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FTR #737 Taqqiya Sunrise, Part II: Turkish Taffy (More on the Rolling Coups in the Middle East)

MP3 Side 1 [1] | Side 2 [2]

Intro­duc­tion: Con­tin­u­ing analy­sis of the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and relat­ed, domes­tic polit­i­cal devel­op­ments, the broad­cast syn­op­sizes major points of this com­plex, ongo­ing series of events.

The title refers to the can­dy called Turk­ish Taffy. A sug­ared con­fec­tion, it might be said to resem­ble the delib­er­ate­ly-sweet­ened ver­sion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood-affil­i­at­ed Turk­ish AK Par­ty.

The lat­ter’s much-bal­ly­hooed “mod­er­a­tion” is said to be the pro­ject­ed polit­i­cal stance of the new­ly resus­ci­tat­ed Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, as well as the rea­son why we should not fear that orga­ni­za­tion’s ascent.

In fact, the polit­i­cal under­pin­nings of the AK Par­ty are inex­tri­ca­bly linked with a fas­cist milieu cement­ing the Islam­ic fas­cists of the Broth­er­hood with Euro-fas­cists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Major ele­ments of the analy­sis in this com­plex series include:

Pro­gram High­lights Include: The PORA move­men­t’s reliance on Sharp’s the­o­ries to aid Mr. Yuschenko in  the Ukraine; PORA’s sub­se­quent dis­il­lu­sion­ment [22] with  Yuschenko, whose regime appears to have been lit­tle more than a cat’s paw for the Ukrain­ian fas­cists of the OUN/B; The New York Times’ pre­sen­ta­tion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood as “mod­er­ate;” Hos­ni Mubarak’s alleged treat­ment for can­cer; review of the GOP’s links [23]to the ter­ror-fund­ing appa­ra­tus bust­ed by the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids of 3/30/2002; review of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood’s links with Grover Norques [24]t, the Bush admin­is­tra­tion and Karl Rove; the Turk­ish AK Par­ty’s links with Achmed Huber and the milieu of the Bank al-Taqwa.

1. Note that the Turk­ish AK Par­ty is being seen as a role mod­el for “mod­er­ate” Islamist par­ties poised to assume a por­tion of pow­er in Egypt and else­where through­out the Mid­dle East. We begin by look­ing at a Ger­man Islamist group affil­i­at­ed with the Refah Par­ty (the Turk­ish branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood). The pro­gram high­lights con­nec­tions between that par­ty and the AK par­ty cur­rent­ly gov­ern­ing Turkey.

“Mil­li Gorus, Germany’s largest Islam­ic asso­ci­a­tion, recent­ly gained the offi­cial sup­port of the Turk­ish gov­ern­ment, despite being watched by Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vices due to alleged extrem­ist lean­ings. On April 19, Turkey’s reli­gious-con­ser­v­a­tive gov­ern­ment ordered its embassies to offer the Islamis­che Gemein­schaft Mil­li Gorus (IGMG) their sup­port. The group, formed in 1985 in Cologne to sup­port Turk­ish nation­al­ism and oppose the sep­a­ra­tion of state and reli­gion, has long been crit­i­cized by Ger­man offi­cials as being anti-Semit­ic and against lib­er­al West­ern val­ues.”

(“Turkey Offers Sup­port for Con­tro­ver­sial Islam­ic Group”; Deutsche Welle; 4/23/2003; p. 1.)

2. More on the rela­tion­ship between Mil­li Gorus and the “mod­er­ate” AK par­ty.

“Turk­ish For­eign Min­is­ter Abdul­lah Gul on Sat­ur­day refused to dis­cuss his spe­cif­ic direc­tions to diplo­mats regard­ing Mil­li Gorus, say­ing only the gov­ern­ment ‘has for some time tried to strength­en the ties between our coun­try and our cit­i­zens over­seas.’ The deci­sion comes only two weeks after an agree­ment between Ger­many and Turkey on com­bat­ing orga­nized crime incensed many mem­bers of Turkey’s rul­ing AK par­ty because it includ­ed Mil­li Gorus with groups like the Kur­dish ter­ror­ist out­fit PKK. Since many Ak mem­bers have ties to Islam­ic reli­gious groups, Gul was com­pelled to say he did not con­sid­er Mil­li Gorus a ter­ror orga­ni­za­tion.”


3. The AK par­ty appears to be lit­tle more than a “mod­er­ate” rework­ing of the Refah par­ty, which is lit­tle more than a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood front orga­ni­za­tion. Erbakan of the Refah was the men­tor of Erdo­gan, who pre­sides over the “mod­er­ate” AK par­ty.

“Some observers say the attempt to reform its pub­lic image could be at least part­ly linked to the rise of Turk­ish Prime Min­is­ter Tayyip Erdo­gan and his AK par­ty. Com­ing to pow­er in a land­slide vic­to­ry last year, Erdo­gan styles his par­ty as a mod­ern con­ser­v­a­tive group based on Mus­lim val­ues. He has dis­tanced him­self from for­mer men­tor Necmet­tin Erbakan, who found­ed the Islam­ic-influ­enced Wel­fare Par­ty. Erbakan’s nephew, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, was IGMG chair­man until he left office after alleged­ly hav­ing an extra-mar­i­tal affair.”

(Ibid.; p. 2.)

4. Flesh­ing out dis­cus­sion of Necmet­tin Erbakan, his Refah par­ty and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the pro­gram high­lights Erbakan’s rela­tion­ship with Ahmed Huber and the man­ner in which that rela­tion­ship pre­cip­i­tat­ed Huber’s ascen­sion to his posi­tion as a direc­tor of Al Taqwa.

Close­ly asso­ci­at­ed with the AK Par­ty’s pre­de­ces­sor Refah orga­ni­za­tion, Huber’s con­cept of “mod­er­a­tion” might be gleaned from the pho­tographs of some of the “mod­er­ates” he admires.

Speak­ing of the décor of Huber’s res­i­dence:

“A sec­ond pho­to­graph, in which Hitler is talk­ing with Himm­ler, hangs next to those of Necmet­tin Erbakan and Jean-Marie Le Pen [leader of the fas­cist Nation­al Front]. Erbakan, head of the Turk­ish Islamist par­ty, Refah, turned to Achmed Huber for an intro­duc­tion to the chief of the French par­ty of the far right. Exit­ing from the meet­ing (which took place in Sep­tem­ber 1995) Huber’s two friends sup­pos­ed­ly stat­ed that they ‘share the same view of the world’ and expressed ‘their com­mon desire to work togeth­er to remove the last racist obsta­cles that still pre­vent the union of the Islamist move­ment with the nation­al right of Europe.’”

(Dol­lars for Ter­ror: The Unit­ed States and Islam; by Richard Labeviere; Copy­right 2000 [SC]; Algo­ra Pub­lish­ing; ISBN 1–892941-06–6; p. 142.) [25]

5. Note that Erbakan, Huber et al are part of an inter­na­tion­al  fas­cist milieu.

“Last­ly, above the desk is dis­played a poster of the imam Khome­i­ni; the meet­ing ‘changed my life,’ Huber says, with stars in his eyes. For years, after the Fed­er­al Palace in Bern, Ahmed Huber pub­lished a Euro­pean press review for the Iran­ian lead­ers, then for the Turk­ish Refah. Since the for­mer lacked finan­cial means, Huber chose to put his efforts to the ser­vice of the lat­ter. An out­post of the Turk­ish Mus­lim Broth­ers, Refah thus became Huber’s prin­ci­pal employ­er; and it was through the inter­me­di­ary of the Turk­ish Islamist par­ty that this for­mer par­lia­men­tary cor­re­spon­dent became a share­hold­er in the bank Al Taqwa.”


6. The Turk­ish AKP Par­ty (tout­ed as a role mod­el for the Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood) has a strong eco­nom­ic rela­tion­ship with Ger­many and oth­er Euro­pean eco­nom­ic play­ers.

. . . . The focus is on two par­tic­u­lar aspects of Turk­ish pol­i­cy. The first is that over the past few years, polit­i­cal Islam in Turkey has proven to be very coop­er­a­tive with the EU. This is due to the eco­nom­ic rise of the con­ser­v­a­tive sec­tors of the Ana­to­lian hin­ter­land, which is orga­nized with­in the Adelet ve Kalk­in­ma Par­tisi (AKP), the par­ty of Prime Min­is­ter Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan and rul­ing par­ty in Ankara since 2002. The AKP has a clear­ly Islam­ic ori­en­ta­tion. The Ana­to­lian enter­pris­es form­ing the back­bone of the par­ty have close eco­nom­ic ties in EU coun­tries. It is on this basis that the AKP has estab­lished inten­sive ties to West­ern Europe, and incor­po­rat­ed into its brand of polit­i­cal Islam a reori­en­ta­tion favor­able to the EU. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[2]) The par­ty has since stood as a mod­el for the pos­si­bil­i­ty of Islamism hav­ing a pro-west­ern char­ac­ter. In fact, over the past few years, sev­er­al North African Islam­ic forces — includ­ing sec­tors of the influ­en­tial Egypt­ian Mus­lim Broth­er­hood — have been ori­ent­ing them­selves on the AKP. Accord­ing to a recent study, co-financed by the SPD-affil­i­at­ed Friedrich Ebert Foun­da­tion, near­ly two-thirds of the pop­u­la­tions in sev­en Arab nations, includ­ing Egypt, would be in favor of their coun­tries’ adopt­ing the Turk­ish model.[3] A pro-west­ern ori­en­ta­tion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, implic­it in such a mod­el, would be appre­ci­at­ed in west­ern cap­i­tals. . . .

“The Turk­ish Mod­el”; german-foreign-policy.com; 2/18/2011. [26]

7.After review­ing infor­ma­tion about Karl Rove, Grover Norquist, Talat Oth­man and their links to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood  and the ter­ror-fund­ing [23] appa­ra­tus bust­ed by the Oper­a­tion Green Quest raids  of 3/20/2002, the pro­gram syn­op­sizes the gen­e­sis of the GOP/Broth­er­hood/ter­ror-fund­ing rela­tion­ship.

Once again, it is to be  not­ed that con­ser­v­a­tives appear to be the only ones who will crit­i­cize the GOP/Brotherhood/terrorist link.

. . . In 1998 [Abdu­rah­man Alam­ou­di] pro­vid­ed at least $20,000  in checks enabling Repub­li­can activist Grover Norqauist toestab­lish what would become a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood front orga­ni­za­tion tar­get­ed at pen­e­trat­ing GOP cir­cles and the pres­i­den­tial cam­paign of then-Gov­er­nor George W. Bush. The new enti­ty was called the Islam­ic Free Mar­ket Insti­tute (bet­ter known at the Islam­ic Insi­tute or II). Alam­ou­di also detailed his long-time deputy, Khaled Saf­fu­ri, to serve as II’s first exec­u­tive director,with Norquist as the Chair­man of the Board.

As a result of these con­nec­tions, Alam­ou­di was among a group of Mus­lim Broth­er­hood oper­a­tives who were invit­ed on May 1, 2000, to meet with Bush in Texas gov­er­nor’s man­sion. Saf­fu­ri was des­ig­nat­ed the Bush cam­paign’s Mus­lim out­reach  coor­di­na­tor and Norquist assist­ed anoth­er promi­nent Ikhwan oper­a­tive, Sami al-Ari­an, to obtain a com­mit­ment from can­di­date
Bush that, if elect­ed, he would pro­hib­it the use of clas­si­fied intel­li­gence evi­dence in depor­ta­tion pro­ceed­ings against for­eign­ers sus­pect­ed of ter­ror­ist ties. This was a pri­or­i­ty for al-Ari­an since his broth­er-in-law was being held at the time by fed­er­al immi­gra­tion author­i­ties on the basis of such evi­dence.

After the elec­tion, a mem­ber of the Islam­ic Insti­tute’s board of direc­tors with myr­i­ad and long­stand­ing con­nec­tions to oth­er Mus­lim Broth­er­hood orga­ni­za­tions, Suhail Khan, was appoint­ed to be the gate­keep­er for the Mus­lim com­mu­ni­ty in the White House Office of Pub­lic Liai­son. [The below-men­tioned Yka­te­ri­na Chu­machenko was deputy direc­tor of the White House Office of Pub­lic Liai­son under Ronald Reagan!–D.E.] Such rela­tion­ships and place­ments afford­ed the  Ikhwan unprece­dent­ed oppor­tu­ni­ties for influ­ence oper­a­tions against the U.S. gov­ern­ment, espe­cial­ly after 9/11.

Unfor­tu­nate­ly for Alam­ou­di, his own abil­i­ty direct­ly to exploit such oppor­tu­ni­ties had by that time been irrepara­bly dam­aged by his appear­ance at an anti-Israel ral­ly out­side th White Hosue in Octo­ber 2000. On that occa­sion, he care­less­ly gave the game away, when he  declared on video: ‘I have been labeled as being a sup­port­er of Hamas. Any­body sup­port­ers of Hamas here? [Roars of approval from the crowd.] We are all sup­port­ers of Hamas. [more roars.] I wish they added that I am also a sup­port­er of Hezbol­lah. [More roars.]

Then, in 2003, Alam­ou­di was arrest­ed at Heathrow Air­port (UK) on his way back from Libya with $340.000 in cash giv­en to him by Libyan Pres­i­dent Muam­mar Kaddafi for jihad. The mon­ey was to be used to kill Crown Prince (now King) Abdul­lah of Sau­di Ara­bia. Alam­ou­di was extra­dit­ed to the Unit­ed States where, in the East­ern Dis­trict of Vir­ginia, he pled guilty to and was con­vict­ed of ter­ror­ism-relat­ed charges. He was proven to be a senior al Qae­da financier, who moved at least $1 mil­lion dol­lars to the ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion. . . .

Sharia: The Threat to Amer­i­ca [“Team B”]; Cen­ter for Secu­ri­ty Pol­i­cy Press [SC]; Copy­right 2010 Cen­ter for Secu­ri­ty Pol­i­cy; ISBN 978–0‑9822947–6‑5; pp. 128–129. [24]

8. After review­ing infor­ma­tion about non­vi­o­lent the­o­reti­cian Gene Sharp, the pro­gram notes that the PORA move­ment in the Ukraine was one of the insti­tu­tions that took their cues from Sharp’s writ­ings [12]. Ini­tial­ly a big sup­port­er of Vladimir Yuschenko, PORA turned against him.

As not­ed in FTR #529 [27], Yuschenko mar­ried the for­mer Yka­te­ri­na Chu­machenko, the point per­son for the OUN/B. Lat­er, Yuschenko named Ban­dera [28] a hero of the Ukraine.

One won­ders if the Pirate Bay/Pirate Party/Anonymous milieu will turn out to be sim­i­lar­ly, cyn­i­cal­ly manip­u­lat­ed in the case of the Pig­gy-Back Coup in the Mid­dle East. Youth­ful ide­al­ists, that milieu may well have helped install the fas­cist Mus­lim Broth­er­hood in pow­er in Egypt and  else­where in the Mid­dle East.

PORA, the non-gov­ern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tion that played a deci­sive role in Ukraine’s Orange Rev­o­lu­tion, has adopt­ed a high­ly crit­i­cal stance towards the ten-point mem­o­ran­dum signed last week by Pres­i­dent Vik­tor Yushchenko and the leader of the Par­ty of Regions, for­mer prime min­is­ter Vik­tor Yanukovych. . . .

“Is PORA Turn­ing Against Yuschenko”; The Kiev Ukraine News Blog; 9/24/2005. [22]

9. In our dis­cus­sion with Fara Man­soor [8], we exam­ined his con­tention that U.S. intel­li­gence had learned that the Shah of Iran had can­cer long before it became pub­lic and decid­ed to replace that staunch, anti-com­mu­nist ally with the  Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ists of Khome­i­ni.

Reports out of the Mid­dle East sug­gest that Mubarak is being treat­ed for can­cer. Is one U.S. sup­port­ed auto­crat in that strate­gic part of the world being replaced by a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood dom­i­nat­ed coali­tion?

Spec­u­la­tion that for­mer Pres­i­dent Hos­ni Mubarak [29] had depart­ed Egypt [30] for Sau­di Ara­bia [31] height­ened Wednes­day with a gov­ern­ment-owned news­pa­per say­ing that he had gone late last week to a spe­cial Sau­di mil­i­tary com­plex at Tabuk for chemother­a­py treat­ment by his usu­al Ger­man doc­tors. He is suf­fer­ing from pan­cre­at­ic and colon can­cer, it said.

There was no offi­cial con­fir­ma­tion of the report.

“Paper in Egypt Says Mubarak Is at Sau­di Site Receiv­ing Care” by Neil Mac­far­quhar; The New York Times; 3/2/2011. [32]