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FTR#1244 How Many Lies Before You Belong to The Lie?, Part 17

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“Polit­i­cal language…is designed to make lies sound truth­ful and mur­der respectable, and to give an appear­ance of solid­i­ty to pure wind.”

— George Orwell, 1946

EVERYTHING MR. EMORY HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT THE UKRAINE WAR IS ENCAPSULATED IN THIS VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24

ANOTHER REVEALING VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24

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­­­FTR#1244 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Jacques Baud

Intro­duc­tion: First of a pro­ject­ed four-part dis­cus­sion of the deci­sive­ly impor­tant work of for­mer Swiss intel­li­gence offi­cer Jacques Baud, this pro­gram presents and details fun­da­men­tals of the Ukraine war and the his­to­ry lead­ing up to it. This analy­sis will be sup­ple­ment­ed in the remain­ing pro­grams in the series.

His CV is pre­sent­ed below, and will be sup­ple­ment­ed by more detail in an inter­view pre­sent­ed with him.

The read­ing of this arti­cle will be con­tin­ued in our next pro­gram. For the con­ve­nience and ben­e­fit of the audi­ence, the entire arti­cle is pre­sent­ed in this descrip­tion. 

Baud points out that the pre­sen­ta­tion of the war in the West is bad­ly skewed, with politi­cians and media pur­su­ing ide­ol­o­gized fan­tasies, rather than sub­stan­tive analy­sis com­ing from intel­li­gence agen­cies.

The essence of Baud’s war analy­sis is pre­sen­ta­tion of com­pelling doc­u­men­ta­tion that the Ukraine war was begun by the West—the U.S. and NATO in particular—in order to weak­en Rus­sia.

Facil­i­tat­ing a mur­der­ous pro­gram of sys­tem­at­ic atroc­i­ty com­mit­ted by Ukraine’s gov­ern­ment against the Russ­ian-speak­ing minor­i­ty of Ukraine, it is the West and the Biden admin­is­tra­tion in par­tic­u­lar, that bear respon­si­bil­i­ty for the con­flict.

As will be seen, analy­sis of the actu­al con­flict itself is fun­da­men­tal­ly skewed in the U.S. and Europe. Far from being “incom­pe­tent,” Rus­sia quick­ly exe­cut­ed maneu­ver war­fare to cut-off the bulk of the Ukrain­ian army, which was poised for a lethal offen­sive against the Russ­ian-speak­ing East.

Russia’s pri­ma­ry objective—completely mis­un­der­stood in the West and sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly mis­rep­re­sent­ed by polit­i­cal and media inter­ests alike—was large­ly achieved with­in a short peri­od.

The Russ­ian forces occu­pied ter­ri­to­ry rough­ly equiv­a­lent to the U.K in a mat­ter of days, fix­ing Ukrain­ian forces with a diver­sion­ary move toward Kiev, elim­i­nat­ing Ukraine’s abil­i­ty to move large num­bers of troops and trap­ping the pri­ma­ry Ukrain­ian forces in the East.

This will be more com­plete­ly dis­cussed, ana­lyzed and pre­sent­ed in the remain­ing pro­grams fea­tur­ing Baud’s work.

 Key Points of Analy­sis and Dis­cus­sion Include: Baud’s first-hand involve­ment in NATO train­ing of the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary; Baud’s for­mer posi­tion as chief of Swiss intelligence’s divi­sion on War­saw pact forces dur­ing the Cold War; Baud’s exten­sive UN expe­ri­ence on pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms, their dis­tri­b­u­tion to civil­ian pop­u­la­tions and the dele­te­ri­ous effects of that dis­tri­b­u­tion; The fun­da­men­tal, insti­tu­tion­al­ized dis­tor­tion of the conflict—politicians and media ignor­ing real­i­ty (includ­ing and espe­cial­ly that pre­sent­ed by intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­als) and incul­cat­ing the pub­lic (and them­selves) with an inflam­ma­to­ry, demon­stra­bly false nar­ra­tive that engen­ders a dan­ger­ous pol­i­cy of esca­la­tion; The essen­tial mis­un­der­stand­ing of the gen­e­sis of the Ukrain­ian con­flict; The cen­tral issue of the post-Maid­an government’s ban­ning of the Russ­ian lan­guage in Ukraine’s East­ern dis­tricts; The fun­da­men­tal mis­un­der­stand­ing of, and mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion of, the civ­il war in Ukraine’s East as a dynam­ic involv­ing “Russ­ian Sep­a­ratists” and “inter­fer­ence” by Putin; Putin’s advice to the Russ­ian-speak­ing East­ern dis­tricts NOT to seek a ref­er­en­dum on auton­o­my; The Ukrain­ian government’s launch of an ill-fat­ed mil­i­tary sup­pres­sion against those dis­tricts; The fun­da­men­tal cor­rup­tion and inep­ti­tude of the post-Maid­an Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary; The false nar­ra­tive dis­trib­uted in the west that Rus­sia was involved in any way with the civ­il war in East­ern Ukraine; The fail­ure of the civ­il war against the East­ern dis­tricts because of that inep­ti­tude; The defec­tion of large “maneu­ver” units of the Ukrain­ian armed forces—armor, artillery and mis­sile for­ma­tions; The mon­u­men­tal fail­ure to report for duty of the Ukrain­ian reserve per­son­nel; Ukraine’s piv­ot to NATO to form the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary; Jacques Baud’s role in that attempt­ed for­ma­tion; NATO’s cre­ation of the fas­cist “reprisal units,” exem­pli­fied by the Azov Reg­i­ment; The Azov regiment’s sym­bol­ic, and his­tor­i­cal nos­tal­gia for the ”Das Reich” Division—2nd Waf­fen SS; The oper­a­tional strength of the NATO-cre­at­ed fas­cist ter­ri­to­r­i­al defense units—102,000; The real­i­ty behind a 2021” hijack­ing of a RyanAir flight in Belarus; the fact that the “journalist”—Roman Protassevitch—was a promi­nent mem­ber of the Azov reg­i­ment; the fact that the action was in keep­ing with the rules of force; The war’s gen­e­sis with a Ukrain­ian cam­paign to con­quer and dec­i­mate the Russ­ian-speak­ing regions of the East; the Duma’s advo­ca­cy of diplo­mat­ic recog­ni­tion for the Russ­ian-speak­ing regions; Putin’s ini­tial refusal to rec­og­nize the regions; France and the West’s refusal to imple­ment the Min­sk Agree­ments; France and the West’s insis­tence on direct con­fronta­tion between Ukraine and Rus­sia; The Ukraine’s ini­ti­a­tion of the con­flict by bom­bard­ing the Russ­ian-speak­ing dis­tricts and mass­ing their army for an all-out assault; Putin’s grant­i­ng of the Duma’s request and diplo­mat­ic recog­ni­tion of the inde­pen­dence of the Russ­ian-speak­ing regions; Those regions’ request for mil­i­tary assis­tance; Putin’s pos­i­tive response to that request, ini­ti­at­ing the con­flict; The Russ­ian strat­e­gy of using pres­sure on Kiev as a diver­sion, draw­ing Ukrain­ian forces around it and per­mit­ting the encir­clement of the bulk of the Ukrain­ian army in East­ern Ukraine; The West’s fun­da­men­tal mis­un­der­stand­ing of Putin’s and Russia’s war aims, due to their own strate­gic and oper­a­tional myopia; The “slow­down” of Russ­ian oper­a­tions, due to the fact that they have already achieved their objec­tive; The “reprisal” units’ delib­er­ate block­ing of civil­ian evac­u­a­tion cor­ri­dors, so that the civil­ians can be used to delib­er­ate­ly impede Russ­ian mil­i­tary progress; The West’s manip­u­la­tion of Zelen­sky and Ukraine, in essence brib­ing him with arms pur­chas­es to “bleed Rus­sia;” The dis­tri­b­u­tion of small arms to Ukrain­ian urban pop­u­la­tions, a devel­op­ment that Baud feels will lead to atroc­i­ties com­mit­ted against fel­low civil­ians; The strong prob­a­bil­i­ty that the Azov Reg­i­ment was using the Mar­i­upol mater­ni­ty hos­pi­tal as a strate­gic van­tage point, and that the Rus­sians fired on it as a legit­i­mate mil­i­tary tar­get; The West­’s using of that “War Crime” to jus­ti­fy fur­ther arms ship­ments; The West­’s sys­tem­at­ic dis­tor­tion and “weaponiza­tion” of war cov­er­age; The joint secu­ri­ty pro­vid­ed to the Cher­nobyl nuclear plant by BOTH Ukrain­ian and Russ­ian sol­diers to pre­vent sab­o­tage.

1. Jacques Baud is a for­mer colonel of the Gen­er­al Staff, ex-mem­ber of the Swiss strate­gic intel­li­gence, spe­cial­ist on East­ern coun­tries. He was trained in the Amer­i­can and British intel­li­gence ser­vices. He has served as Pol­i­cy Chief for Unit­ed Nations Peace Oper­a­tions. As a UN expert on rule of law and secu­ri­ty insti­tu­tions, he designed and led the first mul­ti­di­men­sion­al UN intel­li­gence unit in the Sudan. He has worked for the African Union and was for 5 years respon­si­ble for the fight, at NATO, against the pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms. He was involved in dis­cus­sions with the high­est Russ­ian mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence offi­cials just after the fall of the USSR. With­in NATO, he fol­lowed the 2014 Ukrain­ian cri­sis and lat­er par­tic­i­pat­ed in pro­grams to assist the Ukraine. He is the author of sev­er­al books on intel­li­gence, war and ter­ror­ism, in par­tic­u­lar Le Détourne­ment pub­lished by SIGEST, Gou­vern­er par les fake newsL’affaire Naval­ny. His lat­est book is Pou­tine, maître du jeu? pub­lished by Max Milo.

This arti­cle appears through the gra­cious cour­tesy of Cen­tre Français de Recherche sur le Ren­seigne­ment, Paris. Trans­lat­ed from the French by N. Dass.

“The Mil­i­tary Sit­u­a­tion in Ukraine” by Jacques Baud; The Pos­til; 4/1/2022.

Part One: The Road To War

For years, from Mali to Afghanistan, I have worked for peace and risked my life for it. It is there­fore not a ques­tion of jus­ti­fy­ing war, but of under­stand­ing what led us to it. I notice that the “experts” who take turns on tele­vi­sion ana­lyze the sit­u­a­tion on the basis of dubi­ous infor­ma­tion, most often hypothe­ses erect­ed as facts—and then we no longer man­age to under­stand what is hap­pen­ing. This is how pan­ics are cre­at­ed.

The prob­lem is not so much to know who is right in this con­flict, but to ques­tion the way our lead­ers make their deci­sions.

Let’s try to exam­ine the roots of the con­flict. It starts with those who for the last eight years have been talk­ing about “sep­a­ratists” or “inde­pen­den­tists” from Don­bass. This is not true. The ref­er­en­dums con­duct­ed by the two self-pro­claimed Republics of Donet­sk and Lugan­sk in May 2014, were not ref­er­en­dums of “inde­pen­dence” (независимость), as some unscrupu­lous jour­nal­ists have claimed, but ref­er­en­dums of “self-deter­mi­na­tion” or “auton­o­my” (самостоятельность). The qual­i­fi­er “pro-Russ­ian” sug­gests that Rus­sia was a par­ty to the con­flict, which was not the case, and the term “Russ­ian speak­ers” would have been more hon­est. More­over, these ref­er­en­dums were con­duct­ed against the advice of Vladimir Putin.

In fact, these Republics were not seek­ing to sep­a­rate from Ukraine, but to have a sta­tus of auton­o­my, guar­an­tee­ing them the use of the Russ­ian lan­guage as an offi­cial lan­guage. For the first leg­isla­tive act of the new gov­ern­ment result­ing from the over­throw of Pres­i­dent Yanukovych, was the abo­li­tion, on Feb­ru­ary 23, 2014, of the Kival­ov-Kolesnichenko law of 2012 that made Russ­ian an offi­cial lan­guage. A bit like if putschists decid­ed that French and Ital­ian would no longer be offi­cial lan­guages in Switzer­land.

This deci­sion caused a storm in the Russ­ian-speak­ing pop­u­la­tion. The result was a fierce repres­sion against the Russ­ian-speak­ing regions (Odessa, Dne­propetro­vsk, Kharkov, Lugan­sk and Donet­sk) which was car­ried out begin­ning in Feb­ru­ary 2014 and led to a mil­i­ta­riza­tion of the sit­u­a­tion and some mas­sacres (in Odessa and Mar­i­oupol, for the most notable). At the end of sum­mer 2014, only the self-pro­claimed Republics of Donet­sk and Lugan­sk remained.

At this stage, too rigid and engrossed in a doc­tri­naire approach to the art of oper­a­tions, the Ukrain­ian gen­er­al staff sub­dued the ene­my with­out man­ag­ing to pre­vail. The exam­i­na­tion of the course of the fight­ing in 2014–2016 in the Don­bass shows that the Ukrain­ian gen­er­al staff sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly and mechan­i­cal­ly applied the same oper­a­tive schemes. How­ev­er, the war waged by the auton­o­mists was very sim­i­lar to what we observed in the Sahel: high­ly mobile oper­a­tions con­duct­ed with light means. With a more flex­i­ble and less doc­tri­naire approach, the rebels were able to exploit the iner­tia of Ukrain­ian forces to repeat­ed­ly “trap” them.

In 2014, when I was at NATO, I was respon­si­ble for the fight against the pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms, and we were try­ing to detect Russ­ian arms deliv­er­ies to the rebels, to see if Moscow was involved. The infor­ma­tion we received then came almost entire­ly from Pol­ish intel­li­gence ser­vices and did not “fit” with the infor­ma­tion com­ing from the OSCE—despite rather crude alle­ga­tions, there were no deliv­er­ies of weapons and mil­i­tary equip­ment from Rus­sia.

The rebels were armed thanks to the defec­tion of Russ­ian-speak­ing Ukrain­ian units that went over to the rebel side. As Ukrain­ian fail­ures con­tin­ued, tank, artillery and anti-air­craft bat­tal­ions swelled the ranks of the auton­o­mists. This is what pushed the Ukraini­ans to com­mit to the Min­sk Agree­ments.

But just after sign­ing the Min­sk 1 Agree­ments, the Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Petro Poroshenko launched a mas­sive anti-ter­ror­ist oper­a­tion (ATO/Антитерористична операція) against the Don­bass. Bis repeti­ta pla­cent: poor­ly advised by NATO offi­cers, the Ukraini­ans suf­fered a crush­ing defeat in Debalt­se­vo, which forced them to engage in the Min­sk 2 Agree­ments.

It is essen­tial to recall here that Min­sk 1 (Sep­tem­ber 2014) and Min­sk 2 (Feb­ru­ary 2015) Agree­ments did not pro­vide for the sep­a­ra­tion or inde­pen­dence of the Republics, but their auton­o­my with­in the frame­work of Ukraine. Those who have read the Agree­ments (there are very, very, very few of those who actu­al­ly have) will note that it is writ­ten in all let­ters that the sta­tus of the Republics was to be nego­ti­at­ed between Kiev and the rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Republics, for an inter­nal solu­tion to the Ukraine.

That is why since 2014, Rus­sia has sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly demand­ed their imple­men­ta­tion while refus­ing to be a par­ty to the nego­ti­a­tions, because it was an inter­nal mat­ter of the Ukraine. On the oth­er side, the West—led by France—systematically tried to replace the Min­sk Agree­ments with the “Nor­mandy for­mat,” which put Rus­sians and Ukraini­ans face-to-face. How­ev­er, let us remem­ber that there were nev­er any Russ­ian troops in the Don­bass before 23–24 Feb­ru­ary 2022. More­over, OSCE observers have nev­er observed the slight­est trace of Russ­ian units oper­at­ing in the Don­bass. For exam­ple, the U.S. intel­li­gence map pub­lished by the Wash­ing­ton Post on Decem­ber 3, 2021 does not show Russ­ian troops in the Don­bass.

In Octo­ber 2015, Vasyl Hryt­sak, direc­tor of the Ukrain­ian Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice (SBU), con­fessed that only 56 Russ­ian fight­ers had been observed in the Don­bass. This was exact­ly com­pa­ra­ble to the Swiss who went to fight in Bosnia on week­ends, in the 1990s, or the French who go to fight in the Ukraine today.

The Ukrain­ian army was then in a deplorable state. In Octo­ber 2018, after four years of war, the chief Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary pros­e­cu­tor, Ana­toly Matios, stat­ed that Ukraine had lost 2,700 men in the Don­bass: 891 from ill­ness­es, 318 from road acci­dents, 177 from oth­er acci­dents, 175 from poi­son­ings (alco­hol, drugs), 172 from care­less han­dling of weapons, 101 from breach­es of secu­ri­ty reg­u­la­tions, 228 from mur­ders and 615 from sui­cides.

In fact, the army was under­mined by the cor­rup­tion of its cadres and no longer enjoyed the sup­port of the pop­u­la­tion. Accord­ing to a British Home Office report, in the March/April 2014 recall of reservists, 70 per­cent did not show up for the first ses­sion, 80 per­cent for the sec­ond, 90 per­cent for the third, and 95 per­cent for the fourth. In October/November 2017, 70% of con­scripts did not show up for the “Fall 2017” recall cam­paign. This is not count­ing sui­cides and deser­tions (often over to the auton­o­mists), which reached up to 30 per­cent of the work­force in the ATO [anti-ter­ror­ist oper­a­tional] area. Young Ukraini­ans refused to go and fight in the Don­bass and pre­ferred emi­gra­tion, which also explains, at least par­tial­ly, the demo­graph­ic deficit of the coun­try.

The Ukrain­ian Min­istry of Defense then turned to NATO to help make its armed forces more “attrac­tive.” Hav­ing already worked on sim­i­lar projects with­in the frame­work of the Unit­ed Nations, I was asked by NATO to par­tic­i­pate in a pro­gram to restore the image of the Ukrain­ian armed forces. But this is a long-term process and the Ukraini­ans want­ed to move quick­ly.

So, to com­pen­sate for the lack of sol­diers, the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment resort­ed to para­mil­i­tary mili­tias. They are essen­tial­ly com­posed of for­eign mer­ce­nar­ies, often extreme right-wing mil­i­tants. In 2020, they con­sti­tut­ed about 40 per­cent of the Ukrain­ian forces and num­bered about 102,000 men, accord­ing to Reuters. They were armed, financed and trained by the Unit­ed States, Great Britain, Cana­da and France. There were more than 19 nationalities—including Swiss.

West­ern coun­tries have thus clear­ly cre­at­ed and sup­port­ed Ukrain­ian far-right mili­tias. In Octo­ber 2021, the Jerusalem Post sound­ed the alarm by denounc­ing the Cen­turia project. These mili­tias had been oper­at­ing in the Don­bass since 2014, with West­ern sup­port. Even if one can argue about the term “Nazi,” the fact remains that these mili­tias are vio­lent, con­vey a nau­se­at­ing ide­ol­o­gy and are vir­u­lent­ly anti-Semit­ic. Their anti-Semi­tism is more cul­tur­al than polit­i­cal, which is why the term “Nazi” is not real­ly appro­pri­ate. . . .

. . . . These mili­tias, orig­i­nat­ing from the far-right groups that ani­mat­ed the Euro­maid­an rev­o­lu­tion in 2014, are com­posed of fanat­i­cal and bru­tal indi­vid­u­als. The best known of these is the Azov Reg­i­ment, whose emblem is rem­i­nis­cent of the 2nd SS Das Reich Panz­er Divi­sion, which is revered in the Ukraine for lib­er­at­ing Kharkov from the Sovi­ets in 1943, before car­ry­ing out the 1944 Oradour-sur-Glane mas­sacre in France.

Among the famous fig­ures of the Azov reg­i­ment was the oppo­nent Roman Pro­tas­se­vitch, arrest­ed in 2021 by the Belaru­sian author­i­ties fol­low­ing the case of RyanAir flight FR4978. On May 23, 2021, the delib­er­ate hijack­ing of an air­lin­er by a MiG-29—supposedly with Putin’s approval—was men­tioned as a rea­son for arrest­ing Pro­tas­se­vich, although the infor­ma­tion avail­able at the time did not con­firm this sce­nario at all.

But then it was nec­es­sary to show that Pres­i­dent Lukashenko was a thug and Pro­tas­se­vich a “jour­nal­ist” who loved democ­ra­cy. How­ev­er, a rather reveal­ing inves­ti­ga­tion pro­duced by an Amer­i­can NGO in 2020 high­light­ed Protassevitch’s far-right mil­i­tant activ­i­ties. The West­ern con­spir­a­cy move­ment then start­ed, and unscrupu­lous media “air-brushed” his biog­ra­phy. Final­ly, in Jan­u­ary 2022, the ICAO report was pub­lished and showed that despite some pro­ce­dur­al errors, Belarus act­ed in accor­dance with the rules in force and that the MiG-29 took off 15 min­utes after the RyanAir pilot decid­ed to land in Min­sk. So no Belaru­sian plot and even less Putin. Ah!… Anoth­er detail: Pro­tas­se­vitch, cru­el­ly tor­tured by the Belaru­sian police, was now free. Those who would like to cor­re­spond with him, can go on his Twit­ter account.

The char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of the Ukrain­ian para­mil­i­taries as “Nazis” or “neo-Nazis” is con­sid­ered Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da. Per­haps. But that’s not the view of the Times of Israel, the Simon Wiesen­thal Cen­ter or the West Point Academy’s Cen­ter for Coun­tert­er­ror­ism. But that’s still debat­able, because in 2014, Newsweek mag­a­zine seemed to asso­ciate them more with… the Islam­ic State. Take your pick!

So, the West sup­port­ed and con­tin­ued to arm mili­tias that have been guilty of numer­ous crimes against civil­ian pop­u­la­tions since 2014: rape, tor­ture and mas­sacres. But while the Swiss gov­ern­ment has been very quick to take sanc­tions against Rus­sia, it has not adopt­ed any against the Ukraine, which has been mas­sacring its own pop­u­la­tion since 2014. In fact, those who defend human rights in the Ukraine have long con­demned the actions of these groups, but have not been sup­port­ed by our gov­ern­ments. Because, in real­i­ty, we are not try­ing to help the Ukraine, but to fight Rus­sia.

The inte­gra­tion of these para­mil­i­tary forces into the Nation­al Guard was not at all accom­pa­nied by a “denaz­i­fi­ca­tion,” as some claim. Among the many exam­ples, that of the Azov Regiment’s insignia is instruc­tive:

In 2022, very schemat­i­cal­ly, the Ukrain­ian armed forces fight­ing the Russ­ian offen­sive were orga­nized as:

  • The Army, sub­or­di­nat­ed to the Min­istry of Defense. It is orga­nized into 3 army corps and com­posed of maneu­ver for­ma­tions (tanks, heavy artillery, mis­siles, etc.).
  • The Nation­al Guard, which depends on the Min­istry of the Inte­ri­or and is orga­nized into 5 ter­ri­to­r­i­al com­mands.

The Nation­al Guard is there­fore a ter­ri­to­r­i­al defense force that is not part of the Ukrain­ian army. It includes para­mil­i­tary mili­tias, called “vol­un­teer bat­tal­ions” (добровольчі батальйоні), also known by the evoca­tive name of “reprisal bat­tal­ions,” and com­posed of infantry. Pri­mar­i­ly trained for urban com­bat, they now defend cities such as Kharkov, Mar­i­upol, Odessa, Kiev, etc.

Part Two: The War

As a for­mer head of the War­saw Pact forces in the Swiss strate­gic intel­li­gence ser­vice, I observe with sadness—but not astonishment—that our ser­vices are no longer able to under­stand the mil­i­tary sit­u­a­tion in Ukraine. The self-pro­claimed “experts” who parade on our screens tire­less­ly relay the same infor­ma­tion mod­u­lat­ed by the claim that Russia—and Vladimir Putin—is irra­tional. Let’s take a step back.

The Out­break Of War

Since Novem­ber 2021, the Amer­i­cans have been con­stant­ly threat­en­ing a Russ­ian inva­sion of the Ukraine. How­ev­er, the Ukraini­ans did not seem to agree. Why not?

We have to go back to March 24, 2021. On that day, Volodymyr Zelen­sky issued a decree for the recap­ture of the Crimea, and began to deploy his forces to the south of the coun­try. At the same time, sev­er­al NATO exer­cis­es were con­duct­ed between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, accom­pa­nied by a sig­nif­i­cant increase in recon­nais­sance flights along the Russ­ian bor­der. Rus­sia then con­duct­ed sev­er­al exer­cis­es to test the oper­a­tional readi­ness of its troops and to show that it was fol­low­ing the evo­lu­tion of the sit­u­a­tion.

Things calmed down until Octo­ber-Novem­ber with the end of the ZAPAD 21 exer­cis­es, whose troop move­ments were inter­pret­ed as a rein­force­ment for an offen­sive against the Ukraine. How­ev­er, even the Ukrain­ian author­i­ties refut­ed the idea of Russ­ian prepa­ra­tions for a war, and Olek­siy Reznikov, Ukrain­ian Min­is­ter of Defense, states that there had been no change on its bor­der since the spring.

In vio­la­tion of the Min­sk Agree­ments, the Ukraine was con­duct­ing air oper­a­tions in Don­bass using drones, includ­ing at least one strike against a fuel depot in Donet­sk in Octo­ber 2021. The Amer­i­can press not­ed this, but not the Euro­peans; and no one con­demned these vio­la­tions.

In Feb­ru­ary 2022, events were pre­cip­i­tat­ed. On Feb­ru­ary 7, dur­ing his vis­it to Moscow, Emmanuel Macron reaf­firmed to Vladimir Putin his com­mit­ment to the Min­sk Agree­ments, a com­mit­ment he would repeat after his meet­ing with Volodymyr Zelen­sky the next day. But on Feb­ru­ary 11, in Berlin, after nine hours of work, the meet­ing of polit­i­cal advi­sors of the lead­ers of the “Nor­mandy for­mat” end­ed, with­out any con­crete result: the Ukraini­ans still refused to apply the Min­sk Agree­ments, appar­ent­ly under pres­sure from the Unit­ed States.Vladimir Putin not­ed that Macron had made emp­ty promis­es and that the West was not ready to enforce the agree­ments, as it had been doing for eight years.

Ukrain­ian prepa­ra­tions in the con­tact zone con­tin­ued. The Russ­ian Par­lia­ment became alarmed; and on Feb­ru­ary 15 asked Vladimir Putin to rec­og­nize the inde­pen­dence of the Republics, which he refused to do.

On 17 Feb­ru­ary, Pres­i­dent Joe Biden announced that Rus­sia would attack the Ukraine in the next few days. How did he know this? It is a mys­tery. But since the 16th, the artillery shelling of the pop­u­la­tion of Don­bass increased dra­mat­i­cal­ly, as the dai­ly reports of the OSCE observers show. Nat­u­ral­ly, nei­ther the media, nor the Euro­pean Union, nor NATO, nor any West­ern gov­ern­ment reacts or inter­venes. It will be said lat­er that this is Russ­ian dis­in­for­ma­tion. In fact, it seems that the Euro­pean Union and some coun­tries have delib­er­ate­ly kept silent about the mas­sacre of the Don­bass pop­u­la­tion, know­ing that this would pro­voke a Russ­ian inter­ven­tion.

At the same time, there were reports of sab­o­tage in the Don­bass. On 18 Jan­u­ary, Don­bass fight­ers inter­cept­ed sabo­teurs, who spoke Pol­ish and were equipped with West­ern equip­ment and who were seek­ing to cre­ate chem­i­cal inci­dents in Gor­liv­ka. They could have been CIA mer­ce­nar­ies, led or “advised” by Amer­i­cans and com­posed of Ukrain­ian or Euro­pean fight­ers, to car­ry out sab­o­tage actions in the Don­bass Republics.

In fact, as ear­ly as Feb­ru­ary 16, Joe Biden knew that the Ukraini­ans had begun shelling the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion of Don­bass, putting Vladimir Putin in front of a dif­fi­cult choice: to help Don­bass mil­i­tar­i­ly and cre­ate an inter­na­tion­al prob­lem, or to stand by and watch the Russ­ian-speak­ing peo­ple of Don­bass being crushed.

If he decid­ed to inter­vene, Putin could invoke the inter­na­tion­al oblig­a­tion of “Respon­si­bil­i­ty To Pro­tect” (R2P). But he knew that what­ev­er its nature or scale, the inter­ven­tion would trig­ger a storm of sanc­tions. There­fore, whether Russ­ian inter­ven­tion were lim­it­ed to the Don­bass or went fur­ther to put pres­sure on the West for the sta­tus of the Ukraine, the price to pay would be the same. This is what he explained in his speech on Feb­ru­ary 21.

On that day, he agreed to the request of the Duma and rec­og­nized the inde­pen­dence of the two Don­bass Republics and, at the same time, he signed friend­ship and assis­tance treaties with them.

The Ukrain­ian artillery bom­bard­ment of the Don­bass pop­u­la­tion con­tin­ued, and, on 23 Feb­ru­ary, the two Republics asked for mil­i­tary assis­tance from Rus­sia. On 24 Feb­ru­ary, Vladimir Putin invoked Arti­cle 51 of the Unit­ed Nations Char­ter, which pro­vides for mutu­al mil­i­tary assis­tance in the frame­work of a defen­sive alliance.

In order to make the Russ­ian inter­ven­tion total­ly ille­gal in the eyes of the pub­lic we delib­er­ate­ly hid the fact that the war actu­al­ly start­ed on Feb­ru­ary 16. The Ukrain­ian army was prepar­ing to attack the Don­bass as ear­ly as 2021, as some Russ­ian and Euro­pean intel­li­gence ser­vices were well aware. Jurists will judge.

In his speech of Feb­ru­ary 24, Vladimir Putin stat­ed the two objec­tives of his oper­a­tion: “demil­i­ta­rize” and “denaz­i­fy” the Ukraine. So, it is not a ques­tion of tak­ing over the Ukraine, nor even, pre­sum­ably, of occu­py­ing it; and cer­tain­ly not of destroy­ing it.

From then on, our vis­i­bil­i­ty on the course of the oper­a­tion is lim­it­ed: the Rus­sians have an excel­lent secu­ri­ty of oper­a­tions (OPSEC) and the details of their plan­ning are not known. But fair­ly quick­ly, the course of the oper­a­tion allows us to under­stand how the strate­gic objec­tives were trans­lat­ed on the oper­a­tional lev­el.

Demil­i­ta­riza­tion:

  • ground destruc­tion of Ukrain­ian avi­a­tion, air defense sys­tems and recon­nais­sance assets;
  • neu­tral­iza­tion of com­mand and intel­li­gence struc­tures (C3I), as well as the main logis­ti­cal routes in the depth of the ter­ri­to­ry;
  • encir­clement of the bulk of the Ukrain­ian army massed in the south­east of the coun­try.

Denaz­i­fi­ca­tion:

  • destruc­tion or neu­tral­iza­tion of vol­un­teer bat­tal­ions oper­at­ing in the cities of Odessa, Kharkov, and Mar­i­upol, as well as in var­i­ous facil­i­ties in the ter­ri­to­ry.

2. Demil­i­ta­riza­tion

The Russ­ian offen­sive was car­ried out in a very “clas­sic” man­ner. Initially—as the Israelis had done in 1967—with the destruc­tion on the ground of the air force in the very first hours. Then, we wit­nessed a simul­ta­ne­ous pro­gres­sion along sev­er­al axes accord­ing to the prin­ci­ple of “flow­ing water”: advance every­where where resis­tance was weak and leave the cities (very demand­ing in terms of troops) for lat­er. In the north, the Cher­nobyl pow­er plant was occu­pied imme­di­ate­ly to pre­vent acts of sab­o­tage. The images of Ukrain­ian and Russ­ian sol­diers guard­ing the plant togeth­er are of course not shown.

The idea that Rus­sia is try­ing to take over Kiev, the cap­i­tal, to elim­i­nate Zelen­sky, comes typ­i­cal­ly from the West—that is what they did in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and what they want­ed to do in Syr­ia with the help of the Islam­ic State. But Vladimir Putin nev­er intend­ed to shoot or top­ple Zelen­sky. Instead, Rus­sia seeks to keep him in pow­er by push­ing him to nego­ti­ate, by sur­round­ing Kiev. Up till now, he had refused to imple­ment the Min­sk Agree­ments. But now the Rus­sians want to obtain the neu­tral­i­ty of the Ukraine.

Many West­ern com­men­ta­tors were sur­prised that the Rus­sians con­tin­ued to seek a nego­ti­at­ed solu­tion while con­duct­ing mil­i­tary oper­a­tions. The expla­na­tion lies in the Russ­ian strate­gic out­look since the Sovi­et era. For the West, war begins when pol­i­tics ends. How­ev­er, the Russ­ian approach fol­lows a Clause­witz­ian inspi­ra­tion: war is the con­ti­nu­ity of pol­i­tics and one can move flu­id­ly from one to the oth­er, even dur­ing com­bat. This allows one to cre­ate pres­sure on the adver­sary and push him to nego­ti­ate.

From an oper­a­tional point of view, the Russ­ian offen­sive was an exam­ple of its kind: in six days, the Rus­sians seized a ter­ri­to­ry as large as the Unit­ed King­dom, with a speed of advance greater than what the Wehrma­cht had achieved in 1940.

The bulk of the Ukrain­ian army was deployed in the south of the coun­try in prepa­ra­tion for a major oper­a­tion against the Don­bass. This is why Russ­ian forces were able to encir­cle it from the begin­ning of March in the “caul­dron” between Slavyan­sk, Kram­a­torsk and Severodonet­sk, with a thrust from the East through Kharkov and anoth­er from the South from Crimea. Troops from the Donet­sk (DPR) and Lugan­sk (LPR) Republics are com­ple­ment­ing the Russ­ian forces with a push from the East.

At this stage, Russ­ian forces are slow­ly tight­en­ing the noose, but are no longer under time pres­sure. Their demil­i­ta­riza­tion goal is all but achieved and the remain­ing Ukrain­ian forces no longer have an oper­a­tional and strate­gic com­mand struc­ture.

The “slow­down” that our “experts” attribute to poor logis­tics is only the con­se­quence of hav­ing achieved their objec­tives. Rus­sia does not seem to want to engage in an occu­pa­tion of the entire Ukrain­ian ter­ri­to­ry. In fact, it seems that Rus­sia is try­ing to lim­it its advance to the lin­guis­tic bor­der of the coun­try.

Our media speak of indis­crim­i­nate bom­bard­ments against the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion, espe­cial­ly in Kharkov, and Dan­tean images are broad­cast in a loop. How­ev­er, Gon­za­lo Lira, a Latin Amer­i­can who lives there, presents us with a calm city on March 10 and March 11. It is true that it is a large city and we do not see everything—but this seems to indi­cate that we are not in the total war that we are served con­tin­u­ous­ly on our screens.

As for the Don­bass Republics, they have “lib­er­at­ed” their own ter­ri­to­ries and are fight­ing in the city of Mar­i­upol.

3. Denaz­i­fi­ca­tion

In cities like Kharkov, Mar­i­upol and Odessa, the defense is pro­vid­ed by para­mil­i­tary mili­tias. They know that the objec­tive of “denaz­i­fi­ca­tion” is aimed pri­mar­i­ly at them.

For an attack­er in an urban­ized area, civil­ians are a prob­lem. This is why Rus­sia is seek­ing to cre­ate human­i­tar­i­an cor­ri­dors to emp­ty cities of civil­ians and leave only the mili­tias, to fight them more eas­i­ly.

Con­verse­ly, these mili­tias seek to keep civil­ians in the cities in order to dis­suade the Russ­ian army from fight­ing there. This is why they are reluc­tant to imple­ment these cor­ri­dors and do every­thing to ensure that Russ­ian efforts are unsuccessful—they can use the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion as “human shields.” Videos show­ing civil­ians try­ing to leave Mar­i­upol and beat­en up by fight­ers of the Azov reg­i­ment are of course care­ful­ly cen­sored here.

On Face­book, the Azov group was con­sid­ered in the same cat­e­go­ry as the Islam­ic State and sub­ject to the platform’s “pol­i­cy on dan­ger­ous indi­vid­u­als and orga­ni­za­tions.” It was there­fore for­bid­den to glo­ri­fy it, and “posts” that were favor­able to it were sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly banned. But on Feb­ru­ary 24, Face­book changed its pol­i­cy and allowed posts favor­able to the mili­tia. In the same spir­it, in March, the plat­form autho­rized, in the for­mer East­ern coun­tries, calls for the mur­der of Russ­ian sol­diers and lead­ers. So much for the val­ues that inspire our lead­ers, as we shall see.

Our media prop­a­gate a roman­tic image of pop­u­lar resis­tance. It is this image that led the Euro­pean Union to finance the dis­tri­b­u­tion of arms to the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion. This is a crim­i­nal act. In my capac­i­ty as head of peace­keep­ing doc­trine at the UN, I worked on the issue of civil­ian pro­tec­tion. We found that vio­lence against civil­ians occurred in very spe­cif­ic con­texts. In par­tic­u­lar, when weapons are abun­dant and there are no com­mand struc­tures.

These com­mand struc­tures are the essence of armies: their func­tion is to chan­nel the use of force towards an objec­tive. By arm­ing cit­i­zens in a hap­haz­ard man­ner, as is cur­rent­ly the case, the EU is turn­ing them into com­bat­ants, with the con­se­quen­tial effect of mak­ing them poten­tial tar­gets. More­over, with­out com­mand, with­out oper­a­tional goals, the dis­tri­b­u­tion of arms leads inevitably to set­tling of scores, ban­dit­ry and actions that are more dead­ly than effec­tive. War becomes a mat­ter of emo­tions. Force becomes vio­lence. This is what hap­pened in Tawar­ga (Libya) from 11 to 13 August 2011, where 30,000 black Africans were mas­sa­cred with weapons para­chut­ed (ille­gal­ly) by France. By the way, the British Roy­al Insti­tute for Strate­gic Stud­ies (RUSI) does not see any added val­ue in these arms deliv­er­ies.

More­over, by deliv­er­ing arms to a coun­try at war, one expos­es one­self to being con­sid­ered a bel­liger­ent. The Russ­ian strikes of March 13, 2022, against the Myko­layev air base fol­low Russ­ian warn­ings that arms ship­ments would be treat­ed as hos­tile tar­gets.

The EU is repeat­ing the dis­as­trous expe­ri­ence of the Third Reich in the final hours of the Bat­tle of Berlin. War must be left to the mil­i­tary and when one side has lost, it must be admit­ted. And if there is to be resis­tance, it must be led and struc­tured. But we are doing exact­ly the opposite—we are push­ing cit­i­zens to go and fight and at the same time, Face­book autho­rizes calls for the mur­der of Russ­ian sol­diers and lead­ers. So much for the val­ues that inspire us.

Some intel­li­gence ser­vices see this irre­spon­si­ble deci­sion as a way to use the Ukrain­ian pop­u­la­tion as can­non fod­der to fight Vladimir Putin’s Rus­sia. This kind of mur­der­ous deci­sion should have been left to the col­leagues of Ursu­la von der Leyen’s grand­fa­ther. It would have been bet­ter to engage in nego­ti­a­tions and thus obtain guar­an­tees for the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion than to add fuel to the fire. It is easy to be com­bat­ive with the blood of oth­ers.

4. The Mater­ni­ty Hos­pi­tal At Mar­i­upol

It is impor­tant to under­stand before­hand that it is not the Ukrain­ian army that is defend­ing Mar­i­oupol, but the Azov mili­tia, com­posed of for­eign mer­ce­nar­ies.

In its March 7, 2022 sum­ma­ry of the sit­u­a­tion, the Russ­ian UN mis­sion in New York stat­ed that “Res­i­dents report that Ukrain­ian armed forces expelled staff from the Mar­i­upol city birth hos­pi­tal No. 1 and set up a fir­ing post inside the facil­i­ty.”

On March 8, the inde­pen­dent Russ­ian media Lenta.ru, pub­lished the tes­ti­mo­ny of civil­ians from Mar­i­oupol who told that the mater­ni­ty hos­pi­tal was tak­en over by the mili­tia of the Azov reg­i­ment, and who drove out the civil­ian occu­pants by threat­en­ing them with their weapons. They con­firmed the state­ments of the Russ­ian ambas­sador a few hours ear­li­er.

The hos­pi­tal in Mar­i­upol occu­pies a dom­i­nant posi­tion, per­fect­ly suit­ed for the instal­la­tion of anti-tank weapons and for obser­va­tion. On 9 March, Russ­ian forces struck the build­ing.Accord­ing to CNN, 17 peo­ple were wound­ed, but the images do not show any casu­al­ties in the build­ing and there is no evi­dence that the vic­tims men­tioned are relat­ed to this strike. There is talk of chil­dren, but in real­i­ty, there is noth­ing. This may be true, but it may not be true. This does not pre­vent the lead­ers of the EU from see­ing this as a war crime. And this allows Zelen­sky to call for a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

In real­i­ty, we do not know exact­ly what hap­pened. But the sequence of events tends to con­firm that Russ­ian forces struck a posi­tion of the Azov reg­i­ment and that the mater­ni­ty ward was then free of civil­ians.

The prob­lem is that the para­mil­i­tary mili­tias that defend the cities are encour­aged by the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty not to respect the cus­toms of war. It seems that the Ukraini­ans have replayed the sce­nario of the Kuwait City mater­ni­ty hos­pi­tal in 1990, which was total­ly staged by the firm Hill & Knowl­ton for $10.7 mil­lion in order to con­vince the Unit­ed Nations Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil to inter­vene in Iraq for Oper­a­tion Desert Shield/Storm.

West­ern politi­cians have accept­ed civil­ian strikes in the Don­bass for eight years, with­out adopt­ing any sanc­tions against the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment. We have long since entered a dynam­ic where West­ern politi­cians have agreed to sac­ri­fice inter­na­tion­al law towards their goal of weak­en­ing Rus­sia.

Part Three: Con­clu­sions

As an ex-intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­al, the first thing that strikes me is the total absence of West­ern intel­li­gence ser­vices in the rep­re­sen­ta­tion of the sit­u­a­tion over the past year. In Switzer­land, the ser­vices have been crit­i­cized for not hav­ing pro­vid­ed a cor­rect pic­ture of the sit­u­a­tion. In fact, it seems that through­out the West­ern world, intel­li­gence ser­vices have been over­whelmed by the politi­cians. The prob­lem is that it is the politi­cians who decide—the best intel­li­gence ser­vice in the world is use­less if the deci­sion-mak­er does not lis­ten. This is what hap­pened dur­ing this cri­sis.

That said, while some intel­li­gence ser­vices had a very accu­rate and ratio­nal pic­ture of the sit­u­a­tion, oth­ers clear­ly had the same pic­ture as that prop­a­gat­ed by our media. In this cri­sis, the ser­vices of the coun­tries of the “new Europe” played an impor­tant role. The prob­lem is that, from expe­ri­ence, I have found them to be extreme­ly bad at the ana­lyt­i­cal level—doctrinaire, they lack the intel­lec­tu­al and polit­i­cal inde­pen­dence nec­es­sary to assess a sit­u­a­tion with mil­i­tary “qual­i­ty.” It is bet­ter to have them as ene­mies than as friends.

Sec­ond, it seems that in some Euro­pean coun­tries, politi­cians have delib­er­ate­ly ignored their ser­vices in order to respond ide­o­log­i­cal­ly to the sit­u­a­tion. That is why this cri­sis has been irra­tional from the begin­ning. It should be not­ed that all the doc­u­ments that were pre­sent­ed to the pub­lic dur­ing this cri­sis were pre­sent­ed by politi­cians based on com­mer­cial sources.

Some West­ern politi­cians obvi­ous­ly want­ed there to be a con­flict. In the Unit­ed States, the attack sce­nar­ios pre­sent­ed by Antho­ny Blinken to the Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil were only the prod­uct of the imag­i­na­tion of a Tiger Team work­ing for him—he did exact­ly as Don­ald Rums­feld did in 2002, who had thus “bypassed” the CIA and oth­er intel­li­gence ser­vices that were much less assertive about Iraqi chem­i­cal weapons.

The dra­mat­ic devel­op­ments we are wit­ness­ing today have caus­es that we knew about but refused to see:

  • on the strate­gic lev­el, the expan­sion of NATO (which we have not dealt with here);
  • on the polit­i­cal lev­el, the West­ern refusal to imple­ment the Min­sk Agree­ments;
  • and oper­a­tional­ly, the con­tin­u­ous and repeat­ed attacks on the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion of the Don­bass over the past years and the dra­mat­ic increase in late Feb­ru­ary 2022.

In oth­er words, we can nat­u­ral­ly deplore and con­demn the Russ­ian attack. But WE (that is: the Unit­ed States, France and the Euro­pean Union in the lead) have cre­at­ed the con­di­tions for a con­flict to break out. We show com­pas­sion for the Ukrain­ian peo­ple and the two mil­lion refugees. That is fine. But if we had had a mod­icum of com­pas­sion for the same num­ber of refugees from the Ukrain­ian pop­u­la­tions of Don­bass mas­sa­cred by their own gov­ern­ment and who sought refuge in Rus­sia for eight years, none of this would prob­a­bly have hap­pened.

Civil­ian casu­al­ties caused by active hos­til­i­ties in 2018–2021, per ter­ri­to­ry

 

In ter­ri­to­ry con­trol- led by the self-pro- claimed “Republics”

In Gov­ern­ment- con­trolled ter­ri­to­ry

 In “no man’s land”

 Total

Decrease com­pared with pre­vi­ous year, per cent

2018

128

27

7

162

41.9

2019

85

18

2

105

35.2

2020

61

9

0

70

33.3

2021

36

8

0

44

37.1

Total

310

62

9

381

 

Per cent

81.4

16.3

2.3

100.0

 

As we can see, more than 80% of the vic­tims in Don­bass were the result of the Ukrain­ian army’s shelling. For years, the West remained silent about the mas­sacre of Russ­ian-speak­ing Ukraini­ans by the gov­ern­ment of Kiev, with­out ever try­ing to bring pres­sure on Kiev. It is this silence that forced the Russ­ian side to act. [Source: “Con­flict-relat­ed civil­ian casu­al­ties, Unit­ed Nations Human Rights Mon­i­tor­ing Mis­sion in Ukraine.]

Whether the term “geno­cide” applies to the abus­es suf­fered by the peo­ple of Don­bass is an open ques­tion. The term is gen­er­al­ly reserved for cas­es of greater mag­ni­tude (Holo­caust, etc.). But the def­i­n­i­tion giv­en by the Geno­cide Con­ven­tion is prob­a­bly broad enough to apply to this case. Legal schol­ars will under­stand this.

Clear­ly, this con­flict has led us into hys­te­ria. Sanc­tions seem to have become the pre­ferred tool of our for­eign poli­cies. If we had insist­ed that Ukraine abide by the Min­sk Agree­ments, which we had nego­ti­at­ed and endorsed, none of this would have hap­pened. Vladimir Putin’s con­dem­na­tion is also ours. There is no point in whin­ing afterwards—we should have act­ed ear­li­er. How­ev­er, nei­ther Emmanuel Macron (as guar­an­tor and mem­ber of the UN Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil), nor Olaf Scholz, nor Volodymyr Zelen­sky have respect­ed their com­mit­ments. In the end, the real defeat is that of those who have no voice.

The Euro­pean Union was unable to pro­mote the imple­men­ta­tion of the Min­sk agreements—on the con­trary, it did not react when Ukraine was bomb­ing its own pop­u­la­tion in the Don­bass. Had it done so, Vladimir Putin would not have need­ed to react. Absent from the diplo­mat­ic phase, the EU dis­tin­guished itself by fuel­ing the con­flict. On Feb­ru­ary 27, the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment agreed to enter into nego­ti­a­tions with Rus­sia. But a few hours lat­er, the Euro­pean Union vot­ed a bud­get of 450 mil­lion euros to sup­ply arms to the Ukraine, adding fuel to the fire. From then on, the Ukraini­ans felt that they did not need to reach an agree­ment. The resis­tance of the Azov mili­tia in Mar­i­upol even led to a boost of 500 mil­lion euros for weapons.

In the Ukraine, with the bless­ing of the West­ern coun­tries, those who are in favor of a nego­ti­a­tion have been elim­i­nat­ed. This is the case of Denis Kireyev, one of the Ukrain­ian nego­tia­tors, assas­si­nat­ed on March 5 by the Ukrain­ian secret ser­vice (SBU) because he was too favor­able to Rus­sia and was con­sid­ered a trai­tor. The same fate befell Dmit­ry Demya­nenko, for­mer deputy head of the SBU’s main direc­torate for Kiev and its region, who was assas­si­nat­ed on March 10 because he was too favor­able to an agree­ment with Russia—he was shot by the Mirotvorets (“Peace­mak­er”) mili­tia. This mili­tia is asso­ci­at­ed with the Mirotvorets web­site, which lists the “ene­mies of Ukraine,” with their per­son­al data, address­es and tele­phone num­bers, so that they can be harassed or even elim­i­nat­ed; a prac­tice that is pun­ish­able in many coun­tries, but not in the Ukraine. The UN and some Euro­pean coun­tries have demand­ed the clo­sure of this site—refused by the Rada.

In the end, the price will be high, but Vladimir Putin will like­ly achieve the goals he set for him­self. His ties with Bei­jing have solid­i­fied. Chi­na is emerg­ing as a medi­a­tor in the con­flict, while Switzer­land is join­ing the list of Russia’s ene­mies. The Amer­i­cans have to ask Venezuela and Iran for oil to get out of the ener­gy impasse they have put them­selves in—Juan Guai­do is leav­ing the scene for good and the Unit­ed States has to piteous­ly back­track on the sanc­tions imposed on its ene­mies.

West­ern min­is­ters who seek to col­lapse the Russ­ian econ­o­my and make the Russ­ian peo­ple suf­fer, or even call for the assas­si­na­tion of Putin, show (even if they have par­tial­ly reversed the form of their words, but not the sub­stance!) that our lead­ers are no bet­ter than those we hate—for sanc­tion­ing Russ­ian ath­letes in the Para-Olympic Games or Russ­ian artists has noth­ing to do with fight­ing Putin.

Thus, we rec­og­nize that Rus­sia is a democ­ra­cy since we con­sid­er that the Russ­ian peo­ple are respon­si­ble for the war. If this is not the case, then why do we seek to pun­ish a whole pop­u­la­tion for the fault of one? Let us remem­ber that col­lec­tive pun­ish­ment is for­bid­den by the Gene­va Con­ven­tions.

The les­son to be learned from this con­flict is our sense of vari­able geo­met­ric human­i­ty. If we cared so much about peace and the Ukraine, why didn’t we encour­age the Ukraine to respect the agree­ments it had signed and that the mem­bers of the Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil had approved?

The integri­ty of the media is mea­sured by their will­ing­ness to work with­in the terms of the Munich Char­ter. They suc­ceed­ed in prop­a­gat­ing hatred of the Chi­nese dur­ing the Covid cri­sis and their polar­ized mes­sage leads to the same effects against the Rus­sians. Jour­nal­ism is becom­ing more and more unpro­fes­sion­al and mil­i­tant.

As Goethe said: “The greater the light, the dark­er the shad­ow.” The more the sanc­tions against Rus­sia are dis­pro­por­tion­ate, the more the cas­es where we have done noth­ing high­light our racism and ser­vil­i­ty. Why have no West­ern politi­cians react­ed to the strikes against the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion of Don­bass for eight years?

Because final­ly, what makes the con­flict in the Ukraine more blame­wor­thy than the war in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya? What sanc­tions have we adopt­ed against those who delib­er­ate­ly lied to the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty in order to wage unjust, unjus­ti­fied and mur­der­ous wars? Have we sought to “make the Amer­i­can peo­ple suf­fer” for lying to us (because they are a democ­ra­cy!) before the war in Iraq? Have we adopt­ed a sin­gle sanc­tion against the coun­tries, com­pa­nies or politi­cians who are sup­ply­ing weapons to the con­flict in Yemen, con­sid­ered to be the “worst human­i­tar­i­an dis­as­ter in the world?” Have we sanc­tioned the coun­tries of the Euro­pean Union that prac­tice the most abject tor­ture on their ter­ri­to­ry for the ben­e­fit of the Unit­ed States?

To ask the ques­tion is to answer it… and the answer is not pret­ty.

 

Discussion

2 comments for “FTR#1244 How Many Lies Before You Belong to The Lie?, Part 17”

  1. What’s actu­al­ly hap­pen­ing on the bat­tle­field in Ukraine? It’s been one of the meta ques­tions loom­ing over the con­flict for near­ly three months now. A fueled not just by the obvi­ous pro­pa­gan­dis­tic nature of a lot of west­ern cov­er­age of the con­flict but also the unde­ni­able fact that we’ve received almost no actu­al report on Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary casu­al­ty.

    But while the casu­al­ty num­bers have been large­ly non-exis­tent through­out the con­flict, we did get a rather sig­nif­i­cant update in fol­low­ing NY Times report from a few days ago on a close­ly relat­ed war met­ric: Rus­si­a’s ter­ri­to­r­i­al gains fol­low­ing the pull back from Kiev and focus on the Don­bas region. Accord­ing to the Russ­ian Defense Min­istry, its forces in east­ern Ukraine had advanced to the bor­der between Donet­sk and Luhan­sk, putting Russ­ian and the sep­a­ratist forces near­ly in con­trol of the entire Don­bas region, con­trast­ed with only around 1/3 con­trol at the start of this con­flict. But what is most remark­able about the update by the Russ­ian Defense Min­istry is that was backed up by the Ukrain­ian author­i­ties which con­firmed that Russ­ian forces are indeed in con­trol of around 80% of the Don­bas.

    Now, we still haven’t received an casu­al­ty updates. But it stands to rea­son that if Russ­ian forces have been steadi­ly gain­ing ground in the Don­bas there’s prob­a­bly been quite a few casu­al­ties sus­tained by both sides.

    Adding to the mys­tery over what’s actu­al­ly hap­pen­ing on the ground in East­ern Ukraine is the fact that this NY Times piece decid­ed to quote Col. Oleg Gon­charuk, the com­man­der of the 128th Sep­a­rate Moun­tain Assault Brigade on the sta­tus of fight­ing. As Gon­charuk put it, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has not com­mit­ted enough forces to move the bat­tle lines sig­nif­i­cant­ly or threat­en Zapor­izhzhia, the largest city near the front­line. But as the arti­cle notes, that inter­view was con­duct last month. This arti­cle was pub­lished on May 10. So this opti­mistic sound­ing pre­dic­tion from this Ukrain­ian com­man­der was tak­en from an inter­view con­duct­ed weeks ear­li­er. What does that say about the real state of that con­flict

    So while the fog of war con­tin­ues to linger over the fight­ing in Ukraine, it does appear that Rus­sia real­ly has man­aged to not just blunt what appeared to be a Ukrain­ian offen­sive to take back ter­ri­to­ry in the east but actu­al­ly push the front line back west towards the edge of the Don­bas. How many casu­al­ties both sides are retain­ing large­ly remains a mys­tery.

    But let’s also keep in mind anoth­er some­what unusu­al fac­tor in this con­flict that could be dri­ving the desire to min­i­mize the report­ing on casu­al­ties: the grow­ing num­ber of for­eign fight­ers fight­ing on behalf of Ukraine. How might reports of Ukrain­ian casu­al­ties impact the flow of for­eign fight­ers into this con­flict? Would up to date reports on dead for­eign fight­ers end up damp­en­ing the inflow of vol­un­teers?

    At the same time, keep in mind that the fight­ing in the east­ern part of coun­try is going to be tak­ing place on ter­ri­to­ry where we can most expect the civil­ian pop­u­lace to hold pro-Russ­ian sym­pa­thies. And that means the war in east­ern Ukraine right now is exact­ly the kind of con­flict where we should expect the Nazi bat­tal­ions fight­ing for Ukraine to engage in civil­ian atroc­i­ties. Might that have some­thing to do with the lack of bat­tle­field report­ing?

    These are the kinds of ques­tions we’re forced to spec­u­late about giv­en the lack of up to date and accu­rate cov­er­age. But despite the extreme con­trol being placed over the infor­ma­tion we’re get­ting on the fight­ing, it’s look­ing like Rus­si­a’s forces have man­aged to con­sol­i­date the Don­bas. And that’s the kind of update that sug­gests this war could con­tin­ue for a very long time. And the longer this war gets, the thick­er the fog of war seems to be get­ting too. So giv­en that the con­flict in the east­ern front looks like it’s going to be sus­tained bat­tle with no end in sight, keep in mind that the near com­plete lack of accu­rate infor­ma­tion about what’s actu­al­ly hap­pen­ing in Ukraine isn’t going to be end­ing any time soon either:

    The New York Times

    Ukraine War’s Geo­graph­ic Real­i­ty: Rus­sia Has Seized Much of the East

    Michael Schwirtz, Marc San­to­ra and Michael Lev­en­son
    May 10, 2022, 6:07 p.m. ET

    POKROVSK, Ukraine — Russia’s near­ly three-month-old inva­sion of neigh­bor­ing Ukraine has been punc­tu­at­ed by flawed plan­ning, poor intel­li­gence, bar­bar­i­ty and wan­ton destruc­tion. But obscured in the dai­ly fight­ing is the geo­graph­ic real­i­ty that Rus­sia has made gains on the ground.

    The Russ­ian Defense Min­istry said Tues­day that its forces in east­ern Ukraine had advanced to the bor­der between Donet­sk and Luhan­sk, the two Russ­ian-speak­ing provinces where Moscow-backed sep­a­ratists have been fight­ing Ukraine’s army for eight years.

    The ministry’s asser­tion, if con­firmed, strength­ens the prospect that Rus­sia could soon gain com­plete con­trol over the region, known as the Don­bas, com­pared with just a third of it before the Feb. 24 inva­sion.

    That is a far cry from what appeared to be the grand ambi­tions of Pres­i­dent Vladimir V. Putin of Rus­sia when he launched the inva­sion: quick and easy seizure of vast swaths of Ukraine, includ­ing the cap­i­tal, Kyiv, the over­throw of a hos­tile gov­ern­ment and a replace­ment with unques­tioned feal­ty that would ensure Ukraine’s sub­servience.

    Nonethe­less, the Don­bas seizure, com­bined with the Russ­ian invasion’s ear­ly suc­cess in seiz­ing parts of south­ern Ukraine adjoin­ing the Crimean penin­su­la, which Rus­sia ille­gal­ly annexed in 2014, gives the Krem­lin enor­mous lever­age in any future nego­ti­a­tion to halt the con­flict.

    And the Rus­sians enjoy the added advan­tage of naval dom­i­nance in the Black Sea, the only mar­itime route for Ukrain­ian trade, which they have par­a­lyzed with an embar­go that could even­tu­al­ly starve Ukraine eco­nom­i­cal­ly and is already con­tribut­ing to a glob­al grain short­age.

    Tes­ti­fy­ing before the Sen­ate Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee in Wash­ing­ton on Tues­day, Avril D. Haines, the direc­tor of nation­al intel­li­gence, warned of a “pro­longed con­flict” in Ukraine as Rus­sia seeks expan­sive ter­ri­to­r­i­al gains beyond the Don­bas region, includ­ing the cre­ation of a land bridge across Ukraine’s Black Sea coast.

    But Ms. Haines cau­tioned that Mr. Putin would strug­gle to achieve those gains with­out a large-scale mobi­liza­tion or draft, which he appears reluc­tant to order for now. As Mr. Putin’s ter­ri­to­r­i­al ambi­tions con­flict with the lim­it­ed capa­bil­i­ties of his mil­i­tary, Ms. Haines said that the war could enter “a more unpre­dictable and poten­tial­ly esca­la­to­ry tra­jec­to­ry” over the next few months, increas­ing the like­li­hood of Mr. Putin issu­ing direct threats to use nuclear weapons.

    For the last sev­er­al weeks, Ukrain­ian and Russ­ian troops have been engaged in a gru­el­ing attri­tion, often fight­ing fierce­ly over small areas, as one vil­lage falls into Russ­ian hands on one day only to be retak­en by the Ukraini­ans a few days lat­er.

    The Ukraini­ans are increas­ing­ly depen­dent on an infu­sion of West­ern mil­i­tary and human­i­tar­i­an aid, much of it from the Unit­ed States, where the House vot­ed Tues­day evening to approve a near­ly $40 bil­lion emer­gency pack­age.

    “The Rus­sians aren’t win­ning, and the Ukraini­ans aren’t win­ning, and we’re at a bit of a stale­mate here,” said Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berri­er, the direc­tor of the Pentagon’s Defense Intel­li­gence Agency, who tes­ti­fied along­side Ms. Haines.

    Still, Rus­sia has all but achieved one of its pri­ma­ry objec­tives: seiz­ing a land bridge con­nect­ing Russ­ian ter­ri­to­ry to the Crimean penin­su­la.

    When Mr. Putin ordered the inva­sion, some of his military’s most skilled fight­ers poured out of Crimea and south­ern Rus­sia, quick­ly seiz­ing a rib­bon of Ukrain­ian ter­ri­to­ry along the Sea of Azov. The last strong­hold of Ukrain­ian resis­tance in this area, at the Azovstal steel plant in Mar­i­upol, has been whit­tled to a few hun­dred hun­gry troops now con­fined most­ly to bunkers.

    But efforts by Russ­ian forces to expand and for­ti­fy the land bridge have been com­pli­cat­ed by Ukrain­ian forces deployed along an east-west front that undu­lates through sprawl­ing fields of wheat and occa­sion­al­ly engulfs vil­lages and towns.

    Though Russ­ian artillery and rock­ets have wreaked hav­oc in res­i­den­tial areas, flat­ten­ing hous­es and ter­ror­iz­ing locals, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has not com­mit­ted enough forces to move the line sig­nif­i­cant­ly or threat­en the major indus­tri­al hub of Zapor­izhzhia, the largest city near the front­line, Col. Oleg Gon­charuk, the com­man­der of the 128th Sep­a­rate Moun­tain Assault Brigade, said in an inter­view last month.

    “They will try to block our forces from mov­ing for­ward and they are try­ing to solid­i­fy their posi­tions,” said Colonel Gon­charuk, whose forces are arrayed along the south­east front. “But we don’t know their orders or what their ambi­tions are.”

    It is in the east­ern provinces of Donet­sk and Luhan­sk where fight­ing is the fiercest.

    At the main hos­pi­tal in Kram­a­torsk, a city in Donet­sk, ambu­lances stream in day and night, car­ry­ing sol­diers wound­ed at the front, who describe being pinned down by near con­stant shelling.

    About 80 per­cent of the patients are wound­ed by explo­sives such as mines and artillery shells, said Capt. Eduard Antonovskyy, the deputy com­man­der of the med­ical unit at the hos­pi­tal. Because of this, he said, very few patients have seri­ous injuries. Either you’re far enough from an explo­sion to sur­vive or you aren’t, he said.

    “We either get mod­er­ate injuries or deaths,” Cap­tain Antonovskyy said.

    Russ­ian forces now con­trol about 80 per­cent of Don­bas, accord­ing to Ukrain­ian offi­cials, and have con­cen­trat­ed their efforts on a pock­et of Ukrain­ian-held ter­ri­to­ry with Kram­a­torsk at its cen­ter.

    All around the city, the booms of dis­tant fight­ing can be heard at all hours and heavy smoke hangs like a morn­ing fog. Almost dai­ly, Russ­ian forces launch rock­et attacks and airstrikes on the city itself, but the most pun­ish­ing vio­lence is reserved for those places in range of Russ­ian artillery.

    About 62 miles north­east of Kram­a­torsk is Severodonet­sk, where Russ­ian artillery, parked about five or six miles out­side the city, rarely relents, mak­ing it dif­fi­cult for the 15,000 or so res­i­dents who remain to ven­ture above ground.

    ...

    Russia’s Black Sea block­ade of Ukraine has not dimin­ished the Kremlin’s desire to gain con­trol of Ode­sa, the most impor­tant Ukrain­ian port, which has been sub­ject­ed to sev­er­al aer­i­al attacks. In the lat­est, Russ­ian forces fired sev­en mis­siles, strik­ing a shop­ping mall and a con­sumer goods ware­house and killing at least one per­son and wound­ing sev­er­al more, Ukrain­ian offi­cials said.

    The strike came only hours after the Euro­pean Coun­cil pres­i­dent, Charles Michel, had vis­it­ed Ode­sa, where he was forced to take cov­er in a bomb shel­ter because of anoth­er attack.

    Mr. Michel, who met with Prime Min­is­ter Denys Shmy­hal of Ukraine, crit­i­cized Rus­sia for stran­gling Ukrain­ian grain exports that feed peo­ple around the world.

    “I saw silos full of grain, wheat and corn ready for export,” Mr. Michel said in a state­ment. “This bad­ly need­ed food is strand­ed because of the Russ­ian war and block­ade of Black Sea ports, caus­ing dra­mat­ic con­se­quences for vul­ner­a­ble coun­tries.”

    Pres­i­dent Volodymyr Zelen­sky of Ukraine urged the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to pres­sure Rus­sia to lift the block­ade.

    “For the first time in decades there is no usu­al move­ment of the mer­chant fleet, no usu­al port func­tion­ing in Ode­sa,” he said in an overnight address. “Prob­a­bly, this has nev­er hap­pened in Ode­sa since World War II.”

    Ukraine’s econ­o­my is expect­ed to shrink 30 per­cent this year, the the Euro­pean Bank for Recon­struc­tion and Devel­op­ment said on Tues­day, wors­en­ing its fore­cast from just two months ago, when it pre­dict­ed a 20 per­cent shrink­age.

    The war has “put Ukraine’s econ­o­my under enor­mous stress, with the heavy dev­as­ta­tion of infra­struc­ture and pro­duc­tion capac­i­ties,” the bank said in an eco­nom­ic update.

    It esti­mat­ed that 30 per­cent to 50 per­cent of Ukrain­ian busi­ness­es have shut down, 10 per­cent of the pop­u­la­tion has fled the coun­try and a fur­ther 15 per­cent is dis­placed inter­nal­ly.

    The bank also fore­cast that Russia’s econ­o­my would shrink by 10 per­cent this year and stag­nate next year, with a bleak out­look unless a peace agree­ment leads to the relax­ing of West­ern sanc­tions.

    ———-

    “Ukraine War’s Geo­graph­ic Real­i­ty: Rus­sia Has Seized Much of the East” by Michael Schwirtz, Marc San­to­ra and Michael Lev­en­son; The New York Times; 05/10/2022

    Russ­ian forces now con­trol about 80 per­cent of Don­bas, accord­ing to Ukrain­ian offi­cials, and have con­cen­trat­ed their efforts on a pock­et of Ukrain­ian-held ter­ri­to­ry with Kram­a­torsk at its cen­ter.”

    Russ­ian forces no con­trol rough­ly 80 per­cent of the Don­bas. That’s accord­ing to Ukrain­ian offi­cials. So when Russ­ian Defense Min­istry announced a few days ago that its forces had reached the bor­ders of Donet­sk and Luhan­sk, we don’t real­ly need to wait for con­fir­ma­tion. The Ukraini­ans have basi­cal­ly already con­firmed this. Which also means the land bridge con­nect­ing the Russ­ian main­land to Crimea has been secured:

    ...
    The Russ­ian Defense Min­istry said Tues­day that its forces in east­ern Ukraine had advanced to the bor­der between Donet­sk and Luhan­sk, the two Russ­ian-speak­ing provinces where Moscow-backed sep­a­ratists have been fight­ing Ukraine’s army for eight years.

    The ministry’s asser­tion, if con­firmed, strength­ens the prospect that Rus­sia could soon gain com­plete con­trol over the region, known as the Don­bas, com­pared with just a third of it before the Feb. 24 inva­sion.

    ...

    “The Rus­sians aren’t win­ning, and the Ukraini­ans aren’t win­ning, and we’re at a bit of a stale­mate here,” said Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berri­er, the direc­tor of the Pentagon’s Defense Intel­li­gence Agency, who tes­ti­fied along­side Ms. Haines.

    Still, Rus­sia has all but achieved one of its pri­ma­ry objec­tives: seiz­ing a land bridge con­nect­ing Russ­ian ter­ri­to­ry to the Crimean penin­su­la.
    ...

    So we got an update on Rus­si­a’s ter­ri­to­r­i­al gains. But still no real updates on the actu­al casu­al­ties each side is endur­ing. That’s part of what makes the ref­er­ence to com­ments made by a Ukrain­ian com­man­der, Col. Oleg Gon­charuk, dur­ing an inter­view last month so note­wor­thy. Even if that inter­view was con­duct­ed at the very end of April, that com­man­der’s assess­ment would still be a week and a half old. Has there been no updates at all in the inter­im?

    ...
    Though Russ­ian artillery and rock­ets have wreaked hav­oc in res­i­den­tial areas, flat­ten­ing hous­es and ter­ror­iz­ing locals, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has not com­mit­ted enough forces to move the line sig­nif­i­cant­ly or threat­en the major indus­tri­al hub of Zapor­izhzhia, the largest city near the front­line, Col. Oleg Gon­charuk, the com­man­der of the 128th Sep­a­rate Moun­tain Assault Brigade, said in an inter­view last month.

    “They will try to block our forces from mov­ing for­ward and they are try­ing to solid­i­fy their posi­tions,” said Colonel Gon­charuk, whose forces are arrayed along the south­east front. “But we don’t know their orders or what their ambi­tions are.”
    ...

    Final­ly, giv­en that this is look­ing like it could be a drawn out “pro­longed con­flict”, as Avril Haines put it, note the incred­i­ble dam­age being done to the Ukrain­ian econ­o­my. Dam­age that’s pre­sum­ably only going to deep as this pro­longed con­flict plays out:

    ...
    And the Rus­sians enjoy the added advan­tage of naval dom­i­nance in the Black Sea, the only mar­itime route for Ukrain­ian trade, which they have par­a­lyzed with an embar­go that could even­tu­al­ly starve Ukraine eco­nom­i­cal­ly and is already con­tribut­ing to a glob­al grain short­age.

    Tes­ti­fy­ing before the Sen­ate Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee in Wash­ing­ton on Tues­day, Avril D. Haines, the direc­tor of nation­al intel­li­gence, warned of a “pro­longed con­flict” in Ukraine as Rus­sia seeks expan­sive ter­ri­to­r­i­al gains beyond the Don­bas region, includ­ing the cre­ation of a land bridge across Ukraine’s Black Sea coast.

    ...

    Ukraine’s econ­o­my is expect­ed to shrink 30 per­cent this year, the the Euro­pean Bank for Recon­struc­tion and Devel­op­ment said on Tues­day, wors­en­ing its fore­cast from just two months ago, when it pre­dict­ed a 20 per­cent shrink­age.

    The war has “put Ukraine’s econ­o­my under enor­mous stress, with the heavy dev­as­ta­tion of infra­struc­ture and pro­duc­tion capac­i­ties,” the bank said in an eco­nom­ic update.

    It esti­mat­ed that 30 per­cent to 50 per­cent of Ukrain­ian busi­ness­es have shut down, 10 per­cent of the pop­u­la­tion has fled the coun­try and a fur­ther 15 per­cent is dis­placed inter­nal­ly.

    The bank also fore­cast that Russia’s econ­o­my would shrink by 10 per­cent this year and stag­nate next year, with a bleak out­look unless a peace agree­ment leads to the relax­ing of West­ern sanc­tions.
    ...

    Giv­en that we’re already see­ing what appears to be a kind of infor­ma­tion block­ade on the casu­al­ties being sus­tained by the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary, what does that say about the like­li­hood of get­ting mean­ing­ful updates on the impact this eco­nom­ic dev­as­ta­tion is hav­ing on the pop­u­lace. Don’t for­get that harsh aus­ter­i­ty was the price Ukraine was going to have to pay just to join the EU trade asso­ci­a­tion agree­ment join­ing the EU. It’s why we prob­a­bly should­n’t expect exten­sive cov­er­age of the eco­nom­ic hard­ships endured by the Ukrain­ian pop­u­lace as a result of this con­flict. Sus­tained aus­ter­i­ty imposed on the Ukrain­ian pop­u­lace has been the plan for Ukraine all along, long before this war broke out.

    So that’s as close to an update as we’re going to get on what’s going on with the fight­ing rag­ing in east­ern Ukraine over the last few weeks. We still don’t have any num­bers on casu­al­ties and prob­a­bly should­n’t expect those num­bers any time soon. But ter­ri­to­r­i­al gains or loss­es are a lot hard­er to obscure. And based on what we’re hear­ing it real­ly does sound like Russ­ian forces are on the verge of seiz­ing con­trol of the entire Don­bas. Whether or not Rus­sia plans on keep­ing that ter­ri­to­ry or using it as lever­age in nego­ti­a­tions is an open ques­tion.

    But per­haps a big­ger open ques­tion is what will Ukraine’s allies in the West do should we end up see­ing a long-term occu­pa­tion of the Don­bas, includ­ing pos­si­ble annex­a­tions. Ukraine is already see­ing a flood of west­ern arms. How much more intense is that mil­i­tary aid going to get? Is Ukraine going to be flood­ed with enough mil­i­tary hard­ware capa­ble of expelling con­sol­i­dat­ed Russ­ian forces? And how about for­eign fight­ers? How many more extrem­ists are going to flood Ukraine by the time this is over? We’ll find out. Maybe. Or maybe this con­flict will just con­tin­ue to an infor­ma­tion black hole that we can only spec­u­late about.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 13, 2022, 3:35 pm
  2. With the col­lapse of the resis­tance in Mar­i­upol and sur­ren­der of the Ukrain­ian forces led by the Azov Bat­tal­ion, it appears that Rus­sia is on the cusp of achiev­ing one of its major strate­gic objec­tives: wip­ing out the Azov Bat­tal­ion’s home base in Mar­i­upol. But as the fol­low­ing arti­cle reminds us, there’s still a num­ber of open ques­tions regard­ing to the fate of those sur­ren­der­ing forces, includ­ing whether or not they’ll even­tu­al­ly be hand­ed back to Ukrain­ian author­i­ties in a pris­on­er swap.

    As we’re going to see, while there’s been a lot of talk about poten­tial pris­on­er swaps, there’s no pub­lic details avail­able yet and voic­es in Rus­si­a’s gov­ern­ment are already call­ing for no exchange for the Azov Nazis. It points towards what could be an epic round of Azov Nazi white­wash­ing by the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to ‘save the brave Azov defend­ers’. And ws we’re going to see in the sec­ond and third arti­cle excerpts below, that white­wash­ing that kicked into high gear with the start of this con­flict is still going strong. White­wash­ing that rou­tine­ly veers into bla­tant gaslight­ing.

    But as we’re also going to see, in the Haaretz inter­view from last week of the deputy com­man­der of Azov’s forces, Svy­atoslav Pala­mar, there’s anoth­er fac­tor in this white­wash­ing cam­paign: the refugees from Mar­i­upol who are now final­ly free to share with the world their expe­ri­ences. And accord­ing to this Haaretz reporter, every Mar­i­upol refugee they spoke with in Zapor­izhzhia told them about being shot at not just by Russ­ian forces but also Ukrain­ian forces which were shoot­ing hous­es “indis­crim­i­nate­ly”. Pala­mar dis­miss­es these alle­ga­tions by assert­ing that Rus­si­a’s prac­tice of forc­ing civil­ians to wear white arm bands was caus­ing these acci­den­tal civil­ian deaths. Recall the videos released out of the area near Bucha where Azov leader Sergey “Boats­man” Korotkikh appeared to give his troops per­mis­sion to shoot any­one not wear­ing a blue arm band. Also recall how a num­ber of the civil­ian bod­ies found dead on that major street on Bucha, Yablun­ska Street, were found with their hands bound behind their backs by a white cloth. So we have to ask: have Azov units been using white arm­bands as an excuse to kill civil­ians in these occu­pied cities? It sounds like it. Which would be all the more need for anoth­er round of Azov Nazi white­wash­ing now that Rus­sia has a large num­ber of Azov POWs:

    Reuters

    Mar­i­upol defend­ers sur­ren­der to Rus­sia but their fate is uncer­tain

    By Natalia Zinets
    May 17, 2022 6:25 PM CDT
    Updat­ed

    Sum­ma­ry

    * Ukrain­ian sol­diers, many wound­ed, bussed to Russ­ian-held towns
    * Mar­i­upol a win for Putin as Russ­ian forces fall back else­where
    * Rus­sia, Ukraine dif­fer in views on poten­tial pris­on­er exchange
    * Fin­land, Swe­den set to file NATO appli­ca­tions

    MARIUPOL, Ukraine, May 17 (Reuters) — More than 250 Ukrain­ian fight­ers sur­ren­dered to Russ­ian forces at the Azovstal steel­works in Mar­i­upol after weeks of des­per­ate resis­tance, bring­ing an end to the most dev­as­tat­ing siege of Rus­si­a’s war in Ukraine and allow­ing Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin to claim a rare vic­to­ry in his fal­ter­ing cam­paign.

    Even as the Krem­lin pre­pares to take full con­trol of the ruins of Mar­i­upol, it faces the grow­ing prospect of defeat in its bid to con­quer all of Ukraine’s east­ern Don­bas because its bad­ly mauled forces lack the man­pow­er for sig­nif­i­cant advances, some ana­lysts of the Russ­ian cam­paign said. read more

    Bus­es left the steel­works late on Mon­day in a con­voy escort­ed by Russ­ian armoured vehi­cles. Five arrived in the Russ­ian-held town of Novoa­zovsk, where Moscow said wound­ed fight­ers would be treat­ed.

    Sev­en bus­es car­ry­ing Ukrain­ian fight­ers from the Azovstal gar­ri­son arrived at a new­ly reopened prison in the Russ­ian-con­trolled town of Oleniv­ka near Donet­sk, a Reuters wit­ness said.

    There were some women aboard at least one of the bus­es in Oleniv­ka, Reuters video showed. Some of the women wore olive green uni­forms, as did most of the men. All of them appeared exhaust­ed. One rest­ed against duf­fel bags stacked on the floor.

    What will hap­pen to the fight­ers was unclear. The Krem­lin said Putin had per­son­al­ly guar­an­teed the pris­on­ers would be treat­ed accord­ing to inter­na­tion­al stan­dards, and Ukrain­ian offi­cials said they could be exchanged for Russ­ian cap­tives.

    TASS news agency said a Russ­ian com­mit­tee planned to ques­tion the sol­diers, many of them mem­bers of the Azov Bat­tal­ion, as part of an inves­ti­ga­tion into what Moscow calls “Ukrain­ian regime crimes”.

    The denoue­ment of a bat­tle which came to sym­bol­ise Ukrain­ian resis­tance gives Moscow total con­trol of the Azov Sea coast and an unbro­ken stretch of east­ern and south­ern Ukraine, even as its troops retreat from the out­skirts of Kharkiv in the north­east.

    Offi­cials from both sides said on Tues­day that peace talks aimed at end­ing the war had stag­nat­ed. Nego­tia­tors last con­vened in-per­son in late March, and there has been lit­tle com­mu­ni­ca­tion between them in recent weeks. read more

    Rus­si­a’s Deputy For­eign Min­is­ter Andrey Rudenko said Ukraine “has prac­ti­cal­ly with­drawn from the nego­ti­a­tion process,” While Russ­ian nego­tia­tor Leonid Slut­sky said talks were not being con­duct­ed in any for­mat.

    Ukrain­ian pres­i­den­tial advis­er Mykhai­lo Podolyak said talks were “on hold” as Rus­sia is not will­ing to accept that it will not achieve its goals.

    PRISONER SWAP?

    The com­plete cap­ture of Mar­i­upol is Rus­si­a’s biggest vic­to­ry since it launched what it calls a “spe­cial mil­i­tary oper­a­tion” on Feb. 24. But the port lies in ruins, and Ukraine believes tens of thou­sands of peo­ple were killed under months of Russ­ian bom­bard­ment.

    Rus­sia said at least 256 Ukrain­ian fight­ers had “laid down their arms and sur­ren­dered”, includ­ing 51 severe­ly wound­ed. Ukraine said 264 sol­diers, includ­ing 53 wound­ed, had left.

    Russ­ian defence min­istry video showed fight­ers leav­ing the plant, some car­ried on stretch­ers, oth­ers with hands up to be searched by Russ­ian troops.

    While both sides spoke of a deal under which all Ukrain­ian troops would aban­don the steel­works, many details were not yet pub­lic, includ­ing how many fight­ers still remained inside, and whether any form of pris­on­er swap had been agreed.

    Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Min­is­ter Han­na Mal­yar told a brief­ing that Kyiv would not dis­close how many fight­ers remained inside until all were safe. Ukraine’s mil­i­tary said units in Azovstal had com­plet­ed their com­bat mis­sion.

    Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Min­is­ter Iry­na Vereshchuk said Kyiv aimed to arrange a pris­on­er swap for the wound­ed once their con­di­tion sta­bilis­es, but nei­ther side dis­closed terms for any spe­cif­ic deal.

    High-pro­file Russ­ian law­mak­ers spoke out against any pris­on­er swap. Vyach­eslav Volodin, speak­er of the State Duma, Rus­si­a’s low­er house, said: “Nazi crim­i­nals should not be exchanged.”

    Law­mak­er Leonid Slut­sky, one of Rus­si­a’s nego­tia­tors in talks with Ukraine, called the evac­u­at­ed com­bat­ants “ani­mals in human form” and said they should be exe­cut­ed.

    Natalia, wife of a sailor among those holed up in the plant, told Reuters she hoped “there will be an hon­est exchange”. But she was still wor­ried: “What Rus­sia is doing now is inhu­mane.”

    The Unit­ed Nations and Red Cross say the true death toll from the Mar­i­upol siege is still uncount­ed but it is cer­tain to be Europe’s worst since the 1990s wars in Chech­nya and the Balka­ns.

    ...

    ———-

    “Mar­i­upol defend­ers sur­ren­der to Rus­sia but their fate is uncer­tain” by Natalia Zinets; Reuters; 05/17/2022

    “While both sides spoke of a deal under which all Ukrain­ian troops would aban­don the steel­works, many details were not yet pub­lic, includ­ing how many fight­ers still remained inside, and whether any form of pris­on­er swap had been agreed.”

    Is a pris­on­er swap going to hap­pen now that Russ­ian forces are poised to take a large num­ber of Azov bat­tal­ion pris­on­ers? Maybe, but we don’t even know if such nego­ti­a­tions are under­way. But a far biggest ques­tion is whether or not Rus­sia has any inter­est in return­ing the sol­diers from the Nazi bat­tal­ion that formed the basis for Rus­si­a’s pre­text for inva­sion:

    ...
    Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Min­is­ter Han­na Mal­yar told a brief­ing that Kyiv would not dis­close how many fight­ers remained inside until all were safe. Ukraine’s mil­i­tary said units in Azovstal had com­plet­ed their com­bat mis­sion.

    Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Min­is­ter Iry­na Vereshchuk said Kyiv aimed to arrange a pris­on­er swap for the wound­ed once their con­di­tion sta­bilis­es, but nei­ther side dis­closed terms for any spe­cif­ic deal.

    High-pro­file Russ­ian law­mak­ers spoke out against any pris­on­er swap. Vyach­eslav Volodin, speak­er of the State Duma, Rus­si­a’s low­er house, said: “Nazi crim­i­nals should not be exchanged.”

    Law­mak­er Leonid Slut­sky, one of Rus­si­a’s nego­tia­tors in talks with Ukraine, called the evac­u­at­ed com­bat­ants “ani­mals in human form” and said they should be exe­cut­ed.
    ...

    And that ques­tion of whether or not cap­tured Azov sol­diers are going to be exchanged in a pris­on­er swap brings us to the fol­low­ing two arti­cles filled with Azov revi­sion­ism. Exact­ly the kind of ‘Nazis? What Nazis? We’re patri­ots!’ kind of revi­sion­ism that we should expect at this point.

    First, here’s an inter­view in Haaretz from last week of the deputy com­man­der of Azov’s forces, Svy­atoslav Pala­mar, who repeat­ed­ly asserts that there’s no Nazis in Azov. And what about the swastikas? Those are just pagan runes. Also, the wolf­san­gle just stands for the ‘the idea of the nation’. Pala­mar goes on to brag about how peo­ple from all dif­fer­ent nation­al­i­ties are serv­ing in Azov. Two sen­tences lat­er he asserts that only Ukrain­ian cit­i­zens are allowed to serve in the unit. The whole thing just feels like the kind of gas light­ing we should expect at this point.

    But this inter­view isn’t just a bunch of revi­sion­ism stenog­ra­phy. Pala­mar is asked some rather point­ed ques­tions. Ques­tions about bru­tal­i­ties expe­ri­ence by civil­ians in Mar­i­upol by Azov. Accord­ing to this reporter, all of the refugees they spoke with in Zapor­izhzhia made the same claim: it was­n’t just Rus­sians who were tar­get­ing civil­ians. Ukrain­ian sol­diers were indis­crim­i­nate­ly shoot­ing at hous­es:

    In Zapor­izhzhia, I met refugees from Mar­i­upol and I spoke with peo­ple who were evac­u­at­ed to Ros­tov in Rus­sia. They all repeat­ed the same claim that they were shot at from all direc­tions while they were in the base­ments. They stressed that it was­n’t just the Rus­sians who were shoot­ing, but the Ukrain­ian sol­diers as well – indis­crim­i­nate­ly, at hous­es. I under­stand that when there are street bat­tles, there isn’t real­ly an alter­na­tive. The ques­tion is dif­fer­ent: Was this worth it? Kher­son, for exam­ple, sur­ren­dered with­out a bat­tle, and it is occu­pied, but there weren’t vic­tims there on a scale like this. Has the fierce defense of Mar­i­upol been worth it?

    So how to Pala­mar respond to these alle­ga­tions? By basi­cal­ly acknowl­edg­ing that Ukrain­ian sol­diers have attack civil­ians but blam­ing it on Russ­ian sol­diers forc­ing Ukrain­ian civil­ians to wear white arm bands:

    “We didn’t have air­craft, mis­siles or mul­ti-bar­rel rock­et launch­ers. All the destruc­tion has result­ed from pre­cise­ly those [Russ­ian] attacks. It’s cor­rect that in street bat­tles all kinds of things can hap­pen, but all our units worked with the utmost cau­tion. We didn’t aim at hous­es, but rather at the Russ­ian vehi­cles near the hous­es. You have to under­stand this. In addi­tion, you have to under­stand that the ene­my used ille­gal means: For exam­ple, they made the civil­ians wear white rib­bons [that sym­bol­ize belong­ing to the Russ­ian forces].

    In oth­er words, Pala­mar was basi­cal­ly acknowl­edg­ing that his units were shoot­ing civil­ians with white rib­bons. This is notable in the con­text of oth­er reports we’ve got­ten about Azov units shoot­ing any­one who was­n’t wear­ing a blue arm band. Recall the videos released out of the area near Bucha where Sergey “Boats­man” Korotkikh appeared to give his troops per­mis­sion to shoot any­one not wear­ing a blue arm band. It’s also worth recall­ing that a num­ber of the civil­ian bod­ies found dead on that major street on Bucha, Yablun­ska Street, were found with their hands bound behind their backs by a white cloth. So with Mar­i­upol refugees all telling reporters that Azov was shoot­ing at them and this Azov deputy com­man­der explains it away as white cloth con­fu­sion, we have to ask: has Azov been sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly treat­ing civil­ians with white cloths as trai­tors? It sure sounds like it. Which is a reminder that any white­wash­ing of Azov’s rep­u­ta­tion is going to have to involved a white­wash­ing of any civil­ian mas­sacres that are poised to final­ly be revealed with the sur­ren­der of Mar­i­upol:

    Haaretz

    Azov Bat­tal­ion’s Sec­ond-in-com­mand: ‘Like in Israel, There Is Also Ter­ror Against Us. We Are Not Nazis’

    In an inter­view with Haaretz, Svy­atoslav Pala­ma, deputy com­man­der of the besieged unit in Ukraine’s Mar­i­upol, is call­ing for aid from the lead­er­ship in Kyiv and the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to res­cue peo­ple from the iron and steel plant

    Liza Rozovsky
    May. 12, 2022

    A few days after Ukraine announced that all the women, chil­dren and elder­ly peo­ple had been evac­u­at­ed from the Azovstal iron and steel plant in Mar­i­upol, as of Wednes­day, Russ­ian forces were still bom­bard­ing it. The reports emerg­ing from the plant are some­times con­fus­ing and incon­sis­tent: Accord­ing to var­i­ous assess­ments, about 100 civil­ians and a large num­ber of Ukrain­ian sol­diers remain there. The leader of the pro-Russ­ian sep­a­ratists in the Donet­sk province has claimed that there are no longer any civil­ians there and thus “our forces’ hands are no longer tied.” At the same time, Kyiv says it has pro­posed swap­ping the seri­ous­ly wound­ed at the steel­works for Russ­ian pris­on­ers of war.

    In an inter­view with Haaretz, the deputy com­man­der of the con­tentious Azov Bat­tal­ion, Svy­atoslav Pala­mar, dis­cussed the plight of the sol­diers who have bar­ri­cad­ed them­selves in cel­lars and the expec­ta­tions for help from Kyiv and the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty. The top offi­cer in the mil­i­tary unit, which was estab­lished in 2014 with the aim of defend­ing the city of Mar­i­upol from Russ­ian aggres­sion, also talked about his per­cep­tion of Israel, as well as the claim that there are Nazi ele­ments among his sol­diers.

    The sep­a­ratist forces have said that since the civil­ians have been evac­u­at­ed from Mar­i­upol, they will have no mer­cy on those who remain there. What are you expect­ing?

    “We expect that our politi­cians, with sup­port of oth­er nations, will nev­er­the­less find a solu­tion, which would be the evac­u­a­tion of our forces. There are a lot of guys here that we can’t give prop­er med­ical aid to. The areas where we are keep­ing the wound­ed were under mas­sive bom­bard­ments and there is lit­tle med­i­cine, few instru­ments for per­form­ing oper­a­tions and the sit­u­a­tion of the wound­ed is very grave.

    “We are ask­ing the Red Cross, the Unit­ed Nations, the strong politi­cians of the world to make it pos­si­ble to res­cue our men. The most impor­tant con­di­tion for this is a cease fire in order to col­lect the wound­ed. Rus­sia also has loss­es – they too need to col­lect their corpses because it’s already hot and the bod­ies have been buried for a long time under rub­ble. The air is tox­ic. Not just because of the bod­ies of the dead, but also from smoke, from the mis­siles and so on.”

    ...

    How many women are there among you now?

    “I won’t state a num­ber but believe me, there are many. There are also women who have been killed.”

    In the video inter­view, Pala­mar describes the sit­u­a­tion as “a dead end. Both they and we have loss­es.” How­ev­er, he stress­es that the fight­ers in the steel plant do not intend to sur­ren­der. “But what’s next? That’s it. They don’t real­ly want to attack us direct­ly and we keep on fight­ing.”

    Pres­i­dent Volodymyr Zelen­skyy has said there is no mil­i­tary pos­si­bil­i­ty of break­ing through to Mar­i­upol now. Do you think your lead­er­ship is doing every­thing it can to free you?

    “They are say­ing that they are doing every­thing pos­si­ble, but I think we have done the impos­si­ble. There­fore, we are ask­ing them, too to do the impos­si­ble. To get my peo­ple out of here and the peo­ple from the sis­ter units who are here: the marines, the coast guard, the bor­der guards and the ter­ri­to­r­i­al defense forces. The women and the men who are present here. In human his­to­ry there is a prac­tice of evac­u­at­ing mil­i­tary per­son­nel with sup­port from a third par­ty – be it to a third, neu­tral coun­try or into Ukrain­ian ter­ri­to­ry.”

    On Wednes­day, a video appeared on social media of a coast guard fight­er who iden­ti­fied him­self as Jew­ish from anoth­er unit inside the Azovstal plant, in which he appealed to Israeli law­mak­ers. He addressed Prime Min­is­ter Naf­tali Ben­nett and Russ­ian-speak­ing Knes­set mem­bers Yuli Edel­stein of Likud and Evge­ny Sova, Yulia Mali­novsky and Alex Kush­nir of Yis­rael Beit­einu and asked that Israel help evac­u­ate the Ukrain­ian forces from Mar­i­upol.

    “He addressed your politi­cians and the nation of Israel,” says Pala­mar. “ He thinks, and so do I, that Israel is a strong coun­try that has been fight­ing for a long time and that pro­tects its sol­diers. We know that Israel takes the mem­bers of its mil­i­tary seri­ous­ly, who defend your coun­try from both ter­ri­to­r­i­al attacks and from ter­ror­ists who car­ry out attacks. The same thing is hap­pen­ing here. I think this is ter­ror. There is no oth­er name for it.”

    The Azovstal plant is already being com­pared to Masa­da, where Jew­ish fight­ers who rebelled against the Roman Empire bar­ri­cad­ed them­selves in, and in the end all of them were killed. Do you under­stand that this could be your fate, too?

    “Every minute. Any minute, we are expect­ing to be killed.”

    The Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da is claim­ing that you are Nazis. But in addi­tion to the pro­pa­gan­da, there have been tes­ti­monies for years in inde­pen­dent media out­lets and in inter­na­tion­al reports that Azov fight­ers hold extreme right­ist posi­tions.

    “What is Nazism? When some­one thinks that one nation is supe­ri­or to anoth­er nation, when some­one thinks he has a right to invade anoth­er coun­try and destroy its inhab­i­tants – this is ter­ror, this is vio­lence, these are cre­ma­to­ria and fil­tra­tion camps. This is cling­ing to one reli­gion or one idea. What is hap­pen­ing here? We believe in our country’s ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty. We have nev­er attacked any­one, and we have not want­ed to do that.

    “Our unit came togeth­er when our coun­try was attacked [in 2014], and our high­est pri­or­i­ty is defend­ing our coun­try. We do not think, and we have nev­er thought, that we are bet­ter than any­one else. Peo­ple from dif­fer­ent nation­al­i­ties are serv­ing with us – Greeks, Jews, Mus­lims, Crimean Tatars – and even if at one time there were soc­cer hooli­gans among us who shout­ed things in sta­di­ums, those are the posi­tions of young peo­ple who have changed because we are a mil­i­tary unit. We have no polit­i­cal ambi­tions or stances. Only cit­i­zens of Ukraine are serv­ing with us. There are no for­eign cit­i­zens with us because that is pro­hib­it­ed by law.”

    A few days ago, I spoke with a for­mer res­i­dent of Mar­i­upol, She claimed that Azov fight­ers walk around with Nazi sym­bols, with swastikas. Is that a lie?

    “They’re talk­ing about our sym­bol, ‘the idea of the nation.’” Its mean­ing is that the main idea of what was once a reg­i­ment and is now our bat­tal­ion is the defense of our nation­al ideals. I think that every civil­ian and sol­dier in every nation – that’s his idea, because it’s incum­bent on every­one to defend their nation­al inter­ests, espe­cial­ly if the coun­try gives them weapons.”

    Nev­er­the­less, I want to be pre­cise here. Can you say that the fight­ers of the bat­tal­ion do not have actu­al swastikas tat­tooed on their bod­ies?

    “There are no swastikas. It could be that there are inscrip­tions in ancient Slav­ic let­ters, or a pagan runic inscrip­tion. Every indi­vid­ual among us can believe what­ev­er he wants here in the unit. We all live in peace.”

    In Zapor­izhzhia, I met refugees from Mar­i­upol and I spoke with peo­ple who were evac­u­at­ed to Ros­tov in Rus­sia. They all repeat­ed the same claim that they were shot at from all direc­tions while they were in the base­ments. They stressed that it was­n’t just the Rus­sians who were shoot­ing, but the Ukrain­ian sol­diers as well – indis­crim­i­nate­ly, at hous­es. I under­stand that when there are street bat­tles, there isn’t real­ly an alter­na­tive. The ques­tion is dif­fer­ent: Was this worth it? Kher­son, for exam­ple, sur­ren­dered with­out a bat­tle, and it is occu­pied, but there weren’t vic­tims there on a scale like this. Has the fierce defense of Mar­i­upol been worth it?

    “Has it been worth it? We are here because no oth­er order was giv­en, and as of now there is no oth­er order. We need to hold the line. We are sol­diers, and we need to act accord­ing to the orders. We are doing this for the sake of our coun­try. I don’t want to believe and I don’t want to under­stand the guys who retreat­ed with­out a fight and with­out an order. I think that if there had been resis­tance in the areas where the Rus­sians arrived [Kher­son and Meli­topol], the sit­u­a­tion would have been entire­ly dif­fer­ent. Why did they act that way? I don’t know.

    “We didn’t have air­craft, mis­siles or mul­ti-bar­rel rock­et launch­ers. All the destruc­tion has result­ed from pre­cise­ly those [Russ­ian] attacks. It’s cor­rect that in street bat­tles all kinds of things can hap­pen, but all our units worked with the utmost cau­tion. We didn’t aim at hous­es, but rather at the Russ­ian vehi­cles near the hous­es. You have to under­stand this. In addi­tion, you have to under­stand that the ene­my used ille­gal means: For exam­ple, they made the civil­ians wear white rib­bons [that sym­bol­ize belong­ing to the Russ­ian forces].

    Zelen­skyy said in an inter­view to Russ­ian jour­nal­ists about a month and a half ago that he had sug­gest­ed that you leave, and that you said that you don’t want to.

    “That wasn’t an order, it was a con­ver­sa­tion in which we were asked what our sit­u­a­tion was here, as of then. The sit­u­a­tion then was very bad. We had a lot of casu­al­ties and fatal­i­ties. Get­ting out of a siege like this means los­ing 90 per­cent of the peo­ple. And that’s only in a case where we could ‘tear through’ the siege in bat­tle with­out tak­ing the dead and the wound­ed with us. If we had tak­en them with us, all of us would have been killed. What would we have thought of our­selves after aban­don­ing our wound­ed and our dead? There­fore, we said: ‘Mr. Pres­i­dent, we won’t be able to do that.’ There­fore, there has been no such order.”

    ———-

    “Azov Bat­tal­ion’s Sec­ond-in-com­mand: ‘Like in Israel, There Is Also Ter­ror Against Us. We Are Not Nazis’ ” by Liza Rozovsky; Haaretz; 05/12/2022

    “What is Nazism? When some­one thinks that one nation is supe­ri­or to anoth­er nation, when some­one thinks he has a right to invade anoth­er coun­try and destroy its inhab­i­tants – this is ter­ror, this is vio­lence, these are cre­ma­to­ria and fil­tra­tion camps. This is cling­ing to one reli­gion or one idea. What is hap­pen­ing here? We believe in our country’s ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty. We have nev­er attacked any­one, and we have not want­ed to do that.”

    What is Nazism? That’s bla­tant dodge was the the response Azov deputy com­man­der Svy­atoslav Pala­mar had in response to a direct ques­tion about the Azov’s overt Nazi ide­ol­o­gy. And as if his gaslight­ing was­n’t bla­tant enough, Pala­mar goes on to point out that peo­ple from dif­fer­ent nation­al­i­ties serv­ing in the unit while simul­ta­ne­ous­ly assert­ing that only cit­i­zens of Ukraine can serve in it:

    ...
    “Our unit came togeth­er when our coun­try was attacked [in 2014], and our high­est pri­or­i­ty is defend­ing our coun­try. We do not think, and we have nev­er thought, that we are bet­ter than any­one else. Peo­ple from dif­fer­ent nation­al­i­ties are serv­ing with us – Greeks, Jews, Mus­lims, Crimean Tatars – and even if at one time there were soc­cer hooli­gans among us who shout­ed things in sta­di­ums, those are the posi­tions of young peo­ple who have changed because we are a mil­i­tary unit. We have no polit­i­cal ambi­tions or stances. Only cit­i­zens of Ukraine are serv­ing with us. There are no for­eign cit­i­zens with us because that is pro­hib­it­ed by law.”
    ...

    Pala­mar goes on to assert that any­one who thinks they’ve spot­ted Nazi sym­bols like swastikas on Azov uni­forms is mis­tak­en. They mere­ly saw pagan runes. And the Azov sym­bol, the Wolf­san­gle, isn’t a Nazi sym­bol. No, no, it mere­ly stands for ‘the idea of the nation’:

    ...
    A few days ago, I spoke with a for­mer res­i­dent of Mar­i­upol, She claimed that Azov fight­ers walk around with Nazi sym­bols, with swastikas. Is that a lie?

    “They’re talk­ing about our sym­bol, ‘the idea of the nation.’” Its mean­ing is that the main idea of what was once a reg­i­ment and is now our bat­tal­ion is the defense of our nation­al ideals. I think that every civil­ian and sol­dier in every nation – that’s his idea, because it’s incum­bent on every­one to defend their nation­al inter­ests, espe­cial­ly if the coun­try gives them weapons.”

    Nev­er­the­less, I want to be pre­cise here. Can you say that the fight­ers of the bat­tal­ion do not have actu­al swastikas tat­tooed on their bod­ies?

    “There are no swastikas. It could be that there are inscrip­tions in ancient Slav­ic let­ters, or a pagan runic inscrip­tion. Every indi­vid­ual among us can believe what­ev­er he wants here in the unit. We all live in peace.”
    ...

    Final­ly, we get Pala­mar’s response to a direct ques­tion regard­ing all of the refugees who are telling reporters that Azov was ter­ror­iz­ing them too dur­ing the siege. Pala­mar basi­cal­ly acknowl­edges that, yes, his troops were shoot­ing at civil­ians, but they were tricked into doing so by the white rib­bons Russ­ian forces were requir­ing the civil­ians to wear:

    ...
    In Zapor­izhzhia, I met refugees from Mar­i­upol and I spoke with peo­ple who were evac­u­at­ed to Ros­tov in Rus­sia. They all repeat­ed the same claim that they were shot at from all direc­tions while they were in the base­ments. They stressed that it was­n’t just the Rus­sians who were shoot­ing, but the Ukrain­ian sol­diers as well – indis­crim­i­nate­ly, at hous­es. I under­stand that when there are street bat­tles, there isn’t real­ly an alter­na­tive. The ques­tion is dif­fer­ent: Was this worth it? Kher­son, for exam­ple, sur­ren­dered with­out a bat­tle, and it is occu­pied, but there weren’t vic­tims there on a scale like this. Has the fierce defense of Mar­i­upol been worth it?

    “Has it been worth it? We are here because no oth­er order was giv­en, and as of now there is no oth­er order. We need to hold the line. We are sol­diers, and we need to act accord­ing to the orders. We are doing this for the sake of our coun­try. I don’t want to believe and I don’t want to under­stand the guys who retreat­ed with­out a fight and with­out an order. I think that if there had been resis­tance in the areas where the Rus­sians arrived [Kher­son and Meli­topol], the sit­u­a­tion would have been entire­ly dif­fer­ent. Why did they act that way? I don’t know.

    “We didn’t have air­craft, mis­siles or mul­ti-bar­rel rock­et launch­ers. All the destruc­tion has result­ed from pre­cise­ly those [Russ­ian] attacks. It’s cor­rect that in street bat­tles all kinds of things can hap­pen, but all our units worked with the utmost cau­tion. We didn’t aim at hous­es, but rather at the Russ­ian vehi­cles near the hous­es. You have to under­stand this. In addi­tion, you have to under­stand that the ene­my used ille­gal means: For exam­ple, they made the civil­ians wear white rib­bons [that sym­bol­ize belong­ing to the Russ­ian forces].
    ...

    Next, here’s a Reuters “Fact­box” piece from a cou­ple of days ago intro­duc­ing read­ers to Azov in the con­text of the sur­ren­der at Mar­i­upol. It’s more or less what we should expect: the Wolf­san­gle is dis­missed as mere­ly an over­lap­ping “N” and “I” stand­ing for “Nation­al Idea”. And while Azov may have been found­ed by an extrem­ist, Andriy Bilet­sky, it’s no longer affil­i­at­ed with him and has no polit­i­cal ide­ol­o­gy after join­ing the Ukrain­ian nation­al guard. Also, Biletksy him­self isn’t actu­al­ly a Nazi. He’s mere­ly a mis­un­der­stood patri­ot­ic nation­al­ist. Yep:

    Reuters

    Fact­box: Last defend­ers of Mar­i­upol: what is Ukraine’s Azov Reg­i­ment?

    May 17, 2022 4:36 AM CDT
    Updat­ed

    May 17 (Reuters) — Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin looks poised to take full con­trol of Ukraine’s south­east­ern port city of Mar­i­upol after the appar­ent sur­ren­der of the last Ukrain­ian forces holed up at a vast steel works. read more

    At the core of that last stand has been the Azov Reg­i­ment whose fight­ers are lionised as heroes in Ukraine, but reviled by Putin’s Krem­lin as a band of Rus­sia-hat­ing neo-Nazis.

    AZOV’S ORIGINS

    The Azov Reg­i­ment began as one of many mili­tias of vol­un­teer fight­ers who band­ed togeth­er to fight pro-Russ­ian sep­a­ratists backed by Moscow who carved out two break­away regions in east­ern Ukraine in 2014 after Rus­sia annexed the Crimean penin­su­la.

    Mar­i­upol is the spir­i­tu­al home of the Azov Reg­i­ment which it helped Ukraine recap­ture from pro-Russ­ian fight­ers in 2014 and where it had a per­ma­nent base until the 2022 inva­sion.

    The mili­tia emerged from Andriy Bilet­skiy’s Patri­ot of Ukraine organ­i­sa­tion that crit­ics say cham­pi­oned white nation­al­ist, anti-immi­grant extreme-right ideas.

    Its logo resem­bles a black “wolf­san­gel”, a sym­bol that was used by some Nazi units and is seen by crit­ics as neo-Nazi. The Azov say the logo rep­re­sents the let­ters N and I of “nation­al idea” and deny it is neo-Nazi.

    Patri­ot of Ukraine lat­er renamed itself the Nation­al Corps and, despite ally­ing with oth­er nation­al­ist par­ties, failed to win elec­tion in 2019. The U.S. State Depart­ment labelled the Nation­al Corps a “nation­al­ist hate group” in 2018.

    Report­ing Rad­i­cal­ism, a Free­dom House-backed group inves­ti­gat­ing polit­i­cal extrem­ism in Ukraine, says Bilet­skiy has writ­ten sev­er­al open­ly racist texts. Bilet­skiy denies hold­ing racist or neo-Nazi views and says he believes in val­ues-based nation­al­ism.

    The Stan­ford Cen­ter for Inter­na­tion­al Secu­ri­ty and Coop­er­a­tion describes the group as “an extreme-right nation­al­ist para­mil­i­tary organ­i­sa­tion based in Ukraine”.

    NATIONAL GUARD

    In 2014, the Azov mili­tia was fold­ed into Ukraine’s Nation­al Guard — a mil­i­tary wing of the inte­ri­or min­istry. Kyiv says it has been reformed away from its rad­i­cal nation­al­ist ori­gins and that it has noth­ing to do with pol­i­tics.

    “They are the offi­cial army of our state. Any­one who want­ed to be involved in pol­i­tics — they left and are now in pol­i­tics. Those who decid­ed to serve in the Armed Forces became part of the Armed Forces,” Pres­i­dent Volodymyr Zelen­skiy said in an inter­view with Greek chan­nel ERT on May 1.

    In a state­ment to CNN last month, Azov said it “appre­ci­ates and respects Andriy Bilet­skiy as the reg­i­men­t’s founder and first com­man­der, but we have noth­ing to do with his polit­i­cal activ­i­ties and the Nation­al Corps par­ty”.

    The state­ment said that Azov’s “moti­va­tion has always angered Rus­sia. There­fore, dis­in­for­ma­tion attacks on the Azov Reg­i­ment have not stopped since 2014”.

    It denies alle­ga­tions of fas­cism, Nazism and racism and says that Ukraini­ans from var­i­ous back­grounds includ­ing Greeks, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and Rus­sians serve in Azov.

    The reg­i­men­t’s cur­rent and fourth com­man­der is Denys Prokopenko, who has been dubbed a Hero of Ukraine by Zelen­skiy, who is Jew­ish.

    It is not clear how many troops serve under Azov, but some media reports have put the num­ber at between 900 and 2,500.

    ...

    ————

    “Fact­box: Last defend­ers of Mar­i­upol: what is Ukraine’s Azov Reg­i­ment?”; Reuters; 05/17/2022

    “Its logo resem­bles a black “wolf­san­gel”, a sym­bol that was used by some Nazi units and is seen by crit­ics as neo-Nazi. The Azov say the logo rep­re­sents the let­ters N and I of “nation­al idea” and deny it is neo-Nazi.”

    It’s not a Nazi Wols­fan­gle. No, not, it’s an “N” and an “I”, stand­ing for “Nation­al idea”. Yeah...that’s the tick­et!. Also, Azov no long has any­thing to do with its founder, Andriy Bilet­sky. Oh, and Bilet­sky isn’t a Nazi and nev­er was:

    ...
    Patri­ot of Ukraine lat­er renamed itself the Nation­al Corps and, despite ally­ing with oth­er nation­al­ist par­ties, failed to win elec­tion in 2019. The U.S. State Depart­ment labelled the Nation­al Corps a “nation­al­ist hate group” in 2018.

    Report­ing Rad­i­cal­ism, a Free­dom House-backed group inves­ti­gat­ing polit­i­cal extrem­ism in Ukraine, says Bilet­skiy has writ­ten sev­er­al open­ly racist texts. Bilet­skiy denies hold­ing racist or neo-Nazi views and says he believes in val­ues-based nation­al­ism.

    ...

    In a state­ment to CNN last month, Azov said it “appre­ci­ates and respects Andriy Bilet­skiy as the reg­i­men­t’s founder and first com­man­der, but we have noth­ing to do with his polit­i­cal activ­i­ties and the Nation­al Corps par­ty”.

    ...

    The reg­i­men­t’s cur­rent and fourth com­man­der is Denys Prokopenko, who has been dubbed a Hero of Ukraine by Zelen­skiy, who is Jew­ish.
    ...

    Azov knows noth­ing about pol­i­tics. It’s pure­ly just a mil­i­tary enti­ty and noth­ing else. Any ties to its Nazi past have been sev­ered, and that Nazi past nev­er exist­ed in the first place. That’s the nar­ra­tive get­ting pushed. In one report after anoth­er. As Joseph Goebbels famous­ly said: “Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth”. Wel­come to the Azov’s new truth. At least for now. New new truths can be rolled out as need­ed.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 19, 2022, 4:25 pm

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