­tion and the GOP are pro­found­ly con­nect­ed to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and a fund­ing appa­raus that has sup­port­ed al Qae­da, Hamas and Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad. Typ­i­fy­ing this dis­turb­ing rela­tion­ship is the vis­it of Faizul Khan to the White House.

Faizul Khan was one of the pri­ma­ry spir­i­tu­al men­tors to Major Hasan (the Fort Hood shoot­er)!

. . . In 2003 and 2004, Pres­i­dent Bush asked Faizul Khan, who is affil­i­at­ed with the Sau­di-fund­ed Islam­ic Cen­ter of Wash­ing­ton, D.C., and serves on the board of direc­tors of the Islam­ic Soci­ety of North Amer­i­ca (ISNA), to give the bless­ing. This year, the Jus­tice Depart­ment offi­cial­ly labeled ISNA as a U.S. branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood [21], the move­ment aim­ing to estab­lish a glob­al Islam­ic empire, and also as an unin­dict­ed co-con­spir­a­tor in the Hamas fund-rais­ing Holy Land Foun­da­tion for Relief and Devel­op­ment tri­al still await­ing a ver­dict in Dal­las. . . .

“Guess Who Came to Iftar for Din­ner?” by Diana West; townhall.com; 10/05/07. [10]

8b. He (Khan) is also linked to the milieu of the insti­tu­tions tar­get­ed by the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/20/2002! Khan’s (and Hasan’s) mosque is linked to the Amana Mutu­al Fund, whose founder–Yaqub Mirza–set up the insti­tu­tions raid­ed on 3/20/2002.

One of the direc­tors of the Amana Mutu­al Fund is Talat Oth­man, a for­mer direc­tor of Harken Ener­gy, a close per­son­al friend and polit­i­cal advis­er to both Pres­i­dents Bush, the man who deliv­ered a Mus­lim bene­dic­tion at the 2000 Repub­li­can con­ven­tion, a direc­tor of Grover Norquist’s Islam­ic Insti­tute, and the man who inter­fered on behalf of the indi­vid­u­als and insti­tu­tions [22] tar­get­ed by the 2002 Green Quest raids [23]!

. . . We’ve also learned that, before his trans­fer to Ft. Hood last year, Hasan served as a psy­chi­a­trist at Wal­ter Reed Army Med­ical Cen­ter in Wash­ing­ton, DC, and reg­u­lar­ly attend­ed Fri­day prayer at the Mus­lim Com­mu­ni­ty Cen­ter in Sil­ver Spring, Md.

The Sil­ver Spring cler­ics have issued for­mal state­ments con­demn­ing the car­nage at Ft. Hood. But Imam Faizul Khan, long the main prayer leader at the mosque and a friend of Hasan, said he nev­er believed Hasan capa­ble of such an act. . . . And Khan is a lead­ing board mem­ber of the Islam­ic Soci­ety of North Amer­i­ca — the main Wah­habi-lob­by group in the Unit­ed States, estab­lished by Sau­di Ara­bia to impose extrem­ism on Amer­i­can Mus­lims. ISNA has a long and dis­grace­ful record of pro­mot­ing rad­i­cal Islam.

On the ros­ter of the ISNA board (list­ed on its Web site), the Sil­ver Spring cen­ter’s Imam Faizul Khan is the fourth mem­ber under its pres­i­dent.

But the mosque has worse asso­ci­a­tions. On its own Web site (mccmd.org), it pro­motes a Sharia-based finan­cial prod­uct — the Amana Mutu­al Fund, put togeth­er by the Wah­habis at the Inter­na­tion­al Insti­tute for Islam­ic Thought (IIIT), in north­ern Vir­ginia.

Fed­er­al antiter­ror­ism agents raid­ed IIIT in the Oper­a­tion Green­Quest raids of 2002. That oper­a­tion remains an ongo­ing inquiry; IIIT and the Amana fund are still under inves­ti­ga­tion. Con­vict­ed Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad leader Sami Al-Ari­an is still in US fed­er­al cus­tody because of his refusal to give evi­dence about the Vir­ginia Wah­habi ring caught in Green­Quest. . . .

“Take a Look at Hasan’s Old Mosque” by Stephen Schwartz (New York Post; 11/7/2009) [12]

8c. Khan appears to have had a sig­nif­i­cant rela­tion­ship with Hasan, for whom he was look­ing for a wife.

. . . Hasan attend­ed prayers reg­u­lar­ly when he lived out­side Wash­ing­ton, often in his Army uni­form, said Faizul Khan, a for­mer imam at a mosque Hasan attend­ed in Sil­ver Spring, Md. He said Hasan was a life­long Mus­lim.

“I got the impres­sion that he was a com­mit­ted sol­dier,” Khan said. He spoke often with Hasan about Hasan’s desire for a wife.

On a form filled out by those seek­ing spous­es through a pro­gram at the mosque, Hasan list­ed his birth­place as Arling­ton, Va., but his nation­al­i­ty as Pales­tin­ian, Khan said. . . .

“Details Emerge about Fort Hood Sus­pec­t’s His­to­ry” by Brett J. Black­ledge [AP]; Yahoo News; 11/7/2009. [11]

9. Anoth­er of the imams who min­is­tered to Hasan was Mr. Awla­ki, who also “min­is­tered” to some of the 9/11 hijack­ers.

. . . Who is Anwar Nass­er Awla­ki? Inves­ti­ga­tors now sus­pect he was a key facil­i­ta­tor and advi­sor, and pos­si­bly even a sur­viv­ing field com­man­der, for the 9/11 cell that hit the Pen­ta­gon. He’s also an Amer­i­can cit­i­zen. They sus­pect he knew details of the plot and gird­ed the al-Qae­da ter­ror­ists’ resolve to car­ry it out. Evi­dence is strong that he was enlist­ed to, at a min­i­mum, hold the hijack­ers’ hands and take their tem­per­a­ture as they moved clos­er to Zero Hour. In short, he’s (if as yet unof­fi­icial­ly) an unin­dict­ed 9/11 co-con­spir­a­tor, and he remains at large.

Three of the hijack­ers of that unique­ly all-Sau­di cell that tor­pe­doed the Pen­ta­gon spent time at the Sau­di-con­nect­ed Awlak­i’s mosques in both San Diego and Falls Church, Vir­ginia, where he served as prayer leader. The phone num­ber for the Falls Church mosque–Dar al-Hir­jah Islam­ic Cen­ter, con­trolled by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and close­ly tied to CAIR–was found in the Ham­burg, Ger­many, apart­ment of one of the plan­ners of the 9/11 attacks, Ramzi Binal­shibh. . . .

The Mus­lim Mafia [16] by P. David Gaubatz and Paul Sper­ry; WND Books [HC]; Copy­right 2009 by P. David Gaubatz and Paul Sper­ry; ISBN 9781935071105; pp. 62–63. [16]

10. Crit­i­cism of GOP king­pins Grover Norquist and Karl Rove, archi­tects of the Islam­ic Insti­tute (a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood adjunct to the GOP), has been sparse. A con­tin­u­ing tragedy is that much of that sparse crit­i­cism comes from mem­bers of the con­ser­v­a­tive com­mu­ni­ty, who have retained enough integri­ty to man­i­fest out­rage against the GOP’s alliance with the very Mus­lim Broth­er­hood ele­ments against which the Repub­li­cans’ amen cho­rus rails.

One con­ser­v­a­tive will­ing to break with her milieu is Pamela Geller, a for­mer edi­tor of the New York Observ­er and edi­tor of the Atlas Shrugs web­site. She recent­ly not­ed Grover Norquist’s con­tin­u­ing activ­i­ties on behalf of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood’ jihadists.

The Free­dom Defense Ini­tia­tive, a new orga­ni­za­tion I start­ed with author and schol­ar Robert Spencer, host­ed its inau­gur­al event to an enthu­si­as­tic stand­ing-room-only crowd at the Con­ser­v­a­tive Polit­i­cal Action Con­fer­ence on Feb­ru­ary 19. But this event was at CPAC, not of CPAC. Could this be because of the influ­ence of con­ser­v­a­tive king­mak­er and pow­er-bro­ker Grover Norquist, who is a mem­ber of the Board of Direc­tors of the Amer­i­can Con­ser­v­a­tive Union, which hosts CPAC? The only event con­cern­ing the war on Amer­i­ca at CPAC was worse than noth­ing at all: It was an Islam­ic pro­pa­gan­da (taqiyya) pre­sen­ta­tion enti­tled “You’ve Been Lied To: Why Real Con­ser­v­a­tives are Against the War on Ter­ror.” Its mes­sage was that “real con­ser­v­a­tives” don’t sup­port the war on ter­ror because it is a cre­ation of the “Israeli lob­by.”

How did CPAC come to this?

Grover Norquist’s ties to Islam­ic suprema­cists and jihadists have been known for years. He and his Pales­tin­ian wife, Samah Alrayyes — who was direc­tor of com­mu­ni­ca­tions for his Islam­ic Free Mar­ket Insti­tute until they mar­ried in 2005 — are very active in “Mus­lim out­reach.” Just six weeks after 9/11, The New Repub­lic ran an exposé explain­ing how Norquist arranged for George W. Bush to meet with fif­teen Islam­ic suprema­cists at the White House on Sep­tem­ber 26, 2001 — to show how Mus­lims reject­ed ter­ror­ism. . . .

It was Norquist who ush­ered these sil­ver-tongued jihadists into the Oval Office of an incu­ri­ous pres­i­dent after the worst attack ever on Amer­i­can soil. Instead of Hamas, Hezb’al­lah, and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, Ibn War­raq, Bat Ye’or, and Wafa Sul­tan should have been advis­ing the pres­i­dent. Instead, at that Sep­tem­ber 26 meet­ing, Bush declared that “the teach­ings of Islam are teach­ings of peace and good.” It was a crit­i­cal­ly impor­tant, his­toric inci­dent. What should have been the most impor­tant teach­ing moment of the long war became a pro­pa­gan­da tool for Islam. A sin­gu­lar oppor­tu­ni­ty was squan­dered, and the result­ing harm is incal­cu­la­ble.

Bush did this because he trust­ed Norquist, who vouched for these Mus­lim lead­ers. Yet “the record sug­gests,” wrote Foer, “that [Norquist] has spent quite a lot of time pro­mot­ing peo­ple open­ly sym­pa­thet­ic to Islamist ter­ror­ists.” And this con­tin­ued for years. . . .

So it is no sur­prise that CPAC 2009, like CPAC 2010, had noth­ing address­ing the war we are actu­al­ly engaged in. This is due to the influ­ence of Norquist, Keene, and Suhail Khan, a CPAC board mem­ber. Accord­ing to Dis­cov­er the Net­works, Khan “has repeat­ed­ly been a fea­tured speak­er at MSA, ISNA and CAIR events” — that is, the Mus­lim Stu­dents Asso­ci­a­tion, Islam­ic Soci­ety of North Amer­i­ca, and Coun­cil on Amer­i­can-Islam­ic Rela­tions, three groups linked to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the inter­na­tion­al Islam­ic orga­ni­za­tion ded­i­cat­ed to estab­lish­ing the rule of Islam­ic law and the sub­ju­ga­tion of infi­dels world­wide.

Grover Norquist almost sin­gle­hand­ed­ly ush­ered Islam­ic suprema­cist lead­ers into Amer­i­ca’s high­est lev­els of gov­ern­ment — sub­ver­sives, the Islam­ic fifth col­umn. He gave them unpar­al­leled access. Why did­n’t Gaffney’s rev­e­la­tions, and those that pre­ced­ed and fol­lowed his exposé, end Norquist’s influ­ence among con­ser­v­a­tives? Why does he still have so much pow­er? . . .

“Grover Norquist’s Jihad” by Pamela Geller; Amer­i­can Thinker; 3/4/2010. [13]

11. Next, the broad­cast touch­es on the remark­able Ptech com­pa­ny and one of its prin­ci­pals, Yaqub Mirza [24] (archi­tect of the insti­tu­tions raid­ed in the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/20/2002.) Ptech–inextricably linked with the milieu of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and the 9/11 attacks–designed the threat assess­ment soft­ware archi­tec­ture for the Air Force, the FAA and the Depart­ment of Ener­gy (which over­sees the coun­try’s nuclear pow­er plants).

The com­pa­ny where a con­vict­ed for­mer Shrews­bury man worked was in the news recent­ly when an offi­cer of the com­pa­ny was arrest­ed after arriv­ing last week at John F. Kennedy Air­port in New York.
Buford George Peter­son, a for­mer Somerville res­i­dent liv­ing in South Korea, was the chief finan­cial offi­cer of PTech, a Quin­cy soft­ware com­pa­ny. Mr. Peter­son, along with Ous­sama Abdul Ziade, the com­pa­ny’s chair­man and chief exec­u­tive offi­cer, are charged in a 2007 indict­ment indict­ment stem­ming from a Jan­u­ary 2002 $650,000 loan appli­ca­tion to the Small Busi­ness Admin­is­tra­tion to help small busi­ness­es strug­gling because of the Sept. 11, 2001, ter­ror­ist attacks on the Unit­ed States. . . .

“US Firm hid ter­ror­ist Sau­di Backer; Shrews­bury man worked at P‑Tech” by Lee Ham­mel; Telegram and Gazette [Worces­ter, MA]; 7/19/2009. [25]

12. Anoth­er GOP politi­cian run­ning inter­fer­ence for indi­vid­u­als from the milieu of the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids is Sen­a­to­r­i­al can­di­date Tom Camp­bell. Camp­bell has sup­port­ed Sami al-Ari­an, the inves­ti­ga­tion of whom led to the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids.

Repub­li­can U.S. Sen­ate can­di­date Tom Camp­bell is fac­ing a poten­tial­ly crip­pling con­tro­ver­sy over his past defense of a fired Flori­da pro­fes­sor with ties to ter­ror­ists and his incon­sis­tent state­ments regard­ing what he knew and when about the man’s actions.

Dogged for weeks by crit­i­cism over his defense of Sami Al-Ari­an, who lat­er plead­ed guilty to aid­ing ter­ror­ists, Camp­bell has denied know­ing about the man’s incen­di­ary past, which includ­ed nods to Islam­ic jihad and calls for “death to Israel.” He also said that his deal­ings with Al-Ari­an occurred before the Sept. 11 ter­ror attacks.

But Camp­bell, who was then a Stan­ford law pro­fes­sor, wrote a let­ter on Al-Ari­an’s behalf months after the Sept. 11 attacks that casts doubt on his claims of igno­rance about Al-Ari­an’s rad­i­cal­ism.

“His incon­sis­tent state­ments are par­tic­u­lar­ly dam­ag­ing because it cre­ates a cred­i­bil­i­ty prob­lem,” said John Pit­ney, a polit­i­cal sci­ence pro­fes­sor at Clare­mont McKen­na Col­lege. . . .

Tom Camp­bell Let­ter Stokes Con­tro­ver­sy over Ties to Jihadist” by Mike Zapler; San Jose Mer­cury News; 3/10/2010. [26]