Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR #912 Food for Thought

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This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: This pro­gram is spec­u­la­tive in nature, eval­u­at­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty that com­pa­nies descend­ed from the I.G. Far­ben Ger­man chem­i­cal car­tel may absorb Mon­san­to, the firm not­ed for its devel­op­ment of genet­i­cal­ly mod­i­fied organ­isms.

Specif­i­cal­ly, Bay­er and BASF fig­ure in the report­ed maneu­ver­ing for Mon­san­to.

Against the back­ground of the remark­able Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work’s effec­tive con­trol of the firms that descend­ed from I.G. Far­ben, we rumi­nate about the pos­si­bil­i­ty of genet­i­cal­ly engi­neered bina­ry pathogens being includ­ed in the food sup­ply avail­able to much of the world’s pop­u­la­tion.

Avail­able infor­ma­tion high­lights pos­si­ble Under­ground Reich maneu­ver­ing to gain con­trol of firms mar­ket­ing food­stuffs to mid­dle, low­er mid­dle and work­ing class peo­ple. This spec­u­la­tion, in turn, is set against the back­ground of infor­ma­tion strong­ly sug­gest­ing that AIDS was delib­er­ate­ly devel­oped.

For more than three decades, Mr. Emory has pre­sent­ed pro­grams indi­cat­ing that AIDS is a man-made dis­ease. Sup­ple­ment­ing that body of work, this pro­gram sets forth cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence indi­cat­ing that AIDS may have been cre­at­ed on a foun­da­tion of research done by the Nazis in con­cen­tra­tion camps dur­ing the Sec­ond World War. Under a pro­gram named Project Paper­clip, Nazi scientists—many of them war criminals—were recruit­ed to do research for the U.S. nation­al secu­ri­ty estab­lish­ment.

Recent med­ical research indi­cates the exis­tence of a genet­ic trait that affords immu­ni­ty to both AIDS and the infec­tions that have come to be known as “plague.” (Orig­i­nal­ly thought to be an out­break of bubon­ic plague–a bac­te­ri­o­log­i­cal disease–recent research has shift­ed focus to a viral dis­ease more akin to Ebo­la.)

This gene—the CCR5 delta-32 muta­tion—is only car­ried by the white race and [accord­ing to some sources] only by peo­ple of North­ern Euro­pean extrac­tion. Did the Nazis note [in their exper­i­ments] that some peo­ple appeared to be immune to infec­tion with plague? Were tis­sue sam­ples tak­en and pre­served for fur­ther study? Was this in any way con­nect­ed to the even­tu­al evo­lu­tion of the CCR5-delta 32 gene as a hered­i­tary pro­tec­tion against infec­tion by HIV?

In June of 2009, it emerged that CCR5 delta-32 was used in trans­plant ther­a­py admin­is­tered by a Ger­man doc­tor to an HIV-pos­i­tive leukemia patient. It appears that the patient was cured of HIV! The Ger­man doc­tor delib­er­ate­ly select­ed a CCR5 delta-32 pos­i­tive donor for the stem cells used for the trans­plant.

Obvi­ous­ly, we are won­der­ing about the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the Under­ground Reich using food­stuffs to vec­tor human­i­ty with genet­i­cal­ly engi­neered pathogens that will real­ize Hitler’s dream of an “Aryan” world.

Pro­gram High­lights Include:

  • Beck­er GMB­H’s gen­e­sis with the SS and cap­i­tal stolen from Jews dur­ing the Holo­caust.
  • Beck­er GMB­H’s absorp­tion into ConA­gra foods.
  • The grow­ing par­tic­i­pa­tion by Jorge Paulo Lemann in food­stuffs and bev­er­ages con­sumed by mid­dle, low­er-mid­dle and work­ing class peo­ple.
  • Spec­u­la­tion about Leman­n’s par­tic­i­pa­tion in the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work.
  • BAS­F’s part­ner­ing with Mon­san­to and the pos­si­bil­i­ty that the firm may acquire any sub­sidiary firms that Bay­er may have to spin off to acquire Mon­san­to.

1a. Bay­er may be poised to buy Mon­san­to.

“Bay­er Takeover of Mon­santo Would Cre­ate a Glob­al Giant” [AP]; The Los Ange­les Times; 5/19/2016.

Bayer’s poten­tial acqui­si­tion of Mon­santo Co. would cre­ate a giant seed and farm chem­i­cal com­pany with a strong foot­print in the U.S., Europe and Asia, com­bin­ing two busi­nesses with com­ple­men­tary geo­graph­i­cal focus.

But Bay­er might have to shed part of its busi­ness because of antitrust con­cerns. [Con­sid­er that in light of the Bloomberg sto­ry about BASF–D.E.] And the price tag on any deal would be huge: Monsanto’s mar­ket val­ue is around $42 bil­lion.

Ger­many-based Bay­er said Thurs­day in a short state­ment that its exec­u­tives had met recent­ly with their Mon­santo coun­ter­parts “to pri­vately dis­cuss a nego­ti­ated acqui­si­tion” of the spe­cial­ist in genet­i­cally mod­i­fied crop seeds.

The news of a poten­tially cost­ly deal sent Bay­er shares tum­bling 8.2%. Mon­santo shares climbed 3.5%.

Both com­pa­nies are famil­iar brands on farms around the globe. Bay­er, whose farm busi­ness pro­duces seeds as well as com­pounds to kill weeds, bugs and fun­gus, said the pro­posed acqui­si­tion would help it “cre­ate a lead­ing inte­grated agri­cul­ture busi­ness.”

Mon­santo, based in St. Louis, said it was review­ing Bayer’s pro­posal. Nei­ther com­pany gave oth­er details.

The pos­si­ble deal had been rumored for a week, but these were the first com­ments from either com­pa­ny.

“A com­bi­na­tion of both com­pa­nies would cre­ate $67 bil­lion of annu­al sales and the world’s largest seed and crop-chem­i­cal com­pany,” ana­lyst Ulrich Huwald at War­burg Research wrote in a research note to investors. “How­ever, the ques­tion is if Mon­santo would be inter­ested in a deal.”

Huwald said that “the busi­nesses are geo­graph­i­cally com­ple­men­tary, with Mon­santo hav­ing a strong pres­ence in North Amer­ica and Bay­er in Europe and Asia.”

A com­bi­na­tion of the two would have 28% of the glob­al mar­ket for pes­ti­cides and a strong pres­ence in the U.S. corn and soy­bean seed busi­ness.

Huwald said that the two com­pa­nies do over­lap in their veg­etable and cot­ton seed busi­ness, which could require divest­ments due to antitrust issues. Bay­er might also have to sell parts of its weed killer busi­ness.

Antitrust reg­u­la­tors scru­ti­nize merg­ers and takeovers and have the author­ity to block them if they hin­der free-mar­ket com­pe­ti­tion. If com­pa­nies get too much con­trol over a mar­ket, they can charge high­er prices and have few­er incen­tives to inno­vate.

News of the talks fol­lows a wave of con­sol­i­da­tion in the chem­i­cal indus­try: DuPont and Dow Chem­i­cal agreed to com­bine last year, and Chem­China agreed to buy Syn­genta of Switzer­land in March after Monsanto’s own bid for its Basel-based rival failed. . . . .

1b. We note that BASF, like Bay­er, one of the suc­ces­sor com­pa­nies to I.G. Far­ben, has part­nered with Mon­san­to in many of their GMO projects. “ . . . . More­over, a Bay­er-Mon­san­to tie-up may put BASF’s col­lab­o­ra­tion with the Amer­i­cans at risk. BASF and Mon­santo work togeth­er on research and devel­op­ment in plant biotech­nol­ogy, giv­ing a strong rea­son, per­haps, to spoil Bayer’s plans. . . . ”

“BASF Best Leav­ing Mon­santo Seeds for the Birds” by Olaf Stor­beck; Reuters; 5/19/2016.

There is one thing the share­hold­ers of the chem­i­cal com­pany BASF should fear more than con­sol­i­da­tion between its Ger­man rival Bay­er and the Amer­i­can seed mak­er Mon­santo: their own board wad­ing in with a coun­ter­bid.

Bayer’s bid for Mon­santo puts BASF’s chief exec­u­tive, Kurt Bock, on the spot. With agri­cul­tural rev­enue of 5.8 bil­lion euros ($6.5 bil­lion), BASF is one of the world’s big play­ers in an indus­try where every­one seems to be enthu­si­as­ti­cally cou­pling. Think of Dow Chemical’s merg­er with DuPont, and Syngenta’s planned takeover by Chem­China. Only BASF would be left on the shelf.

More­over, a Bay­er-Mon­san­to tie-up may put BASF’s col­lab­o­ra­tion with the Amer­i­cans at risk. BASF and Mon­santo work togeth­er on research and devel­op­ment in plant biotech­nol­ogy, giv­ing a strong rea­son, per­haps, to spoil Bayer’s plans. . . .

1c. IF Bay­er does pur­chase Mon­san­to and is forced to divest itself of some sub­sidiary firms due to anti-trust con­sid­er­a­tions, BASF may well pick up those firms that are “spun off,” thus giv­ing the Under­ground Reich effec­tive con­trol of the GMO food busi­ness.

“. . . . In the lead up to Bay­er AG’s unso­licited takeover pro­posal for Mon­santo Co on Thurs­day, Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer Kurt Bock has talked up thrift, balk­ing at the price tags placed on assets. Rather than bet­ting the farm on a big deal and chal­leng­ing arch agro­chem­i­cals rival Bay­er for Mon­santo, Bock appears con­tent to stay out of the fray, ready to selec­tively buy up any busi­nesses that may come to the mar­ket in the dust of mega deals. . . .”

“BASF Is Sleep­ing Giant on Deals as Bay­er Moves on Mon­san­to” by Sheenagh Matthews and Andrew Marc Noel; Bloomberg; 5/19/2016.

* Ger­man chem­i­cals mak­er fears over­pay­ing, los­ing inte­gra­tion
* CEO Kurt Bock may buy agro­chem­i­cals assets dis­carded on deals

With an aver­sion to over­pay­ing and con­vic­tion that a con­glom­er­ate approach is best, Germany’s BASF SE has so far sat out the biggest-ever con­sol­i­da­tion wave in the glob­al crop chem­i­cals and seeds indus­try.

In the lead up to Bay­er AG’s unso­licited takeover pro­posal for Mon­santo Co on Thurs­day, Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer Kurt Bock has talked up thrift, balk­ing at the price tags placed on assets. Rather than bet­ting the farm on a big deal and chal­leng­ing arch agro­chem­i­cals rival Bay­er for Mon­santo, Bock appears con­tent to stay out of the fray, ready to selec­tively buy up any busi­nesses that may come to the mar­ket in the dust of mega deals. . . . .

2. The I.G. Far­ben com­pa­ny, a core ele­ment of the Third Reich, was cen­tral to Reich­sleit­er Mar­tin Bormann’s plans to secret Germany’s wealth abroad. Note, also, I.G. Farben’s dom­i­nance of the Euro­pean chem­i­cal indus­try, and the opin­ion of Dr. von Schnit­zler that tech­ni­cal depen­dence on I.G. facil­i­ties would con­tin­ue after the war. (To learn more about I.G. Far­ben, see—among oth­er programs–FTR#’s 305411506552. Seri­ous stu­dents should also read Treason’s Peace and The Devil’s Chemists, avail­able for down­load.)

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; p. 28.

 . . . I.G. Far­ben was a for­mi­da­ble ally for Reich­sleit­er Bor­mann in his plans for the post­war eco­nom­ic rebirth of Ger­many. In a tele­phone con­ver­sa­tion with Dr. von Schnit­zler, Bor­mann asked what would the loss of fac­to­ries in France and the oth­er occu­pied coun­tries mean to Ger­man indus­try in gen­er­al and to I.G. in par­tic­u­lar. Dr. von Schnit­zler said he believed the tech­ni­cal depen­dence of these coun­tries on I.G. would be so great that despite Ger­man defeat I.G., in one way or anoth­er, could regain its posi­tion of con­trol of the Euro­pean chem­i­cal busi­ness. ‘They will need the con­stant tech­ni­cal help of I.G.’s sci­en­tif­ic lab­o­ra­to­ries as they do not own appro­pri­ate instal­la­tions with­in them­selves.’ . . . (Ibid.; p. 28.)

3. Bor­mann and Schmitz then dis­cussed I.G.’s prospects for the post­war peri­od. The cozy rela­tion­ship with pow­er­ful ele­ments with­in the pow­er elites of the West­ern allies was fore­seen by Schmitz as bod­ing well for the company’s future. Schmitz’s pre­dic­tions were rel­a­tive­ly accu­rate. Nei­ther Schmitz nor any of the I.G. Far­ben exec­u­tives were severe­ly pun­ished and the firm’s three suc­ces­sor firms car­ried on effec­tive­ly in the post­war peri­od.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; p. 158.

. . . .The Reich­sleit­er asked Schmitz his views of the future. Schmitz replied, ‘The occu­pa­tion armies will be under­stand­ing in the West, but cer­tain­ly not in the East. I have instruct­ed all Far­ben admin­is­tra­tors and tech­ni­cians to come to the West, where they can be of use in resum­ing our oper­a­tions once the dis­tur­bances of 1945 come to a halt.’ Schmitz added that, while gen­er­al bomb dam­age to the I.G. plants was about 25 per­cent of capac­i­ty, some were untouched. He men­tioned speak­ing with Field Mar­shal Mod­el, who was com­mand­ing the defens­es of the Ruhr. ‘Mod­el had planned to turn our Bay­er-Leberkusen phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal fac­to­ry into an artillery base, but he agreed to make it an open, unde­fend­ed fac­to­ry. Hope­ful­ly, we will get it back untouched.’ ‘What about your board of direc­tors and the essen­tial exec­u­tives? If they are held by the occu­pa­tion author­i­ties, can I.G. con­tin­ue?’ Bor­mann asked. ‘We can con­tin­ue. We have an oper­a­tional plan for such a con­tin­gency, which every­one under­stands. How­ev­er, I don’t believe our board mem­bers will be detained too long. Nor will I. But we must go through a pro­ce­dure of inves­ti­ga­tion before release, so I have been told by our N.W. 7 peo­ple who have excel­lent con­tacts in Wash­ing­ton.’ . . .

4. The broad­cast details the pro­found rela­tion­ship between I.G. Far­ben and the gov­ern­ment of the Third Reich. Of par­tic­u­lar util­i­ty to the Bor­mann flight cap­i­tal pro­gram was I.G. Farben’s elab­o­rate infra­struc­ture in for­eign coun­tries. Note that, as is seen here, I.G. Far­ben was inex­tri­ca­bly linked with both the gov­ern­ment of the Third Reich and with the Nazi par­ty itself. Of par­tic­u­lar sig­nif­i­cance is the N.W.7 office and its con­trol by Mar­tin Bor­mann.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; p. 54.

 . . . This, too, report­ed to Mar­tin Bormann.I.G. Farben’s N.W.7 office in Berlin com­piled mil­i­tary and eco­nom­ic data on all coun­tries for the Wehrma­cht. This depart­ment was staffed with men of rec­og­nized abil­i­ty in all branch­es of busi­ness and sci­ence. It was under the direc­tion of Dr. Max Ilgn­er, nephew of Her­mann Schmitz, I.G.’s pres­i­dent, who was known through­out the indus­tri­al world as ‘the mas­ter of finan­cial cam­ou­flage.’ [Empha­sis added.] Far­ben had offices and rep­re­sen­ta­tives in 93 coun­tries, and no social gath­er­ing of busi­ness­men was too small to be cov­ered by an N.W.7 rep­re­sen­ta­tive, whose reports on mar­ket con­di­tions, fac­to­ry instal­la­tions, raw-mate­r­i­al sup­plies, and research were trans­mit­ted imme­di­ate­ly to Berlin and Dr. Ilgn­er. In the Unit­ed States, N.W.7 oper­at­ed through the firm of Chem­ny­co, Inc., an Amer­i­can-formed sub­sidiary. Chem­ny­co sent tremen­dous amounts of infor­ma­tion rang­ing from pho­tographs and blue prints to detailed descrip­tions of entire indus­tri­al com­plex­es and secret process­es. . . .”

5. Of par­tic­u­lar impor­tance for this dis­cus­sion is the fact that I.G. used Ger­man mil­i­tary con­quest to gain effec­tive func­tion­al con­trol of the chem­i­cal indus­try of the con­ti­nent. In para­graph 13, we not­ed Georg von Scnitzler’s pre­dic­tion that I.G.’s tech­ni­cal dom­i­nance would result in the post­war per­pet­u­a­tion of this con­trol. As we will see, this con­trol was main­tained. Note the role of the N.W.7 Far­ben espi­onage orga­ni­za­tion in Bor­man­n’s plans for the secret­ing of Nazi monies abroad.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 55–58.

. . . This huge orga­ni­za­tion func­tioned as a man­u­fac­tur­ing and research arm of the Ger­man gov­ern­ment, with the respon­si­bil­i­ty of dis­cov­er­ing all pos­si­ble means of increas­ing the mil­i­tary pow­er of Ger­many. More than RM 4.25 bil­lion was invest­ed in new plants, mines, and pow­er instal­la­tions, with oth­er mil­lions going into new research facil­i­ties. . . . So close had Far­ben become to the gov­ern­ment that I.G. always knew in advance all inva­sions planned by Hitler. It was to sup­ply the mate­ri­als nec­es­sary to each con­quest, and when a land had been over­run and sub­ju­gat­ed, the Far­ben experts would han­dle the con­sol­i­da­tion and orga­ni­za­tion of the indus­tri­al facil­i­ties as addi­tion­al sup­ply sources for the Ger­man armed forces. As Ger­man troops swept across Europe and Hitler pro­claimed his vision of a thou­sand-year Third Reich, I.G. Far­ben also dreamed of world empire. This was out­lined with clar­i­ty in a doc­u­ment called Neuord­nung, or ‘New Order,’ that was accom­pa­nied by a let­ter of trans­mit­tal to the Min­istry of Eco­nom­ics. It declared that a new order for the chem­i­cal indus­try of the world should sup­ple­ment Hitler’s New Order. There­fore, the doc­u­ment stat­ed, Far­ben was fit­ting future indus­tri­al plans into such a frame­work. . . . I.G. Far­ben was the major chem­i­cal firm on the Con­ti­nent, and as each coun­try fell to Ger­many its acqui­si­tions of chem­i­cal and dyestuff com­pa­nies were enor­mous. I.G. also increased its invest­ments in these by RM 7 bil­lion. [Empha­sis added.]

. . . .The close rela­tion­ship of Far­ben to the Third Reich lead­er­ship was under­scored in oth­er ways. I.G.’s lead­ing offi­cials assist­ed in the for­mu­la­tion and exe­cu­tion of eco­nom­ic poli­cies of gov­ern­ment; its pres­i­dent was a mem­ber of the Reich­stag; its lead­ing sci­en­tist was a chief assis­tant to Her­mann Goer­ing under the Four-Year Plan; its sta­tis­ti­cians and econ­o­mists pre­pared intel­li­gence for the Nazi High Com­mand; scores of its tech­ni­cians were at any giv­en time on loan to the air and war min­istries.

. . . The con­tact men of N.W.7 through­out the world were called the I.G. Verbindungs­man­ner, the liai­son offi­cers between Far­ben back in Ger­many and the branch­es else­where. These I.G. Verbindungs­man­ner, as well as all oth­er key Far­ben rep­re­sen­ta­tives work­ing beyond the bor­ders of the Third Reich, were mem­bers of the Nation­al Social­ist Ger­man Work­ers Par­ty. . . . So now Mar­tin Bor­mann had at his com­mand not only the Aus­lands-Organ­i­sa­tion but also the I.G. Verbindungs­man­ner of Far­ben, which could be count­ed on to heed his orders when it was time to dis­perse the com­mer­cial assets of the Third Reich. . . .

6. More about how the vast inter­na­tion­al oper­a­tions of the I.G. Far­ben firm and its var­i­ous sub­sidiary oper­a­tions was a prin­ci­pal ele­ment of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion. I.G. Far­ben chief Her­mann Schmitz dis­cussed I.G.’s involve­ment with the Bor­mann pro­gram.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 157–158.

. . . . In tes­ti­mo­ny lat­er giv­en to Nurem­berg inves­ti­ga­tors, Schmitz praised Bor­mann for the way he had direct­ed the dis­tri­b­u­tion of Ger­man assets around the world. His own Far­ben orga­ni­za­tion had, of course, con­tributed to the suc­cess of the oper­a­tion. Every region­al rep­re­sen­ta­tive work­ing for Her­mann Schmitz was an excep­tion­al busi­ness­man, or he would not have been with I.G. All had con­tributed sound advice in their areas of com­pe­tence, the regions of the world where they rep­re­sent­ed Far­ben while keep­ing an eye on the sub­sidiaries of the par­ent con­cern and the 700 hid­den cor­po­ra­tions they con­trolled. They had pro­vid­ed assis­tance and con­tin­u­ing guid­ance in estab­lish­ing the 750 new com­pa­nies cre­at­ed on order of Bor­mann, who want­ed more than hid­den assets; Bor­mann want­ed the mon­ey and patents and tech­ni­cians put to work to cre­ate even greater assets that would bol­ster Ger­many in the post­war years. In their meet­ing in the chan­cellery, both men checked over the fig­ures of sums dis­bursed, and they were accu­rate to the pfen­nig. . . .

7. As fore­cast by Dr. Scheid in the August 10, 1944 meet­ing, the cor­po­rate allies of the major Ger­man cor­po­ra­tions, includ­ing and espe­cial­ly those of I.G. Far­ben, proved to be of great val­ue to the uccess of the Bor­mann flight cap­i­tal pro­gram.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; p. 156.

. . . . Pow­er­ful friends of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion in all West­ern coun­tries, includ­ing those sprin­kled in con­trol points through­out the admin­is­tra­tion in Wash­ing­ton and in the finan­cial and bro­ker­age busi­ness­es of Wall Street, the City of Lon­don, and the Paris estab­lish­ment, did not wish a coor­di­nat­ed dri­ve to get at these exter­nal Ger­man assets. They had under­stand­able rea­sons, if you over­look moral­i­ty: the finan­cial ben­e­fits for coop­er­a­tion (col­lab­o­ra­tion had become an old-hat term with the war wind­ing down) were very entic­ing, depend­ing on one’s impor­tance and abil­i­ty to be of ser­vice to the orga­ni­za­tion and the 750 cor­po­ra­tions they were secret­ly manip­u­lat­ing, to say noth­ing of the known multi­na­tion­als such as I.G. Far­ben, Thyssen A.G., and Siemens; and, as a sec­ond rea­son, the phi­los­o­phy of free enter­prise and preser­va­tion of pri­vate prop­er­ty. . . . (Ibid.; p. 156.)

8. Note the post­war resus­ci­ta­tion of I.G. Far­ben, in the form of the “Big Three” suc­ces­sor firms that grew out Far­ben. Although offi­cial­ly bro­ken up at the end of World War II, I.G. Far­ben con­tin­ued func­tion­ing in new form. Recent merg­ers (such as the 1996 merg­er of I.G. car­tel affil­i­ates Ciba-Geigy and San­doz to form Novar­tis) indi­cate a new com­ing togeth­er of the old com­po­nents of I.G. Again, pay close atten­tion to the rela­tion­ship between these com­pa­nies and the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; p. 282.

. . . . By 1956, the three major multi­na­tion­als (Hoechst, BASF, and Bay­er) reshaped from the 159 com­pa­nies with­in Ger­many that had com­prised I.G. Far­ben were gen­er­at­ing record prof­its for the orig­i­nal 450 major Far­ben stock­hold­ers, who had orga­nized them­selves into the I.G. Far­ben Stock­hold­ers Pro­tec­tive com­mit­tee in Bonn. The Big Three went on expand­ing, tripling cap­i­tal­iza­tion in 1956 from invest­ment funds that poured in from the inter­lock­ing com­pa­nies estab­lished in safe haven coun­tries by Mar­tin Bor­mann and Her­mann Schmitz. There was a return, more vig­or­ous than ever, of the huge, mono­lith­ic indus­tri­al multi­na­tion­als that dom­i­nat­ed the Ger­man econ­o­my before and dur­ing World War II. . . .

9. The enor­mous cor­po­rate wealth and pow­er of the three suc­ces­sor firms is at the dis­pos­al of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work and Under­ground Reich.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 282–283.

. . . . Each of these three spin­offs from I.G. Far­ben today does more busi­ness indi­vid­u­al­ly than did Far­ben at its zenith, when its cor­po­rate struc­ture cov­ered 93 coun­tries. BASF and Bay­er indi­vid­u­al­ly boast world­wide sales of near­ly $10 bil­lion annu­al­ly, while Hoechst, now the world’s largest chem­i­cal com­pa­ny, gen­er­at­ed $16.01 bil­lion in world­wide sales in 1980. Each does more busi­ness than E.I. du Pont de Nemours, with sales of $9.4 bil­lion. The Unit­ed States is, of course, the major mar­ket, one into which these Ger­man cor­po­ra­tions con­tin­ue to pour invest­ment mon­ey for both new cap­i­tal con­struc­tion and cor­po­rate takeovers. Togeth­er, these three multi­na­tion­als assure per­ma­nent pros­per­i­ty for the orig­i­nal 450 Far­ben stock­hold­ers, their banks, and the shad­owy share­hold­ers of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion in South Amer­i­ca who guard and vote the Her­mann Schmitz trust fund through inter­me­di­aries at the annu­al meet­ings of BASF, Bay­er and Hoechst. [Empha­sis added.] . . . .

10. A sig­nif­i­cant part of the I.G. Far­ben lega­cy, the Her­mann Schmitz Trust is also at the dis­pos­al of the Bor­mann cap­i­tal net­work and the Under­ground Reich.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 279–280.

. . . . If there is any doubt in Europe who, in the long run, won the peace, there is none what­so­ev­er among the for­mer Ger­man lead­ers dwelling in South Amer­i­ca. It is a good bet that if Her­mann Schmitz were alive today, he would bear wit­ness as to who real­ly won. Schmitz died con­tent­ed, hav­ing wit­nessed the resur­gence of I.G. Far­ben, albeit in altered cor­po­rate forms, a mon­ey machine that con­tin­ues to gen­er­ate prof­its for all the old I.G. share­hold­ers and enor­mous inter­na­tion­al pow­er for the Ger­man cadre direct­ing the work­ings of the suc­ces­sor firms. . . . He was the mas­ter manip­u­la­tor, the cor­po­rate and finan­cial wiz­ard, the magi­cian, who could make mon­ey appear and dis­ap­pear, and reap­pear again. His whole exis­tence was leg­erde­main, played out on the game­board of I.G. Far­ben and his beloved Ger­many. . . Their [Schmitz and Bor­mann] asso­ci­a­tion was close and trust­ing over the years, and it is the con­sid­ered opin­ion of those in their cir­cle that the wealth pos­sessed by Her­mann Schmitz was shift­ed to Switzer­land and South Amer­i­ca, and placed in trust with Bor­mann, the legal heir to Hitler. [Her­mann] Schmitz’s wealth—largely I.G. Far­ben bear­er bonds con­vert­ed to the Big Three suc­ces­sor firms, shares in Stan­dard Oil of New Jer­sey (equal to those held by the Rock­e­fellers), as well as shares in the 750 cor­po­ra­tions he helped Bor­mann estab­lish dur­ing the last year of World War II—has increased in all seg­ments of the mod­ern indus­tri­al world. The Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion in South Amer­i­ca uti­lizes the vot­ing pow­er of the Schmitz trust along with their own assets to guide the multi­na­tion­als they con­trol, as they keep steady the eco­nom­ic course of the Father­land. . . .

11. The pro­gram notes the eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal sig­nif­i­cance of the Bor­mann net­work:

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184-0309–8; pp. 284–285.

. . . . Atop an orga­ni­za­tion­al pyra­mid that dom­i­nates the indus­try of West Ger­many through banks, vot­ing rights enjoyed by major­i­ty share­hold­ers in sig­nif­i­cant car­tels, and the pro­fes­sion­al input of a rel­a­tive­ly young lead­er­ship group of lawyers, invest­ment spe­cial­ists, bankers, and indus­tri­al­ists, he is sat­is­fied that he achieved his aim of help­ing the Father­land back on its feet. To ensure con­ti­nu­ity of pur­pose and direc­tion, a close watch is main­tained on the prof­it state­ments and man­age­ment reports of cor­po­ra­tions under its con­trol else­where. This lead­er­ship group of twen­ty, which is in fact a board of direc­tors, is chaired by Bor­mann, but pow­er has shift­ed to the younger men who will car­ry on the ini­tia­tive that grew from that his­toric meet­ing in Stras­bourg on August 10, 1944. Old Hein­rich Mueller, chief of secu­ri­ty for the NSDAP in South Amer­i­ca, is the most feared of all, hav­ing the pow­er of life and death over those deemed not to be act­ing in the best inter­ests of the orga­ni­za­tion. Some still envi­sion a Fourth Reich. . .What will not pass is the eco­nom­ic influ­ences of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion, whose com­mer­cial direc­tives are obeyed almost with­out ques­tion by the high­est ech­e­lons of West Ger­man finance and indus­try. ‘All orders come from the share­hold­ers in South Amer­i­ca,’ I have been told by a spokesman for Mar­tin Bor­mann. . . . .(Ibid.; pp. 284–5.)

13. Next, we review an excerpt from FTR #305, highlighting–among oth­er things–Becker GMBH. The firm, found­ed by an SS vet­er­an of the “Final Solu­tion” with mon­ey tak­en from Jew­ish vic­tims of the con­cen­tra­tion camps, was absorbed into ConA­gra, a major pro­duc­er of food­stuffs mar­ket­ed to mid­dle, low­er-mid­dle and work­ing-class peo­ple. The Bor­mann group would undoubt­ed­ly have received stock options and/or a seat on the board of direc­tors. Thus, the Under­ground Reich would have direct influ­ence in a major pro­duc­er of food­stuffs for work­ing peo­ple.

“Nazi Mon­ey Trail Heats Up after 50 Years” by Greg Stein­metz; Wall Street Jour­nal; 4/28/97; p. A1.

14a. Next, we present an excerpt from FTR #606 about the “Aryan Gene” that pro­vides immu­ni­ty to HIV infec­tion.

The pro­gram reviews an excerpt from tes­ti­mo­ny before a House appro­pri­a­tions sub­com­mit­tee that was draw­ing up the defense bud­get for the fol­low­ing year. (The hear­ings were in 1969.) The tes­ti­mo­ny dis­cuss­es the pos­si­bil­i­ty of using genet­ic engi­neer­ing to pro­duce a dis­ease that would be “refrac­to­ry” to the immune sys­tem. This is vir­tu­al­ly the clin­i­cal def­i­n­i­tion of AIDS. It is worth not­ing that the project was fund­ed, and just such a disease—AIDS—appeared in just the time frame posit­ed. It is also worth not­ing that, in the 2002 edi­tion of A High­er Form of Killing, this pas­sage is omit­ted!!

A High­er Form of Killing; Robert Har­ris and Jere­my Pax­man; Hill and Wang [SC]; ISBN 0–8090-5471‑X; p. 241 (p. 266 in e‑book).

. . . As long ago as 1962, forty sci­en­tists were employed at the U.S. Army bio­log­i­cal war­fare lab­o­ra­to­ries on full-time genet­ics research. ‘Many oth­ers,’ it was said, ‘appre­ci­ate the impli­ca­tions of genet­ics for their own work.’ The impli­ca­tions were made more spe­cif­ic that genet­ic engi­neer­ing could solve one of the major dis­ad­van­tages of bio­log­i­cal war­fare, that it is lim­it­ed to dis­eases which occur nat­u­ral­ly some­where in the world. ‘With­in the next 5 to 10 years, it would prob­a­bly be pos­si­ble to make a new infec­tive micro-organ­ism which could dif­fer in cer­tain impor­tant respects from any known dis­ease-caus­ing organ­isms. Most impor­tant of these is that it might be refrac­to­ry to the immuno­log­i­cal and ther­a­peu­tic process­es upon which we depend to main­tain our rel­a­tive free­dom from infec­tious dis­ease.’ [Ital­ics are Mr. Emory’s.] The pos­si­bil­i­ty that such a ‘super germ’ may have been suc­cess­ful­ly pro­duced in a lab­o­ra­to­ry some­where in the world in the years since that assess­ment was made is one which should not be too read­i­ly cast aside. . . .

14b. Next, the pro­gram reviews dis­cus­sion of the gene pro­vid­ing peo­ple of the white race [and—according to some sources—primarily those of North­ern Euro­pean extrac­tion] with immu­ni­ty from the AIDS virus. The pro­gram high­lights that gene’s role in pro­vid­ing some peo­ple with immu­ni­ty from the plagues that rav­aged Europe cen­turies ago. (The gene is CCR5 delta32.)

Note that no oth­er eth­nic groups or races have the delta 32 gene that pre­vents infec­tion by HIV.

 “Secrets of the Dead—Case File: Mys­tery of the Black Death; Back­ground”; Secrets of the Dead.

. . . In Sep­tem­ber 1665, George Vic­cars, a tai­lor in the small, cen­tral-Eng­land vil­lage of Eyam, received a par­cel of cloth rid­den with plague-infect­ed fleas from Lon­don. Four days lat­er, Vic­cars died. By the end of the month, five more vil­lagers had suc­cumbed to the plague. The pan­icked town turned to their rec­tor, William Mom­pes­son, who per­suad­ed them to quar­an­tine the entire vil­lage to pre­vent the bac­teri­um from spread­ing through­out the region. It seemed like sui­cide. A year lat­er, the first out­siders ven­tured into Eyam, expect­ing a ghost town. Yet, mirac­u­lous­ly, half the town had sur­vived. How did so many vil­lagers live through the most dev­as­tat­ing dis­ease known to man? . . .

Local Eyam lore tells befud­dling sto­ries of plague sur­vivors who had close con­tact with the bac­teri­um but nev­er caught the dis­ease. Eliz­a­beth Han­cock buried six chil­dren and her hus­band in a week, but nev­er became ill. The vil­lage gravedig­ger han­dled hun­dreds of plague-rav­aged corpses, but sur­vived as well. Could these peo­ple have some­how been immune to the Black Death?”

Dr. Stephen O’Brien of the Nation­al Insti­tutes of Health in Wash­ing­ton D.C. sug­gests they were. His work with HIV and the mutat­ed form of the gene CCR, called ‘delta 32,’ led him to Eyam. In 1996, research showed that delta32 pre­vents HIV from enter­ing human cells and infect­ing the body. O’Brien thought this prin­ci­ple could be applied to the plague bac­te­ria, which affects the body in a sim­i­lar man­ner. To deter­mine whether the Eyam plague sur­vivors may have car­ried delta 32, O’Brien test­ed the DNA of their mod­ern-day descen­dents. What he found out was star­tling . . .”

For a dis­ease-caus­ing microor­gan­ism to infect the human body there must be a gate­way or por­tal through which it enters into human cells. The plague bac­teri­um works this way, hijack­ing the white blood cells sent to elim­i­nate it. Trav­el­ing inside the white blood cells to the lymph nodes, the bac­te­ria break out and attack the focal point of the human immune sys­tem. Dr. Stephen O’Brien felt that the mutat­ed CCR5 gene, delta 32, may have pre­vent­ed the plague from being able to enter its host’s white blood cells.

Eyam pro­vid­ed O’Brien an ide­al oppor­tu­ni­ty to test this the­o­ry. Specif­i­cal­ly, Eyam was an iso­lat­ed pop­u­la­tion known to have sur­vived a plague epi­dem­ic. Every­one in the town would have been exposed to the bac­teri­um, so it’s like­ly that any life-sav­ing genet­ic trait would have been exposed to the bac­teri­um, so it’s like­ly that any life-sav­ing genet­ic trait would have been pos­sessed by each of these sur­vivors. ‘Like a Xerox machine,’ says O’Brien, ‘their gene fre­quen­cies have been repli­cat­ed for sev­er­al gen­er­a­tions with­out a lot of infu­sion from out­side,’ thus pro­vid­ing a viable pool of sur­vivor-descen­dants who would have inher­it­ed such a trait. . . .

. . . DNA sam­ples could only be col­lect­ed from direct descen­dents of the plague sur­vivors. DNA is the prin­ci­ple com­po­nent of chro­mo­somes, which car­ry the genes that trans­mit hered­i­tary char­ac­ter­is­tics. We inher­it our DNA from our par­ents, thus Eyam res­i­dent Joan Plant, for instance, may have inher­it­ed the delta 32 muta­tion from one of her ancient rel­a­tives. Plant can trace her mother’s lin­eage back ten gen­er­a­tions to the Black­well sib­lings, Fran­cis and Mar­garet, who both lived through the plague to the turn of the cen­tu­ry. The next step was to har­vest a DNA sam­ple from Joan and the oth­er descen­dants. DNA is found in the nuclei of cells. The amount is con­stant in all typ­i­cal cells, regard­less of the size or func­tion of that cell. One of the eas­i­est meth­ods of obtain­ing a DNA tis­sue sam­ple is to take a cheek or buc­cal swab. . . .

After three weeks of test­ing at Uni­ver­si­ty Col­lege in Lon­don, delta 32 had been found in 14% of the sam­ples. This is a genet­i­cal­ly sig­nif­i­cant per­cent­age, yet what, real­ly, did it mean? Could the vil­lagers have inher­it­ed delta 32 from else­where, res­i­dents who had moved to the com­mu­ni­ty in the 350 years since the plague? Was this real­ly a high­er per­cent­age than any­where else? To find out, O’Brien assem­bled an inter­na­tion­al team of sci­en­tists to test for the pres­ence of delta 32 around the world. ‘Native Africans did not have delta 32 at all,’ O’Brien says, ‘and when we looked at East Asians and Indi­ans, they were also flat zero.’ In fact the lev­els of delta 32 found in Eyam were only matched in regions of Europe that had been affect­ed by the plague and in Amer­i­ca, which was, for the most part, set­tled by Euro­pean plague sur­vivors and their descen­dants.”

Mean­while, recent work with anoth­er dis­ease strik­ing­ly sim­i­lar to the plague, AIDS, sug­gests O’Brien was on the right track. HIV, the virus that caus­es AIDS, tricks the immune sys­tem in a sim­i­lar man­ner as the plague bac­teri­um, tar­get­ing and tak­ing over white blood cells. Virol­o­gist Dr. Bill Pax­ton at the Aaron Dia­mond AIDS Research Cen­ter in New York City noticed, ‘the cen­ter had no study of peo­ple who were exposed to HIV but who had remained neg­a­tive.’ He began test­ing the blood of high-risk, HIV-neg­a­tive indi­vid­u­als like Steve Crohn, expos­ing their blood to three thou­sand times the amount of HIV nor­mal­ly need­ed to infect a cell. Steve’s blood nev­er became infect­ed. ‘We thought maybe we had infect­ed the cul­ture with bac­te­ria or what­ev­er,’ says Pax­ton. ‘So we went back to Steve. But it was the same result. We went back again and again. Same result.’ Pax­ton began study­ing Crohn’s DNA, and con­clud­ed there was some sort of block­ing mech­a­nism pre­vent­ing the virus from bind­ing to his cells. Fur­ther research showed that that mech­a­nism was delta 32. Sci­en­tists study­ing HIV first learned about the gate­way-block­ing capac­i­ty of the CCR5 muta­tion in 1996. Sev­er­al drug com­pa­nies, then, quick­ly began explor­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty of devel­op­ing phar­ma­ceu­ti­cals that would mim­ic delta 32 by bind­ing to CCR5 and block­ing the attach­ment of HIV. . . .

14c. In June of 2009, it emerged that CCR5 delta-32 was used in trans­plant ther­a­py admin­is­tered by a Ger­man doc­tor to an HIV-pos­i­tive leukemia patient. It appears that the patient was cured of HIV! The Ger­man doc­tor delib­er­ate­ly select­ed a CCR5 delta-32 pos­i­tive donor for the stem cells used for the trans­plant. Dr. Gup­ta, quot­ed in the fol­low­ing arti­cle, won­ders why more pub­lic­i­ty was­n’t afford­ed this event. Why indeed?

“Local Physician:HIV/AIDS Cure Get­ting Lit­tle Pub­lic­i­ty” by Bob Mor­gan; Gulf Coast News Today; 5/27/2009.

A Foley [Alaba­ma] physi­cian said what appears to be the first case of HIV/AIDS cure in the world is get­ting lit­tle men­tion in the media.

Dr. Awad­hesh K. Gup­ta, med­ical direc­tor at Foley Walk-In Med Care, said he first heard of the med­ical break­through in April when he attend­ed the Annu­al Con­fer­ence of the Amer­i­can Col­lege of Physi­cians in Inter­nal Med­i­cine in Philadel­phia.

It’s a con­fer­ence Gup­ta tries to attend every year.

“This is the most pres­ti­gious orga­ni­za­tion of physi­cians in Inter­nal Med­i­cine and is respon­si­ble for cer­ti­fy­ing post grad­u­ate train­ing in Inter­nal Med­i­cine. It is also one of the old­est,” he said.

Accord­ing to Gup­ta, who has been prac­tic­ing med­i­cine in the South Bald­win area since 1997, the cure was first report­ed in ear­ly 2008 by a group of physi­cians from Ger­many at the annu­al con­fer­ence on “Retro­virus­es and Oppor­tunis­tic Infec­tions” in Boston. The New Eng­land Jour­nal of Med­i­cine, one of the most pres­ti­gious med­ical jour­nals in the world, final­ly pub­lished the report in its Feb. 12, 2009, issue, Gup­ta said.

So why has the news of the first case of HIV/AIDS cure received so lit­tle atten­tion where the pub­lic is con­cerned?

“I can’t be sure as to why so lit­tle pub­lic­i­ty,” Gup­ta said recent­ly.

“My guess is that most sci­en­tif­ic researchers are some­what stunned that a clin­i­cian — not a research sci­en­tist — has been able to come up with the cure. Most of the big research mon­ey and big name Amer­i­can insti­tu­tions are some­what embar­rassed to acknowl­edge that the very first case of HIV cure is not com­ing from their insti­tu­tions.”

The cure, instead, is com­ing from Char­i­ty Uni­ver­si­ty Hos­pi­tal in Berlin, Ger­many, and the doc­tor is Gero Huet­ter, who works in the Depart­ment of Hema­tol­ogy, Oncol­o­gy and Trans­fu­sion Med­i­cine at the same hos­pi­tal.

Asked about the reac­tion of atten­dees at the med­ical con­fer­ence in Philadel­phia as regard­ed the news of an HIV/AIDS cure, Gup­ta said, “Unfor­tu­nate­ly, because of the hec­tic sched­ule, I did not try to engage too many physi­cians. How­ev­er, the doc­tor pre­sent­ing this infor­ma­tion seemed extreme­ly excit­ed about it.”

As Gup­ta explains the case and cure in ques­tion, a 40-year-old Amer­i­can work­ing in Berlin had been HIV-pos­i­tive for 10 years. The patient’s HIV infec­tion had been under con­trol for four years with “con­ven­tion­al HAART treat­ment reg­i­men” (High­ly Active Anti-Retro­vi­ral Ther­a­py).

When the patient devel­oped leukemia, how­ev­er, a bone mar­row trans­plant of stem cells was done using stan­dard pro­to­col, which Gup­ta said includes radi­a­tion ther­a­py and chemother­a­py pri­or to the trans­plant.

“Remem­ber, once you stop HIV drugs, the HIV viral count ris­es very rapid­ly, usu­al­ly with­in a few days to a week,” Gup­ta said.

Accord­ing to Gup­ta, Huet­ter, the Ger­man physi­cian treat­ing the Amer­i­can, delib­er­ate­ly chose a stem cell donor who had a gene muta­tion known as “CCR‑5 Delta- 32,” rather than using the best matched donor.

Gup­ta said Huet­ter remem­bered research first observed in 1996 — research Gup­ta said is well known in the sci­en­tif­ic com­mu­ni­ty. That research found that cer­tain gay men in the San Fran­cis­co area remained unin­fect­ed with HIV in spite of engag­ing in risky sex­u­al activ­i­ties. As it was lat­er dis­cov­ered, those men had the CCR‑5 Delta-32 gene muta­tion.

As it turned out, the patient’s stem cell trans­plant was a suc­cess, Gup­ta said, even though the patient had to have a sec­ond stem cell trans­plant (from the same donor) when his leukemia relapsed.

“This patient has been off all his HIV drugs for two years now,” Gup­ta said. “He con­tin­ues to show no detectable signs of HIV in all the known places HIV is detect­ed — no signs of HIV in his blood, bone mar­row, lymph nodes, intestines or brain.” Also, the patient’s T‑cell count remains nor­mal.

Thus, accord­ing to Gup­ta, with­in the lim­its of sci­en­tists’ abil­i­ty to detect HIV, it appears this patient’s HIV has been “erad­i­cat­ed.”. . .

14d. The dev­as­tat­ing impli­ca­tions of the find­ings dis­cussed above were elo­quent­ly pre­sent­ed in an online edi­to­r­i­al:

“Aryan Genes Immune to Death from AIDS” by geminiwalker_ink. (This post appears to have dis­ap­peared from the inter­net)

This is the night­mare of AIDS no one wants to believe. As we come clos­er to cel­e­brat­ing, on Decem­ber 1, yet anoth­er World AIDS Day, let’s take a good hard look at what’s real­ly going on before we pour more of our ever dimin­ish­ing hard earned mon­ey down yet anoth­er hor­ren­dous sink­hole. It has been found that some Cau­casians who have test­ed pos­i­tive for the HIV virus were found to take a very long time to actu­al­ly devel­op ‘full-blown’ AIDS (as they call it). It has since been dis­cov­ered (since 1997) that 20% of Euro­pean Cau­casians have the so-called ‘Aryan’ genet­ic dis­po­si­tion. If both your par­ents, in oth­er words, are of Aryan descent, it appears you can nev­er die of AIDS even though you might be infect­ed.

The rea­son for this is in the genet­ic cod­ing of the killer T‑cells, which are part of the body’s immune sys­tem pro­tec­tive shield. These are the cells that are attacked by the HIV retro­virus. The loca­tion of the attack has been dis­cov­ered. It is on the CCR5 gene in the 3rd DNA gene pair. The par­tic­u­lar loca­tion is the Delta 32 RECEPTOR SITE. If either of your DNA pairs (from either your moth­er or your father) is DELTA 32 POSITIVE then the HIV virus can attach itself at that point. If you are DELTA 32 NEGATIVE then HIV just floats around in your blood harm­less­ly for you.

But even though you may be DELTA 32 NEGATIVE at both sites, you can sup­pos­ed­ly still spread the virus. What has been dis­cov­ered is that these 20% of Euro­pean Cau­casians are mem­bers of the Aryan gene pool. Also it has been dis­cov­ered that the far­ther north you go in Europe, say in Nor­way, Fin­land, Swe­den, etc., you find the high­est per­cent­age of peo­ple that are DELTA 32 NEGATIVE at the CCR5 gene allele.

That this would be a sim­ple coin­ci­dence is beyond all human rea­son. To say that HIV sud­den­ly crawled out of the wood­work in Cen­tral Africa by some­one being bit­ten by a green tree mon­key is one thing. But then to say that the only human gene pool on Earth that is immune to HIV is the Aryan Race is a coin­ci­dence that even Howdy Doo­dy wouldn’t buy. . . .

15a. Look­ing ahead to what fig­ures to be a very, very dark future, we feel com­pelled to revis­it some key aspects of the AIDS epi­dem­ic, in light of the alarm­ing pro­lif­er­a­tion of genet­i­cal­ly-mod­i­fied organ­isms. Human­i­ty has failed bad­ly in its approach to the dis­ease, ignor­ing the evi­dence that it was delib­er­ate­ly cre­at­ed.

In FTR #606, we encap­su­lat­ed infor­ma­tion about AIDS col­lat­ed over more than a quar­ter of a cen­tu­ry, dove­tail­ing that with indi­ca­tions that the boil­er-plate research on the dis­ease may track back to the Third Reich and its min­ions hired by the U.S. under Project Paper­clip. We sup­ple­ment­ed this in FTR #682.

In that pro­gram, we made a num­ber of key points that should be revis­it­ed in the con­text of genet­i­cal­ly-mod­i­fied organ­isms and their rapid pro­lif­er­a­tion:

  • The prospect of using genet­ic engi­neer­ing to cre­ate a dis­ease that would be resis­tant to and/or attack the human immune sys­tem was fore­cast in House Appro­pri­a­tions hear­ings for the defense bud­get for fis­cal year 1970: “. . . As long ago as 1962, forty sci­en­tists were employed at the U.S. Army bio­log­i­cal war­fare lab­o­ra­to­ries on full-time genet­ics research. ‘Many oth­ers,’ it was said, ‘appre­ci­ate the impli­ca­tions of genet­ics for their own work.’  The impli­ca­tions were made more spe­cific that genet­ic engi­neer­ing could solve one of the major dis­ad­van­tages of bio­log­i­cal war­fare, that it is lim­ited to dis­eases which occur nat­u­rally some­where in the world. ‘With­in the next 5 to 10 years, it would prob­a­bly be pos­si­ble to make a new infec­tive micro-organ­ism which could dif­fer in cer­tain impor­tant respects from any known dis­ease-caus­ing organ­isms. Most impor­tant of these is that it might be refrac­tory to the immuno­log­i­cal and ther­a­peu­tic process­es upon which we depend to main­tain our rel­a­tive free­dom from infec­tious dis­ease.’ The pos­si­bil­ity that such a ‘super germ’ may have been suc­cess­fully pro­duced in a lab­o­ra­tory some­where in the world in the years since that assess­ment was made is one which should not be too read­ily cast aside. . .”
  • There is a hered­i­tary immu­ni­ty to HIV infec­tion that is present only in the white race and only in pure-bred north­ern Euro­peans (“Aryans”)
  • There is anoth­er hered­i­tary trait that pre­dis­pos­es peo­ple of African extrac­tion to HIV infec­tion.
  • At the end of World War II, the U.S. imple­ment­ed Project Paper­clip, under which Nazi sci­en­tists (many of them war crim­i­nals of the first order) were brought into the coun­try and put to work at the heart of the U.S. defense estab­lish­ment: “Near­ing the end of World War II, the Unit­ed States and the Sovi­et Union raced to recruit Ger­man sci­en­tists for post­war pur­poses. Under a top-secret pro­gram code-named Project PAPERCLIP, the U.S. mil­i­tary pur­sued Nazi sci­en­tific tal­ent ‘like for­bid­den fruit,’ bring­ing them to Amer­ica under employ­ment con­tracts and offer­ing them full U.S. cit­i­zen­ship. The recruits were sup­posed to be nom­i­nal par­tic­i­pants in Nazi activ­i­ties. But the zeal­ous mil­i­tary recruit­ed more than two thou­sand sci­en­tists, many of whom had dark Nazi par­ty pasts. . . .” (Lab 257 by Michael Car­roll; p. 7.)
  • One of the Nazi researchers import­ed into the U.S. was Dr. Erich Traub.  Accord­ing to Michael C. Car­roll, author of Lab 257: The Dis­turb­ing Sto­ry of the Gov­ern­men­t’s Secret Plum Island Germ Lab­o­ra­to­ry, Traub was a key admin­is­tra­tor of the Third Reich’s bio­log­i­cal war­fare research pro­gram and report­ed direct­ly to SS chief Hein­rich Himm­ler. ” . . . . Every­body seemed will­ing to for­get about Erich Traub’s dirty past—that he played a cru­cial role in the Nazis’ ‘Can­cer Research Pro­gram,’ the cov­er name for their bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and that he worked direct­ly under SS Reichs­fuhrer Hein­rich Himm­ler. They seemed will­ing to over­look that Traub in the 1930’s faith­fully attend­ed Camp Sigfried. In fact, the USDA liked him so much, it glossed over his dubi­ous past and offered him the top sci­en­tist job at the new Plum Island Laboratory—not once, but twice. Just months after the 1952 pub­lic hear­ings on select­ing Plum Island, Doc Sha­han dialed Dr. Traub at the naval lab­o­ra­tory to dis­cuss plans for estab­lish­ing the germ lab­o­ra­tory and a posi­tion on Plum Island. . . .” (Lab 257 by Michael Car­roll; p. 10.) NB: Traub was nev­er for­mal­ly induct­ed into the SS, but report­ed direct­ly to Hein­rich Himm­ler. He was Plum Island’s top sci­en­tist, not its founder.
  • The Nazis began research­ing tox­ic agents on apes and then moved on to humans—inmates in con­cen­tra­tion camps. AIDS results from a mon­key virus that even­tu­ally jumped to humans as well. Does the pro­gres­sion in the Nazi death camps of test­ing on apes to test­ing on humans have any rela­tion­ship with the pro­gres­sion of a simi­an virus to infec­tion of humans? Might the cre­ation of AIDS have stemmed from Nazi research? Is it an acci­dent that the hered­i­tary immu­nity from HIV infec­tion is only present in the white race, and [accord­ing to some sources] North­ern Euro­peans in par­tic­u­lar? Is it an acci­dent that peo­ple of African extrac­tion are par­tic­u­larly sus­cep­ti­ble to HIV infec­tion?
  • Dr. Franz Liesau Zac­cha­rias was the Abwehr agent who obtained the apes for the Nazi med­ical exper­i­ments. He was bad­ly want­ed by West­ern intel­li­gence after the warWhy?! West­ern intel­li­gence agen­cies cer­tain­ly did­n’t need any­one to teach them how to obtain apes from Africa. Exper­i­ment­ing on ani­mals is not a war crime. The sus­pi­cion here is that he had dis­cov­ered some­thing of val­ue dur­ing his pri­mate work. Evi­dence also sug­gests that he remained part of The Under­ground Reich.
  • Among the dis­eases that Liesau Zacharias’ ani­mals were used for test­ing was “the plague”! Did the Nazis note that some peo­ple appeared to be immune to infec­tion with plague? Were tis­sue and/or sera sam­ples tak­en and pre­served for fur­ther study? Was this in any way con­nected to the even­tual evo­lu­tion of the CCR5-delta 32 gene as a hered­i­tary pro­tec­tion against infec­tion by HIV? Is it pos­si­ble that Liesau Zacharias was actu­ally tar­geted for recruit­ment by the U.S. for Project Paper­clip? Did Liesau Zacharias expe­ri­ence an out­break of immun­od­e­fi­ciency among his pri­mates await­ing ship­ment to Ger­many? Might such an out­break have been due to SIV? Did Liesau Zacharias take tis­sue and sera sam­ples from infect­ed pri­mates? Might such a devel­op­ment have been relat­ed to his impor­tance to the Allies?
  • Kaiser Per­ma­nente has dis­cussed the dan­gers of GMO’s in a newslet­ter, link­ing them to “dev­as­tat­ing” threats to human health.
  • We should not fail to rec­og­nize the dan­ger of using GMO’s in food, water, med­i­cine or oth­er “vec­tors” to achieve the goals of Nazi geno­cide.
  • In FTR #305, we dis­cussed the absorp­tion of Beck­er GMBH into ConA­gra foods, a major play­er in the food indus­try. Beck­er was begun by an SS offi­cer with funds from Holo­caust vic­tims. How many oth­er major food firms are Under­ground Reich prop­er­ties? Might they slow­ly destroy their “racial ene­mies” by using food as a vec­tor for “pro-Aryan” GMO’s?
  • In that con­text, we are very sus­pi­cious of Jorge Paulo Lemann and 3G Cap­i­tal, a major play­er in the food and brew­ing indus­tries. They own Anheuser-Busch (the largest Amer­i­can brew­er), Heinz foods, the com­pa­ny that sup­plies McDon­ald’s, Burg­er King and many oth­er firms. Lemann is a Brazil­ian-born, Swiss-based “self-made man.” His  pro­file and that of his busi­ness inter­ests fit the pro­file of a Bor­mann firm to a tee. Keep on eye on this.
  •  Leman­n’s “new” Anheuser-Busch is fac­ing class-action lit­i­ga­tion for water­ing its beer! What else are they doing to the food and bev­er­ages that they man­u­fac­ture?
  • In time, as well, the health crises that will stem from the indis­crim­i­nate use of GMO’s, lax envi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tion become man­i­fest, the increase in health care costs will place addi­tion­al (per­haps cat­a­stroph­ic) strain on the U.S. bud­get. The calls for aus­ter­i­ty will sure­ly mul­ti­ply and become more shrill in this event.

 “Top US Health­care Giant: GMOs Are Dev­as­tat­ing Health” by Antho­ny Guc­cia­r­di [Nat­u­ral­So­ci­ety]; Read­er Sup­port­ed News; 11/28/2012.

Just days after a lead­ing genet­i­cal­ly mod­i­fied organ­ism (GMO) researcher spoke out against GMOs and how many pro-GMO ‘sci­en­tists’ are in bed with Mon­san­to or car­ry their own GMO patents, the largest man­aged health­care provider in the Unit­ed States is now pub­licly speak­ing out against GMOs. In a recent newslet­ter, the Kaiser Per­ma­nente com­pa­ny dis­cussed the numer­ous dan­gers of GMOs in a recent newslet­ter and how to avoid them.

Explain­ing how GM ingre­di­ents have been linked to tumors and organ dam­age in rats in the only life­long rat study avail­able, the newslet­ter high­light­ed how the only real long- term research indi­cates that GMOs are a seri­ous health dan­ger. The newslet­ter, which you can view here, states:

“Despite what the biotech indus­try might say, there is lit­tle research on the long-term effects of GMOs on human health. Inde­pen­dent research has found sev­er­al vari­eties of GMO corn caused organ dam­age in rats. Oth­er stud­ies have found that GMOs may lead to an inabil­i­ty in ani­mals to repro­duce.” . . . .

15b. An overview of Jorge Paulo Leman­n’s busi­ness under­tak­ings, not­ing as we go his Ger­man­ic last name and the pro­found Bor­mann pres­ence in Latin Amer­i­ca and Switzer­land (Leman­n’s place of res­i­dence):

“Jorge Paulo Lemann”; Forbes; 5/27/2016.

Jorge Paulo Lemann is Brazil’s rich­est man thanks to his stake in Anheuser-Busch InBev, the world’s largest brew­er, which he owns through pri­vate equi­ty firm 3G Cap­i­tal togeth­er with fel­low bil­lion­aires and long­time part­ners Car­los Sicu­pi­ra and Mar­cel Her­rmann Telles [a nice Iber­ian name, no?–D.E.]. The trio also has stakes in Restau­rant Brands Inter­na­tion­al, which owns Burg­er King and Tim Hor­tons and is list­ed both the New York and Toron­to stock exchanges. In 2013 Leman­n’s pri­vate equi­ty firm bought H.J. Heinz & Com­pa­ny for $23 bil­lion togeth­er with War­ren Buf­fet­t’s Berk­shire Hath­away. It was 3G Cap­i­tal’s sec­ond acqui­si­tion of an Amer­i­can name brand. In 2010, 3G Cap­i­tal bought Burg­er King in a lever­aged buy­out.

 

Discussion

6 comments for “FTR #912 Food for Thought”

  1. The Aids virurs reser­achers who were devel­op­ing a vac­cine for AIDS were killed on MH17. Such a dis­cov­ery finan­cial­ly hurt phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal com­pa­nies that make drugs cock­tails and antibi­otics, etc., used to treat HIV and dis­eases of its vic­tims such as the pneu­mo­nia.

    AIDS treat­ments cost the US a for­tune in hos­pi­tal­iza­tions, med­ical treat­ments, and phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal drugs.

    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-crash-joep-lange-among-up-to-100-aids-researchers-and-activists-on-board-flight-9613821.html

    Malaysia Air­lines flight MH17 crash: Was the cure for Aids lost along with Joep Lange and 100 top researchers?
    By Lizzie Dear­den @lizziedearden
    Inde­pen­dent UK Fri­day 18 July 2014

    There are fears the cure for Aids could have been lost with 100 of the “best and bright­est” sci­en­tists and researchers on board Malaysia Air­lines flight MH17.

    Joep Lange, a world-renowned researcher and for­mer pres­i­dent of the Inter­na­tion­al Aids Soci­ety, was with the group head­ing to the glob­al Aids 2014 con­fer­ence in Mel­bourne, Aus­tralia.

    The exact num­ber of sci­en­tists he was trav­el­ling with has not been con­firmed but del­e­gates in Syd­ney were told that emails indict­ed around 100 atten­dees were on the ill-fat­ed plane.

    Nine British pas­sen­gers, includ­ing a stu­dent, for­mer BBC jour­nal­ist and two New­cas­tle Unit­ed fans, were among the 298 peo­ple killed when the Boe­ing 777–200 was report­ed­ly shot down as it passed over the war-torn coun­try on Thurs­day.

    Trevor Strat­ton, a Cana­di­an HIV researcher attend­ing the con­fer­ence told ABC researchers had been get­ting close to a vac­cine against Aids.

    “What if the cure for AIDS was on that plane? Real­ly? We don’t know,” he said. “There were some real­ly promi­nent researchers that have been doing this for a very long time and we’re get­ting close to vac­cines and peo­ple are talk­ing about cures and the end of AIDS. “And you can’t help but won­der what kind of exper­tise was on that plane.” Pro­fes­sor Richard Boyd, direc­tor of the Monash Immunol­o­gy and Stem Cell Lab­o­ra­to­ries, told Guardian Aus­tralia there were “some seri­ous HIV lead­ers” on board.

    “This will have ram­i­fi­ca­tions glob­al­ly because when­ev­er you lose a leader in any field, it has an impact. That knowl­edge is irre­place­able,” he said. “We’ve lost glob­al lead­ers and also some bright young peo­ple who were com­ing through. It’s a gut-wrench­ing loss. I was involved in the after­math of 9/11 in New York and it brings back that lev­el of cat­a­stro­phe.”

    Clive Aspin, a HIV researcher in Aus­tralia ahead of the Aids con­fer­ence said there was a “huge feel­ing of sad­ness” among del­e­gates, with peo­ple cry­ing in cor­ri­dors. He added: “These peo­ple were the best and the bright­est, the ones who had ded­i­cat­ed their whole careers to fight­ing this ter­ri­ble virus.”

    News of Mr Lange’s death sent rip­ples through the Aids com­mu­ni­ty, who paid trib­ute to a “giant” in the field who made invalu­able advances in afford­able treat­ment for suf­fer­ers in Asia and Africa.
    Sci­en­tists at the Kir­by Insti­tute at the Uni­ver­si­ty of New South Wales (UNSW) in Aus­tralia said Mr Lange was trav­el­ling with his wife, Jacque­line. Direc­tor of the insti­tute, Pro­fes­sor David Coop­er, said his friend had an “absolute com­mit­ment” to HIV treat­ment and care in Asia and Africa. He added: “The joy in col­lab­o­rat­ing with Joep was that he would always bring a fresh view, a unique take on things, and he nev­er accept­ed that some­thing was impos­si­ble to achieve. Our joint work in Bangkok, the HIVNAT cen­tre, will stand as his lega­cy.”

    Pro­fes­sors Coop­er had worked with Mr Lange on HIV treat­ment for decades and con­cen­trat­ed on “resource-poor” areas from the mid-1990s, attempt­ing to pre­vent the dis­ease tak­ing hold in Asia the way it had in Africa. In 1996 they estab­lished a research cen­tre in Bangkok called HIV-NAT with a Thai col­league.

    Accord­ing to UNSW, Mr Lange had worked in Aids research and treat­ment since 1983 and made “ground-break­ing” con­tri­bu­tions to the devel­op­ment of afford­able treat­ments. He also played a pio­neer­ing role in explor­ing afford­able and sim­ple anti­retro­vi­ral drug reg­i­mens for the pre­ven­tion of moth­er-to-child trans­mis­sion.

    At the time of his death, Pro­fes­sor Lange was Pro­fes­sor of Med­i­cine at the Aca­d­e­m­ic Med­ical Cen­ter, Uni­ver­si­ty of Ams­ter­dam and Senior Sci­en­tif­ic Advi­sor to the Inter­na­tion­al Antivi­ral Ther­a­py Eval­u­a­tion Cen­tre, Ams­ter­dam. He was co-direc­tor of the HIV Nether­lands Aus­tralia Research Col­lab­o­ra­tion (HIV-NAT) and a for­mer pres­i­dent of Inter­na­tion­al AIDS Soci­ety.

    The group expressed its “sin­cere sad­ness” at news of the deaths of col­leagues and friends on MH17, con­firm­ing they were on route to attend the 20th Inter­na­tion­al AIDS Con­fer­ence start­ing in Mel­bourne on Sun­day. “At this incred­i­bly sad and sen­si­tive time the IAS stands with our inter­na­tion­al fam­i­ly and sends con­do­lences to the loved ones of those who have been lost to this tragedy,” a state­ment said.
    “The IAS has also heard reports that among the pas­sen­gers was a for­mer IAS Pres­i­dent Joep Lange and if that is the case then the HIV/AIDS move­ment has tru­ly lost a giant.”

    In 2001, he found­ed and chaired the Phar­mA­c­cess Foun­da­tion, a not-for-prof­it organ­i­sa­tion based in Ams­ter­dam, designed to improve access to ther­a­py in devel­op­ing coun­tries and was a found­ing edi­tor of the aca­d­e­m­ic jour­nal, Antivi­ral Ther­a­py.

    Glenn Thomas, a British media rela­tions co-ordi­na­tor for the World Health Organ­i­sa­tion, was also part of the del­e­ga­tion, accord­ing to WHO offi­cials. The 49-year-old was a for­mer BBC jour­nal­ist from Black­pool and had recent­ly cel­e­brat­ed his birth­day, accord­ing to The Times.

    Nine Britons, 154 Dutch, 27 Aus­tralians, 38 Malaysians, 23 US cit­i­zens and 80 chil­dren were among those on board Boe­ing 777–200 from Ams­ter­dam to Kuala Lumpur.

    None of the 298 and crew sur­vived the crash, near the town of Grabo­vo in east­ern Ukraine, which has seen fierce fight­ing between sep­a­ratist mili­tias and gov­ern­ment troops.

    Both pro-Russ­ian rebels and the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment denied shoot­ing the air­craft down after US author­i­ties said intel­li­gence analy­sis showed it had been hit by a sur­face-to-air mis­sile.

    Posted by Chem | July 1, 2016, 6:04 pm
  2. 2009 New Eng­land Jour­nal of Med­i­cine Arti­cle on CCR5 Delta 32/Delta 32 Gene Ther­a­py for long term con­trol of HIV‑1

    http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa0802905#t=article

    Pret­ty much the same info Dave cov­ered in the pro­gram in the Gulf Coast News Today arti­cle but from the high­ly respect­ed med­ical jour­nal rather than the pop­u­lar press. Which is a very good sign the info is legit­i­mate and not made up.

    Posted by GK | July 2, 2016, 7:04 pm
  3. Bay­er (a for­mer divi­sion of IG Far­ben) is try­ing to buy Mon­san­to with CASH that few com­pa­nies have the mon­ey to finance. Bay­er wants to become dom­i­nant in the farm sup­plies indus­try, com­bin­ing its crop sci­ence busi­ness with Mon­san­to’s strength in seeds in a form of ver­ti­cal inte­gra­tion. This is part of an old Nazi strat­e­gy to devel­op dom­i­nant car­tels on the world stage with the Under­ground Reich com­pa­nies.

    http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN11B2G9

    Reuters Tue Sep 6, 2016 | 10:09 AM EDT
    Bay­er sweet­ens Mon­san­to bid as talks enter final stretch

    By Lud­wig Burg­er, Arno Schuet­ze and Greg Roume­li­o­tis | FRANKFURT/NEW YORK

    (Reuters) — Ger­man phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal and crop chem­i­cals man­u­fac­tur­er Bay­er AG says talks with Mon­san­to Co have advanced and it is now will­ing to offer more than $65 bil­lion, a 2 per­cent increase on its pre­vi­ous offer for the world’s largest seeds com­pa­ny.

    “Both sides are grad­u­al­ly near­ing con­sen­sus,” one per­son famil­iar with the mat­ter said.

    Mon­san­to has also agreed to open its books for Bay­er to con­duct due dili­gence checks on the com­pa­ny’s busi­ness, two sources close to the mat­ter said.

    Bay­er’s pre­vi­ous offer was already the largest all-cash takeover bid on record with a deal with Mon­san­to aimed at giv­ing the Ger­man com­pa­ny a shot at grab­bing the top spot in the fast-con­sol­i­dat­ing farm sup­plies indus­try, com­bin­ing its crop sci­ence busi­ness with Mon­san­to’s strength in seeds.

    Bay­er now says it is pre­pared to offer $127.50 per share in a nego­ti­at­ed deal, up from its pre­vi­ous offer of $125 per share.

    But Ger­man dai­ly news­pa­per Rheinis­che Post also report­ed late on Mon­day that an offer of $130 per share may be nec­es­sary to get a deal with Mon­san­to “in a swift and friend­ly way.”

    Bay­er was still con­sid­er­ing all options regard­ing Mon­san­to, includ­ing strik­ing a friend­ly deal, mak­ing a hos­tile bid or pulling its offer, a per­son famil­iar with the mat­ter told Reuters.

    Bay­er’s shares were down 0.25 per­cent at 94 euros by 0934 GMT on Tues­day. Mon­san­to’s shares last trad­ed at $107.44 and ana­lysts at bro­ker­age Equinet said Bay­er has now effec­tive­ly capped its Mon­san­to bid.

    “We infer from Bay­er’s state­ment that fail­ure to agree a deal at $127.50/share could imply a risk to Mon­san­to share­hold­ers of either a hos­tile bid at a less­er con­sid­er­a­tion, or no deal at all,” they said in a note.

    Ana­lysts from Baad­er Helvea dis­agreed. “We still expect a bid per share in the $130–135 range before Mon­san­to comes to the table. As such, we con­tin­ue see the Bay­er shares remain­ing under pres­sure as the nego­ti­a­tions con­tin­ue,” they said in a note.

    In a brief state­ment, Mon­san­to said on Mon­day it had been engaged in “con­struc­tive” nego­ti­a­tions with Bay­er, dur­ing which it received the updat­ed non-bind­ing pro­pos­al of $127.50 per share in cash.

    The Saint Louis-based com­pa­ny added that it was con­tin­u­ing these con­ver­sa­tions as it eval­u­at­ed Bay­er’s offer, as well as pro­pos­als from oth­er par­ties it did not name. It cau­tioned that there was no cer­tain­ty that any deal would occur.

    Some Bay­er share­hold­ers, how­ev­er, con­tin­ue to crit­i­cize the pro­posed merg­er, say­ing it would increase Bay­er’s expo­sure to agri­cul­ture at the expense of its phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal busi­ness.

    “We knew that Bay­er would have to bid high­er and this offer is prob­a­bly get­ting clos­er to suc­ceed­ing, but it does­n’t change our view that it presents sig­nif­i­cant risks to share­hold­ers,” said Greg Her­bert, co-man­ag­er of the Jupiter Glob­al Equi­ty Income Fund.

    “The com­pa­ny will be left with a high­ly geared bal­ance sheet and the man­age­ment effort to inte­grate the two busi­ness­es could eas­i­ly lead to the larg­er phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal busi­ness being neglect­ed.”

    John Ben­nett of fund man­ag­er Hen­der­son said that he opposed the revised offer.

    “Bay­er have backed them­selves into a cor­ner,” he said in emailed com­ments. “The mon­ey would have been bet­ter spent buy­ing their own stock. Alas, for share­hold­ers, it was not to be.”

    Posted by Anonymous | September 6, 2016, 6:12 pm
  4. A Bor­mann com­pa­ny spon­sor­ing Han­ni­ty?

    Would­n’t be much of a sur­prise.

    A trust­ed asso­ciate not­ed an inter­est­ing and sig­nif­i­cant sub­text the burn­ing of Keurig cof­fee mak­ers (the man­u­fac­tur­er) in response to Keurig pulling sup­port from Han­ni­ty in response to his defense of Roy Moore.

    “Sean Han­ni­ty’s fans have been in the news recent­ly for smash­ing their Keurig cof­fee mak­ers, in protest of Keurig pulling ad dol­lars from Han­ni­ty’s show due to Han­ni­ty’s defense of Roy Moore. (NOTE: I thought it odd that Trump sup­port­ed Moore’s oppo­nent in the Alaba­ma pri­ma­ry, despite being more polit­i­cal­ly sim­i­lar to Moore… did Trump get a tipoff that this scan­dal was com­ing?) Good old-fash­ioned Repub­li­can fam­i­ly val­ues in action! How­ev­er, it got me think­ing... what was Keurig doing sup­port­ing Han­ni­ty in the first place?

    While the Ger­man­ic name Keurig caught my eye, it is not ulti­mate­ly rel­e­vant, nor are the founders, at least that I could find. How­ev­er, the CURRENT own­ers, J.A.B Hold­ings and it’s asso­ci­at­ed Reimann fam­i­ly, are very Ger­man and very rel­e­vant, in my opin­ion.

    -They are owned by a secre­tive group of Ger­man bil­lion­aires, most­ly relat­ed to each oth­er. This group owns (out­right or major­i­ty) a rather shock­ing num­ber of major Amer­i­can brands, includ­ing Peets Cof­fee, Pan­era Bread, Jim­my Choo Shoes, Doug­we Eberts Cof­fee, and Krispy Kreme Donuts! They also own part of 3G, the mas­sive Brazil­ian hold­ing com­pa­ny (with one of the three heads hav­ing the last name Lemann, and the oth­er hav­ing Her­mann as a mid­dle name). [This is a focal point of FTR #912–D.E.]

    -3G owns Inbev (dom­i­nant play­er in the world’s liquor indus­try), Heinz, Kraft, and Burg­er King, who they quick­ly moved to Cana­da and merged with Tim Hor­tons, a mas­sive Cana­di­an restau­rant chain, for tax breaks. They also own the largest logistics/railroad com­pa­ny in South Amer­i­ca and its largest retail shop­ping com­pa­ny. So, between their inter­ests in JAB and 3G, this one fam­i­ly has their ten­ta­cles into a ridicu­lous amount of com­merce.

    -Like all good Ger­man cor­po­rate cit­i­zens, they make their head­quar­ters in Lux­em­bourg.

    -All mem­bers of the Reimann fam­i­ly sign an oath at 18 that they will keep a low pro­file and keep them­selves out of the news. I found that inter­est­ing…

    -They also own 10% of a British chem­i­cal com­pa­ny that was once Ger­man and cor­ner­stone of their fam­i­ly for­tune, which began in the ear­ly 1800s. That com­pa­ny has some inter­est­ing sto­ries as well…

    I’ll cut to the chase… is this Bor­mann mon­ey “gulp­ing up com­pa­nies like a giant amoe­ba?”

    https://www.ft.com/content/242db7ea-d1a8-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377

    …Late last year, a group called JAB Hold­ing splashed out $13.9bn to add Keurig Green Moun­tain, the biggest group in the US sin­gle-serve cof­fee mar­ket, to its grow­ing list of cof­fee invest­ments.
    The deal capped a three-year, $30bn acqui­si­tion spree, dur­ing which JAB bought up groups rang­ing from instant cof­fee spe­cial­ists in Europe to hip­ster cof­fee chains in the US and prompt­ed sug­ges­tions that a chal­lenger to Nestlé’s dom­i­nant Nespres­so brand could be emerg­ing.
    At the same time, the deal sparked anoth­er round of inter­est in the prin­ci­pal own­ers of JAB Hold­ing: four mem­bers of Germany’s intense­ly pri­vate and immense­ly wealthy Reimann fam­i­ly: Wolf­gang, Ste­fan, Renate and Matthias.
    Keurig Green Moun­tain cof­fee packs, which form part of JAB’s grow­ing list of cof­fee invest­ments © Bloomberg

    Through JAB, the fam­i­ly owns stakes in some of the world’s best-known brands. As well as its invest­ments in the cof­fee sec­tor, JAB’s bur­geon­ing port­fo­lio encom­pass­es a 8 per cent stake in Reckitt Benckiser, the con­sumer goods con­glom­er­ate, and a 77.4 per cent stake in the US fra­grance group Coty, which owns the Calvin Klein and David Beck­ham per­fume brands. On top of this, the hold­ing com­pa­ny also con­trols lux­u­ry mar­ques Jim­my Choo, Bal­ly and Bel­staff.
    Last year, Forbes put the com­bined wealth of JAB’s four prin­ci­pal own­ers at $16bn, which would make the clan one of Europe’s wealth­i­est busi­ness dynas­ties. Rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the fam­i­ly and JAB declined to com­ment for this arti­cle.

    The Reimanns’ march to indus­tri­al promi­nence began in the ear­ly years of the 19th cen­tu­ry. In 1823, Johann Adam Benckiser, whose ini­tials are enshrined in JAB’s name, bought a chem­i­cals busi­ness in Pforzheim, a small town in the south-west­ern Ger­man province of Baden-Würt­tem­berg.

    A few years lat­er, Lud­wig Reimann, the great-great-grand­fa­ther of the Reimanns who now own JAB, joined the com­pa­ny and mar­ried Benckiser’s daugh­ter. After Benckiser’s death, Reimann took over the com­pa­ny, which had by now moved some 100km north to Lud­wigshafen, paving the way for his descen­dants to etch the family’s name into the annals of Ger­man indus­try.

    The last of the Reimanns to active­ly be involved in the day-to-day run­ning of Benckiser was Albert junior, Ludwig’s great-grand­son, who inher­it­ed the com­pa­ny in 1952 and pushed it in the direc­tion of con­sumer goods. He died in 1984, leav­ing equal stakes to his nine adopt­ed chil­dren.
    Although all nine of Albert’s chil­dren had ini­tial­ly kept the 11.1 per cent stakes they inher­it­ed, by 2003, Wolf­gang and Renate (who are sib­lings) and Matthias and Ste­fan (who are broth­ers) had bought out the oth­er five.

    In 1997, the fam­i­ly took Benckiser pub­lic and two years lat­er engi­neered a merg­er with the British con­sumer goods group, Reckitt and Col­man, to form Reckitt Benckiser.
    The fam­i­ly mem­bers who sold out of the busi­ness then fol­lowed a well-trod­den path by rely­ing on a fam­i­ly office to man­age their wealth. Sub­se­quent­ly they found­ed Deutsche Kon­tor Pri­vat­bank, a pri­vate bank based in Munich, to offer wealth man­age­ment ser­vices to oth­er non-fam­i­ly mem­bers.

    Those who kept their stakes have put their for­tune in the hands of a small group of trust­ed advis­ers who run JAB — cur­rent­ly Peter Harf, Bart Becht and Olivi­er Goudet. Harf start­ed at Benckiser in 1981, while Becht joined in 1988. Goudet, a for­mer Mars exec­u­tive, joined in 2012. The fam­i­ly mem­bers play no role in the oper­a­tive busi­ness­es. The trio of man­agers make sug­ges­tions to the fam­i­ly mem­bers on pos­si­ble invest­ments, which they then dis­cuss, but that the fam­i­ly has the ulti­mate say.

    The set-up has prompt­ed com­par­isons with 3G, a pri­vate equi­ty group run by three Brazil­ian tycoons, that has been buy­ing up brands in the con­sumer goods sec­tor. How­ev­er the dif­fer­ence, accord­ing to Pablo Zuanic, an ana­lyst at Susque­han­na, is that at 3G the man­agers also pro­vide the cash. “At JAB, the Reimann fam­i­ly pro­vides the cap­i­tal, but the dri­ving force behind the day-to-day strat­e­gy is the three man­agers,” he says.

    NOTE: For some rea­son, the FT does not men­tion that this fam­i­ly owns sig­nif­i­cant shares in 3G as well!
    (con­tin­u­ing)

    The Reimann’s newest asset, Keurig, co-oper­ates with a num­ber of third-par­ty brands, whose cof­fee it sells along with its cof­fee-dis­pens­ing machines. This means it is poten­tial­ly vul­ner­a­ble to some of those brands walk­ing away. The best way to deal with this, says Zuanic, would be for the fam­i­ly vehi­cle to buy up more brands of its own. “JAB has to have big­ger plans in cof­fee for this deal to make sense,” he says.

    NOTE: In a nut­shell, they want a con­glom­er­ate to com­pete with Star­bucks (Jew­ish-owned, FYI) on the “way Amer­i­cans start their day with a good cup of old Joe”. That is my guess. Own the cof­fee, own the cof­fee mak­ers, own the cof­fee and donut shops.

    https://qz.com/207122/meet-the-family-behind-the-worlds-biggest-new-coffee-company/

    JAB is most­ly owned by four very pri­vate sib­lings, Renate Reimann-Haas, Wolf­gang Reimann, Ste­fan Reimann-Ander­sen, and Matthias Reimann-Ander­sen.

    The family’s wealth dates back to the Ger­man chem­i­cal com­pa­ny Benckiser, which was start­ed in 1823. It moved into con­sumer goods in the 50s. The fam­i­ly took the com­pa­ny pub­lic in 1997, and merged with the British con­sumer goods com­pa­ny Reckitt and Col­man two years lat­er. The fam­i­ly still owns around 10% of what’s now Reckitt-Benckiser, which owns brands rang­ing from Durex to Lysol to Strep­sils.
    Albert Reimann inher­it­ed the whole com­pa­ny in 1952 and left 11.1% to each of his nine adopt­ed chil­dren. The four con­trol­ling Reimanns bought out con­trol from their oth­er sib­lings.

    ... In addi­tion to the new cof­fee behe­moth, the fam­i­ly owns a sub­stan­tial lux­u­ry port­fo­lio which includes brands such as the high-end shoe brand Jim­my Choo, the per­fume mak­er Coty, and the Swiss shoe­mak­er Bal­ly. Before its $9.8‑billion pur­chase of D.E. Mas­ter Blenders, the com­pa­ny spent a com­bined $1.3 bil­lion on the retail cof­fee chains Cari­bou Cof­fee and Peet’s, though the busi­ness­es are run sep­a­rate­ly.

    NOTE: More data on the Cof­fee Coup… also note how JAB is com­pared to 3G, yet it is not men­tioned how JAB and 3G often part­ner togeth­er!

    http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/billionaire-reimann-family-adding-krispy-kreme-to-its-empire-in/article_6a14de24-9413–58f2-8aac-81701e6bceee.html\

    The Reimann fam­i­ly, one of Europe’s wealth­i­est busi­ness dynas­ties, has the cof­fee. Now, it wants the dough­nuts.
    After build­ing a cof­fee empire rang­ing from hip­ster Stump­town Cof­fee Roast­ers to sin­gle-serve main­stay Keurig, the Reimanns’ JAB Hold­ing invest­ment com­pa­ny wants its grow­ing sta­ble of con­sumer brands to add some high-calo­rie oomph: Krispy Kreme Dough­nuts Inc.
    The $1.35 bil­lion deal, announced Mon­day, puts the intense­ly pri­vate Reimann clan — Wolf­gang, Ste­fan, Renate and Matthias — on a poten­tial col­li­sion course with Krispy Kre­me’s rival of the moment, the mighty Star­bucks Corp.

    It also trains a spot­light on JAB, whose stew­ard­ship of the Reimann for­tune has drawn com­par­isons to 3G Cap­i­tal, the Brazil­ian pri­vate equi­ty giant run by the bil­lion­aire Jorge Paulo Lemann. JAB, run by a trio of trust­ed Reimann advis­ers, is com­ing off a four-year acqui­si­tion spree in which it spent about $30 bil­lion tak­ing con­trol­ling stakes in Jacobs Douwe Egberts, Peet’s Cof­fee & Tea, Cari­bou Cof­fee, Ein­stein Noah Restau­rant Group, Espres­so House and Bares­so Cof­fee.

    “They’ve been slow­ly amass­ing a pret­ty big umbrel­la of break­fast- and cof­fee-ori­ent­ed brands, and so Krispy Kreme slides under­neath that umbrel­la pret­ty eas­i­ly,” said Will Slabaugh, an ana­lyst at Stephens Inc.

    …The four Reimanns each have a net worth of $3.3 bil­lion, accord­ing to the Bloomberg Bil­lion­aires Index. A fifth sib­ling, Andrea Reimann-Cia­rdel­li, sold her stake in JAB in 2003 and has a $1.2 bil­lion net worth. Seek­ing a favor­able tax envi­ron­ment for the Reimanns, Harf moved their fam­i­ly offices to Vien­na from Lud­wigshafen, Ger­many, in 2006. The fam­i­ly trad­ed their Ger­man pass­ports for Aus­tri­an ones.

    For now, cof­fee is a small part of Krispy Kre­me’s busi­ness. Almost 90 per­cent of its rev­enue came from dough­nuts last year. Com­pare that with Dunkin’ Donuts, which gets most of its sales from cof­fee. Dunkin’ too has been cit­ed as a pos­si­ble JAB takeover tar­get, though the firm may take its time before mak­ing such a deal, Slabaugh said.

    “They prob­a­bly want to swal­low an acqui­si­tion like this for a while before look­ing at some­thing like Dunkin’,” he said.

    NOTE: More bio­graph­i­cal infor­ma­tion on the Reimann fam­i­ly.

    https://www.forbes.com/sites/maxjedeurpalmgren/2015/12/07/the-secretive-billionaire-family-behind-the-13–9‑billion-keurig-green-mountain-deal/#2cadbd953b51

    Just as they wish it to be, you have prob­a­bly have nev­er heard of the Reimann fam­i­ly. Chances are how­ev­er that you have come across the prod­ucts of their empire mul­ti­ple times a day; maybe it was a pair of Jim­my Choo shoes, Durex con­doms, Peet’s cof­fee, a Mon­delez snack or Calvin Klein fra­grances. On Mon­day, the fam­i­ly’s con­glom­er­at­ed announced it will pay $13.9 bil­lion in cash to add yet anoth­er well-known prod­uct to its port­fo­lio, Keurig Green Moun­tain, mak­er of home and office cof­fee brew­ing sys­tems. The offer was a 78% pre­mi­um to where it had trad­ed on Fri­day, and the news sent the stock soar­ing. (The com­pa­ny’s founder, Bob Stiller, saw his for­tune jump near­ly $300 mil­lion today but he is still worth well less than he was at the stock­’s peak).

    The sib­lings are dece­dents of Ger­man chemist Lud­wig Reimann, who in 1828 joined Johann Adam Benckiser, and his name­sake com­pa­ny in Lud­wigshafen, Ger­many. By mar­ry­ing one of Benckiser’s daugh­ters, Reimann end­ed up inher­it­ing the entire com­pa­ny. His great-grand­son Albert Reimann took the reins in 1952, and decid­ed to steer the com­pa­ny in a new direc­tion, adding con­sumer goods to its busi­ness. When he died in 1984, his nine adopt­ed chil­dren, none of whom had ever worked for the busi­ness or had any role in its oper­a­tions, each inher­it­ed 11.1% of John A. Benckiser (JAB S.e.r.l.).

    The lack of involve­ment is alleged­ly part of the fam­i­ly pol­i­cy, which also includes sign­ing a codex on one’s 18th birth­day pledg­ing to stay out of the pub­lic as much as pos­si­ble, thus mak­ing them one of the most pri­vate bil­lion­aire fam­i­lies.

    Five of the orig­i­nal nine sib­lings have divest­ed from JAB, sell­ing their stakes to the remain­ing four. Wolf­gang, Matthias, Ste­fan and Renate togeth­er now own 95% of the com­pa­ny, which they hold through fam­i­ly offices based in Vien­na. Andrea Reimann-Ciadel­li, now an Amer­i­can cit­i­zen liv­ing in New Hamp­shire, sold her stake in 2003 for close to $1 bil­lion and is the low­est rank­ing fam­i­ly mem­ber one the Forbes Bil­lion­aires List. The oth­er sell­ers are believed to have been bought out in the late 90’s to unknown, but prob­a­bly low­er, amounts.
    …The explic­it aim of the lat­est deal accord­ing to the press releas­es was to cre­ate the world’s largest pure-play cof­fee com­pa­ny. With the Keur­ing Green Moun­tain Deal announced on Mon­day, JAB will have suc­ceed­ed in doing just that, and will pass Nestlé in terms of glob­al annu­al rev­enue for cof­fee. Be as secre­tive as you may, it’s hard to escape the head­lines if you are mak­ing deals to take over an indus­try.

    NOTE: This arti­cle dis­cuss­es JAB and 3G com­pet­ing for Pan­era, but takes the time to point out that this unusu­al and that they usu­al­ly move in tan­dem. Also, note that the CEO of JAB is chair of 3G-owned Inbev! Very cozy… also, note that War­ren Buf­fett is rou­tine­ly involved with both. Few things tes­ti­fy to the moral and intel­lec­tu­al bank­rupt­cy of Amer­i­can lib­er­al­ism than its fan­dom for Buf­fett. Yeah, he occa­sion­al­ly takes a swipe at Trump or the Bush­es, but that doesn’t mean he is “the Good Bil­lion­aire”. He has always been dirty as fuck…

    https://nypost.com/2017/04/10/buffett-backed-firm-interested-in-bid-for-panera-bread-sources/

    If 3G moves to top JAB’s $7.5 bil­lion offer for Pan­era, it would put two of the world’s largest PE firms in direct com­pe­ti­tion for what is like­ly the first time.
    JAB and 3G have been seen as allies. For exam­ple, Olivi­er Goudet, JAB’s chief exec­u­tive, is chair of 3G’s Anheuser-Busch InBev.
    The two firms have also invest­ed in each other’s deals, sources close to the firms said.
    “The idea of them being in com­bat with each oth­er is real­ly unusu­al,” a source who’s an invest­ment banker said.
    “Giv­en that they invest in each other’s deals, it would be like going to war with your neigh­bor,” the banker said.
    JAB, the invest­ment vehi­cle for the reclu­sive bil­lion­aire Reimann fam­i­ly, of Ger­many, signed a $315-a-share cash merg­er agree­ment with Pan­era last week. Pan­era shares closed Mon­day at $313.30.

    It was an exclu­sive sales process where­by Pan­era did not shop itself to oth­er suit­ors, an invest­ment banker said.
    Both JAB and 3G are on a glob­al buy­ing spree. They have a sim­i­lar strat­e­gy of invest­ing in a space and expand­ing their busi­ness­es via acqui­si­tion.

    NOTE: This arti­cle con­firms the JAB invest­ment in 3G.

    http://www.vcpost.com/articles/92480/20150917/brazilian-pe-firm-3g-capital-eyes-sab-miller.htm

    Though 3G Cap­i­tal is a PE firm, it does­n’t raise mon­ey in the nor­mal way as most of the pri­vate equi­ty firms do. It prefers to get huge lots of mon­ey from the wealth­i­est fam­i­lies in the world. Lemann and his asso­ciates Car­los Alber­to, Sicu­pi­ra and Mar­cel have pooled up big lots of mon­ey from over three dozen super rich indi­vid­u­als and the most wealth­i­est fam­i­lies in the world.
    The world’s well-known fund man­ag­er William Ack­man also recent­ly invest­ed in 3G Cap­i­tal. Oth­er major investors include Colom­bi­a’s San­to Domin­go fam­i­ly, ten­nis play­er Roger Fed­er­er from Switzer­land and JAB Hold­ings, which han­dles Ger­many’s Reimann fam­i­ly assets.

    NOTE: These last two arti­cles are about Reckitt Benckiser, the British chem­i­cal com­pa­ny that is 10% owned by the Reimanns and is essen­tial­ly the com­pa­ny that birthed their empire. “Benckiser” is the “B” in “JAB Hold­ings”. They were tagged by Amnesty Inter­na­tion­al for sourc­ing its palm oil from exploiters of child labor.

    https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/30/kelloggs-unilever-nestle-child-labour-palm-oil-wilmar-amnesty

    … lob­al firms behind pop­u­lar brands such as Kit Kat, Col­gate tooth­paste and Dove cos­met­ics use palm oil pro­duced by child work­ers in dan­ger­ous con­di­tions, Amnesty Inter­na­tion­al has claimed.
    The human rights organ­i­sa­tion traced a range of well-known prod­ucts back to the palm oil com­pa­ny Wilmar, which it alleged employs chil­dren to do back-break­ing phys­i­cal labour on refiner­ies in Indone­sia.
    Sin­ga­pore-based Wilmar counts multi­na­tion­al com­pa­nies includ­ing Kellogg’s, Unilever, Col­gate-Pal­mo­live, Reckitt Benckiser and Nestlé among its major clients, accord­ing to Amnesty.

    In a 110-page report accom­pa­nied by a video, Amnesty alleged prod­ucts sold by those com­pa­nies were “taint­ed by appalling human rights abus­es ... with chil­dren as young as eight work­ing in haz­ardous con­di­tions”.
    It called on the com­pa­nies impli­cat­ed to tell cus­tomers whether the palm oil in indi­vid­ual prod­ucts such as Mag­num ice-creams, Ariel deter­gent, Knorr soup, Pan­tene sham­poo and Aero choco­late bars were made using child labour.

    NOTE: They also own D‑Con, and sued Cal­i­for­nia for ban­ning it due to harm caused to wildlife.

    http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/03/31/makers-of-rat-poison-d-con-sue-california/

    The man­u­fac­tur­ers of one of the most com­mon brands of rat and mice poi­son, d‑Con, have sued state reg­u­la­tors just one week after Cal­i­for­nia banned the pes­ti­cide and blamed it for killing wildlife.

    Reckitt Benckiser, the UK-based con­sumer prod­ucts com­pa­ny that makes d‑Con, filed a law­suit Thurs­day against the Cal­i­for­nia Depart­ment of Pes­ti­cide Con­trol for halt­ing the sale of the roden­ti­cide com­mon­ly used by home­own­ers to kill rats and mice. The law­suit alleges that the state over­stepped its author­i­ty and has exposed Cal­i­for­nia res­i­dents to health risks because they won’t be able to get rid of rodents in their home.
    D‑Con is “the most afford­able and effec­tive rodent con­trol method avail­able to con­sumers,” the law­suit says. The rat poi­son costs about $5 at Wal­mart.

    But by July 1, the roden­ti­cide will be removed from most stores, and only cer­ti­fied pro­fes­sion­als such as pest con­trol busi­ness­es will be able to pur­chase it. This month the state Depart­ment of Pes­ti­cide Reg­u­la­tion banned d‑Con and oth­er prod­ucts that con­tain tox­ins blamed for killing at least 300 ani­mals, includ­ing endan­gered species, in the last two decades. Rats and mice eat the pes­ti­cides, and preda­tors such as fox­es and hawks ingest the poi­son when they eat the rodents.
    “It’s a huge, huge step in the right direc­tion and we’re not inclined to sit back as Reckitt tries to undo the progress that’s been made,” said Gre­go­ry Loarie, staff attor­ney with San Fran­cis­co envi­ron­men­tal advo­ca­cy group Earth­jus­tice.
    Reckitt Benckiser and the company’s attor­neys in San Fran­cis­co did not imme­di­ate­ly respond to emails from this news­pa­per.”

    A Bormann/Underground Reich spon­sor for Han­ni­ty? Not unlike­ly.

    One of the key points of infor­ma­tion in the above [chrac­ter­is­ti­cal­ly] insight­ful com­ment from this asso­ciate is the secre­cy/low-pro­file oath the Reimanns took at age 18.

    One of the major keys to Bor­mann Group pow­er, in addi­tion to their con­sum­mate eco­nom­ic pow­er and bril­liant invest­ment strat­e­gy is to STAY BEHIND THE SCENES. Their prod­ucts are well known and their abil­i­ty to dom­i­nate equi­ties mar­kets and adver­tis­ing con­tracts gives them con­sum­mate lever­age.

    But peo­ple don’t know who they are.

    Say, in that con­text, enjoy those Krispy Kreme Donuts, and wash it down with a cup of Peet’s cof­fee.

    Yum­my,

    Dave Emory

    Posted by Dave Emory | November 16, 2017, 2:40 pm
  5. Here’s an update on the many law­suits fac­ing Bay­er over the charges that the wide­ly used pes­ti­cide RoundUp — which Bay­er now sells after it bought Mon­san­to in 2016caus­es can­cer: Bay­er just set­tled with most of the claims, but not all of them. Bay­er said the set­tle­ment agree­ments “con­tain no admis­sion of lia­bil­i­ty or wrong­do­ing” and the com­pa­ny plans on con­tin­u­ing to sell the glyphosate-based pes­ti­cide.

    In addi­tion, Bay­er has a plan for pre­emp­tive­ly resolv­ing the risk of future claims from peo­ple who haven’t yet devel­oped can­cer, a big con­cern no doubt since the com­pa­ny plans on con­tin­u­ing to sell RoundUp. The scheme is intend­ed to set­tle once and for all the ques­tion of whether or not RoundUp caus­es can­cer and allow the com­pa­ny to con­tin­ue sell­ing it going for­ward. Impor­tant­ly, it would be a pan­el of sci­en­tif­ic experts who make that deter­mi­na­tion, not jurors, which is an impor­tant detail because the three times this issue was tak­en to tri­al before a jury those juries found that RoundUp did indeed cause can­cer and ordered large penal­ties. That strat­e­gy of try­ing to set­tle the issue once and for all with­out a jury might be the biggest news here because Bay­er appears to have cho­sen a legal res­o­lu­tion method that could be applied to all sorts of oth­er future class action law­suits of this nature that cen­ter around tech­ni­cal­ly dif­fi­cult bio­med­ical sci­en­tif­ic ques­tions about pub­lic safe­ty.

    Basi­cal­ly, Bay­er agreed to pay $8.8 bil­lion to $9.6 bil­lion to set­tle about 75% of the RoundUp can­cer claims. In addi­tion, an inde­pen­dent pan­el of sci­en­tif­ic experts, who will like­ly be cho­sen and agreed upon by both sides, will study the issue of glyphosate’s safe­ty and its find­ings will deter­mine whether or not future class action law­suits can take place. The study should take around four years. If the pan­el finds that glyphosate is safe, peo­ple who devel­op can­cer in the future won’t be allowed to sue Bay­er. But if the pan­el does find that RoundUp caus­es can­cers Bay­er could be open to all sorts of future RoundUp law­suits. Bay­er claims the lead plain­tiffs’ lawyers have agreed to the plan.

    It’s the kind of legal strat­e­gy that takes on new sig­nif­i­cance in the COVID-era, where all sorts of new ther­a­pies and vac­cines are being rushed through clin­i­cal safe­ty tri­als before the risks can be ful­ly eval­u­at­ed. How many future law­suits are going to emerge from Mod­er­na’s first-ever use of RNA vac­cines? Who knows but you can be sure Mod­er­na, Gilead, and the rest of biotech giants rac­ing to be the first to bring a COVID ther­a­py to the mar­ket are going to be keen­ly watch­ing Bay­er’s legal strat­e­gy:

    CNN

    Bay­er set­tles law­suits from can­cer patients over Roundup weed killer in $10 bil­lion agree­ment

    By Hol­ly Yan
    Updat­ed 6:49 PM ET, Wed June 24, 2020

    (CNN) After thou­sands of law­suits from can­cer patients or their estates, the com­pa­ny behind Roundup weed killer is set­tling most of the cur­rent and pos­si­ble future law­suits for more than $10 bil­lion.

    Bay­er, the Ger­man-based com­pa­ny that acquired agro­chem­i­cal giant Mon­san­to in 2018, made the announce­ment Wednes­day. It comes after years of lit­i­ga­tion from can­cer patients who claimed Roundup caused non-Hodgkin lym­phoma and that Mon­san­to failed to ade­quate­ly warn con­sumers of the risk.

    The set­tle­ment of Roundup cas­es in the US “will bring clo­sure to approx­i­mate­ly 75% of the cur­rent Roundup lit­i­ga­tion involv­ing approx­i­mate­ly 125,000 filed and unfiled claims over­all,” Bay­er said in a news release.

    “The com­pa­ny will make a pay­ment of $8.8 bil­lion to $9.6 bil­lion to resolve the cur­rent Roundup lit­i­ga­tion, includ­ing an allowance expect­ed to cov­er unre­solved claims, and $1.25 bil­lion to sup­port a sep­a­rate class agree­ment to address poten­tial future lit­i­ga­tion.”

    Poten­tial future cas­es will be gov­erned by a class agree­ment that’s sub­ject to court approval, the com­pa­ny said.

    Bay­er said the set­tle­ment agree­ments “con­tain no admis­sion of lia­bil­i­ty or wrong­do­ing.”

    Of the thou­sands of Roundup law­suits filed in fed­er­al or state courts, only three have gone to tri­al: those of can­cer patients Dewayne John­son, Edwin Harde­man and Alva and Alber­ta Pil­liod.

    In each of those tri­als, jurors sided with the plain­tiffs, say­ing Roundup was a sub­stan­tial con­tribut­ing fac­tor in caus­ing the plain­tiffs’ can­cer.

    And in each case, jurors award­ed the plain­tiffs tens of mil­lions (or bil­lions) of dol­lars — though judges lat­er reduced those award amounts, say­ing they were too exces­sive.

    Bay­er has appealed the ver­dicts in each of those three tri­als. On Wednes­day, the com­pa­ny said those cas­es “will con­tin­ue through the appeals process and are not cov­ered by the set­tle­ment.”

    ...

    As for Roundup, Bay­er said it will con­tin­ue sell­ing the weed killer because it stands by pre­vi­ous asser­tions that it’s safe when used as direct­ed.

    Non-Hodgkin lym­phoma patients start­ed suing Mon­san­to by the hun­dreds after a 2015 World Health Orga­ni­za­tion report sug­gest­ed glyphosate, the key ingre­di­ent in Roundup, might cause can­cer.

    The report, by WHO’s Inter­na­tion­al Agency for Research on Can­cer, said glyphosate is “prob­a­bly car­cino­genic to humans.”

    But Mon­san­to has long main­tained that Roundup does not cause can­cer and said the IARC report is great­ly out­num­bered by stud­ies say­ing glyphosate is safe.

    “Lead­ing health reg­u­la­tors around the world have repeat­ed­ly con­clud­ed that Bay­er’s glyphosate-based her­bi­cides can be used safe­ly as direct­ed and that glyphosate is not car­cino­genic ... includ­ing more than 100 stud­ies (the) EPA con­sid­ered rel­e­vant to its can­cer risk analy­sis, and more than 800 safe­ty stud­ies over­all sub­mit­ted to reg­u­la­tors,” Bay­er has said.

    The Amer­i­can Can­cer Soci­ety said with most cas­es of lym­phoma, the cause is unknown.

    But crit­ics ques­tion whether Mon­san­to had a cozy rela­tion­ship with reg­u­la­tors such as the Envi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency.

    A 2017 CNN inves­ti­ga­tion showed inter­nal emails from Mon­san­to dis­cussing com­mu­ni­ca­tions with an EPA offi­cial.

    In a 2015 email, a Mon­san­to exec­u­tive wrote that an EPA offi­cial at the time offered to help stop anoth­er agen­cy’s review of glyphosate, say­ing “If I can kill this, I should get a medal.”

    A Mon­san­to spokes­woman respond­ed at that time that the com­pa­ny has nev­er paid, giv­en gifts to or done any­thing else to cur­ry favor with the EPA.

    ————-

    “Bay­er set­tles law­suits from can­cer patients over Roundup weed killer in $10 bil­lion agree­ment” by Hol­ly Yan; CNN; 06/25/2020

    “Bay­er said the set­tle­ment agree­ments “con­tain no admis­sion of lia­bil­i­ty or wrong­do­ing.””

    No admis­sion of lia­bil­i­ty or wrong­do­ing and plen­ty of ambi­tion for future RoundUp sales. Hence the plan for a court approved class agree­ment that would deter­mine whether or not future cas­es can take place:

    ...
    Poten­tial future cas­es will be gov­erned by a class agree­ment that’s sub­ject to court approval, the com­pa­ny said.

    ...

    As for Roundup, Bay­er said it will con­tin­ue sell­ing the weed killer because it stands by pre­vi­ous asser­tions that it’s safe when used as direct­ed.

    ...

    Of the thou­sands of Roundup law­suits filed in fed­er­al or state courts, only three have gone to tri­al: those of can­cer patients Dewayne John­son, Edwin Harde­man and Alva and Alber­ta Pil­liod.

    In each of those tri­als, jurors sided with the plain­tiffs, say­ing Roundup was a sub­stan­tial con­tribut­ing fac­tor in caus­ing the plain­tiffs’ can­cer.

    And in each case, jurors award­ed the plain­tiffs tens of mil­lions (or bil­lions) of dol­lars — though judges lat­er reduced those award amounts, say­ing they were too exces­sive.
    ...

    And it’s that class action set­tle­ment that’s intend­ed to allow Bay­er to con­tin­ue sell­ing RoundUp by resolv­ing the ques­tion of its safe­ty using an inde­pen­dent pan­el, not a jury, that’s seen as a risky bet. It’s kind of an all or noth­ing strat­e­gy. If the sci­en­tif­ic pan­el finds that RoundUp does poten­tial­ly cause can­cer when used as direct­ed that would open Bay­er up to future lia­bil­i­ties that it would have a much hard­er time fight­ing because it could­n’t real­ly fight about the sci­ence any­more. But if the pan­el comes back in Bay­er’s favor it’s appar­ent­ly set­tled for­ev­er. That’s why it’s the kind of big risk Bay­er is will­ing to take:

    Reuters

    Bay­er bets on sci­ence in bid to pre­vent future Roundup law­suits: legal experts

    Tina Bel­lon
    June 24, 2020 / 11:08 PM

    (Reuters) — Seek­ing to fore­stall fur­ther claims, Bay­er AG is tak­ing a risky bet that an inde­pen­dent sci­en­tif­ic review will ulti­mate­ly show that its wide­ly used weed killer Roundup does not cause can­cer, legal experts said.

    The com­pa­ny on Wednes­day agreed to pay as much as $10.9 bil­lion to end the lit­i­ga­tion by U.S. Roundup users who say the her­bi­cide caused them to devel­op a form of blood can­cer.

    But Bay­er had to find a sep­a­rate solu­tion to mit­i­gate the risk of future claims with­out pulling the prod­uct off the shelves. The com­pa­ny decid­ed to make a cal­cu­lat­ed gam­ble on the sci­en­tif­ic evi­dence which so far has over­whelm­ing­ly sup­port­ed its claim that glyphosate, the active ingre­di­ent in Roundup, is safe for agri­cul­tur­al use.

    Reg­u­la­tors world­wide, includ­ing the U.S. Envi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency and the Euro­pean Chem­i­cals Agency, have deter­mined glyphosate to be non-car­cino­genic.

    But the World Health Organization’s can­cer research arm deter­mined the her­bi­cide to be a “prob­a­ble car­cino­gen” in 2015 and since 2018, three con­sec­u­tive U.S. juries, who lis­tened to sci­en­tif­ic evi­dence from both sides dur­ing tri­al, found that Roundup caus­es can­cer.

    “Bay­er is tak­ing a huge risk by doing this and it’s a bet that time can show that the sci­ence under­ly­ing the plain­tiffs’ claims is bad,” said David Noll, a law pro­fes­sor at Rut­gers Uni­ver­si­ty.

    While many details of the pro­pos­al have yet to be released by Bay­er and approved by a fed­er­al judge, the plan calls for an inde­pen­dent pan­el of sci­en­tif­ic experts, who will like­ly be cho­sen and agreed upon by both sides.

    The com­pa­ny will pay $1.25 bil­lion to sup­port the panel’s research, an amount that does not include any pay­outs to set­tle future law­suits.

    The sci­en­tif­ic review process is expect­ed to take at least four years, and find­ings by the pan­el would be bind­ing on Bay­er and any­one who has used Roundup before Wednes­day but not devel­oped can­cer.

    If the pan­el finds glyphosate to be non-car­cino­genic, those users could not sue.

    If the pan­el deter­mines glyphosate caus­es can­cer, how­ev­er, Bay­er could face a flood of new law­suits, with poten­tial dam­ages deter­mined at a lat­er stage. Bay­er on Wednes­day said the lead plain­tiffs’ lawyers have agreed to its plans, but Reuters was not imme­di­ate­ly able to reach those attor­neys for com­ment.

    Lawyers for Roundup can­cer claimants in the past have alleged that Bay­er manip­u­lat­ed sci­en­tif­ic stud­ies and deceived the sci­en­tif­ic com­mu­ni­ty, claims Bay­er denies.

    Com­pa­ny exec­u­tives on calls with reporters and ana­lysts on Wednes­day repeat­ed­ly said the sci­ence was in their favor.

    “We are con­fi­dent that the sci­ence pan­el will look at the sci­en­tif­ic body of evi­dence and come to the con­clu­sion that glyphosate is safe,” said Bayer’s glob­al head of lit­i­ga­tion, Bill Dodero.

    Sci­en­tif­ic pan­els have been set up in pre­vi­ous mass torts but gen­er­al­ly not as part of a set­tle­ment process, legal experts said. Bayer’s pro­pos­al was “cre­ative but risky” and will like­ly face pro­ce­dur­al chal­lenges in court, said Adam Zim­mer­man, a pro­fes­sor at Loy­ola Law School.

    The experts said many details, includ­ing how peo­ple who have not yet got­ten sick could give up their rights to a future law­suit under the pro­pos­al, remained unclear.

    ...

    ————-

    “Bay­er bets on sci­ence in bid to pre­vent future Roundup law­suits: legal experts” by Tina Bel­lon; Reuters; 06/24/2020

    “Sci­en­tif­ic pan­els have been set up in pre­vi­ous mass torts but gen­er­al­ly not as part of a set­tle­ment process, legal experts said. Bayer’s pro­pos­al was “cre­ative but risky” and will like­ly face pro­ce­dur­al chal­lenges in court, said Adam Zim­mer­man, a pro­fes­sor at Loy­ola Law School.”

    Cre­ative but risky. That’s how Bay­er’s legal strat­e­gy is being described. But note how gov­ern­ment reg­u­la­tors have con­sis­tent­ly sided with Bay­er on the ques­tion of RoundUp’s safe­ty. It’s the World Health Orga­ni­za­tion and juror who have been rul­ing against Bay­er. So Bay­er (and Mon­san­to before it) has had plen­ty of suc­cess in get­ting sci­en­tif­ic pan­els to approve the safe­ty of RoundUp and the com­pa­ny is pre­sum­ably bet­ting on that same suc­cess:

    ...
    Reg­u­la­tors world­wide, includ­ing the U.S. Envi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency and the Euro­pean Chem­i­cals Agency, have deter­mined glyphosate to be non-car­cino­genic.

    But the World Health Organization’s can­cer research arm deter­mined the her­bi­cide to be a “prob­a­ble car­cino­gen” in 2015 and since 2018, three con­sec­u­tive U.S. juries, who lis­tened to sci­en­tif­ic evi­dence from both sides dur­ing tri­al, found that Roundup caus­es can­cer.

    “Bay­er is tak­ing a huge risk by doing this and it’s a bet that time can show that the sci­ence under­ly­ing the plain­tiffs’ claims is bad,” said David Noll, a law pro­fes­sor at Rut­gers Uni­ver­si­ty.

    ...

    The sci­en­tif­ic review process is expect­ed to take at least four years, and find­ings by the pan­el would be bind­ing on Bay­er and any­one who has used Roundup before Wednes­day but not devel­oped can­cer.

    If the pan­el finds glyphosate to be non-car­cino­genic, those users could not sue.

    If the pan­el deter­mines glyphosate caus­es can­cer, how­ev­er, Bay­er could face a flood of new law­suits, with poten­tial dam­ages deter­mined at a lat­er stage. Bay­er on Wednes­day said the lead plain­tiffs’ lawyers have agreed to its plans, but Reuters was not imme­di­ate­ly able to reach those attor­neys for com­ment.

    ...

    The experts said many details, includ­ing how peo­ple who have not yet got­ten sick could give up their rights to a future law­suit under the pro­pos­al, remained unclear.
    ...

    “The experts said many details, includ­ing how peo­ple who have not yet got­ten sick could give up their rights to a future law­suit under the pro­pos­al, remained unclear.

    Those seem like some pret­ty impor­tant details to get ham­mered out before this agree­ment is put into effect. That points to anoth­er thing to watch on this case: will Bay­er be allowed to pro­ceed with this pan­el pro­pos­al before details like how peo­ple who have not yet got­ten sick could give up their rights to a future law­suit under the pro­pos­al are worked out?

    And that’s all part of what makes this sto­ry so much big­ger than just the ques­tion of whether or not the world’s most pop­u­lar pes­ti­cide caus­es can­cer, which itself is a mas­sive ques­tion. It’s not like there are a lot of great alter­na­tives to glyphosate so it real­ly would be prefer­able if this stuff did­n’t cause can­cer. But it might, and it’s pret­ty clear that Bay­er is going to be using every option at its dis­pos­al to ensure it can con­tin­ue sell­ing the stuff either way. So, yes, Bay­er is tak­ing a big risk. A big risk that includes big upside risk for Bay­er’s future prof­its. And big upside risk for future can­cer. Lia­bil­i­ty-free future can­cer.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 27, 2020, 2:38 pm
  6. ProP­ub­li­ca has a new report that is par­tic­u­lar­ly top­i­cal for the hol­i­day sea­son. ‘Tis the sea­son of dirty dish­es, after all. San­ta ain’t clean­ing them. So it’s prob­a­bly an appro­pri­ate time to address some of the issues asso­ci­at­ed with sup­ply­ing all of the chem­i­cals that go into cre­at­ing the deter­gents that are actu­al­ly doing the clean­ing. In par­tic­u­lar, the man­u­fac­ture of sur­fac­tants, the chem­i­cals that reduce sur­face ten­sion between two sub­stances, enabling grime to come off. It turns out BASF, the world’s largest chem­i­cal man­u­fac­tur­er, has long been the US’s pri­ma­ry man­u­fac­tur­er of sur­fac­tants, with oper­a­tions spread across mul­ti­ple states. States with notably lax pol­lu­tion reg­u­la­tions. First, the chem­i­cal eth­yl­ene is first man­u­fac­tured in Port Arthur, Texas. It’s then shipped to Geis­mar, Louisiana, where the eth­yl­ene is turned into eth­yl­ene oxide, before head­ing off to White Stone, in Spar­tan­burg coun­ty, South Car­oli­na, where the eth­yl­ene oxide is con­vert­ed into sur­fac­tants. Final­ly, the sur­fac­tants end up at the Proc­ter & Gam­ble plant in St. Louis where they’re used to make a myr­i­ad of house­hold con­sumer prod­ucts, like Cas­cade, the deter­gent was undoubt­ed­ly used to clean all those hol­i­day dish­es.

    So what was it that ProP­ub­li­ca’s report revealed about the BAS­F’s sur­fac­tant man­u­fac­tur­ing oper­a­tions? Ram­pant air pol­lu­tion. That’s what. Yes, it turns out the pro­duc­tion of chem­i­cals like eth­yl­ene and its sur­fac­tant end-prod­ucts poten­tial­ly gen­er­ates a lot air pol­lu­tion. Invis­i­ble eth­yl­ene just being spewed out into the atmos­phere. Based on ProP­ub­li­ca’s analy­sis, BASF’s foot­print of can­cer-caus­ing air pol­lu­tion is larg­er than that of any oth­er for­eign-owned com­pa­ny in the US and is the fourth-largest tox­ic foot­print among all com­pa­nies oper­at­ing in the coun­try.

    The vol­ume of BAS­F’s can­cer-caus­ing air-pol­lu­tion is just one part of this scan­dal. The oth­er part if the fact that it all appears to be large­ly legal and done with­in the reg­u­la­to­ry guide­lines. Guide­lines that typ­i­cal­ly leave it up to states to deter­mine what, if any, envi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tions to fol­low. And as we’ll see, those state-lev­el reg­u­la­tions more often just leave it up to the pol­luter to mon­i­tor and report their pol­lu­tion lev­els. As we’ll also see, it turns out the BASF plants spew­ing out this pol­lu­tion tends to exclu­sive­ly be adja­cent to com­mu­ni­ties with large minor­i­ty pop­u­la­tions. And then there’s ‘acci­den­tal dis­charge’ rules that more or less incen­tivize indus­tri­al spills.

    And then there’s inter­est­ing his­to­ry of BAS­F’s oper­a­tions in the US: as one of the com­po­nents of IG Far­ben, BASF became part of the IG Far­ben com­plex in 1925. After BASF was spun out from IF Far­ben in the after­math of WWII it almost imme­di­ate­ly began look­ing for a US city to set up oper­a­tions. A US tour cam­paign was start­ed by the com­pa­ny in 1949 and by 1958 the com­pa­ny opened its first US plant in Freeport, Texas. So BAS­F’s US oper­a­tions were start­ing up ear­ly on in the post-war era. Inter­est­ing­ly, we’re also told the Proc­ter & Gam­ble was first exposed to the idea of using sur­fac­tants in deter­gent dur­ing a pre-WWII meet­ing with IG Far­ben exec­u­tives. So some sort of rela­tion­ship between Proc­ter & Gam­ble and IG Far­ben appears to have like­ly played a role here.

    So as big a pain as all those hol­i­day dish­es might seem right now, it’s impor­tant to keep in mind that the com­mu­ni­ties direct­ly involved in the man­u­fac­ture of the chem­i­cals that go into these clean­ing prod­ucts have been sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly endur­ing the pain of can­cer and oth­er dis­ease as part of the price of sourc­ing these mate­ri­als for decades. And if you’re unfor­tu­nate enough to be liv­ing next to one of these BASF plants, there’s no break from that kind of chron­ic expo­sure, unless you hap­pen to leave town for the hol­i­days:

    ProP­ub­li­ca

    The Dirty Secret of America’s Clean Dish­es

    The world’s largest chem­i­cal mak­er, BASF, pro­duces ingre­di­ents for America’s most pop­u­lar prod­ucts, from soaps to sur­face clean­ers to dish­wash­er deter­gent. Emis­sions from their U.S. plants ele­vate can­cer risks for an esti­mat­ed 1.5 mil­lion peo­ple.

    by Max Blau and Lyl­la Younes, pho­tog­ra­phy by Kath­leen Fly­nn, spe­cial to ProP­ub­li­ca

    Dec. 20, 2021 1:25 p.m. EST

    Hol­lie Walk­er cher­ished the sim­plic­i­ty of her life in White Stone, South Car­oli­na, a tiny com­mu­ni­ty on the out­skirts of Spar­tan­burg. In the qui­et of the coun­try, she and her hus­band raised their two sons in a yel­low house on 37 acres of seclud­ed land, where they hiked in the woods and swam in their lake. Today, the area is home to a one-room post office, two church­es, and a shoot­ing range open three days a week. For years in the 1990s, Walk­er worked behind the counter at the post office.

    There used to be a bar called the White Stone Mall on the same stretch of high­way, where Walk­er would sip beers, shoot pool and chat with work­ers get­ting off their shifts from a chem­i­cal plant across the street. She didn’t know much about the Ger­man-owned com­pa­ny, BASF, that oper­at­ed the plant. After BASF expand­ed its site in the 2000’s, demol­ish­ing the bar in the process, she had lit­tle rea­son to stop along that high­way, except when the rail­road gates halt­ed traf­fic.

    The pass­ing trains car­ried tank cars of chem­i­cals bound for White Stone’s BASF plant, a fleet­ing moment in an epic mul­ti-state jour­ney dur­ing which BASF trans­forms nat­ur­al gas into spe­cial­ized, secre­tive com­pounds that are the build­ing blocks of ubiq­ui­tous clean­ing prod­ucts. BASF isn’t a house­hold name like Proc­ter & Gam­ble, but the ingre­di­ents it cre­ates are essen­tial to the suc­cess of that company’s prod­ucts, allow­ing dirt stains to be lift­ed from clothes and egg yolk to be washed off plates.

    The long, wind­ing path from shale rock to the kitchen cab­i­net con­tributes to mas­sive sales for BASF, the world’s largest chem­i­cal mak­er. But for the company’s neigh­bors, the jour­ney leaves behind a trail of tox­ic pol­lu­tion that has placed hun­dreds of thou­sands of peo­ple — includ­ing Walk­er — in harm’s way.

    The U.S. Envi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency aspires to min­i­mize the num­ber of peo­ple exposed to emis­sions that increase excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion. That risk lev­el means that if 1 mil­lion peo­ple in an area were exposed to tox­ic air pol­lu­tants over a pre­sumed life­time of 70 years, there would like­ly be at least one case of can­cer on top of those from risks peo­ple already face. But a ProP­ub­li­ca analy­sis found that the EPA effec­tive­ly allows two dozen BASF plants nation­wide to expose an esti­mat­ed 1.5 mil­lion Amer­i­cans to ele­vat­ed can­cer risks greater than 1 in 1 mil­lion. EPA rules also say that plants should nev­er expose peo­ple to an addi­tion­al life­time can­cer risk that exceeds 1 in 10,000. Yet an esti­mat­ed 2,800 peo­ple who live near BASF plants around the coun­try face risks at least that high because of the company’s emis­sions, accord­ing to our analy­sis. Our analy­sis is based on an EPA screen­ing tool that uses data report­ed by com­pa­nies such as BASF. It can­not be used to assess the cause of indi­vid­ual can­cer cas­es, but can iden­ti­fy geo­graph­ic areas of poten­tial con­cern.

    BASF’s foot­print of can­cer-caus­ing air pol­lu­tion is larg­er than that of any oth­er for­eign-owned com­pa­ny in the U.S. and is the fourth-largest tox­ic foot­print among all com­pa­nies oper­at­ing in this coun­try, accord­ing to our analy­sis.

    ...

    BASF, a multi­bil­lion-dol­lar cor­po­ra­tion that employs over 110,000 peo­ple world­wide, is part of a larg­er sto­ry about the hid­den costs of our nation’s sup­ply chains. ProP­ub­li­ca pieced togeth­er the sup­ply chain — and the envi­ron­men­tal impact — of a sin­gle BASF-pro­duced chem­i­cal found in one com­mon house­hold clean­ing prod­uct dur­ing the peri­od of our analy­sis, which exam­ined data from 2014 to 2018. We reviewed thou­sands of pages of cor­po­rate fil­ings; obtained inter­nal doc­u­ments through near­ly 100 pub­lic records requests; and inter­viewed dozens of work­ers, sup­ply chain experts and res­i­dents liv­ing near BASF plants. Our report­ing offers a rare look at how the pro­duc­tion of a sin­gle con­sumer good — Cas­cade dish­wash­er deter­gent — con­tributes to ele­vat­ed can­cer risk for an esti­mat­ed near­ly 1 mil­lion peo­ple in mul­ti­ple com­mu­ni­ties across the South.

    By the time mil­lions of con­sumers pur­chase Cas­cade each month, the cru­cial chem­i­cals that end up in the deter­gent have been craft­ed over the course of an 800-mile jour­ney from a BASF facil­i­ty in Port Arthur, Texas, to one in Geis­mar, Louisiana, to the one across from the post office in White Stone. From there, a final chem­i­cal prod­uct is hauled to an assem­bly line at a giant plant in St. Louis, Mis­souri, end­ing up in bold green pack­ages that line gro­cery store aisles nation­wide. By the time Walk­er pulls a con­tain­er of Cas­cade off the shelf, she will have already paid an even high­er price: chron­ic expo­sure to one of America’s most dan­ger­ous air pol­lu­tants, a sac­ri­fice in order to man­u­fac­ture the most pop­u­lar dish­wash­er deter­gent in the nation.

    The Crack­ing
    Port Arthur, Texas

    The sto­ry of BASF’s dra­mat­ic Amer­i­can expan­sion began in Texas fol­low­ing the dark­est chap­ter in the company’s his­to­ry. Found­ed as a dye mak­er in the 1860s, BASF employed sci­en­tists who invent­ed thou­sands of chem­i­cals, from syn­thet­ic indi­go, which enabled the mass pro­duc­tion of blue jeans, to chlo­rine gas, which was used to poi­son sol­diers in the trench­es dur­ing World War I. In 1925, BASF helped found IG Far­ben, a Ger­man chem­i­cal car­tel that would not only sup­ply raw mate­ri­als for the Nazi war machine but also oper­ate a syn­thet­ic rub­ber and oil fac­to­ry depen­dent on slave labor from Jew­ish peo­ple impris­oned at the Monowitz con­cen­tra­tion camp. Among the cartel’s con­tri­bu­tions to the Nazis was a pes­ti­cide known as Zyk­lon B, which they used to exter­mi­nate more than 1 mil­lion peo­ple dur­ing the Holo­caust. At one of the Nurem­berg tri­als, a pros­e­cu­tor described the two-dozen IG Far­ben exec­u­tives indict­ed for war crimes as the “magi­cians who made the fan­tasies of Mein Kampf come true.” (BASF declined to answer ProPublica’s ques­tions about its past, but wrote on its web­site that IG Far­ben became part of an “autar­kic, coer­cive sys­tem” that aid­ed the Nazi regime.)

    After 13 of its exec­u­tives were found guilty, IG Far­ben was bro­ken up into sev­er­al com­pa­nies. In 1949, an exec­u­tive with the new­ly reformed BASF toured Dow Chemical’s plant in Freeport, Texas. Less than a decade lat­er, BASF broke ground on a chem­i­cal plant there, the first the com­pa­ny opened out­side of its home­land after World War II.

    In the decades that fol­lowed, U.S. com­mu­ni­ties hun­gry for jobs court­ed the com­pa­ny, which was able to grow its prof­its at an unprece­dent­ed pace thanks in part to reg­u­la­tions that allowed its plants to oper­ate with more lenient envi­ron­men­tal pro­tec­tions than com­pa­ra­ble plants in Ger­many. The extent of pol­lu­tion allowed by U.S. reg­u­la­tors was par­tic­u­lar­ly grave in south­east Texas. By the time BASF opened a plant in the coastal town of Port Arthur in 2001, near­by com­mu­ni­ties were so inun­dat­ed with poi­so­nous air that the arrival of BASF hard­ly stood out.

    “There are plen­ty of places in the state of Texas where these indus­tries could have been placed,” said Hilton Kel­ley, a local envi­ron­men­tal jus­tice advo­cate. “Why Port Arthur? It’s the area of least resis­tance.”

    Stand­ing on the top floor of Port Arthur’s City Hall, John Beard Jr. looks up from under his black wide-brimmed hat toward a hori­zon dot­ted with hulk­ing indus­tri­al facil­i­ties. Six per­cent of America’s crude oil gets refined in this 54,000-person city along the Gulf Coast, where neigh­bor­hood sub­di­vi­sions, ele­men­tary schools and play­grounds bor­der petro­chem­i­cal plants. Eigh­teen dif­fer­ent facil­i­ties emit a vari­ety of can­cer-caus­ing pol­lu­tants such as ben­zene, buta­di­ene and naph­tha­lene into the air of Port Arthur and its neigh­bor­ing towns.

    After clock­ing in at a refin­ery for 38 years, Beard Jr. came to real­ize that the indus­try had jeop­ar­dized the health of Port Arthur, a work­ing-class com­mu­ni­ty where the per­cent­age of Black res­i­dents is near­ly triple the nation­al aver­age. Since retir­ing in 2017, Beard Jr., founder and CEO of the Port Arthur Com­mu­ni­ty Action Net­work, has sound­ed the alarm by demand­ing bet­ter emis­sions con­trols and chal­leng­ing com­pa­nies’ attempts to pol­lute more. He also offers a guid­ed “tox­ic tour” to any­one inter­est­ed in see­ing the high price of liv­ing in “Ener­gy City.” One of his stops, on the north side of town, is BASF’s steam crack­er.

    Inside BASF’s plant, a col­or­less, odor­less gas known as ethane flows into a tow­er­ing struc­ture called a crack­er, where the gas is moved through a tube, dilut­ed with steam and pushed through a fur­nace heat­ed to around 1,500 degrees. With­in a sec­ond, heat “cracks” the bonds of each ethane mol­e­cule. The final prod­uct, eth­yl­ene, has been called the “world’s most impor­tant chem­i­cal,” a raw mate­r­i­al for ingre­di­ents found in every­thing from plas­tics and PVC pipes to foam insu­la­tion and syn­thet­ic rub­ber, antifreeze and air­plane wings.

    The crack­ing process emits ben­zene, a car­cino­gen that stud­ies have linked to leukemia. While the Ger­man gov­ern­ment has long required BASF’s plants to be out­fit­ted with pol­lu­tion-reduc­tion equip­ment, the EPA did not issue rules to ade­quate­ly con­trol tox­ic releas­es until the late 1990s. Instead of requir­ing larg­er chem­i­cal plant oper­a­tors to reg­u­lar­ly mon­i­tor ben­zene emis­sions like Ger­man facil­i­ties did, fed­er­al and state envi­ron­men­tal agen­cies in the U.S. often took com­pa­nies that oper­at­ed chem­i­cal plants at their word that they would not emit more ben­zene than their per­mits allowed. Car­roll Muf­fett, pres­i­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Inter­na­tion­al Envi­ron­men­tal Law, says that Amer­i­can envi­ron­men­tal rules “have been out of step with the sci­ence of human health for decades.”

    In the U.S., experts say the devel­op­ment of the rules gov­ern­ing how much pol­lu­tion chem­i­cal com­pa­nies can emit has been a noto­ri­ous­ly fraught process. The EPA often allows engi­neers employed by the com­pa­nies the agency reg­u­lates to help devel­op these rules. As an EPA engi­neer told Cary Coglianese, a Uni­ver­si­ty of Penn­syl­va­nia law pro­fes­sor who directs the Penn Pro­gram on Reg­u­la­tion: “We help them; they help us.”

    U.S. envi­ron­men­tal advo­cates say they are side­lined in the ear­li­est stages of the EPA’s rule­mak­ing process. To influ­ence a rule, they often must sue the agency, alleg­ing that its rule updates have failed to ade­quate­ly pro­tect the public’s health. By con­trast, Euro­pean envi­ron­men­tal offi­cials require advo­ca­cy orga­ni­za­tions, trade groups and indus­tri­al engi­neers to work togeth­er to devel­op more pro­tec­tive stan­dards for emis­sions-con­trol tech­nolo­gies. Both the U.S. and Europe require rules for those tech­nolo­gies to be reviewed every eight years, but the EPA often choos­es not to update its rules, while Euro­pean offi­cials require that new and more pro­tec­tive stan­dards are passed dur­ing each review.

    ...

    But there is one major loop­hole that may fur­ther under­mine pol­lu­tion lim­its: acci­den­tal dis­charges. Such dis­charges hap­pen reg­u­lar­ly and may expose com­mu­ni­ties to much high­er lev­els of chem­i­cals than allowed under a plant’s per­mit. An Envi­ron­men­tal Integri­ty Project report found that BASF’s Port Arthur crack­er had emit­ted more than 887,000 pounds of air pol­lu­tants dur­ing unper­mit­ted dis­charges from 2015 to 2018, the sev­enth high­est out of 90 Texas plants ana­lyzed. Last year, BASF’s steam crack­er released 2,308 pounds of ben­zene in unper­mit­ted events, fifth-most statewide.

    Since the begin­ning of 2017, reg­u­la­tors have fined BASF $456,000 for air reg­u­la­tion vio­la­tions at the plant. But advo­cates say that fines are issued for less than 3% of all acci­den­tal dis­charges in Texas, and those fines are small giv­en the lev­el of unau­tho­rized emis­sions. The Texas Com­mis­sion on Envi­ron­men­tal Qual­i­ty deter­mines fines by the size of an unper­mit­ted release, poten­tial harm caused to human health, and whether the com­pa­ny prop­er­ly noti­fied the agency, said Tiffany Young, a spokesper­son for the TCEQ. In a state­ment, Young also said: “Fund­ing and staffing resources lim­it the agency’s abil­i­ty” to mon­i­tor emis­sions from acci­den­tal dis­charges at many indi­vid­ual plants.

    ...

    The Con­ver­sion
    Geis­mar, Louisiana

    From its plant in Port Arthur, BASF pipes its eth­yl­ene past Texas marsh­lands and Louisiana bay­ous, to a rur­al com­mu­ni­ty more than 150 miles east, the next stop in the sup­ply chain.

    Inside BASF’s plant in Geis­mar, Louisiana, work­ers man­u­fac­ture eth­yl­ene oxide by heat­ing Port Arthur-made eth­yl­ene and mix­ing it with oxy­gen, then pass­ing the mix­ture through a reac­tor packed with a sil­ver cat­a­lyst. Once the reac­tor has cooled, the chem­i­cal prod­uct is puri­fied and processed. The plant, capa­ble of mak­ing 220,000 met­ric tons of eth­yl­ene oxide each year, gen­er­ates one of the country’s largest foot­prints of can­cer-caus­ing air pol­lu­tion — expos­ing more than an esti­mat­ed 800,000 Louisianans to excess can­cer risk greater than 1 in 1 mil­lion. (The real num­ber is cer­tain­ly high­er, but the plant’s emis­sions are esti­mat­ed to dis­perse far beyond the geo­graph­ic lim­its of the EPA’s mod­el­ing.) It also ele­vates the excess can­cer risk above 1 in 10,000 for an esti­mat­ed 180 of Geis­mar’s rough­ly 7,000 res­i­dents.

    Malai­ka Favorite, who is exposed to an esti­mat­ed excess can­cer risk of 1 in 16,000, wasn’t aware of the spe­cif­ic threat when she moved back to Geis­mar after decades away. But the fore­bod­ing scale of the indus­tri­al devel­op­ment in her home­town was imme­di­ate­ly clear. The rur­al com­mu­ni­ty, which sits at the heart of a 85-mile-long indus­tri­al cor­ri­dor of Louisiana, hard­ly resem­bled the place in which she was raised. The lev­ee over­look­ing the Mis­sis­sip­pi Riv­er where she used to play had been blocked off by pri­vate roads and sown with nat­ur­al gas pipelines. The trees that had lined the long road to her child­hood home, form­ing a canopy over­head, had been replaced by barbed wire fences encir­cling chem­i­cal plants.

    Favorite, a 72-year-old artist, was so dis­mayed by the changes that she decid­ed to get involved in the deci­sions dri­ving them. This past win­ter, she attend­ed a pub­lic meet­ing to dis­cuss the renew­al and mod­i­fi­ca­tion of a Louisiana Depart­ment of Envi­ron­men­tal Qual­i­ty per­mit for BASF’s Geis­mar com­plex, the company’s largest U.S. oper­a­tion. She said that eight peo­ple attend­ed the meet­ing, includ­ing sev­er­al com­pa­ny spokes­peo­ple, and that when she asked about the air pol­lu­tion that would be allowed by the per­mit renew­al, a spokesper­son under­scored the impor­tance of the company’s pro­duc­tion of chem­i­cals, includ­ing eth­yl­ene oxide. The ver­sa­tile chem­i­cal is used not only to make prod­ucts to clean house­holds, but also to ster­il­ize rough­ly half of the U.S. health­care system’s med­ical equip­ment.

    She also said that the spokesper­son acknowl­edged that if BASF didn’t make its chem­i­cals there, it would emit pol­lu­tants some­where else. (Asked about Favorite’s rec­ol­lec­tions of the meet­ing, com­pa­ny spokesper­son Nel­son said: “BASF would not sup­port such a com­ment you allege a BASF spokesper­son made.”)

    Chem­i­cal com­pa­nies had trans­formed Favorite’s bucol­ic home­town into one of the nation’s largest “sac­ri­fice zones,” a term advo­cates use to describe indus­tri­al cor­ri­dors where cer­tain com­mu­ni­ties bear dis­pro­por­tion­ate health costs from the man­u­fac­tur­ing of prod­ucts used across the coun­try. Accord­ing to ProPublica’s analy­sis, eth­yl­ene oxide con­tributes to more can­cer risk than any oth­er tox­ic air pol­lu­tant emit­ted by Amer­i­can indus­try. Our demand for eth­yl­ene oxide cre­ates excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion for an esti­mat­ed 3.7 mil­lion peo­ple in south Louisiana. Stud­ies have linked the chem­i­cal to high­er rates of breast can­cer, lym­phoma and leukemia.

    The LDEQ’s eth­yl­ene oxide stan­dard, which allows con­cen­tra­tions of up to one micro­gram per cubic meter of air in com­mu­ni­ties near chem­i­cal plants, is 50 times the max­i­mum con­cen­tra­tion advised by the EPA. This allows com­pa­nies to emit vol­umes of pol­lu­tion that could ele­vate excess can­cer risk to a lev­el 30 times the EPA’s 1 in 10,000 stan­dard. As a result, BASF’s Geis­mar plant emits more than nine times as much eth­yl­ene oxide as its larg­er plant that makes the same chem­i­cal in its home­town of Lud­wigshafen, Ger­many. At that plant, com­pa­nies licensed by Ger­man reg­u­la­tors con­duct annu­al inspec­tions to ensure that con­cen­tra­tions of the can­cer-caus­ing chem­i­cal at each emis­sion point are below 0.5 mil­ligrams per cubic meter — a rule designed to lim­it the pollutant’s spread into neigh­bor­ing com­mu­ni­ties.

    When asked why LDEQ approves per­mits that can enable can­cer risk lev­els that high, depart­ment spokesper­son Gre­go­ry Lan­g­ley told ProP­ub­li­ca that can­cer rates in the cen­sus tract where BASF oper­ates are below the state aver­age. The cen­sus tract where Geis­mar is locat­ed encom­pass­es 66 square miles, and stretch­es into the neigh­bor­ing rur­al com­mu­ni­ties of Dutch­town and Burn­side.

    ...

    Favorite didn’t real­ize the spe­cif­ic threat posed by eth­yl­ene oxide until the LDEQ meet­ing. As she left the cour­t­house that evening ear­li­er this year, she couldn’t stop think­ing back to a time when BASF’s activ­i­ty drew the atten­tion of more than a small hand­ful of locals. In the 1980s, envi­ron­men­tal­ists and labor orga­niz­ers had trav­eled to Geis­mar to protest the company’s treat­ment of its work­ers. At the bar­gain­ing table, lead­ers of the Oil, Chem­i­cal and Atom­ic Work­ers Inter­na­tion­al Union had voiced con­cerns about BASF’s safe­ty record, which includ­ed a his­to­ry of fires, spills and leaks that the union feared jeop­ar­dized the well-being of 370 mem­bers. When nego­ti­a­tions final­ly broke down in the sum­mer of 1984, the com­pa­ny locked work­ers out of the Geis­mar plant and hired short-term con­trac­tors.

    In the fol­low­ing years, union mem­bers applied for unem­ploy­ment and strug­gled to feed their fam­i­lies. To pres­sure BASF, OCAW pro­duced a 53-minute video on the locked-out work­ers and the company’s mem­ber­ship in a chem­i­cal car­tel with links to the Nazis. One evening, as they bat­ted around ideas of how to advance their cam­paign, the orga­niz­ers dis­cussed the area’s can­cer rates. From that day for­ward, they described south Louisiana’s indus­tri­al cor­ri­dor as “Can­cer Alley,” and plas­tered the phrase on a bill­board near the plant. The name stuck, and the orga­niz­ers’ strat­e­gy pre­vailed.

    After five years, BASF allowed the union mem­bers to return to the Geis­mar plant. To safe­guard the work­ers, OCAW lead­ers built a coali­tion with envi­ron­men­tal advo­ca­cy groups and long­time res­i­dents, includ­ing Favorite’s father, Amos, a World War II vet­er­an and for­mer chem­i­cal plant work­er. While many of BASF’s work­ers resided in neigh­bor­ing towns, Amos Favorite lived in Geismar’s pre­dom­i­nant­ly Black com­mu­ni­ty. White suprema­cists had tried to bomb Amos’ house after he sup­port­ed Malaika’s deci­sion to become the first Black stu­dent in the parish’s all-white high school. If he could face Ku Klux Klan sym­pa­thiz­ers, he thought, he could stand up to BASF.

    Togeth­er with OCAW, Amos Favorite secured funds not only to install an air mon­i­tor near BASF’s plant, but also to deliv­er clean water from Baton Rouge, so that his com­mu­ni­ty would no longer have to rely on wells con­t­a­m­i­nat­ed by indus­tri­al com­pa­nies. But by the time Amos died in 2002, the momen­tum gen­er­at­ed by the lock­out had slowed. Two of the union’s chief lead­ers died from can­cer. Funds for the union’s coali­tion build­ing efforts dried up. The OCAW merged with a larg­er union that pri­or­i­tized labor con­cerns over envi­ron­men­tal issues.

    Today, thin strips of neigh­bor­hoods are sand­wiched between sprawl­ing chem­i­cal plants. Eth­yl­ene oxide bil­lows invis­i­bly from BASF’s plant toward the Favorite house­hold. Short­ly before Malai­ka Favorite moved back home in 2016, the EPA declared the chem­i­cal to be 30 times more tox­ic to adults and 60 times more tox­ic to chil­dren than the agency pre­vi­ous­ly thought. In the fol­low­ing years, com­mu­ni­ties across the coun­try began learn­ing that they had been exposed for decades to one of America’s most potent indus­tri­al chem­i­cals. Res­i­dents of a Chica­go sub­urb protest­ed until the med­ical ster­il­iza­tion plant emit­ting eth­yl­ene oxide near their homes was forced to shut down. But in Favorite’s cor­ner of Can­cer Alley, the protests have long qui­et­ed even as reg­u­la­tors have recent­ly cleared the way for more indus­tri­al devel­op­ment.

    ...

    When Geis­mar res­i­dents devel­op can­cer, they often feel torn about whether to blame the plants. In a local Rotary Club speech in 2017, a BASF exec­u­tive down­played con­cerns about the rates of can­cer in the Geis­mar area, say­ing that “you can turn sta­tis­tics any way you want.” A decade ago, one of Favorite’s broth­ers bat­tled lym­phoma. Anoth­er broth­er and his wife worked in the chem­i­cal indus­try in Geis­mar for most of their careers. When her brother’s wife died of can­cer, Favorite said, he didn’t believe that her work­place had any­thing to do with it.

    ...

    The Cook­ing
    Spar­tan­burg, South Car­oli­na

    South Carolina’s boom­ing chem­i­cal indus­try lured the Walk­ers to Spar­tan­burg. In the 1980s, Hol­lie Walker’s hus­band, Reed, received a job offer from Mil­liken & Com­pa­ny, where he stayed for the next three decades. He trav­eled around the world pro­mot­ing Mil­lad, a chem­i­cal prod­uct that is used to make plas­tic goods like Tup­per­ware see-through. He sold so much of the chem­i­cal that his col­leagues called him “Mr. Mil­lad.”

    By the time the Walk­ers set­tled into their home in the woods, about 10 miles south­east of Mil­liken head­quar­ters and a few min­utes down the road from BASF’s facil­i­ty, BASF already was decades into the lucra­tive Amer­i­can expan­sion it had first launched in Texas. That expan­sion would help lead to bil­lions of dol­lars of annu­al sales glob­al­ly and earn BASF a spot on the For­tune 100.

    In the 1960s, a sharp-dressed busi­ness­man named Hans Laut­en­schlager trav­eled across Amer­i­ca to sell a more pros­per­ous life. To civic boost­ers, he pledged bet­ter jobs. To farm­ers, he assured greater yields. To politi­cians, he promised stronger economies. They could achieve their Amer­i­can dreams, he explained, if they opened their towns to BASF. In sell­ing those dreams, Laut­en­schlager helped BASF become one of the world’s largest chem­i­cal mak­ers. To keep BASF expand­ing, Laut­en­schlager con­vinced South Car­oli­na offi­cials to let the com­pa­ny build a $100 mil­lion petro­chem­i­cal plant near its coast, just out­side the bur­geon­ing tourist town of Hilton Head.

    But an unlike­ly alliance of work­ing-class Black shrimpers and rich white real estate devel­op­ers emerged in the ear­ly 1970s to fight the BASF plant and its poten­tial pol­lu­tion. They protest­ed, launched a nation­al media cam­paign and threat­ened legal action. On the heels of their lob­by­ing, a mem­ber of Pres­i­dent Richard Nixon’s admin­is­tra­tion warned the com­pa­ny that he would oppose the plant unless the company’s plans pro­tect­ed South Carolina’s Low­coun­try. BASF dropped the project, spar­ing Hilton Head from that threat. Soon after, though, a PR exec rep­re­sent­ing BASF told South Car­oli­na Gov.-elect John West that the com­pa­ny hoped to oper­ate a dif­fer­ent chem­i­cal plant else­where in the state. West sup­port­ed the plans. (He died in 2004.) With min­i­mal fan­fare, BASF acquired a chem­i­cal plant on the out­skirts of Spar­tan­burg, an inland city once nick­named “Tex­tile Town.” Since many of the region’s mills had shut­tered, local offi­cials embraced the chem­i­cal mak­ers because they pre­served jobs and tax dol­lars.

    The plant marked a turn­ing point in BASF’s nation­al expan­sion strat­e­gy, a way for the com­pa­ny to avoid con­tro­ver­sial plant con­struc­tions. Between 1970 and 2000, the com­pa­ny went from own­ing a hand­ful of facil­i­ties across the coun­try to oper­at­ing more than two dozen, many of them occu­py­ing the foot­print of for­mer plants and some locat­ed in South­ern states with more lax envi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tions. BASF also divest­ed from its man­u­fac­tur­ing of con­sumer goods like cas­sette tapes. Now focused on chem­i­cals, BASF aired a wave of TV com­mer­cials dur­ing the 1990s, in which the com­pa­ny pro­claimed: “We don’t make a lot of the prod­ucts you buy. We make a lot of the prod­ucts you buy bet­ter.”

    At its Spar­tan­burg plant, BASF uses its Geis­mar-pro­duced eth­yl­ene oxide to man­u­fac­ture dif­fer­ent kinds of sur­fac­tants, a type of chem­i­cal used in prod­ucts that pave roads, fuel cars and wash clothes. Invent­ed by a BASF sci­en­tist in 1916, the chem­i­cal reduces sur­face ten­sion between two sub­stances, enabling grime to come off of coun­ter­tops and cof­fee rings to dis­ap­pear from mugs. Freight trains trav­el­ing from Geis­mar pull cylin­dri­cal rail cars full of eth­yl­ene oxide past the tiny post office where Walk­er once worked, toward the BASF plant reac­tors. Inside, BASF work­ers mix the eth­yl­ene oxide with an alco­hol and a cat­a­lyst, “cook” the batch for hours at a high tem­per­a­ture and cool it off. Sur­fac­tants known as alco­hol alkoxy­lates are formed.

    Each year, the plant releas­es hun­dreds of pounds of eth­yl­ene oxide into White Stone’s air. Accord­ing to ProPublica’s analy­sis, the BASF plant emis­sions cause an esti­mat­ed 96,000 South Car­olini­ans to expe­ri­ence an ele­vat­ed can­cer risk lev­el above the EPA’s tar­get lim­it of 1 in 1 mil­lion. But because the EPA allows states to admin­is­ter the fed­er­al Clean Air Act, its imple­men­ta­tion varies wide­ly across the nation. Some states have tak­en steps to reduce the num­ber of peo­ple exposed to ele­vat­ed can­cer risk; Mass­a­chu­setts, for instance, does not allow indus­tri­al pol­lu­tion to gen­er­ate an excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion. Oth­er states, includ­ing Louisiana and South Car­oli­na, have per­mit­ted plants to emit can­cer-caus­ing pol­lu­tants at lev­els beyond the 1‑in-10,000 lim­it that the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment deems accept­able.

    Ron Aiken, spokesper­son for the South Car­oli­na Depart­ment of Health and Envi­ron­men­tal Con­trol, down­played con­cerns about can­cer risk found by ProPublica’s analy­sis. He also praised the com­pa­ny for its “well-mon­i­tored pol­lu­tion con­trol sys­tems” and said that “no mea­sured sci­en­tif­ic data sup­ports the asser­tion of increased can­cer risk for res­i­dents liv­ing near the BASF facil­i­ty.”

    There is no mea­sured data because the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment doesn’t require com­pa­nies to mea­sure emis­sions leav­ing their smoke­stacks and does not rou­tine­ly mon­i­tor the air in impact­ed neigh­bor­hoods for can­cer-caus­ing chem­i­cals, leav­ing states to decide whether they will. State reg­u­la­tors in South Car­oli­na have installed two mon­i­tors in Spar­tan­burg, but the clos­est one is rough­ly four miles from the BASF facil­i­ty, near a small med­ical ster­il­iza­tion plant.

    EPA spokesper­son Made­line Beal said in a state­ment that the agency intends to “advance the sci­ence around mon­i­tor­ing tech­nol­o­gy” and col­lect bet­ter emis­sions data. The agency has pledged $20 mil­lion in new fund­ing for mon­i­tors.

    “Only with that kind of infor­ma­tion can you fig­ure out how it’s going to impact the sur­round­ing com­mu­ni­ties,” said Richard Pelti­er, asso­ciate pro­fes­sor with the Uni­ver­si­ty of Mass­a­chu­setts’ envi­ron­men­tal health sci­ences depart­ment. “If you don’t have that access to that data, or you refuse to get that kind of data, you’re real­ly just guess­ing in the dark.”

    Walk­er didn’t know about the ele­vat­ed can­cer risk in White Stone — or the lack of mon­i­tor­ing near the BASF plant — until ProP­ub­li­ca showed her our find­ings this past spring.

    ...

    Four months after her recur­rence, a blood clot blocked one of Reed Walker’s arter­ies. He died unex­pect­ed­ly of a pul­monary embolism. Pul­monary embolism is the third lead­ing cause of death brought on by car­dio­vas­cu­lar dis­ease, which researchers have linked to high­er expo­sure of eth­yl­ene oxide. Walk­er now believes her husband’s risks could have been increased by air pol­lu­tion from his decades in the chem­i­cal busi­ness, which includ­ed spend­ing time in plants nation­wide, includ­ing one in South Car­oli­na that has emit­ted eth­yl­ene oxide. “Of course, it cross­es your mind,” she said. “He may have been exposed more than the com­mon per­son.”

    And now, sud­den­ly, she would have to fight can­cer alone.

    The Mix­ing
    St. Louis, Mis­souri

    Once BASF cooks sur­fac­tants, the com­pa­ny ships batch­es of them to one of its most loy­al cus­tomers. The ship­ment trav­els across the Mis­sis­sip­pi Riv­er, past the Gate­way Arch in St. Louis, to an indus­tri­al dis­trict near the city’s river­front. This is where Proc­ter & Gam­ble oper­ates a large clean­ing prod­uct man­u­fac­tur­ing site, where it turns raw chem­i­cal ingre­di­ents into such well-known brands as Mr. Clean, Febreze and Swif­fer. The chem­i­cal whose cre­ation pol­lutes the air in Geis­mar and Spar­tan­burg is ready to become part of one of America’s most rec­og­niz­able house­hold prod­ucts: Cas­cade.

    To Proc­ter & Gam­ble employ­ees, the company’s near­ly-cen­tu­ry-old plant resem­bles a giant kitchen. When BASF’s sur­fac­tants arrive at the St. Louis facil­i­ty, work­ers trans­fer the chem­i­cals into a ves­sel large enough to hold sev­er­al back­yard pools’ worth of liq­uid. The sur­fac­tant ves­sel stands near dozens of oth­er ingre­di­ents, each wait­ing to be used in a recipe for dif­fer­ent house­hold clean­ing prod­ucts. As one for­mer employ­ee explained: “The prod­ucts are easy to make. It’s lit­er­al­ly just mix­ing. … You just stir it with your spoon, your big old man­u­fac­tur­ing spoon.”

    The For­tune 500 com­pa­ny — which makes Tide, Crest, Boun­ty, Pam­pers, Old Spice, Tam­pax and dozens of oth­er pop­u­lar brands — relies on petro­le­um-derived sur­fac­tants to man­u­fac­ture its house­hold clean­ing prod­ucts. ProP­ub­li­ca spent months iden­ti­fy­ing con­sumer goods that con­tain spe­cif­ic BASF sur­fac­tants; we were able to trace a full sup­ply chain for Cas­cade, thanks in part to Proc­ter & Gamble’s cen­tral­ized pro­duc­tion of its dish­wash­er deter­gent. Records obtained by ProP­ub­li­ca show that BASF sur­fac­tants typ­i­cal­ly com­pose a tiny frac­tion of Cas­cade prod­ucts. But that small amount plays a large role in remov­ing grime with­out pro­duc­ing a lot of foam, which is cru­cial for a deter­gent to lim­it suds from form­ing in a dish­wash­er. In addi­tion, the sur­fac­tants allow for water to bet­ter clean glass­es with­out leav­ing spots and help glass­es sparkle more.

    BASF’s sur­fac­tants are a cru­cial part of the recipe that dif­fer­en­ti­ates Cas­cade from oth­er deter­gents — and help Proc­ter & Gam­ble con­trol more than 60% of the nation’s $1.4 bil­lion dish­wash­er deter­gent mar­ket, accord­ing to Chica­go-based mar­ket research firm IRI. (Proc­ter & Gam­ble declined to answer ques­tions about Cascade’s for­mu­la­tion. For­mer employ­ees say that the com­pa­ny typ­i­cal­ly uses mul­ti­ple chem­i­cal sup­pli­ers to min­i­mize sup­ply chain dis­rup­tions. Records obtained by ProP­ub­li­ca show that Proc­ter & Gam­ble has stored BASF sur­fac­tants at its plant over much of the past two decades.)

    The rise of Cas­cade mir­rors BASF’s nation­wide expan­sion. In the 1950s, Proc­ter & Gam­ble unveiled a “mir­a­cle” green pow­der, which it claimed could out­per­form all oth­er dish­wash­er deter­gents. The ear­li­est Cas­cade for­mu­la­tions were devel­oped at a time when Amer­i­can prod­ucts were begin­ning to incor­po­rate sur­fac­tants, a tech­nol­o­gy that a Proc­ter & Gam­ble sci­en­tist orig­i­nal­ly heard about dur­ing a meet­ing with IG Far­ben before World War II. Thanks in part to those sur­fac­tants, Cas­cade quick­ly became America’s most pop­u­lar dish­wash­er deter­gent brand. Decades lat­er, Proc­ter & Gam­ble faced a major busi­ness threat when com­peti­tors first intro­duced liq­uid deter­gents, tout­ed as more con­ve­nient than pow­der for­mu­la­tions. When Proc­ter & Gam­ble final­ly debuted its liq­uid for­mu­la­tion in the late 1980s, the com­pa­ny began to con­sol­i­date Cas­cade pro­duc­tion at its St. Louis plant.

    ...

    ————

    “The Dirty Secret of America’s Clean Dish­es” by Max Blau and Lyl­la Younes; ProP­ub­li­ca; 12/20/2021

    By the time mil­lions of con­sumers pur­chase Cas­cade each month, the cru­cial chem­i­cals that end up in the deter­gent have been craft­ed over the course of an 800-mile jour­ney from a BASF facil­i­ty in Port Arthur, Texas, to one in Geis­mar, Louisiana, to the one across from the post office in White Stone. From there, a final chem­i­cal prod­uct is hauled to an assem­bly line at a giant plant in St. Louis, Mis­souri, end­ing up in bold green pack­ages that line gro­cery store aisles nation­wide. By the time Walk­er pulls a con­tain­er of Cas­cade off the shelf, she will have already paid an even high­er price: chron­ic expo­sure to one of America’s most dan­ger­ous air pol­lu­tants, a sac­ri­fice in order to man­u­fac­ture the most pop­u­lar dish­wash­er deter­gent in the nation.”

    Deter­gent does­n’t man­u­fac­ture itself. All of those chem­i­cal ingre­di­ents had to come from some­where, and as the ProP­ub­li­ca report laid out just the eth­yl­ene-based sur­fac­tants alone go on a cross-coun­try jour­ney. It starts in Port Arthur, Texas, where the eth­yl­ene is first man­u­fac­tured by BASF. It trav­els to Geis­mar, Louisiana, where the con­ver­sion to eth­yl­ene oxide takes place and then gets trans­port­ed to White Stone, South Car­oli­na, where the eth­yl­ene oxide is fur­ther con­vert­ed into a vari­ety of sur­fac­tants. And those sur­fac­tants are final­ly tak­en to Proc­tor & Gam­ble’s plant at St. Louis, Mis­souri, where they’re mixed with the rest of the ingre­di­ents used to cre­ate Cas­cade and the myr­i­ad of oth­er house­hold con­sumer prod­ucts BAS­F’s chem­i­cals go into. And at each of those stops is a lega­cy of pol­lu­tion, can­cer, and exploita­tion of vul­ner­a­ble com­mu­ni­ties. Oh, and a lega­cy prof­its for BASF. Pol­lu­tion and prof­it. The two go hand in hand. It’s an inher­ent aspect of BAS­F’s chem­i­cal man­u­fac­tur­ing indus­try: more pol­lu­tion = more prof­its.

    But BASF isn’t just any chem­i­cal mak­er. It’s the largest chem­i­cal man­u­fac­tur­er in the world. That’s a lot of prof­it. And pol­lu­tion. More can­cer-caus­ing air-pol­lu­tion than any oth­er for­eign-owned com­pa­ny in the US. BAS­F’s foot­print in the US is so large its tox­ic foot­print was esti­mat­ed to be the fourth-largest of all com­pa­nies oper­at­ing in the coun­try. There are just three com­pa­nies in the entire US that spew out more pol­lu­tion than BASF. On one lev­el, it’s chill­ing. But on oth­er lev­el, it’s exact­ly what we should expect. BASF is a glob­al giant. Of course it has a major pres­ence in the US so of course its pol­lu­tion foot­print is enor­mous. And yet, as the report makes clear, that enor­mous pol­lu­tion foot­print isn’t sim­ply due to BAS­F’s enor­mous cor­po­rate pres­ence in the US. It’s also due to the fact that the com­pa­ny has appar­ent­ly been exploit­ing state and fed­er­al reg­u­la­to­ry loop­holes in the US that effec­tive­ly gives the pol­lut­ing com­pa­nies over­sight over their own pol­lu­tion. Trust the pol­luters. That’s the way in the USA. And the US has been trust­ing BASF quite a bit the last sev­en decades or so:

    ...
    The pass­ing trains car­ried tank cars of chem­i­cals bound for White Stone’s BASF plant, a fleet­ing moment in an epic mul­ti-state jour­ney dur­ing which BASF trans­forms nat­ur­al gas into spe­cial­ized, secre­tive com­pounds that are the build­ing blocks of ubiq­ui­tous clean­ing prod­ucts. BASF isn’t a house­hold name like Proc­ter & Gam­ble, but the ingre­di­ents it cre­ates are essen­tial to the suc­cess of that company’s prod­ucts, allow­ing dirt stains to be lift­ed from clothes and egg yolk to be washed off plates.

    The long, wind­ing path from shale rock to the kitchen cab­i­net con­tributes to mas­sive sales for BASF, the world’s largest chem­i­cal mak­er. But for the company’s neigh­bors, the jour­ney leaves behind a trail of tox­ic pol­lu­tion that has placed hun­dreds of thou­sands of peo­ple — includ­ing Walk­er — in harm’s way.

    The U.S. Envi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency aspires to min­i­mize the num­ber of peo­ple exposed to emis­sions that increase excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion. That risk lev­el means that if 1 mil­lion peo­ple in an area were exposed to tox­ic air pol­lu­tants over a pre­sumed life­time of 70 years, there would like­ly be at least one case of can­cer on top of those from risks peo­ple already face. But a ProP­ub­li­ca analy­sis found that the EPA effec­tive­ly allows two dozen BASF plants nation­wide to expose an esti­mat­ed 1.5 mil­lion Amer­i­cans to ele­vat­ed can­cer risks greater than 1 in 1 mil­lion. EPA rules also say that plants should nev­er expose peo­ple to an addi­tion­al life­time can­cer risk that exceeds 1 in 10,000. Yet an esti­mat­ed 2,800 peo­ple who live near BASF plants around the coun­try face risks at least that high because of the company’s emis­sions, accord­ing to our analy­sis. Our analy­sis is based on an EPA screen­ing tool that uses data report­ed by com­pa­nies such as BASF. It can­not be used to assess the cause of indi­vid­ual can­cer cas­es, but can iden­ti­fy geo­graph­ic areas of poten­tial con­cern.

    BASF’s foot­print of can­cer-caus­ing air pol­lu­tion is larg­er than that of any oth­er for­eign-owned com­pa­ny in the U.S. and is the fourth-largest tox­ic foot­print among all com­pa­nies oper­at­ing in this coun­try, accord­ing to our analy­sis.
    ...

    Part of this lega­cy of pol­lu­tion is the fact that BAS­F’s inter­est in US oper­a­tions appears to have begun almost imme­di­ate­ly after the com­pa­ny was spun out for the very same IG Far­ben com­plex it helped cre­ate in 1925. A major indus­tri­al com­po­nent of the Third Reich’s indus­tri­al machine began tour­ing the US to find a loca­tion in 1949 and laid the ground for its first plant less than a decade lat­er in Freeport, Texas. BASF has been a major part of the US’s core indus­tri­al infra­struc­ture for near­ly the entire post-war era. And as the arti­cle made clear, BASF has been oper­at­ing in states that more or less made it up to BASF to reg­u­late itself when it came to pol­lu­tion con­trols:

    ...
    The sto­ry of BASF’s dra­mat­ic Amer­i­can expan­sion began in Texas fol­low­ing the dark­est chap­ter in the company’s his­to­ry. Found­ed as a dye mak­er in the 1860s, BASF employed sci­en­tists who invent­ed thou­sands of chem­i­cals, from syn­thet­ic indi­go, which enabled the mass pro­duc­tion of blue jeans, to chlo­rine gas, which was used to poi­son sol­diers in the trench­es dur­ing World War I. In 1925, BASF helped found IG Far­ben, a Ger­man chem­i­cal car­tel that would not only sup­ply raw mate­ri­als for the Nazi war machine but also oper­ate a syn­thet­ic rub­ber and oil fac­to­ry depen­dent on slave labor from Jew­ish peo­ple impris­oned at the Monowitz con­cen­tra­tion camp. Among the cartel’s con­tri­bu­tions to the Nazis was a pes­ti­cide known as Zyk­lon B, which they used to exter­mi­nate more than 1 mil­lion peo­ple dur­ing the Holo­caust. At one of the Nurem­berg tri­als, a pros­e­cu­tor described the two-dozen IG Far­ben exec­u­tives indict­ed for war crimes as the “magi­cians who made the fan­tasies of Mein Kampf come true.” (BASF declined to answer ProPublica’s ques­tions about its past, but wrote on its web­site that IG Far­ben became part of an “autar­kic, coer­cive sys­tem” that aid­ed the Nazi regime.)

    After 13 of its exec­u­tives were found guilty, IG Far­ben was bro­ken up into sev­er­al com­pa­nies. In 1949, an exec­u­tive with the new­ly reformed BASF toured Dow Chemical’s plant in Freeport, Texas. Less than a decade lat­er, BASF broke ground on a chem­i­cal plant there, the first the com­pa­ny opened out­side of its home­land after World War II.

    In the decades that fol­lowed, U.S. com­mu­ni­ties hun­gry for jobs court­ed the com­pa­ny, which was able to grow its prof­its at an unprece­dent­ed pace thanks in part to reg­u­la­tions that allowed its plants to oper­ate with more lenient envi­ron­men­tal pro­tec­tions than com­pa­ra­ble plants in Ger­many. The extent of pol­lu­tion allowed by U.S. reg­u­la­tors was par­tic­u­lar­ly grave in south­east Texas. By the time BASF opened a plant in the coastal town of Port Arthur in 2001, near­by com­mu­ni­ties were so inun­dat­ed with poi­so­nous air that the arrival of BASF hard­ly stood out.

    ...

    Stand­ing on the top floor of Port Arthur’s City Hall, John Beard Jr. looks up from under his black wide-brimmed hat toward a hori­zon dot­ted with hulk­ing indus­tri­al facil­i­ties. Six per­cent of America’s crude oil gets refined in this 54,000-person city along the Gulf Coast, where neigh­bor­hood sub­di­vi­sions, ele­men­tary schools and play­grounds bor­der petro­chem­i­cal plants. Eigh­teen dif­fer­ent facil­i­ties emit a vari­ety of can­cer-caus­ing pol­lu­tants such as ben­zene, buta­di­ene and naph­tha­lene into the air of Port Arthur and its neigh­bor­ing towns.

    After clock­ing in at a refin­ery for 38 years, Beard Jr. came to real­ize that the indus­try had jeop­ar­dized the health of Port Arthur, a work­ing-class com­mu­ni­ty where the per­cent­age of Black res­i­dents is near­ly triple the nation­al aver­age. Since retir­ing in 2017, Beard Jr., founder and CEO of the Port Arthur Com­mu­ni­ty Action Net­work, has sound­ed the alarm by demand­ing bet­ter emis­sions con­trols and chal­leng­ing com­pa­nies’ attempts to pol­lute more. He also offers a guid­ed “tox­ic tour” to any­one inter­est­ed in see­ing the high price of liv­ing in “Ener­gy City.” One of his stops, on the north side of town, is BASF’s steam crack­er.
    ...

    And note the all major loop­hole that’s being exploit­ed by BASF: acci­den­tal dis­charges. Or rather, poor­ly fined acci­den­tal dis­charges that bare­ly cost pol­luters any­thing if fines are even imposed at all. It’s been the sta­tus quo in the US in the indus­try all along:

    ...
    The crack­ing process emits ben­zene, a car­cino­gen that stud­ies have linked to leukemia. While the Ger­man gov­ern­ment has long required BASF’s plants to be out­fit­ted with pol­lu­tion-reduc­tion equip­ment, the EPA did not issue rules to ade­quate­ly con­trol tox­ic releas­es until the late 1990s. Instead of requir­ing larg­er chem­i­cal plant oper­a­tors to reg­u­lar­ly mon­i­tor ben­zene emis­sions like Ger­man facil­i­ties did, fed­er­al and state envi­ron­men­tal agen­cies in the U.S. often took com­pa­nies that oper­at­ed chem­i­cal plants at their word that they would not emit more ben­zene than their per­mits allowed. Car­roll Muf­fett, pres­i­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Inter­na­tion­al Envi­ron­men­tal Law, says that Amer­i­can envi­ron­men­tal rules “have been out of step with the sci­ence of human health for decades.”

    ...

    But there is one major loop­hole that may fur­ther under­mine pol­lu­tion lim­its: acci­den­tal dis­charges. Such dis­charges hap­pen reg­u­lar­ly and may expose com­mu­ni­ties to much high­er lev­els of chem­i­cals than allowed under a plant’s per­mit. An Envi­ron­men­tal Integri­ty Project report found that BASF’s Port Arthur crack­er had emit­ted more than 887,000 pounds of air pol­lu­tants dur­ing unper­mit­ted dis­charges from 2015 to 2018, the sev­enth high­est out of 90 Texas plants ana­lyzed. Last year, BASF’s steam crack­er released 2,308 pounds of ben­zene in unper­mit­ted events, fifth-most statewide.

    Since the begin­ning of 2017, reg­u­la­tors have fined BASF $456,000 for air reg­u­la­tion vio­la­tions at the plant. But advo­cates say that fines are issued for less than 3% of all acci­den­tal dis­charges in Texas, and those fines are small giv­en the lev­el of unau­tho­rized emis­sions. The Texas Com­mis­sion on Envi­ron­men­tal Qual­i­ty deter­mines fines by the size of an unper­mit­ted release, poten­tial harm caused to human health, and whether the com­pa­ny prop­er­ly noti­fied the agency, said Tiffany Young, a spokesper­son for the TCEQ. In a state­ment, Young also said: “Fund­ing and staffing resources lim­it the agency’s abil­i­ty” to mon­i­tor emis­sions from acci­den­tal dis­charges at many indi­vid­ual plants.
    ...

    Not to be out­done by Tex­as­’s lax reg­u­la­tion, the BASF plant in Geis­mar, Louisiana, where the eth­yl­ene oxide is made, gen­er­ates one of the largest foot­prints of can­cer-caus­ing air-pol­lu­tion in the coun­try, with res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hoods sand­wiched between chem­i­cal plant. A tox­ic foot­print that’s a lot more tox­ic than pre­vi­ous­ly rec­og­nized. In 2016, the EPA declared eth­yl­ene oxide to be 30 times more tox­ic to adults and 60 times more tox­ic to chil­dren than pre­vi­ous­ly thought. Yes, it’s worse than we thought. Approx­i­mate­ly 30 to 60 times worse based on the last esti­mate:

    ...
    Inside BASF’s plant in Geis­mar, Louisiana, work­ers man­u­fac­ture eth­yl­ene oxide by heat­ing Port Arthur-made eth­yl­ene and mix­ing it with oxy­gen, then pass­ing the mix­ture through a reac­tor packed with a sil­ver cat­a­lyst. Once the reac­tor has cooled, the chem­i­cal prod­uct is puri­fied and processed. The plant, capa­ble of mak­ing 220,000 met­ric tons of eth­yl­ene oxide each year, gen­er­ates one of the country’s largest foot­prints of can­cer-caus­ing air pol­lu­tion — expos­ing more than an esti­mat­ed 800,000 Louisianans to excess can­cer risk greater than 1 in 1 mil­lion. (The real num­ber is cer­tain­ly high­er, but the plant’s emis­sions are esti­mat­ed to dis­perse far beyond the geo­graph­ic lim­its of the EPA’s mod­el­ing.) It also ele­vates the excess can­cer risk above 1 in 10,000 for an esti­mat­ed 180 of Geis­mar’s rough­ly 7,000 res­i­dents.

    ...

    Chem­i­cal com­pa­nies had trans­formed Favorite’s bucol­ic home­town into one of the nation’s largest “sac­ri­fice zones,” a term advo­cates use to describe indus­tri­al cor­ri­dors where cer­tain com­mu­ni­ties bear dis­pro­por­tion­ate health costs from the man­u­fac­tur­ing of prod­ucts used across the coun­try. Accord­ing to ProPublica’s analy­sis, eth­yl­ene oxide con­tributes to more can­cer risk than any oth­er tox­ic air pol­lu­tant emit­ted by Amer­i­can indus­try. Our demand for eth­yl­ene oxide cre­ates excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion for an esti­mat­ed 3.7 mil­lion peo­ple in south Louisiana. Stud­ies have linked the chem­i­cal to high­er rates of breast can­cer, lym­phoma and leukemia.

    The LDEQ’s eth­yl­ene oxide stan­dard, which allows con­cen­tra­tions of up to one micro­gram per cubic meter of air in com­mu­ni­ties near chem­i­cal plants, is 50 times the max­i­mum con­cen­tra­tion advised by the EPA. This allows com­pa­nies to emit vol­umes of pol­lu­tion that could ele­vate excess can­cer risk to a lev­el 30 times the EPA’s 1 in 10,000 stan­dard. As a result, BASF’s Geis­mar plant emits more than nine times as much eth­yl­ene oxide as its larg­er plant that makes the same chem­i­cal in its home­town of Lud­wigshafen, Ger­many. At that plant, com­pa­nies licensed by Ger­man reg­u­la­tors con­duct annu­al inspec­tions to ensure that con­cen­tra­tions of the can­cer-caus­ing chem­i­cal at each emis­sion point are below 0.5 mil­ligrams per cubic meter — a rule designed to lim­it the pollutant’s spread into neigh­bor­ing com­mu­ni­ties.

    ...

    Today, thin strips of neigh­bor­hoods are sand­wiched between sprawl­ing chem­i­cal plants. Eth­yl­ene oxide bil­lows invis­i­bly from BASF’s plant toward the Favorite house­hold. Short­ly before Malai­ka Favorite moved back home in 2016, the EPA declared the chem­i­cal to be 30 times more tox­ic to adults and 60 times more tox­ic to chil­dren than the agency pre­vi­ous­ly thought. In the fol­low­ing years, com­mu­ni­ties across the coun­try began learn­ing that they had been exposed for decades to one of America’s most potent indus­tri­al chem­i­cals. Res­i­dents of a Chica­go sub­urb protest­ed until the med­ical ster­il­iza­tion plant emit­ting eth­yl­ene oxide near their homes was forced to shut down. But in Favorite’s cor­ner of Can­cer Alley, the protests have long qui­et­ed even as reg­u­la­tors have recent­ly cleared the way for more indus­tri­al devel­op­ment.

    ...

    When Geis­mar res­i­dents devel­op can­cer, they often feel torn about whether to blame the plants. In a local Rotary Club speech in 2017, a BASF exec­u­tive down­played con­cerns about the rates of can­cer in the Geis­mar area, say­ing that “you can turn sta­tis­tics any way you want.” A decade ago, one of Favorite’s broth­ers bat­tled lym­phoma. Anoth­er broth­er and his wife worked in the chem­i­cal indus­try in Geis­mar for most of their careers. When her brother’s wife died of can­cer, Favorite said, he didn’t believe that her work­place had any­thing to do with it.
    ...

    Next, the eth­yl­ene oxide is shipped to the BASF plant at White Stone, South Car­oli­na, in Spar­tan­burg Coun­ty, where its used to cre­ate a vari­ety of sur­fac­tants. How much pol­lu­tion is that plant releas­ing into the air? It’s not entire­ly clear since the clos­est pol­lu­tion mon­i­tor is four miles from the plant. It’s as if Spar­tan­burg has active­ly adopt­ed a ‘see no evil, mon­i­tor no evil, speak no evil’ approach to over­sight for the plant:

    ...
    In the 1960s, a sharp-dressed busi­ness­man named Hans Laut­en­schlager trav­eled across Amer­i­ca to sell a more pros­per­ous life. To civic boost­ers, he pledged bet­ter jobs. To farm­ers, he assured greater yields. To politi­cians, he promised stronger economies. They could achieve their Amer­i­can dreams, he explained, if they opened their towns to BASF. In sell­ing those dreams, Laut­en­schlager helped BASF become one of the world’s largest chem­i­cal mak­ers. To keep BASF expand­ing, Laut­en­schlager con­vinced South Car­oli­na offi­cials to let the com­pa­ny build a $100 mil­lion petro­chem­i­cal plant near its coast, just out­side the bur­geon­ing tourist town of Hilton Head.

    But an unlike­ly alliance of work­ing-class Black shrimpers and rich white real estate devel­op­ers emerged in the ear­ly 1970s to fight the BASF plant and its poten­tial pol­lu­tion. They protest­ed, launched a nation­al media cam­paign and threat­ened legal action. On the heels of their lob­by­ing, a mem­ber of Pres­i­dent Richard Nixon’s admin­is­tra­tion warned the com­pa­ny that he would oppose the plant unless the company’s plans pro­tect­ed South Carolina’s Low­coun­try. BASF dropped the project, spar­ing Hilton Head from that threat. Soon after, though, a PR exec rep­re­sent­ing BASF told South Car­oli­na Gov.-elect John West that the com­pa­ny hoped to oper­ate a dif­fer­ent chem­i­cal plant else­where in the state. West sup­port­ed the plans. (He died in 2004.) With min­i­mal fan­fare, BASF acquired a chem­i­cal plant on the out­skirts of Spar­tan­burg, an inland city once nick­named “Tex­tile Town.” Since many of the region’s mills had shut­tered, local offi­cials embraced the chem­i­cal mak­ers because they pre­served jobs and tax dol­lars.

    The plant marked a turn­ing point in BASF’s nation­al expan­sion strat­e­gy, a way for the com­pa­ny to avoid con­tro­ver­sial plant con­struc­tions. Between 1970 and 2000, the com­pa­ny went from own­ing a hand­ful of facil­i­ties across the coun­try to oper­at­ing more than two dozen, many of them occu­py­ing the foot­print of for­mer plants and some locat­ed in South­ern states with more lax envi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tions. BASF also divest­ed from its man­u­fac­tur­ing of con­sumer goods like cas­sette tapes. Now focused on chem­i­cals, BASF aired a wave of TV com­mer­cials dur­ing the 1990s, in which the com­pa­ny pro­claimed: “We don’t make a lot of the prod­ucts you buy. We make a lot of the prod­ucts you buy bet­ter.”

    At its Spar­tan­burg plant, BASF uses its Geis­mar-pro­duced eth­yl­ene oxide to man­u­fac­ture dif­fer­ent kinds of sur­fac­tants, a type of chem­i­cal used in prod­ucts that pave roads, fuel cars and wash clothes. Invent­ed by a BASF sci­en­tist in 1916, the chem­i­cal reduces sur­face ten­sion between two sub­stances, enabling grime to come off of coun­ter­tops and cof­fee rings to dis­ap­pear from mugs. Freight trains trav­el­ing from Geis­mar pull cylin­dri­cal rail cars full of eth­yl­ene oxide past the tiny post office where Walk­er once worked, toward the BASF plant reac­tors. Inside, BASF work­ers mix the eth­yl­ene oxide with an alco­hol and a cat­a­lyst, “cook” the batch for hours at a high tem­per­a­ture and cool it off. Sur­fac­tants known as alco­hol alkoxy­lates are formed.

    Each year, the plant releas­es hun­dreds of pounds of eth­yl­ene oxide into White Stone’s air. Accord­ing to ProPublica’s analy­sis, the BASF plant emis­sions cause an esti­mat­ed 96,000 South Car­olini­ans to expe­ri­ence an ele­vat­ed can­cer risk lev­el above the EPA’s tar­get lim­it of 1 in 1 mil­lion. But because the EPA allows states to admin­is­ter the fed­er­al Clean Air Act, its imple­men­ta­tion varies wide­ly across the nation. Some states have tak­en steps to reduce the num­ber of peo­ple exposed to ele­vat­ed can­cer risk; Mass­a­chu­setts, for instance, does not allow indus­tri­al pol­lu­tion to gen­er­ate an excess can­cer risk above 1 in 1 mil­lion. Oth­er states, includ­ing Louisiana and South Car­oli­na, have per­mit­ted plants to emit can­cer-caus­ing pol­lu­tants at lev­els beyond the 1‑in-10,000 lim­it that the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment deems accept­able.

    Ron Aiken, spokesper­son for the South Car­oli­na Depart­ment of Health and Envi­ron­men­tal Con­trol, down­played con­cerns about can­cer risk found by ProPublica’s analy­sis. He also praised the com­pa­ny for its “well-mon­i­tored pol­lu­tion con­trol sys­tems” and said that “no mea­sured sci­en­tif­ic data sup­ports the asser­tion of increased can­cer risk for res­i­dents liv­ing near the BASF facil­i­ty.”

    There is no mea­sured data because the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment doesn’t require com­pa­nies to mea­sure emis­sions leav­ing their smoke­stacks and does not rou­tine­ly mon­i­tor the air in impact­ed neigh­bor­hoods for can­cer-caus­ing chem­i­cals, leav­ing states to decide whether they will. State reg­u­la­tors in South Car­oli­na have installed two mon­i­tors in Spar­tan­burg, but the clos­est one is rough­ly four miles from the BASF facil­i­ty, near a small med­ical ster­il­iza­tion plant.
    ...

    Final­ly, the sur­fac­tants are shipped off to the Proc­ter & Gam­ble plant in St. Louis, where they’re mixed to cre­ate a myr­i­ad of house­hold con­sumer prod­ucts used by near­ly every Amer­i­can house­hold. Thanks, in part, to BAS­F’s sur­fac­tants, Proc­ter & Gam­ble con­trols more than 60% of the US’s dish­wash­er deter­gent mar­ket. It real­ly isn’t an exag­ger­a­tion to say Amer­i­ca cleans its dish­es with BAS­F’s chem­i­cals. It’s a reliance on BASF tech­nol­o­gy that report­ed­ly goes all the way back before WWII, when Proc­ter & Gam­ble exec­u­tives held a meet­ing with IG Far­ben exec­u­tives where they first heard about the idea of using sur­fac­tants:

    ...
    Once BASF cooks sur­fac­tants, the com­pa­ny ships batch­es of them to one of its most loy­al cus­tomers. The ship­ment trav­els across the Mis­sis­sip­pi Riv­er, past the Gate­way Arch in St. Louis, to an indus­tri­al dis­trict near the city’s river­front. This is where Proc­ter & Gam­ble oper­ates a large clean­ing prod­uct man­u­fac­tur­ing site, where it turns raw chem­i­cal ingre­di­ents into such well-known brands as Mr. Clean, Febreze and Swif­fer. The chem­i­cal whose cre­ation pol­lutes the air in Geis­mar and Spar­tan­burg is ready to become part of one of America’s most rec­og­niz­able house­hold prod­ucts: Cas­cade.

    ...

    BASF’s sur­fac­tants are a cru­cial part of the recipe that dif­fer­en­ti­ates Cas­cade from oth­er deter­gents — and help Proc­ter & Gam­ble con­trol more than 60% of the nation’s $1.4 bil­lion dish­wash­er deter­gent mar­ket, accord­ing to Chica­go-based mar­ket research firm IRI. (Proc­ter & Gam­ble declined to answer ques­tions about Cascade’s for­mu­la­tion. For­mer employ­ees say that the com­pa­ny typ­i­cal­ly uses mul­ti­ple chem­i­cal sup­pli­ers to min­i­mize sup­ply chain dis­rup­tions. Records obtained by ProP­ub­li­ca show that Proc­ter & Gam­ble has stored BASF sur­fac­tants at its plant over much of the past two decades.)

    The rise of Cas­cade mir­rors BASF’s nation­wide expan­sion. In the 1950s, Proc­ter & Gam­ble unveiled a “mir­a­cle” green pow­der, which it claimed could out­per­form all oth­er dish­wash­er deter­gents. The ear­li­est Cas­cade for­mu­la­tions were devel­oped at a time when Amer­i­can prod­ucts were begin­ning to incor­po­rate sur­fac­tants, a tech­nol­o­gy that a Proc­ter & Gam­ble sci­en­tist orig­i­nal­ly heard about dur­ing a meet­ing with IG Far­ben before World War II. Thanks in part to those sur­fac­tants, Cas­cade quick­ly became America’s most pop­u­lar dish­wash­er deter­gent brand. Decades lat­er, Proc­ter & Gam­ble faced a major busi­ness threat when com­peti­tors first intro­duced liq­uid deter­gents, tout­ed as more con­ve­nient than pow­der for­mu­la­tions. When Proc­ter & Gam­ble final­ly debuted its liq­uid for­mu­la­tion in the late 1980s, the com­pa­ny began to con­sol­i­date Cas­cade pro­duc­tion at its St. Louis plant.
    ...

    So Proc­ter & Gam­ble first got the idea for using sur­fac­tants dur­ing a pre-WWII meet­ing with IG Far­ben. And as we saw about, flash for­ward to the post-war peri­od and we find that BASF — hav­ing been just spun out from IG Far­ben — was already work­ing on set­ting up a US foot­print by 1949. And remains a linch­pin of the US’s indus­tri­al infra­struc­ture to this day. BAS­F’s prod­ucts go into so many dif­fer­ent US con­sumer prod­ucts it’s effec­tive­ly impos­si­ble to avoid prod­ucts made from BASF chem­i­cals. Which makes this the kind of scan­dal that almost can’t get any big­ger. The biggest for­eign man­u­fac­tur­er in the US has basi­cal­ly been giv­en license to pol­lute select­ed com­mu­ni­ties for decades. Noth­ing has changed up to now and there’s no indi­ca­tion change is com­ing. Well, ok, change is com­ing in some sense. The indus­tri­al pol­lu­tion is get­ting steadi­ly worse as this sit­u­a­tion con­tin­ues. That’s change.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | December 26, 2021, 5:16 pm

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