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FTR#1246 How Many Lies Before You Belong to The Lies?, Part 19

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— George Orwell, 1946

EVERYTHING MR. EMORY HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT THE UKRAINE WAR IS ENCAPSULATED IN THIS VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24

ANOTHER REVEALING VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24

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FTR#1246 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Jacques Baud

Intro­duc­tion: In this pro­gram, we present a sec­ond analy­sis of Colonel Jacques Baud’s analy­sis of the mil­i­tary sit­u­a­tion in the Ukraine war.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis: Colonel Baud recaps his analy­sis pre­sent­ed in his first article—that the move on Kiev was a diver­sion and the main “Schw­er­punkt” of the Russ­ian offen­sive is encir­cling the bulk of the Ukrain­ian forces con­cen­trat­ed on the bor­der of the Don­bass; Baud’s con­tention that the West fun­da­men­tal­ly mis­in­ter­pret­ed Russia’s oper­a­tion because its ana­lysts saw Russ­ian intent as being what the West would have done—trying to cap­ture the cap­i­tal in order to effect “regime change;” West­ern polit­i­cal and media pun­dits are see­ing things as they want them to be and not how they are; The West’s divorce from accu­rate intel­li­gence pro­vid­ed by intel­li­gence ser­vices; The West’s reliance on fun­da­men­tal­ly unre­li­able Ukrain­ian bat­tle­field “intel­li­gence;” The West’s sub­ver­sion of the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a nego­ti­at­ed set­tle­ment by send­ing Ukraine weapons in the hope/belief that Ukraine has a chance of win­ning; Baud sup­ports the view expressed in pre­vi­ous pro­grams that Rus­sia is NOT indis­crim­i­nate­ly bomb­ing civil­ian pop­u­la­tions; Baud points out that Rus­sia empha­sizes action involv­ing ground troops and does not engage in the kind of mas­sive aer­i­al bom­bard­ment that pro­duced mas­sive civil­ian casu­al­ties in West­ern mil­i­tary cam­paigns; Baud points out that Russ­ian mil­i­tary action is pri­mar­i­ly in the eth­nic Russ­ian areas of Ukraine in which the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion is not hos­tile to their forces; Con­verse­ly, the Ukrain­ian “ultra-nation­al­ist” forces are deployed in cities where the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion has no con­nec­tion with the com­bat­ants, max­i­miz­ing civil­ian loss­es; Dis­cus­sion of the Russ­ian offi­cers lead­ing from the rear—leading to high­er casu­al­ties and fun­da­men­tal mis­un­der­stand­ing of this by West­ern com­men­ta­tors; Dis­cus­sion of for­eign “vol­un­teers” fight­ing for Ukraine and the pos­si­bil­i­ty of West­ern weapon­ry falling into the hands of future ter­ror­ists-to-be; Baud’s belief that U.S. and Ger­man intel­li­gence knew of the Ukrain­ian intent to attack the Don­bass, delib­er­ate­ly push­ing Ukraine into the war; “Ukraine was thus instru­men­tal­ized to affect Rus­sia;” Baud reit­er­ates his con­tention that the West and France’s Macron, in par­tic­u­lar, com­plete­ly under­mined diplo­ma­cy and uphold­ing the Min­sk agree­ments; A dis­turb­ing truth con­cern­ing Putin’s plac­ing of Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert; “ . . . . it fol­lowed the thin­ly veiled threat made by Jean-Yves Le Dri­an, three days ear­li­er, that NATO could use nuclear weapons . . .”; The increas­ing vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of the West to manip­u­la­tion by “false-flag oper­a­tions;” The fact that Rus­sia destroyed its stock­pile of bio­log­i­cal weapons and the West has not; “ . . . . But in the cur­rent atmos­phere, all the con­di­tions are now met for an inci­dent to hap­pen that would push the West to become more involved, in some form, in the Ukrain­ian con­flict (a “false-flag” inci­dent). . . .”

The pro­gram con­cludes with pre­sen­ta­tion of an inter­view with Jacques Baud, which will be read in full in our next pro­gram.

1. We read into the record a sec­ond arti­cle by Jacques Baud. Before pre­sent­ing a syn­op­sis of the arti­cle, we recap Colonel Baud’s back­ground.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis: Colonel Baud recaps his analy­sis pre­sent­ed in his first article—that the move on Kiev was a diver­sion and the main “Schw­er­punkt” of the Russ­ian offen­sive is encir­cling the bulk of the Ukrain­ian forces con­cen­trat­ed on the bor­der of the Don­bass; Baud’s con­tention that the West fun­da­men­tal­ly mis­in­ter­pret­ed Russia’s oper­a­tion because its ana­lysts saw Russ­ian intent as being what the West would have done—trying to cap­ture the cap­i­tal in order to effect “regime change;” West­ern polit­i­cal and media pun­dits are see­ing things as they want them to be and not how they are; The West’s divorce from accu­rate intel­li­gence pro­vid­ed by intel­li­gence ser­vices; The West’s reliance on fun­da­men­tal­ly unre­li­able Ukrain­ian bat­tle­field “intel­li­gence;” The West’s sub­ver­sion of the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a nego­ti­at­ed set­tle­ment by send­ing Ukraine weapons in the hope/belief that Ukraine has a chance of win­ning; Baud sup­ports the view expressed in pre­vi­ous pro­grams that Rus­sia is NOT indis­crim­i­nate­ly bomb­ing civil­ian pop­u­la­tions; Baud points out that Rus­sia empha­sizes action involv­ing ground troops and does not engage in the kind of mas­sive aer­i­al bom­bard­ment that pro­duced mas­sive civil­ian casu­al­ties in West­ern mil­i­tary cam­paigns; Baud points out that Russ­ian mil­i­tary action is pri­mar­i­ly in the eth­nic Russ­ian areas of Ukraine in which the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion is not hos­tile to their forces; Con­verse­ly, the Ukrain­ian “ultra-nation­al­ist” forces are deployed in cities where the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion has no con­nec­tion with the com­bat­ants, max­i­miz­ing civil­ian loss­es; Dis­cus­sion of the Russ­ian offi­cers lead­ing from the rear—leading to high­er casu­al­ties and fun­da­men­tal mis­un­der­stand­ing of this by West­ern com­men­ta­tors; Dis­cus­sion of for­eign “vol­un­teers” fight­ing for Ukraine and the pos­si­bil­i­ty of West­ern weapon­ry falling into the hands of future ter­ror­ists-to-be; Baud’s belief that U.S. and Ger­man intel­li­gence knew of the Ukrain­ian intent to attack the Don­bass, delib­er­ate­ly push­ing Ukraine into the war; “Ukraine was thus instru­men­tal­ized to affect Rus­sia;” Baud reit­er­ates his con­tention that the West and France’s Macron, in par­tic­u­lar, com­plete­ly under­mined diplo­ma­cy and uphold­ing the Min­sk agree­ments; A dis­turb­ing truth con­cern­ing Putin’s plac­ing of Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert; “ . . . . it fol­lowed the thin­ly veiled threat made by Jean-Yves Le Dri­an, three days ear­li­er, that NATO could use nuclear weapons . . .”; The increas­ing vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of the West to manip­u­la­tion by “false-flag oper­a­tions;” The fact that Rus­sia destroyed its stock­pile of bio­log­i­cal weapons and the West has not; “ . . . . But in the cur­rent atmos­phere, all the con­di­tions are now met for an inci­dent to hap­pen that would push the West to become more involved, in some form, in the Ukrain­ian con­flict (a “false-flag” inci­dent). . . .”

Jacques Baud is a for­mer colonel of the Gen­er­al Staff, ex-mem­ber of the Swiss strate­gic intel­li­gence, spe­cial­ist on East­ern coun­tries. He was trained in the Amer­i­can and British intel­li­gence ser­vices. He has served as Pol­i­cy Chief for Unit­ed Nations Peace Oper­a­tions. As a UN expert on rule of law and secu­ri­ty insti­tu­tions, he designed and led the first mul­ti­di­men­sion­al UN intel­li­gence unit in the Sudan. He has worked for the African Union and was for 5 years respon­si­ble for the fight, at NATO, against the pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms. He was involved in dis­cus­sions with the high­est Russ­ian mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence offi­cials just after the fall of the USSR. With­in NATO, he fol­lowed the 2014 Ukrain­ian cri­sis and lat­er par­tic­i­pat­ed in pro­grams to assist the Ukraine. He is the author of sev­er­al books on intel­li­gence, war and ter­ror­ism, in par­tic­u­lar Le Détourne­ment pub­lished by SIGEST, Gou­vern­er par les fake newsL’affaire Naval­ny. His lat­est book is Pou­tine, maître du jeu? pub­lished by Max Milo.

This arti­cle appears through the gra­cious cour­tesy of Cen­tre Français de Recherche sur le Ren­seigne­ment, Paris. Trans­lat­ed from the French by N. Dass.

“The Mil­i­tary Sit­u­a­tion in the Ukraine—An Update” by Jacques Baud; The Pos­til; 4/11/2022.

The Oper­a­tional Sit­u­a­tion

As of March 25, 2022, our analy­sis of the sit­u­a­tion con­firms the obser­va­tions and con­clu­sions made in mid-March.

The offen­sive launched on Feb­ru­ary 24 is artic­u­lat­ed in two lines of effort, in accor­dance with Russ­ian oper­a­tional doc­trine:

1) A main effort direct­ed toward the south of the coun­try, in the Don­bass region, and along the Azov Sea coast. As the doc­trine states, the main objec­tives are—the neu­tral­iza­tion of the Ukrain­ian armed forces (the objec­tive of “demil­i­ta­riza­tion”), and the neu­tral­iza­tion of ultra-nation­al­ist, para­mil­i­tary mili­tias in the cities of Kharkov and Mar­i­upol (the objec­tive of “denaz­i­fi­ca­tion“). This pri­ma­ry push is being led by a coali­tion of forces: through Kharkov and Crimea are Russ­ian forces from the South­ern Mil­i­tary Dis­trict; in the cen­ter are mili­tia forces from the Donet­sk and Lugan­sk republics; the Chechen Nation­al Guard is con­tribut­ing with engage­ment in the urban area of Mar­i­upol;

2) A sec­ondary effort on Kiev, aimed at “pin­ning down” Ukrain­ian (and West­ern) forces, so as to pre­vent them from car­ry­ing out oper­a­tions against the main thrust or even tak­ing Russ­ian coali­tion forces from the rear.

This offen­sive fol­lows, to the let­ter, the objec­tives defined by Vladimir Putin on Feb­ru­ary 24. But, lis­ten­ing only to their own bias, West­ern “experts” and politi­cians have got­ten it into their heads that Russia’s objec­tive is to take over the Ukraine and over­throw its gov­ern­ment. Apply­ing a very West­ern log­ic, they see Kiev as the “cen­ter of grav­i­ty” (Schw­er­punkt) of Ukrain­ian forces. Accord­ing to Clause­witz, the “cen­ter of grav­i­ty” is the ele­ment from which a bel­liger­ent derives his strength and abil­i­ty to act, and is there­fore the pri­ma­ry objec­tive of an adversary’s strat­e­gy. This is why West­ern­ers have sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly tried to take con­trol of cap­i­tals in the wars they have fought. Trained and advised by NATO experts, the Ukrain­ian Gen­er­al Staff has, pre­dictably enough, applied the same log­ic, focus­ing on strength­en­ing the defense of Kiev and its sur­round­ings, while leav­ing its troops help­less in the Don­bass, along the axis of the main Russ­ian effort.

If one had lis­tened care­ful­ly to Vladimir Putin, one would have real­ized that the strate­gic objec­tive of the Russ­ian coali­tion is not to take over the Ukraine, but to remove any threat to the Russ­ian-speak­ing pop­u­la­tion of the Don­bass. Accord­ing to this gen­er­al objec­tive, the “real” cen­ter of grav­i­ty that the Russ­ian coali­tion is try­ing to tar­get is the bulk of the Ukrain­ian armed forces massed in the south-south­east of the coun­try (since the end of 2021), and not Kiev.

Russ­ian Suc­cess or Fail­ure?

Con­vinced that the Russ­ian offen­sive is aimed at Kiev, West­ern experts have quite log­i­cal­ly con­clud­ed that (a) the Rus­sians are stalling, and that (b) their offen­sive is doomed to fail­ure because they will not be able to hold the coun­try in the long term. The gen­er­als who have fol­lowed each oth­er on French TV seem to have for­got­ten what even a sec­ond lieu­tenant com­pre­hends well: “Know your enemy!”—not as one would like him to be, but as he is. With gen­er­als like that, we don’t need an ene­my any­more.

That being said, the West­ern nar­ra­tive about a Russ­ian offen­sive that is bogged down, and whose suc­cess­es are mea­ger, is also part of the pro­pa­gan­da war waged by both sides. For exam­ple, the sequence of maps of oper­a­tions, pub­lished by Libéra­tion from the end of Feb­ru­ary, shows almost no dif­fer­ence from one day to the next, until March 18th (when the media stopped updat­ing it). Thus, on Feb­ru­ary 23rd, on France 5 [TV sta­tion], the jour­nal­ist Élise Vin­cent eval­u­at­ed the ter­ri­to­ry tak­en by the Russ­ian coali­tion as the equiv­a­lent of Switzer­land or the Nether­lands. In real­i­ty, we are more in the area of Great Britain.

As an exam­ple, let us observe the dif­fer­ence between the map of the sit­u­a­tion on March 25, 2022, as pub­lished by Ouest-France:

… and as pub­lished by the French Min­istry of the Armed Forces:

In addi­tion, it should be not­ed that Ukrain­ian forces do not appear on any map (pre­sent­ed in our media) of the con­flict-sit­u­a­tion. Thus, if the map of the French Min­istry of Armed Forces gives a slight­ly more hon­est pic­ture of real­i­ty, it also care­ful­ly avoids men­tion­ing the Ukrain­ian forces encir­cled in the Kram­a­torsk caul­dron.

In fact, the sit­u­a­tion­al map, as of March 25, should look more like this:

The Sit­u­a­tion as of March 25, 2022. [“Poussée prin­ci­pale”= main thrust;
“poussée sec­ondaire”= sec­ondary thrust].
 The bone-shaped, blue area marks the loca­tion of the mass of the Ukrain­ian army (in real­i­ty, this “massed” Ukrain­ian army is split into sev­er­al small­er caul­drons). The red-lined arrows show the over­all offen­sive of the Russ­ian army. The orange-lined arrows show the thrust of the Don­bass forces. The red dot­ted line shows the max­i­mum advance of Russ­ian coali­tion forces.

More­over, Ukrain­ian forces are nev­er indi­cat­ed on our maps, as this would show that they were not deployed on the Russ­ian bor­der in Feb­ru­ary 2022, but were regrouped in the south of the coun­try, in prepa­ra­tion for their offen­sive, the ini­tial phase of which began on Feb­ru­ary 16th. This con­firms that Rus­sia was only react­ing to a sit­u­a­tion ini­ti­at­ed by the West, by way of the Ukraine, as we shall see. At present, it is these forces that are encir­cled in the Kram­a­torsk caul­dron and are being method­i­cal­ly frag­ment­ed and neu­tral­ized, lit­tle by lit­tle, in an incre­men­tal way, by the Russ­ian coali­tion.

The vague­ness main­tained in the West about the sit­u­a­tion of the Ukrain­ian forces, has oth­er effects. First, it main­tains the illu­sion of a pos­si­ble Ukrain­ian vic­to­ry. Thus, instead of encour­ag­ing a nego­ti­a­tion process, the West seeks to pro­long the war. This is why the Euro­pean Union and some of its mem­ber coun­tries have sent weapons and are encour­ag­ing the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion and vol­un­teers of all kinds to go and fight, often with­out train­ing and with­out any real com­mand structure—with dead­ly con­se­quences.

We know that in a con­flict, each par­ty tends to inform in order to give a favor­able image of its actions. How­ev­er, the image we have of the sit­u­a­tion and of the Ukrain­ian forces is based exclu­sive­ly on data pro­vid­ed by Kiev. It masks the pro­found defi­cien­cies of the Ukrain­ian lead­er­ship, even though it was trained and advised by NATO mil­i­tary.

Thus, mil­i­tary log­ic would have the forces caught in the Kram­a­torsk caul­dron with­draw to a line at the Dnieper, for exam­ple, in order to regroup and con­duct a coun­terof­fen­sive. But they were for­bid­den to with­draw by Pres­i­dent Zelen­sky. Even back in 2014 and 2015, a close exam­i­na­tion of the oper­a­tions showed that the Ukraini­ans were apply­ing “West­ern-style” schemes, total­ly unsuit­ed to the cir­cum­stances, and in the face of a more imag­i­na­tive, more flex­i­ble oppo­nent who pos­sessed lighter lead­er­ship struc­tures. It is the same phe­nom­e­non today.

In the end, the par­tial view of the bat­tle­field giv­en to us by our media has made it impos­si­ble for the West to help the Ukrain­ian gen­er­al staff make the right deci­sions. And it has led the West to believe that the obvi­ous strate­gic objec­tive is Kiev; that “demil­i­ta­riza­tion” is aimed at the Ukraine’s mem­ber­ship in NATO; and that “denaz­i­fi­ca­tion” is aimed at top­pling Zelen­sky. This leg­end was fueled by Vladimir Putin’s appeal to the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary to dis­obey, which was inter­pret­ed (with great imag­i­na­tion and bias) as a call to over­throw the gov­ern­ment. How­ev­er, this appeal was aimed at the Ukrain­ian forces deployed in the Don­bass to sur­ren­der with­out fight­ing. The West­ern inter­pre­ta­tion caused the Ukrain­ian gov­ern­ment to mis­judge Russ­ian objec­tives and mis­use its poten­tial of win­ning.

You don’t win a war with bias—you lose it. And that’s what is hap­pen­ing. Thus, the Russ­ian coali­tion was nev­er “on the run” or “stopped” by hero­ic resistance—it sim­ply did not attack where it was expect­ed. We did not want to lis­ten to what Vladimir Putin had explained to us very clear­ly. This is why the West has thus become—volens nolens—the main archi­tect of the Ukrain­ian defeat that is tak­ing shape. Para­dox­i­cal­ly, it is prob­a­bly because of our self-pro­claimed “experts” and recre­ation­al strate­gists on our tele­vi­sion sets that the Ukraine is in this sit­u­a­tion today.

The Con­duct of Bat­tle

As for the course of oper­a­tions, the analy­ses pre­sent­ed in our media come most often from politi­cians or so-called mil­i­tary experts, who relay Ukrain­ian pro­pa­gan­da.

Let’s be clear. A war, what­ev­er else it is, is dra­ma. The prob­lem here is that our strate­gists in neck­ties are clear­ly try­ing to over­dra­ma­tize the sit­u­a­tion in order to exclude any nego­ti­at­ed solu­tion. This devel­op­ment, how­ev­er, is prompt­ing some West­ern mil­i­tary per­son­nel to speak out and offer a more nuanced judg­ment. Thus, in Newsweek, an ana­lyst from the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency (DIA), the Amer­i­can equiv­a­lent of the Direc­tion du Ren­seigne­ment Mil­i­taire (DRM) in France, not­ed that “in 24 days of con­flict, Rus­sia has car­ried out some 1,400 strikes and launched near­ly 1,000 mis­siles (by way of com­par­i­son, the Unit­ed States car­ried out more strikes and launched more mis­siles on the first day of the Iraq war in 2003).”

While the West likes to “soft­en up” the bat­tle­field with inten­sive and pro­longed strikes, before send­ing in ground-troops, the Rus­sians pre­fer a less destruc­tive, but more troop-inten­sive approach. On France 5, the jour­nal­ist Mélanie Tar­vant pre­sent­ed the death of Russ­ian gen­er­als on the bat­tle­field as proof of the desta­bi­liza­tion of the Russ­ian army. But this is a pro­found mis­un­der­stand­ing of the tra­di­tions and modes of oper­a­tion of the Russ­ian army. Where­as in the West, com­man­ders tend to lead from the rear, their Russ­ian coun­ter­parts tend to lead from the front—in the West they say, “For­ward!” In Rus­sia, they say, “Fol­low me!” This explains the high loss­es in the upper ech­e­lons of com­mand, already observed in Afghanistan—but it also tells of the much more rig­or­ous selec­tion of staff-per­son­nel than in the West.

Fur­ther­more, the DIA ana­lyst not­ed that “the vast major­i­ty of the airstrikes are over the bat­tle­field, with Russ­ian air­craft pro­vid­ing ‘close air sup­port’ to ground forces. The remainder—less than 20 per­cent, accord­ing to U.S. experts—has been aimed at mil­i­tary air­fields, bar­racks and sup­port­ing depots.” Thus, the phrase “indis­crim­i­nate bomb­ing [that] is dev­as­tat­ing cities and killing every­one” echoed by the West­ern media seems to con­tra­dict the U.S. intel­li­gence expert, who said, “If we mere­ly con­vince our­selves that Rus­sia is bomb­ing indis­crim­i­nate­ly, or [that] it is fail­ing to inflict more harm because its per­son­nel are not up to the task or because it is tech­ni­cal­ly inept, then we are not see­ing the real con­flict.”

In fact, Russ­ian oper­a­tions dif­fer fun­da­men­tal­ly from the West­ern con­cept of the same. The West’s obses­sion with hav­ing no fatal­i­ties in their own forces leads them to oper­a­tions that are pri­mar­i­ly in the form of very lethal air strikes. Ground troops only inter­vene when every­thing has been destroyed. This is why, in Afghanistan or in the Sahel, West­ern­ers killed more civil­ians than ter­ror­ists did. This is why West­ern coun­tries engaged in Afghanistan, the Mid­dle East and North Africa no longer pub­lish the num­ber of civil­ian casu­al­ties caused by their strikes. In fact, Euro­peans engaged in regions that only mar­gin­al­ly affect their nation­al secu­ri­ty, such as the Esto­ni­ans in the Sahel, go there just to “get their feet wet.”

In the Ukraine, the sit­u­a­tion is very dif­fer­ent. One only has to look at a map of lin­guis­tic zones to see that the Russ­ian coali­tion oper­ates almost exclu­sive­ly in the Russ­ian-speak­ing zone; thus, among pop­u­la­tions that are gen­er­al­ly favor­able to it. This also explains the state­ments of a US Air Force offi­cer: “I know that the news keeps repeat­ing that Putin is tar­get­ing civil­ians, but there is no evi­dence that Rus­sia is inten­tion­al­ly doing so.”

Con­verse­ly, it is for the same reason—but in a dif­fer­ent way—that the Ukraine has deployed its ultra-nation­al­ist para­mil­i­tary fight­ers in major cities, such as Mar­i­upol or Kharkov—with­out emo­tion­al or cul­tur­al ties to the local pop­u­la­tion, these mili­tias can fight even at the cost of heavy civil­ian casu­al­ties. The atroc­i­ties that are cur­rent­ly being uncov­ered remain hid­den by the French-speak­ing media, for fear of los­ing sup­port for the Ukraine, as not­ed by media close to the Repub­li­cans in the Unit­ed States.

After “decap­i­ta­tion” strikes in the first min­utes of the offen­sive, the Russ­ian oper­a­tional strat­e­gy was to bypass the urban cen­ters, and to envel­op the Ukrain­ian army, “pinned down” by the forces of the Don­bass republics. It is impor­tant to remem­ber that the “decap­i­ta­tion” is not intend­ed to anni­hi­late the gen­er­al staff or the gov­ern­ment (as our “experts” tend to under­stand it), but to sun­der the lead­er­ship struc­tures so as to pre­vent the coor­di­nat­ed maneu­ver of forces. On the con­trary, the aim is to pre­serve the lead­er­ship struc­tures them­selves in order to be able to nego­ti­ate a way out of the cri­sis.

On March 25, 2022, after hav­ing sealed the caul­dron of Kram­a­torsk which denied any pos­si­bil­i­ty of retreat to the Ukraini­ans and hav­ing tak­en most of the cities of Kharkov and Mar­i­oupol, Rus­sia has prac­ti­cal­ly ful­filled its objectives—all that remains is to con­cen­trate its efforts on reduc­ing the pock­ets of resis­tance. Thus, con­trary to what the West­ern press has claimed, this is not a reori­en­ta­tion or a resiz­ing of its offen­sive, but the method­i­cal imple­men­ta­tion of the objec­tives announced on Feb­ru­ary 24.

The Role of the Vol­un­teers

A par­tic­u­lar­ly dis­turb­ing aspect of this con­flict is the atti­tude of Euro­pean gov­ern­ments that allow or encour­age their cit­i­zens to go and fight in the Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky’s call to join the Inter­na­tion­al Legion for the Ter­ri­to­r­i­al Defense of Ukraine, which he recent­ly cre­at­ed, has been greet­ed with enthu­si­asm by Euro­pean coun­tries.

Encour­aged by the media that present a rout­ed Russ­ian army, many of these young peo­ple head off, imag­in­ing they are going—literally—on a hunt­ing trip. How­ev­er, once there, dis­il­lu­sion­ment is high. Tes­ti­monies show that these “ama­teurs” often end up as “can­non fod­der,” with­out hav­ing any real impact on the out­come of the con­flict. The expe­ri­ence of recent con­flicts shows that the arrival of for­eign fight­ers brings noth­ing to a con­flict, except to increase its dura­tion and lethal­i­ty.

More­over, the arrival of sev­er­al hun­dred Islamist fight­ers from the Idlib region, an area under the con­trol and pro­tec­tion of the West­ern coali­tion in Syr­ia (and also the area in which two Islam­ic State lead­ers were killed by the Amer­i­cans) should arouse our con­cern. Indeed, the weapons we are very lib­er­al­ly sup­ply­ing to the Ukraine are already part­ly in the hands of crim­i­nal indi­vid­u­als and orga­ni­za­tions and are already begin­ning to pose a secu­ri­ty prob­lem for the author­i­ties in Kiev. Not to men­tion the fact that the weapons that are being tout­ed as effec­tive against Russ­ian air­craft could even­tu­al­ly threat­en our mil­i­tary and civil­ian air­craft.

The vol­un­teer proud­ly pre­sent­ed by the RTBF on the 7:30 p.m. news of March 8, 2022 was an admir­er of the “Corps Franc Wal­lonie,” Bel­gian vol­un­teers who served the Third Reich; and he illus­trates the type of peo­ple attract­ed to the Ukraine. In the end, we will have to ask our­selves, who gained the most—[in this case] Bel­gium or the Ukraine?

Dis­trib­ut­ing weapons indis­crim­i­nate­ly could well make the EU—volens nolens—a sup­port­er of extrem­ism and even inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism. The result—we are adding mis­ery to mis­ery, in order to sat­is­fy the Euro­pean elites more than the Ukraine itself.

Three Points Deserve to be High­light­ed by Way of Con­clu­sion

1.  West­ern Intel­li­gence, Ignored by Pol­i­cy­mak­ers

Mil­i­tary doc­u­ments found in Ukrain­ian head­quar­ters in the south of the coun­try con­firm that the Ukraine was prepar­ing to attack the Don­bass; and that the fir­ing observed by OSCE observers as ear­ly as Feb­ru­ary 16 her­ald­ed an immi­nent out­break in days or weeks.

Here, some intro­spec­tion is nec­es­sary for the West—either its intel­li­gence ser­vices did not see what was hap­pen­ing and they are thus very bad, or the polit­i­cal deci­sion-mak­ers chose not to lis­ten to them. We know that Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices have far supe­ri­or ana­lyt­i­cal capa­bil­i­ties than their West­ern coun­ter­parts. We also know that the Amer­i­can and Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vices had very well under­stood the sit­u­a­tion, since the end of 2021, and knew that the Ukraine was prepar­ing to attack the Don­bass.

This allows us to deduce that the Amer­i­can and Euro­pean polit­i­cal lead­ers delib­er­ate­ly pushed the Ukraine into a con­flict that they knew was lost in advance—for the sole pur­pose of deal­ing a polit­i­cal blow to Rus­sia.

The rea­son Zelen­sky did not deploy his forces to the Russ­ian bor­der, and repeat­ed­ly stat­ed that his large neigh­bor would not attack him, was pre­sum­ably because he thought he was rely­ing on West­ern deter­rence. This is what he told CNN on March 20th—he was clear­ly told that the Ukraine would not be part of NATO, but that pub­licly they would say the oppo­site. The Ukraine was thus instru­men­tal­ized to affect Rus­sia. The objec­tive was the clo­sure of the North Stream 2 gas pipeline, announced on Feb­ru­ary 8th, by Joe Biden, dur­ing the vis­it of Olaf Scholz; and which was fol­lowed by a bar­rage of sanc­tions.

2. Bro­ken Diplo­ma­cy

Clear­ly, since the end of 2021, no effort has been made by the West to reac­ti­vate the Min­sk agree­ments, as evi­denced by the reports of vis­its and tele­phone con­ver­sa­tions, notably between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin. How­ev­er, France, as guar­an­tor of the Min­sk Agree­ments, and as a per­ma­nent mem­ber of the Unit­ed Nations Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil, has not respect­ed its com­mit­ments, which has led to the sit­u­a­tion that the Ukraine is expe­ri­enc­ing today. There is even a feel­ing that the West has sought to add fuel to the fire since 2014.

Thus, Vladimir Putin’s plac­ing of nuclear forces on alert on Feb­ru­ary 27 was pre­sent­ed by our media and politi­cians as an irra­tional act or black­mail. What is for­got­ten is that it fol­lowed the thin­ly veiled threat made by Jean-Yves Le Dri­an, three days ear­li­er, that NATO could use nuclear weapons. It is very like­ly that Putin did not take this “threat” seri­ous­ly, but want­ed to push West­ern countries—and France in particular—to aban­don the use of exces­sive lan­guage.

 3. The Vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of Euro­peans to Manip­u­la­tion is Increas­ing

Today, the per­cep­tion prop­a­gat­ed by our media is that the Russ­ian offen­sive has bro­ken down; that Vladimir Putin is crazyirra­tional and there­fore ready to do any­thing to break the dead­lock in which he sup­pos­ed­ly finds him­self. In this total­ly emo­tion­al con­text, the ques­tion asked by Repub­li­can Sen­a­tor Mar­co Rubio dur­ing Vic­to­ria Nuland’s hear­ing before Con­gress was strange, to say the least: “If there is a bio­log­i­cal or chem­i­cal weapon inci­dent or attack inside the Ukraine, is there any doubt in your mind that 100% it would be the Rus­sians behind it?” Nat­u­ral­ly, she answered that there is no doubt. Yet there is absolute­ly no indi­ca­tion that the Rus­sians are using such weapons. Besides, the Rus­sians fin­ished destroy­ing their stock­piles in 2017, while the Amer­i­cans have not yet destroyed theirs.

Per­haps this means noth­ing. But in the cur­rent atmos­phere, all the con­di­tions are now met for an inci­dent to hap­pen that would push the West to become more involved, in some form, in the Ukrain­ian con­flict (a “false-flag” inci­dent).

Jacques Baud is a for­mer colonel of the Gen­er­al Staff, ex-mem­ber of the Swiss strate­gic intel­li­gence, and spe­cial­ist on East­ern coun­tries. He was trained in the Amer­i­can and British intel­li­gence ser­vices. He has served as Pol­i­cy Chief for Unit­ed Nations Peace Oper­a­tions. As a UN expert on rule of law and secu­ri­ty insti­tu­tions, he designed and led the first mul­ti­di­men­sion­al UN intel­li­gence unit in the Sudan. He has worked for the African Union and was for 5 years respon­si­ble for the fight, at NATO, against the pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms. He was involved in dis­cus­sions with the high­est Russ­ian mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence offi­cials just after the fall of the USSR. With­in NATO, he fol­lowed the 2014 Ukrain­ian cri­sis and lat­er par­tic­i­pat­ed in pro­grams to assist the Ukraine. He is the author of sev­er­al books on intel­li­gence, war and ter­ror­ism, in par­tic­u­lar Le Détourne­ment pub­lished by SIGEST, Gou­vern­er par les fake newsL’affaire Naval­ny. His lat­est book is Pou­tine, maître du jeu? pub­lished by Max Milo.

This arti­cle appears through the gra­cious cour­tesy of Cen­tre Français de Recherche sur le Ren­seigne­ment, Paris. Trans­lat­ed from the French by N. Dass.

 

2.  Next, we begin the read­ing of an inter­view The Pos­til did with Colonel Baud. We will con­tin­ue with this inter­view next week.

“Our Inter­view with Jacques Baud”; The Pos­til; 5/1/2022.

In this pen­e­trat­ing inter­view, Jacques Baud delves into geopol­i­tics to help us bet­ter under­stand what is actu­al­ly tak­ing place in the Ukraine, in that it is ulti­mate­ly the larg­er strug­gle for glob­al dom­i­nance, led by the Unit­ed States, NATO and the polit­i­cal lead­ers of the West and against Rus­sia.

As always, Colonel Baud brings to bear his well-informed analy­sis, which is unique for its depth and grav­i­ty. We are sure that you will find this con­ser­va­tion infor­ma­tive, insight­ful and cru­cial in con­nect­ing the dots.

The Pos­til (TP): We are so very pleased to have you join us for this con­ver­sa­tion. Would you please tell us a lit­tle about your­self, about your back­ground?

Jacques Baud (JB): Thank you for invit­ing me! As to my edu­ca­tion, I have a master’s degree in Econo­met­rics and post­grad­u­ate diplo­mas in Inter­na­tion­al Rela­tions and in Inter­na­tion­al Secu­ri­ty from the Grad­u­ate Insti­tute for Inter­na­tion­al rela­tions in Gene­va (Switzer­land). I worked as strate­gic intel­li­gence offi­cer in the Swiss Depart­ment of Defense, and was in charge of the War­saw Pact armed forces, includ­ing those deployed abroad (such as Afghanistan, Cuba, Ango­la, etc.) I attend­ed intel­li­gence train­ing in the UK and in the US. Just after the end of the Cold War, I head­ed for a few years a unit in the Swiss Defense Research and Pro­cure­ment Agency. Dur­ing the Rwan­da War, because of my mil­i­tary and intel­li­gence back­ground, I was sent to the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic of Con­go as secu­ri­ty advis­er to pre­vent eth­nic cleans­ing in the Rwan­dan refugee camps.

Dur­ing my time in the intel­li­gence ser­vice, I was in touch with the Afghan resis­tance move­ment of Ahmed Shah Masood, and I wrote a small hand­book to help Afghans in dem­i­ning and neu­tral­iz­ing Sovi­et bomblets. In the mid-1990, the strug­gle against antiper­son­nel mines became a for­eign pol­i­cy pri­or­i­ty of Switzer­land. I pro­posed to cre­ate a cen­ter that would col­lect infor­ma­tion about land­mines and dem­i­ning tech­nolo­gies for the UN. This led to the cre­ation of the Gene­va Inter­na­tion­al Cen­ter for Human­i­tar­i­an Dem­i­ning in Gene­va. I was lat­er offered to head the Pol­i­cy and Doc­trine Unit of the UN Depart­ment of Peace­keep­ing Oper­a­tions. After two years in New York, I went to Nairo­bi to per­form a sim­i­lar job for the African Union.

Then I was assigned to NATO to counter the pro­lif­er­a­tion of small arms. Switzer­land is not a mem­ber of the Alliance, but this par­tic­u­lar posi­tion had been nego­ti­at­ed as a Swiss con­tri­bu­tion to the Part­ner­ship for Peace with NATO. In 2014, as the Ukraine cri­sis unfold­ed, I mon­i­tored the flow of small arms in the Don­bass. Lat­er, in the same year I was involved in a NATO pro­gram to assist the Ukrain­ian armed forces in restor­ing their capac­i­ties and improv­ing per­son­nel man­age­ment, with the aim of restor­ing trust in them.

TP: You have writ­ten two insight­ful arti­cles about the cur­rent con­flict in the Ukraine, which we had the great priv­i­lege to trans­late and pub­lish (here and here). Was there a par­tic­u­lar event or an instance which led you to for­mu­late this much-need­ed per­spec­tive?

JB: As a strate­gic intel­li­gence offi­cer, I always advo­cat­ed pro­vid­ing to the polit­i­cal or mil­i­tary deci­sion-mak­ers the most accu­rate and the most objec­tive intel­li­gence. This is the kind of job where you need to keep you prej­u­dice and your feel­ings to your­self, in order to come up with an intel­li­gence that reflects as much as pos­si­ble the real­i­ty on the ground rather than your own emo­tions or beliefs. I also assume that in a mod­ern demo­c­ra­t­ic State deci­sion must be fact-based. This is the dif­fer­ence with auto­crat­ic polit­i­cal sys­tems where deci­sion-mak­ing is ide­ol­o­gy-based (such as in the Marx­ist States) or reli­gion-based (such as in the French pre-rev­o­lu­tion­ary monar­chy).

Thanks to my var­i­ous assign­ments, I was able to have an insid­er view in most recent con­flicts (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syr­ia and, of course, Ukraine). The main com­mon aspect between all these con­flicts is that we tend to have a total­ly dis­tort­ed under­stand­ing of them. We do not under­stand our ene­mies, their ratio­nale, their way of think­ing and their real objec­tives. Hence, we are not even able to artic­u­late sound strate­gies to fight them. This is espe­cial­ly true with Rus­sia. Most peo­ple, includ­ing the top brass, tend to con­fuse “Rus­sia” and “USSR.” As I was in NATO, I could hard­ly find some­one who could explain what Russia’s vision of the world is or even its polit­i­cal doc­trine. Lot of peo­ple think Vladimir Putin is a com­mu­nist. We like to call him a “dic­ta­tor,” but we have a hard time to explain what we mean by that. As exam­ples, peo­ple come up invari­ably with the assas­si­na­tion of such and such jour­nal­ist or for­mer FSB or GRU agents, although evi­dence is extreme­ly debat­able. In oth­er words, even if it is true, we are not able to artic­u­late exact­ly the nature of the prob­lem. As a result, we tend to por­tray the ene­my as we wished him to be, rather than as he actu­al­ly is. This is the ulti­mate recipe for fail­ure. This explains why, after five years spent with­in NATO, I am more con­cerned about West­ern strate­gic and mil­i­tary capa­bil­i­ties than before.

In 2014, dur­ing the Maid­an rev­o­lu­tion in Kiev, I was in NATO in Brus­sels. I noticed that peo­ple didn’t assess the sit­u­a­tion as it was, but as they wished it would be. This is exact­ly what Sun Tzu describes as the first step towards fail­ure. In fact, it appeared clear to me that nobody in NATO had the slight­est inter­est in Ukraine. The main goal was to desta­bi­lize Rus­sia.

TP: How do you per­ceive Volodymyr Zelen­sky? Who is he, real­ly? What is his role in this con­flict? It seems he wants to have a “for­ev­er war,” since he must know he can­not win? Why does he want to pro­long this con­flict?

JB: Volodymyr Zelen­sky was elect­ed on the promise he would make peace with Rus­sia, which I think is a noble objec­tive. The prob­lem is that no West­ern coun­try, nor the Euro­pean Union man­aged to help him real­ize this objec­tive. After the Maid­an rev­o­lu­tion, the emerg­ing force in the polit­i­cal land­scape was the far-right move­ment. I do not like to call it “neo-Nazi” because “Nazism” was a clear­ly defined polit­i­cal doc­trine, while in Ukraine, we are talk­ing about a vari­ety of move­ments that com­bine all the fea­tures of Nazism (such as anti­semitism, extreme nation­al­ism, vio­lence, etc.), with­out being uni­fied into a sin­gle doc­trine. They are more like a gath­er­ing of fanat­ics.

After 2014, Ukrain­ian armed forces’ com­mand & con­trol was extreme­ly poor and was the cause of their inabil­i­ty to han­dle the rebel­lion in Don­bass. Sui­cide, alco­hol inci­dents, and mur­der surged, push­ing young sol­diers to defect. Even the British gov­ern­ment not­ed that young male indi­vid­u­als pre­ferred to emi­grate rather than to join the armed forces. As a result, Ukraine start­ed to recruit vol­un­teers to enforce Kiev’s author­i­ty in the Russ­ian speak­ing part of the coun­try. These vol­un­teers were (and still are) recruit­ed among Euro­pean far-right extrem­ists. Accord­ing to Reuters, their num­ber amounts to 102,000. They have become a size­able and influ­en­tial polit­i­cal force in the coun­try.

The prob­lem here is that these far-right fanat­ics threat­ened to kill Zelen­sky were he to try to make peace with Rus­sia. As a result, Zelen­sky found him­self sit­ting between his promis­es and the vio­lent oppo­si­tion of an increas­ing­ly pow­er­ful far-right move­ment. In May 2019, on the Ukrain­ian media Obozre­va­tel, Dmytro Yarosh, head of the “Pravy Sek­tor” mili­tia and advis­er to the Army Com­man­der in Chief, open­ly threat­ened Zelen­sky with death, if he came to an agree­ment with Rus­sia. In oth­er words, Zelen­sky appears to be black­mailed by forces he is prob­a­bly not in full con­trol of.

In Octo­ber 2021, the Jerusalem Post pub­lished a dis­turb­ing report on the train­ing of Ukrain­ian far-right mili­tias by Amer­i­can, British, French and Cana­di­an armed forces. The prob­lem is that the “col­lec­tive West” tends to turn a blind eye to these inces­tu­ous and per­verse rela­tion­ships in order to achieve its own geopo­lit­i­cal goals. It is sup­port­ed by unscrupu­lous far-right biased medias against Israel, which tend to approve the crim­i­nal behav­ior of these mili­tias. This sit­u­a­tion has repeat­ed­ly raised Israel’s con­cerns. This explains why Zelensky’s demands to the Israeli par­lia­ment in March 2022 were not well received and have not been suc­cess­ful.

So, despite his prob­a­ble will­ing­ness to achieve a polit­i­cal set­tle­ment for the cri­sis with Rus­sia, Zelen­sky is not allowed to do so. Just after he indi­cat­ed his readi­ness to talk with Rus­sia, on 25 Feb­ru­ary, the Euro­pean Union decid­ed two days lat­er to pro­vide €450M in arms to Ukraine. The same hap­pened in March. As soon as Zelen­sky indi­cat­ed he want­ed to have talks with Vladimir Putin on 21 March, the Euro­pean Union decid­ed to dou­ble its mil­i­tary aid to €1 bil­lion on 23 March. End of March, Zelen­sky made an inter­est­ing offer that was retract­ed short­ly after.

Appar­ent­ly, Zelen­sky is try­ing to nav­i­gate between West­ern pres­sure and his far right on the one hand and his con­cern to find a solu­tion on the oth­er, and is forced into a “back-and-forth,” which dis­cour­ages the Russ­ian nego­tia­tors.

In fact, I think Zelen­sky is in an extreme uncom­fort­able posi­tion, which reminds me of Sovi­et Mar­shal Kon­stan­tin Rokossovsky’s dur­ing WWII. Rokossovsky had been impris­oned in 1937 for trea­son and sen­tenced to death by Stal­in. In 1941, he got out of prison on Stalin’s orders and was giv­en a com­mand. He was even­tu­al­ly pro­mot­ed to Mar­shall of the Sovi­et Union in 1944, but his death sen­tence was not lift­ed until 1956.

Today, Zelen­sky must lead his coun­try under the sword of Damo­cles, with the bless­ing of West­ern politi­cians and uneth­i­cal media. His lack of polit­i­cal expe­ri­ence made him an easy prey for those who were try­ing to exploit Ukraine against Rus­sia, and in the hands of extreme right-wing move­ments. As he acknowl­edges in an inter­view with CNN, he was obvi­ous­ly lured into believ­ing that Ukraine would enter NATO more eas­i­ly after an open con­flict with Rus­sia, as Olek­sey Arestovich, his advis­er, con­firmed in 2019.

TP: What do you think will be the fate of the Ukraine? Will it be like all the oth­er exper­i­ments in “spread­ing democ­ra­cy” (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, etc.)? Or is Ukraine a spe­cial case?

JB: I have def­i­nite­ly no crys­tal ball… At this stage, we can only guess what Vladimir Putin wants. He prob­a­bly wants to achieve two main goals. The first one is to secure the sit­u­a­tion of the Russ­ian-speak­ing minor­i­ty in Ukraine. How, remains an open ques­tion. Does he want to re-cre­ate the “Novorossiya” that tried to emerge from the 2014 unrests? This “enti­ty” that nev­er real­ly exist­ed, and it con­sist­ed of the short-lived Republics of Odessa, Donet­sk, Dne­propetro­vsk, Kharkov and Lugan­sk, of which only the Republics of Donet­sk and Lugan­sk “sur­vived.” The auton­o­my ref­er­en­dum planned for ear­ly May in the city of Kher­son might be an indi­ca­tion for this option. Anoth­er option would be to nego­ti­ate an autonomous sta­tus for these areas, and to return them to Ukraine in exchange of its neu­tral­i­ty.

The sec­ond goal is to have a neu­tral Ukraine (some will say a “Fin­lan­dized Ukraine”). That is—without NATO. It could be some kind of Swiss “armed neu­tral­i­ty.” As you know, in the ear­ly 19th cen­tu­ry, Switzer­land had a neu­tral sta­tus imposed on it by the Euro­pean pow­ers, as well as the oblig­a­tion to pre­vent any mis­use of its ter­ri­to­ry against one of these pow­ers. This explains the strong mil­i­tary tra­di­tion we have in Switzer­land and the main ratio­nale for its armed forces today. Some­thing sim­i­lar could prob­a­bly be con­sid­ered for Ukraine.

An inter­na­tion­al­ly rec­og­nized neu­tral sta­tus would grant Ukraine a high degree of secu­ri­ty. This sta­tus pre­vent­ed Switzer­land from being attacked dur­ing the two world wars. The often-men­tioned exam­ple of Bel­gium is mis­lead­ing, because dur­ing both world wars, its neu­tral­i­ty was declared uni­lat­er­al­ly and was not rec­og­nized by the bel­liger­ents. In the case of Ukraine, it would have its own armed forces, but would be free from any for­eign mil­i­tary pres­ence: nei­ther NATO, nor Rus­sia. This is just my guess, and I have no clue about how this could be fea­si­ble and accept­ed in the cur­rent polar­ized inter­na­tion­al cli­mate.

I am not sure about the so-called “col­or-rev­o­lu­tions” aim at spread­ing democ­ra­cy. My take is that it is just a way to weaponize human rights, the rule of law or democ­ra­cy in order to achieve geo-strate­gic objec­tives. In fact, this was clear­ly spelled out in a memo to Rex Tiller­son, Don­ald Trump’s Sec­re­tary of State, in 2017. Ukraine is a case in point. After 2014, despite West­ern influ­ence, it has nev­er been a democ­ra­cy: cor­rup­tion soared between 2014 and 2020; in 2021, it banned oppo­si­tion media and jailed the leader of the main par­lia­men­tary oppo­si­tion par­ty. As some inter­na­tion­al orga­ni­za­tions have report­ed, tor­ture is a com­mon prac­tice, and oppo­si­tion lead­ers as well as jour­nal­ists are chased by the Ukrain­ian Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice.

TP: Why is the West only inter­est­ed in draw­ing a sim­plis­tic image of the Ukraine con­flict? That of “good guys” and the “bad guys?” Is the West­ern pub­lic real­ly now that dumb­ed down?

JB: I think this is inher­ent to any con­flict. Each side tends to por­tray itself as the “good guy.” This is obvi­ous­ly the main rea­son.

Besides this, oth­er fac­tors come into play. First, most peo­ple, includ­ing politi­cians and jour­nal­ists, still con­fuse Rus­sia and the USSR. For instance, they don’t under­stand why the com­mu­nist par­ty is the main oppo­si­tion par­ty in Rus­sia.

Sec­ond, since 2007, Putin was sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly demo­nized in the West. Whether or not he is a “dic­ta­tor” Is a mat­ter of dis­cus­sion; but it is worth not­ing that his approval rate in Rus­sia nev­er fell below 59 % in the last 20 years. I take my fig­ures from the Lev­a­da Cen­ter, which is labeled as “for­eign agent” in Rus­sia, and hence doesn’t reflect the Kremlin’s views. It is also inter­est­ing to see that in France, some of the most influ­en­tial so-called “experts” on Rus­sia are in fact work­ing for the British MI‑6’s “Integri­ty Ini­tia­tive.”

Third, in the West, there is a sense that you can do what­ev­er you want if it is in the name of west­ern val­ues. This is why the Russ­ian offen­sive in Ukraine is pas­sion­ate­ly sanc­tioned, while FUKUS (France, UK, US) wars get strong polit­i­cal sup­port, even if they are noto­ri­ous­ly based on lies. “Do what I say, not what I do!” One could ask what makes the con­flict in Ukraine worse than oth­er wars. In fact, each new sanc­tion we apply to Rus­sia high­lights the sanc­tions we haven’t applied ear­li­er to the US, the UK or France.

The pur­pose of this incred­i­ble polar­iza­tion is to pre­vent any dia­logue or nego­ti­a­tion with Rus­sia. We are back to what hap­pened in 1914, just before the start of WWI

TP: What will Rus­sia gain or lose with this involve­ment in the Ukraine (which is like­ly to be long-term)? Rus­sia is fac­ing a con­flict on “two fronts,” it would seem: a mil­i­tary one and an eco­nom­ic one (with the end­less sanc­tions and “can­cel­ing” of Rus­sia).

JB: With the end of the Cold War, Rus­sia expect­ed being able to devel­op clos­er rela­tions with its West­ern neigh­bors. It even con­sid­ered join­ing NATO. But the US resist­ed every attempt of rap­proche­ment. NATO struc­ture does not allow for the coex­is­tence of two nuclear super­pow­ers. The US want­ed to keep its suprema­cy.

Since 2002, the qual­i­ty of the rela­tions with Rus­sia decayed slow­ly, but steadi­ly. It reached a first neg­a­tive “peak” in 2014 after the Maid­an coup. The sanc­tions have become US and EU pri­ma­ry for­eign pol­i­cy tool. The West­ern nar­ra­tive of a Russ­ian inter­ven­tion in Ukraine got trac­tion, although it was nev­er sub­stan­ti­at­ed. Since 2014, I haven’t met any intel­li­gence pro­fes­sion­al who could con­firm any Russ­ian mil­i­tary pres­ence in the Don­bass. In fact, Crimea became the main “evi­dence” of Russ­ian “inter­ven­tion.” Of course, West­ern his­to­ri­ans ignore superbly that Crimea was sep­a­rat­ed from Ukraine by ref­er­en­dum in Jan­u­ary 1990, six months before Ukrain­ian inde­pen­dence and under Sovi­et rule. In fact, it’s Ukraine that ille­gal­ly annexed Crimea in 1995. Yet, west­ern coun­tries sanc­tioned Rus­sia for that…

Since 2014 sanc­tions severe­ly affect­ed east-west rela­tions. After the sig­na­ture of the Min­sk Agree­ments in Sep­tem­ber 2014 and Feb­ru­ary 2015, the West—namely France, Ger­many as guar­an­tors for Ukraine, and the US—made no effort what­so­ev­er to make Kiev com­ply, despite repeat­ed requests from Moscow.

Russia’s per­cep­tion is that what­ev­er it will do, it will face an irra­tional response from the West. This is why, in Feb­ru­ary 2022, Vladimir Putin real­ized he would gain noth­ing in doing noth­ing. If you take into account his mount­ing approval rate in the coun­try, the resilience of the Russ­ian econ­o­my after the sanc­tions, the loss of trust in the US dol­lar, the threat­en­ing infla­tion in the West, the con­sol­i­da­tion of the Moscow-Bei­jing axis with the sup­port of India (which the US has failed to keep in the “Quad”), Putin’s cal­cu­la­tion was unfor­tu­nate­ly not wrong.

Regard­less of what Rus­sia does, US and west­ern strat­e­gy is to weak­en it. From that point on, Rus­sia has no real stake in its rela­tions with us. Again, the US objec­tive is not to have a “bet­ter” Ukraine or a “bet­ter” Rus­sia, but a weak­er Rus­sia. But it also shows that the Unit­ed States is not able to rise high­er than Rus­sia and that the only way to over­come it is to weak­en it. This should ring an alarm bell in our coun­tries…

TP: You have writ­ten a very inter­est­ing book on Putin. Please tell us a lit­tle about it.

JB: In fact, I start­ed my book in Octo­ber 2021, after a show on French state TV about Vladimir Putin. I am def­i­nite­ly not an admir­er of Vladimir Putin, nor of any West­ern leader, by the way. But the so-called experts had so lit­tle under­stand­ing of Rus­sia, inter­na­tion­al secu­ri­ty and even of sim­ple plain facts, that I decid­ed to write a book. Lat­er, as the sit­u­a­tion around Ukraine devel­oped, I adjust­ed my approach to cov­er this mount­ing con­flict.

The idea was def­i­nite­ly not to relay Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da. In fact, my book is based exclu­sive­ly on west­ern sources, offi­cial reports, declas­si­fied intel­li­gence reports, Ukrain­ian offi­cial medias, and reports pro­vid­ed by the Russ­ian oppo­si­tion. The approach was to demon­strate that we can have a sound and fac­tu­al alter­na­tive under­stand­ing of the sit­u­a­tion just with acces­si­ble infor­ma­tion and with­out rely­ing on what we call “Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da.”

The under­ly­ing think­ing is that we can only achieve peace if we have a more bal­anced view of the sit­u­a­tion. To achieve this, we have to go back to the facts. Now, these facts exist and are abun­dant­ly avail­able and acces­si­ble. The prob­lem is that some indi­vid­u­als make every effort to pre­vent this and tend to hide the facts that dis­turb them. This is exem­pli­fied by some so-called jour­nal­ist who dubbed me “The spy who loved Putin!” This is the kind of “jour­nal­ists” who live from stir­ring ten­sions and extrem­ism. All fig­ures and data pro­vid­ed by our media about the con­flict come from Ukraine, and those com­ing from Rus­sia are auto­mat­i­cal­ly dis­missed as pro­pa­gan­da. My view is that both are pro­pa­gan­da. But as soon as you come up with west­ern data that do not fit into the main­stream nar­ra­tive, you have extrem­ists claim­ing you “love Putin.”

Our media are so wor­ried about find­ing ratio­nal­i­ty in Putin’s actions that they turn a blind eye to the crimes com­mit­ted by Ukraine, thus gen­er­at­ing a feel­ing of impuni­ty for which Ukraini­ans are pay­ing the price. This is the case of the attack on civil­ians by a mis­sile in Kramatorsk—we no longer talk about it because the respon­si­bil­i­ty of Ukraine is very like­ly, but this means that the Ukraini­ans could do it again with impuni­ty.

On the con­trary, my book aims at reduc­ing the cur­rent hys­te­ria that pre­vent any polit­i­cal solu­tion. I do not want to deny the Ukraini­ans the right to resist the inva­sion with arms. If I were Ukrain­ian, I would prob­a­bly take the arms to defend my land. The issue here is that it must be their deci­sion. The role of the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty should not be to add fuel to the fire by sup­ply­ing arms but to pro­mote a nego­ti­at­ed solu­tion.

To move in this direc­tion, we must make the con­flict dis­pas­sion­ate and bring it back into the realm of ratio­nal­i­ty. In any con­flict the prob­lems come from both sides; but here, strange­ly, our media show us that they all come from one side only. This is obvi­ous­ly not true; and, in the end, it is the Ukrain­ian peo­ple who pay the price of our pol­i­cy against Vladimir Putin.

TP: Why is Putin hat­ed so much by the West­ern elite?

JB: Putin became West­ern elite’s “bête noire” in 2007 with his famous speech in Munich. Until then, Rus­sia had only mod­er­ate­ly react­ed to NATO expan­sion. But as the US with­drew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and start­ed nego­ti­a­tions with some East Euro­pean coun­tries to deploy anti-bal­lis­tic mis­siles, Rus­sia felt the heat and Putin vir­u­lent­ly crit­i­cized the US and NATO.

This was the start of a relent­less effort to demo­nize Vladimir Putin and to weak­en Rus­sia. The prob­lem was def­i­nite­ly not human rights or democ­ra­cy, but the fact that Putin dared to chal­lenge the west­ern approach. The Rus­sians have in com­mon with the Swiss the fact that they are very legal­is­tic. They try to strict­ly fol­low the rules of inter­na­tion­al law. They tend to fol­low “law-based Inter­na­tion­al order.” Of course, this is not the image we have, because we are used to hid­ing cer­tain facts. Crimea is a case in point.

In the West, since the ear­ly 2000s, the US has start­ed to impose a “rules-based inter­na­tion­al order.” As an exam­ple, although the US offi­cial­ly rec­og­nizes that there is only one Chi­na and that Tai­wan is only a part of it, it main­tains a mil­i­tary pres­ence on the island and sup­plies weapons. Imag­ine if Chi­na would sup­ply weapons to Hawaii (which was ille­gal­ly annexed in the 19th cen­tu­ry)!

What the West is pro­mot­ing is an inter­na­tion­al order based on the “law of the strongest.” As long as the US was the sole super­pow­er, every­thing was fine. But as soon as Chi­na and Rus­sia start­ed to emerge as world pow­ers, the US tried to con­tain them. This is exact­ly what Joe Biden said in March 2021, short­ly after tak­ing office: “The rest of the world is clos­ing in and clos­ing in fast. We can’t allow this to con­tin­ue.”

As Hen­ry Kissinger said in the Wash­ing­ton Post: “For the West, the demo­niza­tion of Vladimir Putin is not a pol­i­cy; it is an ali­bi for the absence of one.” This is why I felt we need to have a more fac­tu­al approach to this con­flict.

TP: Do you know who was involved and when it was decid­ed by the US and NATO that regime change in Rus­sia was a pri­ma­ry geopo­lit­i­cal objec­tive?

JB: I think every­thing start­ed in the ear­ly 2000s. I am not sure the objec­tive was a regime change in Moscow, but it was cer­tain­ly to con­tain Rus­sia. This is what we have wit­nessed since then. The 2014 events in Kiev have boost­ed US efforts.

These were clear­ly defined in 2019, in two pub­li­ca­tions of the RAND Cor­po­ra­tion [James Dob­bins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chan­dler, Bryan Fred­er­ick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLu­ca, For­rest E. Mor­gan, Howard J. Shatz, Brent Williams, “Extend­ing Rus­sia : Com­pet­ing from Advan­ta­geous Ground,” RAND Cor­po­ra­tion, 2019; James Dob­bins & al., “Overex­tend­ing and Unbal­anc­ing Rus­sia,” RAND Cor­po­ra­tion, (Doc Nr. RB-10014‑A), 2019]. .This has noth­ing to do with the rule of law, democ­ra­cy or human rights, but only with main­tain­ing US suprema­cy in the world. In oth­er words, nobody cares about Ukraine. This is why the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty (that is, West­ern coun­tries) make every effort to pro­long the con­flict.

Since 2014, this is exact­ly what hap­pened. Every­thing the West did was to ful­fill US strate­gic objec­tives.

TP: In this regard, you have also writ­ten anoth­er inter­est­ing book, on Alex­ei Naval­ny. Please tell us about what you have found out about Naval­ny.

JB: What dis­turbed me about the Naval­ny case was the haste with which West­ern gov­ern­ments con­demned Rus­sia and applied sanc­tions, even before know­ing the results of an impar­tial inves­ti­ga­tion. So, my point in the book is not “to tell truth,” because we do not know exact­ly what the truth is, even if we have con­sis­tent indi­ca­tions that the offi­cial nar­ra­tive is wrong.

The inter­est­ing aspect is that the Ger­man doc­tors in the Char­ité Hos­pi­tal in Berlin, were not able to iden­ti­fy any nerve agent in Navalny’s body. Sur­pris­ing­ly, they pub­lished their find­ings in the respect­ed med­ical review The Lancet, show­ing that Naval­ny prob­a­bly expe­ri­enced a bad com­bi­na­tion of med­i­cine and oth­er sub­stances.

The Swedish mil­i­tary lab that ana­lyzed Navalny’s blood—redact­ed the name of the sub­stance they dis­cov­ered, which is odd since every­body expect­ed “Novi­chok” to be men­tioned.

The bot­tom line is that we don’t know exact­ly what hap­pened, but the nature of the symp­toms, the reports of the Ger­man doc­tors, the answers pro­vid­ed by the Ger­man gov­ern­ment to the Par­lia­ment, and the puz­zling Swedish doc­u­ment tend to exclude a crim­i­nal poi­son­ing, and there­fore, a for­tiori, poi­son­ing by the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment.

The main point of my book is that inter­na­tion­al rela­tions can­not be “Twit­ter-dri­ven.” We need to use appro­pri­ate­ly our intel­li­gence resources, not as a pro­pa­gan­da instru­ment, as we tend to do these days, but as an instru­ment for smart and fact-based deci­sion-mak­ing.

TP: You have much expe­ri­ence with­in NATO. What do you think is the pri­ma­ry role of NATO now?

JB: This is an essen­tial ques­tion. In fact, NATO hasn’t real­ly evolved since the end of the Cold War. This is inter­est­ing because in 1969, there was the “Harmel Report” that was ahead of its time and could be the fun­da­ment of a new def­i­n­i­tion of NATO’s role. Instead, NATO tried to find new mis­sions, such as in Afghanistan, for which the Alliance was not pre­pared, nei­ther intel­lec­tu­al­ly, nor doc­tri­nal­ly, nor from a strate­gic point of view.

Hav­ing a col­lec­tive defense sys­tem in Europe is nec­es­sary, but the nuclear dimen­sion of NATO tends to restrict its abil­i­ty to engage a con­ven­tion­al con­flict with a nuclear pow­er. This is the prob­lem we are wit­ness­ing in Ukraine. This is why Rus­sia strives hav­ing a “glacis” between NATO and its ter­ri­to­ry. This would prob­a­bly not pre­vent con­flicts but would help keep them as long as pos­si­ble in a con­ven­tion­al phase. This is why I think a non-nuclear Euro­pean defense orga­ni­za­tion would be a good solu­tion.

TP: Do you think that NATO’s proxy war with Rus­sia serves to pla­cate inter­nal EU ten­sions, between con­ser­v­a­tive Central/Eastern Europe and the more pro­gres­sive West?

JB: Some will cer­tain­ly see it that way, but I think this is only a by-prod­uct of the US strat­e­gy to iso­late Rus­sia.

TP: Can you say some­thing about how Turkey has posi­tioned itself, between NATO and Rus­sia?

JB: I have worked quite exten­sive­ly with Turkey as I was in NATO. I think Turkey is a very com­mit­ted mem­ber of the Alliance. What we tend to for­get is that Turkey is at the cross­roads between the “Chris­t­ian World” and the “Islam­ic World;” it sits between two civ­i­liza­tions and in a key region of the Mediter­ranean zone. It has its own region­al stakes.

The con­flicts waged by the West in the Mid­dle East sig­nif­i­cant­ly impact­ed Turkey, by pro­mot­ing Islamism and stim­u­lat­ing ten­sions, in par­tic­u­lar with the Kurds. Turkey has always tried to main­tain a bal­ance between its desire for West­ern-style mod­ern­iza­tion and the very strong tra­di­tion­al­ist ten­den­cies of its pop­u­la­tion. Turkey’s oppo­si­tion to the Iraq War due to domes­tic secu­ri­ty con­cerns was total­ly ignored and dis­missed by the US and its NATO Allies.

Inter­est­ing­ly, when Zelen­sky sought a coun­try to medi­ate the con­flict, he turned to Chi­na, Israel and Turkey, but didn’t address any EU coun­try.

TP: If you were to pre­dict, what do you think the geopo­lit­i­cal sit­u­a­tion of Europe and the world will look like 25 years from now?

JB: Who would have pre­dict­ed the fall of the Berlin Wall? The day it hap­pened, I was in the office of a Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advis­er in Wash­ing­ton DC, but he had no clue about the impor­tance of the event!

I think the decay of US hege­mo­ny will be the main fea­ture of the next decades. At the same time, we will see a fast-grow­ing impor­tance of Asia led by Chi­na and India. But I am not sure Asia will “replace” the US strict­ly speak­ing. While US world­wide hege­mo­ny was dri­ven by its mil­i­tary-indus­tri­al com­plex, Asia’s dom­i­nance will be in the research and tech­nol­o­gy area.

The loss of con­fi­dence in the US dol­lar may have sig­nif­i­cant impact on the US econ­o­my at large. I don’t want to spec­u­late on future devel­op­ments in the West, but a sig­nif­i­cant dete­ri­o­ra­tion could lead the Unit­ed States to engage in more con­flicts around the world. This is some­thing that we are see­ing today, but it could become more impor­tant.

TP: What advice would you give peo­ple try­ing to get a clear­er pic­ture of what is real­ly dri­ving com­pet­ing regional/national and glob­al inter­ests?

JB: I think the sit­u­a­tion is slight­ly dif­fer­ent in Europe than in North Amer­i­ca.

In Europe, the lack of qual­i­ty alter­na­tive media and real inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ism makes it dif­fi­cult to find bal­anced infor­ma­tion. The sit­u­a­tion is dif­fer­ent in North Amer­i­ca where alter­na­tive jour­nal­ism is more devel­oped and con­sti­tutes an indis­pens­able ana­lyt­i­cal tool. In the Unit­ed States, the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty is more present in the media than in Europe.

I prob­a­bly could not have writ­ten my book based only on the Euro­pean media. At the end of the day, the advice I would give is a fun­da­men­tal one of intel­li­gence work:

Be curi­ous!

TP: Thank you so very much for your time—and for all your great work.

Discussion

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