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Intro­duc­tion: In AFA #22, among oth­er pro­grams, we exam­ined the mas­sacre of Israeli ath­letes at the 1972 sum­mer Olympics in Munich, Ger­many. The chief of secu­ri­ty for that ill-fat­ed event was Hans Lange­mann, an offi­cer with the BND, the Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vice and the final incar­na­tion of the Gehlen spy orga­ni­za­tion.

Lange­mann report­ed­ly col­lab­o­rat­ed with Hans Koll­mar (then head of the BKA, the Ger­man Fed­er­al Police) in set­ting up provo­ca­tions to be blamed on “left­ists.” Ali Has­san Salameh, the leader of the Black Sep­tem­ber cadre, was work­ing for the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency after the mas­sacre.

In FTR #333, we looked at Lange­man­n’s role in pro­vid­ing an ali­bi for Karl-Heinz Hoff­man, whose orga­ni­za­tion was impli­cat­ed in the 1980 Munich Okto­ber­fest bomb­ing. That crime, in turn, appears to have been part of a larg­er con­fig­u­ra­tion of inci­dents per­pe­trat­ed by ele­ments of the post­war fas­cist inter­na­tion­al.

Now, it emerges that Ger­man neo-Nazis aid­ed the Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists. Fur­ther­more, the for­eign min­istry had advanced warn­ing of the impend­ing attack and passed the infor­ma­tion along to Ger­man intel­li­gence, which took no action. Might this have been due to Lange­man­n’s efforts?

We now know that Willi Pohl, one of the neo-Nazis who assist­ed the ter­ror­ists at the Olympics, also found employ­ment with the CIA.

Ali Has­san Salameh–leader of the Black Sep­tem­ber fac­tion that per­pe­trat­ed the attacks–was recruit­ed by Hen­ry Kissinger. Was Pohl’s recruit­ment also a result of Kissinger’s efforts?

Review­ing infor­ma­tion from FTR #806, we note that Kissinger and Richard Nixon were  con­spir­ing with Rein­hard Gehlen and oth­er Third Reich alum­ni to desta­bi­lize the gov­ern­ment of Willi Brandt. Might the Olympics mas­sacre have been con­nect­ed with that oper­a­tion?

Pro­gram High­lights Include:

• The rel­a­tive lack of inter­est on the part of the Ger­man author­i­ties into neo-Nazi Willi Pohl’s activ­i­ties on behalf of Black Sep­tem­ber. Was this an indi­ca­tion of com­plic­i­ty among those in rel­a­tive posi­tions of pow­er?
• The light sen­tence hand­ed to Pohl. Again, was the “fix” in?
• What role might Lange­mann have played in defray­ing inter­est in Pohl’s activ­i­ties?
• The report refers to “neo-Nazis”–plural–as being com­plic­it with the Black Sep­tem­ber con­tin­gent that per­pe­trat­ed the Olympics mas­sacre. Might Pohl have had accom­plices? How many?
• Did accom­plices with­in the Ger­man neo-Nazi scene–perhaps with the con­nivance of ele­ments of Ger­man intel­li­gence and/or law enforcement–have helped with obtain­ing “false pass­ports” for the Olympics con­spir­a­tors?
• Hans Globke’s work with Kissinger, Gehlen and the “Lit­tle Ser­vice.”
• With­in a month of the attacks, the Ger­man gov­ern­ment was in touch with the Black Sep­tem­ber “perps” and was down­play­ing the sig­nif­i­cance of the attacks.
• Review of Kissinger’s post­war work incor­po­rat­ing Third Reich vet­er­ans into the U.S. nation­al secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment.
• Why were there 3 more ter­ror­ists at the air­port than had pre­vi­ous­ly been expect­ed?
• Why did­n’t the Ger­man secu­ri­ty per­son­nel bring rifles, which were essen­tial to the res­cue plan?
• Why did the Ger­mans refuse Israeli intel­li­gence assis­tance?

1. In AFA #22, among oth­er pro­grams, we exam­ined the mas­sacre of Israeli ath­letes at the 1972 sum­mer Olympics in Munich, Ger­many. The chief of secu­ri­ty for that ill-fat­ed event was Hans Lange­mann, an offi­cer with the BND, the Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vice and the final incar­na­tion of the Gehlen spy orga­ni­za­tion.

Lange­mann report­ed­ly col­lab­o­rat­ed with Hans Koll­mar (then head of the BKA, the Ger­man Fed­er­al Police) in set­ting up provo­ca­tions to be blamed on “left­ists.” Ali Has­san Salameh, the leader of the Black Sep­tem­ber cadre, was work­ing for the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency after the mas­sacre.

In FTR #333, we looked at Lange­man­n’s role in pro­vid­ing an ali­bi for Karl-Heinz Hoff­man, whose orga­ni­za­tion was impli­cat­ed in the 1980 Munich Okto­ber­fest bomb­ing. That crime, in turn, appears to have been part of a larg­er con­fig­u­ra­tion of inci­dents per­pe­trat­ed by ele­ments of the post­war fas­cist inter­na­tion­al.

Now, it emerges that Ger­man neo-Nazis aid­ed the Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists.

Of par­tic­u­lar inter­est here:

• The rel­a­tive lack of inter­est on the part of the Ger­man author­i­ties into neo-Nazi Willi Pohl’s activ­i­ties on behalf of Black Sep­tem­ber. Was this an indi­ca­tion of com­plic­i­ty among those in rel­a­tive posi­tions of pow­er?
• The light sen­tence hand­ed to Pohl. Again, was the “fix” in?
• What role might Lange­mann have played in defray­ing inter­est in Pohl’s activ­i­ties?
• The report refers to “neo-Nazis”–plural–as being com­plic­it with the Black Sep­tem­ber con­tin­gent that per­pe­trat­ed the Olympics mas­sacre. Might Pohl have had accom­plices? How many?
• Did accom­plices with­in the Ger­man neo-Nazi scene–perhaps with the con­nivance of ele­ments of Ger­man intel­li­gence and/or law enforcement–have helped with obtain­ing “false pass­ports” for the Olympics con­spir­a­tors?

“Neo-Nazi Helped Black Sep­tem­ber Munich Attack” by Ben­jamin Weinthal; Jerusalem Post [Der Spiegel]; 6/17/2012.

New­ly released files from Germany’s domes­tic intel­li­gence agency Ver­fas­sungss­chutz (BfV) reveal that neo- Nazis worked with the rad­i­cal Pales­tin­ian group Black Sep­tem­ber in the 1972 Munich ter­ror attack, accord­ing to a Der Spiegel mag­a­zine sto­ry on Sun­day.

Accord­ing to the online report, police in the city of Dort­mund sent a notice to the BfV, in which they not­ed that “Saad Wal­li, an ‘Arab-look­ing man’ met con­spir­a­to­ri­al­ly with the Ger­man neo-Nazi Willi Pohl.”

Saad Wal­li was the cov­er name for Abu Daoud, who is wide­ly believed to be the ring­leader of the plot that result­ed in the mur­der of 11 Israeli ath­letes at the 1972 Olympic games. Pohl alleged­ly bragged to his employ­er about his con­tact with the extrem­ist PLO wing.

Accord­ing to the BfV doc­u­ments, which Der Spiegel obtained in advance of the 40th anniver­sary of the mur­ders, there are no indi­ca­tions that the Ger­man author­i­ties act­ed on the infor­ma­tion pro­vid­ed to them by the Dort­mund police. That helps explain, said Der Spiegel, how the Pales­tini­ans pre­pared the attack in the Fed­er­al Repub­lic with­out being caught. Pohl, who is now a crime fic­tion author, told Der Spiegel that “I chauf­feured Abu Daoud through the entire Fed­er­al Repub­lic where he met in dif­fer­ent cities with Pales­tini­ans.” Pohl also helped Daoud obtain false pass­ports and oth­er doc­u­ments. . . .

. . . It is unclear why the Ger­man domes­tic intel­li­gence agency and the state and fed­er­al crim­i­nal police author­i­ties failed to act on the infor­ma­tion from the local Dort­mund police offi­cials. Crit­ics have long accused Ger­man author­i­ties of a lax enforce­ment pol­i­cy toward rad­i­cal Islam­ic groups. The Iran-backed rad­i­cal Islam­ic enti­ty Hezbol­lah, which has engaged in ter­ror attacks in the Mid­dle East and South Amer­i­ca, is a legal polit­i­cal orga­ni­za­tion in Ger­many, with an esti­mat­ed 900 active mem­bers.

In con­nec­tion with anoth­er slat­ed PLO attack in Ger­many, the PLO’s secret ser­vice head – Abu Ijad – assigned Pohl to plan kid­nap­ping oper­a­tions at the Cologne cathe­dral and in the city halls of a num­ber of Ger­man cities. In late Octo­ber 1972, the author­i­ties arrest­ed Pohl and an accom­plice in Munich, and the police con­fis­cat­ed machine guns, hand grenades and oth­er mil­i­tary equip­ment. In one suit­case, police found a threat­en­ing let­ter by the Black Sep­tem­ber group. The let­ter was direct­ed toward a judge who inves­ti­gat­ed three PLO ter­ror­ists involved in the 1972 attacks.

After the PLO hijacked a Lufthansa plane in 1972, Ger­man author­i­ties released the three ter­ror­ists. Crit­ics say Ger­many had failed at the time to clamp down on Pales­tin­ian ter­ror activ­i­ty in Ger­many. Despite the over­whelm­ing proof of Pohl’s ter­ror activ­i­ty, Der Spiegel not­ed that Pohl was giv­en a mild sen­tence of two years and two months in prison for weapons pos­ses­sion. Four days after the sen­tence was imposed on Pohl, he fled to Beirut.

2. Der Spiegel gives us anoth­er jolt­ing rev­e­la­tion con­cern­ing the 1972 Olympics Mas­sacre in Munich. Ger­man author­i­ties had been warned almost a month in advance of Pales­tin­ian inten­tions to cre­ate an inci­dent at the Olympics.

Despite a warn­ing from the for­eign min­istry, the Munich secu­ri­ty offi­cials took no sig­nif­i­cant action, this despite the fact that the Black Sep­tem­ber group appears to have been method­olog­i­cal­ly ama­teur­ish.

The secu­ri­ty offi­cials at the games per­mit­ted Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ists to walk right past the build­ing where the Israeli ath­letes were quar­tered. Might Lange­mann have had some­thing to do with this?

“Ger­many Had a Tip-Off Three Weeks Ahead of Munich Mas­sacre, Der Spiegel Claims” by Raphael Ahren; Times of Israel; 7/22/2012.

Ger­many had a tip-off from a Pales­tin­ian infor­mant in Beirut three weeks before the 1972 Munich Olympic mas­sacre that Pales­tini­ans were plan­ning an “inci­dent” at the Games, a Ger­man news mag­a­zine charged Sun­day.

The For­eign Min­istry in Bonn took the tip-off suf­fi­cient­ly seri­ous­ly to pass it on to the secret ser­vice in Munich and urge that “all pos­si­ble secu­ri­ty mea­sures” be tak­en.

But the Munich author­i­ties failed to act on the tip, which was passed on to Bonn by the Ger­man Embassy in Beirut, and have nev­er acknowl­edged it in the ensu­ing 40 years, Der Spiegel said in a front-page sto­ry to be pub­lished Mon­day but made avail­able online in Ger­man on Sun­day.

The fail­ure to act upon that tip-off at the time, and the sub­se­quent fail­ure to acknowl­edge that it had even been received, Der Spiegel added, is only part of a 40-year cov­er-up by the Ger­man author­i­ties of the mis­han­dling of the 1972 ter­ror attack, in which 11 mem­bers of the Israeli team were mas­sa­cred by Pales­tin­ian Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists.

“The fed­er­al gov­ern­ment [in Bonn] and the local gov­ern­ment of the state of Bavaria com­mit­ted grave errors in their han­dling of the attack on Israeli ath­letes dur­ing the Olympic Games in Munich, and have kept the true extent of the fail­ure true under wraps until today,” Der Spiegel assert­ed.

For the first 20 years after the mas­sacre in Munich, the Ger­man author­i­ties refused to release any infor­ma­tion about the attack; nor did they accept any respon­si­bil­i­ty for the trag­ic results. . . . .

. . . . On Sun­day, Der Spiegel said it obtained hith­er­to secret reports by author­i­ties, embassy cables and min­utes of cab­i­net meet­ings that demon­strate just how ama­teur­ish the Ger­man offi­cials were ahead of the Sep­tem­ber 5 attack, which also claimed the life of one Ger­man police­man.

Accord­ing to Bonn’s offi­cial doc­u­men­ta­tion of the event, the Pales­tin­ian Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror group car­ried out its dead­ly mis­sion with “pre­ci­sion.” But the Ger­man author­i­ties knew the Black Sep­tem­ber was a bad­ly pre­pared group that bare­ly man­aged to find hotel rooms in Munich, Der Spiegel stat­ed.

As far back as August 14, 1972, three weeks before the mas­sacre, the Ger­man Embassy in Beirut report­ed to Bonn that an infor­mant had talked about Pales­tin­ian plans for “an inci­dent” dur­ing the Olympics, accord­ing to the report. Four days lat­er, the For­eign Min­istry in Bonn told the secret service’s Munich branch about this and advised author­i­ties to “take all pos­si­ble secu­ri­ty mea­sures.”

Need­less to say, the nec­es­sary secu­ri­ty mea­sures were nev­er tak­en. The report revealed, for instance, that the ter­ror­ists were strolling by the apart­ments of the Israeli ath­letes with­out any­body stop­ping them from doing so.

All these facts are miss­ing from the offi­cial doc­u­men­ta­tion of the Ger­man gov­ern­ment.

The offi­cial doc­u­men­ta­tion also con­ceals the fact that the Munich pros­e­cu­tion inves­ti­gat­ed the city’s police chiefs for sus­pect­ed neg­li­gent homi­cide, the mag­a­zine report­ed.

“Mutu­al accu­sa­tions should be avoid­ed, as well as self-crit­i­cism,” a For­eign Min­istry offi­cial told a spe­cial cab­i­net ses­sion just two days after the dead­ly attack. “From that moment on, this appar­ent­ly became the mot­to of the gov­ern­ments in Bonn and Munich,” the mag­a­zine wrote.

3. We have high­light­ed how the Ger­man gov­ern­ment had pri­or warn­ing of the attacks, yet took no sig­nif­i­cant secu­ri­ty pro­ce­dures, how the Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists received aid in the logis­ti­cal plan­ning for the attack by Ger­man neo-Nazis, and how the chief of secu­ri­ty for the attacks was alleged to have staged ter­ror­ist inci­dents to be blamed on the left, as well as pro­vid­ing an ali­bi for Karl­heinz Hoff­man, head of the Nazi group that exe­cut­ed the 1980 Okto­ber­fest bomb­ing in Munich.

We have also seen how the Ger­man domes­tic intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment agen­cies main­tain a dis­turbing­ly cozy rela­tion­ship with neo-Nazi orga­ni­za­tions.

Inter­est­ing­ly, the Ger­man diplo­mat (Wal­ter Nowak) han­dling much of the dis­cus­sion with the Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists has a back­ground sug­ges­tive of involve­ment with the ver­triebene groups, one of the most salient aspects of the Under­ground Reich.

At a min­i­mum, it is appar­ent that the Ger­mans took no sig­nif­i­cant steps to inter­dict the ter­ror­ist attack and it is dif­fi­cult to avoid the view that the Under­ground Reich may very well have been com­plic­it in the attack.

“Germany’s Secret Con­tacts to Pales­tin­ian Ter­ror­ists” by Felix Bohr, Gun­ther Latsch and Klaus Wiegrefe; Der Spiegel; 8/28/2012.

Eleven Israelis and one Ger­man police offi­cer died in the Munich mas­sacre of 1972, when Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ists took Israeli ath­letes hostage at the Olympics. Now, gov­ern­ment doc­u­ments sug­gest that Ger­many main­tained secret con­tacts with the orga­niz­ers of the attack for years after­ward and appeased the Pales­tini­ans to pre­vent fur­ther blood­shed on Ger­man soil. . . .

. . . .Wal­ter Nowak, 48, the then Ger­man ambas­sador to Lebanon, con­demned the Israeli action [killing some of the per­pe­tra­tors of the 1972 Olympics attack], say­ing that the dead Pales­tini­ans were among the most “ratio­nal and respon­si­ble” mem­bers of the PLO. A day after the retal­ia­tory strike, the out­raged diplo­mat wrote a let­ter to gov­ern­ment author­i­ties in Bonn, the then-Ger­man cap­i­tal, say­ing that it was “not to be ruled out” that the Israelis had killed Abu Youssef and the oth­ers to hin­der the peace process in the Mid­dle East. “Those who don’t want to nego­ti­ate are both­ered by those they might be expect­ed to face in nego­ti­a­tions,” he wrote.

Nowak’s idio­syn­cratic assess­ment stemmed from the mis­sion the ambas­sador was pur­su­ing at the time. Nowak had met with Abu Youssef, one of the founders of Black Sep­tem­ber, about a week before his death. In the two-hour con­ver­sa­tion, he offered Abu Youssef and oth­er back­ers of the Munich attack the prospect of cre­at­ing “a new basis of trust” between them and the Ger­man gov­ern­ment. There was even talk of a secret meet­ing in Cairo between then For­eign Min­is­ter Wal­ter Scheel, a mem­ber of the lib­eral Free Demo­c­ra­tic Par­ty (FDP), and Abu Youssef.

The Munich attack had occurred only six months ear­lier. Despite the still-vivid images of masked ter­ror­ists on the bal­conies of the Olympic Vil­lage and a burned-out heli­copter on the tar­mac at the NATO air­base at Fürsten­feld­bruck, there was already active but secret diplo­matic com­mu­ni­ca­tion between Ger­mans and Pales­tini­ans. West Ger­man rep­re­sen­ta­tives were talk­ing to men like Abu Youssef, Ali Salameh and Amin al-Hin­di, all of them mas­ter­minds of the Munich mur­ders. Even the Ger­man Fed­eral Crim­i­nal Police Office (BKA), which is oblig­ated to pros­e­cute crim­i­nals, was involved in meet­ings, accord­ing to doc­u­ments in the Polit­i­cal Archives of the Ger­man For­eign Min­istry and the Fed­eral Archive in the west­ern city of Koblenz, which SPIEGEL has now ana­lyzed. . . .

. . . . In the com­ing weeks, dur­ing events to mark the 40th anniver­sary of the attack, the ques­tion will once again be raised as to why the Ger­man courts nev­er tried any of the per­pe­tra­tors or back­ers of the Munich mas­sacre. The doc­u­ments that are now avail­able sug­gest one answer in par­tic­u­lar: West Ger­many didn’t want to call them to account.

In the first few weeks after the attack, Ger­man gov­ern­ment offices in Bonn were imbued with a spir­it of appease­ment. From the Israeli per­spec­tive, it felt like a bit­ter irony of his­tory that it involved Munich — a city that became a sym­bol of the West­ern pow­ers’ appease­ment of Hitler after the Munich Agree­ment per­mit­ting Nazi Germany’s annex­a­tion of the Sude­ten­land was signed there in 1938.

Although the Munich attack involved mul­ti­ple mur­ders, the lan­guage in the files odd­ly down­plays what hap­pened there. Then-Chan­cel­lor Brandt is quot­ed as say­ing that the Olympic mas­sacre was a “crazy inci­dent,” while Paul Frank, a state sec­re­tary in the For­eign Min­istry, refers to it sim­ply as the “events in Munich.” Diplo­mats and senior Inte­rior Min­istry offi­cials upgrad­ed the sta­tus of Black Sep­tem­ber by call­ing it a “resis­tance group” — as if its acts of ter­ror had been direct­ed against Hitler and not Israeli civil­ians.

At the For­eign Min­istry, in par­tic­u­lar, some offi­cials were appar­ently very sym­pa­thetic to the Pales­tini­ans. Wal­ter Nowak, the Ger­man ambas­sador to Lebanon, once told Abu Youssef that the Ger­mans were a peo­ple “with a sub­stan­tial num­ber of refugees,” because of the fact that eth­nic Ger­mans had been expelled from parts of Cen­tral and East­ern Europe after World War II. (Nowak him­self was born in Sile­sia, which is now part of Poland, back when it belonged to Ger­many.) This, he added, made them more under­stand­ing of the Pales­tin­ian sit­u­a­tion than oth­er nations. . . .

. . . .  It is clear that the Fed­eral Crim­i­nal Police Office (BKA) coop­er­ated with the PLO, as evi­denced by a telex from the embassy in Beirut report­ing on a meet­ing between Hin­di and a BKA offi­cial on June 14, 1980. Accord­ing to the mes­sage, Hin­di com­plained that the press had got­ten wind of the con­nec­tions between the PLO and the BKA. He also claimed that the leak was on the Ger­man side. An indis­cre­tion like this could jeop­ar­dize coop­er­a­tion, Hin­di threat­ened, telling the BKA offi­cial that either the two orga­ni­za­tions “con­tinue work­ing togeth­er in secret, or not at all.”

Hin­di died of can­cer in 2010, and most of the oth­ers behind the Munich mas­sacre are now dead, as well. One of the three ter­ror­ists whose release the PLO secured by hijack­ing a Lufthansa flight occa­sion­ally appears in doc­u­men­tary films. There is still a Ger­man war­rant out for his arrest, but there is noth­ing to sug­gest that Ger­man author­i­ties have ever tried to find him.

Giv­en these cir­cum­stances, there is every indi­ca­tion that he will not be tried for the mur­der of the 11 Israelis and a Ger­man police offi­cer, at least not in a Ger­man court.

4. The Ger­many Watch blog has a wor­thy update on the 1972 Olympics inves­ti­ga­tion, accessed in the sec­ond excerpt below.

The post rais­es a num­ber of inter­est­ing ques­tions, includ­ing:

• Why were there 3 more ter­ror­ists at the air­port than had pre­vi­ous­ly been expect­ed?
• Why did­n’t the Ger­man secu­ri­ty per­son­nel bring rifles, which were essen­tial to the res­cue plan?
• Why did­n’t the Ger­mans take more secu­ri­ty pre­cau­tions in advance of the Olympics?
• Why did the Ger­mans refuse Israeli intel­li­gence assis­tance?

“Munich 1972: Fur­ther Dis­clo­sures”; Ger­many Watch; 8/30/2012.

. . . . Here are just some of the high­lights;

When the Black Sep­tem­ber ter­ror­ists left the Olympic site in heli­copters in order to fly to the air­port to meet their plane, there were 5 ter­ror­ists.

When the stand-off and shoot­ings hap­pened at the air­port, there were sud­den­ly 8 ter­ror­ists. (Ital­ics added.)

The 3 extra ter­ror­ists took the Israeli Mossad Chief, who was present at the air­port, by sur­prise. He ques­tioned the Ger­mans on this, and did not get a clear expla­na­tion. (Because they were the Ger­man con­tacts, already in the heli­copters wait­ing at the Olympic site. It was these three that sur­vived the shoot­ing and were lat­er released — the oth­ers were expend­able).

Despite requests for secu­ri­ty of the Israeli team before the inci­dent, Ger­man police laughed off the need for secu­ri­ty for the team say­ing it was “not in the Olympic spir­it”.

Despite know­ing their own plan for sup­pos­ed­ly retriev­ing the hostages includ­ed snip­ing the ter­ror­ists at the air­port, the Ger­mans did not bring any rifles. They were armed with pis­tols and machi­nen­pis­tol [sub-machine guns–D.E.]. This meant that when they opened fire, “Ger­man bul­lets were spray­ing about”, poten­tial­ly includ­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty that some of the ath­letes were actu­al­ly shot by Ger­mans. . . . (Ital­ics added.)

5. A recent Dai­ly Mail sto­ry under­scores the degree of net­work­ing that Hen­ry Kissinger under­took in con­junc­tion with Third Reich alum­ni (undoubt­ed­ly oper­at­ing with approval of the Under­ground Reich.)

Dis­pleased with for­mer chan­cel­lor Willy Brandt’s “Ost­poli­tik,” Kissinger and his boss Richard Nixon col­lud­ed with SS offi­cers, oth­er Third Reich vet­er­ans and Ger­man aris­to­crats to explore the pos­si­bil­i­ty of stag­ing a coup against Brandt’s gov­ern­ment. Worth not­ing in this regard is the fact that the milieu of the plot­ters in Ger­many itself was appar­ent­ly assem­bled by Rein­hard Gehlen, head of the BND dur­ing most of the post­war peri­od. (Gehlen offi­cial­ly retired in 1968. He is not men­tioned by name in the arti­cle below, but would almost cer­tain­ly have been the “go-to” guy tabbed to mar­tial will­ing Nazis for the under­tak­ing at hand.)

As revealed in a Tele­graph arti­cle about the plot, one of their co-con­spir­a­tors was Hans Globke, the gray emi­nence behind Kon­rad Ade­nauer (see excerpt below.) Globke was expe­ri­enced with coup plots against the Ger­man gov­ern­ment, hav­ing been part of the Nau­mann coup attempt staged in 1953 and dis­cussed in The New Ger­many and the Old Nazis. One won­ders how many oth­er Nau­mann coup vet­er­ans were involved with the “lit­tle ser­vice” that net­worked with Kissinger et al.

Note that Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists who pre­vi­ous­ly sup­port­ed Hitler financed the orga­ni­za­tion. This could not have been ini­ti­at­ed with­out the go-ahead of Mar­tin Bor­mann and his net­work.

For both Nixon and Kissinger, con­spir­ing with Third Reich alum­ni was noth­ing new. Nixon was piv­otal in assem­bling and nur­tur­ing the Nazi wing of the Repub­li­can Par­ty, as dis­cussed in (among oth­er pro­grams) FTR #465.

Fun­da­men­tal to the devel­op­ment of “The Lit­tle Ser­vice” is the CSU and its larg­er part­ner par­ty, the CDU. The CSU also fig­ures promi­nent­ly in the appar­ent Okto­ber­fest Bomb­ing cov­er-up high­light­ed above.

Kissinger’s back­ground is note­wor­thy in this con­text.

Kissinger helped to forge the Third Reich alum­ni into a guer­ril­la force to fight behind Sovi­et lines after World War II:

America’s Nazi Secret by John Lof­tus; Trine Day [SC]; 2010936158; p. 11

. . .Kissinger was recruit­ed as a pro­fes­sional spy for Dulles short­ly after the end of the war in Europe. Although there is no evi­dence that he per­son­ally recruit­ed Nazis, Kissinger ran the intel­li­gence file room where records of Nazi recruit­ment were kept. He then trans­ferred to Har­vard where he spe­cial­ized in recruit­ing for­eign stu­dents for espi­onage. Lat­er he worked for Dulles dur­ing the glo­ry days of Office of Pol­icy Coor­di­na­tion (OPC). He was hired as a con­sul­tant for a pri­vate group known as Oper­a­tions Research Office, which planned to use for­mer Nazis as agents behind Russ­ian lines in the event of World War III. Men­tion of Kissinger’s clas­si­fied work was cen­sored from the orig­i­nal man­u­script of this book. . .

6. The Dai­ly Mail sto­ry men­tioned above sets forth much of the par­tic­u­lars con­cern­ing “The Lit­tle Ser­vice.”

“Kissinger and the Secret Spy Net­work of Old Nazis and Ger­man Aris­to­crats ‘Who Plot­ted to Over­throw West Ger­man Gov­ern­ment’ ” by Alan Hall; Dai­ly Mail; 12/03/2012.

A Ger­man aca­d­e­m­ic has unearthed evi­dence show­ing for­mer U.S. Sec­re­tary of State Hen­ry Kissinger once dis­cussed a coup with dis­grun­tled Nazis to over­throw the West Ger­man gov­ern­ment in the 1970s.

Kissinger and Richard Nixon were aggriev­ed at the left-lean­ing gov­ern­ment of the day’s bur­geon­ing friend­ship with the hard­line East Ger­man gov­ern­ment. Kissinger became the con­tact man for a secret spy net­work made up of old Nazis and elite aris­to­crats aimed at tor­pe­do­ing the plans for­mu­lat­ed by Chan­cel­lor Willy Brandt.

By the end of 1970, Kissinger was offer­ing the spies advice on how to deal with Brandt’s Social Demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ment. The group he became embroiled with was called ‘The Lit­tle Ser­vice’ and was formed by the con­ser­v­a­tive Chris­t­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Union (CDU), which was allied with Bavari­a’s Chris­t­ian Social Union.

One agent who vis­it­ed Kissinger quot­ed him say­ing, ‘It might be pos­si­ble to over­throw the cur­rent gov­ern­ment, but it remains to be seen whether this would involve risks which could put a Chris­t­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Union (CDU)/ Chris­t­ian Social Union (CSU) gov­ern­ment in great dif­fi­cul­ty. . . .

. . . . Brandt pur­sued a pol­i­cy of engage­ment with the Ger­man Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic, con­vinced it was bet­ter to build bridges with the dic­ta­tor­ship to defuse Cold War ten­sions rather than always being at log­ger­heads. For the all-white, all male con­ser­v­a­tives of the CDU, this was too much.

They want­ed West Ger­many to face off against the Sovi­et-backed regime in the belief that iso­la­tion would make it crum­ble. It was out of this belief that its pri­vate spy organ­i­sa­tion, made up of many for­mer Gestapo and SS men as well as titled barons and counts, was formed.

Polit­i­cal sci­en­tist Ste­fanie Waske spent sev­en years research­ing let­ters from politi­cians from the Chris­t­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Union and its Bavar­i­an sis­ter par­ty the Chris­t­ian Social Union, and her results are to be pub­lished next year; poten­tial­ly embar­rass­ing tim­ing for Chan­cel­lor Angela Merkel, who in Novem­ber 2013 will seek re-elec­tion as CDU chan­cel­lor for the third time.

Waske approached Kissinger for com­ment but he refused, as did many of the noble­men who worked for the The Lit­tle Ser­vice which came into being in 1969 after the par­ty lost its first gen­er­al elec­tion since the post­war repub­lic was formed in 1949.

Details of her research are pub­lished in the cur­rent edi­tion of the Ger­man intel­lec­tu­al week­ly Die Zeit. The cat­a­lyst for the spy group was Brandt’s deci­sion to rec­og­nize post-WW2 bor­ders divid­ing Ger­many and a pledge Brandt gave that his state would not use vio­lence against the Com­mu­nist one in the east.

Con­ser­v­a­tive MP Karl Theodor Frei­herr zu Gut­ten­berg, who was the grand­fa­ther of the dis­graced for­mer defense min­is­ter who had to resign last year after it was dis­cov­ered he cheat­ed on his doc­tor­ate, held a meet­ing in the autumn of 1969 with for­mer chan­cel­lor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and lead­ing CDU and CSU politi­cians, the CSU being the Bavar­i­an wing of the par­ty.

‘They decid­ed to form an infor­ma­tion ser­vice for the oppo­si­tion,’ said Waske. ‘It was a secret spy ser­vice.’ The for­mer head of the BND, Ger­many’s [for­eign] intel­li­gence agency [Rein­hard Gehlen–D.E.], was tapped and he offered up a ready-made web of infor­mants across the globe in coun­tries as far apart as the US, France and Sau­di Ara­bia.

Hans Christoph von Stauf­fen­berg, the cousin of the man who tried and failed to kill Hitler in the July 1944 bomb plot, was cho­sen to head the net­work. Casimir Prince of Sayn-Wittgen­stein, who would lat­er only nar­row­ly miss impris­on­ment for the CDU’s par­ty dona­tion scan­dal of a decade ago, was recruit­ed to raise the hun­dreds of thou­sands of D‑marks nec­es­sary to fund the net­work.

He col­lect­ed from con­ser­v­a­tives in indus­try, many of whom had pre­vi­ous­ly sup­port­ed Hitler, and who now viewed with sus­pi­cion the appar­ent cozi­ness devel­op­ing between Brandt and the Com­mu­nists. The first act was to open a secret ‘back chan­nel’ to Kissinger who was keen to know what the Sovi­ets were up to at all times, includ­ing their pup­pets in East Berlin.

The trea­sur­er of the group was Alfred Sei­dl, a for­mer Nazi who act­ed as the chief defense lawyer for Hitler deputy Rudolf Hess.

‘In 1971 Brandt was talk­ing about the admin­is­tra­tion of Berlin with Leonid Brezh­nev in Yal­ta and Stauffenberg’s infor­mants were deliv­er­ing secret infor­ma­tion to the con­ser­v­a­tives who were dis­cussing it with Kissinger,’ said Waske. The intel­li­gence gleaned came from eaves­drop­ping, inter­cept­ed mail, inform­ers and tele­phone taps. . . .

7. About Hans Globke’s par­tic­i­patin in the Kissinger/Nixon/Underground Reich net­work:

“West Ger­many’s CDU Had Pri­vate Spy Ser­vice” by Matthew Day; The Tele­graph; 12/03/2012.

. . . Draw­ing on the ranks of for­mer mem­bers of the Ger­man secret ser­vice, the net­work brought togeth­er such fig­ures as Hans Globke, co-author of the Nurem­berg laws . . .

8. Next, we revis­it an excerpt of AFA #22. Ali Has­san Salameh, the leader of the ter­ror­ist con­tin­gent who per­formed the Olympics Mas­sacre, was work­ing for the CIA with­in a very short time after the attack. Recruit­ed while Hen­ry Kissinger was the top nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er to Richard Nixon–allegedly to pre­vent PLO attacks against U.S. diplomats–Salameh was the son of a key aide to the Grand Mufti. Salameh was killed by a Mossad car bomb in 1979.

Is there any rela­tion­ship between Kissinger’s efforts to desta­bi­lize the Brandt regime with “the Lit­tle Ser­vice” with Gehlen and oth­er Third Reich vet­er­ans and the 1972 Olympics attack? Is there any rela­tion­ship between those events and Kissinger’s recruit­ment of Salameh?

9. Willi Pohl, aka Willi Voss, was recruit­ed by CIA as an “informer.” Is there any rela­tion­ship between the Agen­cy’s recruit­ment of Pohl/Voss and its recruit­ment of Ali Has­san Salameh? What relationship–IF any–is there between the Agen­cy’s recruit­ment of Pohl/Voss and Kissinger’s efforts with “The Lit­tle Ser­vice” against Willi Brandt?

Voss/Pohl was appar­ent­ly “run” by Duane Clar­ridge, one of the CIA offi­cials involved with the Iran-Con­tra affair. Voss/Pohl also appears to have lived right next door to Abu Nidal.

“One Man, Three Lives: The Munich Olympics and the CIA’s New Infor­mant” by Karen Ass­man, Felix Bohr, Gun­ther Latsch and Klaus Wiegrefe; Der Spiegel; 1/02/2013.

In the sum­mer of 1975, Willi Voss was left with few alter­na­tives: prison, sui­cide or betray­al. He chose betray­al. After all, he had just been betrayed by the two men whom he had trust­ed, and whose strug­gle had forced him to lead a clan­des­tine exis­tence.

ANZEIGE

It was Pales­tin­ian leader Yass­er Arafat’s clos­est advis­ers who had used him and jeop­ar­dized his life: Abu Daoud, the mas­ter­mind behind the ter­ror attack on Israeli ath­letes at the 1972 Sum­mer Olympics in Munich, and Abu Iyad, head of the PLO intel­li­gence ser­vice Razd.

Voss, a pet­ty crim­i­nal from West Ger­many’s indus­tri­al Ruhr region, in cahoots with Pales­tin­ian lead­ers who were feared around the world? It took a num­ber of coin­ci­dences and twists of fate in Voss’ life before he found him­self in such a posi­tion, but here he was on a mis­sion for the Pales­tini­ans — in a Mer­cedes-Benz, trav­el­ing from Beirut to Bel­grade, togeth­er with his girl­friend Ellen, so it would all look like a vaca­tion trip.

His job was to deliv­er the car, Iyad and Daoud had said. But they had neglect­ed to men­tion that the Mer­cedes con­tained auto­mat­ic weapons, a sniper rifle and explo­sives, which were hid­den in a secret com­part­ment and con­sist­ed of a num­ber of pack­ages, each weigh­ing 20 kilos (44 pounds) — com­plete with ful­ly assem­bled det­o­na­tors made of mer­cury ful­mi­nate, a high­ly unsta­ble sub­stance. If Voss had got­ten into an acci­dent or hit a deep pot­hole, he, the car and his girl­friend would have been blown to pieces.

Voss only found out about his dan­ger­ous car­go when Roman­ian cus­toms offi­cials tore the vehi­cle apart. The only thing that saved the 31-year-old and his com­pan­ion from end­ing up behind bars was the fact that the PLO main­tained excel­lent ties with the Roman­ian regime. Roman­ian offi­cials placed the two Ger­mans in a car dri­ven by a cou­ple of pen­sion­ers from the Rhineland region, who were on their way back home to Ger­many after a vaca­tion. Voss and his girl­friend hopped out in Bel­grade. This was the end of the road for them — and, as Voss recalls today, the day when they had to make a fate­ful deci­sion: prison, sui­cide or betray­al?

Becom­ing a Defec­tor

Prison: In Ger­many there was a war­rant for Voss’ arrest. A few years ear­li­er, he had been tak­en into cus­tody dur­ing a raid at the Munich home of a for­mer SS offi­cer who was in league with neo-Nazis. Inves­ti­ga­tors had secured weapons and explo­sives from the PLO along with plans for ter­ror attacks and hostage-tak­ing mis­sions in Cologne and Vien­na.

Sui­cide: Voss and his com­pan­ion spent three days and nights in a tawdry hotel in Bel­grade, where they con­tin­u­ous­ly debat­ed whether they should put an end to their lives. But they decid­ed against this option as well.

That left only betray­al. Voss and his girl­friend went to the Amer­i­can embassy, demand­ed to speak to a diplo­mat and made the state­ments that would add yet anoth­er twist to his already event­ful life: “I am an offi­cer of Fatah. This is my wife. I’m in a posi­tion to make an inter­est­ing offer to your intel­li­gence agency.”

Voss became a defec­tor. He went from being an accom­plice of Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ists to a mem­ber of the US intel­li­gence agency — from a hand­maid­en of ter­ror to a CIA spy. As if his first life were not event­ful enough, Voss opt­ed for a sec­ond life: as a CIA spook with the code­name “Ganymede,” named after the kid­napped lover of Zeus, the father of the gods in Greek mythol­o­gy.

His career as an under­cov­er agent took him from Milan and Madrid back to Beirut and the head­quar­ters of the PLO intel­li­gence ser­vice. “Ganymede” pro­vid­ed infor­ma­tion and doc­u­ments that helped thwart attacks in the Mid­dle East and Europe. Duane Clar­ridge, the leg­endary and infa­mous founder of the CIA Coun­tert­er­ror­ist Cen­ter, even gave him the mis­sion of catch­ing top ter­ror­ist Car­los, “The Jack­al.”

Today, as he sits in a Berlin café and talks about his life, the gray-haired man clad in a black leather jack­et appears at times bit­ing­ly iron­ic, at times shy and prone to depres­sion — mak­ing it all the more dif­fi­cult to rec­on­cile him with the dare­dev­il who lived through this luna­cy. . . .

 

. . . . Hook­ing Up with the Pales­tini­ans

Voss’ con­nec­tion with the PLO began when he helped smug­gle his bud­dy [Udo] Albrecht out of prison in a con­tain­er. The neo-Nazi slipped away to Jor­dan, where he hooked up with the Pales­tini­ans. When Daoud, the archi­tect of the Munich mas­sacre, asked him if he knew a reli­able man in Ger­many, Albrecht rec­om­mend­ed his prison pal from the Ruhr region.

Voss made him­self use­ful. In Dort­mund he pur­chased a num­ber of Mer­cedes sedans for Daoud — and he estab­lished con­tact to a pass­port forg­er in his cir­cle of acquain­tances. Today, Voss believes that he was even involved in the prepa­ra­tions for the Munich attack. For a num­ber of weeks, he says, he drove the leader of Black Sep­tem­ber, a ter­ror­ist group with ties to the PLO, “all across Ger­many, where he met with Pales­tini­ans in var­i­ous cities.”

The Pales­tini­ans used him to han­dle oth­er jobs, as well: “I was to hold a press con­fer­ence in Vien­na, in which I would com­ment on a mis­sion that I would only find out about once it was suc­cess­ful­ly com­plet­ed,” as the PLO chief of intel­li­gence Iyad had told him. When Voss saw the images on TV, he real­ized that the “mis­sion” was the mas­sacre at the 1972 Sum­mer Olympics. Instead of secur­ing the release of hun­dreds of Pales­tin­ian pris­on­ers, as the hostage-tak­ers had demand­ed, it end­ed in a blood­bath: Nine Israeli hostages, five Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ists and one Ger­man police­man died.

Six weeks lat­er, Voss was arrest­ed in Ger­many. He had machine guns and hand grenades that stemmed from the same source as the weapons used by the Pales­tin­ian hostage-tak­ers in Munich. This marked the begin­ning of wild nego­ti­a­tions ini­ti­at­ed by Voss’ lawyer Wil­helm Schöt­tler, who sent a let­ter with a “clas­si­fied” offer to Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for Spe­cial Affairs Egon Bahr.

The offer was sim­ple: Release Voss to allow for nego­ti­a­tions with Black Sep­tem­ber. The objec­tive was to pre­vent fur­ther attacks on Ger­man soil. Today, it is known that high-rank­ing offi­cials at the For­eign Min­istry met with the lawyer, who was con­sid­ered a right-wing rad­i­cal, and dis­cussed an ongo­ing series of demands until March 1974, when then-Inte­ri­or Min­is­ter Hans-Diet­rich Gen­sch­er decid­ed to end the nego­ti­a­tions.

Six days lat­er, a court in Munich hand­ed Voss a rel­a­tive­ly mild prison sen­tence of 26 months for con­tra­ven­ing the War Weapons Con­trol Act.

In Decem­ber of 1974, his sen­tence was sus­pend­ed despite the fact that he was still under inves­ti­ga­tion on sus­pi­cion of being a mem­ber of Black Sep­tem­ber. In Feb. 1975, he slipped out of Ger­many and head­ed back to Beirut, where he was soon serv­ing the Pales­tin­ian cause again — right up until that big turn­ing point in his life when he drove a car packed with weapons and explo­sives to the Roman­ian bor­der in the sum­mer of 1975. . . .