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FTR #723 Doin’ the Earth Island Boogie

[1]Lis­ten:
MP3 Side 1 [2] | Side 2 [3]

Intro­duc­tion: (NB: This descrip­tion con­tains impor­tant infor­ma­tion not includ­ed in the orig­i­nal broad­cast.) High­light­ing maneu­ver­ing in the vast, strate­gi­cal­ly crit­i­cal por­tion of the world known to gen­er­a­tions of geopoliti­cians as “The Earth Island,” this pro­gram sug­gests that intel­li­gence agen­cies, Islamist and Pan-Turk­ist ele­ments are attempt­ing to shift the polit­i­cal, eco­nom­ic and social order in that area. In par­tic­u­lar, forces at work in the Cen­tral Asian states that emerged from the for­mer Sovi­et Union give indi­ca­tions of attempt­ing to con­trol fos­sil fuel and [pos­si­bly] key strate­gic tran­sit points for those resources and Afghan hero­in as well.

The pro­gram begins by not­ing the prox­im­i­ty in time [4] between a US/Russian diplo­mat­ic rap­proche­ment and the break­ing of a Russ­ian spy scan­dal. On the heels of Pres­i­dent Oba­ma’s meet­ing with Russ­ian pres­i­dent Medvedev in which progress on var­i­ous mat­ters appears to have been achieved, a “Russ­ian spy scan­dal” dom­i­nat­ed the head­lines.

In FTR #706 [5], we exam­ined John Lof­tus’ con­tention that there are two CIA’s–one Demo­c­ra­t­ic that serves the inter­ests of the Unit­ed States and one Repub­li­can, which serves the inter­ests of the trans-nation­al cor­po­ra­tions. Is the “Repub­li­can CIA” work­ing to poi­son rela­tions between the two coun­tries, there­by weak­en­ing Oba­ma’s admin­is­tra­tion?

The inci­dent brings to mind the U‑2 inci­dent of 1960, in which the CIA’s appar­ent­ly delib­er­ate sab­o­tage of a U‑2 spy plane deep-sixed a pro­posed sum­mit con­fer­ence between Pres­i­dent Eisen­how­er and Pre­mier Khr­uschev of the U.S.S.R. (This was dis­cussed in Part I of “The Guns of Novem­ber.” [6])

Also inter­est­ing to con­tem­plate in this con­text is a Decem­ber 2009 pro-jihadist con­fer­ence in Geor­gia, held with appar­ent U.S. sup­port, dis­cussed in FTR #710 [7]. Part of the rap­proche­ment achieved between Medvedev and Oba­ma con­cerned Amer­i­ca’s place­ment of a jihadist ter­ror­ist on the inter­na­tion­al ter­ror watch list, as desired and request­ed by Rus­sia.

Did this run counter to the wish­es of a pro-Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, pro-jihadist ele­ment asso­ci­at­ed with transna­tion­al petro­le­um com­pa­nies? Are they, in turn, seek­ing to sep­a­rate the Cau­casian and Cen­tral Asian fos­sil fuel resources from Rus­sia? Will it serve the inter­ests of the Under­ground Reich [8], seek­ing to man­i­fest tra­di­tion­al Ger­man Ost­poli­tik [9], while exac­er­bat­ing ten­sions between the U.S. and Rus­sia? Will it serve the inter­ests of the GOP, by weak­en­ing Oba­ma’s for­eign pol­i­cy?

In the for­mer Sovi­et Cen­tral Asian repub­lic of Kyr­gyzs­tan, eth­nic ten­sions have flared [10]between the gov­ern­ment and the Uzbek minor­i­ty in the key towns of Osh and Jalal­abad. Seek­ing to take advan­tage of this ten­sion, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate Hizb ut-Tahrir [11] has promised that the instal­la­tion of a caliphate would pro­mote social jus­tice.

Of strate­gic sig­nif­i­cance in this con­text is the fact that the Fer­ghana Val­ley (dom­i­nat­ed by Osh and Jalal­abad) is a key tran­sit area for Afghan hero­in and the pres­ence of a key U.S. air base in Kyr­gyzs­tan, a facil­i­ty that is essen­tial for the Afghan war effort. Indeed, the gov­ern­ment of Kyr­gyzs­tan is blam­ing the trou­ble on Islamists [12].

Anoth­er con­sid­er­a­tion to be weighed in the con­text of “The Earth Island Boo­gie” is maneu­ver­ing around the Afghan hero­in crop [13], which NATO forces have refused to destroy. (The pop­py is one of the few sub­sis­tence crops avail­able to Afghan farm­ers, and destroy­ing the har­vest could alien­ate the pop­u­la­tion and dri­ve them toward the Tal­iban.)

Rus­sia has request­ed that the crop be destroyed [14], because hero­in orig­i­nat­ing in Afghanistan is caus­ing enor­mous prob­lems in Rus­sia. This rejec­tion has led Rus­sia to charge that NATO is aid­ing the pro­duc­tion of Afghan hero­in [15]. Is it pos­si­ble that a Saudi/Safari Club/petroleum/Underground Reich milieu may be prof­it­ing from Afghan hero­in, while using the drug as a weapon to sub­vert Russ­ian influ­ence in a new “Great Game?” Are these net­works sup­ply­ing some of the prod­uct that has been trans­port­ed by the milieu inves­ti­gat­ed by Daniel Hop­sick­er?

The broad­cast con­cludes with exam­i­na­tion of the flotil­la incident–the pro­found involve­ment of Turk­ish gov­ern­ment ele­ments with the affair. Seen by some ana­lysts as an attempt at re-assert­ing its pri­ma­cy in the Mus­lim world, the Turk­ish maneu­ver­ing is rem­i­nis­cent of the Turk­ish hege­mo­ny over the Arab world dur­ing the Ottoman Empire. Con­cep­tu­al­ized by the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood as an ide­al state of affairs, the “Caliphate” is some­thing it has worked to restore.

Are we see­ing a renewed Pan-Turk­ism in places like Kyr­gyzs­tan and Uzbekistan–areas with Turko­phone pop­u­la­tions? We will be see­ing a dove­tail­ing of the Islamist move­ment and tra­di­tion­al­ly sec­u­lar Pan-Turk­ist move­ment (which has adhered to the rig­or­ous stan­dards adopt­ed by Kemal Attaturk at the end of World War I.) In FTR #721 [16], we saw how Pan-Turk­ist ele­ments work­ing first for Nazi Ger­many and lat­er for the Fed­er­al Repub­lic and ele­ments of West­ern intel­li­gence were linked to the bur­geon­ing Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. Are peo­ple like Ruzy Nazar “doin’ the Earth Island Boo­gie?” (Nazar is pic­tured above, at left).

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The dev­as­tat­ing wild­fires hap­pen­ing in Rus­sia; review of the Islamists’ use of for­est fires as weapons of jihad; review of the Safari Club net­work; review of the links between the Bank al-Taqwa milieu and the par­ty of Turk­ish prime min­is­ter Erdo­gan; the pro­found links between the IHH orga­ni­za­tion that spon­sored the flotil­la inci­dent and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood; a 1997 Turk­ish gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tion that revealed IHH to be a jihadist orga­ni­za­tion, seek­ing, among oth­er things, to over­throw Turk­ish sec­u­lar­ism!

1. The pro­gram begins by not­ing the prox­im­i­ty in time [17] between a US/Russian diplo­mat­ic rap­proche­ment and the break­ing of a Russ­ian spy scan­dal. On the heels of Pres­i­dent Oba­ma’s meet­ing with Russ­ian pres­i­dent Medvedev in which progress on var­i­ous mat­ters appears to have been achieved, a “Russ­ian spy scan­dal” dom­i­nat­ed the head­lines.

In FTR #706 [18], we exam­ined John Lof­tus’ con­tention that there are two CIA’s–one Demo­c­ra­t­ic that serves the inter­ests of the Unit­ed States and one Repub­li­can, which serves the inter­ests of the trans-nation­al cor­po­ra­tions. Is the “Repub­li­can CIA” work­ing to poi­son rela­tions between the two coun­tries, there­by weak­en­ing Oba­ma’s admin­is­tra­tion? Are the petro­le­um indus­try, Under­ground Reich, Islamist net­works and Pan-Turk­ist net­works [19] seek­ing to blunt that U.S./Russian rap­proche­ment?

The inci­dent brings to mind the U‑2 inci­dent of 1960, in which the CIA’s appar­ent­ly delib­er­ate sab­o­tage of a U‑2 spy plane deep-sixed a pro­posed sum­mit con­fer­ence between Pres­i­dent Eisen­how­er and Pre­mier Khr­uschev of the U.S.S.R. (This was dis­cussed in Part I of “The Guns of Novem­ber.” [20])

Also inter­est­ing to con­tem­plate in this con­text is a Decem­ber 2009 pro-jihadist con­fer­ence in Geor­gia, held with appar­ent U.S. sup­port, dis­cussed in FTR #710 [7]. Part of the rap­proche­ment achieved between Medvedev and Oba­ma con­cerned Amer­i­ca’s place­ment of a jihadist ter­ror­ist on the inter­na­tion­al ter­ror watch list, as desired and request­ed by Rus­sia.

Did this run counter to the wish­es of a pro-Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, pro-jihadist ele­ment asso­ci­at­ed with transna­tion­al petro­le­um com­pa­nies? Are they, in turn, seek­ing to sep­a­rate the Cau­casian and Cen­tral Asian fos­sil fuel resources from Rus­sia? Will it serve the inter­ests of the Under­ground Reich [8], seek­ing to man­i­fest tra­di­tion­al Ger­man Ost­poli­tik [9], while exac­er­bat­ing ten­sions between the U.S. and Rus­sia? Will it serve the inter­ests of the GOP, by weak­en­ing Oba­ma’s for­eign pol­i­cy?

With the strange tim­ing of the sur­fac­ing of this Russ­ian spy­ing scan­dal, are we see­ing ‘U‑2, II”?

2. Recent­ly, Rus­sia has been plagued by drought and wild­fires. In FTR #667 [21], we looked at Islamist ele­ments pur­su­ing wild­fires as weapons of jihad. Are the jihadist ele­ments referred to above involved in any way with the set­ting of these fires?

3. In the for­mer Sovi­et Cen­tral Asian repub­lic of Kyr­gyzs­tan, eth­nic ten­sions have flared [10]between the gov­ern­ment and the Uzbek minor­i­ty in the key towns of Osh and Jalal­abad.

Seek­ing to take advan­tage of this ten­sion, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate Hizb ut-Tahrir [11] has promised that the instal­la­tion of a caliphate would pro­mote social jus­tice.

Of strate­gic sig­nif­i­cance in this con­text is the fact that the Fer­ghana Val­ley (dom­i­nat­ed by Osh and Jalal­abad) is a key tran­sit area for Afghan hero­in and the pres­ence of a key U.S. air base in Kyr­gyzs­tan, a facil­i­ty that is essen­tial for the Afghan war effort.

4. Indeed, the gov­ern­ment of Kyr­gyzs­tan is blam­ing the trou­ble on Islamists [22].

5. Anoth­er con­sid­er­a­tion to be weighed in the con­text of “The Earth Island Boo­gie” is maneu­ver­ing around the Afghan hero­in crop [13], which NATO forces have refused to destroy. (The pop­py is one of the few sub­sis­tence crops avail­able to Afghan farm­ers, and destroy­ing the har­vest could alien­ate the pop­u­la­tion and dri­ve them toward the Tal­iban.)

Rus­sia has request­ed that the crop be destroyed [14], because hero­in orig­i­nat­ing in Afghanistan is caus­ing enor­mous prob­lems in Rus­sia.

6. This rejec­tion has led Rus­sia to charge that NATO is aid­ing the pro­duc­tion of Afghan hero­in [23]. Is it pos­si­ble that a Saudi/Safari Club/petroleum/Underground Reich milieu may be prof­it­ing from Afghan hero­in, while using the drug as a weapon to sub­vert Russ­ian influ­ence in a new “Great Game?”

7. The shift­ing and maneu­ver­ing tak­ing place on the Earth Island involves some sig­nif­i­cant polit­i­cal pos­tur­ing by Turkey. In the recent, lethal inci­dent in which Israeli forces inter­dict­ed a Turk­ish-based flotil­la attempt­ing to pierce the block­ade of Gaza, one can read­i­ly dis­cern Turk­ish diplo­mat­ic and polit­i­cal over­tures to the Arab pop­u­la­tion of the Mid­dle East and the world’s Mus­lim pop­u­la­tion in gen­er­al.

Far from being mod­er­ates, the orga­ni­za­tion behind the flotil­la has strong links to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and jihadist ele­ments. [24]

In 1997, the Turk­ish gov­ern­ment itself raid­ed offices of IHH [25]and revealed the orga­ni­za­tion’s true nature.

8. Dis­claimers to the con­trary notwith­stand­ing, the Turk­ish gov­ern­ment and that coun­try’s polit­i­cal elite are direct­ly tied to the IHH.

The Turk­ish char­i­ty that led the flotil­la involved in a dead­ly Israeli raid has exten­sive con­nec­tions with Turkey’s polit­i­cal elite, and the group’s efforts to chal­lenge Israel’s block­ade of Gaza received sup­port at the top lev­els of the gov­ern­ing par­ty, Turk­ish diplo­mats and gov­ern­ment offi­cials said.

The char­i­ty, the Human­i­tar­i­an Relief Foun­da­tion, often called I.H.H., has come under attack in Israel and the West for offer­ing finan­cial sup­port to groups accused of ter­ror­ism. But in Turkey the group has helped Prime Min­is­ter Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan shore up sup­port from con­ser­v­a­tive Mus­lims ahead of crit­i­cal elec­tions next year and improve Turkey’s stand­ing and influ­ence in the Arab world.

Accord­ing to a senior Turk­ish offi­cial close to the gov­ern­ment, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because of the polit­i­cal del­i­ca­cy of the issue, as many as 10 Par­lia­ment mem­bers from Mr. Erdogan’s gov­ern­ing Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Par­ty were con­sid­er­ing board­ing the Mavi Mar­mara, the ship where the dead­ly raid occurred, but were warned off at the last minute by senior For­eign Min­istry offi­cials con­cerned that their pres­ence might esca­late ten­sions too much.

When lead­ers of the char­i­ty returned home after nine Turks died in the Israeli raid, they were warm­ly embraced by top Turk­ish offi­cials, said Huseyin Oruc, deputy direc­tor of the char­i­ty, who was aboard the flotil­la.

“When we flew back to Turkey, I was afraid we would be in trou­ble for what hap­pened, but the first thing we saw when the plane’s door opened in Istan­bul was Bulent Arinc, the deputy prime min­is­ter, in tears,” he said in an inter­view. “We have good coor­di­na­tion with Mr. Erdo­gan,” he added. “But I am not sure he is hap­py with us now.”

The raid has caused a rup­ture between Turkey and Israel, and height­ened alarm in the Unit­ed States and Europe that Turkey, a large Mus­lim coun­try and a major NATO mem­ber, is shift­ing alle­giance toward the Arab world. Turkey has warned that its coop­er­a­tive ties to Israel could be irrepara­bly dam­aged unless the Israelis apol­o­gize and accept an inter­na­tion­al inves­ti­ga­tion, steps Israel has so far refused to take.

The charity’s mis­sion, polit­i­cal ana­lysts said, has advanced Mr. Erdogan’s aim of shift­ing Turkey’s focus to the Mus­lim east when its prospects for join­ing the Euro­pean Union are dim.

The gov­ern­ment “could have stopped the ship if it want­ed to, but the mis­sion to Gaza served both the I.H.H. and the gov­ern­ment by mak­ing both heroes at home and in the Arab world,” said Ercan Citli­oglu, a ter­ror­ism expert at Bahce­se­hir Uni­ver­si­ty in Istan­bul.

Turk­ish offi­cials said that the char­i­ty oper­at­ed inde­pen­dent­ly and that its lead­er­ship had refused to drop plans to break Israel’s naval block­ade of Hamas-con­trolled Gaza, despite requests from the gov­ern­ment. The offi­cials said they had no legal author­i­ty to stop the work of a pri­vate char­i­ty.

Ege­men Bagis, Turkey’s min­is­ter for Euro­pean affairs, said in an inter­view that the char­i­ty and the Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Par­ty, called the AK Par­ty, had no sub­stan­tive ties, even if peo­ple in pol­i­tics often became involved in char­i­ta­ble groups. “The I.H.H. has noth­ing to do with the AK Par­ty, and we have no hid­den agen­da,” Mr. Bagis said.

But crit­ics say such state­ments belie the close con­nec­tions between the par­ty and the char­i­ty, as well as the extent to which Turk­ish offi­cials were close­ly attuned to the details of the flotilla’s mis­sion before its depar­ture. . . .

“Spon­sor of Flotil­la Tied to Elite of Turkey” by Tyler Hicks; The New York Times; 7/15/2010. [26]

9. Pri­or to the flotil­la inci­dent, the Erdo­gan gov­ern­ment was doing poor­ly in pre-elec­tion polls.

The Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Par­ty (AKP) won about 39% of the vote, accord­ing to uncon­firmed results — down from the 47% gen­er­al elec­tion land­slide of 2007.

“This is a mes­sage from the peo­ple and we will take the nec­es­sary lessons,” said a som­bre Mr Erdo­gan.

At least five peo­ple were report­ed­ly killed in elec­tion-relat­ed vio­lence.

The deaths came in the pre­dom­i­nant­ly Kur­dish east of the coun­try, as sup­port­ers of rival can­di­dates for a non-par­ty posi­tion of vil­lage chief fought armed bat­tles.

In Sun­day’s elec­tions, the gov­ern­ing AKP lost ground to both oppo­si­tion and Kur­dish rivals, who had focused on grow­ing eco­nom­ic dif­fi­cul­ties and cor­rup­tion alle­ga­tions.

“Turk­ish PM’s Par­ty Slips in Polls”; BBC News; 3/30/2009. [27]

10. As seen in FTR #408 [28], Erdo­gan’s par­ty is very close to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and the milieu of the Bank al-Taqwa.