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FTR#1211 The Narco-Fascism of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, Part 18

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­­­FTR #1211 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: Intro­duc­ing the expan­sion of Amer­i­can expe­ri­ence with Chi­ang and his Kuom­intang fas­cists into U.S. Cold War pol­i­cy in Asia, we present Ster­ling Seagrave’s rumi­na­tion about Stan­ley Horn­beck, a State Depart­ment flack who became: “. . . . the doyen of State’s Far East­ern Divi­sion. . . .”

Horn­beck “ . . . . had only the most abbre­vi­at­ed and stilt­ed knowl­edge of Chi­na, and had been out of touch per­son­al­ly for many years. . . . He with­held cables from the Sec­re­tary of State that were crit­i­cal of Chi­ang, and once stat­ed that ‘the Unit­ed States Far East­ern pol­i­cy is like a train run­ning on a rail­road track.  It has been clear­ly laid out and where it is going is plain to all.’ It was in fact bound for Saigon in 1975, with whis­tle stops along the way at Peking, Que­moy, Mat­su, and the Yalu Riv­er. . . .”

Next, we vis­it one of the stops on Horn­beck­’s straight rail­way line:

A con­sum­mate­ly impor­tant study of Viet­nam War crimes was authored by Nick Turse. A review by the U.S. Naval Insti­tute can be tak­en as an advi­so­ry in this regard.

Mr. Turse per­forms the remark­able feat of unspar­ing­ly sear­ing pre­sen­ta­tion of the war crimes that were stan­dard oper­at­ing pro­ce­dure for much of the Amer­i­can (and allied) forces in Viet­nam by trac­ing the foun­da­tion of those crimes from the tech­no­crat­ic approach to mil­i­tary strat­e­gy pur­sued by the Pen­ta­gon and Robert McNa­ma­ra, through the re-social­iza­tion and re-pro­gram­ming of young, often teen-aged, recruits to turn them into reflex­ive killers, chron­i­cling the mas­sive fire­pow­er avail­able to U.S. forces, and doc­u­ment­ing the recal­ci­trant atti­tude of the offi­cer corps and Gen­er­al Staff, who were unwill­ing to coun­te­nance the pro­fes­sion­al and ide­o­log­i­cal dam­age that would result from pre­sen­ta­tion and adju­di­ca­tion of the truth.

In addi­tion, Mr. Turse–while avoid­ing self-right­eous posturing–highlights the doc­tri­naire racism of many U.S. com­bat­ants, who com­mit­ted war crimes behind the “MGR”–the “Mere Gook Rule.”

“ ‘An impor­tant addi­tion to Viet­nam war stud­ies . . . . Turse’s study is not anti-vet­er­an, anti-mil­i­tary, or anti-Amer­i­can. It does not allege that the major­i­ty of U.S. mil­i­tary per­son­nel in South Viet­nam com­mit­ted crimes. . . .” Pro­ceed­ings (U.S. Naval Insti­tute).

Nick Turse traces the strate­gic use of over­whelm­ing fire­pow­er and de fac­to coun­te­nanc­ing of civil­ian casu­al­ties owes much to the tac­ti­cal approach of Japan­ese forces dur­ing World War II in Chi­na: “ . . . . These efforts were com­mon­ly known as ‘paci­fi­ca­tion,’ but their true aim was to depop­u­late the con­test­ed coun­try­side. ‘The peo­ple are like water and the army is like fish.’ Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist rev­o­lu­tion, had famous­ly writ­ten. Amer­i­can plan­ners grasped his dic­tum, and also stud­ied the ‘kill-all, burn-all, loot-all’ scorched earth cam­paigns that the Japan­ese army launched in rur­al Chi­na dur­ing the 1930s and ear­ly 1940s for lessons on how to drain the ‘sea.’ Not sur­pris­ing­ly the idea of forc­ing peas­ants out of their vil­lages was embraced by civil­ian paci­fi­ca­tion offi­cials and mil­i­tary offi­cers alike. . . .”

The accounts of many G.I.’s about war crimes appear to be large­ly rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the con­duct of U.S. forces: “ . . . . While we have only frag­men­tary evi­dence about the full extent of civil­ian suf­fer­ing in South Viet­nam, enough sim­i­lar accounts exist so that rough­ly the same sto­ry could have been told in a chap­ter about Binh Dinh Province in the mid-1960’s, or Quang Tri Province in the ear­ly 1970s, among oth­ers. The inci­dents in this chap­ter were unbear­ably com­mon­place through­out the con­flict and are unusu­al only in that they were report­ed in some form or recount­ed by wit­ness­es instead of van­ish­ing entire­ly from the his­tor­i­cal record.” 

Turse notes that racism–embodied in the “MGR” (Mere Gook Rule)—contributed fun­da­men­tal­ly to the slaugh­ter per­pe­trat­ed by the U.S. in Viet­nam. “ . . . . In 1971, Major Gor­don Liv­ingston, a West Point grad­u­ate who served as reg­i­men­tal sur­geon with the 11th Armored Cav­al­ry Reg­i­ment, tes­ti­fied before mem­bers of Con­gress about the ease with which Amer­i­cans killed Viet­namese. ‘Above 90 per­cent of the Amer­i­cans with whom I had con­tact in Viet­nam,’ said Dr. Liv­ingston, treat­ed the Viet­namese as sub­hu­man snd with ‘near­ly uni­ver­sal con­tempt.’ . . . .”

Turse’s very impor­tant and pro­found­ly dis­turb­ing book encap­su­lates the Amer­i­can pol­i­cy in Viet­nam. Speak­ing of the Phoenix assas­si­na­tion pro­gram: “ . . . . Phoenix was a pro­gram run amok, but it was also the log­i­cal result of a mil­i­tary cam­paign dri­ven by the body count and run under the pre­cept of the mere-gook rule. For the Viet­namese the Amer­i­can war was an end­less gaunt­let of poten­tial calami­ties . . . . the range of dis­as­ters was near­ly end­less.

While no exact fig­ures are avail­able, there can be lit­tle ques­tion that such events occurred in shock­ing num­bers. They were the very essence of the war: crimes that went on all the time, all over South Viet­nam, for years and years. When you con­sid­er this along with the tal­lies of dead, wound­ed, and dis­placed, the scale of the suf­fer­ing becomes almost unimaginable—almost as unimag­in­able as the fact that some­how, in the Unit­ed States all that suf­fer­ing was more or less ignored as it hap­pened and then writ­ten out of his­to­ry even more thor­ough­ly in the decades since. . . .”

Stan­ley Horn­beck referred to U.S. Far East­ern pol­i­cy as a rail­road track, pro­ceed­ing on a straight line. Ster­ling Sea­grave not­ed that ” . . . . It was in fact bound for Saigon in 1975, with whis­tle stops along the way at Peking, Que­moy, Mat­su, and the Yalu Riv­er. . . .”

The ref­er­ence to the Yalu Riv­er is in con­sid­er­a­tion of a key inci­dent in the Kore­an War. Gen­er­al Dou­glas MacArthur was warned by mil­i­tary intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­als not to approach the Yalu Riv­er dur­ing his advance through North Korea, lest the Chi­nese enter the con­flict.

MacArthur ignored the warn­ing of the mil­i­tary intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­als with the ulti­mate result that they fore­cast: Chi­nese forces entered the con­flict and rout­ed the forces under MacArthur’s com­mand.

Dur­ing the pre­cip­i­tous retreat of the Amer­i­can and U.N. forces, it appears that the U.S. used bio­log­i­cal war­fare against the Chi­nese and North Korea.

In numer­ous pro­grams and lec­tures, we have dis­cussed the impor­tant, dev­as­tat­ing­ly suc­ces­sive­ly mind con­trol pro­grams engaged in by the mil­i­tary and CIA. Those pro­grams were devel­oped in reac­tion to downed Amer­i­can air­men who–after captivity–gave tes­ti­mo­ny that they had been involved in bio­log­i­cal war­fare attacks against Chi­na and North Korea dur­ing the war.

A superb book about Unit 731–the Japan­ese bio­log­i­cal war­fare unit dur­ing World War II–had a chap­ter in the British edi­tion that was omit­ted in the Amer­i­can edi­tion. (Sad­ly, the books are out of print, although both the British and Amer­i­can edi­tions are avail­able through used-book ser­vices. Mr. Emory hearti­ly encour­ages lis­ten­ers to obtain the book. Even the Amer­i­can edition–missing this key chapter–is worth­while. Hope­ful­ly, a pub­lish­er will obtain the rights to the book and re-issue it. If so, we will enthu­si­as­ti­cal­ly pro­mote the work.)

The chap­ter in the UK edi­tion chron­i­cles the inves­ti­ga­tion into the alle­ga­tions of Amer­i­can BW use dur­ing the Kore­an War, includ­ing cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence that Unit 731 vet­er­ans and method­ol­o­gy may well have been used in the alleged cam­paign. That chap­ter is alto­geth­er objec­tive, avoid­ing ide­o­log­i­cal bias toward either side in the con­flict.

Because of that, we found the omis­sion of this chap­ter from the U.S. edi­tion to be sig­nif­i­cant. As the bril­liant Peter Dale Scott not­ed: “The cov­er-up obvi­ates the con­spir­a­cy.” It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

FTR#1172 presents the sci­en­tif­ic cre­den­tials of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion inves­ti­gat­ing the alle­ga­tions of bio­log­i­cal war­fare, which are impres­sive and their con­clu­sions are cred­i­ble.

The intro­duc­tion of FTR#1173 con­sists of read­ing and analy­sis of Tom O’Neil­l’s pre­sen­ta­tion of the career of one of the CIA’s most impor­tant MK-Ultra mind con­trol oper­a­tives, which occurred in the imme­di­ate after­math of the Kore­an War–1954.

Note that Jim­mie Shaver was serv­ing in the Air Force. Per­son­nel from that branch were involved in the alle­ga­tions of BW waged by the U.S. Those alle­ga­tions were the ratio­nale for the U.S. mind con­trol pro­grams, devel­oped to com­bat Chi­nese “brain­wash­ing” which was alleged to have pre­cip­i­tat­ed the basis for the tes­ti­mo­ny by USAF.

Louis Joly­on West was Jack Ruby’s psy­chi­a­trist, and pre­sent­ed the unten­able hypoth­e­sis that Ruby killed Oswald because he had a brief psy­chomo­tor epilep­tic event in the base­ment of the Dal­las jail. In fact, the evi­dence sug­gests strong­ly that West had helped to erase Ruby’s mem­o­ry of hav­ing killed Oswald.

West­’s work with Ruby helped to keep the train of U.S. Far East­ern pol­i­cy run­ning on track.

The broad­cast sets forth the mur­der of Chere Jo Hor­ton, a three-year-old girl whose muti­la­tion, rape and mur­der were pinned on 29-year-old Jim­mie Shaver.

An obvi­ous vic­tim of mind con­trol, appar­ent­ly imple­ment­ed in con­sid­er­able mea­sure by Louis Joly­on West, Shaver was pro­grammed to take respon­si­bil­i­ty for the killing, despite enor­mous con­tra­dic­tions in the evi­dence.

O’Neil­l’s dis­cus­sion of West, Shaver, the mind con­trol pro­grams and the Man­son Fam­i­ly “op” is part of what appears to be a domes­tic Phoenix Pro­gram, designed to win “hearts and minds” in the U.S. dur­ing the Viet­nam War.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and analy­sis include:

  1. Shaver’s unusu­al behav­ior and demeanor at the ini­tial scene of the crime: ” . . . . He was shirt­less, cov­ered in blood and scratch­es. Mak­ing no attempt to escape, he let the search par­ty walk him to the edge of the high­way. Bystanders described him as ‘dazed’ and ‘trance-like’ . . . .”
  2. Shaver’s appar­ent lack of aware­ness of the imme­di­ate cir­cum­stances of the crime: ” ‘What’s going on here?’ he asked. He did­n’t seem drunk, but he could­n’t say where he was, how he’d got­ten there, or whose blood was all over him. Mean­while, the search par­ty found Hor­ton’s body in the grav­el pit. Her neck was bro­ken, her legs had been torn open, and she’s been raped. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Around four that morn­ing, an Air Force mar­shal ques­tioned Shaver and two doc­tors exam­ined him, agree­ing he was­n’t drunk. One lat­er tes­ti­fied that he ‘was not nor­mal . . . . he was very com­posed out­side, which I did not expect him to be under these cir­cum­stances.’ . . .”
  4. Shaver did­n’t rec­og­nize his own wife when she came to vis­it him. ” . . . . When his wife came to vis­it, he did­n’t rec­og­nize her. . . .”
  5. Ini­tial­ly, he believed some­one else com­mit­ted the crime. ” . . . . He gave his first state­ment at 10:30 a.m., adamant that anoth­er man was respon­si­ble: he could sum­mon an image of a stranger with blond hair and tat­toos. . . .”
  6. Even­tu­al­ly, he signed a state­ment tak­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty: ” . . . . After the Air Force mar­shal returned to the jail­house, how­ev­er, Shaver signed a sec­ond state­ment tak­ing full respon­si­bil­i­ty. Though he still did­n’t remem­ber any­thing, he rea­soned that he must have done it. . . .”
  7. Enter Jol­ly West: ” . . . . Two months lat­er, in Sep­tem­ber, Shaver’s mem­o­ries still had­n’t returned. The base hos­pi­tal com­man­der told Jol­ly West to per­form an eval­u­a­tion: was he legal­ly sane at the time of the mur­der? Shaver spent the next two weeks under West­’s super­vi­sion . . . While Shaver was under–with West inject­ing more truth serum to ‘deep­en the trance’–Shaver recalled the events of that night. He con­fessed to killing Hor­ton. . . .”
  8. West was a defense wit­ness who, instead, appears to have aid­ed the pros­e­cu­tion: ” . . . . At the tri­al, West argued that Shaver’s truth-serum con­fes­sion was more valid than any oth­er. And West was tes­ti­fy­ing for the defense . . . .”
  9. Shaver’s behav­ior at the tri­al is fur­ther sug­ges­tive of mind con­trol: ” . . . . One news­pa­per account said he ‘sat through the stren­u­ous ses­sions like a man in a trance,’ say­ing noth­ing, nev­er ris­ing to stretch or smoke, though he was a known chain-smok­er. ‘Some believe it’s an act,’ the paper said, ‘oth­ers believe his demeanor is real. . . .”
  10. Shaver’s med­ical records at Lack­land Air Force base had van­ished. ” . . . . But, curi­ous­ly, all the records for patients in 1954 had been main­tained, with one excep­tion: the file for last names begin­ning with ‘Sa’ through ‘St’ had van­ished. . . .”
  11. West posed lead­ing ques­tions to Shaver, who denied hav­ing ever tak­en the vic­tim’s clothes off. ” . . . . West had used lead­ing ques­tions to walk the entranced Shaver through the crime. ‘Tell me about when you took your clothes off, Jim­my,’ he said. And try­ing to prove that Shaver had repressed mem­o­ries: ‘Jim­my, do you remem­ber when some­thing like this hap­pened before?’ Or: ‘After you took her clothes off, what did you do?’ ‘I nev­er did take her clothes off,’ Shaver said. . . .”
  12. The inter­view was divid­ed into thirds, the mid­dle third of which was not record­ed! ” . . . . The inter­view [with Shaver] was divid­ed into thirds. The mid­dle third, for some rea­son, was­n’t record­ed. When the record picked up, the man­u­script said, ‘Shaver is cry­ing. He has been con­front­ed with all the facts repeat­ed­ly.’ . . .”

Next, we review Luce’s beat­i­fi­ca­tion of Chi­ang Kai-shek in Life mag­a­zine, por­tray­ing the Gen­er­alis­si­mo as a Chris­t­ian mar­tyr: “ . . . . Chi­ang Kai-shek has hereto­fore shown him­self a man of remark­able courage and res­o­lu­tion. . . . He is a con­vert­ed Methodist who has now for solace the exam­ples of tribu­la­tion in the Chris­t­ian bible. . . .”

Adding fur­ther depth to the Luce/Time Inc. meme of Chi­ang Kai-shek as an icon­ic Chris­t­ian is his “broth­el-hop­ping” behav­ior with his fel­low Chris­t­ian con­vert, Tu Yueh-sheng.

“ . . . . At the oppo­site end of the Shang­hai social scale, Big-eared Tu enjoyed vis­it­ing the famous Blue Vil­la and cruis­ing the oth­er Green Gang broth­els in the Blue Cham­ber Dis­trict with a young, ill-tem­pered bra­vo by the name of Chi­ang Kai-shek. . . .”

he pros­ti­tutes in the broth­els were sub­jects of the bru­tal prac­tice of foot­bind­ing;

“ . . . . Since this nether­world con­sumed so much of Chiang’s and Tu’s atten­tion, it requires a clos­er look. The Chi­nese broth­els, almost with­out excep­tion, were staffed by girls with bound feet—the ide­al being less than three inch­es long. These were objects of extra­or­di­nary sex­u­al excite­ment, and enjoyed a cen­tral role in any noisy evening. . . .”

More about the prac­tice of foot­bind­ing, long-since for­bid­den in Chi­na.

“ . . . . Foot­bind­ing usu­al­ly began at age four. A ten-foot long two-inch ban­dage was wrapped around the toes to force them in against the sole. Each day the ban­dage was tight­ened until the foot was fold­ed under with only the big toe stick­ing out, a shape called the ‘Gold­en Lotus’ because it resem­bled a lotus pod with the petals removed. Flesh rot­ted and fell off, some­times a toe or two, and the foot oozed pus, until the process of defor­ma­tion was com­plete after two years, at which point the feet were prac­ti­cal­ly dead. . . .”

1.  Intro­duc­ing the expan­sion of Amer­i­can expe­ri­ence with Chi­ang and his Kuom­intang fas­cists into U.S. Cold War pol­i­cy in Asia, we present Ster­ling Seagrave’s rumi­na­tion about Stan­ley Horn­beck, a State Depart­ment flack who became: “. . . . the doyen of State’s Far East­ern Divi­sion. . . .”

Horn­beck “ . . . . had only the most abbre­vi­at­ed and stilt­ed knowl­edge of Chi­na, and had been out of touch per­son­al­ly for many years. . . . He with­held cables from the Sec­re­tary of State that were crit­i­cal of Chi­ang, and once stat­ed that ‘the Unit­ed States Far East­ern pol­i­cy is like a train run­ning on a rail­road track.  It has been clear­ly laid out and where it is going is plain to all.’ It was in fact bound for Saigon in 1975, with whis­tle stops along the way at Peking, Que­moy, Mat­su, and the Yalu Riv­er. . . .”

The Soong Dynasty by Ster­ling Sea­grave; Harp­er & Row 1985 [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by  Ster­ling Sea­grave; ISBN 0–06-015308–3; p. 404.

2. A con­sum­mate­ly impor­tant study of Viet­nam War crimes was authored by Nick Turse. A review by the U.S. Naval Insti­tute can be tak­en as an advi­so­ry in this regard.

Mr. Turse per­forms the remark­able feat of unspar­ing­ly sear­ing pre­sen­ta­tion of the war crimes that were stan­dard oper­at­ing pro­ce­dure for much of the Amer­i­can (and allied) forces in Viet­nam by trac­ing the foun­da­tion of those crimes from the tech­no­crat­ic approach to mil­i­tary strat­e­gy pur­sued by the Pen­ta­gon and Robert McNa­ma­ra, through the re-social­iza­tion and re-pro­gram­ming of young, often teen-aged, recruits to turn them into reflex­ive killers, chron­i­cling the mas­sive fire­pow­er avail­able to U.S. forces, and doc­u­ment­ing the recal­ci­trant atti­tude of the offi­cer corps and Gen­er­al Staff, who were unwill­ing to coun­te­nance the pro­fes­sion­al and ide­o­log­i­cal dam­age that would result from pre­sen­ta­tion and adju­di­ca­tion of the truth.

In addi­tion, Mr. Turse–while avoid­ing self-right­eous posturing–highlights the doc­tri­naire racism of many U.S. com­bat­ants, who com­mit­ted war crimes behind the “MGR”–the “Mere Gook Rule.”

“ ‘An impor­tant addi­tion to Viet­nam war stud­ies . . . . Turse’s study is not anti-vet­er­an, anti-mil­i­tary, or anti-Amer­i­can. It does not allege that the major­i­ty of U.S. mil­i­tary per­son­nel in South Viet­nam com­mit­ted crimes. . . .” Pro­ceed­ings (U.S. Naval Insti­tute).

Kill Any­thing That Moves by Nick Turse; Copy­right 2013 by Nick Turse; Pic­a­dor [Hen­ry Holt]; ISBN 978–1‑250–04506‑5.

3a. Nick Turse traces the strate­gic use of over­whelm­ing fire­pow­er and de fac­to coun­te­nanc­ing of civil­ian casu­al­ties owes much to the tac­ti­cal approach of Japan­ese forces dur­ing World War II in Chi­na: “ . . . . These efforts were com­mon­ly known as ‘paci­fi­ca­tion,’ but their true aim was to depop­u­late the con­test­ed coun­try­side. ‘The peo­ple are like water and the army is like fish.’ Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist rev­o­lu­tion, had famous­ly writ­ten. Amer­i­can plan­ners grasped his dic­tum, and also stud­ied the ‘kill-all, burn-all, loot-all’ scorched earth cam­paigns that the Japan­ese army launched in rur­al Chi­na dur­ing the 1930s and ear­ly 1940s for lessons on how to drain the ‘sea.’ Not sur­pris­ing­ly the idea of forc­ing peas­ants out of their vil­lages was embraced by civil­ian paci­fi­ca­tion offi­cials and mil­i­tary offi­cers alike. . . .”

Kill Any­thing That Moves by Nick Turse; Copy­right 2013 by Nick Turse; Pic­a­dor [Hen­ry Holt]; ISBN 978–1‑250–04506‑5; p. 63.

3b. The accounts of many G.I.’s about war crimes appear to be large­ly rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the con­duct of U.S. forces: “ . . . . While we have only frag­men­tary evi­dence about the full extent of civil­ian suf­fer­ing in South Viet­nam, enough sim­i­lar accounts exist so that rough­ly the same sto­ry could have been told in a chap­ter about Binh Dinh Province in the mid-1960’s, or Quang Tri Province in the ear­ly 1970s, among oth­ers. The inci­dents in this chap­ter were unbear­ably com­mon­place through­out the con­flict and are unusu­al only in that they were report­ed in some form or recount­ed by wit­ness­es instead of van­ish­ing entire­ly from the his­tor­i­cal record.” 

Kill Any­thing That Moves by Nick Turse; Copy­right 2013 by Nick Turse; Pic­a­dor [Hen­ry Holt]; ISBN 978–1‑250–04506‑5; pp.142–143.

4. Turse notes that racism–embodied in the “MGR” (Mere Gook Rule)—contributed fun­da­men­tal­ly to the slaugh­ter per­pe­trat­ed by the U.S. in Viet­nam. “ . . . . In 1971, Major Gor­don Liv­ingston, a West Point grad­u­ate who served as reg­i­men­tal sur­geon with the 11th Armored Cav­al­ry Reg­i­ment, tes­ti­fied before mem­bers of Con­gress about the ease with which Amer­i­cans killed Viet­namese. ‘Above 90 per­cent of the Amer­i­cans with whom I had con­tact in Viet­nam,’ said Dr. Liv­ingston, treat­ed the Viet­namese as sub­hu­man snd with ‘near­ly uni­ver­sal con­tempt.’ . . . .”

Kill Any­thing That Moves by Nick Turse; Copy­right 2013 by Nick Turse; Pic­a­dor [Hen­ry Holt]; ISBN 978–1‑250–04506‑5; pp.160–161.

5.   Turse’s very impor­tant and pro­found­ly dis­turb­ing book encap­su­lates the Amer­i­can pol­i­cy in Viet­nam. Speak­ing of the Phoenix assas­si­na­tion pro­gram: “ . . . . Phoenix was a pro­gram run amok, but it was also the log­i­cal result of a mil­i­tary cam­paign dri­ven by the body count and run under the pre­cept of the mere-gook rule. For the Viet­namese the Amer­i­can war was an end­less gaunt­let of poten­tial calami­ties . . . . the range of dis­as­ters was near­ly end­less.

While no exact fig­ures are avail­able, there can be lit­tle ques­tion that such events occurred in shock­ing num­bers. They were the very essence of the war: crimes that went on all the time, all over South Viet­nam, for years and years. When you con­sid­er this along with the tal­lies of dead, wound­ed, and dis­placed, the scale of the suf­fer­ing becomes almost unimaginable—almost as unimag­in­able as the fact that some­how, in the Unit­ed States all that suf­fer­ing was more or less ignored as it hap­pened and then writ­ten out of his­to­ry even more thor­ough­ly in the decades since. . . .”

Kill Any­thing That Moves by Nick Turse; Copy­right 2013 by Nick Turse; Pic­a­dor [Hen­ry Holt]; ISBN 978–1‑250–04506‑5; p. 191.

6. Stan­ley Horn­beck referred to U.S. Far East­ern pol­i­cy as a rail­road track, pro­ceed­ing on a straight line. Ster­ling Sea­grave not­ed that ” . . . . It was in fact bound for Saigon in 1975, with whis­tle stops along the way at Peking, Que­moy, Mat­su, and the Yalu Riv­er. . . .”

The ref­er­ence to the Yalu Riv­er is in con­sid­er­a­tion of a key inci­dent in the Kore­an War. Gen­er­al Dou­glas MacArthur was warned by mil­i­tary intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­als not to approach the Yalu Riv­er dur­ing his advance through North Korea, lest the Chi­nese enter the con­flict.

MacArthur ignored the warn­ing of the mil­i­tary intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­als with the ulti­mate result that they fore­cast: Chi­nese forces entered the con­flict and rout­ed the forces under MacArthur’s com­mand.

Dur­ing the pre­cip­i­tous retreat of the Amer­i­can and U.N. forces, it appears that the U.S. used bio­log­i­cal war­fare against the Chi­nese and North Korea.

In numer­ous pro­grams and lec­tures, we have dis­cussed the impor­tant, dev­as­tat­ing­ly suc­ces­sive­ly mind con­trol pro­grams engaged in by the mil­i­tary and CIA. Those pro­grams were devel­oped in reac­tion to downed Amer­i­can air­men who–after captivity–gave tes­ti­mo­ny that they had been involved in bio­log­i­cal war­fare attacks against Chi­na and North Korea dur­ing the war.

A superb book about Unit 731–the Japan­ese bio­log­i­cal war­fare unit dur­ing World War II–had a chap­ter in the British edi­tion that was omit­ted in the Amer­i­can edi­tion. (Sad­ly, the books are out of print, although both the British and Amer­i­can edi­tions are avail­able through used-book ser­vices. Mr. Emory hearti­ly encour­ages lis­ten­ers to obtain the book. Even the Amer­i­can edition–missing this key chapter–is worth­while. Hope­ful­ly, a pub­lish­er will obtain the rights to the book and re-issue it. If so, we will enthu­si­as­ti­cal­ly pro­mote the work.)

The chap­ter in the UK edi­tion chron­i­cles the inves­ti­ga­tion into the alle­ga­tions of Amer­i­can BW use dur­ing the Kore­an War, includ­ing cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence that Unit 731 vet­er­ans and method­ol­o­gy may well have been used in the alleged cam­paign. That chap­ter is alto­geth­er objec­tive, avoid­ing ide­o­log­i­cal bias toward either side in the con­flict.

Because of that, we found the omis­sion of this chap­ter from the U.S. edi­tion to be sig­nif­i­cant. As the bril­liant Peter Dale Scott not­ed: “The cov­er-up obvi­ates the con­spir­a­cy.” It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

FTR#1172 presents the sci­en­tif­ic cre­den­tials of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion inves­ti­gat­ing the alle­ga­tions of bio­log­i­cal war­fare, which are impres­sive and their con­clu­sions are cred­i­ble.

Unit 731: The Japan­ese Army’s Secret of Secrets by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; Hod­der & Stoughton [HC]; Copy­right 1989 by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; ISBN 0–340-39463–3; p. 240.

. . . . One source of infor­ma­tion, the Report of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion for the Facts Con­cern­ing Bac­te­r­i­al War­fare in Korea and Chi­na, which was pre­pared with Chi­nese and North Kore­an assis­tance, is gen­er­al­ly accept­ed today as being of high qual­i­ty . . . Dr. Andrea Andreen, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of the Hos­pi­tals Board of the City of Stock­holm; Jean Mal­terre, Inge­nieur-Agri­cole, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of Ani­mal Phys­i­ol­o­gy, Nation­al Col­lege of Agri­cul­ture, Grignon, France; Dr. Oliviero Oli­vo, pro­fes­sor of Human Anato­my in the Fac­ul­ty of Med­i­cine of the Uni­ver­si­ty of Bologna, Italy; Dr. Samuel Pes­soa, pro­fes­sor of Par­a­sitol­ogy at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Sao Pao­lo and for­mer­ly direc­tor of pub­lic Health for the State of Sao Pao­lo; Dr. Nico­lai Zhukov-Verezh­nikov, pro­fes­sor of Bac­te­ri­ol­o­gy at, and Vice-Pres­i­dent of, the Sovi­et Acad­e­my of Med­i­cine and for­mer­ly chief med­ical expert at the Khabarovsk tri­al, and final­ly, Dr. Joseph Need­ham, FRS, Sir William Dunn Read­er in Bio­chem­istry, Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty, for­mer­ly sci­en­tif­ic coun­sel­lor, Her Bri­tan­nic Majesty’s Embassy, Chungk­ing and lat­er direc­tor of the Depart­ment of Nat­ur­al Sci­ences, UNESCO, (He became in 1966, the Mas­ter of Gonville and Caius Col­lege, Cam­bridge, and is cur­rent­ly writ­ing a his­to­ry of sci­ence and civ­i­liza­tion in Chi­na.) . . . .

7. The intro­duc­tion of FTR#1173 con­sists of read­ing and analy­sis of Tom O’Neil­l’s pre­sen­ta­tion of the career of one of the CIA’s most impor­tant MK-Ultra mind con­trol oper­a­tives, which occurred in the imme­di­ate after­math of the Kore­an War–1954.

Note that Jim­mie Shaver was serv­ing in the Air Force. Per­son­nel from that branch were involved in the alle­ga­tions of BW waged by the U.S. Those alle­ga­tions were the ratio­nale for the U.S. mind con­trol pro­grams, devel­oped to com­bat Chi­nese “brain­wash­ing” which was alleged to have pre­cip­i­tat­ed the basis for the tes­ti­mo­ny by USAF.

Louis Joly­on West was Jack Ruby’s psy­chi­a­trist, and pre­sent­ed the unten­able hypoth­e­sis that Ruby killed Oswald because he had a brief psy­chomo­tor epilep­tic event in the base­ment of the Dal­las jail. In fact, the evi­dence sug­gests strong­ly that West had helped to erase Ruby’s mem­o­ry of hav­ing killed Oswald.

West­’s work with Ruby helped to keep the train of U.S. Far East­ern pol­i­cy run­ning on track.

The broad­cast sets forth the mur­der of Chere Jo Hor­ton, a three-year-old girl whose muti­la­tion, rape and mur­der were pinned on 29-year-old Jim­mie Shaver.

An obvi­ous vic­tim of mind con­trol, appar­ent­ly imple­ment­ed in con­sid­er­able mea­sure by Louis Joly­on West, Shaver was pro­grammed to take respon­si­bil­i­ty for the killing, despite enor­mous con­tra­dic­tions in the evi­dence.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and analy­sis include:

  1. Shaver’s unusu­al behav­ior and demeanor at the ini­tial scene of the crime: ” . . . . He was shirt­less, cov­ered in blood and scratch­es. Mak­ing no attempt to escape, he let the search par­ty walk him to the edge of the high­way. Bystanders described him as ‘dazed’ and ‘trance-like’ . . . .”
  2. Shaver’s appar­ent lack of aware­ness of the imme­di­ate cir­cum­stances of the crime: ” ‘What’s going on here?’ he asked. He did­n’t seem drunk, but he could­n’t say where he was, how he’d got­ten there, or whose blood was all over him. Mean­while, the search par­ty found Hor­ton’s body in the grav­el pit. Her neck was bro­ken, her legs had been torn open, and she’s been raped. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Around four that morn­ing, an Air Force mar­shal ques­tioned Shaver and two doc­tors exam­ined him, agree­ing he was­n’t drunk. One lat­er tes­ti­fied that he ‘was not nor­mal . . . . he was very com­posed out­side, which I did not expect him to be under these cir­cum­stances.’ . . .”
  4. Shaver did­n’t rec­og­nize his own wife when she came to vis­it him. ” . . . . When his wife came to vis­it, he did­n’t rec­og­nize her. . . .”
  5. Ini­tial­ly, he believed some­one else com­mit­ted the crime. ” . . . . He gave his first state­ment at 10:30 a.m., adamant that anoth­er man was respon­si­ble: he could sum­mon an image of a stranger with blond hair and tat­toos. . . .”
  6. Even­tu­al­ly, he signed a state­ment tak­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty: ” . . . . After the Air Force mar­shal returned to the jail­house, how­ev­er, Shaver signed a sec­ond state­ment tak­ing full respon­si­bil­i­ty. Though he still did­n’t remem­ber any­thing, he rea­soned that he must have done it. . . .”
  7. Enter Jol­ly West: ” . . . . Two months lat­er, in Sep­tem­ber, Shaver’s mem­o­ries still had­n’t returned. The base hos­pi­tal com­man­der told Jol­ly West to per­form an eval­u­a­tion: was he legal­ly sane at the time of the mur­der? Shaver spent the next two weeks under West­’s super­vi­sion . . . While Shaver was under–with West inject­ing more truth serum to ‘deep­en the trance’–Shaver recalled the events of that night. He con­fessed to killing Hor­ton. . . .”
  8. West was a defense wit­ness who, instead, appears to have aid­ed the pros­e­cu­tion: ” . . . . At the tri­al, West argued that Shaver’s truth-serum con­fes­sion was more valid than any oth­er. And West was tes­ti­fy­ing for the defense . . . .”
  9. Shaver’s behav­ior at the tri­al is fur­ther sug­ges­tive of mind con­trol: ” . . . . One news­pa­per account said he ‘sat through the stren­u­ous ses­sions like a man in a trance,’ say­ing noth­ing, nev­er ris­ing to stretch or smoke, though he was a known chain-smok­er. ‘Some believe it’s an act,’ the paper said, ‘oth­ers believe his demeanor is real. . . .”
  10. Shaver’s med­ical records at Lack­land Air Force base had van­ished. ” . . . . But, curi­ous­ly, all the records for patients in 1954 had been main­tained, with one excep­tion: the file for last names begin­ning with ‘Sa’ through ‘St’ had van­ished. . . .”
  11. West posed lead­ing ques­tions to Shaver, who denied hav­ing ever tak­en the vic­tim’s clothes off. ” . . . . West had used lead­ing ques­tions to walk the entranced Shaver through the crime. ‘Tell me about when you took your clothes off, Jim­my,’ he said. And try­ing to prove that Shaver had repressed mem­o­ries: ‘Jim­my, do you remem­ber when some­thing like this hap­pened before?’ Or: ‘After you took her clothes off, what did you do?’ ‘I nev­er did take her clothes off,’ Shaver said. . . .”
  12. The inter­view was divid­ed into thirds, the mid­dle third of which was not record­ed! ” . . . . The inter­view [with Shaver] was divid­ed into thirds. The mid­dle third, for some rea­son, was­n’t record­ed. When the record picked up, the man­u­script said, ‘Shaver is cry­ing. He has been con­front­ed with all the facts repeat­ed­ly.’ . . .”

Chaos: Charles Man­son, the CIA, and the Secret His­to­ry of the Six­ties by Tom O’Neill; Lit­tle, Brown and Com­pa­ny [HC]; Copy­right 2019 by Tom O’Neill; 978–0‑316–47755‑0; pp.226–232; pp.370–374.

8a.  Next, we review Luce’s beat­i­fi­ca­tion of Chi­ang Kai-shek in Life mag­a­zine, por­tray­ing the Gen­er­alis­si­mo as a Chris­t­ian mar­tyr: “ . . . . Chi­ang Kai-shek has hereto­fore shown him­self a man of remark­able courage and res­o­lu­tion. . . . He is a con­vert­ed Methodist who has now for solace the exam­ples of tribu­la­tion in the Chris­t­ian bible. . . .”

The Soong Dynasty by Ster­ling Sea­grave; Harp­er & Row 1985 [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by Ster­ling Sea­grave; ISBN 0–06-015308–3; pp. 362–363.

8b. Adding fur­ther depth to the Luce/Time Inc. meme of Chi­ang Kai-shek as an icon­ic Chris­t­ian is his “broth­el-hop­ping” behav­ior with his fel­low Chris­t­ian con­vert, Tu Yueh-sheng.

“ . . . . At the oppo­site end of the Shang­hai social scale, Big-eared Tu enjoyed vis­it­ing the famous Blue Vil­la and cruis­ing the oth­er Green Gang broth­els in the Blue Cham­ber Dis­trict with a young, ill-tem­pered bra­vo by the name of Chi­ang Kai-shek. . . .”

The Soong Dynasty by Ster­ling Sea­grave; Harp­er & Row 1985 [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by  Ster­ling Sea­grave; ISBN 0–06-015308–3; p. 152.

8c. The pros­ti­tutes in the broth­els were sub­jects of the bru­tal prac­tice of foot­bind­ing;

“ . . . . Since this nether­world con­sumed so much of Chiang’s and Tu’s atten­tion, it requires a clos­er look. The Chi­nese broth­els, almost with­out excep­tion, were staffed by girls with bound feet—the ide­al being less than three inch­es long. These were objects of extra­or­di­nary sex­u­al excite­ment, and enjoyed a cen­tral role in any noisy evening. . . .”

The Soong Dynasty by Ster­ling Sea­grave; Harp­er & Row 1985 [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by  Ster­ling Sea­grave; ISBN 0–06-015308–3; p. 158.

9. More about the prac­tice of foot­bind­ing, long-since for­bid­den in Chi­na.

“ . . . . Foot­bind­ing usu­al­ly began at age four. A ten-foot long two-inch ban­dage was wrapped around the toes to force them in against the sole. Each day the ban­dage was tight­ened until the foot was fold­ed under with only the big toe stick­ing out, a shape called the ‘Gold­en Lotus’ because it resem­bled a lotus pod with the petals removed. Flesh rot­ted and fell off, some­times a toe or two, and the foot oozed pus, until the process of defor­ma­tion was com­plete after two years, at which point the feet were prac­ti­cal­ly dead. . . .”

The Soong Dynasty by Ster­ling Sea­grave; Harp­er & Row 1985 [HC]; Copy­right 1985 by  Ster­ling Sea­grave; ISBN 0–06-015308–3; p. 159.

 

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