Dave Emory’s entire lifetime of work is available on a flash drive that can be obtained here. (The flash drive includes the anti-fascist books available on this site.)
Listen: MP3
Introduction: This program continues analysis of the installation in the Ukraine of a government composed largely of political forces evolved from, and manifesting ideological continuity with, the fascist OUN/B.
Having staffed the 14th Waffen SS (Galician) Division and the Einsatzgruppen (mobile execution squads) in the Ukraine, the OUN/B was a pivotal element in the postwar Gehlen spy outfit in its CIA and BND incarnations, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the GOP ethnic outreach organization.
OUN/B has been deeply involved with covert operations and figures in the investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as the de-stabilization of the Soviet Union during the climactic phase of the Cold War. With a profound presence in the GOP’s ethnic division, as well as the contemporary Ukrainian political infrastructure, the OUN/B is anything but an historical relic. The development of the OUN/B in both the U.S. and the Ukraine is explained in great historical depth in AFA #37.
The Orwellian aspects of the Ukrainian crisis could not be exaggerated and are explored at greater length in this program.
(We have done five programs to date about the Ukrainian crisis: FTR #‘s 777, 778, 779, 780, 781.)
The program begins by reviewing some of the Yuschenko regime’s deliberate and fundamental remaking of Ukrainian history and ideology. Having literally created an Orwellian “Ministry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s government paved the way for the political midwifing of the Swoboda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.
Swinging the spotlight to this side of the Atlantic, the broadcast highlights the Orwellian nature of U.S. media coverage of the events in the Ukraine. In particular, the disgraceful behavior of The New York Times–the CIA’s #1 propaganda asset–is set forth here.
If Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavarov said that “2 + 2+4,” the Times would present it thusly: “In a joint press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavarov repeated their allegation that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Incessantly repeated by the Russian media since the secessionist vote in the Crimea was scheduled, this is a major theme of Russian mathematical propaganda.”
According to The Ministry of Truth (in this case The New York Times), Swoboda is now “moderate.” We guess that is what happens when the leader of the group meets with the Secretary of State (John Kerry.) Swoboda’s moderation is indicated by their unwillingness to “openly” advocate throwing firebombs at the Ukrainian government security forces.
The Times portrays as outlandish propaganda the [accurate] Russian claim that the new government of the Ukraine is composed of Nazis to a considerable extent. The Per Anders Rudling text excerpted above provides ample documentation of this.) The Gray Lady similarly portrays the Russian [accurate] claim that the current government is composed of political heirs to Stephan Bandera. Again, that is a fact, NOT Russian propaganda.
A significant element of the discussion centers on the Times’ editorial board member Serge Schmemann. Of White Russian extraction, his family background and journalistic behavior raise the question of whether Schmemann might have links to the anti-communist axis emigre milieu.
Born in France during the closing days of World War II, Schmemann grew up speaking Russian and came to the U.S. when his family moved here in 1951. We wonder if the Schmemann family and Serge, in particular, may have had contact with anti-Soviet intelligence and/or fascist networks? Might they have had links to the Promethean League? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intelligence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some element of CIA or other intelligence agency?
IF so, might that account for the editorial bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrainian crisis?
Schmemann wrote a badly slanted book review he wrote in 1988. He was dismissive of Christopher Simpson’s accurate assessment of the role of anti-Soviet Axis collaborators within the Reagan administration and their permanent, destructive imprint on U.S. foreign and national security policy. The political axis defined by Ykaterina [Chumachenko] Yuschenko and her husband and their role in realizing the Ukrainian Ministry of Truth, discussed in FTR #781, bears ample witness to the accuracy of Simpson’s analysis, as does AFA #37.
One of the elements looming large in the Ukrainian crisis is the pan-Turkist movement. Allied with Nazi Germany in World War II and fascist in nature, the pan-Turkists had long sought to carve up the Soviet Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The program devotes considerable time to an excerpt from AFA #14 (recorded in January of 1986.)
The focal point of the discussion is the Promethean League. An anti-Soviet network similar to the World Anti-Communist League, the Promethean League was established between the world wars. Subsidized by Marshall Pilsudski’s Polish intelligence apparatus, the group was physically based in Poland, but heavily supported by French intelligence and ideologists based in France. Featuring Pan-Turkist and Ukrainian elements, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and later to elements of Western intelligence and allied organizations.
Program Highlights Include: Swoboda leader Oleh Tyanhybok, was honored by veterans of the 14th Waffen SS Division (Galicia); in April of 2011, Swoboda returned the favor, honoring the veterans of the 14th Waffen SS in Lvov; Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s support for the Crimean Tatars; the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Hizb Ut-Tahrir in the Crimea; the role of Theodor Oberlander in the mobilizing of Turkophone minorities on behalf of the Third Reich; Oberlander’s role as political officer of the Einsatzgruppe Nachtgall.
1. The program reviews some of the Yuschenko regime’s deliberate and fundamental remaking of Ukrainian history and ideology. Having literally created an Orwellian “Ministry of Truth,” Yuschenko’s government paved the way for the political midwifing of the Swoboda party–the heirs to the OUN/B.
Note that this book is in Google Books.
. . . . . Swept to power by the Orange Revolution, the third president of Ukraine,Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), put in substantial efforts into the production of historical myths. He tasked a set of nationalistically minded historians to produce and disseminate an edifying national history as well as a new set of national heroes. . . . .
. . . . . The OUN wings disagreed on strategy and ideology but shared a commitment to the manufacture of a historical past based on victimization and heroism. The émigrés developed an entire literature that denied the OUN’s fascism, its collaboration with Nazi Germany, and its participation in atrocities, instead presenting the organization as composed of democrats and pluralists who had rescued Jews during the Holocaust. The diaspora narrative was contradictory, combining celebrations of the supposedly anti-Nazi resistance struggle of the OUN-UPA with celebrations of the Waffen SS Galizien, a Ukrainian collaborationist formation established by Heinrich Himmler in 1943 (Rudling, 2011a, 2011c, 2012a). Thus, Ukrainian Waffen SS veterans could celebrate the UPA as “anti-Nazi resistance fighters” while belonging to the same war veterans’ organizations (Bairak, 1978). Unlike their counterparts in some other post-Soviet states, Ukrainian “nationalizing” historians did not have to invent new nationalist myths but re-imported a narrative developed by the émigrés (Dietsch, 2006: 111–146; Rudling, 2011a: 751–753). . . . .
YUSHCHENKOISM
As president, Yushchenko initiated substantial government propaganda initiatives. In July 2005, he established an Institute of National Memory, assigned the archives of the former KGB (now the SBU, Sluzhba Bezpeki Ukrainy, the Ukrainian Security Service) formal propagandistic duties and supported the creation of a “Museum of Soviet Occupation” in Kyiv (Jilge, 2008: 174). Yushchenko appointed the young activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) director of the SBU archives. V’’iatrovych combined his position as government-appointed memory manager with ultra-nationalist activism; he was simultaneously director of an OUN(b) front organization, the Center for the Study for the Liberation Movement. State institutions disseminated a sanitized, edifyingly patriotic version of the history of the “Ukrainian national liberation movement,” the leaders of which were presented in iconographic form as heroic and saintly figures, martyrs of the nation (Rasevych, 2010; Rudling, 2011c: 26–33, 2012b). . . .
. . . A reconstructed historical memory is created as ‘true memory’ and then contrasted with ‘false Soviet history’ ”(Jilge, 2007:104–105). Thus, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, SBU director under Yushchenko, described the task of his agency as being to disseminate “the historical truth of the past of the Ukrainian people,” to “liberate Ukrainian history from lies and falsifications and to work with truthful documents only” (Jilge, 2008:179). Ignoring the OUN’s antisemitism, denying its participation in anti– Jewish violence, and overlooking its fascist ideology, Nalyvaichenko and his agency presented the OUN as democrats, pluralists, even righteous rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. . . .
. . . . On June 30, 2011, the 70th anniversary of the German invasion and Stetsko’s “renewal of Ukrainian statehood” was re-enacted in Lviv as a popular festival, where parents with small children waved flags to re-enactors in SS uniforms. . . .
. . . . Svoboda’s claims to the OUN legacy are based upon ideological continuity, as well as organization and political culture (Shekhovtsov, 2011b:13–14). Presenting Svoboda as the successor of Dontsov and the OUN, Tiahnybok regards Svoboda as “an Order-party which constitutes the true elite of the nation” (Tiahnybok, 2011). Like those of many other far-right movements, Svoboda’s official policy documents are relatively cautious and differ from its daily activities and internal jargon, which are much more radical and racist (Olszan´ski, 2011). . . .
Following violent clashes, the police detained more than 50 Svoboda activists, armed with gas canisters, smoke bombs and catapults. The Cherkasy branch of Svoboda criticized the police for their alleged failure “to stop and avert aggression by Hasidic Jews to Ukrainians” (“Uman: Righ-twing activists detained,” 2011). Svoboda’s anti-Russian and anti-Jewish rhetoric is accompanied by an anti-Polish message. Svoboda maintains that Poland has played a negative historical role in Ukrainian lands. The party demands an official apology from Poland for five hundred years of Polonization, from the 15th to the 20th centuries, and indemnities for “the Polish terror and occupation of Ukrainian lands in the 20th century” (“Zaiava VO ‘Svoboda’ shchodoproiaviv ukrainofobii,” 2010). Focusing on divisive and sensitive issues, Svoboda provocatively denies any involvement of the Waffen SS Galizien in atrocities against the Polish minority in Galicia. For instance, on the site of Huta Pieniacka, Svoboda has placed a huge billboard denying the conclusion of both Polish and Ukrainian historical commissions that the fourth police regiment, which was later adjoined to the Waffen SS Galizien, burnt this Polish village and slaughtered most of its residents on February 28, 1944. . . .
In Canada, in May 2010, Tiahnybok received the golden cross “for his service to Ukraine” from the Brotherhood of the Veterans of the First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army, as the veterans of the Waffen SS Galizien call themselves (“Esesovtsy nagradil lideraukrainskikh natsionalistov,” 2010). Following the conviction and sentencing of the death camp guard John Demjanjuk to five years of jail for his role as an accessory to the murder of 27,900 people at the Sobibór death camp,Tiahnybok traveled to Germany and met up with Demjanjuk’s lawyer, Ulrich Busch, presenting the death camp guard as a hero, a victim of persecution, who is “fighting for truth” (“Oleh Tiahnybok iz dvodennym vizytomvidvidav Nimechynu,” 2010). . . .
. . . . Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn (b. 1982), Tiahnybok’s adviser on ideological matters, Svoboda’s top name in the election to the Lviv city council and its candidate for mayor in 2010, represents a more radical current in the movement.Proudly confessing himself part of the fascist tradition, Mykhal’chyshyn relishes the harshness, extremism and uncompromising radicalism of his idols of the 1930s and 1940s. Constantly reiterating that “We consider tolerance a crime” and that “We value the truth of the spirit and blood over-all success and wealth” (Nasha Vatra , n.d.),Mykhal’chyshyn takes pride in the label “extremist,” which he proudly shares with “Stepan Bandera,who created an underground terrorist-revolutionary army, the shadow of which still stirs up horrible fear in the hearts of the enemies of our Nation”(Mykhal’chyshyn, “Orientyry”, n.d.). Mykhal’chyshyn serves as a link between VO Svoboda and the so-called autonomous nationalists. Mirroring the “autonomous anarchists” of the extreme left, which they resemble in terms of dress code, lifestyle, aesthetics, symbolism and organization, the “autonomous nationalists” attract particularly militant and extremely violent “event-oriented” young fascists. . . . .
. . . . The glorification of street violence is a key component of this political subculture: in an extra session with the Lviv regional Rada in front of the Bandera memorial in Lviv, Mykhal’chyshyn boasted that “Our Banderite army will cross the Dnipro and throw that blue-ass gang, which today usurps the power, out of Ukraine. . . . That will make those Asiatic dogs shut their ugly mouths.” . . . .
. . . . Explicitly endorsing Hamas, Mykhal’chyshyn regards the Holocaust as “a bright episode in European civilization” . . . .
. . . . We recognize the heavy emphasis on heroes and heroism from the narrative of the émigré OUN and from Yushchenko’s legitimizing historians. The difference is that, unlike these two influences, Mykhal’chyshyn does not deny Bandera and Stets’ko’s fascism. On the contrary, their fascist ideology constitutes the basis for his admiration. . . .
. . . . Yushchenko left behind a legacy of myths which helped legitimized Svoboda’s ideology. Svoboda’s appropriation of many rituals in honour of “national heroes” from more moderate nationalists is but one expression of its increased political strength in post-Yushchenko Western Ukraine. . . .
. . . . On April 28, 2011, Svoboda celebrated the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Waffen SS Galizien. Octogenarian Waffen SS veterans were treated as heroes in a mass rally, organized by Svoboda and the “autonomous nationalists.” Nearly 700 participants (the organizers claimed 2,000) marched down the streets of Lviv, from the massive socialist–realist style Bandera monument, to Prospekt Svobody, the main street, shouting slogans like “One race, one nation, one fatherland!,” . . . .
. . . . The procession was led by Mykhal’chyshyn . . . .
2. So, according to The Ministry of Truth, Swoboda is now “moderate.” We guess that is what happens when the leader of the group meets with the Secretary of State (John Kerry.)
Notice that Swoboda’s moderation is indicated by their unwillingness to “openly” advocate throwing firebombs at the Ukrainian government security forces. Hey, that sure sounds moderate to us!
In 2010, Oleh Tyanhybok, the leader of the group was honored by veterans of the 14th Waffen SS Division (Galicia). In April of 2011, Swoboda returned the favor, honoring the veterans of the 14th Waffen SS in Lvov.
. . . . Mr. Yarosh has hinted at a role for his group in balancing the influence of a longtime player in Ukrainian politics, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, the former prime minister who emerged from prison after the fall of the old government with members of her political party, Fatherland, already holding the positions of acting president and prime minister.
Before the protests, the nationalist party Svoboda had occupied the nationalist niche to the right of Ms. Tymoshenko. But Svoboda and Fatherland are now allied. . . . [They were all along. Just check out FTR #779–D.E.)
The Svoboda party, meanwhile, has moderated, and did not openly [!–D.E.] endorse the tactic of throwing firebombs when street fighting began in January. Svoboda was founded in 1991 under the name the Socialist-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, with a symbol that resembled a swastika. Its leader, Oleg Tyagnibok, met Secretary of State John Kerry on Tuesday . . . .
3. We note the deliberate slanting of coverage of the Ukrainian crisis in the New York Times. Note how the Times spins the [accurate] Russian claim that the new government of the Ukraine is composed of Nazis to a considerable extent. The earlier programs about the Ukrainian crisis should provide ample documentation of this.
. . . Russian media, a potent weapon in a battle to demoralize and divide what remains of Ukrainian state authority in Crimea, has announced a string of defections, some true, some not, and kept up a drumbeat with accounts of how Ukraine has slipped into the hands of extremists, terrorists and even Nazis. [They are–D.E.]. . .
4. Note how the Times subtly spins the accurate analysis of the new Ukrainian government as successors to Bandera’s OUN/B forces. It is not “Russian propaganda.”
. . . . “I don’t want to live in a country run by fascists,” said Sergei Gaenko, a retired law enforcement official, echoing a widespread view here that Mr. Yanukovych’s ouster was engineered by the political descendants of militant Ukrainian nationalists who, during World War II, sometimes formed loose tactical alliances with Hitler’s invading army.
Crimea, he added, was “illegally given to Ukraine” by Nikita Khrushchev and he said it was time to “correct an historic injustice.” Like many Russians here, he scorned the new interim government as made up of “Banderovtsi,” a derogatory Soviet term used to describe followers of Stepan Bandera, a wartime Ukrainian nationalist leader vilified by Moscow as a pro-Nazi traitor. .
5a. The New York Times noted that Obama has not reacted to the “democratic” developments in the Ukraine in the way that George W. Bush reacted to the “Orange Revolution.” Note how the Gray Lady references Paula J. Dobriansky’s viewpoint. A member of the National Security Council under Ronald Reagan, Dobriansky was a Deputy Secretary of State under George W. Bush. The daughter of Lev Dobriansky, Paula is part and parcel to the OUN/B milieu in the United States.
“Wary Stance from Obama on Ukraine” by Peter Baker; The New York Times; 2/24/2014.
Televisions around the White House were aglow with pictures of Ukrainians in the streets, demanding to be heard and toppling a government aligned with Russia. It was an invigorating moment, and it spurred a president already rethinking his approach to the world.
That was a different decade and a different president. While George W. Bush was inspired by the Orange Revolution of 2004 and weeks later vowed in his second inaugural address to promote democracy, Barack Obama has approached the revolution of 2014 with a more clinical detachment aimed at avoiding instability.
Rather than an opportunity to spread freedom in a part of the world long plagued by corruption and oppression, Mr. Obama sees Ukraine’s crisis as a problem to be managed, ideally with a minimum of violence or geopolitical upheaval. While certainly sympathetic to the pro-Western protesters who pushed out President Viktor F. Yanukovych and hopeful that they can establish a representatively elected government, Mr. Obama has not made global aspirations of democracy the animating force of his presidency.
“I just think this president is not going to lean forward on his skis with regard to democracy promotion,” said John Lewis Gaddis, a Yale University historian who advised the Bush White House as speechwriters worked on the former president’s January 2005 inaugural address promising to combat tyranny abroad. “If anything, he’s going to lean back and let natural forces take us there, if they do.” . . . . “The administration’s Ukraine policy is emblematic of a broader problem with today’s foreign policy — absence of a strategic vision, disinterest in democracy promotion and an unwillingness to lead,” said Paula J. Dobriansky, an under secretary of state for Mr. Bush. . . .
5b. Note that the rhetorical pressure on Obama coming from Paula Dobriansky is coming from someone connected to the OUN/B milieu and its participation in the GOP and Reagan administration.
. . . In Washington, the OUN‑B reconstituted under the banner of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), an umbrella organization comprised of “complete OUN‑B fronts,” according to Bellant. By the mid-1980’s, the Reagan administration was honeycombed with UCCA members, with the group’s chairman Lev Dobriansky, serving as ambassador to the Bahamas, and his daughter, Paula, sitting on the National Security Council. Reagan personally welcomed Stetsko, the Banderist leader who oversaw the massacre of 7000 Jews in Lviv, into the White House in 1983.“Your struggle is our struggle,” Reagan told the former Nazi collaborator. “Your dream is our dream.” . . .
6. A gentleman named Serge Schmemann is an important member of the Times’ editorial board. He was formerly the Times’ Bonn bureau chief, when that city was the former West Germany’s capital. We haven’t seen many bi-lines featuring Mr. Schmemann’s recently. He has been featured in editorial musings in recent Sunday Times editions.
We remember Schmemann from a badly slanted book review he wrote in 1988. He was dismissive of Christopher Simpson’s accurate assessment of the role of anti-Soviet Axis collaborators within the Reagan administration and their permanent, destructive imprint on U.S. foreign and national security policy.
The role of Ms. Chumachenko/Yuschenko and her husband in remaking Ukrainian history and ideology to pave the way for the rise of Swoboda, Pravy Sektor and other OUN/B clones bears brutal testimony to the accuracy of Simpson’s analysis.
. . . .But Mr. Simpson argues further that the recruitment of East Europeans and other anti-Communists by the C.I.A. after the war served to keep Washington on a cold-war track to this day. He talks of ”the scars that secret emigre anti-Communist programs have left on life in the United States,” down to the survival of the ”liberationist cause” in the Reagan administration’s ”cold-war strategy.”
There are several problems here. Most seriously, Mr. Simpson’s logic has the effect of smearing anti-Communism with the taint of Nazism. ”Liberationism” may not be a uniquely Nazi idea, he writes, ”but the fact remains that ideas and theories have histories, just as nations do. . . . The true origins of liberationism as a coherent philosophy lie in Nazi Germany and in the Nazis’ political warfare campaign on the eastern front, and nowhere else.” Today ”liberation activists” may have a reasonably sophisticated agenda, he continues, but ”the one position they cling to above all . . . is an implacable paranoia toward the USSR that would permit no arms control treaties, no trade and indeed no East-West cooperation of any type, only relentless preparation for war.” That is a serious charge, and, in the light of the real case histories of Nazi mass murderers, it is patently unfair. . . .
. . . . Mr. Simpson claims that something called the Captive Nations movement, in which the C.I.A. had a hand, hindered Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon in their search for detente with the Soviet Union. Even if it did, is that really a ”blowback” from the recruitment of Nazis?
Mr. Simpson likewise seems to make a fairly heady leap from argument to conclusion in describing how clandestine operations to ”roll back Communism” backfired in Eastern Europe. In the case of the Ukraine, he claims, ”instead of rallying to the new ‘democratic’ movement, there is every indication that many of the ordinary people of the Ukraine gave increased credence to the Soviet government’s message that the United States, too, was really Nazi at heart and capable of using any sort of deceit and violence to achieve its ends.” . . .
7. Serge Schmemann has a White Russian background. Born in France during the closing days of World War II, Schmemann grew up speaking Russian and came to the U.S. when his family moved here in 1951. We wonder if the Schmemann family and Serge, in particular, may have had contact with anti-Soviet intelligence and/or fascist networks? Might they have had links to the Promethean League (see below for details)? Might they have had some links to Third Reich intelligence and/or the Gehlen org? Might Serge have links with some element of CIA or other intelligence agency?
IF so, might that account for the editorial bias of the Times with regard to the Ukrainian crisis?
“Serge Schmemann’: Wikipedia.com
Born in France [4/12/1945], the son of Alexander Schmemann and Juliana Ossorguine (a descendant of Juliana of Lazarevo, a Russian Orthodox Saint),[2] he moved to the United States as a child, in 1951. He grew up speaking Russian at home, but he visited his ancestral homeland for the first time only in 1980 when he arrived with his family as Moscow correspondent for the Associated Press. It was not until 1990 that the Soviet authorities allowed him to visit his grandparents’ home village near Kaluga. . . . .
. . . .Writing for The New York Times, he won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1991 for his coverage of the reunification of Germany,[1] . . .
8. Note that Serge’s father Alexander was the son of an emigre Czarist officer and resided in France during the period that the Promethean League was very active there. Alexander Schmemann was being educated in France during the course of the Nazi occupation of that country.
“Alexander Schmemann”; Wikipedia.com
. . . . Alexander Schmemann was born on 13 September 1921 in Tallinn, Estonia, into a family of Russian White émigrés. His grandfather had been a senator and a member of the State Council and his father an officer of the Imperial Life-Guards. When he was a child his family moved to France, where he was educated in Russian schools and at a French lycee before becoming a student at the University of Paris (1940–1945) . . .
9. In the past, we have noted that the supposedly “moderate” Islamist government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan isn’t “moderate” at all. Descended from the Al-Taqwa/Muslim Brotherhood milieu, it is both Islamist and Pan-Turkist in its outlook. Erdogan and his foreign minister have been posturing in defense of the Crimean Tatars and–doing something he has become known for–conjuring the Ottoman Empire in their political pronouncements.
“Turkey Moves to Protect Crimea’s Tatar Minority”; Middle East Online; 3/13/2014.
Turkey, which has kept a low profile in the Ukraine crisis, is making moves to protect Crimea’s ethnic Tatar minority as the region prepares for a referendum on joining Russia this week.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pledged to support Crimea’s Turkish-speaking Tatar minority, which Ankara fears could be sidelined in a March 16 vote on switching over to Kremlin rule.
“Turkey has never left Crimean Tatars alone and will never do so,” he said, after a phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier this month.
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu vowed to protect the “rights of our kinsmen” after meeting with Ukrainian officials and representatives of the Tatar community during an unscheduled visit to Kiev earlier this month. . . .
10. Of considerable importance in the context of the Crimean Tatar population of the Ukraine is the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir has a cadre in that historically peaceful and ecumenical population group. Hizb ut-Tahrir is both Islamist and associated with Pan-Turkism. The group has networked with the NPD, the top German neo-Nazi party.
“Crimean Tatars on Guard Against Joining Russia” by Noah Sneider; The New York Times; 3/14/2014.
. . . . While the Tatars have a history of peaceful resistance, the potential for radicalization does exist. Tatar militants have fought alongside the opposition in Syria, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic group banned in several countries including Russia, has 1,000 members in Crimea, according to Fazil Amzayev, a spokesman for the group’s local chapter. . . .
11. One of the elements looming large in the Ukrainian crisis is the pan-Turkist movement. Allied with Nazi Germany in World War II and fascist in nature, the pan-Turkists had long sought to carve up the Soviet Union and restore the Ottomon Empire. The program devotes considerable time to an excerpt from AFA #14 (recorded in January of 1986.)
The focal point of the discussion is the Promethean League. An anti-Soviet network similar to the World Anti-Communist League, the Promethean League was established between the world wars. Subsidized by Marshall Pilsudski’s Polish intelligence apparatus, the group was physically based in Poland, but heavily supported by French intelligence and ideologists based in France. Featuring Pan-Turkist and Ukrainian elements, many of the Promethean League groups jumped first to the Third Reich and later to elements of Western intelligence and allied organizations.
Here’s a great and very long interview of Russ Bellant on the OUN‑B and its ties to both Svoboda and the GOP and why it’s still very relevant history today:
There are all sorts of good reasons for keeping fascists out of your government. For instance, fascist chief prosecutors might have trouble remaining impartial:
It begins. Hide the children.
Yep!
Yes, according to the EC president, “the agreement would bring Ukraine and its 46 million people closer to a ‘European way of life’ ” which would be pretty exciting if that wasn’t a reference to the post-2008 ‘European way of life’ so you have to wonder how long this discontent with closer EU ties is going to be limited to Ukraine’s ethnic Russian population.
Because the situation in Ukraine just wasn’t Orwellian enough...
So the “Ministry of Truth” idea was first floated on Sunday and made into law with little parliamentary debate the next day? Bravo.
Uh oh, this probably isn’t going to help with the Russian/Turkey tensions:
“But Turkey’s Dogan news agency reported last year that he is a Turkish citizen whose father Ramazan was mayor of Keban municipality for the ultra-nationalist National Movement Party (MHP).”
Yeah, it’s probably not going to help tensions when it turns out that Alparslan Celik, the head of the Turkmen militia unit who was boasting of killing the parachuting Russia pilot, was featured in a Dogan news agency report from last year about being the sone of the MHP mayor of Keban and traveling to Syria. Especially since his relatively sparse twitter feed includes tweet of Grey Wolves founder Alparslan Turkes in March of 2013 and then no public tweets until a January 2015 tweet of Alparslan and his Turkmen militia members showing the Grey Wolves hand gesture.
And just today a major pro-Kurdish Turkish lawyer, Taher Elci, was just assassinated while making a speech calling for an end to the hostilities between the Turkish state and the PKK (which Gary Brecher, a.k.a. The War Nerd, see as “state killing” written all over it). So we could be looking at a period of increased violence and aggression from the Turkish Deep State and affiliated fascists and Islamists.
But also note something else rather significant that’s happening in parallel: Erdogan has made it clear for a while now that a redrawing of the Middle East’s borders is something he has in mind. Recall, for instance, his speech last year when he declared Lawrence of Arabia a bigger threat to peace in the Middle East than ISIS and endorsed redrawing the Middle East’s map:
“Erdogan’s comments Monday give a glimpse into the Turkish leadership’s reasons for denying the use of Incirlik.”
Yes, that resusal to allow the use of the Incirlik airbase for anti-ISIS operations may very well have to do with a desire to not just see ISIS topple the Assad government but also redraw the map of the Middle East in a manner consistent with ISIS’s ambitions. As the diplomat puts it at the end:
And based on Erdogan’s speech, it appears that redrawing the maps of Syria and Iraq (and possibly more) just might be seen as one way to achieve those aims. Of course, Turkey and ISIS alone can’t force a redrawing of the Middle Eastern map. But if, say, the larger neoconservative establishment in the West was to get behind the idea, well, that could certainly make a post-Sykes Picot world much more possible. So it’s worth noting that one of the biggest neoconservatives around, John Bolton, just endorsed the Turkey/ISIS plan of breaking up Iraq and Syria and creating a new Sunni state:
“If, in this context, defeating the Islamic State means restoring to power Mr. Assad in Syria and Iran’s puppets in Iraq, that outcome is neither feasible nor desirable. Rather than striving to recreate the post-World War I map, Washington should recognize the new geopolitics. The best alternative to the Islamic State in northeastern Syria and western Iraq is a new, independent Sunni state.”
When John Bolton backs Erdogan’s and ISIS’s calls for a new sectarian map, well, we should probably considering the possibility that making such a map reality is a serious possibility. Especially given other thorny realities like the fact that the Russian military is now making it very clear hat a military defeat of Assad’s forces isn’t going to happen any time soon.
Also keep in mind this this talk of redrawing the map of the Middle East isn’t new from a prominent neocon. Back in 2006, Lt Colonel Ralph Peters (who has called for “military attacks on partisan media” during wartime, a sentiment Erdogan can probably relate to) wrote his “Blood Borders” piece for the Armed Forced Journal which made the case that partitioning the Middle East along ethnic and sectarian lines was the best long-term solution for peace in the region. Tribalism for World Peace! The point being that redrawing the map of the Middle East has been an idea bandied about by influential people for a while now and based on what we’ve heard from Erdogan it seems reasonable that it’s been something he’s had in mind for a while too which is something that might add some context to Turkey’s covert but aggressive backing of a ISIS’s attempts to carve out a new de facto state with or without the overthrowing Assad’s government.
It also adds some context to stories like President Obama having to call for Turkey to seal its border in the areas where its known that ISIS fighters are flowing into and out of Syria. Sure, Erdogan might be allowing those flows because he’d like to see the downfall of Assad. But when a redrawing of the maps of Iraq and Syria are also one of his goals, simply maintaining the existence of ISIS as a de facto state (which is sitting on A LOT of oil) that makes putting Iraq and Syria back together impossible might alone be enough of a motivation to keep those borders open and those fighters flowing. In other words, the military collapse of Assad’s forces may not be required for the achievement of Erdogan’s strategic objectives for the region.
Adding to the intrigue is another very fascinating possibility that’s emerging as world powers negotiate over the fate of Syria and Iraq: Now that Russia is directly militarily involved in ensure the Assad government doesn’t militarily collapse, the partitioning of Syria and Iraq is probably going to be seen as the only possible solution but it will be a solution that will effectively require the agreement of Russia. And that raises all sorts of fascinating potential dynamics because Russia’s claim to Crimea is still contested by most of the world, not to mention the status of Eastern Ukraine. So...might we be in store for an upcoming grand bargain of sorts between Russia, Turkey, and the West? Europe and the US recognizes Crimea as a Russian state in exchange for Russia backing a balkanized Syria and Iraq? Don’t forget that Turkey has the capacity to create quite a few headaches in Crimea given the large population of Tartars and the ties to pan-Turkist movements. Also don’t forget that the downing of the Russian jet happened less than a week after someone blew up power pylon in Ukraine that were feeding electricity into Crimea and it was Crimean Tartar activists, along with members of the Right Sector, who endorsed the sabotage and are blocking Ukrainian repairs. As a result, Crimea is still without power and when Russia demanded that Ukraine repair the pylons, Kiev responded by declaring a blockade of all goods into Crimea. Also note that the man issuing demands on behalf of the Crimean Tartar protesters, Ukrainian MP and Crimean Tartar representative Mustafa Dzhemilev, received Turkey’s highest state award in April 2014:
“Dzhemilev and Poroshenko told journalists that Gul assured them that Ankara will never recognize the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea by Russia, will support Ukraine’s efforts to establish order in its eastern regions, and will contribute to peace and stability in the Black Sea region.”
That was then. But this isn’t 2014 and now that Russia is making a military solution to the Syrian civil war very unlikely any time soon you have to wonder whether or not Ankara’s pledge to “never” recognized the annexation of Crimea is really a pledge to “never” recognize that annexation, or whether an agreement to break of Syria and Iraq might turn that “never” pledge into a “not at the moment, but we’ll see” pledge. There’s a pretty clear ratcheting of tensions between Russia and Turkey, but when you consider the post-Syke-Picot dreams of Erdogan and other, there’s a pretty clear potential quid pro quo sitting there too. And as we saw with ideas like “Blood Borders” getting bandied about in 2006, it’s a quid pro quo that quite a few governments or strategist have probably been thinking about for a while.
So when we’re thinking about what could have motivated Turkey to shoot down that plane, keep in mind that a ratcheting of tensions with Russia also doubles as quid pro quo appetizer.