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FTR #1197 This program was recorded in one, 60-minute segment.
Introduction: This program continues with discussion of the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek’s “narco-fascism,”–the opium and narcotics trade in China.
One cannot understand contemporary China and the political history of that country over the last couple of centuries without a comprehensive grasp of the effect of the Opium Wars on that nation and its people.
Indeed, one cannot grasp Chinese history and politics without an understanding of the narcotics trade’s central position in that country’s politics.
Key points of analysis and discussion of the Opium Wars include:
- The economic imperative for the conflicts were the trade imbalance between China and Britain: “ . . . . In the 18th century the demand for Chinese luxury goods (particularly silk, porcelain, and tea) created a trade imbalance between China and Britain. European silver flowed into Chinathrough the Canton System, which confined incoming foreign trade to the southern port city of Canton. . . .”
- To alter that dynamic, the British East India Company turned to the opium trade: “ . . . . To counter this imbalance, the British East India Company began to grow opium in Bengal and allowed private British merchants to sell opium to Chinese smugglers for illegal sale in China. The influx of narcotics reversed the Chinese trade surplus, drained the economy of silver, and increased the numbers of opium addicts inside the country, outcomes that seriously worried Chinese officials. . . .”
- The Chinese attempt at interdicting the opium trade was countered with force of arms: “ . . . . In 1839, the Daoguang Emperor, rejecting proposals to legalize and tax opium, appointed ViceroyLin Zexu to go to Canton to halt the opium trade completely.[8] Lin wrote an open letter to Queen Victoria, which she never saw, appealing to her moral responsibility to stop the opium trade.[9] Lin then resorted to using force in the western merchants’ enclave. He confiscated all supplies and ordered a blockade of foreign ships on the Pearl River. Lin also confiscated and destroyed a significant quantity of European opium.[10] The British government responded by dispatching a military force to China and in the ensuing conflict, the Royal Navy used its naval and gunnery power to inflict a series of decisive defeats on the Chinese Empire,[11] a tactic later referred to as gunboat diplomacy. . . .”
- Forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking, China experienced: “ . . . . In 1842, the Qing dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking—the first of what the Chinese later called the unequal treaties—which granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to British subjects in China . . . . The 1842 Treaty of Nanking not only opened the way for further opium trade, but ceded the territory of Hong Kong . . . . ”
- The trade imbalance between China and Britain worsened, and the expense of maintain new colonial territories—including Hong Kong (appropriated through the first Opium War)—led to the second Opium War. Note that the “extraterritoriality” granted to British subjects exempted them from Chinese law, including the official prohibition against opium trafficking: “ . . . . Despite the new ports available for trade under the Treaty of Nanking, by 1854 Britain’s imports from China had reached nine times their exports to the country. At the same time British imperial finances came under further pressure from the expense of administering the burgeoning colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore in addition to India. Only the latter’s opium could balance the deficit. [30]Along with various complaints about the treatment of British merchants in Chinese ports and the Qing government’s refusal to accept further foreign ambassadors, the relatively minor ‘Arrow Incident’ provided the pretext the British needed to once more resort to military force to ensure the opium kept flowing. . . . Matters quickly escalated and led to the Second Opium War . . . .”
- As a result of the Second Opium War, China was obliged to Cede No.1 District of Kowloon (south of present-day Boundary Street) to Britain; grant “freedom of religion,” which led to an influx of Western Missionaries, U.S. in particular; British ships were allowed to carry indentured Chinese to the Americas; legalization of the opium trade.”
- Fierce, eloquent condemnation of the Opium Wars was voiced by British Prime Minister Gladstone: “ . . . . The opium trade incurred intense enmity from the later British Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone.[34] As a member of Parliament, Gladstone called it ‘most infamous and atrocious’, referring to the opium trade between China and British India in particular.[35] Gladstone was fiercely against both of the Opium Wars, was ardently opposed to the British trade in opium to China, and denounced British violence against Chinese.[36] Gladstone lambasted it as ‘Palmerston’s Opium War’ and said that he felt ‘in dread of the judgments of God upon England for our national iniquity towards China’ in May 1840.[37] A famous speech was made by Gladstone in Parliament against the First Opium War.[38][39] Gladstone criticized it as ‘a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with permanent disgrace’. . . .”
Among the outgrowths of the Opium Wars was an end to the Qing dynasty’s ban on Chinese emigration and the resultant “coolie trade.”
The Chinese have a long-standing and deserved reputation as good workers. The U.S. and British embrace of the “coolie trade” permitted large numbers of Chinese laborers to be imported into the U.S., where they were widely employed in the silver mining industry and the railroads.
This led to widespread, deadly retaliation by the white establishment against Chinese workers, encouraged by the media and political establishments.
Beheadings, scalping, castration and cannibalism were among the deadly outgrowths of the White Terror against Chinese.
The violence was accompanied by legal restrictions on the immigration by Chinese into the U.S.
With opium having developed into a major scourge of Chinese society and legalized through the Second Opium War, the opium trade became the foundation for the ascent of the brilliant, charismatic, treacherous and altogether deadly Shanghai organized crime boss Tu Yueh-Sheng (“Big Eared Tu”).
Convincing Pockmarked Huang–leader of China’s Red Gang–to join with him in organizing the opium trade into a cartel, Big-Eared Tu consolidated and maximized the enormous profits of that trade into a power base that made him the most powerful figure in China.
He further augmented his influence by terrorizing the management of numerous commercial enterprises, while consolidating the workers of those firms into what became–in effect–Green Gang labor cadres.
Eventually, Tu brought a carousing buddy–the young Chiang Kai-shek–into his fold and made Chiang and his Kuomintang into a political front for the Green Gang’s vast criminal empire and its doctrinaire anti-Communism.
The latter became a key element of ideological affinity became Chiang’s Kuomintang and the U.S.
The Green Gang/Chiang Kai-shek/Kuomintang alliance also embraced the powerful Soong family, which gave that milieu tremendous gravitas with the U.S.
T.V. Soong, his brothers and–in particular–his sisters Ai-ling and Mae-ling Soong played dominant roles in both China and the US.
(Ai-ling married wealthy Chinese finance minister H.H. Kung and arranged for her sister Mae-ling to marry Chiang Kai-shek.)
Much more will be said about the members of this family later in this series of programs.
One of the principal vehicles for the Green Gang’s control of China was its successful infiltration of the Whampoa Military Academy, which gave that criminal syndicate decisive leverage over the Kuomintang Army.
That army’s leadership were simultaneously officers and leaders of the army and gangsters of the first order.
Much more will be said about the synthesis of the Green Gang and the Kuomintang army later in this series.
We conclude with review of research by the brilliant Douglas Valentine, presented in FTR#1095. Valentine’s analysis is a good synoptic view of Chiang’s regime.
In addition to the European colonization of China and Britain’s violent imposition of the opium drug trade through the Opium Wars, China’s political and historical memory is vividly animated by the drug-financed fascist dictatorship of Nationalist Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Dubbed “the Peanut” by General Joseph Stilwell during World War II, Chiang was compared by Stilwell (the chief American military adviser and liaison to the Kuomintang forces during World War II) to Mussolini.
Chiang’s entire government and brutal national security apparatus rested on the foundation of the narcotics traffic, as was well known by the US Commissioner Bureau of Narcotics, Harry Anslinger.
Key points of discussion and analysis of this relationship include: The decisive role of the Green Gang of Shanghai crime lord Du (sometimes ‘Tu”) Yue-sheng in both financing Chiang’s forces and supplying muscle and intelligence to Tai Li, Chiang’s intelligence chief and interior minister, nicknamed “The Himmler of China;” the important role of Chiang’s drug traffic in supplying American t’ongs who, in turned, supplied the Mafia with their narcotics; the role of Chiang’s finance minister as Du Yue-sheng’s protector; the collaboration of Du and Chaing Kai-shek’s Kuomintang apparatus with the Japanese occupation government of Manchuria in the narcotics traffic; the role of Chaing’s head of Narcotics Control in supplying Chinese officials with drugs; the role of the Superintendent of Maritime Customs in Shanghai in supervising the trafficking of drugs to the U.S.; Du Yueh-sheng’s flight to Hong Kong after the Japanese occupation of Shanghai; Du’s collaboration with Hong Kong-based British financiers in selling drugs to the Chinese population; the deliberate deception on the part of Anslinger and kingpins in the US China Lobby, who knowingly misled the American public by blaming the U.S. drug traffic on the Communist Chinese; the narcotics kickbacks to U.S. China Lobby figures by Chiang’s dope trafficking infrastructure; the overlap of the Kuomintang dope trade with arms sales by China Lobby luminaries; the support of the CIA for Chiang’s narcotics traffic; the destruction of the career of Foreign Service officer John Service, who noted that “the Nationalists were totally dependent on opium and ‘incapable of solving China’s problems;’ ” the central role of Tai Li’s agents in the U.S. in framing John Service.
Supplemental information about these topics is contained in AFA #11 and AFA #24.
1. One cannot understand contemporary China and the political history of that country over the last couple of centuries without a comprehensive grasp of the effect of the Opium Wars on that nation and its people.
Indeed, one cannot grasp Chinese history and politics without an understanding of the narcotics trade’s central position in that country’s politics.
A viable understanding of China’s past yields understanding of its present.
Awareness of key dynamics of Chinese history includes:
- The decisive role of European and American military domination and economic exploitation of China.
- The role of the narcotics traffic in the erosion of Chinese society in the 19th century.
- The British-led “Opium Wars,” which were the foundation of the destruction wrought by dope addiction in China.
- The Opium Wars and their implementation by “Gunboat Diplomacy” of British and European territorial expansion in China.
- The pivotal role of that “Gunboat Diplomacy” in the British acquisition of Hong Kong.
- Contemporary Chinese concern with the military safety of their ports, territorial waters, adjacent seas and oceans, shipping lanes, merchant marine traffic. This stems in large measure from China’s experience with “Gunboat Diplomacy” and the ravaging of China by Imperial Japan during the 1930’s and 1940’s.
- The introduction of Western missionaries into China–American missionaries, in particular.
- The fostering of the “Missionary position” toward China on the part of the U.S.
- American missionaries’ use of morphine to cure Chinese opium addicts, a practice so prevalent that the Chinese referred to morphine as “Jesus opium.”
- The enormous opium trade in China as the foundation for the coalescence and ascent of Shanghai’s Green Gang and Tu Yueh-Shen: “Big Eared Tu.”
- The dominance of the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-Shek by the Green Gang and Big-Eared Tu.
- The fundamental reliance of Chiang’s government on the narcotics trade.
- The dominant role of Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime in the U.S. narcotics trade.
- The doctrinaire fascism of Chiang Kai-Shek and his operational relationships with Nazi Germany, Mussolini’s Italy and Imperial Japan.
- The central role of the Soong family in Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang; T.V. Soong, his sisters Mae-ling (married to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek), Ai-ling (married to H.H. Kung, a key finance minister of the Kuomointang), and several of T. V.‘s brothers, who also shared in the slicing of the pie under Chiang.
- The pivotal role of American publishing giant Henry Luce, whose missionary background in China informed and animated his adoration of Chiang Kai-Shek and Mme. Chiang.
- The role of the Luce publishing empire and the enormous financial influence of the consummately corrupt Soong family in spawning “The China Lobby.”
- The decisive role of the Chiang Kai-Shek’s refusal to fight the Japanese invaders, combined with the brutal repression and civic ineptitude in driving the Chinese people into the arms of Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communist Party.
Key points of analysis and discussion of the Opium Wars include:
- The economic imperative for the conflicts were the trade imbalance between China and Britain: “ . . . . In the 18th century the demand for Chinese luxury goods (particularly silk, porcelain, and tea) created a trade imbalance between China and Britain. European silver flowed into Chinathrough the Canton System, which confined incoming foreign trade to the southern port city of Canton. . . .”
- To alter that dynamic, the British East India Company turned to the opium trade: “ . . . . To counter this imbalance, the British East India Company began to grow opium in Bengal and allowed private British merchants to sell opium to Chinese smugglers for illegal sale in China. The influx of narcotics reversed the Chinese trade surplus, drained the economy of silver, and increased the numbers of opium addicts inside the country, outcomes that seriously worried Chinese officials. . . .”
- The Chinese attempt at interdicting the opium trade was countered with force of arms: “ . . . . In 1839, the Daoguang Emperor, rejecting proposals to legalize and tax opium, appointed ViceroyLin Zexu to go to Canton to halt the opium trade completely.[8] Lin wrote an open letter to Queen Victoria, which she never saw, appealing to her moral responsibility to stop the opium trade.[9] Lin then resorted to using force in the western merchants’ enclave. He confiscated all supplies and ordered a blockade of foreign ships on the Pearl River. Lin also confiscated and destroyed a significant quantity of European opium.[10] The British government responded by dispatching a military force to China and in the ensuing conflict, the Royal Navy used its naval and gunnery power to inflict a series of decisive defeats on the Chinese Empire,[11] a tactic later referred to as gunboat diplomacy. . . .”
- Forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking, China experienced: “ . . . . In 1842, the Qing dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking—the first of what the Chinese later called the unequal treaties—which granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to British subjects in China . . . . The 1842 Treaty of Nanking not only opened the way for further opium trade, but ceded the territory of Hong Kong . . . . ”
- The trade imbalance between China and Britain worsened, and the expense of maintain new colonial territories—including Hong Kong (appropriated through the first Opium War)—led to the second Opium War. Note that the “extraterritoriality” granted to British subjects exempted them from Chinese law, including the official prohibition against opium trafficking: “ . . . . Despite the new ports available for trade under the Treaty of Nanking, by 1854 Britain’s imports from China had reached nine times their exports to the country. At the same time British imperial finances came under further pressure from the expense of administering the burgeoning colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore in addition to India. Only the latter’s opium could balance the deficit. [30]Along with various complaints about the treatment of British merchants in Chinese ports and the Qing government’s refusal to accept further foreign ambassadors, the relatively minor ‘Arrow Incident’ provided the pretext the British needed to once more resort to military force to ensure the opium kept flowing. . . . Matters quickly escalated and led to the Second Opium War . . . .”
- As a result of the Second Opium War, China was obliged to Cede No.1 District of Kowloon (south of present-day Boundary Street) to Britain; grant “freedom of religion,” which led to an influx of Western Missionaries, U.S. in particular; British ships were allowed to carry indentured Chinese to the Americas; legalization of the opium trade.”
- Fierce, eloquent condemnation of the Opium Wars was voiced by British Prime Minister Gladstone: “ . . . . The opium trade incurred intense enmity from the later British Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone.[34] As a member of Parliament, Gladstone called it ‘most infamous and atrocious’, referring to the opium trade between China and British India in particular.[35] Gladstone was fiercely against both of the Opium Wars, was ardently opposed to the British trade in opium to China, and denounced British violence against Chinese.[36] Gladstone lambasted it as ‘Palmerston’s Opium War’ and said that he felt ‘in dread of the judgments of God upon England for our national iniquity towards China’ in May 1840.[37] A famous speech was made by Gladstone in Parliament against the First Opium War.[38][39] Gladstone criticized it as ‘a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with permanent disgrace’. . . .”
2. Among the outgrowths of the Opium Wars was an end to the Qing dynasty’s ban on Chinese emigration and the resultant “coolie trade.”
The Chinese have a long-standing and deserved reputation as good workers. The U.S. and British embrace of the “coolie trade” permitted large numbers of Chinese laborers to be imported into the U.S., where they were widely employed in the silver mining industry and the railroads.
This led to widespread, deadly retaliation by the white establishment against Chinese workers, encouraged by the media and political establishments.
Beheadings, scalping, castration and cannibalism were among the deadly outgrowths of the White Terror against Chinese.
The violence was accompanied by legal restrictions on the immigration by Chinese into the U.S.
3. With opium having developed into a major scourge of Chinese society and legalized through the Second Opium War, the opium trade became the foundation for the ascent of the brilliant, charismatic, treacherous and altogether deadly Shanghai organized crime boss Tu Yueh-Sheng (“Big Eared Tu”).
Convincing Pockmarked Huang–leader of China’s Red Gang–to join with him in organizing the opium trade into a cartel, Big-Eared Tu consolidated and maximized the enormous profits of that trade into a power base that made him the most powerful figure in China.
He further augmented his influence by terrorizing the management of numerous commercial enterprises, while consolidating the workers of those firms into what became–in effect–Green Gang labor cadres.
Eventually, Tu brought a carousing buddy–the young Chiang Kai-shek–into his fold and made Chiang and his Kuomintang into a political front for the Green Gang’s vast criminal empire and its doctrinaire anti-Communism.
The latter became a key element of ideological affinity became Chiang’s Kuomintang and the U.S.
The Green Gang/Chiang Kai-shek/Kuomintang alliance also embraced the powerful Soong family, which gave that milieu tremendous gravitas with the U.S.
T.V. Soong, his brothers and–in particular–his sisters Ai-ling and Mae-ling Soong played dominant roles in both China and the US.
(Ai-ling married wealthy Chinese finance minister H.H. Kung and arranged for her sister Mae-ling to marry Chiang Kai-shek.)
Much more will be said about the members of this family later in this series of programs.
4. One of the principal vehicles for the Green Gang’s control of China was its successful infiltration of the Whampoa Military Academy, which gave that criminal syndicate decisive leverage over the Kuomintang Army.
That army’s leadership were simultaneously officers and leaders of the army and gangsters of the first order.
Much more will be said about the synthesis of the Green Gang and the Kuomintang army later in this series.
5. In addition to the European colonization of China and Britain’s violent imposition of the opium drug trade through the Opium Wars, China’s political and historical memory is vividly animated by the drug-financed fascist dictatorship of Nationalist Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Dubbed “the Peanut” by General Joseph Stilwell during World War II, Chiang was compared by Stilwell (the chief American military adviser and liaison to the Kuomintang forces during World War II) to Mussolini.
Chiang’s entire government and brutal national security apparatus rested on the foundation of the narcotics traffic, as was well known by the US Commissioner Bureau of Narcotics, Harry Anslinger.
Key points of discussion and analysis of this relationship include: The decisive role of the Green Gang of Shanghai crime lord Du (sometimes ‘Tu”) Yue-sheng in both financing Chiang’s forces and supplying muscle and intelligence to Tai Li, Chiang’s intelligence chief and interior minister, nicknamed “The Himmler of China;” the important role of Chiang’s drug traffic in supplying American t’ongs who, in turned, supplied the Mafia with their narcotics; the role of Chiang’s finance minister as Du Yue-sheng’s protector; the collaboration of Du and Chaing Kai-shek’s Kuomintang apparatus with the Japanese occupation government of Manchuria in the narcotics traffic; the role of Chaing’s head of Narcotics Control in supplying Chinese officials with drugs; the role of the Superintendent of Maritime Customs in Shanghai in supervising the trafficking of drugs to the U.S.; Du Yueh-sheng’s flight to Hong Kong after the Japanese occupation of Shanghai; Du’s collaboration with Hong Kong-based British financiers in selling drugs to the Chinese population; the deliberate deception on the part of Anslinger and kingpins in the US China Lobby, who knowingly misled the American public by blaming the U.S. drug traffic on the Communist Chinese; the narcotics kickbacks to U.S. China Lobby figures by Chiang’s dope trafficking infrastructure; the overlap of the Kuomintang dope trade with arms sales by China Lobby luminaries; the support of the CIA for Chiang’s narcotics traffic; the destruction of the career of Foreign Service officer John Service, who noted that “the Nationalists were totally dependent on opium and ‘incapable of solving China’s problems;’ ” the central role of Tai Li’s agents in the U.S. in framing John Service.
Supplemental information about these topics is contained in AFA #11 and AFA #24.
The CIA as Organized Crime by Douglas Valentine; Clarity Press [SC]; Copyright 2017 by Douglas Valentine; ISBN 978–0‑9972870–2‑8; pp. 222–224.
In the 1920s, the US threw its weight behind Chiang Kai-shek, whose Kuomintang Party was fighting the Communists and several other warlords for control of China. The US was competing with the other colonial nations for control of China, which had a cheap labor force and represented billions in profits for US corporations and investors. The problem was that the Kuomintang supported itself through the opium trade. It’s well documented in the diplomatic cables between the US government and its representatives in China. Historians Kinder and Walker said the Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, Harry Anslinger, “clearly knew about the ties between Chiang and opium dealers.”
Anslinger knew that Shanghai was “the prime producer and exporter to the illicit world drug markets,” through a syndicate controlled by Du Yue-sheng, a crime lord who facilitated Chiang’s bloody ascent to power in 1927. As early as 1932, Anslinger knew that Chiang’s finance minister was Du’s protector. He’d had evidence since 1929 that American t’ongs were receiving Kuomintang narcotics and distributing it to the Mafia. Middlemen worked with opium merchants, gangsters like Du, Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria, and Dr. Lansing Ling, “who supplied narcotics to Chinese officials traveling abroad.” In 1938, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Dr. Ling head of his Narcotic Control Department.
In October 1934, the Treasury attache in Shanghai “submitted reports implicating Chiang Kai-shek in the heroin trade to North America.” In 1935, the attache reported that the Superintendent of Maritime Customs in Shanghai was “acting as agent for Chiang Kai-shek in arranging for the preparation and shipment of the stuff to the United States.”
These reports reached Anslinger’s desk, so he knew which KMT officials and trade missions were delivering dope to American t’ongs and which American mafia drug rings were buying it. He knew the t’ongs were kicking back a percentage of the profits to finance Chiang’s regime.
After Japanese forces Shanghai in August 1937, Anslinger was even less willing to deal honestly with the situation. By then, Du was sitting on Shanghai’s Municipal Board with William J. Keswick. Du found sanctuary in Hong Kong, where he was welcomed by a cabal of free-trading British colonialists whose shipping and banking companies earned huge revenues by allowing Du to push his drugs on the hapless Chinese. The revenues were truly immense: according to Colonel Joseph Stilwell, the US military attache in China, in 1935 there were “eight million Chinese heroin and morphine addicts and another 72 million Chinese opium addicts.”
Anslinger tried to minimize the problem by lying and saying that Americans were not affected. But the final decisions were made by his bosses in Washington, and from their national security perspective, the profits enabled the Kuomintang to purchase $31 million worth of fighter planes from arms dealer William Pawley to fight the Communists, and that trumped any moral dilemmas about trading with the Japanese or getting Americans addicted.
It’s all documented. Check the sources I cite in my books. Plus, US Congressmen and Senators in the China Lobby were profiting from the guns for drugs business too. They got kickbacks in the form of campaign funds and in exchange, they looked away as long as Anslinger told them the dope stayed overseas. After 1949, the China Lobby manipulated public hearings and Anslinger cooked the books to make sure that the Peoples Republic was blamed for all narcotics coming out of the Far East. Everyone made money and after 1947 the operation was run out of Taiwan, with CIA assistance.
The US government’s involvement in the illicit drug business was institutionalized during World War Two. While serving on General Joseph Stilwell’s staff in 1944, Foreign Service officer John Service reported from Kunming, the city where the Flying Tigers and OSS were headquartered, that the Nationalists were totally dependent on opium and “incapable of solving China’s problems.”
Service’s reports contributed to the Truman Administration’s decision not to come to Chiang’s rescue at the end of the war. In retaliation, Chiang’s intelligence chief, Tai Li, had his agents in America accuse Service of leaking the Kuomintang’s battle plans to a leftist newsletter. Service was arrested. After Service was cleared of any wrongdoing, the China Lobby persisted in attacking his character for the next six years. He was subjected to eight loyalty hearings, and dismissed from the State Department in 1951.
Service’s persecution was fair warning that anyone linking the Nationalist Chinese to drug smuggling would, at a minimum, be branded a Communist sympathizer and his reputation ruined. That is how the US drug operation is still protected today, although security for the operation has improved and whistleblowers are smeared in other ways.
After World War Two, the business of managing the government’s involvement in the illicit narcotics trade was given to the CIA, because it could covertly conduct support operations for, among others, the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan. The CIA also relocated and supplied one of Chiang’s armies to Burma. This KMT army supported itself through the opium trade and the CIA flew the opium to places where it was converted to heroin and sold to the Mafia. The other bureaucracies—the military and the Departments of State, Justice and Treasury—provided protection along with the China Lobby congressmen and senators who controlled the little information that was made public. . . .
Discussion
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