Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #899 Fara Mansoor on “The Deep October Surprise,” Part 4

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This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: This broad­cast con­cludes our review of Fara Man­soor’s hero­ic, ground-break­ing research on what we call “The Deep Octo­ber Sur­prise,” and ref­er­ences the his­tor­i­cal lessons to be drawn from the inquiry to the con­tem­po­rary polit­i­cal scene.

In numer­ous pro­grams, we have dis­cussed what Peter Lev­en­da has termed “weaponized reli­gion.” In par­tic­u­lar, we have exam­ined what Peter termed weaponized Islam. With the recent Iran­ian nuclear deal and the lift­ing of eco­nom­ic sanc­tions against Iran, the his­to­ry of U.S./Iranian rela­tions has attained greater rel­e­vance.

In that con­text, we present the fourth and con­clud­ing broad­cast in a series of pro­grams revis­it­ing Fara Man­soor’s land­mark research on what we have termed the “Deep Octo­ber Sur­prise.” Usu­al­ly, the term “Octo­ber Sur­prise” refers to an alleged deal between the Reagan/Bush cam­paign and the Khome­i­ni regime in Iran to with­hold the U.S. hostages tak­en from the Amer­i­can Embassy until after Jim­my Carter’s humil­i­a­tion and con­se­quent elec­tion defeat were assured.

” . . . . By late August [of 1977], the Shah was total­ly con­fused. U.S. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van record­ed the Shah’s plead­ings over the out­break of vio­lence: ‘He said the pat­tern was wide­spread and that it was like an out­break of a sud­den rash in the country…it gave evi­dence of sophis­ti­cat­ed plan­ning and was not the work of spon­ta­neous oppo­si­tion­ists…the Shah pre­sent­ed that it was the work of for­eign intrigue…this intrigue went beyond the capa­bil­i­ties of the Sovi­et KGB and must, there­fore, also involve British and Amer­i­can CIA. The Shah went on to ask ‘Why was the CIA sud­den­ly turn­ing against him? What had he done to deserve this sort of action from the Unit­ed States?’ . . . . ”

Fara’s research goes far­ther and deep­er, sug­gest­ing that the CIA learned of the Shah’s can­cer in 1974 (from for­mer CIA direc­tor Richard Helms), with­held the infor­ma­tion from Jim­my Carter, installed Khome­ini’s Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ists as an anti-com­mu­nist bul­wark on the Sovi­et Union’s South­ern flank and then micro-man­aged the hostage cri­sis to insure the ascen­sion of the Reagan/Bush/Casey forces. What has become known as the Iran-Con­tra Scan­dal was an out­growth of this dynam­ic.

” . . . . With thou­sands of doc­u­ments to sup­port his posi­tion, Man­soor says that the “hostage cri­sis” was a polit­i­cal “man­age­ment tool” cre­at­ed by the pro-Bush fac­tion of the CIA, and imple­ment­ed through an a pri­ori Alliance with Khomeini’s Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists.” He says the pur­pose was twofold:

  • To keep Iran intact and com­mu­nist-free by putting Khome­i­ni in full con­trol.
  • To destablize the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion and put George Bush in the White House.

‘The pri­vate Alliance was the log­i­cal result of the intri­cate Iran­ian polit­i­cal real­i­ty of the mid-70s, and a com­plex net­work of pow­er­ful U.S.-Iranian ‘busi­ness’ rela­tion­ships,’ Man­soor states. ‘I first met Khome­i­ni in 1963 dur­ing the failed coup attempt against the Shah. Since that time I have been inti­mate­ly involved with Iran­ian pol­i­tics. I knew in 1979 that the whole, phoney ‘Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion’ was ‘mis­sion implau­si­ble’.’ Man­soor was frank. ‘There is sim­ply no way that those guys with the beards and tur­bans could have pulled off such a bril­liant­ly planned oper­a­tion with­out very sophis­ti­cat­ed help.’ . . .

. . . . ‘I have col­lect­ed enough data to yield a very clear pic­ture. Mr. Bush’s lieu­tenants removed the Shah, brought Khome­i­ni back to Iran, and guid­ed his rise to pow­er, stick­ing it to Pres­i­dent Carter, the Amer­i­can peo­ple (52 in par­tic­u­lar), and the Iran­ian peo­ple.’ . . .”

Extend­ing a doc­trine for­mu­lat­ed by then Sec­re­tary of State John Fos­ter Dulles in the ear­ly 1950’s, “the reli­gions of the East” were viewed by the nation­al secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment as a bul­wark against the U.S.S.R. (We note that the British orig­i­nal­ly installed the first Shah of Iran in the post World War I peri­od as an anti-Sovi­et bul­wark.) When Jim­my Carter nei­ther extend­ed George H.W. Bush’s CIA tenure nor appoint­ed Theodore Shack­ley as head of the agency, but fired Shack­ley and much of the insti­tu­tion­al­ized covert action team, his polit­i­cal fate was sealed.

” . . . Mansoor’s metic­u­lous research clear­ly demon­strates how Khomeini’s pub­lished vision of an Islam­ic Gov­ern­ment (Vilay­at-Faqih) dove­tailed with the region­al and glob­al strate­gic objec­tives of a hard-core sub­set of the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment loy­al to George Bush. It shows that the Iran­ian hostage cri­sis was nei­ther a cri­sis nor chaos. In 1953, the CIA orches­trat­ed a coup in Iran, which threw out the demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ment and installed the Shah.

In order to under­stand the imper­a­tive of this Alliance, we must real­is­ti­cal­ly exam­ine the sociopo­lit­i­cal align­ment both in Iran and the U.S., and accu­rate­ly assess their respec­tive inter­ests to find the com­mon ground for this coa­les­cence. The anti-monar­chic forces in mid-70s Iran con­sist­ed of var­i­ous nation­al­ist groups includ­ing reli­gious reformists, the Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists, and the left­ists and com­mu­nists. . . . .

. . . . The Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists had no gov­ern­ment expe­ri­ence, but they had major grass­roots sup­port. Islam, in its Shi’ite for­mat, was deeply embed­ded in the lives of the vast major­i­ty of the Iran­ian peo­ple. The Fun­da­men­tal­ists were absolute­ly anti-com­mu­nist.

The philo­soph­i­cal divide with­in the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment, espe­cial­ly the CIA, became quite seri­ous in the after­math of Water­gate. To make mat­ters worse, the elec­tion of Jim­my Carter in 1976, his cam­paign promise to clean the “cow­boy” ele­ments out of the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency and his “human rights” poli­cies alarmed the fac­tion of the CIA loy­al to George Bush. Bush was CIA direc­tor under Ger­ald Ford. Final­ly, the fir­ing of CIA Direc­tor George Bush by Carter, and the sub­se­quent “Hal­loween Mas­sacre” in which Carter fired over 800 CIA covert oper­a­tives in 1977, angered the “cow­boys” beyond all mea­sure. That was Carter’s Octo­ber sur­prise, 800 fir­ings on Hal­loween 1977.

Bush and his CIA coverts were well aware of the Shah’s ter­mi­nal can­cer, unknown to Pres­i­dent Carter. The team had an elab­o­rate vest­ed inter­est to pro­tect. They were deter­mined to keep Iran intact and com­mu­nist-free and put George Bush in the White House. . . .

Trac­ing the intri­cate net­work­ing of CIA and Iran­ian per­son­nel in the machi­na­tions of this gam­bit, this broad­cast high­lights a sig­na­ture event in April of 1978, months before Khome­i­ni took over and and more than a year before the hostages were tak­en from the U.S. Embassy.

” . . . . Man­soor pro­duced a con­fi­den­tial doc­u­ment called the “Coun­try Team Min­utes” of April 26, 1978, more than a year before the hostage cri­sis. The meet­ing was held in Iran. The sec­ond para­graph of the rou­tine min­utes, states, ‘The Ambas­sador com­ment­ed on our dis­tin­guished vis­i­tors, Ronald Rea­gan, George Bush and Mar­garet Thatch­er, and com­ment­ed that Teheran seems to be the site for an oppo­si­tion par­ties con­gress.’ Man­soor indi­cates the entire rela­tion­ship was prob­a­bly the most sophis­ti­cat­ed crim­i­nal act in recent his­to­ry. ‘That the peo­ple who, until recent­ly, were hold­ing pow­er in Wash­ing­ton and those who cur­rent­ly are still in con­trol in Teheran, got there by total­ly sub­vert­ing the demo­c­ra­t­ic process of both coun­tries is news. That their meth­ods of sub­ver­sion relied on kid­nap­ping, extor­tion and mur­der is crim­i­nal,’ Man­soor states. . . .”

Drama­tis Per­son­ae of the “Deep Octo­ber Sur­prise”:

A. Gen­er­al Hos­sein Far­doust:

  1. Far­doust was a key play­er in this dra­ma. Like Richard Cot­tam and Gen­er­al Qarani, he had been net­work­ing with the CIA/Shah/Helms milieu for decades. He was the head of an elite intel­li­gence orga­ni­za­tion with­in the Shah’s regime that super­seded the SAVAK (the Shah’s secret police) in impor­tance and influ­ence. It was from his long-time asso­ciate Far­doust that Helms learned that the Shah had can­cer. ” . . . In 1975, for­mer CIA direc­tor, and the U.S. Ambas­sador to Iran, Richard Helms learned of the Shah’s can­cer through the Shah’s clos­est con­fi­dant, Gen­er­al Hos­sein Far­doust. The Shah, Helms and Far­doust had been close per­son­al friends since their school days togeth­er in Switzer­land dur­ing the 1930s. . . .”
  2. Gen­er­al Far­doust set up an inci­dent that was cen­tral to the stag­ing of the upris­ing that installed Khome­i­ni in pow­er. ” . . . On Jan­u­ary 7, 1978, an insid­i­ous arti­cle enti­tled Iran and the Red and Black Colo­nial­ism, appeared in the Iran­ian dai­ly news­pa­per Ettela’at. It cas­ti­gat­ed the exiled Khome­i­ni, and pro­duced a mas­sive protest riot in the Holy City of Qum the next day. The cler­gy had lit­tle choice but to ral­ly to Khomeini’s defense. The Qum inci­dent shift­ed many of the cler­gy from a posi­tion of sup­port for the Shah’s monar­chy to an active oppo­si­tion. That ‘dirty trick’ per­pet­u­at­ed by Gen­er­al Far­doust was the trig­ger that sparked Islam­ic move­ment par­tic­i­pat­ing in the anti-Shah demo­c­ra­t­ic Rev­o­lu­tion. John D. Stem­pel, char­ac­ter­ized Fardoust’s impor­tance to the Alliance: ‘it is hard to over­es­ti­mate the val­ue of hav­ing a mole in the inner cir­cle of the Shah.’ . . .”
  3. After Khome­ini’s ascen­sion to pow­er, Gen­er­al Qarani (see below) con­sults with Gen­er­al Far­doust about the per­son­nel to fill Khome­ini’s gen­er­al staff of the armed forces. All the rec­om­men­da­tions are fol­lowed, except for the fill­ing of the head of SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police. Far­doust is then appoint­ed head of SAVAMA, Khome­ini’s ver­sion of SAVAK! ” . . . . On Feb­ru­ary 11, 1979, in seem­ing­ly a bizarre twist, Gen­er­al Qarani asked the Shah’s “eyes and ears” Gen­er­al Hossien Far­doust for rec­om­men­da­tions to fill the new top posts in Iran’s armed forces. Except for the rec­om­men­da­tion for the Chief of SAVAK, all the oth­ers were accept­ed. Short­ly after, Gen­er­al Far­doust became head of SAVAMA, Khomeini’s suc­ces­sor to SAVAK. . . .”

B. Dr. Ibrahim Yaz­di:

  1. Yaz­di is in close con­tact with 1953 coup par­tic­i­pant, Bush oper­a­tive and prob­a­ble CIA offi­cer Richard Cot­tam. ” . . . . In August [1978], the Bush team sent its own point man to meet the exiled Aya­tol­lah in Najaf. Pro­fes­sor Richard Cot­tam car­ried excel­lent cre­den­tials. Dur­ing the 1953 coup, he had been in charge of the CIA’s Iran Desk. He had also been in close con­tact with Dr. Ibrahim Yaz­di in the U.S. since 1975. . . .”
  2. In Sep­tem­ber of 1978, Yaz­di is vis­it­ed in the U.S. by Khome­i­ni ally Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hus­sein Beheshti. ” . . . . In Mid-Sep­tem­ber, at the height of the rev­o­lu­tion, ‘one of the hand­ful of Khomeini’s trust­ed asso­ciates,’ Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hus­sein Beheshti, secret­ly vis­it­ed the Unit­ed States. He also met with Yaz­di in Texas, among oth­ers. Beheshti was an advo­cate of the eye-for-an-eye school of jus­tice. . . .”
  3. Fol­low­ing an abortive takeover of the U.S. Embassy by Khome­i­ni fol­low­ers pos­ing as left­ists, Yaz­di con­nects U.S. Ambas­sador William Sul­li­van with Mashal­lah Khashani, who becomes chief of secu­ri­ty for the com­pound.  ” . . . . On Feb­ru­ary 14, soon after order was restored at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Khomeini’s aide Yaz­di sup­plied the Embassy with a group of Ira­ni­ans for com­pound secu­ri­ty. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van installed, armed, and trained this Swat squad lead by SAVAK/CIA agent Mashal­lah Kah­sani, with whom Sul­li­van devel­oped a close work­ing rela­tion­ship. . . . ”

C. Gen­er­al Val­li­ol­lah Qarani:

  1. Like Gen­er­al Hos­sein Far­doust, Qarani was net­work­ing with the CIA milieu since the 1953 coup that installed the Shah. In April of 1978, he advised Khome­i­ni that the CIA was ready to remove the Shah. ” . . . . The same month, Khomeini’s old ally from the failed 1963 coup (that result­ed in Khomeini’s arrest and major upris­ing in June 1963 and his sub­se­quent exile to Iraq) Gen­er­al Val­li­ol­lah Qarani sent his emis­sary to meet Khome­i­ni in Najaf. Qarani had been a major CIA asset in Iran since the 1953 coup. See­ing anoth­er chance to gain pow­er for him­self, he advised Khome­i­ni, accord­ing to for­mer Iran­ian Pres­i­dent Abol Has­san Bani-sad­er: ‘If you set­tle for the Shah’s depar­ture and don’t use anti-Amer­i­can rhetoric, the Amer­i­cans are ready to take him out. . . .’ ”
  2. Qarani was then appoint­ed chief of staff of the army under Khome­i­ni.  ” . . . . Khome­i­ni moved quick­ly to estab­lish his author­i­ty. On Feb­ru­ary 5 he named Meh­di Bazargan, a devot­ed Mus­lim and anti-com­mu­nist, inter­im Prime Min­is­ter. Yaz­di and Abbas Amir Entezam became Bazargan’s deputies, Dr. San­jabi For­eign Min­is­ter, and Gen­er­al Qarani was named mil­i­tary Chief of Staff. . . . ”

D. Mashal­lah Khashani:

  1. Mashal­lah Khashani was a SAVAK and CIA agent who was installed by Khome­i­ni aide Dr. Ibrahim Yaz­di as chief of secu­ri­ty for the com­pound after an abortive takeover of the Embassy in Feb­ru­ary of 1979. ” . . . . On Feb­ru­ary 14, soon after order was restored at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Khomeini’s aide Yaz­di sup­plied the Embassy with a group of Ira­ni­ans for com­pound secu­ri­ty. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van installed, armed, and trained this Swat squad lead by SAVAK/CIA agent Mashal­lah Kah­sani, with whom Sul­li­van devel­oped a close work­ing rela­tion­ship. . . . ”
  2. On Novem­ber 4th of 1979, “chief of secu­ri­ty” Khashani leads the takeover of the U.S. Embassy. This was the begin­ning of the hostage cri­sis. ” . . . . On Novem­ber 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy was tak­en again. Lead­ing the charge was none oth­er than Ambas­sador Sullivan’s trust­ed Mashal­lah Kashani, the Embassy’s once and for­mer secu­ri­ty chief. . . .”

E. Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hos­sein Beheshti:

  1. By July of 1977, a CIA analy­sis iden­ti­fies Beheshti as one of the major play­ers in any sce­nario fol­low­ing the removal of the Shah. ” . . . . By July 1977, antic­i­pat­ing trou­ble ahead, the Bush covert team issued a pre­lim­i­nary script for the tran­si­tion of pow­er in Iran. Accord­ing to John D. Stem­pel, a CIA ana­lyst and Deputy Chief Polit­i­cal offi­cer of the U.S. Embassy in Iran: “A ten page analy­sis of the oppo­si­tion writ­ten by the embassy’s polit­i­cal sec­tion in July 1977 cor­rect­ly iden­ti­fied Bakhtiar, Bazargan, Khome­i­ni and Beheshti as major actors in the dra­ma that began unfold­ing a year lat­er. . . . ”
  2. In mid-Sep­tem­ber of 1978, Beheshti vis­its Yaz­di in the Unit­ed States. ” . . . . In Mid-Sep­tem­ber, at the height of the rev­o­lu­tion, “one of the hand­ful of Khomeini’s trust­ed asso­ciates,” Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hus­sein Beheshti, secret­ly vis­it­ed the Unit­ed States. He also met with Yaz­di in Texas, among oth­ers. Beheshti was an advo­cate of the eye-for-an-eye school of jus­tice. . . .”

F. Richard Cot­tam: 

  1.  A pro­fes­sor, Cot­tam was in all like­li­hood the CIA oper­a­tive he was dur­ing the 1953 coup that oust­ed Mossadegh and re-installed the Shah. ” . . . In August, the Bush team sent its own point man to meet the exiled Aya­tol­lah in Najaf. Pro­fes­sor Richard Cot­tam car­ried excel­lent cre­den­tials. Dur­ing the 1953 coup, he had been in charge of the CIA’s Iran Desk. He had also been in close con­tact with Dr. Ibrahim Yaz­di in the U.S. since 1975. Curi­ous­ly, he admit­ted to Bani-sadr in 1987, that he had not been work­ing for the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion. Cottam’s vis­it must have had an impact, because Iran sud­den­ly began to expe­ri­ence a series of mys­te­ri­ous cat­a­stro­phes. . . .”
  2. Cot­tam tried to arrange a meet­ing between Carter secu­ri­ty aide Gary Sick and Khome­ini’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive in the U.S., Ibrahim Yaz­di. ” . . . A few days lat­er, Carter’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty aide, Gary Sick, received a call from Richard Cot­tam, request­ing a dis­crete meet­ing between him and Khomeini’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive in the U.S., Dr. Yaz­di. Sick refused. . . .”
  3. Cot­tam requests of Gary Sick that the Carter admin­is­tra­tion facil­i­tate the tran­sit of Khome­i­ni from Iraq. “. . . . Octo­ber 3, 1978, Yaz­di picked up Khome­i­ni in Iraq and head­ed for Kuwait. Accord­ing to Gary Sick, he received an urgent call from Richard Cot­tam, learn­ing for the first time that Khome­i­ni had been forced out of Iraq. Sick was told that Khome­i­ni and his entourage were stuck in no man’s land while attempt­ing to cross the bor­der. Cot­tam was request­ing White House inter­ven­tion to resolve the issue. Sick respond, ‘there is noth­ing we could do.’ ”
  4. In Decem­ber of 1978, Cot­tam vis­its Khome­i­ni in Paris, not­ing that Ibrahim Yaz­di func­tioned as the Aya­tol­lah’s appar­ent chief of staff. ” . . . . Decem­ber 28, Cot­tam vis­it­ed Khome­i­ni in Paris where he not­ed that U.S. cit­i­zen Dr. Yaz­di was the ‘lead­ing tac­ti­cian in Khomeini’s camp’ and appar­ent ‘chief of staff’. . . .”
  5. In Jan­u­ary of 1979, Cot­tam goes to Teheran to pre­pare for Khome­ini’s return and instal­la­tion. ” . . . . Leav­ing Paris, Cot­tam slipped into Teheran, arriv­ing the first week in Jan­u­ary 1979, to pre­pare Khomeini’s tri­umphal return to Iran. . . .”

Some key events and rela­tion­ships fig­ur­ing promi­nent­ly in the mate­r­i­al pre­sent­ed in this pro­gram (mate­r­i­al in these broad­casts is delib­er­ate­ly over­lapped with infor­ma­tion from the pre­vi­ous pro­gram):

20. A few days lat­er, Carter’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty aide, Gary Sick, received a call from Richard Cot­tam, request­ing a dis­crete meet­ing between him and Khomeini’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive in the U.S., Dr. Yaz­di. Sick refused.

21. Khome­i­ni for the first time, pub­licly called for the Shah’s over­throw.

22. In Mid-Sep­tem­ber, at the height of the rev­o­lu­tion, “one of the hand­ful of Khomeini’s trust­ed asso­ciates,” Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hus­sein Beheshti, secret­ly vis­it­ed the Unit­ed States. He also met with Yaz­di in Texas, among oth­ers. Beheshti was an advo­cate of the eye-for-an-eye school of jus­tice.

23. In ear­ly Octo­ber 1978, the agent for the Bush covert team arranged to force Khome­i­ni out of Iraq.

24. Octo­ber 3, 1978, Yaz­di picked up Khome­i­ni in Iraq and head­ed for Kuwait. Accord­ing to Gary Sick, he received an urgent call from Richard Cot­tam, learn­ing for the first time that Khome­i­ni had been forced out of Iraq. Sick was told that Khome­i­ni and his entourage were stuck in no man’s land while attempt­ing to cross the bor­der. Cot­tam was request­ing White House inter­ven­tion to resolve the issue. Sick respond, “there is noth­ing we could do”.

25. Octo­ber 6, Khomeini’s entourage, hav­ing got­ten back through Bagh­dad, popped up in Paris. Accord­ing to Bani-sadr, “it was Khome­i­ni who insist­ed on going to Paris instead of Syr­ia or Alge­ria”. Who­ev­er helped Khome­i­ni out of the Kuwaiti bor­der impasse had to have been on good terms with both the French and Sad­dam Hus­sein.

26. Decem­ber 12, Yaz­di made a trip to the U.S. to pro­mote Khome­i­ni and his Islam­ic Repub­lic. Yaz­di met secret­ly with Hen­ry Precht in an unof­fi­cial capac­i­ty. Precht was the Direc­tor of the Iran Desk at the State Depart­ment and one of the Bush team’s main choke points in the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion. Lat­er Precht and Yaz­di appeared togeth­er for tele­vised dis­cus­sion of Iran. Yaz­di assured the Amer­i­can pub­lic that Khome­i­ni had not real­ly called for a “tor­rent of blood,” and that the “elec­tion would be absolute­ly free.” The Islam­ic Repub­lic “would enjoy full free­dom of speech and the press, includ­ing the right to attack Islam. [Khome­ini’s fat­wa against Salman Rushdie stands in sharp rebut­tal to that claim–D.E.]

27. Decem­ber 28, Cot­tam vis­it­ed Khome­i­ni in Paris where he not­ed that U.S. cit­i­zen Dr. Yaz­di was the “lead­ing tac­ti­cian in Khomeini’s camp” and appar­ent “chief of staff”. Khome­i­ni was not inter­est­ed in the Mul­lahs tak­ing over the gov­ern­ment. It is also not­ed that “Khomeini’s move­ment def­i­nite­ly plans to orga­nize a polit­i­cal par­ty to draw on Khomeini’s charis­ma. Cot­tam thinks such a par­ty would win all Majlis seats.”

28. Leav­ing Paris, Cot­tam slipped into Teheran, arriv­ing the first week in Jan­u­ary 1979, to pre­pare Khomeini’s tri­umphal return to Iran.

29. Jan­u­ary 4, 1979, Carter’s secret envoy, Gen­er­al Robert Huyser arrived in Iran. His mis­sion was to pre­vent the “fall of the Shah.” Accord­ing to Huyser, Alexan­der Haig, osten­si­bly a strong Shah sup­port­er-inex­plic­a­bly, “took vio­lent excep­tion to the whole idea.” Huyser recalled that “Gen­er­al Haig nev­er gave me a full expla­na­tion of his strong objec­tions.” Huyser also revealed that Ambas­sador Sul­li­van “had also expressed objec­tions.” Two pro-Shah advo­cates opposed to the pre­ven­tion of the Shah’s fall.

30. On Jan­u­ary 14, Pres­i­dent Carter final­ly “autho­rized a meet­ing between War­ren Zim­mer­man and Ibrahim Yaz­di. On the same day, Khome­i­ni, in an inter­view on CBS claimed, “a great part of the army was loy­al to him” and that “he will be in effect the strong man of Iran.”

31. On Jan­u­ary 16, in an exact repeat of the 1953 CIA coup, Bush’s covert team ush­ered the “eccen­tric and weak” Shah out of Iran.

32. On Feb­ru­ary 1, 1979, Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni staged his own ver­sion of a “tri­umphal return” in the streets of Teheran.

33. Khome­i­ni moved quick­ly to estab­lish his author­i­ty. On Feb­ru­ary 5 he named Meh­di Bazargan, a devot­ed Mus­lim and anti-com­mu­nist, inter­im Prime Min­is­ter. Yaz­di and Abbas Amir Entezam became Bazargan’s deputies, Dr. San­jabi For­eign Min­is­ter, and Gen­er­al Qarani was named mil­i­tary Chief of Staff.

34. On Feb­ru­ary 11, 1979, in seem­ing­ly a bizarre twist, Gen­er­al Qarani asked the Shah’s “eyes and ears” Gen­er­al Hossien Far­doust for rec­om­men­da­tions to fill the new top posts in Iran’s armed forces. Except for the rec­om­men­da­tion for the Chief of SAVAK, all the oth­ers were accept­ed. Short­ly after, Gen­er­al Far­doust became head of SAVAMA, Khomeini’s suc­ces­sor to SAVAK.

35. On Feb­ru­ary 14, 1979, two weeks after Khomeini’s return to Iran, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was seized by Khome­i­ni sup­port­ers dis­guised as left­ist guer­ril­las in an attempt to neu­tral­ize the left. U.S. hostages were seized, but to the cha­grin of Khomeini’s Fun­da­men­tal­ists, the Iran­ian coali­tion gov­ern­ment restored order imme­di­ate­ly. On the same day in Kab­ul, Afghanistan, the U.S. Ambas­sador was also kid­napped by fanat­ic Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists dis­guised as left­ist guer­ril­las and killed in the gun­fight.

36. On Feb­ru­ary 14, soon after order was restored at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Khomeini’s aide Yaz­di sup­plied the Embassy with a group of Ira­ni­ans for com­pound secu­ri­ty. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van installed, armed, and trained this Swat squad lead by SAVAK/CIA agent Mashal­lah Kah­sani, with whom Sul­li­van devel­oped a close work­ing rela­tion­ship.

37. By August, pro-Bush CIA offi­cial George Cave was vis­it­ing Iran to pro­vide intel­li­gence brief­in­gs to Khomeini’s aides, espe­cial­ly Yaz­di and Entezam. These intel­li­gence exchanges con­tin­ued until Octo­ber 31, the anniver­sary of the day on which Carter fired Bush and the 800 agents. Then with all the Iran­ian offi­cials who had restored order in the first Embassy seizure elim­i­nat­ed, the stage was set for what hap­pened four days lat­er.

38. On Novem­ber 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy was tak­en again. Lead­ing the charge was none oth­er than Ambas­sador Sullivan’s trust­ed Mashal­lah Kashani, the Embassy’s once and for­mer secu­ri­ty chief.

Pro­gram High­lights Include:

  • The assas­si­na­tion of anoth­er mod­er­ate rival of Khome­ini’s.
  • Appar­ent links between Hos­sein Far­doust’s selec­tion to head the Iran­ian navy and Albert Hakim and Richard Sec­ord of Iran-Con­tra fame.
  • The par­tial dis­arm­ing of the Marine guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Iran, there­by facil­i­tat­ing the takeover in Novem­ber of 1979.
  • A warn­ing by Mr. Emory (on 1/23/1993) that the same counter-ter­ror­ism net­works that were used by George H.W. Bush were still in place and that they might be used to de-sta­bi­lize the Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion.
  • The counter-ter­ror­ism back­ground of Bush White House holdover Lin­da Tripp, who was the infor­mant for the Mon­i­ca Lewin­sky affair. That affair, of course, de-sta­bi­lized Clin­ton’s Pres­i­den­cy. Tripp was also the last per­son to see White House Coun­sel Vince Fos­ter alive, before he alleged­ly com­mit­ted sui­cide. Lin­da Tripp served Fos­ter lunch, which turned out to be his “last sup­per.”
  • Mitt Rom­ney sup­port­er James Comey’s ini­ti­a­tion of the inves­ti­ga­tion into Hillary Clin­ton’s e‑mail serv­er. Comey is head of the FBI and the for­mal gen­er­al coun­sel for Bridge­wa­ter Asso­ciates, which helped to cap­i­tal­ize Palan­tir, the appar­ent mak­er of the PRISM soft­ware at the focal point of “L’Af­faire Snow­den.”

1. A 1995 arti­cle by Har­ry Mar­tin, for­mer­ly of the Napa Sen­tinel, gives an overview of Fara’s analy­sis:

“The Real Iran­ian Hostage Sto­ry from the Files of Fara Man­soor” by Har­ry V. Mar­tin; Free Amer­i­ca; 7/1/1995.

Fara Man­soor is a fugi­tive. No, he hasn’t bro­ken any laws in the Unit­ed States. His crime is the truth. What he has to say and the doc­u­ments he car­ries are equiv­a­lent to a death war­rant for him. Man­soor is an Iran­ian who was part of the “estab­lish­ment” in Iran long before the 1979 hostage tak­ing. Mansoor’s records actu­al­ly dis­count the alleged “Octo­ber Sur­prise” the­o­ry that the Ronald Rea­gan-George Bush team paid the Ira­ni­ans not to release 52 Amer­i­can hostages until after the Novem­ber 1980 Pres­i­den­tial elec­tions.

Mansoor’s metic­u­lous doc­u­ments, shared exclu­sive­ly with this mag­a­zine, shows a much more sin­is­ter plot, the plot to take the hostages in the first place. “For 15 years the truth about the nature and ori­gins of the Iran­ian hostage cri­sis has been buried in a moun­tain of mis­in­for­ma­tion,” Man­soor states. “End­less expert analy­sis has served only to deep­en the fog that still sur­rounds this issue. We have been led to believe that the ‘cri­sis’ was a spon­ta­neous act that just sprang out of the ‘chaos’ of the ‘Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion’. Noth­ing could be fur­ther from the truth!”

“To real­ly under­stand the hostage cri­sis and ‘who done it’, one has to look not only with a micro­scope, but also a wide angle lens to have a panoram­ic view of this well script­ed ‘dra­ma’,” Man­soor states. “That ‘dra­ma’ was the result of large his­tor­i­cal pat­terns, mod­els, and motives. Once its true nature is under­stood, it will be clear how Iran/Contra hap­pened, why Raf­san­jani has been try­ing to ‘move toward the West,’ and why Rea­gan called him a ‘mod­er­ate’. And why, dur­ing the Gulf War, James Bak­er said, ‘we think Iran has con­duct­ed itself in a very, very cred­i­ble way through this cri­sis’” Man­soor empha­sizes that the “Octo­ber Sur­prise” myth has served as dan­ger­ous mis­in­for­ma­tion.

THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT

With thou­sands of doc­u­ments to sup­port his posi­tion, Man­soor says that the “hostage cri­sis” was a polit­i­cal “man­age­ment tool” cre­at­ed by the pro-Bush fac­tion of the CIA, and imple­ment­ed through an a pri­ori Alliance with Khomeini’s Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists.” He says the pur­pose was twofold:

  • To keep Iran intact and com­mu­nist-free by putting Khome­i­ni in full con­trol.
  • To destablize the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion and put George Bush in the White House.

“The pri­vate Alliance was the log­i­cal result of the intri­cate Iran­ian polit­i­cal real­i­ty of the mid-70s, and a com­plex net­work of pow­er­ful U.S.-Iranian ‘busi­ness’ rela­tion­ships,” Man­soor states. “I first met Khome­i­ni in 1963 dur­ing the failed coup attempt against the Shah. Since that time I have been inti­mate­ly involved with Iran­ian pol­i­tics. I knew in 1979 that the whole, phoney ‘Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion’ was ‘mis­sion implau­si­ble’.” Man­soor was frank. “There is sim­ply no way that those guys with the beards and tur­bans could have pulled off such a bril­liant­ly planned oper­a­tion with­out very sophis­ti­cat­ed help.”

Man­soor has spent 10 years research­ing the issue.

“I have col­lect­ed enough data to yield a very clear pic­ture. Mr. Bush’s lieu­tenants removed the Shah, brought Khome­i­ni back to Iran, and guid­ed his rise to pow­er, stick­ing it to Pres­i­dent Carter, the Amer­i­can peo­ple (52 in par­tic­u­lar), and the Iran­ian peo­ple.”

He stat­ed with box­es and box­es of evi­dence to sup­port his con­tentions.

“My exten­sive research has revealed the hereto­fore untold truth about this episode. This is not anoth­er ‘Octo­ber Sur­prise’ the­o­ry pur­port­ing how the hostage cri­sis result­ed in some Khome­i­ni-Repub­lic bet­ter deal. That the­o­ry puts the cart before the horse. Its absurd premise is that a major inter­na­tion­al deal was ini­ti­at­ed and con­sum­mat­ed in three weeks. Give me a break! Bill Casey didn’t have to go to Paris to play lets-make-deal. The ‘deal’ had been in oper­a­tion for at least two years. This game of blind-man’s‑bluff around Casey’s grave­stone was more dis­in­for­ma­tion, dam­age con­trol.”

REAGAN, BUSH AND THATCHER IN IRAN IN 1978

Man­soor pro­duced a con­fi­den­tial doc­u­ment called the “Coun­try Team Min­utes” of April 26, 1978, more than a year before the hostage cri­sis. The meet­ing was held in Iran. The sec­ond para­graph of the rou­tine min­utes, states, “The Ambas­sador com­ment­ed on our dis­tin­guished vis­i­tors, Ronald Rea­gan, George Bush and Mar­garet Thatch­er, and com­ment­ed that Teheran seems to be the site for an oppo­si­tion par­ties con­gress.” Man­soor indi­cates the entire rela­tion­ship was prob­a­bly the most sophis­ti­cat­ed crim­i­nal act in recent his­to­ry. “That the peo­ple who, until recent­ly, were hold­ing pow­er in Wash­ing­ton and those who cur­rent­ly are still in con­trol in Teheran, got there by total­ly sub­vert­ing the demo­c­ra­t­ic process of both coun­tries is news. That their meth­ods of sub­ver­sion relied on kid­nap­ping, extor­tion and mur­der is crim­i­nal,” Man­soor states.

Man­soor became a tar­get after he did a radio show in Port­land on Novem­ber 13, 1992. It was the first time he attempt­ed to go pub­lic with his doc­u­ments and infor­ma­tion. The Iran­ian regime has placed a boun­ty on Mansoor’s head and he has received many death threats.

Is Man­soor just anoth­er con­spir­a­cy nut? Ervand Abra­hami­an of Baruch Col­lege of New York stat­ed in a let­ter to Man­soor,

“As you know I am very weary of con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries. But, despite my pre­con­ceived bias, I must admit I found your man­u­script to be thor­ough­ly researched, well doc­u­ment­ed, and, of course extreme­ly rel­e­vant to the present. You have done a first-class job of inter­view­ing par­tic­i­pants, col­lect­ing data from scat­tered sources, and putting them togeth­er like a high­ly com­pli­cat­ed puz­zle.”

Mansoor’s metic­u­lous research clear­ly demon­strates how Khomeini’s pub­lished vision of an Islam­ic Gov­ern­ment (Vilay­at-Faqih) dove­tailed with the region­al and glob­al strate­gic objec­tives of a hard-core sub­set of the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment loy­al to George Bush. It shows that the Iran­ian hostage cri­sis was nei­ther a cri­sis nor chaos. In 1953, the CIA orches­trat­ed a coup in Iran, which threw out the demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ment and installed the Shah.

In order to under­stand the imper­a­tive of this Alliance, we must real­is­ti­cal­ly exam­ine the sociopo­lit­i­cal align­ment both in Iran and the U.S., and accu­rate­ly assess their respec­tive inter­ests to find the com­mon ground for this coa­les­cence. The anti-monar­chic forces in mid-70s Iran con­sist­ed of var­i­ous nation­al­ist groups includ­ing reli­gious reformists, the Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists, the left­ists and com­mu­nists.

The nation­al­ist forces were var­ied. Some were from with­in the gov­ern­ment, but they were poor­ly orga­nized and with­out grass-roots sup­port. Their posi­tion was clear­ly anti-left and anti-com­mu­nist, but they were vul­ner­a­ble to being tak­en over by the well-orga­nized left.

The Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists had no gov­ern­ment expe­ri­ence, but they had major grass­roots sup­port. Islam, in its Shi’ite for­mat was deeply embed­ded in the lives of the vast major­i­ty of the Iran­ian peo­ple. The Fun­da­men­tal­ists were absolute­ly anti-com­mu­nist.

CARTER FIRES 800 CIA COVERT OPERATORS

The philo­soph­i­cal divide with­in the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment, espe­cial­ly the CIA, became quite seri­ous in the after­math of Water­gate. To make mat­ters worse, the elec­tion of Jim­my Carter in 1976, his cam­paign promise to clean the “cow­boy” ele­ments out of the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency and his “human rights” poli­cies alarmed the fac­tion of the CIA loy­al to George Bush. Bush was CIA direc­tor under Ger­ald Ford. Final­ly, the fir­ing of CIA Direc­tor George Bush by Carter, and the sub­se­quent “Hal­loween Mas­sacre” in which Carter fired over 800 CIA covert oper­a­tives in 1977, angered the “cow­boys” beyond all mea­sure. That was Carter’s Octo­ber sur­prise, 800 fir­ings on Hal­loween 1977.

Bush and his CIA coverts were well aware of the Shah’s ter­mi­nal can­cer, unknown to Pres­i­dent Carter. The team had an elab­o­rate vest­ed inter­est to pro­tect. They were deter­mined to keep Iran intact and com­mu­nist-free and put George Bush in the White House.

TIMELINE: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Hence, the Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists were the only viable choice through which the Bush covert team could imple­ment its own pri­vate for­eign pol­i­cy. The results: the birth of the Islam­ic Repub­lic of Iran and the fall of Pres­i­dent Carter. Mansoor’s doc­u­ments show step-by-step events:

1. In 1974, the Shah of Iran was diag­nosed with can­cer.

2. In 1975, for­mer CIA direc­tor, and the U.S. Ambas­sador to Iran, Richard Helms learned of the Shah’s can­cer through the Shah’s clos­est con­fi­dant, Gen­er­al Hos­sein Far­doust. The Shah, Helms and Far­doust had been close per­son­al friends since their school days togeth­er in Switzer­land dur­ing the 1930s.

3. On Novem­ber 4, 1976, con­cur­rent with Jim­my Carter’s elec­tion as Pres­i­dent, CIA Direc­tor George Bush issued a secret memo to the U.S. Ambas­sador in Iran, Richard Helms, ask­ing:

“Have there been any changes in the per­son­al­i­ty pat­tern of the Shah; what are their impli­ca­tions . . . . for polit­i­cal behav­ior? Iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of top mil­i­tary offi­cers that most like­ly play key roles in any trans­fer­ence of pow­er if the Shah were killed…who will be the lead­ing actors? How will the Shah’s pet projects, includ­ing the eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment pro­gram, be affect­ed by his depar­ture?”

4. By July 1977, antic­i­pat­ing trou­ble ahead, the Bush covert team issued a pre­lim­i­nary script for the tran­si­tion of pow­er in Iran. Accord­ing to John D. Stem­pel, a CIA ana­lyst and Deputy Chief Polit­i­cal offi­cer of the U.S. Embassy in Iran: “A ten page analy­sis of the oppo­si­tion writ­ten by the embassy’s polit­i­cal sec­tion in July 1977 cor­rect­ly iden­ti­fied Bakhtiar, Bazargan, Khome­i­ni and Beheshti as major actors in the dra­ma that begin unfold­ing a year lat­er.”

5. Con­trary to this analy­sis, in August 1977, the “offi­cial wing” of the CIA fed Pres­i­dent Carter a 60-page Study on Iran which con­clud­ed:

“The Shah will be an active par­tic­i­pant in Iran­ian life well into the 1980s…and there will be no rad­i­cal changes in Iran­ian polit­i­cal behav­ior in the near future.”

6. On Octo­ber 31, 1977, pres­i­dent Carter made good on his cam­paign promise to clean the “cow­boys” out of the CIA. He fired over 800 covert oper­a­tives from the Agency, many of whom were loy­al to George Bush. Carter’s pres­i­den­cy split the CIA. It pro­duced in them–many of whom were “well-trained in polit­i­cal warfare–a con­cert­ed will for revenge.” By the end of the 1970s many of these spe­cial covert oper­a­tives had allied them­selves with George Bush’s can­di­da­cy, and lat­er with Ronald Reagan’s pres­i­den­tial cam­paign.

7. On Novem­ber 15, the Shah of Iran vis­it­ed Wash­ing­ton, D.C. Carter toast­ed his guest, “If ever there was a coun­try which has blos­somed forth under enlight­ened lead­er­ship, it would be the ancient empire of Per­sia.”

8. On Novem­ber 23, Aya­tol­lah Khomeini’s elder son, Haji Mustafa, died mys­te­ri­ous­ly in Najaf, Iraq. Accord­ing to pro­fes­sor Hamid Algar, he was “assas­si­nat­ed by the Shah’s U.S.-instituted secu­ri­ty police SAVAK…the tragedy inflamed the pub­lic in Iran.” Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni placed an adver­tise­ment in the French News­pa­per Le Monde which read: “thank­ing peo­ple for con­do­lences that had been sent for the mur­der of his son.” He also “appealed to the army to lib­er­ate Iran, and to the intel­lec­tu­als and all good Mus­lims to con­tin­ue their crit­i­cism of the Shah”.

9. Decem­ber 31, 1977, Carter vis­it­ed the Shah in Iran. He toast­ed the Shah for main­tain­ing Iran as “an island of sta­bil­i­ty in one of the more trou­bled areas of the world.” Iron­i­cal­ly, that so-called sta­bil­i­ty evap­o­rat­ed before the cham­pagne lost its fizz.

10. On Jan­u­ary 7, 1978, an insid­i­ous arti­cle enti­tled Iran and the Red and Black Colo­nial­ism, appeared in the Iran­ian dai­ly news­pa­per Ettela’at. It cas­ti­gat­ed the exiled Khome­i­ni, and pro­duced a mas­sive protest riot in the Holy City of Qum the next day. The cler­gy had lit­tle choice but to ral­ly to Khomeini’s defense. The Qum inci­dent shift­ed many of the cler­gy from a posi­tion of sup­port for the Shah’s monar­chy to an active oppo­si­tion. That “dirty trick” per­pet­u­at­ed by Gen­er­al Far­doust was the trig­ger that sparked Islam­ic move­ment par­tic­i­pat­ing in the anti-Shah demo­c­ra­t­ic Rev­o­lu­tion. John D. Stem­pel, char­ac­ter­ized Fardoust’s impor­tance to the Alliance: “it is hard to over­es­ti­mate the val­ue of hav­ing a mole in the inner cir­cle of the Shah.”

11. On Feb­ru­ary 3, a con­fi­den­tial com­mu­niqué from the U.S. Embassy clear­ly reflect­ed the vision of the Alliance:

“Though based on incom­plete evi­dence, our best assess­ment to date is that the Shia Islam­ic move­ment dom­i­nat­ed by Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni is far bet­ter orga­nized, enlight­ened and able to resist Com­mu­nism than its detrac­tors would lead us to believe. It is root­ed in the Iran­ian peo­ple more than any west­ern ide­ol­o­gy, includ­ing Com­mu­nism.”

12. April 1978, Le Monde “iden­ti­fied Khomeini’s Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment of Iran as the most sig­nif­i­cant force in the oppo­si­tion. Shi’ite Islam unites the reformist pro­gres­sive crit­ics of the Shah on the same ground. In fact, this analy­sis was con­trary to what Mohaam­mad Tavas­soli, leader of the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment of Iran, expressed to John D. Stem­pel on August 21, 1978:

“The nation­al­ist move­ment in Iran lacks a pop­u­lar base. The choice is between Islam and Communism…close ties between the Lib­er­a­tion Move­ment of Iran and the reli­gious move­ment were nec­es­sary. Iran was becom­ing split between the Marx­ist and the reli­gious.”

13. On April 26, the con­fi­den­tial min­utes of the U. S. Embassy Coun­try team meet­ing wel­comed Bush, Rea­gan and Thatch­er.

14. On May 6, Le Monde became the first west­ern news­pa­per to inter­view Khome­i­ni in Najaf, Iraq. Khome­i­ni acknowl­edged his com­pat­i­bil­i­ty with the strate­gic imper­a­tives of the Bush covert team, “we would not col­lab­o­rate with the Marx­ists, even in the over­throw of the Shah.”

15. The same month, Khomeini’s old ally from the failed 1963 coup (that result­ed in Khomeini’s arrest and major upris­ing in June 1963 and his sub­se­quent exile to Iraq) Gen­er­al Val­li­ol­lah Qarani sent his emis­sary to meet Khome­i­ni in Najaf. Qarani had been a major CIA asset in Iran since the 1953 coup. See­ing anoth­er chance to gain pow­er for him­self, he advised Khome­i­ni, accord­ing to for­mer Iran­ian Pres­i­dent Abol Has­san Bani-sad­er:

“If you set­tle for the Shah’s depar­ture and don’t use anti-Amer­i­can rhetoric, the Amer­i­cans are ready to take him out.”

16. In August, the Bush team sent its own point man to meet the exiled Aya­tol­lah in Najaf. Pro­fes­sor Richard Cot­tam car­ried excel­lent cre­den­tials. Dur­ing the 1953 coup, he had been in charge of the CIA’s Iran Desk. He had also been in close con­tact with Dr. Ibrahim Yaz­di in the U.S. since 1975. Curi­ous­ly, he admit­ted to Bani-sadr in 1987, that he had not been work­ing for the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion. Cottam’s vis­it must have had an impact, because Iran sud­den­ly began to expe­ri­ence a series of mys­te­ri­ous cat­a­stro­phes:

  • Fun­da­men­tal­ist sup­port­ers burned down a the­ater killing the inno­cent occu­pants, blam­ing it on the SAVAK and the Shah.
  • There were riots in Isfa­han that result­ed in mar­tial law.
  • On August 27, one of Khomeini’s rivals among the Shia Islam­ic faith­ful out­side of Iran, Aya­tol­lah Mosa Sadr mys­te­ri­ous­ly disp­peared. Accord­ing to an intel­li­gence source he was killed and buried in Libya.

17. By late August, the Shah was total­ly con­fused. U.S. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van record­ed the Shah’s plead­ings over the out­break of vio­lence:

“He said the pat­tern was wide­spread and that it was like an out­break of a sud­den rash in the country…it gave evi­dence of sophis­ti­cat­ed plan­ning and was not the work of spon­ta­neous oppositionists…the Shah pre­sent­ed that it was the work of for­eign intrigue…this intrigue went beyond the capa­bil­i­ties of the Sovi­et KGB and must, there­fore, also involve British and Amer­i­can CIA. The Shah went on to ask ‘Why was the CIA sud­den­ly turn­ing against him? What had he done to deserve this sort of action from the Unit­ed States?”

18. Sep­tem­ber 8, the Shah’s army gunned down hun­dreds of demon­stra­tors in Teheran in what became known as the “Jaleh Square Mas­sacre”.

19. On Sep­tem­ber 9, Pres­i­dent Carter phoned the Shah to con­firm his sup­port for the Shah, a fact that enraged the Iran­ian pop­u­la­tion.

20. A few days lat­er, Carter’s Nation­al Secu­ri­ty aide, Gary Sick, received a call from Richard Cot­tam, request­ing a dis­crete meet­ing between him and Khomeini’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive in the U.S., Dr. Yaz­di. Sick refused.

21. Khome­i­ni for the first time, pub­licly called for the Shah’s over­throw.

22. In Mid-Sep­tem­ber, at the height of the rev­o­lu­tion, “one of the hand­ful of Khomeini’s trust­ed asso­ciates,” Aya­tol­lah Mohammed Hus­sein Beheshti, secret­ly vis­it­ed the Unit­ed States. He also met with Yaz­di in Texas, among oth­ers. Beheshti was an advo­cate of the eye-for-an-eye school of jus­tice.

23. In ear­ly Octo­ber 1978, the agent for the Bush covert team arranged to force Khome­i­ni out of Iraq.

24. Octo­ber 3, 1978, Yaz­di picked up Khome­i­ni in Iraq and head­ed for Kuwait. Accord­ing to Gary Sick, he received an urgent call from Richard Cot­tam, learn­ing for the first time that Khome­i­ni had been forced out of Iraq. Sick was told that Khome­i­ni and his entourage were stuck in no man’s land while attempt­ing to cross the bor­der. Cot­tam was request­ing White House inter­ven­tion to resolve the issue. Sick respond, “there is noth­ing we could do”.

25. Octo­ber 6, Khomeini’s entourage, hav­ing got­ten back through Bagh­dad, popped up in Paris. Accord­ing to Bani-sadr, “it was Khome­i­ni who insist­ed on going to Paris instead of Syr­ia or Alge­ria”. Who­ev­er helped Khome­i­ni out of the Kuwaiti bor­der impasse had to have been on good terms with both the French and Sad­dam Hus­sein.

26. Decem­ber 12, Yaz­di made a trip to the U.S. to pro­mote Khome­i­ni and his Islam­ic Repub­lic. Yaz­di met secret­ly with Hen­ry Precht in an unof­fi­cial capac­i­ty. Precht was the Direc­tor of the Iran Desk at the State Depart­ment and one of the Bush team’s main choke points in the Carter Admin­is­tra­tion. Lat­er Precht and Yaz­di appeared togeth­er for tele­vised dis­cus­sion of Iran. Yaz­di assured the Amer­i­can pub­lic that Khome­i­ni had not real­ly called for a “tor­rent of blood,” and that the “elec­tion would be absolute­ly free.” The Islam­ic Repub­lic “would enjoy full free­dom of speech and the press, includ­ing the right to attack Islam. [Khome­ini’s fat­wa against Salman Rushdie stands in sharp rebut­tal to that claim–D.E.]

27. Decem­ber 28, Cot­tam vis­it­ed Khome­i­ni in Paris where he not­ed that U.S. cit­i­zen Dr. Yaz­di was the “lead­ing tac­ti­cian in Khomeini’s camp” and appar­ent “chief of staff”. Khome­i­ni was not inter­est­ed in the Mul­lahs tak­ing over the gov­ern­ment. It is also not­ed that “Khomeini’s move­ment def­i­nite­ly plans to orga­nize a polit­i­cal par­ty to draw on Khomeini’s charis­ma. Cot­tam thinks such a par­ty would win all Majlis seats.”

28. Leav­ing Paris, Cot­tam slipped into Teheran, arriv­ing the first week in Jan­u­ary 1979, to pre­pare Khomeini’s tri­umphal return to Iran.

29. Jan­u­ary 4, 1979, Carter’s secret envoy, Gen­er­al Robert Huyser arrived in Iran. His mis­sion was to pre­vent the “fall of the Shah.” Accord­ing to Huyser, Alexan­der Haig, osten­si­bly a strong Shah sup­port­er-inex­plic­a­bly, “took vio­lent excep­tion to the whole idea.” Huyser recalled that “Gen­er­al Haig nev­er gave me a full expla­na­tion of his strong objec­tions.” Huyser also revealed that Ambas­sador Sul­li­van “had also expressed objec­tions.” Two pro-Shah advo­cates opposed to the pre­ven­tion of the Shah’s fall.

30. On Jan­u­ary 14, Pres­i­dent Carter final­ly “autho­rized a meet­ing between War­ren Zim­mer­man and Ibrahim Yaz­di. On the same day, Khome­i­ni, in an inter­view on CBS claimed, “a great part of the army was loy­al to him” and that “he will be in effect the strong man of Iran.”

31. On Jan­u­ary 16, in an exact repeat of the 1953 CIA coup, Bush’s covert team ush­ered the “eccen­tric and weak” Shah out of Iran.

32. On Feb­ru­ary 1, 1979, Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni staged his own ver­sion of a “tri­umphal return” in the streets of Teheran.

33. Khome­i­ni moved quick­ly to estab­lish his author­i­ty. On Feb­ru­ary 5 he named Meh­di Bazargan, a devot­ed Mus­lim and anti-com­mu­nist, inter­im Prime Min­is­ter. Yaz­di and Abbas Amir Entezam became Bazargan’s deputies, Dr. San­jabi For­eign Min­is­ter, and Gen­er­al Qarani was named mil­i­tary Chief of Staff.

34. On Feb­ru­ary 11, 1979, in seem­ing­ly a bizarre twist, Gen­er­al Qarani asked the Shah’s “eyes and ears” Gen­er­al Hossien Far­doust for rec­om­men­da­tions to fill the new top posts in Iran’s armed forces. Except for the rec­om­men­da­tion for the Chief of SAVAK, all the oth­ers were accept­ed. Short­ly after, Gen­er­al Far­doust became head of SAVAMA, Khomeini’s suc­ces­sor to SAVAK.

35. On Feb­ru­ary 14, 1979, two weeks after Khomeini’s return to Iran, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was seized by Khome­i­ni sup­port­ers dis­guised as left­ist guer­ril­las in an attempt to neu­tral­ize the left. U.S. hostages were seized, but to the cha­grin of Khomeini’s Fun­da­men­tal­ists, the Iran­ian coali­tion gov­ern­ment restored order imme­di­ate­ly. On the same day in Kab­ul, Afghanistan, the U.S. Ambas­sador was also kid­napped by fanat­ic Islam­ic Fun­da­men­tal­ists dis­guised as left­ist guer­ril­las and killed in the gun­fight.

36. On Feb­ru­ary 14, soon after order was restored at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Khomeini’s aide Yaz­di sup­plied the Embassy with a group of Ira­ni­ans for com­pound secu­ri­ty. Ambas­sador Sul­li­van installed, armed, and trained this Swat squad lead by SAVAK/CIA agent Mashal­lah Kah­sani, with whom Sul­li­van devel­oped a close work­ing rela­tion­ship.

37. By August, pro-Bush CIA offi­cial George Cave was vis­it­ing Iran to pro­vide intel­li­gence brief­in­gs to Khomeini’s aides, espe­cial­ly Yaz­di and Entezam. These intel­li­gence exchanges con­tin­ued until Octo­ber 31, the anniver­sary of the day on which Carter fired Bush and the 800 agents. Then with all the Iran­ian offi­cials who had restored order in the first Embassy seizure elim­i­nat­ed, the stage was set for what hap­pened four days lat­er.

38. On Novem­ber 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy was tak­en again. Lead­ing the charge was none oth­er than Ambas­sador Sullivan’s trust­ed Mashal­lah Kashani, the Embassy’s once and for­mer secu­ri­ty chief.

With the evi­dence and doc­u­men­ta­tion sup­plied by Man­soor, the alleged Octo­ber Sur­prise would not have been nec­es­sary. Pres­i­dent Carter was the tar­get, in revenge for the Hal­loween Mas­sacre, the night 800 CIA oper­a­tives and George Bush were fired by Carter. The main thrust, how­ev­er, was to pre­vent a com­mu­nist takover of Iran after the Shah’s antic­i­pat­ed death.

2. In the con­clud­ing min­utes of the excerpt pre­sent­ed from the 1/23/1993 inter­view with Fara Man­soor, Mr. Emory warned that the counter-ter­ror­ism appa­ra­tus used by George H.W. Bush to affect many of the machi­na­tions of the Iran-Con­tra scan­dal were still in place and could be used to de-sta­bi­lize the (Bill) Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion. Bush White House holdover Lin­da Tripp was the con­duit who con­veyed the Mon­i­ca Lewin­sky infor­ma­tion to Lucianne Gold­berg, who pub­li­cized it and pre­cip­i­tat­ed the scan­dal that result­ed in Clin­ton’s impeach­ment.

Lin­da Tripp had a back­ground in counter-ter­ror­ism, hav­ing a Top-Secret secu­ri­ty clear­ance while work­ing for the Delta Force, the coun­try’s elite counter-ter­ror­ism com­man­do unit.

Inci­den­tal­ly, Mon­i­ca Lewin­sky was rep­re­sent­ed by Pla­to Cacheris, who is now rep­re­sent­ing Edward Snow­den, whose actions have helped to de-sta­bi­lize the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion.

“Linda’s Trip” by Jeff Leen and Gene Wein­garten; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 3/15/1998.

 . . . . There was a long string of assign­ments, in Ger­many and else­where. Lin­da got a top-secret secu­ri­ty clear­ance. At one point, accord­ing to her resume, she was doing sec­re­tar­i­al work for Delta Force, the super-secret coun­tert­er­ror­ist unit that does not, offi­cial­ly, exist. . . .

. . . . It was April 1990 when she joined the Bush White House. Ellen Strichartz, a neigh­bor who worked as a White House cor­re­spon­dence ana­lyst, had spon­sored her. Tripp start­ed as a “floater,” fill­ing in answer­ing phones or tak­ing dic­ta­tion when­ev­er there was a sec­re­tar­i­al vacan­cy.

Tripp had worked most­ly for the mil­i­tary, in aus­tere oper­a­tions that were high in dis­ci­pline and rig­or but low in pomp and stature. This changed. Her 32-month tenure in the Bush White House was a bath in pow­er and priv­i­lege and pres­tige.  . . .

3. Repub­li­can James Comey–a Mitt Rom­ney sup­port­er in 2012–is tak­ing actions that are caus­ing seri­ous prob­lems for the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion and for the Hillary Clin­ton can­di­da­cy. In par­tic­u­lar, the e‑mail scan­dal appears to have been Comey’s baby.

He has also ruf­fled feath­ers with the alto­geth­er com­pli­cat­ed Apple “ISIS­pho­ne” con­tro­ver­sy. That con­sum­mate­ly impor­tant case, Byzan­tine in its com­plex­i­ty and mul­ti-dimen­sion­al­i­ty (to coin a term) will be dealt with in a future pro­gram.

Comey was pre­vi­ous­ly the gen­er­al coun­sel for Bridge­wa­ter Asso­ciates, a hedge fund that helped cap­i­tal­ize Palan­tir, which (their dis­claimers to the con­trary notwith­stand­ing) makes the Prism soft­ware that is at the epi­cen­ter of “L’Af­faire Snow­den.” (CORRECTION: In past pro­grams and posts, we incor­rect­ly iden­ti­fied Comey as gen­er­al coun­sel for Palan­tir, not Bridge­wa­ter.)

The Bridgewater/Palantir/Comey nexus is inter­est­ing, nonethe­less. Palan­tir’s top stock­hold­er is Peter Thiel, a backer of Ted Cruz and the man who pro­vid­ed most of the cap­i­tal for Ron Paul’s 2012 Pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. Ron Paul’s Super PAC was in–of all places–Provo Utah, Rom­ney coun­try. Paul is from Texas. The alleged mav­er­ick Paul was, in fact, close to Rom­ney.

Recall that “Eddie the Friend­ly Spook” is a big Ron Paul fan and Bruce Fein, Snow­den’s first attor­ney and the coun­sel for the Snow­den fam­i­ly, was the chief legal coun­sel for Ron Paul’s cam­paign.

The pos­si­ble impli­ca­tions of these rela­tion­ships are worth con­tem­plat­ing and will be dis­cussed at greater length in future pro­grams.

“Comey’s FBI Makes Waves” by Cory Ben­nett and Julian Hat­tem; The Hill; 3/09/2016.

The aggres­sive pos­ture of the FBI under Direc­tor James Comey is becom­ing a polit­i­cal prob­lem for the White House.

The FBI’s demand that Apple help unlock an iPhone used by one of the San Bernardi­no killers has out­raged Sil­i­con Val­ley, a sig­nif­i­cant source of polit­i­cal sup­port for Pres­i­dent Oba­ma and Democ­rats.

Comey, mean­while, has stirred ten­sions by link­ing ris­ing vio­lent crime rates to the Black Lives Mat­ter movement’s focus on police vio­lence and by warn­ing about “gaps” in the screen­ing process for Syr­i­an refugees.

Then there’s the biggest issue of all: the FBI’s inves­ti­ga­tion into the pri­vate email serv­er used by Hillary Clin­ton, Obama’s for­mer sec­re­tary of State and the lead­ing con­tender to win the Demo­c­ra­t­ic pres­i­den­tial nom­i­na­tion.

A deci­sion by the FBI to charge Clin­ton or her top aides for mis­han­dling clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion would be a shock to the polit­i­cal sys­tem.

In these cas­es and more, Comey — a Repub­li­can who donat­ed in 2012 to Mitt Rom­ney — has proved he is “not attached to the strings of the White House,” said Ron Hosko, the for­mer head of the FBI’s crim­i­nal inves­tiga­tive divi­sion and a crit­ic of Obama’s law enforce­ment strate­gies.

Pub­licly, admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials have not betrayed any wor­ry about the Clin­ton probe. They have also down­played any dif­fer­ences of opin­ion on Apple.

But for­mer offi­cials say the FBI’s moves are clear­ly ruf­fling feath­ers with­in the admin­is­tra­tion.

With regards to the Apple stand­off, “It’s just not clear [Comey] is speak­ing for the admin­is­tra­tion,” said Richard Clarke, a for­mer White House coun­tert­er­ror­ism and cyber­se­cu­ri­ty chief. “We know there have been admin­is­tra­tion meet­ings on this for months. The pro­pos­al that Comey had made on encryp­tion was reject­ed by the admin­is­tra­tion.”

Comey has a rep­u­ta­tion for speak­ing truth to pow­er, dat­ing back to a dra­mat­ic con­fronta­tion in 2004 when he rushed to a hos­pi­tal to stop the Bush White House from renew­ing a war­rant­less wire­tap­ping pro­gram while Attor­ney Gen­er­al John Ashcroft was grave­ly ill. Comey was Ashcroft’s deputy at the time.

That show­down won Comey plau­dits from both sides of the aisle and made him an attrac­tive pick to lead the FBI. But now that he’s in charge of the agency, the pres­i­dent might be get­ting more than he bar­gained for.

“Part of his role is to not nec­es­sar­i­ly be in lock step with the White House,” said Mitch Sil­ber, a for­mer intel­li­gence offi­cial with the New York City Police Depart­ment and cur­rent senior man­ag­ing direc­tor at FTI Con­sult­ing.

“He takes very seri­ous­ly the fact that he works for the exec­u­tive branch,” added Leo Tad­deo, a for­mer agent in the FBI’s cyber divi­sion. “But he also under­stands the impor­tance of main­tain­ing his inde­pen­dence as a law enforce­ment agency that needs to give not just the appear­ance of inde­pen­dence but the real­i­ty of it.”

The split over Clinton’s email serv­er is the most polit­i­cal­ly charged issue fac­ing the FBI, with noth­ing less than the race for the White House poten­tial­ly at stake.

Oba­ma has pub­licly defend­ed Clin­ton, say­ing that while she “made a mis­take” with her email set­up, it was “not a sit­u­a­tion in which America’s nation­al secu­ri­ty was endan­gered.”

But the FBI direc­tor has bris­tled at that state­ment, say­ing the pres­i­dent would not have any knowl­edge of the inves­ti­ga­tion. Comey, mean­while, told law­mak­ers last week that he is “very close, per­son­al­ly,” to the probe.

Obama’s com­ments reflect­ed a pat­tern, sev­er­al for­mer agents said, of the pres­i­dent mak­ing improp­er com­ments about FBI inves­ti­ga­tions. In 2012, he made sim­i­lar­ly dis­mis­sive com­ments about a pend­ing inquiry into then-CIA Direc­tor David Petraeus, who lat­er plead­ed guilty to a mis­de­meanor charge for giv­ing clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion to his mis­tress and biog­ra­ph­er, Paula Broad­well.

“It serves no one in the Unit­ed States for the pres­i­dent to com­ment on ongo­ing inves­ti­ga­tions,” Tad­deo said. “I just don’t see a pur­pose.”

Hosko sug­gest­ed that a show­down over poten­tial crim­i­nal charges for Clin­ton could lead to a reprise of the famous 2004 hos­pi­tal scene, when Comey threat­ened to resign.

“He has that man­tle,” Hosko said. “I think now there’s this expec­ta­tion — I hope it’s a fair one — that he’ll do it again if he has to.”

Comey’s inde­pen­dent streak has also been on dis­play in the Apple fight, when his bureau decid­ed to seek a court order demand­ing that the tech giant cre­ate new soft­ware to bypass secu­ri­ty tools on an iPhone used by Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the two ter­ror­ist attack­ers in San Bernardi­no, Calif.

Many observers ques­tioned whether the FBI was mak­ing an end-run around the White House, which had pre­vi­ous­ly dis­missed a series of pro­pos­als that would force com­pa­nies to decrypt data upon gov­ern­ment request.

“I think there’s actu­al­ly some peo­ple that don’t think with one mind­set on this issue with­in the admin­is­tra­tion,” said Sen. Tom Carp­er (D‑Del.), the Sen­ate Home­land Secu­ri­ty Committee’s top Demo­c­rat, at a Tues­day hear­ing. “It’s a tough issue.”

While the White House has repeat­ed­ly backed the FBI’s deci­sion, it has not ful­ly endorsed the poten­tial pol­i­cy ram­i­fi­ca­tions, leav­ing some to think a gap might devel­op as sim­i­lar cas­es pop up. The White House is poised to soon issue its own pol­i­cy paper on the sub­ject of data encryp­tion.

“The posi­tion tak­en by the FBI is at odds with the con­cerns expressed by indi­vid­u­als [in the White House] who were look­ing into the encryp­tion issue,” said Neema Singh Guliani, a leg­isla­tive coun­sel with the Amer­i­can Civ­il Lib­er­ties Union (ACLU).

This week, White House home­land secu­ri­ty advis­er Lisa Mona­co tried to down­play the dif­fer­ences between the two sides. The White House and FBI are both grap­pling with the same prob­lems, she said in a dis­cus­sion at the Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­tions.

“There is a recog­ni­tion across the admin­is­tra­tion that the virtues of strong encryp­tion are with­out a doubt,” Mona­co said on Mon­day. “There is also uni­for­mi­ty about the recog­ni­tion that strong encryp­tion pos­es real chal­lenges.”

 

 

 

Discussion

8 comments for “FTR #899 Fara Mansoor on “The Deep October Surprise,” Part 4”

  1. http://www.newsweek.com/opening-holocaust-cartoon-contest-exhibition-tehran-provokes-continued-461286

    Ger­many added yet anoth­er voice Wednes­day to the grow­ing list of coun­tries and lead­ers con­demn­ing a Holo­caust car­toon con­test being held in Iran.

    “The mur­der of 6 mil­lion men, women and chil­dren dur­ing the Holo­caust, for which we Ger­mans bear guilt and respon­si­bil­i­ty, must not be aban­doned to ridicule,” Ger­man For­eign Min­istry spokesman Mar­tin Schae­fer said. The For­eign Min­is­ter Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier him­self, Schae­fer said, had pre­vi­ous­ly come out against such a con­test dur­ing a vis­it to Tehran in Feb­ru­ary, the Asso­ci­at­ed Press report­ed. It’s “very regret­table” that the con­test has nev­er­the­less con­tin­ued, Schae­fer said.

    An exhi­bi­tion of 150 car­toons and car­i­ca­tures sub­mit­ted for the con­test opened Sat­ur­day at the Tehran Art Bureau, accord­ing to the Tehran Times, with artists of dozens of nation­al­i­ties rep­re­sent­ed in the dis­play. Sub­mis­sions report­ed­ly came from coun­tries such as France, Aus­tralia, Brazil, Chi­na, Indone­sia and Colom­bia. Three win­ners in each of the two cat­e­gories (car­toon and car­i­ca­ture) will be announced upon the show’s con­clu­sion at the end of the month, CNSNews report­ed, with rough­ly $50,000 in prize mon­ey to be dis­trib­uted among win­ners and final­ists. The top prize is $12,000.

    Try Newsweek for only $1.25 per week

    “This exhi­bi­tion con­sti­tutes a response to the pub­li­ca­tions of car­toons by the French Char­lie Heb­do mag­a­zine, which affront­ed the Prophet Muham­mad, as well as an expres­sion of [our oppo­si­tion] to the mas­sacres per­pe­trat­ed against the Pales­tin­ian peo­ple,” said Masoud Sho­jaei-Tabatabaei in a report by Iran’s Al-Alam TV, which has been post­ed to YouTube with Eng­lish sub­ti­tles by the Mid­dle East Media Research Insti­tute (MEMRI), a non­prof­it based in Wash­ing­ton, D.C., that aims to bridge lan­guage gaps and inform dis­cus­sions of the Mid­dle East.

    “We do not mean to approve or deny the Holo­caust,” Sho­jaei-Tabatabaei told the Tehran Times. “How­ev­er, the main ques­tion is why is there no per­mis­sion to talk about the Holo­caust despite their [the West­’s] belief in free­dom of speech.” He report­ed­ly explained at a press con­fer­ence Sat­ur­day that the first con­test, held in 2006, as well as the cur­rent one—which some sources are refer­ring to as the Sec­ond Inter­na­tion­al Holo­caust Car­toon Con­test despite the fact that a ver­sion of the com­pe­ti­tion was also held last year—are meant to high­light a dou­ble stan­dard in the West when it comes to depict­ing the Holo­caust ver­sus the Prophet Moham­mad. He insist­ed that Holo­caust denial was not the goal, but his attempts to elab­o­rate result­ed in a jar­ring com­par­i­son. “Holo­caust means ‘mass killing,’” he said. “We are wit­ness­ing the biggest killings by the Zion­ist regime in Gaza and Pales­tine.”

    Iran has a his­to­ry of Holo­caust denial. When the con­test was first held in 2006, then-Pres­i­dent Mah­moud Ahmadine­jad had already become well known for call­ing the Holo­caust a “myth.” The country’s supreme leader, Aya­tol­lah Ali Khamenei, has also expressed doubt. For exam­ple, in a speech he gave for Nowruz, the Iran­ian New Year, in 2014, he called the Holo­caust “an event whose real­i­ty is uncer­tain, and if it hap­pened, it’s uncer­tain how it hap­pened.”

    The com­ments from Germany’s For­eign Min­istry spokesman on Wednes­day were only the lat­est in a string of con­dem­na­tions for the lat­est con­test. Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu, who was a fre­quent tar­get in the sub­mit­ted car­i­ca­tures, fumed at a week­ly cab­i­net meet­ing in Jerusalem on Sun­day, telling min­is­ters that Iran “denies the Holo­caust, mocks the Holo­caust and is prepar­ing anoth­er Holo­caust,” and say­ing that “every coun­try in the world must stand up and ful­ly con­demn this.”

    That same day, U.S. State Depart­ment spokesman Mark Ton­er expressed Washington’s con­cern that the con­test could “be used as a plat­form for Holo­caust denial and revi­sion­ism and egre­gious­ly anti-Semit­ic speech, as it has in the past.”

    “We denounce any Holo­caust denial and triv­i­al­iza­tion as inflam­ma­to­ry and abhor­rent. It is insult­ing to the mem­o­ry of the mil­lions of peo­ple who died in the Holo­caust,” Ton­er added. “Such offen­sive speech should be con­demned by the author­i­ties and civ­il soci­ety lead­ers rather than encour­aged.”

    In an inter­view pub­lished last month, Iran­ian For­eign Min­is­ter Moham­mad Javad Zarif told The New York­er that the gov­ern­ment of Iran was not respon­si­ble for the con­test and did not con­trol or endorse the non­govern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tion run­ning it. But both the con­test orga­niz­er Sho­jaei-Tabatabaei and exiled Iran­ian jour­nal­ist Aida Qajar have refut­ed the idea that Iran’s gov­ern­ment has no involve­ment.

    The Unit­ed States Holo­caust Memo­r­i­al Muse­um echoed those sen­ti­ments in a press release dat­ed April 29. “The orga­ni­za­tions asso­ci­at­ed with the con­test are spon­sored or sup­port­ed by gov­ern­ment enti­ties, includ­ing the Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Guard Corps and the Min­istry of Islam­ic Guid­ance,” the release said, while reports in Iran­ian press indi­cat­ed sup­port from the Min­istry of Cul­ture. The 2006 con­test, the USHMM said, “had the endorse­ment and sup­port of gov­ern­ment offi­cials and agen­cies.”

    “The glob­al com­mu­ni­ty and the peo­ple of Iran deserve an unequiv­o­cal denounce­ment of this Holo­caust car­toon con­test,” Tad Stahnke, direc­tor of USHMM’s Ini­tia­tive on Holo­caust Denial and Anti­semitism, is quot­ed as say­ing. “Giv­en the Iran­ian government’s past involve­ment with these events and its his­to­ry of restrict­ing unsanc­tioned speech, it will take much more effort on its part to dis­tance itself from this con­test,” he added. “We strong­ly encour­age Zarif and oth­er mem­bers of the Iran­ian gov­ern­ment to con­demn Holo­caust denial and to allow Iran­ian cit­i­zens access to accu­rate infor­ma­tion about the Holo­caust.”

    In the Al-Alam seg­ment post­ed by MEMRI, reporter Sal­im Issa says that “the goals of the con­test are to enhance the cul­ture of free­dom of speech by means of mod­ern art and to open new hori­zons for cul­tur­al and artis­tic coop­er­a­tion and exchange between Iran­ian and for­eign artists.”

    But Iri­na Boko­va, the direc­tor-gen­er­al of UNESCO, has vehe­ment­ly crit­i­cized the event. “This con­test goes against the uni­ver­sal val­ues of tol­er­ance and respect, and runs counter to the action led by UNESCO to pro­mote Holo­caust edu­ca­tion, to fight anti-Semi­tism and denial,” she said in a state­ment post­ed Fri­day, hav­ing pre­vi­ous­ly expressed UNESCO’s con­cerns in a let­ter to the Iran­ian ambas­sador. “Such an ini­tia­tive which aims at a mock­ery of the geno­cide of the Jew­ish peo­ple, a trag­ic page of human­i­ty’s his­to­ry, can only fos­ter hatred and incite to vio­lence, racism and anger.”

    Posted by Tiffany Sunderson | May 18, 2016, 3:02 pm
  2. Fore some time I had my sus­pi­cious about the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion. So this infor­ma­tion does­n’t sur­prise me.
    Does Man­soor still lives and where’re his doc­u­ments? Why did­n’t he pub­lish a book? I was search­ing for this kind of book on this mat­ter)
    Thank you for shar­ing this impor­tant, inter­est­ing info!

    Posted by Patrick | June 27, 2016, 5:29 am
  3. @Patrick–

    Fara has a blog, which is the best I can do: https://faratimes.com/about/

    Best,

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | June 27, 2016, 8:17 pm
  4. How many more ‘Octo­ber Sur­prise’ sur­pris­es are there, wait­ing to be found or shared? That was one of the many ques­tions raised by a pret­ty sur­pris­ing report out of the New York Times last week that appears to be about as sol­id a con­fir­ma­tion as we can expect at this point that the Octo­ber Sur­prise plot was indeed car­ried out by the Rea­gan cam­paign. It’s a con­fir­ma­tion that comes from Ben Barnes, a once promi­nent Texas Demo­c­ra­t­ic who has an even more promi­nent men­tor: John Con­nal­ly. The same for­mer Texas gov­er­nor who was shot and injured dur­ing the JFK assas­si­na­tion while he was Democ­rats and went on to switch parites and become Richard Nixon’s Trea­sury Sec­re­tary.

    Con­nal­ly are Barnes aren’t names that have pre­vi­ous­ly been asso­ci­at­ed with the Octo­ber sur­prise plot. But as Barnes tells it, it was Barnes and Con­nal­ly who lit­er­al­ly trav­eled across the Mid­dle East in 1980, meet­ing one leader after anoth­er with a sim­ple mes­sage: Iran can’t release the hostages yet. Or, rather, it was Con­nal­ly con­vey­ing the mes­sage. Barnes was just tag­ging along for some rea­son. Impor­tant­ly, Barnes also reveals that, fol­low­ing the Mid­dle East trip, he and Con­nal­ly both had a three hour meet­ing with Bill Casey at the Dal­las air­port where Casey was briefed about the trip.

    As Barnes tells it, Con­nal­ly’s mes­sage to the Arab lead­ers was some­thing along the lines of “‘Look, Ronald Reagan’s going to be elect­ed pres­i­dent and you need to get the word to Iran that they’re going to make a bet­ter deal with Rea­gan than they are Carter,’...‘It would be very smart for you to pass the word to the Ira­ni­ans to wait until after this gen­er­al elec­tion is over.’ ” Intrigu­ing­ly, Barnes claims that he had no idea this was the intent of the trip until he and Con­nal­ly met with the first Arab leader and Con­nal­ly con­veyed that mes­sage right in front of him. And then did it again with each leader. Why did Conal­ly bring Barnes along for such a mis­sion? That remains a mys­tery.

    It’s worth recall anoth­er Con­nal­ly Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty pro­tege who found him­self involved with some rather sleazy polit­i­cal maneu­ver­ings: Robert (Bob) Strauss, who Con­nal­ly placed on the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Nation­al Com­mit­tee in 1968 as part of an effort to block the nom­i­na­tion of anti-war can­di­date George McGov­ern. Two years lat­er, Con­nal­ly joined the Nixon admin­is­tra­tion. It’s also worth not­ing that it was Barnes who appar­ent­ly got George W. Bush into the Texas Air Nation­al Guard as part of Bush’s attempt to dodge the Viet­nam war. That’s part of the of con­text here: Barnes and Con­nal­ly were Texas Democ­rats with deep Repub­li­can ties. So deep in Con­nal­ly’s case that he lit­er­al­ly became a Repub­li­can and Nixon’s Trea­sury Sec­re­tary in 1973. And some­how, the two were put at the cen­ter of a clan­des­tine lob­by­ing effort to put Rea­gan in office. An effort that Barnes appar­ent­ly did­n’t even know he was get­ting into when Con­nal­ly dragged him along.

    All in all, it’s quite a remark­able sto­ry. But not one Barnes has nev­er shared before with any­one else. In fact, four peo­ple con­firmed to the NY Times that Barnes did indeed dis­close all of this to them years ago. It rais­es the ques­tion of just how open a secret is all this stuff in DC cir­cles?

    Why is Barnes reveal­ing it now? To give Jim­my Carter some long belat­ed jus­tice as he sits on his deathbed. At least that’s how Barns is putting it. It’s sort of a ‘deathbed by proxy’ con­fes­sion.

    Also note that there is no men­tion at all of how this all ties into the explo­sive and damn­ing research by Fara Man­soor show­ing how the Iran­ian Rev­o­lu­tion was effec­tive foment­ed and man­aged by the CIA as part of an effort start­ed after learn­ing of the Shah’s can­cer diag­no­sis to install the ardent­ly anti-com­mu­nist reli­gious fun­da­men­tal­ists of Iran into pow­er to pre­vent left-wing forces from fil­ing that vac­u­um. Not that we should have expect­ed Man­soor’s research to fac­tor into this report­ing. But it points towards one of the oth­er major con­texts that this new rev­e­la­tion is oper­at­ing in: the utter inabil­i­ty of the US to mean­ing­ful­ly come to grips with its own his­to­ry. An inabil­i­ty root­ed in the col­lec­tive silence giv­en to impor­tant research like Man­soor’s. The US soci­ety sim­ply does­n’t seem to care very much about acquir­ing an accu­rate under­stand­ing of how it got here. So while it’s going to be inter­est­ing to watch the poten­tial impact of this lat­est rev­e­la­tion play out, it’s like­ly going to be depress­ing­ly inter­est­ing as the US’s amne­si­ac apa­thy kicks in and every­one for­gets that there are major unre­solved scan­dals just sit­ting here wait­ing to be under­stood:

    The New York Times

    A Four-Decade Secret: One Man’s Sto­ry of Sab­o­tag­ing Carter’s Re-elec­tion

    A promi­nent Texas politi­cian said he unwit­ting­ly took part in a 1980 tour of the Mid­dle East with a clan­des­tine agen­da.

    By Peter Bak­er
    March 18, 2023

    WASHINGTON — It has been more than four decades, but Ben Barnes said he remem­bers it vivid­ly. His long­time polit­i­cal men­tor invit­ed him on a mis­sion to the Mid­dle East. What Mr. Barnes said he did not real­ize until lat­er was the real pur­pose of the mis­sion: to sab­o­tage the re-elec­tion cam­paign of the pres­i­dent of the Unit­ed States.

    It was 1980 and Jim­my Carter was in the White House, bedev­iled by a hostage cri­sis in Iran that had par­a­lyzed his pres­i­den­cy and ham­pered his effort to win a sec­ond term. Mr. Carter’s best chance for vic­to­ry was to free the 52 Amer­i­cans held cap­tive before Elec­tion Day. That was some­thing that Mr. Barnes said his men­tor was deter­mined to pre­vent.

    His men­tor was John B. Con­nal­ly Jr., a titan of Amer­i­can pol­i­tics and for­mer Texas gov­er­nor who had served three pres­i­dents and just lost his own bid for the White House. A for­mer Demo­c­rat, Mr. Con­nal­ly had sought the Repub­li­can nom­i­na­tion in 1980 only to be swamped by for­mer Gov. Ronald Rea­gan of Cal­i­for­nia. Now Mr. Con­nal­ly resolved to help Mr. Rea­gan beat Mr. Carter and in the process, Mr. Barnes said, make his own case for becom­ing sec­re­tary of state or defense in a new admin­is­tra­tion.

    What hap­pened next Mr. Barnes has large­ly kept secret for near­ly 43 years. Mr. Con­nal­ly, he said, took him to one Mid­dle East­ern cap­i­tal after anoth­er that sum­mer, meet­ing with a host of region­al lead­ers to deliv­er a blunt mes­sage to be passed to Iran: Don’t release the hostages before the elec­tion. Mr. Rea­gan will win and give you a bet­ter deal.

    Then short­ly after return­ing home, Mr. Barnes said, Mr. Con­nal­ly report­ed to William J. Casey, the chair­man of Mr. Reagan’s cam­paign and lat­er direc­tor of the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency, brief­ing him about the trip in an air­port lounge.

    Mr. Carter’s camp has long sus­pect­ed that Mr. Casey or some­one else in Mr. Reagan’s orbit sought to secret­ly tor­pe­do efforts to lib­er­ate the hostages before the elec­tion, and books have been writ­ten on what came to be called the Octo­ber sur­prise. But con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tions debunked pre­vi­ous the­o­ries of what hap­pened.

    Mr. Con­nal­ly did not fig­ure in those inves­ti­ga­tions. His involve­ment, as described by Mr. Barnes, adds a new under­stand­ing to what may have hap­pened in that hard-fought, piv­otal elec­tion year. With Mr. Carter now 98 and in hos­pice care, Mr. Barnes said he felt com­pelled to come for­ward to cor­rect the record.

    “His­to­ry needs to know that this hap­pened,” Mr. Barnes, who turns 85 next month, said in one of sev­er­al inter­views, his first with a news orga­ni­za­tion about the episode. “I think it’s so sig­nif­i­cant and I guess know­ing that the end is near for Pres­i­dent Carter put it on my mind more and more and more. I just feel like we’ve got to get it down some way.”

    Mr. Barnes is no shady for­eign arms deal­er with ques­tion­able cred­i­bil­i­ty, like some of the char­ac­ters who fueled pre­vi­ous iter­a­tions of the Octo­ber sur­prise the­o­ry. He was once one of the most promi­nent fig­ures in Texas, the youngest speak­er of the Texas House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives and lat­er lieu­tenant gov­er­nor. He was such an influ­en­tial fig­ure that he helped a young George W. Bush get into the Texas Air Nation­al Guard rather than be exposed to the draft and sent to Viet­nam. Lyn­don B. John­son pre­dict­ed that Mr. Barnes would become pres­i­dent some­day.

    ...

    Mr. Barnes iden­ti­fied four liv­ing peo­ple he said he had con­fid­ed in over the years: Mark K. Upde­grove, pres­i­dent of the L.B.J. Foun­da­tion; Tom John­son, a for­mer aide to Lyn­don John­son (no rela­tion) who lat­er became pub­lish­er of the Los Ange­les Times and pres­i­dent of CNN; Lar­ry Tem­ple, a for­mer aide to Mr. Con­nal­ly and Lyn­don John­son; and H.W. Brands, a Uni­ver­si­ty of Texas his­to­ri­an.

    All four of them con­firmed in recent days that Mr. Barnes shared the sto­ry with them years ago. “As far as I know, Ben nev­er has lied to me,” Tom John­son said, a sen­ti­ment the oth­ers echoed. Mr. Brands includ­ed three para­graphs about Mr. Barnes’s rec­ol­lec­tions in a 2015 biog­ra­phy of Mr. Rea­gan, but the account gen­er­at­ed lit­tle pub­lic notice at the time.

    Records at the Lyn­don Baines John­son Library and Muse­um con­firm part of Mr. Barnes’s sto­ry. An itin­er­ary found this past week in Mr. Connally’s files indi­cat­ed that he did, in fact, leave Hous­ton on July 18, 1980, for a trip that would take him to Jor­dan, Syr­ia, Lebanon, Sau­di Ara­bia, Egypt and Israel before return­ing to Hous­ton on Aug. 11. Mr. Barnes was list­ed as accom­pa­ny­ing him.

    Brief news accounts at the time report­ed on some of Mr. Connally’s stops with scant detail, describ­ing the trip as “strict­ly pri­vate.” An intrigu­ing note in Mr. Connally’s file con­firms Mr. Barnes’s mem­o­ry that there was con­tact with the Rea­gan camp ear­ly in the trip. Under the head­ing “Gov­er­nor Rea­gan,” a note from an assis­tant report­ed to Mr. Con­nal­ly on July 21: “Nan­cy Rea­gan called — they are at Ranch he wants to talk to you about being in on strat­e­gy meet­ings.” There was no record of his response.

    Mr. Barnes recalled join­ing Mr. Con­nal­ly in ear­ly Sep­tem­ber to sit down with Mr. Casey to report on their trip dur­ing a three-hour meet­ing in the Amer­i­can Air­lines lounge at what was then called the Dallas/Fort Worth Region­al Air­port. An entry in Mr. Connally’s cal­en­dar found this past week showed that he trav­eled to Dal­las on Sept. 10. A search of Mr. Casey’s archives at the Hoover Insti­tu­tion at Stan­ford Uni­ver­si­ty turned up no doc­u­ments indi­cat­ing whether he was in Dal­las then or not.

    Mr. Barnes said he was cer­tain the point of Mr. Connally’s trip was to get a mes­sage to the Ira­ni­ans to hold the hostages until after the elec­tion. “I’ll go to my grave believ­ing that it was the pur­pose of the trip,” he said. “It wasn’t free­lanc­ing because Casey was so inter­est­ed in hear­ing as soon as we got back to the Unit­ed States.” Mr. Casey, he added, want­ed to know whether “they were going to hold the hostages.”

    None of that estab­lish­es whether Mr. Rea­gan knew about the trip, nor could Mr. Barnes say that Mr. Casey direct­ed Mr. Con­nal­ly to take the jour­ney. Like­wise, e does not know if the mes­sage trans­mit­ted to mul­ti­ple Mid­dle East­ern lead­ers got to the Ira­ni­ans, much less whether it influ­enced their deci­sion mak­ing. But Iran did hold the hostages until after the elec­tion, which Mr. Rea­gan won, and did not release them until min­utes after noon on Jan. 20, 1981, when Mr. Carter left office.

    ...

    Sus­pi­cions about the Rea­gan camp’s inter­ac­tions with Iran cir­cu­lat­ed qui­et­ly for years until Gary Sick, a for­mer nation­al secu­ri­ty aide to Mr. Carter, pub­lished a guest essay in The New York Times in April 1991 advanc­ing the the­o­ry, fol­lowed by a book, “Octo­ber Sur­prise,” pub­lished that Novem­ber.

    The term “Octo­ber sur­prise” was orig­i­nal­ly used by the Rea­gan camp to describe its fears that Mr. Carter would manip­u­late the hostage cri­sis to effect a release just before the elec­tion.

    To fore­stall such a sce­nario, Mr. Casey was alleged to have met with rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Iran in July and August 1980 in Madrid lead­ing to a deal sup­pos­ed­ly final­ized in Paris in Octo­ber in which a future Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion would ship arms to Tehran through Israel in exchange for the hostages being held until after the elec­tion.

    The House and Sen­ate sep­a­rate­ly autho­rized inves­ti­ga­tions and both ulti­mate­ly reject­ed the claims. The bipar­ti­san House task force, led by a Demo­c­rat, Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Lee H. Hamil­ton of Indi­ana, and con­trolled by Democ­rats 8 to 5, con­clud­ed in a a con­sen­sus 968-page report that Mr. Casey was not in Madrid at the time and that sto­ries of covert deal­ings were not backed by cred­i­ble tes­ti­mo­ny, doc­u­ments or intel­li­gence reports.

    Still, a White House memo pro­duced in Novem­ber 1991 by a lawyer for Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush report­ed the exis­tence of “a cable from the Madrid embassy indi­cat­ing that Bill Casey was in town, for pur­pos­es unknown.” That memo was not turned over to Mr. Hamilton’s task force and was dis­cov­ered two decades lat­er by Robert Par­ry, a jour­nal­ist who helped pro­duce a “Front­line” doc­u­men­tary on the Octo­ber sur­prise.

    Reached by tele­phone this past week, Mr. Sick said he nev­er heard of any involve­ment by Mr. Con­nal­ly but saw Mr. Barnes’s account as ver­i­fy­ing the broad con­cerns he had raised. “This is real­ly very inter­est­ing and it real­ly does add sig­nif­i­cant­ly to the base lev­el of infor­ma­tion on this,” Mr. Sick said. “Just the fact that he was doing it and debriefed Casey when he got back means a lot.” The sto­ry goes “fur­ther than any­thing that I’ve seen thus far,” he added. “So this is real­ly new.”

    Michael F. Zeldin, a Demo­c­ra­t­ic lawyer for the task force, and David H. Lauf­man, a Repub­li­can lawyer for the task force, both said in recent inter­views that Mr. Con­nal­ly nev­er crossed their radar screen dur­ing the inquiry and so they had no basis to judge Mr. Barnes’s account.

    While Mr. Casey was nev­er proved to have been engaged in any Octo­ber sur­prise deal-mak­ing, he was lat­er accused of sur­rep­ti­tious­ly obtain­ing a Carter cam­paign brief­ing book before the lone debate between the two can­di­dates, although he denied involve­ment.

    News of Mr. Barnes’s account came as val­i­da­tion to some of Mr. Carter’s remain­ing advis­ers. Ger­ald Raf­shoon, who was his White House com­mu­ni­ca­tions direc­tor, said any inter­fer­ence may have changed his­to­ry. “If we had got­ten the hostages home, we’d have won, I real­ly believe that,” he said. “It’s pret­ty damn out­ra­geous.”

    Mr. Con­nal­ly was a polit­i­cal giant of his era. Raised on a South Texas cot­ton farm, he served in the Navy in World War II and became a con­fi­dant of Lyn­don B. John­son, help­ing run five of his cam­paigns, includ­ing his dis­put­ed 1948 elec­tion to the Sen­ate that was marred by cred­i­ble alle­ga­tions of fraud. Mr. Con­nal­ly man­aged Mr. Johnson’s unsuc­cess­ful bid for the Demo­c­ra­t­ic pres­i­den­tial nom­i­na­tion in 1960, then worked for the tick­et of John F. Kennedy and Mr. John­son. Mr. Con­nal­ly was reward­ed with an appoint­ment as sec­re­tary of the Navy. He then won a race for gov­er­nor of Texas in 1962.

    He was in the pres­i­den­tial lim­ou­sine sit­ting just in front of Mr. Kennedy in Dal­las in Novem­ber 1963 when Lee Har­vey Oswald opened fire. Mr. Con­nal­ly suf­fered injuries to his back, chest, wrist and thigh, but unlike Mr. Kennedy sur­vived the ordeal. He won two more terms as gov­er­nor, then became Pres­i­dent Richard M. Nixon’s sec­re­tary of the Trea­sury and ulti­mate­ly switched par­ties. He was a favorite of Mr. Nixon, who want­ed to make him his vice pres­i­dent or suc­ces­sor as pres­i­dent.

    ...

    Along the way, Mr. Con­nal­ly found a polit­i­cal pro­tégé in Mr. Barnes, who became “more a god­son than a friend,” as James Reston Jr. put it in “The Lone Star,” his biog­ra­phy of Mr. Con­nal­ly. The son of a peanut farmer who paid for col­lege sell­ing vac­u­um clean­ers door to door, Mr. Barnes was elect­ed to the Texas Leg­is­la­ture at age 21 and stood at Mr. Connally’s side for his first speech as a can­di­date for gov­er­nor in 1962.

    With Mr. Connally’s help, Mr. Barnes became House speak­er at 26 and was lat­er elect­ed lieu­tenant gov­er­nor, a pow­er­ful posi­tion in Texas, only to fall short in his own bid for gov­er­nor in 1972. He urged Mr. Con­nal­ly to run for pres­i­dent in 1980 even though by then they were in dif­fer­ent par­ties.

    After Mr. Connally’s cam­paign col­lapsed, he and Mr. Barnes went into busi­ness togeth­er, form­ing Barnes/Connally Invest­ments. The two built apart­ment com­plex­es, shop­ping cen­ters and office build­ings, and bought a com­muter air­line and an oil com­pa­ny, and lat­er a bar­be­cue house, a West­ern art mag­a­zine, a title com­pa­ny and an adver­tis­ing com­pa­ny. But they overex­tend­ed them­selves, took on too much debt and, after falling oil prices shat­tered the Texas real estate mar­ket, filed for bank­rupt­cy in 1987.

    The two stayed on good terms. “In spite of the dis­il­lu­sion­ment of our busi­ness arrange­ments, Ben Barnes and I remain friends, although I doubt that either of us would go back into busi­ness with the oth­er,” Mr. Con­nal­ly wrote in his mem­oir, “In History’s Shad­ow,” short­ly before dying in 1993 at age 76. Mr. Barnes, for his part, said this past week that “I remain a great fan of him.”

    Mr. Barnes said he had no idea of the pur­pose of the Mid­dle East trip when Mr. Con­nal­ly invit­ed him. They trav­eled to the region on a Gulf­stream jet owned by Supe­ri­or Oil. Only when they sat down with the first Arab leader did Mr. Barnes learn what Mr. Con­nal­ly was up to, he said.

    Mr. Con­nal­ly said, “‘Look, Ronald Reagan’s going to be elect­ed pres­i­dent and you need to get the word to Iran that they’re going to make a bet­ter deal with Rea­gan than they are Carter,’” Mr. Barnes recalled. “He said, ‘It would be very smart for you to pass the word to the Ira­ni­ans to wait until after this gen­er­al elec­tion is over.’ And boy, I tell you, I’m sit­ting there and I heard it and so now it dawns on me, I real­ize why we’re there.”

    Mr. Barnes said that, except for Israel, Mr. Con­nal­ly repeat­ed the same mes­sage at every stop in the region to lead­ers such as Pres­i­dent Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. He thought his friend’s motive was clear. “It became very clear to me that Con­nal­ly was run­ning for sec­re­tary of state or sec­re­tary of defense,” Mr. Barnes said. (Mr. Con­nal­ly was lat­er offered ener­gy sec­re­tary but declined.)

    Mr. Barnes said he did not reveal the real sto­ry at the time to avoid blow­back from his own par­ty. “I don’t want to look like Bene­dict Arnold to the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty by par­tic­i­pat­ing in this,” he recalled explain­ing to a friend. The head­lines at the time, he imag­ined, would have been scan­dalous. “I did not want that to be on my obit­u­ary at all.”

    But as the years have passed, he said, he has often thought an injus­tice had been done to Mr. Carter. Dis­cussing the trip now, he indi­cat­ed, was his way of mak­ing amends. “I just want his­to­ry to reflect that Carter got a lit­tle bit of a bad deal about the hostages,” he said. “He didn’t have a fight­ing chance with those hostages still in the embassy in Iran.”

    ———–
    “A Four-Decade Secret: One Man’s Sto­ry of Sab­o­tag­ing Carter’s Re-elec­tion” By Peter Bak­er; The New York Times; 03/18/2023

    “His men­tor was John B. Con­nal­ly Jr., a titan of Amer­i­can pol­i­tics and for­mer Texas gov­er­nor who had served three pres­i­dents and just lost his own bid for the White House. A for­mer Demo­c­rat, Mr. Con­nal­ly had sought the Repub­li­can nom­i­na­tion in 1980 only to be swamped by for­mer Gov. Ronald Rea­gan of Cal­i­for­nia. Now Mr. Con­nal­ly resolved to help Mr. Rea­gan beat Mr. Carter and in the process, Mr. Barnes said, make his own case for becom­ing sec­re­tary of state or defense in a new admin­is­tra­tion.

    The Octo­ber Sur­prise plot was, in part, a bid by John Con­nal­ly to become Ronald Rea­gan’s sec­re­tary of state or defense. That was the motive for Con­nal­ly’s pre­vi­ous­ly unrec­og­nized key role in the plot, as laid out by Con­nal­ly’s mentee, Ben Barnes. And as the arti­cle pointcs out, Barnes is no ran­dom acquain­tance of Con­nal­ly. He was, at one point, one of the most promi­nent fig­ures in Texas. He even helped George W. Bush dodge the draft by get­ting into the Texas Air Nation­al Guard. Those appar­ent ties to the Bush fam­i­ly make this a good time to recall how Farah Man­soor’s research found the Iran­ian hostage cri­sis to be a polit­i­cal “man­age­ment tool” cre­at­ed by a ‘pro-Bush’ fac­tion of the CIA. That was the milieu Barnes was oper­at­ing in when he had the expe­ri­ences he’s only now shar­ing. It’s not quite a deathbed con­fes­sion from Barnes — it’s Jim­my Carters deathbed that appar­ent­ly promt­ed this — but Barnes is clear­ly some­one who knows where ‘the bod­ies are buried’. That part of the con­text of this new round of Octo­ber Sur­prise rev­e­la­tions. This is some­one undoubt­ed­ly who knows A LOT of secrets reach­ing a point in life where they are will­ing to start shar­ing them:

    ...
    “His­to­ry needs to know that this hap­pened,” Mr. Barnes, who turns 85 next month, said in one of sev­er­al inter­views, his first with a news orga­ni­za­tion about the episode. “I think it’s so sig­nif­i­cant and I guess know­ing that the end is near for Pres­i­dent Carter put it on my mind more and more and more. I just feel like we’ve got to get it down some way.”

    Mr. Barnes is no shady for­eign arms deal­er with ques­tion­able cred­i­bil­i­ty, like some of the char­ac­ters who fueled pre­vi­ous iter­a­tions of the Octo­ber sur­prise the­o­ry. He was once one of the most promi­nent fig­ures in Texas, the youngest speak­er of the Texas House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives and lat­er lieu­tenant gov­er­nor. He was such an influ­en­tial fig­ure that he helped a young George W. Bush get into the Texas Air Nation­al Guard rather than be exposed to the draft and sent to Viet­nam. Lyn­don B. John­son pre­dict­ed that Mr. Barnes would become pres­i­dent some­day.
    ...

    Nor are Bar­nes’s claims entire­ly uncor­rob­o­rat­ed. For starters, four peo­ple con­firmed Barnes shared this when them years ago, which rais­es the inter­est­ing ques­tion as to just how open a secret this all real­ly was in DC cir­cles. But it appears a Con­nal­ly itin­er­ary found in the LBJ Library pro­vide some com­pelling evi­dence that Barnes isn’t mak­ing the 1980 Mid­dle East trip up. The trip hap­pened, includ­ing post-trip dis­cus­sions with Rea­gan:

    ...
    Mr. Barnes iden­ti­fied four liv­ing peo­ple he said he had con­fid­ed in over the years: Mark K. Upde­grove, pres­i­dent of the L.B.J. Foun­da­tion; Tom John­son, a for­mer aide to Lyn­don John­son (no rela­tion) who lat­er became pub­lish­er of the Los Ange­les Times and pres­i­dent of CNN; Lar­ry Tem­ple, a for­mer aide to Mr. Con­nal­ly and Lyn­don John­son; and H.W. Brands, a Uni­ver­si­ty of Texas his­to­ri­an.

    All four of them con­firmed in recent days that Mr. Barnes shared the sto­ry with them years ago. “As far as I know, Ben nev­er has lied to me,” Tom John­son said, a sen­ti­ment the oth­ers echoed. Mr. Brands includ­ed three para­graphs about Mr. Barnes’s rec­ol­lec­tions in a 2015 biog­ra­phy of Mr. Rea­gan, but the account gen­er­at­ed lit­tle pub­lic notice at the time.

    Records at the Lyn­don Baines John­son Library and Muse­um con­firm part of Mr. Barnes’s sto­ry. An itin­er­ary found this past week in Mr. Connally’s files indi­cat­ed that he did, in fact, leave Hous­ton on July 18, 1980, for a trip that would take him to Jor­dan, Syr­ia, Lebanon, Sau­di Ara­bia, Egypt and Israel before return­ing to Hous­ton on Aug. 11. Mr. Barnes was list­ed as accom­pa­ny­ing him.

    Brief news accounts at the time report­ed on some of Mr. Connally’s stops with scant detail, describ­ing the trip as “strict­ly pri­vate.” An intrigu­ing note in Mr. Connally’s file con­firms Mr. Barnes’s mem­o­ry that there was con­tact with the Rea­gan camp ear­ly in the trip. Under the head­ing “Gov­er­nor Rea­gan,” a note from an assis­tant report­ed to Mr. Con­nal­ly on July 21: “Nan­cy Rea­gan called — they are at Ranch he wants to talk to you about being in on strat­e­gy meet­ings.” There was no record of his response.
    ...

    Per­haps the most unbe­liev­able part of Bar­nes’s sto­ry is how Con­nal­ly appar­ent­ly did­n’t inform Barnes as to what the trip was about, and yet both of them met with one Mid­dle East leader after anoth­er where Con­nal­ly issued the same mes­sage. It points to a remark­able lev­el of trust Con­nal­ly must have had in Bar­nes’s abil­i­ty to keep a secret. Which is what Barns did, most­ly, for 43 years. But the secret isn’t just that they met with all these lead­ers to deliv­er the same mes­sage. There was the fol­low up meet­ing with future CIA-direc­tor Bill Casey at the Amer­i­can Air­lines lounge at the Dal­las Air­port. A meet­ing that Con­nal­ly again brought Barnes to. And then there’s the fact that Barnes is claim­ing that Con­nal­ly and Barnes were shar­ing the ‘don’t release the hostages’ mes­sages not just with Iran­ian lead­ers but lead­ers across the Mid­dle East, with an appar­ent hope that those lead­ers would con­vey the mes­sage to Iran. It’s not entire­ly clear why Barnes was brought along to all these meet­ings for a scan­dalous mis­sion that he appar­ent­ly was­n’t aware of from the start, or why non-Iran­ian lead­ers would be informed about the plot, but that’s the sto­ry he’s shar­ing:

    ...
    What hap­pened next Mr. Barnes has large­ly kept secret for near­ly 43 years. Mr. Con­nal­ly, he said, took him to one Mid­dle East­ern cap­i­tal after anoth­er that sum­mer, meet­ing with a host of region­al lead­ers to deliv­er a blunt mes­sage to be passed to Iran: Don’t release the hostages before the elec­tion. Mr. Rea­gan will win and give you a bet­ter deal.

    ...

    Mr. Barnes recalled join­ing Mr. Con­nal­ly in ear­ly Sep­tem­ber to sit down with Mr. Casey to report on their trip dur­ing a three-hour meet­ing in the Amer­i­can Air­lines lounge at what was then called the Dallas/Fort Worth Region­al Air­port. An entry in Mr. Connally’s cal­en­dar found this past week showed that he trav­eled to Dal­las on Sept. 10. A search of Mr. Casey’s archives at the Hoover Insti­tu­tion at Stan­ford Uni­ver­si­ty turned up no doc­u­ments indi­cat­ing whether he was in Dal­las then or not.

    Mr. Barnes said he was cer­tain the point of Mr. Connally’s trip was to get a mes­sage to the Ira­ni­ans to hold the hostages until after the elec­tion. “I’ll go to my grave believ­ing that it was the pur­pose of the trip,” he said. “It wasn’t free­lanc­ing because Casey was so inter­est­ed in hear­ing as soon as we got back to the Unit­ed States.” Mr. Casey, he added, want­ed to know whether “they were going to hold the hostages.”

    ...

    Mr. Barnes said he had no idea of the pur­pose of the Mid­dle East trip when Mr. Con­nal­ly invit­ed him. They trav­eled to the region on a Gulf­stream jet owned by Supe­ri­or Oil. Only when they sat down with the first Arab leader did Mr. Barnes learn what Mr. Con­nal­ly was up to, he said.

    Mr. Con­nal­ly said, “‘Look, Ronald Reagan’s going to be elect­ed pres­i­dent and you need to get the word to Iran that they’re going to make a bet­ter deal with Rea­gan than they are Carter,’” Mr. Barnes recalled. “He said, ‘It would be very smart for you to pass the word to the Ira­ni­ans to wait until after this gen­er­al elec­tion is over.’ And boy, I tell you, I’m sit­ting there and I heard it and so now it dawns on me, I real­ize why we’re there.”

    Mr. Barnes said that, except for Israel, Mr. Con­nal­ly repeat­ed the same mes­sage at every stop in the region to lead­ers such as Pres­i­dent Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. He thought his friend’s motive was clear. “It became very clear to me that Con­nal­ly was run­ning for sec­re­tary of state or sec­re­tary of defense,” Mr. Barnes said. (Mr. Con­nal­ly was lat­er offered ener­gy sec­re­tary but declined.)
    ...

    And while sus­pi­cions about an Octo­ber Sur­prise were around from the start of the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion, it was­n’t until the 1991 pub­li­ca­tion of an opin­ion piece by for­mer Carter Nation­al Secu­ri­ty aide Gary Sick, that the sto­ry start­ed get­ting the kind of atten­tion it deserved. Recall how Farah Man­soor’s the­sis that the CIA orches­trat­ed the col­lapse of the Shah of the rise of Khome­i­ni and the Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ists was based in part on Sick­’s expe­ri­ences, that includ­ed what appeared to be mul­ti­ple attempts in 1978 by CIA-con­nect­ed indi­vid­u­als to take steps that would have assist­ed Khome­ini’s rev­o­lu­tion­ary efforts. It’s a reminder that we can’t real­ly sep­a­rate the Octo­ber Sur­prise intrigue Barnes is flesh­ing out from Fara Man­soor’s damn­ing the­sis about the CIA’s spon­sor­ship of the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion. This is all one big wild­ly scan­dalous sto­ry:

    ...
    Sus­pi­cions about the Rea­gan camp’s inter­ac­tions with Iran cir­cu­lat­ed qui­et­ly for years until Gary Sick, a for­mer nation­al secu­ri­ty aide to Mr. Carter, pub­lished a guest essay in The New York Times in April 1991 advanc­ing the the­o­ry, fol­lowed by a book, “Octo­ber Sur­prise,” pub­lished that Novem­ber.

    ...

    Reached by tele­phone this past week, Mr. Sick said he nev­er heard of any involve­ment by Mr. Con­nal­ly but saw Mr. Barnes’s account as ver­i­fy­ing the broad con­cerns he had raised. “This is real­ly very inter­est­ing and it real­ly does add sig­nif­i­cant­ly to the base lev­el of infor­ma­tion on this,” Mr. Sick said. “Just the fact that he was doing it and debriefed Casey when he got back means a lot.” The sto­ry goes “fur­ther than any­thing that I’ve seen thus far,” he added. “So this is real­ly new.”
    ...

    Regard­ing the bipar­ti­san con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tion that fol­lowed Gary Sick­’s 1991 opin­ion piece, and the fact that it ini­tial­ly con­clud­ed that there was noth­ing to the Octo­ber Sur­prise ‘con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries’, it’s worth not­ing that the Demo­c­rat who head­ed that inves­ti­ga­tion, Lee H. Hamil­ton of Indi­ana, was also the vice chair of the wide­ly panned 9/11 Com­mis­sion.

    And note who ulti­mate­ly dis­cov­ered a 1991 memo by a lawyer for Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush that con­firmed that yes, Bill Casey was indeed in Madrid dur­ing July and August of 1980, the peri­od when he is alleged to have met with rep­re­se­n­a­tives of Iran to pre­vent a release of the hostage: Robert Par­ry, 20 year lat­er in 2011. Who else knew about that memo dur­ing that 20 year peri­od? Just how open a secret was all this?

    ...
    The term “Octo­ber sur­prise” was orig­i­nal­ly used by the Rea­gan camp to describe its fears that Mr. Carter would manip­u­late the hostage cri­sis to effect a release just before the elec­tion.

    To fore­stall such a sce­nario, Mr. Casey was alleged to have met with rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Iran in July and August 1980 in Madrid lead­ing to a deal sup­pos­ed­ly final­ized in Paris in Octo­ber in which a future Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion would ship arms to Tehran through Israel in exchange for the hostages being held until after the elec­tion.

    The House and Sen­ate sep­a­rate­ly autho­rized inves­ti­ga­tions and both ulti­mate­ly reject­ed the claims. The bipar­ti­san House task force, led by a Demo­c­rat, Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Lee H. Hamil­ton of Indi­ana, and con­trolled by Democ­rats 8 to 5, con­clud­ed in a a con­sen­sus 968-page report that Mr. Casey was not in Madrid at the time and that sto­ries of covert deal­ings were not backed by cred­i­ble tes­ti­mo­ny, doc­u­ments or intel­li­gence reports.

    Still, a White House memo pro­duced in Novem­ber 1991 by a lawyer for Pres­i­dent George H.W. Bush report­ed the exis­tence of “a cable from the Madrid embassy indi­cat­ing that Bill Casey was in town, for pur­pos­es unknown.” That memo was not turned over to Mr. Hamilton’s task force and was dis­cov­ered two decades lat­er by Robert Par­ry, a jour­nal­ist who helped pro­duce a “Front­line” doc­u­men­tary on the Octo­ber sur­prise.

    ...

    Michael F. Zeldin, a Demo­c­ra­t­ic lawyer for the task force, and David H. Lauf­man, a Repub­li­can lawyer for the task force, both said in recent inter­views that Mr. Con­nal­ly nev­er crossed their radar screen dur­ing the inquiry and so they had no basis to judge Mr. Barnes’s account.
    ...

    John Con­nal­ly was­n’t even ‘on the radar’ of con­gres­sion­al inves­ti­ga­tors over 30 years ago. But he’s just been put on the radar in a big way. What will his­to­ri­ans and inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ists do with this now? Is this just a ran­dom­ly one-off? Prob­a­bly. But, again, that’s a big part of the con­text here: it’s not just that we got what appears to be con­fir­ma­tion that the ‘Octo­ber Sur­prise’ did indeed hap­pen as many sus­pect­ed. We’re also get­ting fur­ther con­fir­ma­tion that, for the most part, almost no one actu­al­ly cares. Sure, there was some hoopla about this report when it first came out. But that was about it. Now it’s back to just pas­sive­ly wait­ing for more sur­pris­es and then not real­ly pur­su­ing those new sur­pris­ing leads.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | March 23, 2023, 10:52 am
  5. It’s Israel’s 9/11. That’s the fram­ing we keep hear­ing in the reports and analy­sis cov­er­ing the explo­sion of full blow war between Israel and Gaza. A giant seem­ing­ly inex­plic­a­ble 9/11-style intel­li­gence fail­ure.

    Time will tell if that’s real­ly what hap­pened, but it’s worth keep­ing in mind that this appar­ent giant intel­li­gence fail­ure coin­cid­ed with the 50th anniver­sary of the start of the Yom Kip­pur War. In oth­er words, the tim­ing of some­thing hap­pen­ing on that date was­n’t exact­ly shock­ing. Some­thing was sure­ly com­ing, albeit not nec­es­sar­i­ly some­thing on this scale.

    But as the ques­tions of how such an intel­li­gence fail­ure hap­pened con­tin­ue to grow, ques­tions are rapid­ly eclips­ing the debate: was Iran involved and will this lead to a wider region­al war? Beyond that, was dis­rupt­ing the Israeli/Saudi peace process the motive here?

    Inter­est­ing­ly, the offi­cial stances on Iran’s involve­ment remain neb­u­lous, with the WSJ ini­tial­ly report­ing that senior mem­bers of Hamas and Hezbol­lah admit­ted that Iran gave its sup­port and green light for the attack. Lat­er state­ments from a senior Hamas offi­cial sug­gest­ed that Iran and Hezbol­lah played no roles at all in the attack. Iran con­tin­ues to insist it played no role at all. And while it’s not hard to see what Iran is deny­ing any involve­ment, it’s also not hard to imag­ine Hamas had some sort of Iran­ian assis­tance, espe­cial­ly giv­en the progress of Israeli/Saudi peace talks. This was a remark­ably sophis­ti­cat­ed mil­i­tary oper­a­tion on a num­ber of lev­els that had to require exten­sive train­ing some­where.

    But for all the ques­tions about Iran’s pos­si­ble involve­ment, and whether or not Iran ends up get­ting dragged into a broad­er region­al war that could pull in the US too, it’s going to be impor­tant to keep in mind the oth­er major ally Hamas has that obvi­ous­ly could have played a major oper­a­tional role: the rest of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood and its many relat­ed affil­i­ates and off­shoots. Hamas isn’t just some iso­lat­ed actor. Plen­ty of Mus­lim Broth­er­hood off­shoots have suf­fered defeats in recent years (like in Syr­ia or Egypt). How big a gam­ble is that larg­er net­work will­ing to make at this point?

    And that brings up the grim­ly fas­ci­nat­ing his­to­ry of the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion that is all the more rel­e­vant today as this cri­sis plays out: the his­to­ry of Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion as an exten­sion of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood’s explo­sive growth across the Mus­lim World through­out the Cold War peri­od. Explo­sive growth spon­sored and fos­tered by the CIA, as Farah Man­soor revealed. As we’ve also seen in the the report­ing by Robert Drey­fuss back in 2006, the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion itself grew out of a Shia Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate, the Devo­tees of Islam, which includ­ed the Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khome­i­ni.

    In fact, as we’re going to see in the Drey­fuss arti­cle excerpt below, the first instance of Islamist ter­ror in the US — the July 22, 1980, assas­si­na­tion of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a for­mer press coun­selor at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton — was exe­cut­ed by David Belfield, an Amer­i­can Mus­lim who first met Mus­lim Broth­er­hood lead — and sus­pect­ed CIA assets — Said Ramadan in 1975. Belfield went on to become Ramadan’s “per­son­al sec­re­tary, spe­cial emis­sary and devot­ed ser­vant.” That’s who com­mit­ted the first act of Islamist ter­ror on US soil. Said Ramadan’s per­son­al sec­re­tary, who killed a crit­ic of the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion. It’s the kind of his­to­ry that could be espe­cial­ly impor­tant when try­ing to make sense of a sit­u­a­tion that risks mor­ph­ing into a broad­er Mus­lim Brotherhood/Iranian allied wave of con­flict.

    Ok, first, here’s an AP men­tion the Egypt­ian claims that this was­n’t a sur­prise attack. Instead, the attack came after Egypt­ian intel­li­gence warned Israel that ‘some­thing big’ is com­ing. Soon:

    Asso­ci­at­ed Press

    What went wrong? Ques­tions emerge over Israel’s intel­li­gence prowess after Hamas attack

    By TIA GOLDENBERG
    Updat­ed 2:47 AM CDT, Octo­ber 9, 2023

    TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) — For Pales­tini­ans in Gaza, Israel’s eyes are nev­er very far away. Sur­veil­lance drones buzz con­stant­ly from the skies. The high­ly-secured bor­der is awash with secu­ri­ty cam­eras and sol­diers on guard. Intel­li­gence agen­cies work sources and cyber capa­bil­i­ties to draw out a bevy of infor­ma­tion.

    But Israel’s eyes appeared to have been closed in the lead-up to an unprece­dent­ed onslaught by the mil­i­tant Hamas group, which broke down Israeli bor­der bar­ri­ers and sent hun­dreds of mil­i­tants into Israel to car­ry out a brazen attack that has killed hun­dreds and pushed the region toward con­flict.

    Israel’s intel­li­gence agen­cies have gained an aura of invin­ci­bil­i­ty over the decades because of a string of achieve­ments. Israel has foiled plots seed­ed in the West Bank, alleged­ly hunt­ed down Hamas oper­a­tives in Dubai and has been accused of killing Iran­ian nuclear sci­en­tists in the heart of Iran. Even when their efforts have stum­bled, agen­cies like the Mossad, Shin Bet and mil­i­tary intel­li­gence have main­tained their mys­tique.

    But the weekend’s assault, which caught Israel off guard on a major Jew­ish hol­i­day, plunges that rep­u­ta­tion into doubt and rais­es ques­tions about the country’s readi­ness in the face of a weak­er but deter­mined foe. Over 48 hours lat­er, Hamas mil­i­tants con­tin­ued to bat­tle Israeli forces inside Israeli ter­ri­to­ry, and dozens of Israelis were in Hamas cap­tiv­i­ty in Gaza.

    “This is a major fail­ure,” said Yaakov Amidror, a for­mer nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er to Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu. “This oper­a­tion actu­al­ly proves that the (intel­li­gence) abil­i­ties in Gaza were no good.”

    ...

    Some say it is too ear­ly to pin the blame sole­ly on an intel­li­gence fault. They point to a wave of low-lev­el vio­lence in the West Bank that shift­ed some mil­i­tary resources there and the polit­i­cal chaos roil­ing Israel over steps by Netanyahu’s far-right gov­ern­ment to over­haul the judi­cia­ry. The con­tro­ver­sial plan has threat­ened the cohe­sion of the country’s pow­er­ful mil­i­tary.

    But the appar­ent lack of pri­or knowl­edge of Hamas’ plot will like­ly be seen as a prime cul­prit in the chain of events that led to the dead­liest attack against Israelis in decades.

    Israel with­drew troops and set­tlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, strip­ping it of a close han­dle on the hap­pen­ings in the ter­ri­to­ry. But even after Hamas over­ran Gaza in 2007, Israel appeared to main­tain its edge, using tech­no­log­i­cal and human intel­li­gence.

    It claimed to know the pre­cise loca­tions of Hamas lead­er­ship and appeared to prove it through the assas­si­na­tions of mil­i­tant lead­ers in sur­gi­cal strikes, some­times while they slept in their bed­rooms. Israel has known where to strike under­ground tun­nels used by Hamas to fer­ry around fight­ers and arms, destroy­ing miles (kilo­me­ters) of the con­cealed pas­sage­ways.

    Despite those abil­i­ties, Hamas was able to keep its plan under wraps. The fero­cious attack, which like­ly took months of plan­ning and metic­u­lous train­ing and involved coor­di­na­tion among mul­ti­ple mil­i­tant groups, appeared to have gone under Israel’s intel­li­gence radar.

    Amir Avivi, a retired Israeli gen­er­al, said that with­out a foothold inside Gaza, Israel’s secu­ri­ty ser­vices have come to rely increas­ing­ly on tech­no­log­i­cal means to gain intel­li­gence. He said mil­i­tants in Gaza have found ways to evade that tech­no­log­i­cal intel­li­gence gath­er­ing, giv­ing Israel an incom­plete pic­ture of their inten­tions.

    “The oth­er side learned to deal with our tech­no­log­i­cal dom­i­nance and they stopped using tech­nol­o­gy that could expose it,” said Avivi, who served as a con­duit for intel­li­gence mate­ri­als under a for­mer mil­i­tary chief of staff. Avivi is pres­i­dent and founder of Israel Defense and Secu­ri­ty Forum, a hawk­ish group of for­mer mil­i­tary com­man­ders.

    “They’ve gone back to the Stone Age,” he said, explain­ing that mil­i­tants weren’t using phones or com­put­ers and were con­duct­ing their sen­si­tive busi­ness in rooms spe­cial­ly guard­ed from tech­no­log­i­cal espi­onage or going under­ground.

    But Avivi said the fail­ure extends beyond just intel­li­gence gath­er­ing and Israel’s secu­ri­ty ser­vices failed to put togeth­er an accu­rate pic­ture from the intel­li­gence they were receiv­ing, based on what he said was a mis­con­cep­tion sur­round­ing Hamas’ inten­tions.

    Israel’s secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment has in recent years increas­ing­ly seen Hamas as an actor inter­est­ed in gov­ern­ing, seek­ing to devel­op Gaza’s econ­o­my and improv­ing the stan­dard of liv­ing of Gaza’s 2.3 mil­lion peo­ple. Avivi and oth­ers say the truth is that Hamas, which calls for Israel’s destruc­tion, still sees that aim as its pri­or­i­ty.

    Israel in recent years has allowed up to 18,000 Pales­tin­ian labor­ers from Gaza to work in Israel, where they can earn a salary about 10 times high­er than in the impov­er­ished coastal enclave. The secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment saw that car­rot as a way to main­tain rel­a­tive calm.

    “In prac­tice, hun­dreds if not thou­sands of Hamas men were prepar­ing for a sur­prise attack for months, with­out that hav­ing leaked,” wrote Amos Harel, a defense com­men­ta­tor, in the dai­ly Haaretz. “The results are cat­a­stroph­ic.”

    Allies who share intel­li­gence with Israel said secu­ri­ty agen­cies were mis­read­ing real­i­ty.

    An Egypt­ian intel­li­gence offi­cial said Egypt, which often serves as a medi­a­tor between Israel and Hamas, had spo­ken repeat­ed­ly with the Israelis about “some­thing big,” with­out elab­o­rat­ing.

    He said Israeli offi­cials were focused on the West Bank and played down the threat from Gaza. Netanyahu’s gov­ern­ment is made up of sup­port­ers of Jew­ish West Bank set­tlers who have demand­ed a secu­ri­ty crack­down in the face of a ris­ing tide of vio­lence there over the last 18 months.

    “We have warned them an explo­sion of the sit­u­a­tion is com­ing, and very soon, and it would be big. But they under­es­ti­mat­ed such warn­ings,” said the offi­cial, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because he wasn’t autho­rized to dis­cuss the con­tent of sen­si­tive intel­li­gence dis­cus­sions with the media.

    Israel has also been pre­oc­cu­pied and torn apart by Netanyahu’s judi­cial over­haul plan. Netanyahu had received repeat­ed warn­ings by his defense chiefs, as well as sev­er­al for­mer lead­ers of the country’s intel­li­gence agen­cies, that the divi­sive plan was chip­ping away at the cohe­sion of the country’s secu­ri­ty ser­vices.

    Mar­tin Indyk, who served as a spe­cial envoy for Israeli-Pales­tin­ian nego­ti­a­tions dur­ing the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion, said inter­nal divi­sions over the legal changes was an aggra­vat­ing fac­tor that con­tributed to the Israelis being caught off guard.

    “That roiled the IDF in a way that was, I think, we dis­cov­ered was a huge dis­trac­tion,” he said.

    ———-

    “What went wrong? Ques­tions emerge over Israel’s intel­li­gence prowess after Hamas attack” by TIA GOLDENBERG; Asso­ci­at­ed Press; 10/09/2023

    “An Egypt­ian intel­li­gence offi­cial said Egypt, which often serves as a medi­a­tor between Israel and Hamas, had spo­ken repeat­ed­ly with the Israelis about “some­thing big,” with­out elab­o­rat­ing.”

    “Some­thing big” was com­ing. That’s what Egypt­ian intel­li­gence was appar­ent­ly warn­ing Israel. Some­thing big was com­ing “soon”:

    ...
    He said Israeli offi­cials were focused on the West Bank and played down the threat from Gaza. Netanyahu’s gov­ern­ment is made up of sup­port­ers of Jew­ish West Bank set­tlers who have demand­ed a secu­ri­ty crack­down in the face of a ris­ing tide of vio­lence there over the last 18 months.

    “We have warned them an explo­sion of the sit­u­a­tion is com­ing, and very soon, and it would be big. But they under­es­ti­mat­ed such warn­ings,” said the offi­cial, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because he wasn’t autho­rized to dis­cuss the con­tent of sen­si­tive intel­li­gence dis­cus­sions with the media.

    Israel has also been pre­oc­cu­pied and torn apart by Netanyahu’s judi­cial over­haul plan. Netanyahu had received repeat­ed warn­ings by his defense chiefs, as well as sev­er­al for­mer lead­ers of the country’s intel­li­gence agen­cies, that the divi­sive plan was chip­ping away at the cohe­sion of the country’s secu­ri­ty ser­vices.
    ...

    So just how big of an intel­li­gence ‘fail­ure’ was this? A gen­uine screw up? Or some­thing clos­er 9/11, with intel­li­gence agen­cies appear­ing to run cov­er for the ter­ror oper­a­tion? It’s too ear­ly to say. But it’s not too ear­ly to revis­it vital his­to­ry for events involv­ing poten­tial col­lu­sion between Hamas and the Iran­ian gov­ern­ment. A his­to­ry of col­lu­sion that involves the CIA too. As Robert Drey­fuss described in this 2006 Moth­er Jones piece, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood leader Said Ramadan did­n’t just play a cru­cial role in estab­lish­ing Mus­lim Broth­er­hood branch­es across the Mus­lim world, includ­ing the for­ma­tion of Hamas in Pales­tine. The Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion emerged from Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate the Devo­tees of Islam, led by the men­tor of Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khome­i­ni. Beyond that, the first instance of Islamist ter­ror in the US — the July 22, 1980, assas­si­na­tion of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a for­mer press coun­selor at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton — was per­pe­trat­ed by none oth­er than David Belfield, an Amer­i­can Mus­lim who first met Said Ramadan in 1975 and went on to become Ramadan’s “per­son­al sec­re­tary, spe­cial emis­sary and devot­ed ser­vant.” And through­out these decades of Ramadan’s build­ing up of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, doc­u­ments indi­cate he was a CIA asset. Unpleas­ant his­to­ry, but the kind of his­to­ry we should prob­a­bly keep in mind as we appear to be lurch­ing clos­er and clos­er to a region­al war that could drag in both the US and Iran:

    Moth­er Jones

    Cold War, Holy War­rior

    Ike was pres­i­dent. Wash­ing­ton was des­per­ate for Arab allies. Enter an Islamist ide­o­logue with an invi­ta­tion to the White House and a plan for glob­al jihad.

    Robert Drey­fuss
    January/February 2006 Issue

    In the fall of 1953, the Oval Office was the stage for a pecu­liar encounter between Pres­i­dent Dwight D. Eisen­how­er and a young Mid­dle-East­ern fire­brand. In the mut­ed black-and-white pho­to­graph record­ing the event, the grand­fa­ther­ly, bald­ing Ike, then 62, stands gray-suit­ed, erect, his elbows bent and his fists clenched as if to add mus­cle to some force­ful point. To his left is an olive-skinned Egypt­ian in a dark suit with a neat­ly trimmed beard and close­ly cropped hair, clutch­ing a sheaf of papers behind his back, star­ing intent­ly at the pres­i­dent. He is just 27 years old, but he already has more than a decade of expe­ri­ence deep inside the vio­lent and pas­sion­ate world of mil­i­tant Islam, from Cairo to Amman to Karachi. Along­side him are mem­bers of a del­e­ga­tion of schol­ars, mul­lahs, and activists from India, Syr­ia, Yemen, Jor­dan, Turkey, and Sau­di Ara­bia, some dressed in suits, oth­ers wear­ing robes and shawls.

    The president’s vis­i­tor that Sep­tem­ber day was Said Ramadan, a key offi­cial and ide­o­logue of a secre­tive, under­ground fra­ter­ni­ty of Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ists known as the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. As he stood at the president’s side, Ramadan appeared respectable, a wel­come guest if not a fel­low states­man.

    Offi­cial­ly, Ramadan was in the Unit­ed States to attend a col­lo­qui­um on Islam­ic cul­ture at Prince­ton Uni­ver­si­ty, cospon­sored by the Library of Con­gress. It was an august event, held with much pomp and cir­cum­stance in Princeton’s Nas­sau Hall. Del­e­gates sat neat­ly arrayed in stiff-backed pews in the high-ceilinged Fac­ul­ty Room and attend­ed lav­ish lun­cheons, recep­tions, and gar­den par­ties in the shade of bright fall foliage.

    Accord­ing to the pub­lished pro­ceed­ings, the con­fer­ence was the for­tu­itous result of the fact that a num­ber of cel­e­brat­ed per­son­ages from the Mid­dle East were vis­it­ing the coun­try. “Dur­ing the sum­mer of 1953 there hap­pened to be an unusu­al­ly large num­ber of dis­tin­guished Mus­lim schol­ars in the Unit­ed States,” the doc­u­ment notes. But the par­tic­i­pants didn’t just “hap­pen” to have crossed the Atlantic. The col­lo­qui­um was orga­nized by the U.S. gov­ern­ment, which fund­ed it, tapped par­tic­i­pants it con­sid­ered use­ful or promis­ing, and bun­dled them off to New Jer­sey. Con­fer­ence orga­niz­ers had vis­it­ed Cairo, Bahrain, Bagh­dad, Beirut, New Del­hi, and oth­er cities to scout for par­tic­i­pants. Foot­ing the bill—to the tune of $25,000, plus addi­tion­al expens­es for trans­port­ing atten­dees from the Mid­dle East—was the Inter­na­tion­al Infor­ma­tion Admin­is­tra­tion (IIA), a branch of the State Depart­ment that had its roots in the U.S. intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty; sup­ple­men­tary fund­ing was sought from U.S. air­lines and from Aram­co, the U.S. oil con­sor­tium in Sau­di Ara­bia. Like many of the par­tic­i­pants, Ramadan, a hard-edged ide­o­logue and not a schol­ar, was vis­it­ing the con­fer­ence as an all-expens­es-paid guest.

    A now-declas­si­fied IIA doc­u­ment labeled “Confidential—Security Infor­ma­tion” sums up the pur­pose of the project: “On the sur­face, the con­fer­ence looks like an exer­cise in pure learn­ing. This in effect is the impres­sion desired.” The true goal, the memo notes, was to “bring togeth­er per­sons exert­ing great influ­ence in for­mu­lat­ing Mus­lim opin­ion in fields such as edu­ca­tion, sci­ence, law and phi­los­o­phy and inevitably, there­fore, on pol­i­tics…. Among the var­i­ous results expect­ed from the col­lo­qui­um are the impe­tus and direc­tion that may be giv­en to the Renais­sance move­ment with­in Islam itself.” At the time, the Unit­ed States was just begin­ning to feel its way around the Mid­dle East, and Amer­i­can ori­en­tal­ists and aca­d­e­mics were debat­ing the extent to which polit­i­cal Islam might serve as a tool for Amer­i­can influ­ence in the region.

    For an orga­ni­za­tion estab­lished as a secret soci­ety, with a para­mil­i­tary arm that was respon­si­ble for assas­si­na­tions and vio­lence, to be char­ac­ter­ized as a har­bin­ger of a rebirth of Islam may seem odd. But such a view was entire­ly in char­ac­ter with U.S. pol­i­cy at a time when vir­tu­al­ly any­one who opposed com­mu­nism was viewed as a poten­tial ally. When­ev­er I inter­viewed CIA and State Depart­ment offi­cials who served in the Mid­dle East between World War II and the fall of the Sovi­et Union, they would repeat, almost like a cat­e­chism, that Islam was seen as a bar­ri­er both to Sovi­et expan­sion and to the spread of Marx­ist ide­ol­o­gy among the mass­es. “We thought of Islam as a coun­ter­weight to com­mu­nism,” says Tal­cott Seelye, an Amer­i­can diplo­mat who, while serv­ing in Jor­dan in the ear­ly 1950s, paid a vis­it to Said Ramadan. “We saw it as a mod­er­ate force, and a pos­i­tive one.” Indeed, adds Her­mann Eilts, anoth­er vet­er­an U.S. diplo­mat who was sta­tioned in Sau­di Ara­bia in the late ’40s, Amer­i­can offi­cials in Cairo had “reg­u­lar meet­ings” with Ramadan’s then-boss, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood leader Has­san al-Ban­na, “and found him per­fect­ly empa­thet­ic.”

    Over the four decades after Ramadan’s vis­it to the Oval Office, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood would become the orga­ni­za­tion­al spon­sor for gen­er­a­tion after gen­er­a­tion of Islamist groups from Sau­di Ara­bia to Syr­ia, Gene­va to Lahore—and Ramadan, its chief inter­na­tion­al orga­niz­er, would turn up, Zeliglike, as an oper­a­tive in vir­tu­al­ly every man­i­fes­ta­tion of rad­i­cal polit­i­cal Islam. The hard­core Islamists of Pak­istan (see “Among the Allies,” page 44), whose acolytes cre­at­ed the Tal­iban in Afghanistan and who have pro­vid­ed suc­cor to Al Qae­da since the 1990s, mod­eled their orga­ni­za­tion on the Broth­er­hood. The regime of the aya­tol­lahs in Iran grew out of a secret soci­ety called the Devo­tees of Islam, a Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate whose leader in the 1950s was the men­tor of Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khome­i­ni. Hamas, the Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion, began as an offi­cial branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. The rad­i­cal-right Egypt­ian Islam­ic Jihad and allied groups, whose mem­bers assas­si­nat­ed Pres­i­dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981 and which merged with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qae­da in the 1990s, grew out of the Broth­er­hood in the 1970s. And some of the Afghan lead­ers who spear­head­ed the anti-Sovi­et jihad that was run by the CIA in the 1980s, and who helped bin Laden build the net­work of “Arab Afghans” that was Al Qaeda’s fore­run­ner, were Broth­er­hood mem­bers.

    It’s no exag­ger­a­tion to say that Ramadan is the ide­o­log­i­cal grand­fa­ther of Osama bin Laden. But Ramadan, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, and their Islamist allies might nev­er have been able to plant the seeds that sprout­ed into Al Qae­da had they not been treat­ed as U.S. allies dur­ing the Cold War and had they not received both overt and covert sup­port from Wash­ing­ton; Ramadan him­self, doc­u­ments sug­gest, was recruit­ed as an asset by the CIA.

    ...

    SAID RAMADAN was born in 1926 in Shib­in el Kom, a vil­lage about 40 miles north of Cairo in the Nile delta. He encoun­tered Ban­na and joined his move­ment when he was 14; six years lat­er, after grad­u­at­ing from Cairo Uni­ver­si­ty, he became Banna’s per­son­al sec­re­tary and right-hand man. A year lat­er, Ramadan was named edi­tor of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood week­ly, Al Shi­hab, and he mar­ried Banna’s daugh­ter, giv­ing him an impor­tant claim to lead­er­ship with­in the orga­ni­za­tion.

    Ramadan became Banna’s rov­ing ambas­sador, amass­ing a net­work of inter­na­tion­al con­tacts. In 1945, he trav­eled to then British-con­trolled Jerusalem, where the storm clouds of war between Arabs and Jews were begin­ning to gath­er. Over the years that fol­lowed, Ramadan would spend a great deal of time shut­tling between Jerusalem, Amman, Dam­as­cus, and Beirut to build Broth­er­hood chap­ters. At the time, Pales­tine was still British-con­trolled ter­ri­to­ry, a des­per­ate­ly poor desert region inhab­it­ed by war­ring Arab and Jew­ish pop­u­la­tions. Trav­el­ing to mosques and uni­ver­si­ty cam­pus­es and focus­ing on Mus­lim youth like him­self, Ramadan preached a mil­i­tant gospel and helped to cre­ate para­mil­i­tary groups made up of young men angry at British colo­nial­ism and Zion­ist immi­gra­tion. By 1947, there were 25 branch­es of the Broth­er­hood in Pales­tine, with between 12,000 and 20,000 mem­bers. In 1948, Ramadan helped the Broth­er­hood send Islam­ic fight­ers into bat­tle with the Jew­ish armed forces that estab­lished Israel that year. Com­pared to the armies of Egypt and Syr­ia, the Brotherhood’s forces were small and mil­i­tar­i­ly insignif­i­cant, but the sym­bol­ic ges­ture would enhance the group’s pres­tige for decades to come.

    By the 1950s, Ramadan had become an itin­er­ant preach­er, sort of an Elmer Gantry of the Islamist move­ment. In 1949 and 1951 he trav­eled to Pak­istan, tak­ing part in the meet­ings of the World Mus­lim Con­gress in Karachi—the first transna­tion­al body con­nect­ing the world’s Islamist movements—where he flirt­ed with becom­ing sec­re­tary-gen­er­al of the orga­ni­za­tion. Pak­istan, the world’s first state orga­nized around the prin­ci­ple of Islam, was becom­ing a mag­net for fun­da­men­tal­ist ide­o­logues, and it would be a kind of sec­ond home for Ramadan. The fledg­ling gov­ern­ment gave Ramadan a broad­cast slot on the nation­al radio net­work, and Prime Min­is­ter Liaquat Ali Khan wrote the pref­ace to one of Ramadan’s books.

    In Pak­istan, Ramadan worked close­ly with a young Islamist named Abul-Ala Maw­du­di, who had found­ed a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood-style move­ment called the Islam­ic Soci­ety. Just as he had recruit­ed angry young Mus­lims to take up arms in Pales­tine, so Ramadan helped Maw­du­di mold a mus­cu­lar pha­lanx of fanat­i­cal Islam­ic stu­dents into a bat­ter­ing ram against Pakistan’s left. Known by its Urdu ini­tials as the IJT and mod­eled on Mussolini’s fas­cist squadristi, the group deployed its often-armed thugs to do bat­tle with left-wing stu­dents on cam­pus. “Egg toss­ing grad­u­al­ly gave way to more seri­ous clash­es, espe­cial­ly in Karachi,” writes Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, a lead­ing expert on the move­ment. In the process, the IJT trained the gen­er­a­tion of rad­i­cals who seized con­trol of Pak­istan in 1977 under the far-right dic­ta­tor Gen­er­al Zia ul-Haq, spon­sored the jihad in Afghanistan, shel­tered Al Qae­da, and even today rep­re­sents a threat to Gen­er­al Per­vez Musharraf’s shaky regime.

    In between his trips to Pak­istan, Ramadan also worked with Arab fun­da­men­tal­ists, espe­cial­ly Pales­tini­ans and Jor­da­ni­ans, to found the Islam­ic Lib­er­a­tion Par­ty, which would lat­er metas­ta­size through­out Mus­lim Cen­tral Asia. By the 1990s, the party—known by its Ara­bic name, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and increas­ing­ly sup­port­ed by Sau­di Arabia—had become an impor­tant rad­i­cal force aligned with Al Qae­da, with a pres­ence in Lon­don, Ger­many, and through­out Europe. While in Jor­dan in the ’50s, Ramadan also helped found the Jor­dan­ian branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, which, as in Pak­istan, became a tool for sup­press­ing the left and Arab nation­al­ists.

    But Ramadan’s efforts in Pales­tine, Jor­dan, and Pak­istan were mere skir­mish­es ahead of the mid-1950s show­down in Egypt. Egypt­ian Pres­i­dent Gamal Abdel Nass­er, a mer­cu­r­ial mil­i­tary offi­cer who led the coup d’etat that top­pled the country’s dis­solute monar­chy in 1952, achieved almost leg­endary sta­tus overnight. By insist­ing on Egypt’s inde­pen­dence, demand­ing that Britain aban­don its mil­i­tary bases in Egypt and turn over the strate­gi­cal­ly vital Suez Canal, Nass­er emerged as a hero to mil­lions of Arabs—and he ter­ri­fied both Great Britain and the Unit­ed States, not least because his brand of nation­al­ism threat­ened U.S. and British oil inter­ests in the Gulf. (British Prime Min­is­ter Antho­ny Eden came up with a vari­ety of schemes to have Nass­er assas­si­nat­ed.)

    The Broth­er­hood saw Nass­er as a hate­ful sec­u­lar­ist who had aban­doned Islam and who was too will­ing to coop­er­ate with communism—beliefs that endeared them to both Lon­don and Wash­ing­ton. In 1954, a Broth­er­hood fanat­ic fired eight shots at the Egypt­ian leader and Nass­er cracked down on the orga­ni­za­tion, arrest­ing many of its lead­ers. Ramadan, by then an unof­fi­cial for­eign min­is­ter for the Broth­er­hood, was in Syr­ia at the time, furi­ous­ly gen­er­at­ing anti-Nass­er pro­pa­gan­da. In Sep­tem­ber 1954, Nass­er stripped Ramadan of his Egypt­ian pass­port. But his exile would not last.

    ONCE AGAIN, it was the Cold War that saved Ramadan and his move­ment. This time, his des­ti­na­tion was Ger­many, an ally of Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ism going back to the Nazi era. When Egypt and Syr­ia estab­lished diplo­mat­ic rela­tions with East Ger­many, West Ger­many made over­tures to both coun­tries’ opposition—and that includ­ed the Broth­er­hood. Ramadan got offi­cial West Ger­man help in flee­ing to Munich from his cer­tain death sen­tence in Egypt; a few years lat­er he set­tled in Gene­va, hub of inter­na­tion­al diplo­ma­cy and intrigue. There, in 1961, he cre­at­ed the Islam­ic Cen­ter of Gene­va, which would serve for decades as the base and orga­ni­za­tion­al head­quar­ters for the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood in Europe.

    As Washington’s ally in the strug­gle to under­mine Nass­er, Ramadan ben­e­fit­ed from a fate­ful choice made by the Unit­ed States in the 1950s and ’60s. Rather than ally­ing itself with Nasser’s brand of Arab nation­al­ism, the Unit­ed States had made per­haps its biggest mis­take in the Mid­dle East since World War II: It chose to make com­mon cause with Sau­di Arabia’s reac­tionary monar­chy. Start­ing in the 1950s, Wash­ing­ton encour­aged the king­dom to cre­ate a net­work of right-wing Islam­ic states and Islamist orga­ni­za­tions, thus help­ing to build the foun­da­tion on which Al Qae­da would ulti­mate­ly rest. Ramadan’s Islam­ic Cen­ter was a major ben­e­fi­cia­ry of the pol­i­cy, reap­ing gen­er­ous fund­ing from the king­dom.

    The cen­ter soon became a place for Islamists from across the entire Mus­lim world to meet and make plans; it also act­ed as a pub­lish­ing house for Islamist lit­er­a­ture. Its pur­pose was to pro­mote the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s ide­ol­o­gy, accord­ing to Hani Ramadan, Said’s son, who has assumed his father’s man­tle as direc­tor of the cen­ter. “The cre­ation of the Islam­ic Cen­ter was sup­posed to real­ize my father’s desire of cre­at­ing a cen­ter from which he could spread the teach­ings of Has­san al-Ban­na,” he says, “a place where stu­dents com­ing from var­i­ous Arab coun­tries could meet and be trained in the mes­sage of Islam.” Accord­ing to Richard Labeviere, a French jour­nal­ist who has writ­ten about the Brotherhood’s ties to ter­ror­ism, Said Ramadan used Gene­va as the launch­ing pad for the Brotherhood’s inter­na­tion­al expan­sion; the group even cre­at­ed its own Swiss bank, Al Taqwa, with offices in the Swiss town of Cam­pi­one d’Italia as well as the Bahamas. After Sep­tem­ber 11, 2001, Al Taqwa was list­ed by the Unit­ed States as hav­ing sup­port­ed ter­ror­ists.

    There’s anoth­er intrigu­ing ques­tion that emerges from this peri­od in Ramadan’s life: Had he been recruit­ed by the CIA dur­ing his 1953 vis­it to the Unit­ed States? Ramadan’s fam­i­ly denies that he was, but declas­si­fied doc­u­ments in the Swiss Nation­al Archives, uncov­ered by Syl­vain Besson of Geneva’s Le Temps news­pa­per, reveal that in the 1960s the Swiss author­i­ties con­sid­ered him to be, “among oth­er things, an intel­li­gence agent of the British and the Amer­i­cans.” In July 2005, the Wall Street Jour­nal, after exten­sive archival research in Switzer­land and Ger­many, report­ed: “His­tor­i­cal evi­dence sug­gests Mr. Ramadan worked with the CIA.” Doc­u­ments from West Ger­man intel­li­gence archives, uncov­ered by the Jour­nal, reveal that Ramadan trav­eled on an offi­cial Jor­dan­ian diplo­mat­ic pass­port secured for him by the CIA, that “his expen­di­tures are financed by the Amer­i­can side,” and that Ramadan worked close­ly with the CIA’s Amer­i­can Com­mit­tee for Lib­er­a­tion from Bol­she­vism, Amcom­lib, which ran Radio Free Europe and Radio Lib­er­ty (both CIA front groups) in the 1950s and 1960s. Accord­ing to the Jour­nal, in May 1961, a CIA offi­cer with Amcom­lib met with Ramadan to plan a “joint pro­pa­gan­da effort against the Sovi­et Union.”

    As it turned out, the Islam­ic Cen­ter was only the begin­ning of Ramadan’s ambi­tions. In 1962 he helped cre­ate a broad­er, more pow­er­ful orga­ni­za­tion that would become the cen­tral ner­vous sys­tem for far-right Wah­habi inter­na­tion­al­ism: the Mus­lim World League. “My father wasn’t just one of the lead­ers of the found­ing group of the league,” says Hani Ramadan. “He had the orig­i­nal idea for its cre­ation.”

    ...

    In 1970, the Broth­er­hood and Ramadan saw their ulti­mate vin­di­ca­tion when Nass­er died and Anwar Sadat, a mem­ber of the Broth­er­hood decades before, became pres­i­dent of Egypt. The next year, Ramadan returned to Egypt at the head of a Mus­lim Broth­er­hood del­e­ga­tion, orga­nized and financed by Sau­di Ara­bia, to bro­ker a deal with Sadat to reestab­lish the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, 17 years after it was first out­lawed. (In the words of Robert Baer, a for­mer CIA oper­a­tions offi­cer who has writ­ten about ties between the CIA and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, Sau­di Ara­bia “pimped for the Broth­ers.”)

    At the time, Sadat was try­ing to reori­ent Egypt away from its ties to the Sovi­et Union, mov­ing the Arab world’s most pow­er­ful coun­try into the orbit of the Unit­ed States and Sau­di Ara­bia. But Sadat lacked any real polit­i­cal base, and he had to purge scores of Nasserists from key posi­tions in the gov­ern­ment. He turned to the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood to help cre­ate a new base of sup­port, and the group seized its chance.

    Dur­ing the 1970s, the Egypt­ian Islamist move­ment spread wild­ly, tak­ing over key insti­tu­tions and spawn­ing a host of rad­i­cal Islamist off­shoots, which in turn mobi­lized to sup­port the CIA’s anti-Sovi­et jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. These vol­un­teers also estab­lished a new orga­ni­za­tion, Islam­ic Jihad, which would lat­er join with Osama bin Laden as part of Al Qae­da. And in 1981, the rad­i­cals turned on their pro­tec­tor: An Islamist assas­sin gunned Sadat down in full pub­lic view dur­ing a tele­vised army parade.

    AS INFLUENTIAL as he was in the Mid­dle East through­out the ’60s and ’70s, Ramadan was vir­tu­al­ly invis­i­ble to the West. The first time Amer­i­cans might have heard his name was in con­nec­tion with a bizarre mur­der in Wash­ing­ton; it would turn out to be the first instance of Islamist ter­ror­ism in the Unit­ed States. On July 22, 1980, the door­bell rang at the home of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a for­mer press coun­selor at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton who, after the fall of the shah in 1979, had found­ed the Iran Free­dom Foun­da­tion and had become a lead­ing oppo­nent of the Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khomeini’s Islamist regime. On his doorstep that day was a young man, dressed as a mail­man. He fired sev­er­al shots into Tabatabai’s abdomen, killing him.

    The assas­sin, who’d bor­rowed a mail truck from an unsus­pect­ing friend, was an Amer­i­can Mus­lim named David Belfield. Inves­ti­ga­tors track­ing Belfield, who was now call­ing him­self Daoud Salahud­din, found that he’d fled first to Gene­va and then to Iran. Then they dis­cov­ered a curi­ous fact: Just before the mur­der, a series of phone calls to Said Ramadan were placed from a pay phone near Belfield’s work­place in Wash­ing­ton. Ramadan—an enthu­si­as­tic sup­port­er of Khomeini’s revolution—also spoke with the fugi­tive in Gene­va, coor­di­nat­ed his escape with the Iran­ian Embassy in Switzer­land, and made a call to Aya­tol­lah Khomeini’s son in Iran to make sure that Belfield made it safe­ly to sanc­tu­ary in Tehran. It lat­er turned out that Belfield had talked to Ramadan before accept­ing a job as a secu­ri­ty guard at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton; accord­ing to The New York­er, Belfield pock­et­ed $5,000 for the assas­si­na­tion from his “han­dler” in the Iran­ian gov­ern­ment.

    Belfield and Ramadan had first met in June 1975 when Ramadan spent sev­er­al months in the Unit­ed States, a tour that includ­ed speak­ing engage­ments at Washington’s Islam­ic Cen­ter, an Eisen­how­er-era mosque on Mass­a­chu­setts Avenue adja­cent to Rock Creek Park. Their first encounter was in Ramadan’s hotel room; after that, Ramadan stayed for three months at Belfield’s mod­est home on Ran­dolph Street in Wash­ing­ton. Ramadan regaled Belfield with tales of jihad, and the young Amer­i­can began almost to wor­ship the Egypt­ian. Accord­ing to an account of the rela­tion­ship pub­lished much lat­er in the Wash­ing­ton Post, Belfield became Ramadan’s “per­son­al sec­re­tary, spe­cial emis­sary and devot­ed ser­vant. Ramadan became his spir­i­tu­al leader for life.” Ramadan told Belfield that if he were to under­take vio­lent action in sup­port of Islam­ic rev­o­lu­tion, “he wouldn’t be emo­tion­al­ly scarred by it—it would ‘be accom­plished and sim­ply for­got­ten.’” Belfield would lat­er tell The New York­er, “His tone was emphat­ic. And for me it was tak­en as a com­mand.”

    ...

    By the 1980s and 90s, with Khomeini’s regime in Iran and Zia ul-Haq’s Islamist dic­ta­tor­ship in Pak­istan firm­ly entrenched, the Afghan jihad under way, and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood estab­lished as a potent, under­ground oppo­si­tion move­ment in Egypt, Syr­ia, Pales­tine, and else­where, Ramadan’s ear­ly spade­work had borne fruit through­out the Mid­dle East. But even as Islamism came into its own, an aging Ramadan was fad­ing from promi­nence, and in 1995, at age 69, he passed away. His son Hani took over the reins of the Islam­ic Cen­ter while anoth­er son, Tariq, a pro­fes­sor in Switzer­land, pub­licly eschewed his father’s rad­i­cal­ism. In 2004, Notre Dame Uni­ver­si­ty invit­ed Tariq Ramadan to come to Indi­ana as a pro­fes­sor, but he was barred from enter­ing the Unit­ed States when the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty refused to grant him a visa.

    Today, Ramadan’s lega­cy is evi­dent every­where. The Mus­lim Broth­er­hood remains a pow­er­ful, transna­tion­al secret soci­ety com­mit­ted to the cre­ation of a fra­ter­ni­ty of Islam­ic republics that would be gov­erned accord­ing to their vision of sev­enth-cen­tu­ry Mus­lim laws. And it has used the back­ing of Iran­ian and Arab petro­le­um poten­tates to cre­ate a pow­er­ful polit­i­cal infra­struc­ture, from Egypt to Syr­ia (where its vio­lent under­ground pres­ence pos­es a direct threat to the sec­u­lar, nation­al­ist regime of Bashar al-Assad) to the chaos of Iraq, where the Sun­ni oppo­si­tion is being steered in a fun­da­men­tal­ist direc­tion by, among oth­ers, the Iraqi Islam­ic Par­ty, a Broth­er­hood branch.

    Among Amer­i­can ana­lysts, the Broth­er­hood still has its defend­ers. Pro­fes­sors John O. Voll and John L. Espos­i­to of George­town Uni­ver­si­ty, both schol­ars of Islam, defend it as a mod­er­ate Islamist orga­ni­za­tion that rejects extrem­ism and vio­lence and note with approval that some U.S. offi­cials see the Broth­er­hood as “impor­tant poten­tial allies in the war on ter­ror­ism.” Reuel Marc Gerecht, a for­mer CIA offi­cer who is now a fel­low at the neo­con­ser­v­a­tive Amer­i­can Enter­prise Insti­tute, argues in his 2004 book, The Islam­ic Para­dox, that even if the Broth­er­hood were to seize pow­er in Egypt and sup­press democ­ra­cy, “the Unit­ed States would still be bet­ter off with this alter­na­tive than with [the cur­rent] sec­u­lar dic­ta­tor­ship.” From the U.S.-allied theoc­ra­cy emerg­ing in Bagh­dad to the right-wing Islamists of Pak­istan, America’s fatal fas­ci­na­tion with fun­da­men­tal­ism con­tin­ues.

    ———–

    “Cold War, Holy War­rior” by Robert Drey­fuss; Moth­er Jones; January/February 2006 Issue

    By the 1980s and 90s, with Khomeini’s regime in Iran and Zia ul-Haq’s Islamist dic­ta­tor­ship in Pak­istan firm­ly entrenched, the Afghan jihad under way, and the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood estab­lished as a potent, under­ground oppo­si­tion move­ment in Egypt, Syr­ia, Pales­tine, and else­where, Ramadan’s ear­ly spade­work had borne fruit through­out the Mid­dle East. But even as Islamism came into its own, an aging Ramadan was fad­ing from promi­nence, and in 1995, at age 69, he passed away. His son Hani took over the reins of the Islam­ic Cen­ter while anoth­er son, Tariq, a pro­fes­sor in Switzer­land, pub­licly eschewed his father’s rad­i­cal­ism. In 2004, Notre Dame Uni­ver­si­ty invit­ed Tariq Ramadan to come to Indi­ana as a pro­fes­sor, but he was barred from enter­ing the Unit­ed States when the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty refused to grant him a visa.”

    Yes, by the 90s, the fruits of Said Ramadan’s decades of net­work­ing and orga­ni­za­tion build­ing had been borne. Mus­lim Broth­er­hood affil­i­ates were wield­ing influ­enc­ing in Mus­lim pop­u­la­tions across the globe. Includ­ing Iran. Decades of work that appears to include spon­sor­ship by the US — and CIA in par­tic­u­lar — going back to Ramadan’s trip to the US in 1953. How does this his­to­ry help explain what we are see­ing unfold today? Are today’s events being facil­i­tat­ed in part from these old ties between Hamas and the Iran­ian Rev­o­lu­tion­ary gov­ern­ment? We still don’t know since Iran’s involve­ment remains unclear. But if Iran was involved, this is very rel­e­vant his­to­ry to keep in in mind:

    ...
    The president’s vis­i­tor that Sep­tem­ber day was Said Ramadan, a key offi­cial and ide­o­logue of a secre­tive, under­ground fra­ter­ni­ty of Islam­ic fun­da­men­tal­ists known as the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. As he stood at the president’s side, Ramadan appeared respectable, a wel­come guest if not a fel­low states­man.

    Offi­cial­ly, Ramadan was in the Unit­ed States to attend a col­lo­qui­um on Islam­ic cul­ture at Prince­ton Uni­ver­si­ty, cospon­sored by the Library of Con­gress. It was an august event, held with much pomp and cir­cum­stance in Princeton’s Nas­sau Hall. Del­e­gates sat neat­ly arrayed in stiff-backed pews in the high-ceilinged Fac­ul­ty Room and attend­ed lav­ish lun­cheons, recep­tions, and gar­den par­ties in the shade of bright fall foliage.

    Accord­ing to the pub­lished pro­ceed­ings, the con­fer­ence was the for­tu­itous result of the fact that a num­ber of cel­e­brat­ed per­son­ages from the Mid­dle East were vis­it­ing the coun­try. “Dur­ing the sum­mer of 1953 there hap­pened to be an unusu­al­ly large num­ber of dis­tin­guished Mus­lim schol­ars in the Unit­ed States,” the doc­u­ment notes. But the par­tic­i­pants didn’t just “hap­pen” to have crossed the Atlantic. The col­lo­qui­um was orga­nized by the U.S. gov­ern­ment, which fund­ed it, tapped par­tic­i­pants it con­sid­ered use­ful or promis­ing, and bun­dled them off to New Jer­sey. Con­fer­ence orga­niz­ers had vis­it­ed Cairo, Bahrain, Bagh­dad, Beirut, New Del­hi, and oth­er cities to scout for par­tic­i­pants. Foot­ing the bill—to the tune of $25,000, plus addi­tion­al expens­es for trans­port­ing atten­dees from the Mid­dle East—was the Inter­na­tion­al Infor­ma­tion Admin­is­tra­tion (IIA), a branch of the State Depart­ment that had its roots in the U.S. intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty; sup­ple­men­tary fund­ing was sought from U.S. air­lines and from Aram­co, the U.S. oil con­sor­tium in Sau­di Ara­bia. Like many of the par­tic­i­pants, Ramadan, a hard-edged ide­o­logue and not a schol­ar, was vis­it­ing the con­fer­ence as an all-expens­es-paid guest.

    ...

    Over the four decades after Ramadan’s vis­it to the Oval Office, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood would become the orga­ni­za­tion­al spon­sor for gen­er­a­tion after gen­er­a­tion of Islamist groups from Sau­di Ara­bia to Syr­ia, Gene­va to Lahore—and Ramadan, its chief inter­na­tion­al orga­niz­er, would turn up, Zeliglike, as an oper­a­tive in vir­tu­al­ly every man­i­fes­ta­tion of rad­i­cal polit­i­cal Islam. The hard­core Islamists of Pak­istan (see “Among the Allies,” page 44), whose acolytes cre­at­ed the Tal­iban in Afghanistan and who have pro­vid­ed suc­cor to Al Qae­da since the 1990s, mod­eled their orga­ni­za­tion on the Broth­er­hood. The regime of the aya­tol­lahs in Iran grew out of a secret soci­ety called the Devo­tees of Islam, a Broth­er­hood affil­i­ate whose leader in the 1950s was the men­tor of Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khome­i­ni. Hamas, the Pales­tin­ian ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion, began as an offi­cial branch of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. The rad­i­cal-right Egypt­ian Islam­ic Jihad and allied groups, whose mem­bers assas­si­nat­ed Pres­i­dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981 and which merged with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qae­da in the 1990s, grew out of the Broth­er­hood in the 1970s. And some of the Afghan lead­ers who spear­head­ed the anti-Sovi­et jihad that was run by the CIA in the 1980s, and who helped bin Laden build the net­work of “Arab Afghans” that was Al Qaeda’s fore­run­ner, were Broth­er­hood mem­bers.

    ...

    SAID RAMADAN was born in 1926 in Shib­in el Kom, a vil­lage about 40 miles north of Cairo in the Nile delta. He encoun­tered Ban­na and joined his move­ment when he was 14; six years lat­er, after grad­u­at­ing from Cairo Uni­ver­si­ty, he became Banna’s per­son­al sec­re­tary and right-hand man. A year lat­er, Ramadan was named edi­tor of the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood week­ly, Al Shi­hab, and he mar­ried Banna’s daugh­ter, giv­ing him an impor­tant claim to lead­er­ship with­in the orga­ni­za­tion.

    Ramadan became Banna’s rov­ing ambas­sador, amass­ing a net­work of inter­na­tion­al con­tacts. In 1945, he trav­eled to then British-con­trolled Jerusalem, where the storm clouds of war between Arabs and Jews were begin­ning to gath­er. Over the years that fol­lowed, Ramadan would spend a great deal of time shut­tling between Jerusalem, Amman, Dam­as­cus, and Beirut to build Broth­er­hood chap­ters. At the time, Pales­tine was still British-con­trolled ter­ri­to­ry, a des­per­ate­ly poor desert region inhab­it­ed by war­ring Arab and Jew­ish pop­u­la­tions. Trav­el­ing to mosques and uni­ver­si­ty cam­pus­es and focus­ing on Mus­lim youth like him­self, Ramadan preached a mil­i­tant gospel and helped to cre­ate para­mil­i­tary groups made up of young men angry at British colo­nial­ism and Zion­ist immi­gra­tion. By 1947, there were 25 branch­es of the Broth­er­hood in Pales­tine, with between 12,000 and 20,000 mem­bers. In 1948, Ramadan helped the Broth­er­hood send Islam­ic fight­ers into bat­tle with the Jew­ish armed forces that estab­lished Israel that year. Com­pared to the armies of Egypt and Syr­ia, the Brotherhood’s forces were small and mil­i­tar­i­ly insignif­i­cant, but the sym­bol­ic ges­ture would enhance the group’s pres­tige for decades to come.
    ...

    And then we get to this fas­ci­nat­ing chap­ter in the his­to­ry of Islamist ter­ror­ism and the US: it appears the first instance of Islamist ter­ror on US soil was com­mit­ted on July 22, 1980, by David Belfield, who first met Said Ramadan in 1975 and end­ed up becom­ing his “per­son­al sec­re­tary, spe­cial emis­sary and devot­ed ser­vant.” Belfield assas­si­nat­ed an Iran­ian crit­ic of the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion:

    ...
    It’s no exag­ger­a­tion to say that Ramadan is the ide­o­log­i­cal grand­fa­ther of Osama bin Laden. But Ramadan, the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, and their Islamist allies might nev­er have been able to plant the seeds that sprout­ed into Al Qae­da had they not been treat­ed as U.S. allies dur­ing the Cold War and had they not received both overt and covert sup­port from Wash­ing­ton; Ramadan him­self, doc­u­ments sug­gest, was recruit­ed as an asset by the CIA.

    ...

    A now-declas­si­fied IIA doc­u­ment labeled “Confidential—Security Infor­ma­tion” sums up the pur­pose of the project: “On the sur­face, the con­fer­ence looks like an exer­cise in pure learn­ing. This in effect is the impres­sion desired.” The true goal, the memo notes, was to “bring togeth­er per­sons exert­ing great influ­ence in for­mu­lat­ing Mus­lim opin­ion in fields such as edu­ca­tion, sci­ence, law and phi­los­o­phy and inevitably, there­fore, on pol­i­tics…. Among the var­i­ous results expect­ed from the col­lo­qui­um are the impe­tus and direc­tion that may be giv­en to the Renais­sance move­ment with­in Islam itself.” At the time, the Unit­ed States was just begin­ning to feel its way around the Mid­dle East, and Amer­i­can ori­en­tal­ists and aca­d­e­mics were debat­ing the extent to which polit­i­cal Islam might serve as a tool for Amer­i­can influ­ence in the region.

    For an orga­ni­za­tion estab­lished as a secret soci­ety, with a para­mil­i­tary arm that was respon­si­ble for assas­si­na­tions and vio­lence, to be char­ac­ter­ized as a har­bin­ger of a rebirth of Islam may seem odd. But such a view was entire­ly in char­ac­ter with U.S. pol­i­cy at a time when vir­tu­al­ly any­one who opposed com­mu­nism was viewed as a poten­tial ally. When­ev­er I inter­viewed CIA and State Depart­ment offi­cials who served in the Mid­dle East between World War II and the fall of the Sovi­et Union, they would repeat, almost like a cat­e­chism, that Islam was seen as a bar­ri­er both to Sovi­et expan­sion and to the spread of Marx­ist ide­ol­o­gy among the mass­es. “We thought of Islam as a coun­ter­weight to com­mu­nism,” says Tal­cott Seelye, an Amer­i­can diplo­mat who, while serv­ing in Jor­dan in the ear­ly 1950s, paid a vis­it to Said Ramadan. “We saw it as a mod­er­ate force, and a pos­i­tive one.” Indeed, adds Her­mann Eilts, anoth­er vet­er­an U.S. diplo­mat who was sta­tioned in Sau­di Ara­bia in the late ’40s, Amer­i­can offi­cials in Cairo had “reg­u­lar meet­ings” with Ramadan’s then-boss, Mus­lim Broth­er­hood leader Has­san al-Ban­na, “and found him per­fect­ly empa­thet­ic.”

    ...

    There’s anoth­er intrigu­ing ques­tion that emerges from this peri­od in Ramadan’s life: Had he been recruit­ed by the CIA dur­ing his 1953 vis­it to the Unit­ed States? Ramadan’s fam­i­ly denies that he was, but declas­si­fied doc­u­ments in the Swiss Nation­al Archives, uncov­ered by Syl­vain Besson of Geneva’s Le Temps news­pa­per, reveal that in the 1960s the Swiss author­i­ties con­sid­ered him to be, “among oth­er things, an intel­li­gence agent of the British and the Amer­i­cans.” In July 2005, the Wall Street Jour­nal, after exten­sive archival research in Switzer­land and Ger­many, report­ed: “His­tor­i­cal evi­dence sug­gests Mr. Ramadan worked with the CIA.” Doc­u­ments from West Ger­man intel­li­gence archives, uncov­ered by the Jour­nal, reveal that Ramadan trav­eled on an offi­cial Jor­dan­ian diplo­mat­ic pass­port secured for him by the CIA, that “his expen­di­tures are financed by the Amer­i­can side,” and that Ramadan worked close­ly with the CIA’s Amer­i­can Com­mit­tee for Lib­er­a­tion from Bol­she­vism, Amcom­lib, which ran Radio Free Europe and Radio Lib­er­ty (both CIA front groups) in the 1950s and 1960s. Accord­ing to the Jour­nal, in May 1961, a CIA offi­cer with Amcom­lib met with Ramadan to plan a “joint pro­pa­gan­da effort against the Sovi­et Union.”

    ...

    AS INFLUENTIAL as he was in the Mid­dle East through­out the ’60s and ’70s, Ramadan was vir­tu­al­ly invis­i­ble to the West. The first time Amer­i­cans might have heard his name was in con­nec­tion with a bizarre mur­der in Wash­ing­ton; it would turn out to be the first instance of Islamist ter­ror­ism in the Unit­ed States. On July 22, 1980, the door­bell rang at the home of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a for­mer press coun­selor at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton who, after the fall of the shah in 1979, had found­ed the Iran Free­dom Foun­da­tion and had become a lead­ing oppo­nent of the Aya­tol­lah Ruhol­lah Khomeini’s Islamist regime. On his doorstep that day was a young man, dressed as a mail­man. He fired sev­er­al shots into Tabatabai’s abdomen, killing him.

    The assas­sin, who’d bor­rowed a mail truck from an unsus­pect­ing friend, was an Amer­i­can Mus­lim named David Belfield. Inves­ti­ga­tors track­ing Belfield, who was now call­ing him­self Daoud Salahud­din, found that he’d fled first to Gene­va and then to Iran. Then they dis­cov­ered a curi­ous fact: Just before the mur­der, a series of phone calls to Said Ramadan were placed from a pay phone near Belfield’s work­place in Wash­ing­ton. Ramadan—an enthu­si­as­tic sup­port­er of Khomeini’s revolution—also spoke with the fugi­tive in Gene­va, coor­di­nat­ed his escape with the Iran­ian Embassy in Switzer­land, and made a call to Aya­tol­lah Khomeini’s son in Iran to make sure that Belfield made it safe­ly to sanc­tu­ary in Tehran. It lat­er turned out that Belfield had talked to Ramadan before accept­ing a job as a secu­ri­ty guard at the Iran­ian Embassy in Wash­ing­ton; accord­ing to The New York­er, Belfield pock­et­ed $5,000 for the assas­si­na­tion from his “han­dler” in the Iran­ian gov­ern­ment.

    Belfield and Ramadan had first met in June 1975 when Ramadan spent sev­er­al months in the Unit­ed States, a tour that includ­ed speak­ing engage­ments at Washington’s Islam­ic Cen­ter, an Eisen­how­er-era mosque on Mass­a­chu­setts Avenue adja­cent to Rock Creek Park. Their first encounter was in Ramadan’s hotel room; after that, Ramadan stayed for three months at Belfield’s mod­est home on Ran­dolph Street in Wash­ing­ton. Ramadan regaled Belfield with tales of jihad, and the young Amer­i­can began almost to wor­ship the Egypt­ian. Accord­ing to an account of the rela­tion­ship pub­lished much lat­er in the Wash­ing­ton Post, Belfield became Ramadan’s “per­son­al sec­re­tary, spe­cial emis­sary and devot­ed ser­vant. Ramadan became his spir­i­tu­al leader for life.” Ramadan told Belfield that if he were to under­take vio­lent action in sup­port of Islam­ic rev­o­lu­tion, “he wouldn’t be emo­tion­al­ly scarred by it—it would ‘be accom­plished and sim­ply for­got­ten.’” Belfield would lat­er tell The New York­er, “His tone was emphat­ic. And for me it was tak­en as a com­mand.”
    ...

    It’s kind of hard to come up with a more illus­tra­tive piece of this com­pli­cat­ed his­to­ry between the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood, the CIA, and the Iran­ian rev­o­lu­tion than the fact that Said Ramadan’s per­son­al sec­re­tary com­mit­ted the first act of Islamist ter­ror in US his­to­ry by assas­si­nat­ing a crit­ic of the Iran­ian Rev­o­lu­tion. A piece of his­to­ry from 43 years ago. And here we are, with some sort of bizarre hyper-provoca­tive attack seem­ing­ly from this same net­work and designed to inflame some­thing much big­ger. Is this pri­mar­i­ly a Hamas oper­a­tion? A broad­er Mus­lim Broth­er­hood oper­a­tion? Or some­thing else? It’s too ear­ly to say, but not too ear­ly to review the rel­e­vant his­to­ry of clan­des­tine pow­er pol­i­tics that we nev­er real­ly learned in the first place.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 10, 2023, 4:35 pm
  6. There was nev­er real­ly going to be a good expla­na­tion for how Israel’s nation­al secu­ri­ty state was appar­ent­ly caught com­plete­ly off guard by Hamas’s Octo­ber 7 mass ter­ror attack. But the more we learn, the worse the expla­na­tion gets. How bad is it ulti­mate­ly going to get? Time will tell, but so far it just keeps get­ting worse.

    Like the lat­est update in NY Times describ­ing a sit­u­a­tion where Israeli intel­li­gence appar­ent­ly decid­ed to just stop eaves­drop­ping on Hamas over a year ago. This includes Israel’s crack Unit 8200 hack­ing team. We’re also told that the Octo­ber 7 attack like­ly took over a year to plan and coor­di­nate. Great tim­ing.

    What’s the expla­na­tion for the deci­sion to effec­tive­ly stop spy­ing on Hamas? Well, on the one hand, we’re told that Israeli intel­li­gence was con­vinced that Hamas had no desire to car­ry out attacks that would trig­ger an Israeli inva­sion of Gaza. Hamas was instead assumed to be focused on foment­ing vio­lence in the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty-con­trolled West Bank.

    At the same time, we’re also told that Israel had cul­ti­vate exten­sive human sources inside Hamas and was effec­tive­ly rest­ing on those lau­rels. This is a good time to recall the reports that came out days before the Octo­ber 7 attacks about how Hamas was rocked by Israel man­ag­ing to acquire a human asset, Khalil Abu Ma’za, who was oper­at­ing close to Hamas’s lead­er­ship for years. Abu Ma’za obvi­ous­ly was­n’t the only human asset. And yet some­how all of these human assets failed to give Israel a heads up on a plot that took over a year to plan.

    And then we get to a very inter­est­ing addi­tion­al gross intel­li­gence fail­ure that led up to all of this: US intel­li­gence appar­ent­ly decid­ed to stop eaves­drop­ping on Hamas over a year ago too. Beyond that, we are told that US intel­li­gence was try­ing to recruit Hamas assets. In fact, Jonathan Schanz­er, a for­mer Trea­sury Depart­ment offi­cial and now the senior vice pres­i­dent for research at the Foun­da­tion for Defense of Democ­ra­cies, report­ed­ly attend­ed a meet­ing he had in 2015 with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment offi­cials about sus­pect­ed Hamas oper­a­tives inside the Unit­ed States. The offi­cials informed him they were try­ing to recruit the sus­pect­ed Hamas agents to be “assets” against ISIS.

    And that, of course, is the kind of sto­ry is eeri­ly rem­i­nis­cent of the 9/11 rev­e­la­tions ear­li­er this year about how the CIA was appar­ent­ly try­ing to recruit some of the 9/11 hijack­ers and end­ed up run­ning cov­er for them and block­ing US law enforce­ment from bust­ing the al Qae­da oper­a­tion on US soil. So when we hear Octo­ber 7 char­ac­ter­ized as “Israel’s 9/11” and all these claims about how Israeli (and US) intel­li­gence had no idea this attack was on the way, we have to ask: were there by chance cer­tain intel­li­gence units that were very aware of the loom­ing attack but did­n’t want to tell any­one out of a fear of dis­rupt­ing their asset recruit­ment efforts? If so, it would­n’t be the first time.

    On top of that all is the real­i­ty that the new­ly elect­ed Speak­er of the House, Mike John­son, is a rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the theo­crat Coun­cil for Nation­al Pol­i­cy, which holds dan­ger­ous Chris­t­ian Zion­ist views about an apoc­a­lyp­tic end­ing for the Jew­ish peo­ple. It’s a wild­ly dan­ger­ous state of affairs.

    And that’s all why we still have to ask how bad is the real sto­ry here? Are these ‘oops, we took our eye off the ball’ expla­na­tions plau­si­ble? If not, how bad is the real sto­ry? Because the more we learn, the worse it looks:

    The New York Times

    How Years of Israeli Fail­ures on Hamas Led to a Dev­as­tat­ing Attack

    Israeli offi­cials com­plete­ly under­es­ti­mat­ed the mag­ni­tude of the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, shat­ter­ing the country’s once invin­ci­ble sense of secu­ri­ty.

    By Ronen Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib

    Ronen Bergman report­ed from Tel Aviv and the Gaza-Israel bor­der, Mark Mazzetti from Wash­ing­ton and Maria Abi-Habib from Lon­don.
    Pub­lished Oct. 29, 2023
    Updat­ed Oct. 30, 2023, 4:31 p.m. ET

    It was 3 a.m. on Oct. 7, and Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s domes­tic secu­ri­ty ser­vice, still could not deter­mine if what he was see­ing was just anoth­er Hamas mil­i­tary exer­cise.

    At the head­quar­ters of his ser­vice, Shin Bet, offi­cials had spent hours mon­i­tor­ing Hamas activ­i­ty in the Gaza Strip, which was unusu­al­ly active for the mid­dle of the night. Israeli intel­li­gence and nation­al secu­ri­ty offi­cials, who had con­vinced them­selves that Hamas had no inter­est in going to war, ini­tial­ly assumed it was just a night­time exer­cise.

    Their judg­ment that night might have been dif­fer­ent had they been lis­ten­ing to traf­fic on the hand-held radios of Hamas mil­i­tants. But Unit 8200, Israel’s sig­nals intel­li­gence agency, had stopped eaves­drop­ping on those net­works a year ear­li­er because they saw it as a waste of effort.

    As time passed that night, Mr. Bar thought that Hamas might attempt a small-scale assault. He dis­cussed his con­cerns with Israel’s top gen­er­als and ordered the “Tequi­la” team — a group of elite coun­tert­er­ror­ism forces — to deploy to Israel’s south­ern bor­der.

    Until near­ly the start of the attack, nobody believed the sit­u­a­tion was seri­ous enough to wake up Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu, accord­ing to three Israeli defense offi­cials.

    With­in hours, the Tequi­la troops were embroiled in a bat­tle with thou­sands of Hamas gun­men who pen­e­trat­ed Israel’s vaunt­ed bor­der fence, sped in trucks and on motor­bikes into south­ern Israel and attacked vil­lages and mil­i­tary bases.

    The most pow­er­ful mil­i­tary force in the Mid­dle East had not only com­plete­ly under­es­ti­mat­ed the mag­ni­tude of the attack, it had total­ly failed in its intel­li­gence-gath­er­ing efforts, most­ly due to hubris and the mis­tak­en assump­tion that Hamas was a threat con­tained.

    Despite Israel’s sophis­ti­cat­ed tech­no­log­i­cal prowess in espi­onage, Hamas gun­men had under­gone exten­sive train­ing for the assault, vir­tu­al­ly unde­tect­ed for at least a year. The fight­ers, who were divid­ed into dif­fer­ent units with spe­cif­ic goals, had metic­u­lous infor­ma­tion on Israel’s mil­i­tary bases and the lay­out of kib­butz­im.

    ...

    Israeli offi­cials have promised a full inves­ti­ga­tion into what went wrong.

    Even before that inquiry, it is clear the attacks were pos­si­ble because of a cas­cade of fail­ures over recent years — not hours, days or weeks. A New York Times exam­i­na­tion, based on dozens of inter­views with Israeli, Arab, Euro­pean and Amer­i­can offi­cials, as well as a review of Israeli gov­ern­ment doc­u­ments and evi­dence col­lect­ed since the Oct. 7 raid, shows that:

    * Israeli secu­ri­ty offi­cials spent months try­ing to warn Mr. Netanyahu that the polit­i­cal tur­moil caused by his domes­tic poli­cies was weak­en­ing the country’s secu­ri­ty and embold­en­ing Israel’s ene­mies. The prime min­is­ter con­tin­ued to push those poli­cies. On one day in July he even refused to meet a senior gen­er­al who came to deliv­er a threat warn­ing based on clas­si­fied intel­li­gence, accord­ing to Israeli offi­cials.

    * Israeli offi­cials mis­judged the threat posed by Hamas for years, and more crit­i­cal­ly in the run-up to the attack. The offi­cial assess­ment of Israeli mil­i­tary intel­li­gence and the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil since May 2021 was that Hamas had no inter­est in launch­ing an attack from Gaza that might invite a dev­as­tat­ing response from Israel, accord­ing to five peo­ple famil­iar with the assess­ments who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to dis­cuss sen­si­tive details. Instead, Israeli intel­li­gence assessed that Hamas was try­ing to foment vio­lence against Israelis in the West Bank, which is con­trolled by its rival, the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty.

    * The belief by Mr. Netanyahu and top Israeli secu­ri­ty offi­cials that Iran and Hezbol­lah, its most pow­er­ful proxy force, pre­sent­ed the gravest threat to Israel divert­ed atten­tion and resources away from coun­ter­ing Hamas. In late Sep­tem­ber, senior Israeli offi­cials told The Times they were con­cerned that Israel might be attacked in the com­ing weeks or months on sev­er­al fronts by Iran-backed mili­tia groups, but made no men­tion of Hamas ini­ti­at­ing a war with Israel from the Gaza Strip.

    * Amer­i­can spy agen­cies in recent years had large­ly stopped col­lect­ing intel­li­gence on Hamas and its plans, believ­ing the group was a region­al threat that Israel was man­ag­ing.

    Over­all, arro­gance among Israeli polit­i­cal and secu­ri­ty offi­cials con­vinced them that the country’s mil­i­tary and tech­no­log­i­cal supe­ri­or­i­ty to Hamas would keep the ter­ror­ist group in check.

    ...

    Many senior offi­cials have accept­ed respon­si­bil­i­ty, but Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sun­day in Israel, after his office was asked for com­ment on this arti­cle, he post­ed a mes­sage on X, for­mer­ly Twit­ter, that repeat­ed remarks he made to The New York Times and blamed the mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence ser­vices for fail­ing to pro­vide him with any warn­ing on Hamas.

    “Under no cir­cum­stances and at no stage was Prime Min­is­ter Netanyahu warned of war inten­tions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the con­trary, the assess­ment of the entire secu­ri­ty ech­e­lon, includ­ing the head of mil­i­tary intel­li­gence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seek­ing an arrange­ment.”

    In the result­ing furor, Ben­ny Gantz, a mem­ber of his war cab­i­net, pub­licly rebuked Mr. Netanyahu, say­ing that “lead­er­ship means dis­play­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty,” and urged the prime min­is­ter to retract the post. It was lat­er delet­ed, and Mr. Netanyahu apol­o­gized in a new one.

    ...

    The last time Israelis’ col­lec­tive belief in their country’s secu­ri­ty was sim­i­lar­ly dev­as­tat­ed was 50 years ear­li­er, at the start of the Yom Kip­pur War, when Israel was caught off guard by an assault by Egypt­ian and Syr­i­an forces. In an echo of that attack, Hamas suc­ceed­ed because Israeli offi­cials made many of the same mis­takes that were made in 1973.

    The Yom Kip­pur War was “a clas­sic exam­ple of how intel­li­gence fails when the pol­i­cy and intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ties build a feed­back loop that rein­forces their prej­u­dices and blinds them to changes in the threat envi­ron­ment,” Bruce Riedel, a for­mer top Mid­dle East ana­lyst at the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency, wrote in a 2017 research paper about the 1973 war.

    In an inter­view this month, Mr. Riedel said that Mr. Netanyahu was reap­ing the con­se­quences of focus­ing on Iran as the exis­ten­tial threat to Israel while large­ly ignor­ing an ene­my in his back­yard.

    “Bibi’s mes­sage to Israelis has been that the real threat is Iran,” he said, using Mr. Netanyahu’s nick­name. “That with the occu­pa­tion of the West Bank and the siege of Gaza, the Pales­tin­ian issue is no longer a threat to Israel’s secu­ri­ty. All of those assump­tions were shat­tered on Oct. 7.”

    Ignored Warn­ings

    On July 24, two senior Israeli gen­er­als arrived at the Knes­set, Israel’s par­lia­ment, to deliv­er urgent warn­ings to Israeli law­mak­ers, accord­ing to three Israeli defense offi­cials.

    The Knes­set was sched­uled that day to give final approval to one of Mr. Netanyahu’s attempts to curb the pow­er of Israel’s judi­cia­ry — an effort that had con­vulsed Israeli soci­ety, ignit­ed mas­sive street protests and led to large-scale res­ig­na­tions from the mil­i­tary reserves.

    A grow­ing por­tion of the Air Force’s oper­a­tional pilots was threat­en­ing to refuse to report to duty if the leg­is­la­tion passed.

    In the brief­case of one of the gen­er­als, Aharon Hali­va, the head of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Mil­i­tary Intel­li­gence Direc­torate, were high­ly clas­si­fied doc­u­ments detail­ing a judg­ment by intel­li­gence offi­cials that the polit­i­cal tur­moil was embold­en­ing Israel’s ene­mies. One doc­u­ment stat­ed that the lead­ers of what Israeli offi­cials call the “axis of resis­tance” — Iran, Syr­ia, Hamas, Hezbol­lah and Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad — believed this was a moment of Israeli weak­ness and a time to strike.

    Hezbollah’s leader, Has­san Nas­ral­lah, accord­ing to one of the doc­u­ments, said that it was nec­es­sary to pre­pare for a major war.

    Gen­er­al Hali­va was ready to tell the coali­tion lead­ers that the polit­i­cal tur­moil was cre­at­ing an oppor­tu­ni­ty for Israel’s ene­mies to attack, par­tic­u­lar­ly if there were more res­ig­na­tions in the mil­i­tary. Only two mem­bers of the Knes­set came to hear his brief­ing.

    The leg­is­la­tion passed over­whelm­ing­ly.

    Sep­a­rate­ly, Gen. Herzi Hale­vi, the military’s chief of staff, tried to deliv­er the same warn­ings to Mr. Netanyahu. The prime min­is­ter refused to meet him, the offi­cials said. Mr. Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for com­ment about this meet­ing.

    The gen­er­als’ warn­ings were in large part based on a series of provo­ca­tions on Israel’s north­ern bor­der.

    In Feb­ru­ary and March, Hezbol­lah had sent explo­sive-laden drones toward Israeli gas rigs. In March, a mil­i­tant climbed over the bor­der fence from Lebanon into Israel, car­ry­ing sev­er­al pow­er­ful bombs, weapons, phones and an elec­tric bike on which he trav­eled to a major north­ern inter­sec­tion. He then used a pow­er­ful charge, appar­ent­ly try­ing to blow up a bus.

    On May 21, Hezbol­lah staged for appar­ent­ly the first time war games at one of its train­ing sites in Aaram­ta in south Lebanon. Hezbol­lah launched rock­ets and flew drones that dropped explo­sives on a sim­u­lat­ed Israeli town.

    Israeli offi­cials believed that Hezbol­lah was lead­ing the plan­ning for a coor­di­nat­ed attack against Israel, but not one that would prompt an all-out war.

    The offi­cials’ con­cerns grew through August and Sep­tem­ber, and Gen­er­al Hale­vi went pub­lic with his con­cerns.

    “We must be more pre­pared than ever for a mul­ti-are­na and exten­sive mil­i­tary con­flict,” he said at a mil­i­tary cer­e­mo­ny on Sept. 11, just weeks before the attack.

    Mr. Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli tele­vi­sion and con­demned Gen­er­al Hale­vi for sow­ing pan­ic.

    In a series of meet­ings, Shin Bet gave sim­i­lar warn­ings to senior Israeli offi­cials as Gen­er­al Hale­vi. Even­tu­al­ly, Mr. Bar also went pub­lic.

    “From the inves­ti­ga­tions we are doing we can say today that the polit­i­cal insta­bil­i­ty and the grow­ing divi­sion are a shot of encour­age­ment to the coun­tries of the axis of evil, the ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions and the indi­vid­ual threats,” Mr. Bar said in a speech.

    Mr. Netanyahu’s gov­ern­ment also ignored warn­ings from Israel’s neigh­bors. As the cus­to­di­an of Mus­lim holy sites in Jerusalem, Jor­dan has tra­di­tion­al­ly been an impor­tant medi­a­tor between Pales­tini­ans and Israel’s gov­ern­ment on the Aqsa Mosque com­pound, the third most holy site in Islam. The mosque com­pound has seen repeat­ed raids by Israeli forces over the years, and Hamas has said that it launched this month’s attack in part as retal­i­a­tion for those acts.

    But Jor­dan found that when Mr. Netanyahu formed a gov­ern­ment late last year, the most far right in recent his­to­ry, it was less recep­tive to their warn­ings that the inci­dents at the Aqsa Mosque com­pound was stir­ring up sen­ti­ment inside Pales­tin­ian ter­ri­to­ries that could boil over into vio­lence, accord­ing to two Arab offi­cials with knowl­edge of the rela­tion­ship.

    The Wrong Focus

    While secu­ri­ty and intel­li­gence offi­cials were right about a com­ing attack, their intense focus on Hezbol­lah and Iran had a trag­ic effect: Far less atten­tion was paid to the threats from Gaza. Since Israel’s with­draw­al in 2005 and Hamas’s evo­lu­tion from a pure­ly guer­ril­la orga­ni­za­tion into the gov­ern­ing pow­er of Gaza in 2007, Hamas had only peri­od­ic skir­mish­es with the Israeli mil­i­tary.

    Under four dif­fer­ent prime min­is­ters, Israel repeat­ed­ly decid­ed that reoc­cu­py­ing Gaza and crush­ing Hamas would cost too many lives and do too much dam­age to Israel’s inter­na­tion­al rep­u­ta­tion.

    Israel knew that Hamas, which Iran sup­ports with fund­ing, train­ing and weapons, was grow­ing stronger over time. But offi­cials thought they could con­tain Hamas with an exten­sive net­work of human spies, sophis­ti­cat­ed sur­veil­lance tools that would deliv­er ear­ly warn­ings of an attack and bor­der for­ti­fi­ca­tions to deter a Hamas ground assault. They also relied on the Iron Dome air defense sys­tem for inter­cept­ing rock­ets and mis­siles launched from Gaza.

    The strat­e­gy, con­firmed by mul­ti­ple Israeli offi­cials, bore some fruit. Over the years, Israel’s invest­ment in pen­e­trat­ing Hamas’s inner cir­cle in Gaza allowed Israel to uncov­er the group’s attack plans and occa­sion­al­ly led to assas­si­na­tions of Hamas lead­ers.

    Strength­en­ing Hamas

    Pub­licly, Mr. Netanyahu used blunt rhetoric about Hamas. His elec­tion slo­gan in 2008 was “Strong Against Hamas,” and in one cam­paign video at the time he pledged: “We will not stop the I.D.F. We will fin­ish the job. We will top­ple the ter­ror regime of Hamas.”

    Over time, how­ev­er, he came to see Hamas as a way to bal­ance pow­er against the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty, which has admin­is­tra­tive con­trol over the West Bank and has long sought a peace agree­ment in Israel in exchange for a Pales­tin­ian state.

    Mr. Netanyahu told aides over the years that a fee­ble Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty low­ered the pres­sure on him to make con­ces­sions to Pales­tini­ans in nego­ti­a­tions, accord­ing to sev­er­al for­mer Israeli offi­cials and peo­ple close to Mr. Netanyahu. An offi­cial in Mr. Netanyahu’s office, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty, denied this had been the prime minister’s pol­i­cy.

    But there is no ques­tion that Israeli offi­cials viewed Hamas as a region­al threat, not a glob­al ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion like Hezbol­lah or the Islam­ic State. This view was shared in Wash­ing­ton, and Amer­i­can intel­li­gence agen­cies ded­i­cat­ed few resources to col­lect­ing infor­ma­tion on the group.

    Some parts of the Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment even believed that Hamas oper­a­tives could be recruit­ed as sources of infor­ma­tion about ter­ror­ist groups con­sid­ered more urgent pri­or­i­ties in Wash­ing­ton.

    Jonathan Schanz­er, a for­mer Trea­sury Depart­ment offi­cial and now the senior vice pres­i­dent for research at the Foun­da­tion for Defense of Democ­ra­cies, recalled a meet­ing he had in 2015 with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment offi­cials about sus­pect­ed Hamas oper­a­tives inside the Unit­ed States.

    Dur­ing the meet­ing, he recalled, the offi­cials told him they were try­ing to turn the Hamas oper­a­tives into “assets” in the fight against the Islam­ic State.

    The Invin­ci­bil­i­ty of the Wall

    Israeli offi­cials firm­ly believed that “The Bar­ri­er” — a near­ly 40-mile-long rein­forced con­crete wall above and below ground, com­plet­ed in 2021 — would her­met­i­cal­ly seal off Gaza. There was also a sur­veil­lance sys­tem at the bor­der based almost exclu­sive­ly on cam­eras, sen­sors and remote-oper­at­ed “sight-shoot­er” sys­tems, four senior Israeli mil­i­tary offi­cers told The Times.

    Senior Israeli mil­i­tary offi­cials believed that the com­bi­na­tion of remote sur­veil­lance and machine-gun sys­tems with the for­mi­da­ble wall would make it almost impos­si­ble to infil­trate Israel, and thus reduce the need for a large num­ber of sol­diers to be sta­tioned at the bases.

    But Hamas’s attack exposed the fragili­ty of that tech­nol­o­gy. The group used explo­sive drones that dam­aged the cel­lu­lar anten­nas and the remote fir­ing sys­tems that pro­tect­ed the fence between Gaza and Israel.

    To get around Israel’s pow­er­ful sur­veil­lance tech­nol­o­gy, Hamas fight­ers also appeared to enforce strict dis­ci­pline among the group’s ranks to not dis­cuss its activ­i­ties on mobile phones. This allowed them to pull off the attack with­out detec­tion, one Euro­pean offi­cial said.

    The group most like­ly divid­ed its fight­ers into small­er cells, each prob­a­bly only trained for a spe­cif­ic objec­tive. That way, the rank and file did not under­stand the scale of the attacks they were prepar­ing for and could not give away the oper­a­tion if caught, a Euro­pean offi­cial said, based on his analy­sis of how the attack unfold­ed and from the videos the group dis­sem­i­nat­ed from the oper­a­tion.

    Hamas may have learned such oper­a­tional dis­ci­pline from Hezbol­lah, which has long con­fused Israeli forces on the bat­tle­field by divid­ing its fight­ers into small­er units of friends or rel­a­tives, accord­ing to Lebanese offi­cials with ties to the group. If the fight­ers speak open­ly on cell­phones to coor­di­nate mil­i­tary oper­a­tions, Lebanese offi­cials with ties to the group said, part of their code is to speak in child­hood mem­o­ries — for exam­ple, ask­ing to meet up in a field where they once played togeth­er.

    ...

    In a con­ver­sa­tion with mil­i­tary inves­ti­ga­tors two weeks after the attack, sol­diers who sur­vived the assault tes­ti­fied that the Hamas train­ing was so pre­cise that they dam­aged a row of cam­eras and com­mu­ni­ca­tion sys­tems so that “all our screens turned off in almost the exact same sec­ond.” The result of all this was a near total blind­ness on the morn­ing of the attack.

    After the fight­ing had stopped, Israeli sol­diers found hand-held radios on the dead bod­ies of some of the Hamas mil­i­tants — the same radios that Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cials had decid­ed a year ago were no longer worth mon­i­tor­ing.

    ———-

    “How Years of Israeli Fail­ures on Hamas Led to a Dev­as­tat­ing Attack” vy Ronen Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib; The New York Times; 10/29/2023

    Despite Israel’s sophis­ti­cat­ed tech­no­log­i­cal prowess in espi­onage, Hamas gun­men had under­gone exten­sive train­ing for the assault, vir­tu­al­ly unde­tect­ed for at least a year. The fight­ers, who were divid­ed into dif­fer­ent units with spe­cif­ic goals, had metic­u­lous infor­ma­tion on Israel’s mil­i­tary bases and the lay­out of kib­butz­im.”

    Exten­sive train­ing and prepa­ra­tions for over a year that went vir­tu­al­ly unde­tect­ed by Israel’s nation­al secu­ri­ty agen­cies. Even Unit 8200 stopped eaves­drop­ping on Hamas because they saw it as a wast­ed effort. That’s the cur­rent nar­ra­tive we’re get­ting, along­side out­right defi­ance by Ben­jamin Netanyahu over whether or not his admin­is­tra­tion had any­thing to do with this giant intel­li­gence lapse:

    ...
    Their judg­ment that night might have been dif­fer­ent had they been lis­ten­ing to traf­fic on the hand-held radios of Hamas mil­i­tants. But Unit 8200, Israel’s sig­nals intel­li­gence agency, had stopped eaves­drop­ping on those net­works a year ear­li­er because they saw it as a waste of effort.

    ...

    Until near­ly the start of the attack, nobody believed the sit­u­a­tion was seri­ous enough to wake up Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu, accord­ing to three Israeli defense offi­cials.

    ...

    Many senior offi­cials have accept­ed respon­si­bil­i­ty, but Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sun­day in Israel, after his office was asked for com­ment on this arti­cle, he post­ed a mes­sage on X, for­mer­ly Twit­ter, that repeat­ed remarks he made to The New York Times and blamed the mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence ser­vices for fail­ing to pro­vide him with any warn­ing on Hamas.

    “Under no cir­cum­stances and at no stage was Prime Min­is­ter Netanyahu warned of war inten­tions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the con­trary, the assess­ment of the entire secu­ri­ty ech­e­lon, includ­ing the head of mil­i­tary intel­li­gence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seek­ing an arrange­ment.”

    In the result­ing furor, Ben­ny Gantz, a mem­ber of his war cab­i­net, pub­licly rebuked Mr. Netanyahu, say­ing that “lead­er­ship means dis­play­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty,” and urged the prime min­is­ter to retract the post. It was lat­er delet­ed, and Mr. Netanyahu apol­o­gized in a new one.
    ...

    Jux­ta­pos­ing Netanyahu’s denials of cul­pa­bil­i­ty is the real­i­ty that his gov­ern­ment had been warned for months by senior gen­er­als that the polit­i­cal tur­moil cre­at­ed by Netanyahu’s judi­cial ‘reforms’ were fun­da­men­tal­ly under­min­ing Israel’s armed forces. Warn­ings that weren’t sim­ply ignored but instead result­ed in Netanyahu’s allies attack­ing these gen­er­als over the air­waves:

    ...
    Ignored Warn­ings

    On July 24, two senior Israeli gen­er­als arrived at the Knes­set, Israel’s par­lia­ment, to deliv­er urgent warn­ings to Israeli law­mak­ers, accord­ing to three Israeli defense offi­cials.

    The Knes­set was sched­uled that day to give final approval to one of Mr. Netanyahu’s attempts to curb the pow­er of Israel’s judi­cia­ry — an effort that had con­vulsed Israeli soci­ety, ignit­ed mas­sive street protests and led to large-scale res­ig­na­tions from the mil­i­tary reserves.

    A grow­ing por­tion of the Air Force’s oper­a­tional pilots was threat­en­ing to refuse to report to duty if the leg­is­la­tion passed.

    In the brief­case of one of the gen­er­als, Aharon Hali­va, the head of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Mil­i­tary Intel­li­gence Direc­torate, were high­ly clas­si­fied doc­u­ments detail­ing a judg­ment by intel­li­gence offi­cials that the polit­i­cal tur­moil was embold­en­ing Israel’s ene­mies. One doc­u­ment stat­ed that the lead­ers of what Israeli offi­cials call the “axis of resis­tance” — Iran, Syr­ia, Hamas, Hezbol­lah and Pales­tin­ian Islam­ic Jihad — believed this was a moment of Israeli weak­ness and a time to strike.

    Hezbollah’s leader, Has­san Nas­ral­lah, accord­ing to one of the doc­u­ments, said that it was nec­es­sary to pre­pare for a major war.

    Gen­er­al Hali­va was ready to tell the coali­tion lead­ers that the polit­i­cal tur­moil was cre­at­ing an oppor­tu­ni­ty for Israel’s ene­mies to attack, par­tic­u­lar­ly if there were more res­ig­na­tions in the mil­i­tary. Only two mem­bers of the Knes­set came to hear his brief­ing.

    The leg­is­la­tion passed over­whelm­ing­ly.

    Sep­a­rate­ly, Gen. Herzi Hale­vi, the military’s chief of staff, tried to deliv­er the same warn­ings to Mr. Netanyahu. The prime min­is­ter refused to meet him, the offi­cials said. Mr. Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for com­ment about this meet­ing.

    The gen­er­als’ warn­ings were in large part based on a series of provo­ca­tions on Israel’s north­ern bor­der.

    ...

    Israeli offi­cials believed that Hezbol­lah was lead­ing the plan­ning for a coor­di­nat­ed attack against Israel, but not one that would prompt an all-out war.

    The offi­cials’ con­cerns grew through August and Sep­tem­ber, and Gen­er­al Hale­vi went pub­lic with his con­cerns.

    “We must be more pre­pared than ever for a mul­ti-are­na and exten­sive mil­i­tary con­flict,” he said at a mil­i­tary cer­e­mo­ny on Sept. 11, just weeks before the attack.

    Mr. Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli tele­vi­sion and con­demned Gen­er­al Hale­vi for sow­ing pan­ic.

    In a series of meet­ings, Shin Bet gave sim­i­lar warn­ings to senior Israeli offi­cials as Gen­er­al Hale­vi. Even­tu­al­ly, Mr. Bar also went pub­lic.

    “From the inves­ti­ga­tions we are doing we can say today that the polit­i­cal insta­bil­i­ty and the grow­ing divi­sion are a shot of encour­age­ment to the coun­tries of the axis of evil, the ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions and the indi­vid­ual threats,” Mr. Bar said in a speech.
    ...

    And then we get to this puz­zling addi­tion to the expla­na­tion for the mas­sive intel­li­gence fail­ure: part of the rea­son Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cials assumed they did­n’t need to direct their sophis­ti­cat­ed sur­veil­lance tools towards Hamas is because it was believed the exten­sive net­work of human spies already cul­ti­vat­ed inside Hamas would be suf­fi­cient. Again, recall the reports that came out days before the Octo­ber 7 attacks about Hamas was rocked by Israel man­ag­ing to acquire a human asset, Khalil Abu Ma’za, who was oper­at­ing close to Hamas’s lead­er­ship for years. How were all these human assets also kept in the dark about an exten­sive plan that took more than a year to pre­pare for?

    ...
    While secu­ri­ty and intel­li­gence offi­cials were right about a com­ing attack, their intense focus on Hezbol­lah and Iran had a trag­ic effect: Far less atten­tion was paid to the threats from Gaza. Since Israel’s with­draw­al in 2005 and Hamas’s evo­lu­tion from a pure­ly guer­ril­la orga­ni­za­tion into the gov­ern­ing pow­er of Gaza in 2007, Hamas had only peri­od­ic skir­mish­es with the Israeli mil­i­tary.

    Under four dif­fer­ent prime min­is­ters, Israel repeat­ed­ly decid­ed that reoc­cu­py­ing Gaza and crush­ing Hamas would cost too many lives and do too much dam­age to Israel’s inter­na­tion­al rep­u­ta­tion.

    Israel knew that Hamas, which Iran sup­ports with fund­ing, train­ing and weapons, was grow­ing stronger over time. But offi­cials thought they could con­tain Hamas with an exten­sive net­work of human spies, sophis­ti­cat­ed sur­veil­lance tools that would deliv­er ear­ly warn­ings of an attack and bor­der for­ti­fi­ca­tions to deter a Hamas ground assault. They also relied on the Iron Dome air defense sys­tem for inter­cept­ing rock­ets and mis­siles launched from Gaza.

    The strat­e­gy, con­firmed by mul­ti­ple Israeli offi­cials, bore some fruit. Over the years, Israel’s invest­ment in pen­e­trat­ing Hamas’s inner cir­cle in Gaza allowed Israel to uncov­er the group’s attack plans and occa­sion­al­ly led to assas­si­na­tions of Hamas lead­ers.
    ...

    And then there’s the real­i­ty that an empow­ered Hamas was seen as a means of weak­en­ing the Pales­tin­ian lead­er­ship over­all. Which rais­es an obvi­ous ques­tion: assum­ing Hamas isn’t entire­ly destroyed by the ongo­ing Israeli cam­paign, what can we rea­son­ably expect regard­ing Hamas’s rel­a­tive influ­ence vs the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty? Because it seems like Hamas is going to be more pop­u­lar than ever at this point:

    ...
    Strength­en­ing Hamas

    Pub­licly, Mr. Netanyahu used blunt rhetoric about Hamas. His elec­tion slo­gan in 2008 was “Strong Against Hamas,” and in one cam­paign video at the time he pledged: “We will not stop the I.D.F. We will fin­ish the job. We will top­ple the ter­ror regime of Hamas.”

    Over time, how­ev­er, he came to see Hamas as a way to bal­ance pow­er against the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty, which has admin­is­tra­tive con­trol over the West Bank and has long sought a peace agree­ment in Israel in exchange for a Pales­tin­ian state.

    Mr. Netanyahu told aides over the years that a fee­ble Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty low­ered the pres­sure on him to make con­ces­sions to Pales­tini­ans in nego­ti­a­tions, accord­ing to sev­er­al for­mer Israeli offi­cials and peo­ple close to Mr. Netanyahu. An offi­cial in Mr. Netanyahu’s office, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty, denied this had been the prime minister’s pol­i­cy.
    ...

    There’s the very inter­est­ing ques­tions about the oth­er mas­sive intel­li­gence fail­ure: the US’s intel­li­gence fail­ure. The US just stopped mon­i­tor­ing Hamas too, assum­ing the Israelis had it han­dled:

    ...
    Israeli offi­cials have promised a full inves­ti­ga­tion into what went wrong.

    Even before that inquiry, it is clear the attacks were pos­si­ble because of a cas­cade of fail­ures over recent years — not hours, days or weeks. A New York Times exam­i­na­tion, based on dozens of inter­views with Israeli, Arab, Euro­pean and Amer­i­can offi­cials, as well as a review of Israeli gov­ern­ment doc­u­ments and evi­dence col­lect­ed since the Oct. 7 raid, shows that:

    * Israeli secu­ri­ty offi­cials spent months try­ing to warn Mr. Netanyahu that the polit­i­cal tur­moil caused by his domes­tic poli­cies was weak­en­ing the country’s secu­ri­ty and embold­en­ing Israel’s ene­mies. The prime min­is­ter con­tin­ued to push those poli­cies. On one day in July he even refused to meet a senior gen­er­al who came to deliv­er a threat warn­ing based on clas­si­fied intel­li­gence, accord­ing to Israeli offi­cials.

    * Israeli offi­cials mis­judged the threat posed by Hamas for years, and more crit­i­cal­ly in the run-up to the attack. The offi­cial assess­ment of Israeli mil­i­tary intel­li­gence and the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil since May 2021 was that Hamas had no inter­est in launch­ing an attack from Gaza that might invite a dev­as­tat­ing response from Israel, accord­ing to five peo­ple famil­iar with the assess­ments who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to dis­cuss sen­si­tive details. Instead, Israeli intel­li­gence assessed that Hamas was try­ing to foment vio­lence against Israelis in the West Bank, which is con­trolled by its rival, the Pales­tin­ian Author­i­ty.

    * The belief by Mr. Netanyahu and top Israeli secu­ri­ty offi­cials that Iran and Hezbol­lah, its most pow­er­ful proxy force, pre­sent­ed the gravest threat to Israel divert­ed atten­tion and resources away from coun­ter­ing Hamas. In late Sep­tem­ber, senior Israeli offi­cials told The Times they were con­cerned that Israel might be attacked in the com­ing weeks or months on sev­er­al fronts by Iran-backed mili­tia groups, but made no men­tion of Hamas ini­ti­at­ing a war with Israel from the Gaza Strip.

    * Amer­i­can spy agen­cies in recent years had large­ly stopped col­lect­ing intel­li­gence on Hamas and its plans, believ­ing the group was a region­al threat that Israel was man­ag­ing.
    ...

    And that brings us to the grim­ly fas­ci­nat­ing appar­ent rea­son con­tribut­ing to the US’s intel­li­gence fail­ure here: US offi­cials were try­ing to turn Hamas oper­a­tives into “assets” against ISIS. Beyond that, Jonathan Schanz­er recalls a 2015 meet­ing about sus­pect­ed Hamas oper­a­tives in the US that US intel­li­gence was hop­ing to recruit. Again, recall the 9/11 rev­e­la­tion from ear­li­er this year about how the CIA was appar­ent­ly try­ing to recruit some of the 9/11 hijack­ers and end­ed up run­ning cov­er for them and block­ing US law enforce­ment from bust­ing the al Qae­da oper­a­tion on US soil. Did “Israel’s 9/11” include a sim­i­lar cat­a­stroph­ic asset-recruit­ment sce­nario?

    ...
    But there is no ques­tion that Israeli offi­cials viewed Hamas as a region­al threat, not a glob­al ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion like Hezbol­lah or the Islam­ic State. This view was shared in Wash­ing­ton, and Amer­i­can intel­li­gence agen­cies ded­i­cat­ed few resources to col­lect­ing infor­ma­tion on the group.

    Some parts of the Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment even believed that Hamas oper­a­tives could be recruit­ed as sources of infor­ma­tion about ter­ror­ist groups con­sid­ered more urgent pri­or­i­ties in Wash­ing­ton.

    Jonathan Schanz­er, a for­mer Trea­sury Depart­ment offi­cial and now the senior vice pres­i­dent for research at the Foun­da­tion for Defense of Democ­ra­cies, recalled a meet­ing he had in 2015 with Amer­i­can intel­li­gence and law enforce­ment offi­cials about sus­pect­ed Hamas oper­a­tives inside the Unit­ed States.

    Dur­ing the meet­ing, he recalled, the offi­cials told him they were try­ing to turn the Hamas oper­a­tives into “assets” in the fight against the Islam­ic State.
    ...

    So at the same time we’re told the Israeli and the US intel­li­gence agen­cies decid­ed to just blow off any eaves­drop­ping of Hamas for over a year now, we’re also told that both coun­tries have been eager­ly recruit­ing Hamas human assets. Human assets who appar­ent­ly neglect­ed to informed either the US or Israel about this impend­ing mass attack. At least that’s the sto­ry we’re get­ting. Which is a reminder that when the pub­lic accepts expla­na­tions that don’t add up, that’s anoth­er kind of “intel­li­gence fail­ure”. Let’s hope this does­n’t turn into anoth­er one of those kinds of intel­li­gence fail­ures.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 31, 2023, 3:32 pm
  7. Iran’s nuclear pro­gram has been com­plete­ly oblit­er­at­ed. For­ev­er. The “12 Days” war between Israel and Iran end­ed with the com­plete destruc­tion of Iran’s nuclear facil­i­ties. End of sto­ry.

    Oblit­er­a­tion was the word of the day. Pres­i­dent Trump insists on it. Intel­li­gence assess­ments be damned. That’s the com­i­cal­ly unhinged nar­ra­tive that emerged in the hours after the US strikes on three Iran­ian nuclear facil­i­ties over the week­end. A nar­ra­tive the Trump White House is stick­ing to fol­low­ing a leaked Defense Intel­li­gence Agency (DIA) assess­ment that report­ed­ly con­clud­ed the strikes set Iran’s nuclear weapons pro­gram back just a mat­ter or months.

    And as we’re going to see, those dis­agree­ments between the Trump White House and the US intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty aren’t lim­it­ed to this leaked DIA assess­ment. The US intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty also con­clud­ed before the strikes that there was no Iran­ian orders to build a bomb in place at all. Iran cer­tain­ly had an ongo­ing nuclear research and enrich­ment pro­gram, but the sce­nario being paint­ed of an immi­nent loom­ing threat sim­ply was not there. It was a con­clu­sion backed by Trump’s Direc­tor of Nation­al Intel­li­gence (DNI) Tul­si Gab­bard. Pres­i­dent Trump reject­ed that intel­li­gence assess­ment in favor of a much more alarmist inter­pre­ta­tion of the avail­able evi­dence offered to him by the Israeli gov­ern­ment. Notably, Gab­bard has now fall­en in line on the “oblit­er­a­tion” nar­ra­tive and is denounc­ing the leaked DNI report.

    And as we’re going to see, the deci­sion by Israel to launch this war had lit­tle to do with alarm and urgency and every­thing to do with oppor­tu­ni­ty. While the Israeli intel­li­gence assess­ment did include a more alarmist inter­pre­ta­tion of the avail­able evi­dence of Iran’s nuclear pro­gram than the US intel­li­gence assess­ment, it does­n’t sound like there was a huge dis­agree­ment with the basic facts or the con­clu­sion that Iran had not yet ordered the devel­op­ment of a bomb. Instead, the Israeli gov­ern­ment sim­ply con­clud­ed that the strikes against Iran’s air defense last Octo­ber had left a win­dow open for strikes of this nature but that win­dow was­n’t going to stay open indef­i­nite­ly. It was a strike con­sis­tent with Israel’s long­stand­ing “Begin Doc­trine”: a strat­e­gy of “antic­i­pa­to­ry self-defense” that has been a core of Israel’s strate­gic think­ing ever since the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osir­ak nuclear reac­tor.

    We are told The Netanyahu gov­ern­ment decid­ed on car­ry­ing out these strikes this year back in the fall and had decid­ed to do them whether the US was involved or not. We are also told that Netanyahu ordered the strikes back in March. US intel­li­gence also con­clud­ed last year that Israel was plan­ning on some sort of strike of this nature in the first 6 months of this year. Inter­est­ing­ly, we are also tole that part of Israel’s sense of urgency was an aware­ness that the head of US Cen­tral Com­mand, Gen­er­al Michael E. Kuril­la, who is described as the “hawk of hawks” when it comes to Iran and some­one who does­n’t think a war against would­n’t nec­es­sar­i­ly be as cost­ly as oth­ers warn.

    One final very inter­est­ing part of this over­all pic­ture is the fact that the Israeli attack uti­lized drones that were smug­gled into Iran by the Mossad and unleashed against Iran’s air defens­es dur­ing the bomb­ing raids. It’s lit­er­al­ly the sec­ond time this month that a US ally has used the ‘smug­gled drone wave’ tac­tic, with the June 1 Ukrain­ian strike deep inside Rus­sia on the Russ­ian strate­gic bomber fleet being the oth­er exam­ple. So now we know the US was work­ing with the Israelis on their war plans. Plans which just hap­pened to include a ver­sion of the smug­gled drone strike.

    And, of course, when it comes to ques­tions about what could be dri­ving the rela­tion­ship between the Trump admin­is­tra­tion and the Netanyahu gov­ern­ment under the sur­face, we can’t for­get the sto­ry of 2016 ‘Russ­ian hack’ that also seems to slip through the cracks: the fact that it was the Netanyahu gov­ern­ment that was serv­ing as the mid­dle-man between Roger Stone and Wik­ileaks and all of the evi­dence that Israel may have had a hand in exe­cut­ing the ‘Russ­ian hacks’. Com­pelling evi­dence exists that Don­ald Trump owed his first term in office to the actions of the Netanyahu gov­ern­ment. It’s the kind of sto­ry that should be fac­tor into a sto­ry like this but will inevitably be sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly ignored.

    Ok, first, here’s a report describ­ing the inter­nal dis­putes between the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency and the rest of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s intel­li­gence estab­lish­ment. Even Tul­si Gab­bard is now back­ing the ‘total­ly destroy’ nar­ra­tive as the rest of the Trump intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty falls into line:

    Asso­ci­at­ed Press

    Ear­ly US intel­li­gence report sug­gests US strikes only set back Iran’s nuclear pro­gram by months

    By MICHELLE L. PRICE, MARY CLARE JALONICK, STEPHANIE LIECHTENSTEIN and SAM McNEIL

    Updat­ed 4:46 PM CDT, June 25, 2025

    NGTON (AP) — A U.S. intel­li­gence report sug­gests that Iran’s nuclear pro­gram has been set back only a few months after U.S. strikes and was not “com­plete­ly and ful­ly oblit­er­at­ed” as Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump has said, accord­ing to two peo­ple famil­iar with the ear­ly assess­ment.

    The report issued by the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency on Mon­day con­tra­dicts state­ments from Trump and Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu about the sta­tus of Iran’s nuclear facil­i­ties. Accord­ing to the peo­ple, the report found that while the Sun­day strikes at the For­do, Natanz and Isfa­han nuclear sites did sig­nif­i­cant dam­age, the facil­i­ties were not total­ly destroyed. The peo­ple were not autho­rized to address the mat­ter pub­licly and spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty.

    The White House reject­ed the DIA assess­ment, call­ing it “flat-out wrong.” On Wednes­day, Direc­tor of Nation­al Intel­li­gence Tul­si Gab­bard said in a post on X that “New intel­li­gence con­firms” what Trump has stat­ed: “Iran’s nuclear facil­i­ties have been destroyed. If the Ira­ni­ans chose to rebuild, they would have to rebuild all three facil­i­ties (Natanz, For­dow, Esfa­han) entire­ly, which would like­ly take years to do.”

    The office of the direc­tor of nation­al intel­li­gence coor­di­nates the work of the nation’s 18 intel­li­gence agen­cies, includ­ing the DIA, which is the intel­li­gence arm of the Defense Depart­ment, respon­si­ble for pro­duc­ing intel­li­gence on for­eign mil­i­taries and the capa­bil­i­ties of adver­saries.

    The DIA’s assess­ment was pre­lim­i­nary and will be refined as new infor­ma­tion becomes avail­able, the agency wrote in a state­ment Wednes­day. Its authors also char­ac­ter­ized it as “low con­fi­dence,” an acknowl­edge­ment that the report’s con­clu­sions could be mis­tak­en. Accord­ing to the DIA state­ment, ana­lysts have not been able to review the sites them­selves.

    The DIA also said it is work­ing with the FBI to inves­ti­gate the unau­tho­rized leak of the assess­ment.

    The U.S. has held out hope of restart­ing nego­ti­a­tions with Iran to con­vince it to give up its nuclear pro­gram entire­ly, but some experts fear that the U.S. strikes — and the poten­tial of Iran retain­ing some of its capa­bil­i­ties — could push Tehran toward devel­op­ing a func­tion­ing weapon.

    The assess­ment also sug­gests that at least some of Iran’s high­ly enriched ura­ni­um, nec­es­sary for cre­at­ing a nuclear weapon, was moved out of mul­ti­ple sites before the U.S. strikes and sur­vived, and it found that Iran’s cen­trifuges, which are required to fur­ther enrich ura­ni­um to weapons-grade lev­els, are large­ly intact, accord­ing to the peo­ple.

    At the deeply buried For­do ura­ni­um enrich­ment plant, where U.S. B‑2 stealth bombers dropped sev­er­al 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs, the entrance col­lapsed and infra­struc­ture was dam­aged, but the under­ground infra­struc­ture was not destroyed, the assess­ment found. The peo­ple said that intel­li­gence offi­cials had warned of such an out­come in pre­vi­ous assess­ments ahead of the strike on For­do.

    The White House push­es back

    Trump defend­ed his char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of the strike’s impact.

    “It was oblit­er­a­tion, and you’ll see that,” Trump told reporters while attend­ing the NATO sum­mit in the Nether­lands. He said the intel­li­gence was “very incon­clu­sive” and described media out­lets as “scum” for report­ing on it.

    Defense Sec­re­tary Pete Hegseth, who was also at the NATO sum­mit, said there would be an inves­ti­ga­tion into how the intel­li­gence assess­ment leaked and dis­missed it as “pre­lim­i­nary” and “low con­fi­dence.”

    Sec­re­tary of State Mar­co Rubio said, “These leak­ers are pro­fes­sion­al stab­bers.”

    ...

    The Israel Atom­ic Ener­gy Com­mis­sion said its assess­ment was that the U.S. and Israeli strikes have “set back Iran’s abil­i­ty to devel­op nuclear weapons by many years.” It did not give evi­dence to back up its claim.

    Trump spe­cial envoy Steve Witkoff, who said he has read dam­age assess­ment reports from U.S. intel­li­gence and oth­er nations, reit­er­at­ed Tues­day that the strikes had deprived Iran of the abil­i­ty to devel­op a weapon and called it out­ra­geous that the U.S. assess­ment was shared with reporters.

    “It’s trea­so­nous so it ought to be inves­ti­gat­ed,” Witkoff said on Fox News Chan­nel.

    Trump has said in com­ments and posts on social media in recent days, includ­ing Tues­day, that the strike left the sites in Iran “total­ly destroyed” and that Iran will nev­er rebuild its nuclear facil­i­ties.

    Netanyahu said Tues­day in a tele­vised state­ment: “For dozens of years I promised you that Iran would not have nuclear weapons and indeed ... we brought to ruin Iran’s nuclear pro­gram.” He said the U.S. join­ing Israel was “his­toric” and thanked Trump.

    Out­side experts had sus­pect­ed Iran had like­ly already hid­den the core com­po­nents of its nuclear pro­gram as it stared down the pos­si­bil­i­ty that Amer­i­can bunker-buster bombs could be used on its nuclear sites.

    Bull­doz­ers and trucks vis­i­ble in satel­lite imagery tak­en just days before the strikes have fueled spec­u­la­tion among experts that Iran may have trans­ferred its half-ton stock­pile of enriched ura­ni­um to an unknown loca­tion. And the incom­plete destruc­tion of the nuclear sites could still leave the coun­try with the capac­i­ty to spin up weapons-grade ura­ni­um and devel­op a bomb.

    Iran has main­tained that its nuclear pro­gram is peace­ful, but it has enriched sig­nif­i­cant quan­ti­ties of ura­ni­um beyond the lev­els required for any civil­ian use. The U.S. and oth­ers assessed pri­or to the U.S. strikes that Iran’s theo­crat­ic lead­er­ship had not yet ordered the coun­try to pur­sue an oper­a­tional nuclear weapon, but the head of the Inter­na­tion­al Atom­ic Ener­gy Agency has repeat­ed­ly warned that Iran has enough enriched ura­ni­um to make sev­er­al nuclear bombs should it choose to do so.

    Vice Pres­i­dent JD Vance said in a Mon­day inter­view on Fox News Chan­nel that even if Iran is still in con­trol of its stock­pile of 408.6 kilo­grams (900.8 pounds) of enriched ura­ni­um, which is just short of weapons-grade, the U.S. has cut off Iran’s abil­i­ty to con­vert it to a nuclear weapon.

    “If they have 60% enriched ura­ni­um, but they don’t have the abil­i­ty to enrich it to 90%, and, fur­ther, they don’t have the abil­i­ty to con­vert that to a nuclear weapon, that is mis­sion suc­cess. That is the oblit­er­a­tion of their nuclear pro­gram, which is why the pres­i­dent, I think, right­ly is using that term,” Vance said.

    Approx­i­mate­ly 42 kilo­grams of 60% enriched ura­ni­um is the­o­ret­i­cal­ly enough to pro­duce one atom­ic bomb if enriched fur­ther to 90%, accord­ing to the U.N. nuclear watch­dog.

    ...

    ————

    “Ear­ly US intel­li­gence report sug­gests US strikes only set back Iran’s nuclear pro­gram by months” By MICHELLE L. PRICE, MARY CLARE JALONICK, STEPHANIE LIECHTENSTEIN and SAM McNEIL; Asso­ci­at­ed Press; 06/25/2025

    The report issued by the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency on Mon­day con­tra­dicts state­ments from Trump and Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu about the sta­tus of Iran’s nuclear facil­i­ties. Accord­ing to the peo­ple, the report found that while the Sun­day strikes at the For­do, Natanz and Isfa­han nuclear sites did sig­nif­i­cant dam­age, the facil­i­ties were not total­ly destroyed. The peo­ple were not autho­rized to address the mat­ter pub­licly and spoke on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty.”

    Who should be believe? A leaked DIA report? Or the increas­ing­ly aggres­sive insis­tence by the Trump Cab­i­net that Iran’s nuclear pro­gram real­ly had been “total­ly destroyed” and that Iran will nev­er rebuild the facil­i­ties? The pes­simistic but admit­ted­ly “low con­fi­dent” intel­li­gence report or the lunatic rant­i­ngs of a Mad King who is demand­ing real­i­ty con­form to his desired:

    ...
    The White House reject­ed the DIA assess­ment, call­ing it “flat-out wrong.” On Wednes­day, Direc­tor of Nation­al Intel­li­gence Tul­si Gab­bard said in a post on X that “New intel­li­gence con­firms” what Trump has stat­ed: “Iran’s nuclear facil­i­ties have been destroyed. If the Ira­ni­ans chose to rebuild, they would have to rebuild all three facil­i­ties (Natanz, For­dow, Esfa­han) entire­ly, which would like­ly take years to do.”

    The office of the direc­tor of nation­al intel­li­gence coor­di­nates the work of the nation’s 18 intel­li­gence agen­cies, includ­ing the DIA, which is the intel­li­gence arm of the Defense Depart­ment, respon­si­ble for pro­duc­ing intel­li­gence on for­eign mil­i­taries and the capa­bil­i­ties of adver­saries.

    The DIA’s assess­ment was pre­lim­i­nary and will be refined as new infor­ma­tion becomes avail­able, the agency wrote in a state­ment Wednes­day. Its authors also char­ac­ter­ized it as “low con­fi­dence,” an acknowl­edge­ment that the report’s con­clu­sions could be mis­tak­en. Accord­ing to the DIA state­ment, ana­lysts have not been able to review the sites them­selves.

    ...

    “It was oblit­er­a­tion, and you’ll see that,” Trump told reporters while attend­ing the NATO sum­mit in the Nether­lands. He said the intel­li­gence was “very incon­clu­sive” and described media out­lets as “scum” for report­ing on it.

    ...

    Trump has said in com­ments and posts on social media in recent days, includ­ing Tues­day, that the strike left the sites in Iran “total­ly destroyed” and that Iran will nev­er rebuild its nuclear facil­i­ties.
    ...

    And note how not only are experts warn­ing that Iran might be less inclined to engage in nego­ti­a­tions at this point but that experts were also warn­ing before the strike that it like­ly could­n’t “oblit­er­ate” facil­i­ties like For­do in the first place. In oth­er words, the divide between the Trump admin­is­tra­tion and the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty start­ed before these strikes were even launched:

    ...
    The U.S. has held out hope of restart­ing nego­ti­a­tions with Iran to con­vince it to give up its nuclear pro­gram entire­ly, but some experts fear that the U.S. strikes — and the poten­tial of Iran retain­ing some of its capa­bil­i­ties — could push Tehran toward devel­op­ing a func­tion­ing weapon.

    The assess­ment also sug­gests that at least some of Iran’s high­ly enriched ura­ni­um, nec­es­sary for cre­at­ing a nuclear weapon, was moved out of mul­ti­ple sites before the U.S. strikes and sur­vived, and it found that Iran’s cen­trifuges, which are required to fur­ther enrich ura­ni­um to weapons-grade lev­els, are large­ly intact, accord­ing to the peo­ple.

    At the deeply buried For­do ura­ni­um enrich­ment plant, where U.S. B‑2 stealth bombers dropped sev­er­al 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs, the entrance col­lapsed and infra­struc­ture was dam­aged, but the under­ground infra­struc­ture was not destroyed, the assess­ment found. The peo­ple said that intel­li­gence offi­cials had warned of such an out­come in pre­vi­ous assess­ments ahead of the strike on For­do.
    ...

    And that update on the results of the strike, and in real­i­ty-defy­ing response by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, brings us to the fol­low­ing Wash­ing­ton Post report describ­ing how both Israel and the US end­ed up order­ing these attacks in the first place. As we’re going see, the con­flict between the politi­cians and in intel­li­gence ana­lysts isn’t lim­it­ed to the Trump admin­is­tra­tion:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    Netanyahu decid­ed on Iran war last year, then sought to recruit Trump

    The Israeli prime min­is­ter had set in motion plans to attack Iran long before Pres­i­dent Trump began efforts to resolve nuclear con­cerns through nego­ti­a­tions, offi­cials say.

    By Ger­ry Shih, War­ren P. Stro­bel and Souad Mekhen­net
    June 23, 2025 at 5:57 p.m. EDT

    JERUSALEM — In the fall, long before Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump embarked on an effort to resolve con­cerns over Iran’s nuclear pro­gram through nego­ti­a­tions, Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu had already set Israel on the road to war, accord­ing to cur­rent and for­mer Israeli offi­cials.

    After Israel dec­i­mat­ed Iran’s air defens­es in a mis­sile skir­mish and crip­pled its main ally, Hezbol­lah, in Octo­ber, Netanyahu issued a gen­er­al order to pre­pare for a strike, the cur­rent and for­mer offi­cials said. Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cials began hud­dling to com­pile lists of dozens of Iran­ian nuclear sci­en­tists and mil­i­tary lead­ers who could be tar­get­ed for assas­si­na­tion. Israel’s air force began to sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly take out air defens­es in Lebanon, Syr­ia and Iraq to clear the skies for future bomb­ing runs against Iran.

    Mean­while, Israeli offi­cials were pur­su­ing anoth­er track in their prepa­ra­tions — to sway Wash­ing­ton. Israeli offi­cials have long believed that mil­i­tary action with U.S. par­tic­i­pa­tion to tar­get the Iran­ian nuclear pro­gram would be more effec­tive than Israel going alone. On Sat­ur­day, Trump indeed joined the con­flict, order­ing U.S. forces, includ­ing B‑2 strate­gic bombers, to strike three Iran­ian nuclear sites.

    Through­out the fall, the Israelis had met with their Biden admin­is­tra­tion coun­ter­parts to dis­cuss intel­li­gence col­lect­ed by both coun­tries in the sum­mer that showed Iran­ian nuclear sci­en­tists were gath­er­ing to resume the­o­ret­i­cal research on weaponiza­tion, accord­ing to three peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. But U.S. intel­li­gence ana­lysts did not con­clude that the Iran­ian lead­er­ship had made such a deci­sion — an assess­ment U.S. spy agen­cies revis­it­ed and main­tained through­out the spring under the new Trump admin­is­tra­tion and up until the time Israel launched strikes, said five peo­ple famil­iar with the con­clu­sions.

    In pri­vate con­ver­sa­tions, how­ev­er, senior Israeli gov­ern­ment offi­cials said they had already decid­ed by March, weeks before Netanyahu met Trump in the Oval Office on April 7, to strike Iran with or with­out U.S. par­tic­i­pa­tion by June at the lat­est, said two peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. The rea­son­ing was that Iran would have rebuilt its air defens­es by the lat­ter half of the year, one of the peo­ple said.

    Ulti­mate­ly, when Netanyahu final­ly launched his sur­prise attack on Iran in the ear­ly hours of June 13 while Trump’s nego­ti­a­tions were still under­way, the deci­sion was not so much dri­ven by new intel­li­gence indi­cat­ing an Iran­ian sprint for a nuclear weapon or any immi­nent threat to Israel. Rather, Israel seized on what it saw as a unique oppor­tu­ni­ty to exe­cute plans, care­ful­ly laid months and years in advance, to heav­i­ly dam­age a weak­ened Iran that had long waged a bloody proxy con­flict with Israel and to set back Iran­ian nuclear and mis­sile pro­grams, Israeli and U.S. offi­cials and advis­ers to both gov­ern­ments say.

    Whether or not Netanyahu had enough evi­dence of Iran­ian progress toward a nuclear weapon to jus­ti­fy an attack has been the sub­ject of intense debate glob­al­ly and rais­es ques­tions about the strikes’ per­mis­si­bil­i­ty under inter­na­tion­al law. In recent days, the issue has appeared to gen­er­ate fric­tion inside the U.S. admin­is­tra­tion, with Trump repeat­ed­ly dis­miss­ing the assess­ment deliv­ered in March by Direc­tor of Nation­al Intel­li­gence Tul­si Gab­bard that Iran’s lead­er­ship has not ordered the devel­op­ment of a nuclear weapon and telling reporters that he per­son­al­ly believed that Iran was “very close” to a bomb.

    Netanyahu, who has argued for decades that Iran was on the verge of acquir­ing nuclear weapons and should be halt­ed by mil­i­tary strikes, has acknowl­edged in recent inter­views that Iran was still months or a year away from a weapon. What was undis­put­ed, he has said, was that Iran had enriched large amounts of ura­ni­um to a lev­el well beyond what is required for civil­ian use and built up a dan­ger­ous arse­nal of bal­lis­tic mis­siles.

    ...

    U.S. intel­li­gence agen­cies begin­ning late last year picked up on Israeli prepa­ra­tions for an attack and warned Wash­ing­ton pol­i­cy­mak­ers that Israel was like­ly to strike in the first six months of 2025.

    But Netanyahu’s plan was unex­pect­ed­ly delayed when he was sum­moned to Wash­ing­ton to meet Trump and told that the Unit­ed States would enter direct nego­ti­a­tions with Iran to solve the prob­lem diplo­mat­i­cal­ly. The prime minister’s strong incli­na­tion to strike, how­ev­er, remained unchanged, said a per­son with knowl­edge of the think­ing of top Israeli offi­cials.

    Going into the spring, there was also con­cern among Israeli offi­cials that any poten­tial deal between Trump envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran would still allow Iran to even­tu­al­ly pos­sess a bomb, an Israeli offi­cial added. And, a for­mer senior Israeli offi­cial said, the Israelis had been antic­i­pat­ing the sched­uled retire­ment of Gen. Michael E. Kuril­la, the U.S. Cen­tral Com­mand chief who had helped make war plans with Israel through­out the spring.

    In an inter­view Tues­day with pro-gov­ern­ment Chan­nel 14 tele­vi­sion, Netanyahu said that he had decid­ed on the exact tim­ing of the strike only two weeks ear­li­er, but that he had made the “dif­fi­cult” deci­sion to car­ry out the oper­a­tion “sev­er­al months ago” and began flesh­ing out the plan and its ele­ment of sur­prise in April.

    ...

    In Israel, the major­i­ty of the secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment and polit­i­cal par­ties have sup­port­ed Netanyahu’s deci­sion to exe­cute what they con­sid­er a pre­ven­ta­tive strike. For decades, a bedrock of Israeli strate­gic think­ing has been the “Begin Doc­trine,” named after for­mer prime min­is­ter Men­achem Begin, who defend­ed Israel’s 1981 bomb­ing of the Osir­ak nuclear reac­tor in Iraq as “antic­i­pa­to­ry self-defense” against a poten­tial ene­my mak­ing a weapon of mass destruc­tion.

    But a minor­i­ty of those have ques­tioned the wis­dom of car­ry­ing out a sur­prise attack while Trump was still pur­su­ing the diplo­mat­ic route — and, they say, with­out proof that the Ira­ni­ans had decid­ed to con­struct a nuclear weapon.

    “We should have giv­en the polit­i­cal route a chance,” said Dan­ny Cit­ri­now­icz, a for­mer head of the Iran desk in the research depart­ment of Israeli mil­i­tary intel­li­gence. “Now, we got oper­a­tional achieve­ments but the risks are enor­mous. We’ve nev­er fought with a coun­try like Iran. We find our­selves not know­ing where the [high­ly enriched ura­ni­um] or cen­trifuges are. If we had an agree­ment, we would at least have less unknowns.”

    Since Trump pulled out of the Oba­ma-era nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, Iran has sharply increased its stock­pile of near-weapons-grade enriched ura­ni­um, accord­ing to the Inter­na­tion­al Atom­ic Ener­gy Agency. But intel­li­gence agen­cies have debat­ed whether Iran has resumed its effort to build a weapon — known as Project Amad — that was halt­ed by Aya­tol­lah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in 2003.

    Last year, U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials, includ­ing CIA Direc­tor William J. Burns, reviewed new intel­li­gence and con­clud­ed that Iran­ian sci­en­tists were revis­it­ing pre­vi­ous­ly sus­pend­ed nuclear weapons research, explor­ing paths that could allow them to more quick­ly make the leap to a crude nuclear bomb — if Khamenei so chose, three peo­ple famil­iar with the mat­ter said. Israeli offi­cials then came to the same real­iza­tion.

    But U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials did not con­clude that Khamenei had changed his stance and sanc­tioned a bomb, said for­mer U.S. and Israeli offi­cials with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. “We knew they could speed up their time­line if they decid­ed to change course,” a for­mer senior U.S. offi­cial said.

    ...

    Jacob Nagel, a long­time advis­er to Netanyahu on Iran­ian nuclear issues and a senior fel­low at the Foun­da­tion for Defense of Democ­ra­cies, said Iran­ian sci­en­tists were work­ing in aca­d­e­m­ic set­tings, and there was nev­er a “smok­ing gun” show­ing they had bro­ken new ground on aspects of weaponiza­tion that were pro­hib­it­ed under the 2015 nuclear agree­ment, such as a mul­ti-point det­o­na­tion device used to trig­ger a nuclear explo­sion. But they were con­duct­ing research seem­ing­ly sur­rep­ti­tious­ly on top­ics that were dif­fi­cult to jus­ti­fy as hav­ing only civil­ian appli­ca­tions, Nagel said. He added that Khamenei “prob­a­bly knew what they were doing.”

    At one point, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion asked Iran about the sci­en­tists’ activ­i­ties, but the sci­en­tists car­ried on, which fur­ther fueled Israeli sus­pi­cions going into the spring, Nagel and anoth­er Israeli offi­cial said.

    As Israeli offi­cials geared up in recent months to strike while hop­ing the U.S. would join, Israel made anoth­er push with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as part of reg­u­lar intel­li­gence shar­ing. U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials did not see any­thing star­tling­ly new, accord­ing to two peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter.

    But Israeli offi­cials believed intel­li­gence showed the sci­en­tists were revis­it­ing stud­ies in sev­er­al alarm­ing areas, includ­ing the mul­ti-point det­o­na­tion device, the pro­duc­tion of plas­tic explo­sives and exper­i­ments on neu­tron radi­a­tion, accord­ing to one per­son who was briefed by Israeli offi­cials in recent weeks.

    Israeli offi­cials acknowl­edged that they still assessed Khamenei had not ordered the pro­duc­tion of a nuclear weapon, the per­son said, adding: “I don’t believe the Israeli [intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty] shad­ed their intel for polit­i­cal pur­pos­es, but I do believe in Netanyahu tak­ing the inch and run­ning a mile with it.”

    In Wash­ing­ton, Trump came to believe that Iran was striv­ing for a bomb, going beyond what ana­lysts in his own intel­li­gence agen­cies con­clud­ed. His CIA chief, John Rat­cliffe, argued that the assess­ment dat­ing back to 2007 that Khamenei had not ordered con­struc­tion of a nuclear weapon was of lim­it­ed val­ue, said two peo­ple famil­iar with Ratcliffe’s views. Iran, he said, was like a foot­ball team that had gone 99 yards down the field, and there was no way it would not try for a nuclear touch­down.

    ...

    Richard Nephew, a lead U.S. nego­tia­tor with Iran under the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion, said the real divi­sion appears not to have been between U.S. and Israeli intel­li­gence ana­lysts but between the spies and the politi­cians, who inter­pret­ed the intel­li­gence in a more alarm­ing fash­ion.

    “It may be that the U.S. and Israeli intel­li­gence ser­vices were on the same page, but they weren’t on the same page as their polit­i­cal lead­er­ship,” said Nephew, now at the Wash­ing­ton Insti­tute for Near East Pol­i­cy.

    Nephew said it was not sur­pris­ing that Iran would edge back toward the option of a bomb after suf­fer­ing a series of strate­gic set­backs. By last fall, Israel had dealt stag­ger­ing blows to allied Iran­ian groups such as Hamas and Lebanon-based Hezbol­lah, and had destroyed much of Iran’s air defens­es in airstrikes in Octo­ber, leav­ing it large­ly exposed.

    In recent months, Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cers were track­ing the loca­tions of var­i­ous mem­bers of the sci­en­tist group, and Israeli air force pilots were train­ing to simul­ta­ne­ous­ly strike the Iran­ian sci­en­tists and mil­i­tary offi­cers in their homes, an Israeli offi­cial said. By this month, Israeli pilots had honed their capa­bil­i­ty to use new soft­ware and muni­tions to car­ry out dozens of strikes simul­ta­ne­ous­ly — a capa­bil­i­ty they did not pos­sess even a few years ago, said Matan Kahana, an Israeli law­mak­er who was an air squadron com­man­der.

    An Israeli offi­cial said that Israel’s exter­nal intel­li­gence ser­vice, the Mossad, had spent years col­lect­ing intel­li­gence about each of the sci­en­tists who would be tar­get­ed for assas­si­na­tion and their roles in Iran’s nuclear pro­gram. Much of the agency’s knowl­edge about the Iran­ian pro­gram came from agents who were recruit­ed and han­dled by the Mossad and worked inside the Natanz and For­dow facil­i­ties.

    The Mossad also unfurled an elab­o­rate, covert mis­sion that includ­ed smug­gling and installing kamikaze drones and mis­sile launch­ers inside Iran itself, an Israeli offi­cial said. There was a risk that the covert oper­a­tion could have been dis­cov­ered, and that con­sid­er­a­tion part­ly influ­enced the tim­ing of the June 13 attack but not Netanyahu’s strate­gic deci­sion, made months ear­li­er, to set it in motion, Israeli gov­ern­ment offi­cials and advis­ers said.

    Today, the ques­tion of what intel­li­gence Israel pos­sessed about the activ­i­ties of the Iran­ian sci­en­tists is “not rel­e­vant any­more” after Netanyahu decid­ed to car­ry out their assas­si­na­tion and to crip­ple Iran’s mis­sile pro­gram and mil­i­tary lead­er­ship, Nagel argued.

    Since June 13, Israel has killed 10 key sci­en­tists and the U.S. and Israeli strikes have set back Iran’s quest for a bomb, Israeli offi­cials say.

    ...

    ———–

    “Netanyahu decid­ed on Iran war last year, then sought to recruit Trump” By Ger­ry Shih, War­ren P. Stro­bel and Souad Mekhen­net; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 06/23/2025

    “Ulti­mate­ly, when Netanyahu final­ly launched his sur­prise attack on Iran in the ear­ly hours of June 13 while Trump’s nego­ti­a­tions were still under­way, the deci­sion was not so much dri­ven by new intel­li­gence indi­cat­ing an Iran­ian sprint for a nuclear weapon or any immi­nent threat to Israel. Rather, Israel seized on what it saw as a unique oppor­tu­ni­ty to exe­cute plans, care­ful­ly laid months and years in advance, to heav­i­ly dam­age a weak­ened Iran that had long waged a bloody proxy con­flict with Israel and to set back Iran­ian nuclear and mis­sile pro­grams, Israeli and U.S. offi­cials and advis­ers to both gov­ern­ments say.

    It was­n’t a pre­emp­tive strike intend­ed to destroy an immi­nent nuclear threat to Israel. It was an oppor­tu­ni­ty that was­n’t going to be passed up. An oppor­tu­ni­ty cre­at­ed thanks to Israel’s larg­er region­al offen­sive waged last year that includ­ed the destruc­tion of much of Iran’s air defens­es. A pre­emp­tive strike of oppor­tu­ni­ty that Israel report­ed­ly com­mit­ted itself to back in March, with or with­out US par­tic­i­pa­tion, we are told:

    ...
    After Israel dec­i­mat­ed Iran’s air defens­es in a mis­sile skir­mish and crip­pled its main ally, Hezbol­lah, in Octo­ber, Netanyahu issued a gen­er­al order to pre­pare for a strike, the cur­rent and for­mer offi­cials said. Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cials began hud­dling to com­pile lists of dozens of Iran­ian nuclear sci­en­tists and mil­i­tary lead­ers who could be tar­get­ed for assas­si­na­tion. Israel’s air force began to sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly take out air defens­es in Lebanon, Syr­ia and Iraq to clear the skies for future bomb­ing runs against Iran.

    Mean­while, Israeli offi­cials were pur­su­ing anoth­er track in their prepa­ra­tions — to sway Wash­ing­ton. Israeli offi­cials have long believed that mil­i­tary action with U.S. par­tic­i­pa­tion to tar­get the Iran­ian nuclear pro­gram would be more effec­tive than Israel going alone. On Sat­ur­day, Trump indeed joined the con­flict, order­ing U.S. forces, includ­ing B‑2 strate­gic bombers, to strike three Iran­ian nuclear sites.

    ...

    In pri­vate con­ver­sa­tions, how­ev­er, senior Israeli gov­ern­ment offi­cials said they had already decid­ed by March, weeks before Netanyahu met Trump in the Oval Office on April 7, to strike Iran with or with­out U.S. par­tic­i­pa­tion by June at the lat­est, said two peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. The rea­son­ing was that Iran would have rebuilt its air defens­es by the lat­ter half of the year, one of the peo­ple said.

    ...

    In an inter­view Tues­day with pro-gov­ern­ment Chan­nel 14 tele­vi­sion, Netanyahu said that he had decid­ed on the exact tim­ing of the strike only two weeks ear­li­er, but that he had made the “dif­fi­cult” deci­sion to car­ry out the oper­a­tion “sev­er­al months ago” and began flesh­ing out the plan and its ele­ment of sur­prise in April.
    ...

    And as the arti­cle points out, Netanyahu did­n’t devise the pol­i­cy of pre­emp­tive strikes. The “Begin Doc­trine” has been a bedrock of Israeli strate­gic think­ing since the 1981 bomb­ing of Iraq’s Osir­ak nuclear reac­tor as an act of “antic­i­pa­to­ry self-defense.” Still, this isn’t a strate­gic pos­ture with­out its crit­ics in the Israeli secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment, like Dan­ny Cit­ri­now­icz, a for­mer head of the Iran desk in the research depart­ment of Israeli mil­i­tary intel­li­gence who basi­cal­ly acknowl­edged that a polit­i­cal route has­n’t real­ly been giv­en a chance. That’s a key part of this strate­gic pos­ture: it’s entire­ly based on mil­i­tary strikes and does­n’t even leave open the option of a polit­i­cal agree­ment:

    ...
    Netanyahu, who has argued for decades that Iran was on the verge of acquir­ing nuclear weapons and should be halt­ed by mil­i­tary strikes, has acknowl­edged in recent inter­views that Iran was still months or a year away from a weapon. What was undis­put­ed, he has said, was that Iran had enriched large amounts of ura­ni­um to a lev­el well beyond what is required for civil­ian use and built up a dan­ger­ous arse­nal of bal­lis­tic mis­siles.

    ...

    In Israel, the major­i­ty of the secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment and polit­i­cal par­ties have sup­port­ed Netanyahu’s deci­sion to exe­cute what they con­sid­er a pre­ven­ta­tive strike. For decades, a bedrock of Israeli strate­gic think­ing has been the “Begin Doc­trine,” named after for­mer prime min­is­ter Men­achem Begin, who defend­ed Israel’s 1981 bomb­ing of the Osir­ak nuclear reac­tor in Iraq as “antic­i­pa­to­ry self-defense” against a poten­tial ene­my mak­ing a weapon of mass destruc­tion.

    But a minor­i­ty of those have ques­tioned the wis­dom of car­ry­ing out a sur­prise attack while Trump was still pur­su­ing the diplo­mat­ic route — and, they say, with­out proof that the Ira­ni­ans had decid­ed to con­struct a nuclear weapon.

    “We should have giv­en the polit­i­cal route a chance,” said Dan­ny Cit­ri­now­icz, a for­mer head of the Iran desk in the research depart­ment of Israeli mil­i­tary intel­li­gence. “Now, we got oper­a­tional achieve­ments but the risks are enor­mous. We’ve nev­er fought with a coun­try like Iran. We find our­selves not know­ing where the [high­ly enriched ura­ni­um] or cen­trifuges are. If we had an agree­ment, we would at least have less unknowns.”
    ...

    Instead, it appears the Israeli jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for all of this pre­emp­tive alarm was NOT root­ed in a con­clu­sion that an order had been issued to cre­ate a bomb. Instead, it was based on an assess­ment that the Ira­ni­ans were con­duct­ing nuclear research that does­n’t have exclu­sive­ly civil­ian appli­ca­tions. Which is a pret­ty loose pre­text for pre­emp­tive strikes of this nature:

    ...
    Since Trump pulled out of the Oba­ma-era nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, Iran has sharply increased its stock­pile of near-weapons-grade enriched ura­ni­um, accord­ing to the Inter­na­tion­al Atom­ic Ener­gy Agency. But intel­li­gence agen­cies have debat­ed whether Iran has resumed its effort to build a weapon — known as Project Amad — that was halt­ed by Aya­tol­lah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in 2003.

    Last year, U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials, includ­ing CIA Direc­tor William J. Burns, reviewed new intel­li­gence and con­clud­ed that Iran­ian sci­en­tists were revis­it­ing pre­vi­ous­ly sus­pend­ed nuclear weapons research, explor­ing paths that could allow them to more quick­ly make the leap to a crude nuclear bomb — if Khamenei so chose, three peo­ple famil­iar with the mat­ter said. Israeli offi­cials then came to the same real­iza­tion.

    But U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials did not con­clude that Khamenei had changed his stance and sanc­tioned a bomb, said for­mer U.S. and Israeli offi­cials with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. “We knew they could speed up their time­line if they decid­ed to change course,” a for­mer senior U.S. offi­cial said.

    ...

    Jacob Nagel, a long­time advis­er to Netanyahu on Iran­ian nuclear issues and a senior fel­low at the Foun­da­tion for Defense of Democ­ra­cies, said Iran­ian sci­en­tists were work­ing in aca­d­e­m­ic set­tings, and there was nev­er a “smok­ing gun” show­ing they had bro­ken new ground on aspects of weaponiza­tion that were pro­hib­it­ed under the 2015 nuclear agree­ment, such as a mul­ti-point det­o­na­tion device used to trig­ger a nuclear explo­sion. But they were con­duct­ing research seem­ing­ly sur­rep­ti­tious­ly on top­ics that were dif­fi­cult to jus­ti­fy as hav­ing only civil­ian appli­ca­tions, Nagel said. He added that Khamenei “prob­a­bly knew what they were doing.”

    At one point, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion asked Iran about the sci­en­tists’ activ­i­ties, but the sci­en­tists car­ried on, which fur­ther fueled Israeli sus­pi­cions going into the spring, Nagel and anoth­er Israeli offi­cial said.

    As Israeli offi­cials geared up in recent months to strike while hop­ing the U.S. would join, Israel made anoth­er push with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion as part of reg­u­lar intel­li­gence shar­ing. U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials did not see any­thing star­tling­ly new, accord­ing to two peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter.

    But Israeli offi­cials believed intel­li­gence showed the sci­en­tists were revis­it­ing stud­ies in sev­er­al alarm­ing areas, includ­ing the mul­ti-point det­o­na­tion device, the pro­duc­tion of plas­tic explo­sives and exper­i­ments on neu­tron radi­a­tion, accord­ing to one per­son who was briefed by Israeli offi­cials in recent weeks.

    Israeli offi­cials acknowl­edged that they still assessed Khamenei had not ordered the pro­duc­tion of a nuclear weapon, the per­son said, adding: “I don’t believe the Israeli [intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty] shad­ed their intel for polit­i­cal pur­pos­es, but I do believe in Netanyahu tak­ing the inch and run­ning a mile with it.”
    ...

    But as the arti­cle also makes clear, the divide between the US and Israel on the wis­dom of this strike was more a divide between the intel­li­gence ana­lysts and the politi­cians, with Pres­i­dent Trump reject­ing the US intel­li­gence in favor of an inter­pre­ta­tion that sug­gest­ed Iran was tak­ing steps toward build­ing a bomb. As one observ­er put it, “It may be that the U.S. and Israeli intel­li­gence ser­vices were on the same page, but they weren’t on the same page as their polit­i­cal lead­er­ship”:

    ...
    Through­out the fall, the Israelis had met with their Biden admin­is­tra­tion coun­ter­parts to dis­cuss intel­li­gence col­lect­ed by both coun­tries in the sum­mer that showed Iran­ian nuclear sci­en­tists were gath­er­ing to resume the­o­ret­i­cal research on weaponiza­tion, accord­ing to three peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter. But U.S. intel­li­gence ana­lysts did not con­clude that the Iran­ian lead­er­ship had made such a deci­sion — an assess­ment U.S. spy agen­cies revis­it­ed and main­tained through­out the spring under the new Trump admin­is­tra­tion and up until the time Israel launched strikes, said five peo­ple famil­iar with the con­clu­sions.

    ...

    Whether or not Netanyahu had enough evi­dence of Iran­ian progress toward a nuclear weapon to jus­ti­fy an attack has been the sub­ject of intense debate glob­al­ly and rais­es ques­tions about the strikes’ per­mis­si­bil­i­ty under inter­na­tion­al law. In recent days, the issue has appeared to gen­er­ate fric­tion inside the U.S. admin­is­tra­tion, with Trump repeat­ed­ly dis­miss­ing the assess­ment deliv­ered in March by Direc­tor of Nation­al Intel­li­gence Tul­si Gab­bard that Iran’s lead­er­ship has not ordered the devel­op­ment of a nuclear weapon and telling reporters that he per­son­al­ly believed that Iran was “very close” to a bomb.

    ...

    In Wash­ing­ton, Trump came to believe that Iran was striv­ing for a bomb, going beyond what ana­lysts in his own intel­li­gence agen­cies con­clud­ed. His CIA chief, John Rat­cliffe, argued that the assess­ment dat­ing back to 2007 that Khamenei had not ordered con­struc­tion of a nuclear weapon was of lim­it­ed val­ue, said two peo­ple famil­iar with Ratcliffe’s views. Iran, he said, was like a foot­ball team that had gone 99 yards down the field, and there was no way it would not try for a nuclear touch­down.

    ...

    Richard Nephew, a lead U.S. nego­tia­tor with Iran under the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion, said the real divi­sion appears not to have been between U.S. and Israeli intel­li­gence ana­lysts but between the spies and the politi­cians, who inter­pret­ed the intel­li­gence in a more alarm­ing fash­ion.

    “It may be that the U.S. and Israeli intel­li­gence ser­vices were on the same page, but they weren’t on the same page as their polit­i­cal lead­er­ship,” said Nephew, now at the Wash­ing­ton Insti­tute for Near East Pol­i­cy.

    Nephew said it was not sur­pris­ing that Iran would edge back toward the option of a bomb after suf­fer­ing a series of strate­gic set­backs. By last fall, Israel had dealt stag­ger­ing blows to allied Iran­ian groups such as Hamas and Lebanon-based Hezbol­lah, and had destroyed much of Iran’s air defens­es in airstrikes in Octo­ber, leav­ing it large­ly exposed.
    ...

    Also note how the attacks by Israeli did­n’t just include bombs and mis­siles fired from jets or drones launched from Israel. In a tac­tic that sounds incred­i­bly sim­i­lar the drone attack car­ried out by Ukraine back on June 1 on Russ­ian strate­gic bombs. Drones launched from trucks smug­gled into Rus­sia. It’s rather remark­able that two US allies car­ried out the same smug­gled-mass-drone tac­tic with­in weeks of each oth­er:

    ...
    In recent months, Israeli intel­li­gence offi­cers were track­ing the loca­tions of var­i­ous mem­bers of the sci­en­tist group, and Israeli air force pilots were train­ing to simul­ta­ne­ous­ly strike the Iran­ian sci­en­tists and mil­i­tary offi­cers in their homes, an Israeli offi­cial said. By this month, Israeli pilots had honed their capa­bil­i­ty to use new soft­ware and muni­tions to car­ry out dozens of strikes simul­ta­ne­ous­ly — a capa­bil­i­ty they did not pos­sess even a few years ago, said Matan Kahana, an Israeli law­mak­er who was an air squadron com­man­der.

    An Israeli offi­cial said that Israel’s exter­nal intel­li­gence ser­vice, the Mossad, had spent years col­lect­ing intel­li­gence about each of the sci­en­tists who would be tar­get­ed for assas­si­na­tion and their roles in Iran’s nuclear pro­gram. Much of the agency’s knowl­edge about the Iran­ian pro­gram came from agents who were recruit­ed and han­dled by the Mossad and worked inside the Natanz and For­dow facil­i­ties.

    The Mossad also unfurled an elab­o­rate, covert mis­sion that includ­ed smug­gling and installing kamikaze drones and mis­sile launch­ers inside Iran itself, an Israeli offi­cial said. There was a risk that the covert oper­a­tion could have been dis­cov­ered, and that con­sid­er­a­tion part­ly influ­enced the tim­ing of the June 13 attack but not Netanyahu’s strate­gic deci­sion, made months ear­li­er, to set it in motion, Israeli gov­ern­ment offi­cials and advis­ers said.

    Today, the ques­tion of what intel­li­gence Israel pos­sessed about the activ­i­ties of the Iran­ian sci­en­tists is “not rel­e­vant any­more” after Netanyahu decid­ed to car­ry out their assas­si­na­tion and to crip­ple Iran’s mis­sile pro­gram and mil­i­tary lead­er­ship, Nagel argued.

    Since June 13, Israel has killed 10 key sci­en­tists and the U.S. and Israeli strikes have set back Iran’s quest for a bomb, Israeli offi­cials say.
    ...

    And mud­dled divide between the US and Israeli intel­li­gence assess­ments brings us to this very inter­est­ing set of details: first, we are told that US intel­li­gence pick up on Israeli prepa­ra­tions for such an attack in last 2024, with the expec­ta­tion that the attack would be car­ried out in the first six months of 2025. But then we’re also told that the sense of urgency by the Israelis was due, in part, to the antic­i­pat­ed retire­ment of Gen­er­al Michael E. Kuril­la, the US Cen­tral Com­mand chief who had helped make war plans with Israel through­out the spring. Did those war plans include these strikes against Iran?

    ...
    U.S. intel­li­gence agen­cies begin­ning late last year picked up on Israeli prepa­ra­tions for an attack and warned Wash­ing­ton pol­i­cy­mak­ers that Israel was like­ly to strike in the first six months of 2025.

    But Netanyahu’s plan was unex­pect­ed­ly delayed when he was sum­moned to Wash­ing­ton to meet Trump and told that the Unit­ed States would enter direct nego­ti­a­tions with Iran to solve the prob­lem diplo­mat­i­cal­ly. The prime minister’s strong incli­na­tion to strike, how­ev­er, remained unchanged, said a per­son with knowl­edge of the think­ing of top Israeli offi­cials.

    Going into the spring, there was also con­cern among Israeli offi­cials that any poten­tial deal between Trump envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran would still allow Iran to even­tu­al­ly pos­sess a bomb, an Israeli offi­cial added. And, a for­mer senior Israeli offi­cial said, the Israelis had been antic­i­pat­ing the sched­uled retire­ment of Gen. Michael E. Kuril­la, the U.S. Cen­tral Com­mand chief who had helped make war plans with Israel through­out the spring.
    ...

    And we can see in the fol­low­ing Respon­si­ble State­craft report, Gen­er­al Kuril­la isn’t just a US gen­er­al sym­pa­thet­ic to Israel’s stance on Iran. He’s con­sid­ered the “Hawk of Hawks” on Iran inside the Pen­ta­gon:

    Respon­si­ble State­craft

    Is Israel’s favorite US gen­er­al help­ing to push us into war?

    Some ques­tion the tim­ing of the attacks, pegged before CENTCOM Com­man­der Michael Kuril­la’s sum­mer retire­ment

    Kel­ley Beau­car Vla­hos
    Jun 17, 2025

    Did the Israelis strike Iran when it did because Michael Kuril­la is still com­man­der of U.S. Cen­tral Com­mand and a “win­dow” for a prospec­tive joint oper­a­tion with the U.S. might be clos­ing?

    Some are spec­u­lat­ing that because Kuril­la is expect­ed to retire from the mil­i­tary this sum­mer that the Israelis saw their chance. The Army gen­er­al, 59, has been wide­ly report­ed to be on one side of a split in the Pen­ta­gon over whether the U.S. should sup­port and even be part of Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear pro­gram.

    In April, Israel news out­let Ynet coined him as “The U.S. gen­er­al Israel doesn’t want to strike Iran with­out.”

    “Israeli defense ana­lysts say the win­dow for a suc­cess­ful attack on Iran’s nuclear pro­gram is rapid­ly clos­ing,” wrote Alon Strim­ling on April 19. “That win­dow could nar­row dra­mat­i­cal­ly once Kuril­la steps down, as his successor’s stance remains unclear.”

    ...

    “He’s a hawk of hawks,” not­ed Curt Mills, exec­u­tive direc­tor of the Amer­i­can Con­ser­v­a­tive. “(The Israelis) knew they were los­ing an ally soon. They knew the nego­ti­a­tions (with Iran) were ongo­ing. The Ira­ni­ans had sig­naled that they were close to accept­ing a deal days before the strike. So all of these things were a fac­tor.

    “And then mean­while, I think there’s every piece of evi­dence that Kuril­la would at least start the con­flict and pop his cork on it before he leaves.”

    Kuril­la, accord­ing to the New York Times, had been open to Israeli strike plans ear­li­er this spring, “that would have com­bined an Israeli com­man­do raid on under­ground nuclear sites with a bomb­ing cam­paign, an effort that the Israelis hoped would involve Amer­i­can air­craft.”

    “Gen. Michael E. Kuril­la, the head of U.S. Cen­tral Com­mand, and Michael Waltz, the nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, both dis­cussed how the Unit­ed States could poten­tial­ly sup­port an Israeli attack, if Mr. Trump backed the plan.”

    Sources who spoke to RS since Friday’s attacks on Iran sug­gest­ed that Kuril­la wasn’t just “open” to such plans, he was active­ly pro­mot­ing them inside the DoD. That’s not a sur­prise, said Justin Logan, direc­tor of For­eign Pol­i­cy and Defense Stud­ies at the Cato Insti­tute.

    “He has been push­ing for war with Iran and away from diplo­ma­cy since before Trump took office in ways that run over civil­ian offi­cials,” Logan told RS. The CENCTOM com­man­der reports direct­ly to the Sec­re­tary of Defense.

    Dan Cald­well, for­mer advis­er to Sec­re­tary of Defense Pete Hegseth, told the Break­ing Points pod­cast Mon­day that he didn’t think the tim­ing of the strikes were a “coin­ci­dence.”

    “I think it’s been report­ed, and you know, based on my expe­ri­ence with him, that he takes a fun­da­men­tal­ly dif­fer­ent view of the impor­tance of the Mid­dle East than a lot of oth­er peo­ple in the admin­is­tra­tion. And he also, I think, believes that a mil­i­tary cam­paign against Iran will not be as cost­ly as oth­ers,” Cald­well said.

    ...

    To under­stand the author­i­ty the CENTCOM com­man­der wields is to under­stand that the com­bat­ant com­mand over­sees an AOR (Area of Respon­si­bil­i­ty) that spans 21 coun­tries — includ­ing Israel now — across the Mid­dle East, Cen­tral Asia, and parts of South Asia. It directs five “ser­vice com­po­nent com­mands” of Army, Navy (includ­ing the Fifth Fleet), Air Force, Marines, Space Com­mand, as well as a joint spe­cial oper­a­tions com­mand (SOCCENT).

    Kuril­la has pur­sued a high­ly elab­o­rate sys­tem of mil­i­tary inte­gra­tion with Israel and part­ners in the region in what he has called a “strat­e­gy to deter Iran­ian aggres­sion.” It has been referred to as a “secu­ri­ty umbrel­la” or “Kurilla’s umbrel­la.”

    Even as Iran­ian prox­ies in the Pales­tin­ian ter­ri­to­ries, Lebanon, Syr­ia, and Iran itself were tak­ing blows and los­ing influ­ence after Oct. 7, 2023, Kuril­la was telling Con­gress that it was impor­tant to that U.S. not be the “secu­ri­ty guar­an­tor” but the “secu­ri­ty inte­gra­tor” in the region because essen­tial­ly Iran is still an exis­ten­tial threat to every­one.

    ———–

    “Is Israel’s favorite US gen­er­al help­ing to push us into war?” by Kel­ley Beau­car Vla­hos; Respon­si­ble State­craft; 06/17/2025

    “He’s a hawk of hawks,” not­ed Curt Mills, exec­u­tive direc­tor of the Amer­i­can Con­ser­v­a­tive. “(The Israelis) knew they were los­ing an ally soon. They knew the nego­ti­a­tions (with Iran) were ongo­ing. The Ira­ni­ans had sig­naled that they were close to accept­ing a deal days before the strike. So all of these things were a fac­tor.”

    A “hawk of hawks” when it comes to Iran. It’s not hard to see why the Israelis want­ed to car­ry out these strikes while Kuril­la is still serv­ing:

    ...
    “And then mean­while, I think there’s every piece of evi­dence that Kuril­la would at least start the con­flict and pop his cork on it before he leaves.”

    Kuril­la, accord­ing to the New York Times, had been open to Israeli strike plans ear­li­er this spring, “that would have com­bined an Israeli com­man­do raid on under­ground nuclear sites with a bomb­ing cam­paign, an effort that the Israelis hoped would involve Amer­i­can air­craft.”

    “Gen. Michael E. Kuril­la, the head of U.S. Cen­tral Com­mand, and Michael Waltz, the nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, both dis­cussed how the Unit­ed States could poten­tial­ly sup­port an Israeli attack, if Mr. Trump backed the plan.”

    Sources who spoke to RS since Friday’s attacks on Iran sug­gest­ed that Kuril­la wasn’t just “open” to such plans, he was active­ly pro­mot­ing them inside the DoD. That’s not a sur­prise, said Justin Logan, direc­tor of For­eign Pol­i­cy and Defense Stud­ies at the Cato Insti­tute.

    “He has been push­ing for war with Iran and away from diplo­ma­cy since before Trump took office in ways that run over civil­ian offi­cials,” Logan told RS. The CENCTOM com­man­der reports direct­ly to the Sec­re­tary of Defense.

    ...

    “I think it’s been report­ed, and you know, based on my expe­ri­ence with him, that he takes a fun­da­men­tal­ly dif­fer­ent view of the impor­tance of the Mid­dle East than a lot of oth­er peo­ple in the admin­is­tra­tion. And he also, I think, believes that a mil­i­tary cam­paign against Iran will not be as cost­ly as oth­ers,” Cald­well said.
    ...

    But if hav­ing Gen­er­al Kuril­la still serv­ing real­ly is crit­i­cal to Israel’s war plans, the fact that the gen­er­al is slat­ed to retire soon sug­gest that any more war plans Israel has will have to be ini­ti­at­ed soon­er rather than lat­er.

    Also keep in mind that if the Trump admin­is­tra­tion real­ly is deter­mined to force the ‘total­ly oblit­er­at­ed’ nar­ra­tive indef­i­nite­ly, and Iran does end up reestab­lish­ing its nuclear pro­gram while Trump is still in office, some sort of new pre­text will have to be estab­lished for future strikes. No point in re-bomb­ing some­thing that was already “oblit­er­at­ed”. Which is a warn­ing that the next round of “antic­i­pa­to­ry self-defense” is going to have to revolve around some oth­er sort of declared exis­ten­tial threat. Will it be bio­log­i­cal war­fare? Chem­i­cal weapons? Some sort of super hack­ing capac­i­ty? Time will tell, but try not to be shocked if the world sud­den­ly ‘learns’ about a new Iran­ian won­der-weapon no one saw com­ing requir­ing an imme­di­ate over­whelm­ing response.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 25, 2025, 9:45 pm
  8. Help is on the way. That was the mes­sage Pres­i­dent Trump decid­ed to share with the peo­ple of Iran of social media. At the same time the gov­ern­men­t’s crack­down on the major protests roil­ing the coun­try, trig­gered by a cur­ren­cy col­lapse, con­tin­ues to grow more and more dead­ly. We have no idea what kind of help Trump was refer­ring to, but he’s appar­ent­ly con­sid­er­ing a anoth­er regime change oper­a­tion. Which brings us to a grim­ly fas­ci­nat­ing dynam­ic that has emerged among the Iran­ian oppo­si­tion in exile. A very divid­ed oppo­si­tion already at war with itself. On one side, there’s the back­ers of the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who has open­ly cham­pi­oned the protests and put him­self for­ward as the future king will­ing to return to pow­er and lead the nation. And on the oth­er side there’s the Nation­al Coun­cil of Resis­tance of Iran and Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK), a group that offi­cial­ly calls for a demo­c­ra­t­ic, sec­u­lar Iran in recent decades, but report­ed­ly oper­ates as a mind-con­trol­ling per­son­al­i­ty cult. Back in 2018 dur­ing the first Trump admin­is­tra­tion, it was MEK that Trump offi­cials was eager­ly work­ing with dur­ing the major Iran­ian protest of that year which were also trig­gered, in part, by a cur­ren­cy col­lapse. Then-Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor John Bolton was espe­cial­ly pro-MEK.

    And here we are, in 2026, with hopes for regime change even pos­si­bly high­er under a sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion, and no John Bolton. Maybe the sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion will adopt­ed a MEK-favor­able approach again, but that remains to be seen. The moment both MEK and the Pahlavi dynasty have long wait­ed for is almost here. But it’s a moment the two move­ment can’t exact­ly share. Or at least aren’t will­ing to share. Which brings us to the fol­low­ing set of sto­ries about that MEK/Pahlavi divide that looks like­ly to deep­en the protests in Iran grow increas­ing­ly volatile and dead­ly. Start­ing with a bizarre sto­ry out of Los Ange­les, where the largest Iran­ian com­mu­ni­ty out­side of Iran resides. A truck drove into a crowd of demon­stra­tors who had gath­ered in sup­port of the Iran­ian pro­test­ers. But it was­n’t a ter­ror attack and for­tu­nate­ly there were no seri­ous injuries. Instead, the truck was cov­ered in slo­gans like “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mul­lah,” which was report­ed­ly not the view of the crowd. We are told police stopped the truck as it approached the crowd and asked him to turn around. But then are told demon­stra­tors tore the signs off his truck and attack him at which point he drove towards a group of LAPD offi­cers, with some indi­vid­u­als jump­ing out of the way. Police appear to have con­clud­ed the dri­ver intend­ed to get a mes­sage out at the demon­stra­tion, but became over­whelmed by the sit­u­a­tion.

    That high­ly volatile sit­u­a­tion serves as a back­drop for role Reza Pahlavi is offer­ing Iran and the world com­mu­ni­ty. A role that goes beyond serv­ing as king under a resume Iran­ian monar­chy, although Pahlavi sug­gests there could also be an elect­ed leader too. Back in May of 2025, Pahlavi unveiled the “Cyrus Accords”, a plan focused on estab­lish­ing deep eco­nom­ic ties between Iran and Israel, with Israel pro­vid­ing Iran with key water tech­nol­o­gy and the con­struc­tion of major pipelines that would move nat­ur­al gas to Euro­pean mar­kets. The name “Cyrus” was­n’t just flour­ish. Pahlavi and his back­ers are open­ly con­nect­ing the plan to the bib­li­cal role King Cyrus played in free­ing the Jews and allow­ing them to return to Israel and build a sec­ond tem­ple. Pahlavi embraces the idea of being a mod­ern day Cyrus who final­ly brings piece to the Iran­ian and Israeli peo­ple and calls for the build­ing of the third tem­ple, an event many Chris­tians believe is a sign of the End Times. Pahlavi is fram­ing his return to the throne as a bib­li­cal event.

    When it comes to per­suad­ing the Trump admin­is­tra­tion to pick an oppo­si­tion group to back, the bible prophe­cy angle is a sad­ly pret­ty savvy move. There’s no way Trump would­n’t be tempt­ed to back that option. Except for one minor snag: Trump has already been declared the mod­ern day Cyrus by many of his evan­gel­i­cal back­ers. It start­ed in his first term, as a bib­li­cal metaphor to excuse devout Chris­tians for defend­ing some­one as un-Chris­t­ian as Trump. You can’t have two Cyrus­es at the same time. And Pahlavi return­ing to the throne, ush­er­ing in peace with Israel, would obvi­ous be a much more Cyrus‑y biog­ra­phy. If Trump backs Pahlavi his Cyrus sta­tus is in per­il. What­ev­er will he do?

    The fourth arti­cle excerpt below is from a Times of Israel piece by Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh, an Iran­ian Chris­t­ian con­vert who spent time in prison and escaped to the US. Ami­rizadeh unsuc­cess­ful­ly ran for con­gress in the 2022 GOP pri­maries. Her piece is writ­ten from a staunch­ly pro-Pahlavi view and all about how the MEK is fake oppo­si­tion with no sup­port, but also that the Iran­ian peo­ple are very excit­ed for the monar­chy’s return and are thank­ful for things like Israeli bomb­ing cam­paigns and eager for some sort of for­eign inter­ven­tion. The Pahlavi crowd sees their moment and they are aim­ing for a full monar­chi­cal return. And while Pahlavi him­self isn’t yet call­ing for US mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion, his fol­low­ers aren’t hold­ing back. That’s the play we are see­ing emerg­ing from the Pahlavi forces as the fight to court the Trump admin­is­tra­tion gets under­way.

    Will the Trump admin­is­tra­tion turn to MEK like it did back in 2018? Or will Pahla­vian End Times bib­li­cal agen­da catch Trump’s fan­cy? Time will tell, but it’s look­ing like it’s regime change time for Iran, and replace­ment options are a cult and the crown prince eager to dab­ble in End Times bible prophe­cy diplo­ma­cy. These are our stu­pid times. Maybe stu­pid End Times. Ok, first, here’s a report from LA about the anti-Pahlavi truck that drove into Pahlav­i’s crowd:

    NBC Los Ange­les

    Man arrest­ed after dri­ving U‑Haul truck through West­wood Iran demon­stra­tion

    The dri­ver was con­front­ed by a group of demon­stra­tors at the large protest in sup­port of the Iran­ian peo­ple.

    By Den­nis Broad and Jonathan Lloyd
    • Pub­lished Jan­u­ary 12, 2026 • Updat­ed on Jan­u­ary 12, 2026 at 4:15 pm

    The man behind the wheel of a U‑Haul box truck that went through a group of demon­stra­tors who gath­ered in sup­port of the Iran­ian peo­ple Sun­day in West­wood has been arrest­ed.

    Calor Madanescht, 48, was arrest­ed on sus­pi­cion of reck­less dri­ving, the LAPD said in a news release. Jail records did not indi­cate an ini­tial court date.

    The events unfold­ed Sun­day after­noon in West­wood, a neigh­bor­hood home to the largest Iran­ian com­mu­ni­ty out­side of Iran, near the Fed­er­al Build­ing at Vet­er­an Avenue and Ohio Avenue. Demon­stra­tors, some wav­ing the flag of Iran from before the Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion, scram­bled out of the way as the U‑Haul truck entered the area, lead­ing to a con­fronta­tion between mem­bers of the crowd and the dri­ver.

    The large box truck, which had mes­sages on the sides of its car­go area, con­tin­ued down the street as demon­stra­tors scram­bled out of the way. No seri­ous injuries were report­ed.

    After speak­ing with Madanescht, inves­ti­ga­tors deter­mined he intend­ed to get a mes­sage out at the demon­stra­tion, but became over­whelmed by the sit­u­a­tion, police said.

    “Offi­cers stopped the truck and direct­ed the dri­ver to turn around, as he was approach­ing a large crowd of pro­test­ers,” the LAPD said in the news release. “On the side of the truck were writ­ten signs that opposed the views of the crowd. The demon­stra­tors tore the signs off the truck, and attacked the dri­ver, who drove toward a group of LAPD offi­cers. Indi­vid­u­als from the crowd jumped out of the truck’s path of trav­el to avoid being struck. Offi­cers formed a skir­mish line between the box truck and the crowd and took the dri­ver into cus­tody.”

    ...

    Demon­stra­tors attempt­ed to remove a sign attached to the side of the truck that read, “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mul­lah.” The Shah of Iran was over­thrown in the 1979 Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion. In 1953, a coup oust­ed Prime Min­is­ter Moham­mad Mosad­degh.

    “The pro­tes­tors had a com­plete­ly dif­fer­ent per­cep­tion of what was hap­pen­ing, and that was due to the writ­ing that was across the side of his truck,” said pro­test­er Ariel Rofeim. “That rhetoric is not some­thing that Ira­ni­ans are unfa­mil­iar with.”

    ...

    Activists say a crack­down on nation­wide protests in Iran has killed more than 530 peo­ple. Pro­test­ers flood­ed the streets in Iran’s cap­i­tal of Tehran and its sec­ond-largest city again Sun­day. The demon­stra­tions began Dec. 28 over the col­lapse of the Iran­ian cur­ren­cy, as the country’s econ­o­my is squeezed by inter­na­tion­al sanc­tions in part levied over its nuclear pro­gram. The protests inten­si­fied and grew into calls direct­ly chal­leng­ing Iran’s theoc­ra­cy.

    ———–

    “Man arrest­ed after dri­ving U‑Haul truck through West­wood Iran demon­stra­tion” by Den­nis Broad and Jonathan Lloyd; NBC Los Ange­les; 01/12/2026

    “Demon­stra­tors attempt­ed to remove a sign attached to the side of the truck that read, “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mul­lah.” The Shah of Iran was over­thrown in the 1979 Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion. In 1953, a coup oust­ed Prime Min­is­ter Moham­mad Mosad­degh.”

    It’s not a sur­prise to find large protests in the largest Iran­ian com­mu­ni­ty out­side of Iran. Nor is it a shock to find a range of views among the pro­test­ers. But this truck inci­dent was rather unex­pect­ed. It appears a truck cov­ered in slo­gans protest­ing both the regime in Iran and the pro-monar­chy sup­port­ers approached the protest, which was appar­ent­ly heav­i­ly attend­ed by a pro-monar­chy crowd, result­ing in the dri­ver pan­ick­ing as he slow­ly drove through the crowd. The slo­gan on the side of the truck, “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mul­lah.” was appar­ent­ly quite trig­ger­ing for what was pre­sum­ably a pro-monar­chy crowd:

    ...
    Calor Madanescht, 48, was arrest­ed on sus­pi­cion of reck­less dri­ving, the LAPD said in a news release. Jail records did not indi­cate an ini­tial court date.

    ...

    The large box truck, which had mes­sages on the sides of its car­go area, con­tin­ued down the street as demon­stra­tors scram­bled out of the way. No seri­ous injuries were report­ed.

    After speak­ing with Madanescht, inves­ti­ga­tors deter­mined he intend­ed to get a mes­sage out at the demon­stra­tion, but became over­whelmed by the sit­u­a­tion, police said.

    “Offi­cers stopped the truck and direct­ed the dri­ver to turn around, as he was approach­ing a large crowd of pro­test­ers,” the LAPD said in the news release. “On the side of the truck were writ­ten signs that opposed the views of the crowd. The demon­stra­tors tore the signs off the truck, and attacked the dri­ver, who drove toward a group of LAPD offi­cers. Indi­vid­u­als from the crowd jumped out of the truck’s path of trav­el to avoid being struck. Offi­cers formed a skir­mish line between the box truck and the crowd and took the dri­ver into cus­tody.”
    ...

    And that truck inci­dent brings us to the one of the facts that could end up play­ing a sig­nif­i­cant role in how this over­all protest move­ment plays out: The exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, is plac­ing him­self at the cen­ter of this protest move­ment and clear­ly has ambi­tions of being Iran’s next leader:

    Nation­al Pub­lic Radio

    Who is Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince encour­ag­ing demon­stra­tions across Iran?

    By Willem Marx
    Jan­u­ary 10, 2026 5:10 PM ET

    As the Islam­ic Repub­lic of Iran nears two weeks of nation­wide demon­stra­tions, the gov­ern­ment in Tehran has acknowl­edged the protests while con­tin­u­ing with a crack­down.

    The death toll from clash­es between pro­tes­tors and gov­ern­ment secu­ri­ty forces had reached 116 as of ear­ly Sun­day, with more than 2,600 peo­ple detained, accord­ing to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). Among the most promi­nent cheer­lead­ers for con­tin­ued action against the gov­ern­ment is Reza Pahlavi, son of the for­mer Shah of Iran, who has issued fre­quent mes­sages encour­ag­ing pro­test­ers.

    Iran’s attor­ney gen­er­al, Moham­mad Mova­he­di Azad, announced Sat­ur­day that par­tic­i­pants in the unrest would be con­sid­ered an “ene­my of God,” A state­ment, car­ried by Iran­ian state tele­vi­sion, said even those who “helped riot­ers” would face that charge, which car­ries the death penal­ty.

    The cur­rent wave of protests began on Dec. 28, fol­low­ing a col­lapse in the nation­al cur­ren­cy, the rial, which is cur­rent­ly trad­ing at over 1.4 mil­lion to the U.S. dol­lar and has lost half its val­ue since Sep­tem­ber. Inter­na­tion­al sanc­tions have squeezed the econ­o­my and the con­se­quent pub­lic griev­ances have prompt­ed direct chal­lenges to Iran’s theoc­ra­cy.

    In response, the gov­ern­ment has mobi­lized secu­ri­ty forces and state-con­trolled media. State tele­vi­sion has broad­cast pro-gov­ern­ment ral­lies, while at the same time sur­veil­lance footage released by the gov­ern­ment affil­i­at­ed Fars news agency depict­ed a pro­test­er in Isfa­han alleged­ly fir­ing a long gun as oth­ers lit fires and threw gaso­line bombs at what appeared to be a gov­ern­ment com­pound. Anoth­er gov­ern­ment-affil­i­at­ed news agency with close ties to Iran’s pow­er­ful Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Guard force, Tas­nim, report­ed that author­i­ties had detained near­ly 200 peo­ple belong­ing to “oper­a­tional ter­ror­ist teams,” along­side alle­ga­tions those arrest­ed had pos­sessed weapons includ­ing firearms, grenades, and gaso­line bombs.

    A divi­sive fig­ure

    Amid these events, Reza Pahlavi, the 65-year-old exiled crown prince and son of the late Shah, Moham­mad Reza Pahlavi, has re-emerged as a lead­ing fig­ure in the var­i­ous Iran­ian oppo­si­tion move­ments. In mes­sages shared on social media, Pahlavi spurred pro­test­ers onto the streets Thurs­day night and Fri­day. He urged demon­stra­tors to con­tin­ue pub­lic street protests over the week­end, car­ry­ing the coun­try’s old lion-and-sun flag and oth­er nation­al sym­bols used dur­ing the time of his father to “claim pub­lic spaces as your own.”

    Despite being born in Iran, Pahlavi has lived in exile for near­ly 50 years.

    ...

    A leader for a future Iran?

    Pahlav­i’s efforts to posi­tion him­self as a leader for a future Iran have prompt­ed some­times heat­ed debates inside and out­side the coun­try. And while pro­test­ers have shout­ed in sup­port of the shah in some protests, it is not clear whether that is sup­port for Pahlavi him­self or a desire to return to a time before the 1979 Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion.

    His pub­lic sup­port of Israel has prompt­ed sig­nif­i­cant crit­i­cism in the past from ordi­nary Ira­ni­ans and oth­er mem­bers of oppo­si­tion groups, par­tic­u­lar­ly after the 12-day war launched by Israel in June 2025.

    He has sought to have a voice through social media videos, and Far­si-lan­guage news chan­nels such as Iran Inter­na­tion­al have high­light­ed his calls for protests. In press inter­views, Pahlavi has repeat­ed­ly raised the idea of a con­sti­tu­tion­al monar­chy, per­haps with an elect­ed rather than a hered­i­tary ruler, but has also stat­ed it is up to Ira­ni­ans to choose.

    ————

    “Who is Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince encour­ag­ing demon­stra­tions across Iran?” By Willem Marx; Nation­al Pub­lic Radio; 01/10/2026

    Amid these events, Reza Pahlavi, the 65-year-old exiled crown prince and son of the late Shah, Moham­mad Reza Pahlavi, has re-emerged as a lead­ing fig­ure in the var­i­ous Iran­ian oppo­si­tion move­ments. In mes­sages shared on social media, Pahlavi spurred pro­test­ers onto the streets Thurs­day night and Fri­day. He urged demon­stra­tors to con­tin­ue pub­lic street protests over the week­end, car­ry­ing the coun­try’s old lion-and-sun flag and oth­er nation­al sym­bols used dur­ing the time of his father to “claim pub­lic spaces as your own.””

    Reza Pahlavi clear­ly has sig­nif­i­cant sup­port among the Iran­ian ex-pat com­mu­ni­ty and he’s not shy­ing away from not just play­ing a pub­lic role in encour­ag­ing the protests but putting him­self for­ward as the future leader of the coun­try. Specif­i­cal­ly, the future monarch of the coun­try. When peo­ple chant “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mul­lah,” they are chant­i­ng against Reza Pahlav­i’s open ambi­tions:

    ...
    Pahlav­i’s efforts to posi­tion him­self as a leader for a future Iran have prompt­ed some­times heat­ed debates inside and out­side the coun­try. And while pro­test­ers have shout­ed in sup­port of the shah in some protests, it is not clear whether that is sup­port for Pahlavi him­self or a desire to return to a time before the 1979 Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion.

    ...

    He has sought to have a voice through social media videos, and Far­si-lan­guage news chan­nels such as Iran Inter­na­tion­al have high­light­ed his calls for protests. In press inter­views, Pahlavi has repeat­ed­ly raised the idea of a con­sti­tu­tion­al monar­chy, per­haps with an elect­ed rather than a hered­i­tary ruler, but has also stat­ed it is up to Ira­ni­ans to choose.
    ...

    It’s not hard to see why many Ira­ni­ans might be vehe­ment­ly opposed to the return of a monar­chy. It’s not exact­ly a uni­ver­sal­ly appeal­ing rev­o­lu­tion­ary ral­ly­ing cry. But as the fol­low­ing Israel365 piece describes, the ambi­tions behind the move­ment to rein­stall the Pahlavi dynasty includes as lot more than a return of the king. With big plans for a nor­mal­iza­tion of rela­tions with Israel, Pahlavi is appar­ent­ly fram­ing him­self as a kind of mod­ern-day Cyrus, the bib­li­cal Per­sian ruler who freed the Jews from their cap­tiv­i­ty, allowed them to return to Israel and rebuild their tem­ple. Or at least that’s one way to inter­pret his grand “Cyrus Accords” pro­posed peace plan with Israel. In fact, Pahlavi appears to even envi­sion that the return of his dynasty will do so much to improve region­al ties to Israel that it will pave the way for the build­ing of a third tem­ple, an event proph­e­sied by Chris­tians to fore­tell the End-Times. Which rais­es the ques­tion of what Peter Thiel — who claims to be obsessed with hold­ing off the End Times at all costs — would have to say about that. But there’s fig­ure who could end up play­ing a very big role in how this plays out who might also be rather non-plussed to learn about Pahlavi putting him­self for­ward as the mod­ern day Cyrus: Pres­i­dent Trump. Recall how a num­ber of Trump’s promi­nent evan­gel­i­cal back­ers have been mak­ing com­par­isons between Trump and Cyrus for years now. You can’t have two Cyrus­es at the same time! In oth­er words, Pahlavi is encroach­ing on Trump’s bib­li­cal prophe­cy turf:

    Israel365

    Iran’s Crown Prince Invokes Cyrus the “Anoint­ed One” as Islam­ic Regime Crum­bles

    Adam Eliyahu Berkowitz
    Jan­u­ary 9, 2026

    Iran’s exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi told The Wall Street Jour­nal this week that the Islam­ic Repub­lic is col­laps­ing from with­in and that Ira­ni­ans them­selves—not Amer­i­can mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion—will bring down the regime. Speak­ing as nation­wide protests against Aya­tol­lah Ali Khamenei’s rule inten­si­fied, Pahlavi reject­ed spec­u­la­tion that Wash­ing­ton might extract the supreme leader or engi­neer a pow­er tran­si­tion, as Pres­i­dent Trump recent­ly accom­plished in Venezuela. The Crown Prince’s com­ments came along­side his unveil­ing of a pro­posed “Cyrus Accords” frame­work that would estab­lish full diplo­mat­ic and eco­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion between a future demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran and Israel, mark­ing what he called the restora­tion of his­toric ties sev­ered by the 1979 rev­o­lu­tion.

    ...

    The Crown Prince sharply crit­i­cized recent Amer­i­can pol­i­cy toward Tehran. He said the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion aban­doned the Green Move­ment in 2009, and he blamed the Biden admin­is­tra­tion for allow­ing the regime access to “over $200 bil­lion of oil rev­enue” that was fun­neled to region­al proxy groups rather than alle­vi­at­ing domes­tic suf­fer­ing. He direct­ly con­nect­ed that pol­i­cy to the Octo­ber 7 mas­sacre, argu­ing that Amer­i­can mon­ey strength­ened Iran’s ter­ror­ist appa­ra­tus. By con­trast, he praised Israel’s gov­ern­ment, call­ing Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu “a very strong prime min­is­ter,” and said Pres­i­dent Trump and Sec­re­tary of State Mar­co Rubio are pur­su­ing a fun­da­men­tal­ly dif­fer­ent approach toward the Islam­ic Repub­lic.

    What Makes This Moment Dif­fer­ent?

    Pahlavi’s opti­mism rests on unprece­dent­ed street demon­stra­tions that have spread from Tehran’s bazaar dis­trict to Isfa­han, Mash­had, Ahvaz and Hamadan. The protests began after mer­chants shut­tered shops to protest a finan­cial cri­sis that sent the rial plum­met­ing to 1.4 mil­lion per dol­lar on the open mar­ket, far from the offi­cial rate of 42,000. Eco­nom­ic rage quick­ly mor­phed into polit­i­cal defi­ance. Crowds chant­ed “Javid Shah”—Long Live the King—and “This is the final bat­tle! Pahlavi will return,” accord­ing to videos cir­cu­lat­ing from inside the coun­try. Oth­er slo­gans tar­get­ed the regime’s region­al pri­or­i­ties direct­ly: “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I give my life for Iran.”

    The reap­pear­ance of pro-monar­chy chants rep­re­sents a rup­ture in the Islam­ic Republic’s found­ing nar­ra­tive. Pub­lic ref­er­ences to the Pahlavi dynasty have been taboo since 1979, when rev­o­lu­tion­ar­ies over­threw the Shah and estab­lished theo­crat­ic rule. The fact that Ira­ni­ans now open­ly invoke the roy­al fam­i­ly sig­nals rejec­tion not just of poli­cies but of the regime’s legit­i­ma­cy. One Iran­ian oppo­si­tion fig­ure told The Jerusalem Post that the mil­i­tary could join the pro­test­ers if demon­stra­tions con­tin­ue and if Pahlavi demon­strates that his pro­fes­sion­al cir­cle can gov­ern effec­tive­ly. “It is crys­tal clear that the pop­u­la­tion accepts the lead­er­ship of Prince Reza Pahlavi,” the source said.

    The Cyrus Accords: A Vision for Post-Regime Rela­tions

    Pahlavi used the inter­view to unveil his vision for what he called the Cyrus Accords, a com­pre­hen­sive frame­work for coop­er­a­tion between a demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran and Israel that would sur­pass the Abra­ham Accords in scope. He ground­ed the pro­pos­al in ancient his­to­ry, cit­ing Cyrus the Great’s ties to the Jew­ish peo­ple and not­ing that Israeli water-man­age­ment tech­nol­o­gy could help Iran address severe envi­ron­men­tal crises. He said Ira­ni­ans envi­sion a future built on coop­er­a­tion with Israel and Arab states, and he argued that the hard-line rulers resist­ed region­al nor­mal­iza­tion specif­i­cal­ly to pre­vent that out­come.

    The Cyrus Accords frame­work pro­pos­es coop­er­a­tion across water and agri­cul­ture, ener­gy and nat­ur­al resources, tech­nol­o­gy and inno­va­tion, and tourism and cul­ture. Iran faces a dev­as­tat­ing water cri­sis, and Israel pos­sess­es advanced desali­na­tion and waste­water recy­cling capa­bil­i­ties. A del­e­ga­tion of pro­fes­sion­als sent by the Crown Prince recent­ly toured Israel’s Shaf­dan waste­water treat­ment plant and the Hebrew University’s Fac­ul­ty of Agri­cul­ture to study Israeli meth­ods. The del­e­ga­tion expressed inter­est in smart-grid tech­nol­o­gy and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence appli­ca­tions to reduce gas loss, fix pipeline leaks and com­bat air pol­lu­tion.

    The accords also pro­pose strate­gic part­ner­ships com­bin­ing Iran’s nat­ur­al resources with Israeli tech­nol­o­gy, includ­ing joint pipelines to trans­port gas and oil to Euro­pean mar­kets via the Mediter­ranean. Ener­gy coop­er­a­tion would extend to renew­able projects, par­tic­u­lar­ly solar and wind. In the tech­nol­o­gy sec­tor, the frame­work calls for joint ven­ture cap­i­tal funds to invest in star­tups in both coun­tries, joint inno­va­tion parks, stu­dent and sci­en­tist exchanges, and col­lab­o­ra­tion in cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence. Cul­tur­al ini­tia­tives would include Per­sian-lan­guage cours­es taught from Israel for Iran­ian stu­dents, dai­ly direct flights between Tehran and Tel Aviv, and preser­va­tion of Jew­ish her­itage sites in Iran.

    Beyond bilat­er­al coop­er­a­tion, the Cyrus Accords envi­sion expand­ing the exist­ing I2U2 framework—currently includ­ing India, Israel, the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates and the Unit­ed States—to include Iran and Iraq in a new struc­ture called I4U2. This mul­ti­lat­er­al arrange­ment would address region­al chal­lenges includ­ing water scarci­ty, food secu­ri­ty and ener­gy secu­ri­ty. The flag­ship project would be an eco­nom­ic cor­ri­dor con­nect­ing Iran to Israel through Iraq and Jor­dan, serv­ing trade, ener­gy and fiber-optic com­mu­ni­ca­tions. The cor­ri­dor would link with the India-Mid­dle East-Europe Cor­ri­dor, mak­ing the region a junc­tion for glob­al trade routes.

    ...

    Remov­ing the Spon­sor of Region­al Ter­ror­ism

    Elim­i­nat­ing the Islamist regime would remove Iran as the lead­ing state spon­sor of ter­ror­ism in the region. Tehran cur­rent­ly funds Hezbol­lah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen and var­i­ous mili­tias in Iraq and Syr­ia. The regime’s finan­cial and mil­i­tary sup­port enables these groups to threat­en Israel, desta­bi­lize neigh­bor­ing states and attack Amer­i­can inter­ests. Pahlavi con­nect­ed Amer­i­can pol­i­cy that grant­ed Tehran access to oil rev­enues direct­ly to the Octo­ber 7 mas­sacre car­ried out by Hamas ter­ror­ists, argu­ing that those funds strength­ened the infra­struc­ture of ter­ror sur­round­ing Israel.

    A demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran aligned with region­al part­ners would deprive these ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions of their pri­ma­ry patron, fun­da­men­tal­ly alter­ing the secu­ri­ty envi­ron­ment. Hezbol­lah, Hamas, Islam­ic Jihad and the Houthis do not exist as region­al forces with­out Iran­ian fund­ing, train­ing and direc­tion. End­ing the regime in Tehran would col­lapse the ter­ror infra­struc­ture that has threat­ened Israel for decades.

    How Ira­ni­ans View Cyrus and Their Bib­li­cal Con­nec­tion

    The accords draw their name and legit­i­ma­cy from Cyrus the Great, founder of the Per­sian Empire in the sixth cen­tu­ry BCE, who issued an edict allow­ing the Jew­ish peo­ple to return to Jerusalem after sev­en decades of Baby­lon­ian exile and rebuild the Tem­ple. The decree appears in the book of Ezra: “Thus said Cyrus king of Per­sia: All the king­doms of the earth has the Lord God of heav­en giv­en me; and He has charged me to build Him a house in Jerusalem, which is in Judah” (Ezra 1:2).

    Among Ira­ni­ans, Cyrus is not viewed as a for­eign con­queror but as a nation­al father fig­ure. Cyrus the Great rep­re­sents jus­tice, restraint and respect for nation­al and reli­gious iden­ti­ty. His lega­cy stands in direct con­tra­dic­tion to the Islam­ic Republic’s ide­ol­o­gy. The Sages not­ed that Cyrus’s decree reversed the cat­a­stro­phe of the Baby­lon­ian con­quest and made pos­si­ble the Sec­ond Tem­ple peri­od. The his­tor­i­cal mem­o­ry con­nects Per­sia to Jew­ish redemp­tion, and Pahlavi explic­it­ly invoked that con­nec­tion in posi­tion­ing his pro­posed accords as a restora­tion of ancient ties.

    Pahlavi direct­ly addressed this shared lega­cy in a major speech deliv­ered in May 2025 out­lin­ing the vision of the Cyrus Accords. “The name Cyrus reminds us of a deep­er truth,” he said. “That the rela­tion­ship between the Iran­ian and Jew­ish peo­ples is not a mat­ter of mod­ern diplo­ma­cy or fleet­ing pol­i­tics. It is root­ed in history—and one that is ancient, proud, and unique.”

    He con­tin­ued, “Over 2,500 years ago, it was Cyrus the Great, the Iran­ian king, who freed the Jew­ish peo­ple from cap­tiv­i­ty and allowed them to return to their home­land and rebuild their tem­ple. That was not just an act of tolerance—it was an affir­ma­tion of reli­gious free­dom and human dig­ni­ty.”

    ...

    He end­ed his May speech with an explic­it call to reclaim that lega­cy. “Let tonight be the begin­ning of a new chap­ter,” he said. “A chap­ter where the ancient friend­ship between our peo­ples becomes a foun­da­tion for a new alliance of free nations.” He con­clud­ed, “Let us reclaim the lega­cy of Cyrus—not only in mem­o­ry, but in action.”

    Before 1979, Iran and Israel main­tained close diplo­mat­ic and eco­nom­ic rela­tions ground­ed in shared strate­gic inter­ests and cul­tur­al affin­i­ty. The Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion sought to erase that his­to­ry by brand­ing Israel “the lit­tle Satan” and mak­ing hos­til­i­ty to the Jew­ish state a cor­ner­stone of regime ide­ol­o­gy. Yet beneath decades of imposed enmi­ty, Ira­ni­ans retain a mem­o­ry of close­ness and a belief in a dif­fer­ent future. When Ira­ni­ans chant for the return of the Shah and invoke the Pahlavi name, they are reject­ing the regime’s ide­o­log­i­cal foun­da­tions and recall­ing a time when Iran and Israel worked as part­ners.

    Cyrus as Mashiach: A Prophet­ic Para­dox

    The book of Isa­iah con­tains a pas­sage that has fas­ci­nat­ed Jew­ish com­men­ta­tors for mil­len­nia. Refer­ring to Cyrus by name, the prophet declares: “So said the Lord to His anoint­ed one (limshi­cho), to Cyrus, whose right hand I held to sub­ju­gate nations before him, and I will loosen the loins of kings, to open por­tals before him, and gates shall not be closed” (Isa­iah 45:1).

    The term mashiach—anoint­ed one—typically refers to Jew­ish kings anoint­ed with sacred oil, and its appli­ca­tion to a gen­tile ruler is with­out par­al­lel in the Bible. Rashi explains that Cyrus received this des­ig­na­tion because he enabled the con­struc­tion of the Sec­ond Tem­ple. Ibn Ezra notes that mashiach in this con­text sig­ni­fies divine appoint­ment for a spe­cif­ic mis­sion rather than the escha­to­log­i­cal role reserved for the King Mashiach from the line of David.

    The Sages under­stood Cyrus as an instru­ment of divine will who oper­at­ed out­side the covenan­tal frame­work yet ful­filled a redemp­tive func­tion with­in Jew­ish his­to­ry. His decree made pos­si­ble the return to Zion and the rebuild­ing of the Tem­ple, revers­ing the destruc­tion wrought by Neb­uchad­nez­zar. The appli­ca­tion of the term mashiach to Cyrus estab­lish­es that God’s plan for Israel can work through unex­pect­ed agents and that redemp­tion can arrive through polit­i­cal events that appear entire­ly sec­u­lar.

    If the Islam­ic Repub­lic col­laps­es and a demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran emerges under Pahlavi’s lead­er­ship, the his­tor­i­cal sym­me­try would be strik­ing. A Per­sian ruler facil­i­tat­ing coop­er­a­tion with the Jew­ish state and poten­tial­ly enabling a Third Tem­ple would echo the orig­i­nal Cyrus’s role in Jew­ish his­to­ry. The resump­tion of Iran-Israel ties under a Pahlavi restora­tion would close a 45-year cir­cle of hos­til­i­ty imposed by the Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion and reopen a part­ner­ship root­ed in antiq­ui­ty.

    The Tem­ple remains cen­tral to Jew­ish escha­tol­ogy, and any shift in region­al pol­i­tics that makes its con­struc­tion more fea­si­ble car­ries prophet­ic impli­ca­tions. Cyrus’s decree led direct­ly to the rebuild­ing of the Tem­ple, a fact record­ed plain­ly in the Bible and pre­served in Jew­ish con­scious­ness. The Tem­ple was not a metaphor. It was a phys­i­cal struc­ture in Jerusalem, restored through Per­sian autho­riza­tion. A future Iran aligned with Israel would fun­da­men­tal­ly alter the region­al dynam­ics sur­round­ing the Tem­ple Mount and Jerusalem’s future.

    ...

    Whether Pahlavi’s pre­dic­tions prove accu­rate remains to be seen, but the fact that an Iran­ian leader is pub­licly advo­cat­ing for full rela­tions with Israel and invok­ing Cyrus the Great sig­nals a his­toric shift. The Islam­ic Repub­lic built its legit­i­ma­cy on hatred of Israel and rejec­tion of the West. A future Iran embrac­ing both would rep­re­sent the regime’s com­plete ide­o­log­i­cal defeat and the restora­tion of ties that the Bible itself records as part of Jew­ish redemp­tion.

    ————

    “Iran’s Crown Prince Invokes Cyrus the “Anoint­ed One” as Islam­ic Regime Crum­bles” by Adam Eliyahu Berkowitz; Israel365; 01/09/2026

    “Iran’s exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi told The Wall Street Jour­nal this week that the Islam­ic Repub­lic is col­laps­ing from with­in and that Ira­ni­ans themselves—not Amer­i­can mil­i­tary intervention—will bring down the regime. Speak­ing as nation­wide protests against Aya­tol­lah Ali Khamenei’s rule inten­si­fied, Pahlavi reject­ed spec­u­la­tion that Wash­ing­ton might extract the supreme leader or engi­neer a pow­er tran­si­tion, as Pres­i­dent Trump recent­ly accom­plished in Venezuela. The Crown Prince’s com­ments came along­side his unveil­ing of a pro­posed “Cyrus Accords” frame­work that would estab­lish full diplo­mat­ic and eco­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion between a future demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran and Israel, mark­ing what he called the restora­tion of his­toric ties sev­ered by the 1979 rev­o­lu­tion.”

    As we can see, Pahlavi isn’t call­ing for direct US mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion. At least not yet. But it’s the recent unveil­ing of his pro­posed “Cyrus Accords” that sug­gests he has plans to return to pow­er with the back­ing of much of Iran’s region­al adver­saries. Notably, Pahlavi did­n’t just open­ly praise Pres­i­dent Trump and Sec­re­tary of State Mar­co Rubio for a shift in US pol­i­cy towards Iran. He open­ly praised the Israeli gov­ern­ment and Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu in par­tic­u­lar. He is open­ly plan­ning on return­ing to pow­er as the new monarch of Iran on a plat­form of vocal sup­port for Israel. It’s not hard to see why Israelis might be open to the plans, but what about Ira­ni­ans? Who is Pahlavi even try­ing to appeal to at this point?

    ...
    The Crown Prince sharply crit­i­cized recent Amer­i­can pol­i­cy toward Tehran. He said the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion aban­doned the Green Move­ment in 2009, and he blamed the Biden admin­is­tra­tion for allow­ing the regime access to “over $200 bil­lion of oil rev­enue” that was fun­neled to region­al proxy groups rather than alle­vi­at­ing domes­tic suf­fer­ing. He direct­ly con­nect­ed that pol­i­cy to the Octo­ber 7 mas­sacre, argu­ing that Amer­i­can mon­ey strength­ened Iran’s ter­ror­ist appa­ra­tus. By con­trast, he praised Israel’s gov­ern­ment, call­ing Prime Min­is­ter Ben­jamin Netanyahu “a very strong prime min­is­ter,” and said Pres­i­dent Trump and Sec­re­tary of State Mar­co Rubio are pur­su­ing a fun­da­men­tal­ly dif­fer­ent approach toward the Islam­ic Repub­lic.
    ...

    We’re also told that when the protests in Iran ini­tial­ly erupt­ed, crowds were chant­i­ng slo­gans like “This is the final bat­tle! Pahlavi will return.” Or slo­gans like “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I give my life for Iran,” which would pur­port­ed­ly indi­cate a pop­u­lace that does­n’t real­ly care about the post-Octo­ber 7 slaugh­ter in Gaza. Is this true? Because that the nar­ra­tive get­ting pushed at this point:

    ...
    Pahlavi’s opti­mism rests on unprece­dent­ed street demon­stra­tions that have spread from Tehran’s bazaar dis­trict to Isfa­han, Mash­had, Ahvaz and Hamadan. The protests began after mer­chants shut­tered shops to protest a finan­cial cri­sis that sent the rial plum­met­ing to 1.4 mil­lion per dol­lar on the open mar­ket, far from the offi­cial rate of 42,000. Eco­nom­ic rage quick­ly mor­phed into polit­i­cal defi­ance. Crowds chant­ed “Javid Shah”—Long Live the King—and “This is the final bat­tle! Pahlavi will return,” accord­ing to videos cir­cu­lat­ing from inside the coun­try. Oth­er slo­gans tar­get­ed the regime’s region­al pri­or­i­ties direct­ly: “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I give my life for Iran.”
    ...

    Then we get to the pro­posed deep­en­ing of eco­nom­ic ties between Iran and Israel that would take place under the Cyrus Accords, includ­ing major new pipelines to trans­fer gas and oil to Europe. Pahlavi even sent a del­e­ga­tion to tour Israel water infra­struc­ture. It’s not hard to see why many inter­na­tion­al play­ers might be keen on sit­ting this come to fruition. It’s far less clear the Iran­ian pub­lic would back this, although that’s the nar­ra­tive we’re get­ting:

    ...
    Pahlavi used the inter­view to unveil his vision for what he called the Cyrus Accords, a com­pre­hen­sive frame­work for coop­er­a­tion between a demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran and Israel that would sur­pass the Abra­ham Accords in scope. He ground­ed the pro­pos­al in ancient his­to­ry, cit­ing Cyrus the Great’s ties to the Jew­ish peo­ple and not­ing that Israeli water-man­age­ment tech­nol­o­gy could help Iran address severe envi­ron­men­tal crises. He said Ira­ni­ans envi­sion a future built on coop­er­a­tion with Israel and Arab states, and he argued that the hard-line rulers resist­ed region­al nor­mal­iza­tion specif­i­cal­ly to pre­vent that out­come.

    ...

    Beyond bilat­er­al coop­er­a­tion, the Cyrus Accords envi­sion expand­ing the exist­ing I2U2 framework—currently includ­ing India, Israel, the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates and the Unit­ed States—to include Iran and Iraq in a new struc­ture called I4U2. This mul­ti­lat­er­al arrange­ment would address region­al chal­lenges includ­ing water scarci­ty, food secu­ri­ty and ener­gy secu­ri­ty. The flag­ship project would be an eco­nom­ic cor­ri­dor con­nect­ing Iran to Israel through Iraq and Jor­dan, serv­ing trade, ener­gy and fiber-optic com­mu­ni­ca­tions. The cor­ri­dor would link with the India-Mid­dle East-Europe Cor­ri­dor, mak­ing the region a junc­tion for glob­al trade routes.

    ...

    Before 1979, Iran and Israel main­tained close diplo­mat­ic and eco­nom­ic rela­tions ground­ed in shared strate­gic inter­ests and cul­tur­al affin­i­ty. The Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion sought to erase that his­to­ry by brand­ing Israel “the lit­tle Satan” and mak­ing hos­til­i­ty to the Jew­ish state a cor­ner­stone of regime ide­ol­o­gy. Yet beneath decades of imposed enmi­ty, Ira­ni­ans retain a mem­o­ry of close­ness and a belief in a dif­fer­ent future. When Ira­ni­ans chant for the return of the Shah and invoke the Pahlavi name, they are reject­ing the regime’s ide­o­log­i­cal foun­da­tions and recall­ing a time when Iran and Israel worked as part­ners.
    ...

    But for all of the mod­ern­iza­tion plans put for­ward by these Cyrus Accords pro­pos­als, it’s the claim­ing of the bib­li­cal role of King Cyrus that makes this such a fas­ci­nat­ing­ly provoca­tive pro­pos­als, seem­ing­ly edg­ing in on Pres­i­dent Trump’s “King Cyrus” sta­tus. And with his appar­ent hopes of the rebuild­ing of the Tem­ple Mount, as fore­told in bib­li­cal End Times prophe­cies, he’s effec­tive­ly try­ing to cast his return as a kind of prophe­cy ful­filled. Again, it’s not hard to see why A LOT of inter­na­tion­al move­ment might be keen on events that could be cast as the ful­fill­ment of prophe­cy. What’s far less clear is what the Iran­ian pub­lic feels about this:

    ...
    The accords draw their name and legit­i­ma­cy from Cyrus the Great, founder of the Per­sian Empire in the sixth cen­tu­ry BCE, who issued an edict allow­ing the Jew­ish peo­ple to return to Jerusalem after sev­en decades of Baby­lon­ian exile and rebuild the Tem­ple. The decree appears in the book of Ezra: “Thus said Cyrus king of Per­sia: All the king­doms of the earth has the Lord God of heav­en giv­en me; and He has charged me to build Him a house in Jerusalem, which is in Judah” (Ezra 1:2).

    ...

    Pahlavi direct­ly addressed this shared lega­cy in a major speech deliv­ered in May 2025 out­lin­ing the vision of the Cyrus Accords. “The name Cyrus reminds us of a deep­er truth,” he said. “That the rela­tion­ship between the Iran­ian and Jew­ish peo­ples is not a mat­ter of mod­ern diplo­ma­cy or fleet­ing pol­i­tics. It is root­ed in history—and one that is ancient, proud, and unique.”

    ...

    He end­ed his May speech with an explic­it call to reclaim that lega­cy. “Let tonight be the begin­ning of a new chap­ter,” he said. “A chap­ter where the ancient friend­ship between our peo­ples becomes a foun­da­tion for a new alliance of free nations.” He con­clud­ed, “Let us reclaim the lega­cy of Cyrus—not only in mem­o­ry, but in action.”

    ...

    If the Islam­ic Repub­lic col­laps­es and a demo­c­ra­t­ic Iran emerges under Pahlavi’s lead­er­ship, the his­tor­i­cal sym­me­try would be strik­ing. A Per­sian ruler facil­i­tat­ing coop­er­a­tion with the Jew­ish state and poten­tial­ly enabling a Third Tem­ple would echo the orig­i­nal Cyrus’s role in Jew­ish his­to­ry. The resump­tion of Iran-Israel ties under a Pahlavi restora­tion would close a 45-year cir­cle of hos­til­i­ty imposed by the Islam­ic Rev­o­lu­tion and reopen a part­ner­ship root­ed in antiq­ui­ty.

    The Tem­ple remains cen­tral to Jew­ish escha­tol­ogy, and any shift in region­al pol­i­tics that makes its con­struc­tion more fea­si­ble car­ries prophet­ic impli­ca­tions. Cyrus’s decree led direct­ly to the rebuild­ing of the Tem­ple, a fact record­ed plain­ly in the Bible and pre­served in Jew­ish con­scious­ness. The Tem­ple was not a metaphor. It was a phys­i­cal struc­ture in Jerusalem, restored through Per­sian autho­riza­tion. A future Iran aligned with Israel would fun­da­men­tal­ly alter the region­al dynam­ics sur­round­ing the Tem­ple Mount and Jerusalem’s future.
    ...

    And with that bizarrely self-aggran­diz­ing Cyrus Accords pro­pos­al serv­ing as Pahlav­i’s offer to the glob­al com­mu­ni­ty should he be installed as king, here’s a look at how one of his US sup­port­ers is han­dling the pub­lic rela­tion­ships dimen­sion to this diplo­mat­ic push: accord­ing to Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh — an Iran­ian immi­grant with a biog­ra­phy that involves con­vert­ing to Chris­tian­i­ty and spend­ing time in an Iran­ian prison — the peo­ple are Iran are clam­or­ing for a return of the Pahlavi dynasty. But you might not know that if you lis­ten to the fake oppo­si­tion who oppose him. In par­tic­u­lar, the Mujahideen‑e Khalq (MEK), who are actu­al­ly secret sup­ports of the Iran­ian regime, accord­ing to Ami­rizadeh. And if this seems like over-the-top rhetoric between rival oppo­si­tion groups, keep in mind how the first Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s Iran­ian regime change plans back in 2018 appeared to rely heav­i­ly on the MEK, with John Bolton view­ing the MEK as a key ide­o­log­i­cal part­ner. And with the Iran­ian regime now look­ing more frag­ile than it did in 2018, we should prob­a­bly expect this Pahlavi/MEK rival­ry to only heat up the longer these Iran­ian protests con­tin­ue:

    The Times of Israel
    The Blogs

    How to Rec­og­nize and Expose Fake Iran­ian Oppo­si­tion and Reformists

    Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh
    Jan 12, 2026, 2:52 AM

    As Ira­ni­ans have tak­en over the streets, calls for death of the aya­tol­lahs and the “Supreme Leader” echo along­side calls for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi to return.

    Ater 47 years, Ira­ni­ans have had enough of the suf­fer­ing and are demand­ing a change. The Islam­ic Repub­lic has been bru­tal, destroy­ing Iran and its poten­tial in the world. Those who remem­ber 1979 are hav­ing buy­ers’ remorse. Those whose protests then mis­tak­en­ly ush­ered in the aya­tol­lahs and their Islam­ic extrem­ism regret being deceived and vow­ing not to be deceived again. That’s why across the board, Ira­ni­ans are pray­ing for the return of the monar­chy, the sys­tem of gov­ern­ment under which Iran, and Per­sia before that, exist­ed for cen­turies.

    ...

    As Ira­ni­ans take their lives and future into their hands, it’s enrag­ing to see the way peo­ple in the West allow them­selves to be fooled. As a proud Amer­i­can, I am par­tic­u­lar­ly wor­ried for my adop­tive coun­try that has giv­en me the free­doms for which Ira­ni­ans yearn. In order to real­ize their free­dom, one of the most urgent things that must be done is expos­ing the fake Iran­ian oppo­si­tion and reformists. There are many.

    I see count­less polit­i­cal, civic, and reli­gious lead­ers allow­ing them­selves to be fooled. Some are peo­ple I admire and who may have the best of inten­tions. But they need to be care­ful who they con­nect to and sup­port, if only through naive­ly post­ing pic­tures togeth­er. I under­stand that my expe­ri­ence, being born in Iran as a woman already with half the val­ue as a man, and the end­less misog­y­ny and bru­tal­i­ty I expe­ri­enced gives me a per­spec­tive oth­ers can­not have. I under­stand that almost nobody can under­stand my being arrest­ed and sen­tenced to death for my Chris­t­ian faith, spend­ing nine months on death row in Iran’s noto­ri­ous Evin Prison gives me a sad but unique and very real under­stand­ing of the bru­tal­i­ty of the evil Islam­ic regime.

    Nev­er­the­less, I don’t under­stand why Amer­i­can and West­ern lead­ers and media are not more care­ful to under­stand the agen­das of any­one they may come across who they might think is actu­al­ly preach­ing good for Iran. Would our elect­ed lead­ers be so stu­pid to sit with and sup­port a dan­ger­ous pedophile with whom they might share one or more pol­i­cy posi­tions? Would the media plat­form some­one who overt­ly speaks out against the very val­ues of West­ern soci­ety just to get a sound bite from an “expert?”

    ...

    First, it’s essen­tial to know that the two promi­nent polit­i­cal groups rul­ing Iran – hard­lin­ers and reformists – are sim­ply oppo­site sides of the same coin. “Reformists” play the role of good cop to the hardliner’s bad cop. But the truth is that there are no real “reformists” in the Islam­ic Republic’s pow­er struc­ture who can, or will, bring any change. “Reformists” are (s)elected to pow­er only with the approval of the “Supreme Leader.” He turns on and off the faucet of per­ceived reforms to try to deceive the world that there are free elec­tions, or that reforms will ever take place. It’s all a lie.

    As much as there is no true oppo­si­tion in any posi­tion of pow­er or influ­ence inside Iran except on the streets as we wit­ness the peo­ple express­ing their will today, out­side Iran there are many who want you to think that they are the oppo­si­tion. It’s nec­es­sary to under­stand who these groups and peo­ple are, and what dis­tin­guish­es them as fake oppo­si­tion and reformists.

    One promi­nent fake oppo­si­tion group out­side Iran is the Nation­al Coun­cil of Resis­tance of Iran, NCRI, also known asMujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK). In 1979 they opposed Shah Mohamad Reza Pahlavi, and sup­port­ed the Mus­lim extrem­ist Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni. MEK sup­port­ed Khomeini’s mas­sive purge and killing of Ira­ni­ans as they con­sol­i­dat­ed pow­er and con­trolled through fear, intim­i­da­tion, and man­dat­ing strict Islam­ic extrem­ism.

    Because of dis­agree­ments over shar­ing pow­er, some­thing Islamist tyrants will nev­er do, MEK lead­ers were forced to flee Iran and cre­at­ed an armed oppo­si­tion army against the Islam­ic regime NCRI/MEK share part of the same rad­i­cal Islam­ic ide­ol­o­gy as the regime but mix their Islam­ic extrem­ism with Marx­ism.

    NCRI/MEK will have you believe that they are for a free Iran, but all they want to do is oppress Ira­ni­ans under a dif­fer­ent brand. Their goal to over­throw the cur­rent Islam­ic regime is not a recipe for free­dom, but for dis­as­ter under a dif­fer­ent hijab.

    ...

    MEK also has the blood of many Amer­i­cans on their hands through the assas­si­na­tion of US mil­i­tary per­son­nel and con­trac­tors through­out the 1970s. In 1997 the US State Depart­ment des­ig­nat­ed MEK as ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion. The Euro­pean Union put MEK on its ter­ror­ists list in 2002. Uncon­ceiv­ably, despite count­less hor­ri­ble videos and doc­u­men­ta­tion of their crimes, the EU and the US removed the MEK from their list of ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions in 2009 and 2012 respec­tive­ly. Ira­ni­ans know the truth and express this wide­ly using#MEK­ter­ror­ists.

    Ira­ni­ans hate MEK and oth­er such fake oppo­si­tion and reformist groups because of their trea­son. They have no pub­lic sup­port inside Iran. This is wide­ly doc­u­ment­ed. Today, when Ira­ni­ans say they pre­fer the aya­tol­lahs to the MEK, it does not mean the aya­tol­lahs are bet­ter, but to show their lev­el of their con­tempt for the MEK.

    NCRI/MEK is one of the most influ­en­tial fake oppo­si­tion and reformist groups. It was true before the cur­rent protests, and has become even more clear since: the only real oppo­si­tion that the major­i­ty of Ira­ni­ans sup­port is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi whose name Ira­ni­ans are brave­ly chant­i­ng through­out the streets of Iran, and across all social media plat­forms, for whose dynasty they hope to restore.

    PART 2 – The Red Flags of the Fake Iran­ian Oppo­si­tion and Reformists

    What’s in A Name

    Assum­ing that part of the rea­son West­ern lead­ers and media have allowed them­selves to be fooled by the fake oppo­si­tion and reformists is igno­rance, it’s essen­tial to explore how to iden­ti­fy these peo­ple so as to nev­er give their tox­ic opin­ions the light of day.

    ...

    Try­ing to deceive as it does, the MEK has changed its name mul­ti­ple times because Ira­ni­ans have exposed them. They are known as PMOI (People’s Moja­hedin Orga­ni­za­tion of Iran), MEK (Moja­hedin-E- Khal­gh), and NCRI (Nation­al Coun­cil Resis­tance of Iran). Regard­less of what they are called, their agen­da is the same. If there is any dif­fer­ence between them, it is not one of ide­ol­o­gy, but more like a hand-in-glove rela­tion­ship where one con­trols anoth­er.

    Words Mat­ter

    It does take a care­ful ear to under­stand when speak­ing to a fake oppo­si­tion or reformist mem­ber, but if you pay atten­tion, it’s easy to break their code.

    MEK mem­bers reflex­ive­ly speak out against the Pahlavi dynasty and the idea of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi to return. They have a famous slo­gan “We want nei­ther a king nor a leader (refer­ring to Aya­tol­lah Khamenei), Curse to both tyrants.” This is the com­mon slo­gan is used both by MEK and export­ed agents of the regime to deceive the world that the Shah was a tyrant, a fas­cist they will say, and that is why they should not sup­port his son. They will make up oth­er absurd lies to defame Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, and dis­cred­it his son, even stat­ing as fact that the videos of Ira­ni­ans call­ing for Reza Pahlavi to return are “fake.” As soon as you hear that, run from them. There are thou­sands of videos cir­cu­lat­ing demon­strat­ing that Crown Prince Pahlavi is who the Ira­ni­ans want to return and restore Iran.

    MEK and oth­er fake oppo­si­tion and reformists know the truth that the major­i­ty of Ira­ni­ans sup­port Prince Pahlavi because of the great work of his father and grand­fa­ther in Iran. That’s why they are work­ing so fran­ti­cal­ly to make peo­ple believe its not true. Ira­ni­ans under­stand their mis­take by not sup­port­ing the Shah in 1979, and the con­se­quences of not appre­ci­at­ing the free­doms and qual­i­ty of life that they had. That is why in most of their protests they chant “Reza Shah, Bless your soul,” to defeat the decep­tion that is pro­mot­ed by MEK and oth­er fake oppo­si­tion and reformists.

    For­eign Inter­ven­tion

    Anoth­er lie by MEK and the fake oppo­si­tion and reformists is that Ira­ni­ans do not want for­eign inter­ven­tion in over­throw­ing the Islam­ic regime. Ira­ni­ans have put their lives on the line and sac­ri­ficed so much as they do again now. In each protest, they have demand­ed help from Amer­i­ca, Israel, and West­ern coun­tries to stand with them. In 2009 I was in prison dur­ing the Green Move­ment protests, trig­gered by that year’s fraud­u­lent elec­tion. Evin Prison’s cells were so packed with peo­ple being round­ed up, beat­en, and incar­cer­at­ed that there was scarce­ly space to move. These were the lucky ones were not beat­en or shot to death, or whose were dis­ap­peared and nev­er seen again. Ira­ni­ans were chant­i­ng Obama’s name in a play on words in Far­si, ask­ing if he was with them or with the mul­lahs. In the end, Oba­ma let down the Iran­ian peo­ple to the extent that they called him a trai­tor.

    Dur­ing the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Ira­ni­ans shared many videos of cel­e­bra­tions in their homes. They were thank­ing Prime Min­is­ter Netanyahu and Israel for hear­ing their voic­es and com­ing to help them to get rid of the regime. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, the war end­ed before the job of remov­ing the regime could be com­plet­ed, and Ira­ni­ans once again felt betrayed and let down.

    ...

    Ira­ni­ans defi­ant­ly need for­eign help, but not like what hap­pened in Venezuela. The West can help by pro­vid­ing arms for groups in Iran who are pre­pared and able to take on the IRGC. The West can ensure unin­ter­rupt­ed free high-speed inter­net to allow the peo­ple tak­ing mat­ters into their own hands to share the news, moti­vate, and not be shut off from oth­ers.

    Ira­ni­ans do not want the “Supreme Leader” to be arrest­ed and tak­en to the US, or allowed to flee to Rus­sia. He needs appre­hend­ed and brought to jus­tice in Iran, by Ira­ni­ans, maybe to be exe­cut­ed pub­licly by Ira­ni­ans as the final nail in the cof­fin of the Islam­ic Repub­lic.

    When you hear Ira­ni­ans over­seas say that Ira­ni­ans do not want for­eign inter­ven­tion, it is code iden­ti­fy­ing them as part of the fake oppo­si­tion and reformists who do not seek free­dom for Iran, but to exert anoth­er kind of bru­tal­i­ty on Ira­ni­ans from a dif­fer­ent source.

    ...

    Watch their Actions

    Recent­ly the “reformists” inside Iran, and their for­eign agents, have start­ed hijack­ing the protests by shar­ing wide­ly on the news and social medias, “Ali Khamenei is not my Leader.” This is anoth­er tac­tic to sig­nal the West that so called “reformists” inside Iran are against Khamenei, ask­ing the West to help them to help one of their fake oppo­si­tion mem­bers to be the future leader. They know Ira­ni­ans will bring them all to jus­tice. Ira­ni­ans are not deceived. That is why they are sig­nal­ing the West that they are will­ing to coop­er­ate in elim­i­nat­ing Khamenei if the West makes one of their agents the future leader of Iran. This can­not hap­pen.

    Ira­ni­ans very loud­ly and clear­ly said what they want. When they chant, “Death to three groups, Mul­lahs (Aya­tol­lahs), Left­ists (Reformists), and Moja­hed (MEK/NCRI/ PMOI) that means they do not accept any of them and they are only seek­ing a com­plete regime change with­out the Islamists’ fin­ger­prints or pres­ence.

    When they call Pahlavi’s name across Iran, it means they are call­ing for the com­plete over­throw of the regime, not just tak­ing out Khamenei and replac­ing him with a fake “reformist.”

    ...

    What’s Their Uni­form

    Mem­bers of NCRI/MEK also have a dress code, a uni­form that iden­ti­fies them as being part of the same team. Men wear a thick mus­tache, and women wear sim­i­lar scarves cov­er­ing all their hair, and unique­ly wrap the scarf in front of their neck. This is their uni­form and how they iden­ti­fy them­selves, and one anoth­er. While there are many sports rival­ries where one uni­form may trig­ger a vis­cer­al response, these people’s appear­ance is anoth­er reveal­ing way to iden­ti­fy and shun them. Some of their mem­bers have shape-shift­ed and dress and appear like West­ern peo­ple. This does make iden­ti­fy­ing them more dif­fi­cult visu­al­ly, but their words and actions are still reveal­ing.

    There is evi­dence that NCRI/MEK is coop­er­at­ing and coor­di­nat­ing with “reformists” in Iran which is obvi­ous through sim­i­lar dress and appear­ance, par­rot­ing the same opin­ions and slo­gans. But Ira­ni­ans can rec­og­nize them imme­di­ate­ly, and want noth­ing to do with them.

    ...

    ————

    “How to Rec­og­nize and Expose Fake Iran­ian Oppo­si­tion and Reformists” by Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh; The Times of Israel; 01/12/2026

    “Ater 47 years, Ira­ni­ans have had enough of the suf­fer­ing and are demand­ing a change. The Islam­ic Repub­lic has been bru­tal, destroy­ing Iran and its poten­tial in the world. Those who remem­ber 1979 are hav­ing buy­ers’ remorse. Those whose protests then mis­tak­en­ly ush­ered in the aya­tol­lahs and their Islam­ic extrem­ism regret being deceived and vow­ing not to be deceived again. That’s why across the board, Ira­ni­ans are pray­ing for the return of the monar­chy, the sys­tem of gov­ern­ment under which Iran, and Per­sia before that, exist­ed for cen­turies.

    LOL, yes, Ira­ni­ans are just pray­ing for the return of the monar­chy. Not a return to democ­ra­cy. No, no. They want the monar­chy. At least that’s the nar­ra­tive we’re get­ting, this time from Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh, who goes on to claim that the MEK and its asso­ci­at­ed orga­ni­za­tions are actu­al­ly all fake and hat­ed by the Iran­ian peo­ple. She even goes on to warn about the slo­gan “We want nei­ther a king nor a leader (refer­ring to Aya­tol­lah Khamenei), Curse to both tyrants,” which sure sounds a lot like what was on that truck that drove into the LA protests:

    ...
    As much as there is no true oppo­si­tion in any posi­tion of pow­er or influ­ence inside Iran except on the streets as we wit­ness the peo­ple express­ing their will today, out­side Iran there are many who want you to think that they are the oppo­si­tion. It’s nec­es­sary to under­stand who these groups and peo­ple are, and what dis­tin­guish­es them as fake oppo­si­tion and reformists.

    One promi­nent fake oppo­si­tion group out­side Iran is the Nation­al Coun­cil of Resis­tance of Iran, NCRI, also known asMujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK). In 1979 they opposed Shah Mohamad Reza Pahlavi, and sup­port­ed the Mus­lim extrem­ist Aya­tol­lah Khome­i­ni. MEK sup­port­ed Khomeini’s mas­sive purge and killing of Ira­ni­ans as they con­sol­i­dat­ed pow­er and con­trolled through fear, intim­i­da­tion, and man­dat­ing strict Islam­ic extrem­ism.

    ...

    Ira­ni­ans hate MEK and oth­er such fake oppo­si­tion and reformist groups because of their trea­son. They have no pub­lic sup­port inside Iran. This is wide­ly doc­u­ment­ed. Today, when Ira­ni­ans say they pre­fer the aya­tol­lahs to the MEK, it does not mean the aya­tol­lahs are bet­ter, but to show their lev­el of their con­tempt for the MEK.

    NCRI/MEK is one of the most influ­en­tial fake oppo­si­tion and reformist groups. It was true before the cur­rent protests, and has become even more clear since: the only real oppo­si­tion that the major­i­ty of Ira­ni­ans sup­port is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi whose name Ira­ni­ans are brave­ly chant­i­ng through­out the streets of Iran, and across all social media plat­forms, for whose dynasty they hope to restore.

    ...

    MEK mem­bers reflex­ive­ly speak out against the Pahlavi dynasty and the idea of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi to return. They have a famous slo­gan “We want nei­ther a king nor a leader (refer­ring to Aya­tol­lah Khamenei), Curse to both tyrants.” This is the com­mon slo­gan is used both by MEK and export­ed agents of the regime to deceive the world that the Shah was a tyrant, a fas­cist they will say, and that is why they should not sup­port his son. They will make up oth­er absurd lies to defame Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, and dis­cred­it his son, even stat­ing as fact that the videos of Ira­ni­ans call­ing for Reza Pahlavi to return are “fake.” As soon as you hear that, run from them. There are thou­sands of videos cir­cu­lat­ing demon­strat­ing that Crown Prince Pahlavi is who the Ira­ni­ans want to return and restore Iran.

    MEK and oth­er fake oppo­si­tion and reformists know the truth that the major­i­ty of Ira­ni­ans sup­port Prince Pahlavi because of the great work of his father and grand­fa­ther in Iran. That’s why they are work­ing so fran­ti­cal­ly to make peo­ple believe its not true. Ira­ni­ans under­stand their mis­take by not sup­port­ing the Shah in 1979, and the con­se­quences of not appre­ci­at­ing the free­doms and qual­i­ty of life that they had. That is why in most of their protests they chant “Reza Shah, Bless your soul,” to defeat the decep­tion that is pro­mot­ed by MEK and oth­er fake oppo­si­tion and reformists.
    ...

    But then we get to the mes­sag­ing about the desires for a for­eign mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion. Unlike Pahlavi, Ami­rizadeh is adamant that Ira­ni­ans do want a for­eign inter­ven­tion and were, in fact, thank­ing Israel for bomb­ing the coun­try last year. Those Iran­ian ex-pats warn­ing against a for­eign inter­ven­tion are all part of the fake oppo­si­tion, accord­ing to Ami­rizadeh:

    ...
    Anoth­er lie by MEK and the fake oppo­si­tion and reformists is that Ira­ni­ans do not want for­eign inter­ven­tion in over­throw­ing the Islam­ic regime. Ira­ni­ans have put their lives on the line and sac­ri­ficed so much as they do again now. In each protest, they have demand­ed help from Amer­i­ca, Israel, and West­ern coun­tries to stand with them. In 2009 I was in prison dur­ing the Green Move­ment protests, trig­gered by that year’s fraud­u­lent elec­tion. Evin Prison’s cells were so packed with peo­ple being round­ed up, beat­en, and incar­cer­at­ed that there was scarce­ly space to move. These were the lucky ones were not beat­en or shot to death, or whose were dis­ap­peared and nev­er seen again. Ira­ni­ans were chant­i­ng Obama’s name in a play on words in Far­si, ask­ing if he was with them or with the mul­lahs. In the end, Oba­ma let down the Iran­ian peo­ple to the extent that they called him a trai­tor.

    Dur­ing the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Ira­ni­ans shared many videos of cel­e­bra­tions in their homes. They were thank­ing Prime Min­is­ter Netanyahu and Israel for hear­ing their voic­es and com­ing to help them to get rid of the regime. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, the war end­ed before the job of remov­ing the regime could be com­plet­ed, and Ira­ni­ans once again felt betrayed and let down.

    ...

    Ira­ni­ans defi­ant­ly need for­eign help, but not like what hap­pened in Venezuela. The West can help by pro­vid­ing arms for groups in Iran who are pre­pared and able to take on the IRGC. The West can ensure unin­ter­rupt­ed free high-speed inter­net to allow the peo­ple tak­ing mat­ters into their own hands to share the news, moti­vate, and not be shut off from oth­ers.

    Ira­ni­ans do not want the “Supreme Leader” to be arrest­ed and tak­en to the US, or allowed to flee to Rus­sia. He needs appre­hend­ed and brought to jus­tice in Iran, by Ira­ni­ans, maybe to be exe­cut­ed pub­licly by Ira­ni­ans as the final nail in the cof­fin of the Islam­ic Repub­lic.

    When you hear Ira­ni­ans over­seas say that Ira­ni­ans do not want for­eign inter­ven­tion, it is code iden­ti­fy­ing them as part of the fake oppo­si­tion and reformists who do not seek free­dom for Iran, but to exert anoth­er kind of bru­tal­i­ty on Ira­ni­ans from a dif­fer­ent source.
    ...

    Marziyeh Ami­rizadeh was­n’t deliv­er­ing an ambigu­ous mes­sage. The peo­ple of Iran are call­ing for a for­eign mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion to rein­stall the Pahlavi dynasty. That was her plea. The kind of plea the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is undoubt­ed­ly being inun­dat­ed with from the Pahlavi crowd at this point. Along with the all of the pleas from MEK sup­port­ers, who are undoubt­ed­ly lob­by­ing the hell out of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion right now too. It’s not clear what reg­u­lar Ira­ni­ans who don’t sup­port theocrats but also aren’t in favor or rein­stalling a monar­chy or back­ing a cult think at this point. But this is a sto­ry about regime change schemes and the lunatics behind them. It was nev­er real­ly about the Iran­ian peo­ple.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | January 14, 2026, 5:52 pm

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