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“Political language…is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”
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EVERYTHING MR. EMORY HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT THE UKRAINE WAR IS ENCAPSULATED IN THIS VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24
ANOTHER REVEALING VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24
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FTR#1253 This program was recorded in one, 60-minute segment.
Albatross
Introduction: This program continues analysis of the “Pandemics, Inc.” consortium of Metabiota, EcoHealth Alliance, In-Q-Tel and Munich Re.
We note that Andrew C. Weber–a key executive of Metabiota–had an interesting background: ” . . . . He joined Metabiota in February 2016 as Head of Global Partnerships in the Government Business Unit. . . . He served until October 2014 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs. . . .”
Weber was in that post at Metabiota when, in October of 2016, Metabiota initiated its projects in Ukraine.
Next, the program reviews an excerpting of a Wired Magazine article about the Metabiota/Munich Reinsurance project.
Bear in mind that In-Q-Tel, the venture capital arm of the CIA and the intelligence community, is greasing the wheels of this project with financing.
We highlight two key points of information:
- The business success of the pandemic insurance would necessarily incorporate analysis of the “fear factor” of potential pandemic pathogens: ” . . . . As sophisticated as Metabiota’s system was, however, it would need to be even more refined to incorporate into an insurance policy. The model would need to capture something much more difficult to quantify than historical deaths and medical stockpiles: fear. The economic consequences of a scourge, the historical data showed, were as much a result of society’s response as they were to the virus itself. . . . The Sentiment Index was built to be, as Oppenheim put it, ‘a catalog of dread.’ For any given pathogen, it could spit out a score from 0 to 100 according to how frightening the public would find it. . . . Madhav and her team, along with Wolfe and Oppenheim, also researched the broader economic consequences of disease outbreaks, measured in the ‘cost per death prevented’ incurred by societal interventions. ‘Measures that decreased person-to-person contact, including social distancing, quarantine, and school closures, had the greatest cost per death prevented, most likely because of the amount of economic disruption caused by those measures,’ they wrote in a 2018 paper. . . .”
- More sinister, still, is the fact that Metabiota had analyzed the scenario of a novel coronavirus pandemic two years before it happened. This appears to be the 2018 paper referred to above. Do not fail to note that, at the time that Metabiota was running this scenario, they were partnered with EcoHealth Alliance, which was using Pentagon and USAID money to research and perform gain-of-function on these types of coronaviruses!! ” . . . . As the human and economic devastation multiplied in tandem across the globe, Metabiota’s employees suddenly found themselves living inside their own model’s projections. Just two years earlier, the company had run a large set of scenarios forecasting the consequences of a novel coronavirus spreading around the globe. . . .”
Next, we review aspects of important article presents depth on a number of overlapping considerations about biological warfare, the Covid “op” and the Ukraine war.
Of particular importance, here, is H5N1’s potential significance of the In-Q-Tel, Metabiota, Munich Re pandemic insurance consortium.
In addition to the H5N1’s real or potential impact on businesses involved with one aspect or another of commercial poultry, the possibility that a weaponized/zoonotic mutation of the virus could spawn a devastating human pandemic could be a major driver of “fear” and the willingness of businesses to purchase pandemic insurance.
Key Points of Analysis and Discussion Include:
- ” . . . . The emergence of the virus in 1997 in Hong Kong was eerily predicted by Kennedy Shortridge, the scientist who would discover it. H5N1 didn’t infect humans until Shortridge and his colleagues had been studying its human infection potential in their labs for several years. At the time, the natural leap of a flu directly from poultry to humans was so improbable that scientists first suspected that it was the result of contamination from Shortridge’s lab. . . .”
- Normally, H5N1 human infections are extremely rare: ” . . . . H5N1 hardly ever infects people. News about highly pathogenic avian influenza usually leads with how deadly it is. Rarely is it mentioned that the disease hardly ever infects people. H5N1 kills more than half of the people who get it, but H5N1 has circled the globe for decades and there have only ever been 860 human infections worldwide. . . .”
- More about how rare human infections are and the rise of avian infections in 2022: ” . . . . There has never been an H5N1 pandemic and no human infectionwith H5N1 bird flu has ever been identified in the U.S. That’s an extraordinary safety record, given how filthy U.S. factory farms and slaughterhouses are and how fast the infection spreads among crowded birds. So far in 2022, 29 states have reported outbreaks of bird flu in 213 flocks resulting in the culling of nearly 31 million birds, including almost 5 percent of egg-laying hens. In 2015, it was even worse with 50 million birds culled, but there wasn’t a single human case. . . .”
- ” . . . . Anthony Fauci has made significant investments in gain-of-function research to give H5N1 pandemic potential, making it easily transmissible from person to person—and Bill Gates chipped in, too! . . .”
- ” . . . . In February 2006, Fauci convened a one-day in-house ‘NIAID Influenza Research Summit’ to identify influenza research priorities. In September, he opened up the topic to a 35-member ‘Blue Ribbon Panel on Influenza Research’ that included Fouchier and Kawaoka. The Blue Ribbon panel’s report doesn’t mention gain-of-function experiments, but Fauci gave them grants to do just that. [Ron] Fouchier and [Yoshihiro] Kawaoka’s now infamous gain-of-function research showed that, through lab manipulation, H5N1 could be altered to become highly transmissible among humans via airborne infection. . . .”
- ” . . . . The first human H5N1 outbreak occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, the year of what the British call the ‘Hong Kong handover,’ when sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred from the U.K. to China. It was during this ‘politically sensitive’ year that Kennedy Shortridge, an Australian scientist who was the director of the World Health Organization’s reference laboratory at the University of Hong Kong, confirmed human cases of highly pathogenic bird flu. . . .”
- ” . . . .The 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 virus was unique in every respect. Time magazine reported, ‘On the H gene at a point called the cleavage site, [was] found a telltale mutation, the same kind of mutation found in other highly pathogenic avian viruses. …The virus … had regions that were identical to portions of [an] avian virus that struck Pennsylvania [chickens] in 1983.” The L.A. Times reported, ‘The H5 piece came from a virus in a goose. The N1 piece came from a second virus in a quail. The remaining flu genes came from a third virus, also in quail.’ . . . .”
- ” . . . . Shortridge had been studying how avian influenza viruses spread to humans since 1975. Prior to discovering H5N1, Shortridge eerily predicted its emergence. As Frank Ching reported in ‘Bird Flu, SARS and Beyond’: As early as 1982, Shortridge had labeled southern China, where humans and domestic animals lived in close proximity, ‘an epicenter for the origin of pandemics.’ Ten years later, he called southern China a ‘virus soup’ and warned that pandemic influenza was a zoonosis, that is, it could be transmitted from animals to humans and, in 1995, he warned that influenza in southern China could not properly be called an ’emerging’ infection because it was constantly lurking. ‘Elusive might be more apt,’ he wrote. . . .”
- ” . . . . An example of Shortridge’s penchant for such predictions is his 1995 Lancet article “The next pandemic influenza virus?” Curiously, H5N1 emerged two years later, in 1997, in the same city where Shortridge worked, Hong Kong. . . .”
- ” . . . . At the time, the natural leap of a flu directly from poultry to humans was thought to be so unlikely that scientists first suspected contamination from Shortridge’s lab was the cause of the highly improbable H5N1 diagnosis. How would that contamination happen unless Shortridge hadn’t already been working with H5N1 in the lab? . . .”
- ” . . . . H5N1 didn’t cause disease in humans until this potential had been studied in a lab for several years. Fauci had been funding Kawaoka and Fouchier’s efforts to get bird flu to leap to humans since 1990 and their work was connected to what Shortridge was doing in Hong Kong. For seven years prior to the first human H5N1 outbreak in 1997, Fauci had been funding Kawaoka’s gain-of-function bird flu research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and Kawaoka’s mentor there, Robert G. Webster, was working and publishing with Shortridge. Every year, Webster spent three months working with Shortridge at the University of Hong Kong, according to this profile of Webster which mentions Kawaoka as his protege. . . .”
- ” . . . . The most eerie connection between Shortridge and Webster’s labs is that the closest known relative of the 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 was the avian virus that struck Pennsylvania chickens in 1983—that Yoshihiro Kawaoka had studied. According to Time magazine: Webster assigned a young scientist, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, to try to figure out how the [1983] virus transformed itself into such a ‘hot’ pathogen. Kawaoka, now a professor of virology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, compared the genetic structure of viruses from the first and second waves and found only a single, extremely subtle change in the H gene. The two viruses differed by just one nucleotide–one of 1,700 nucleotides that made up the gene. . . .”
- “. . . . There’s also a connection to Fouchier, through his mentor at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Jan De Jong, also a colleague and collaborator of Shortridge and Webster’s. . . .”
- ” . . . . Kawaoka’s colleague and mentor Robert G. Webster and Fouchier’s colleague and mentor Jan De Jong were the first scientists outside of Hong Kong to receive samples of the 1997 H5N1 flu from Shortridge’s lab. . . .”
- ” . . . . De Jong is often credited with being the one who identified the 1997 Hong Kong flu as H5N1, but he did so with ‘a panel of reagents to every type of flu strain yet known’ that had been brought from Webster’s lab in Memphis to the National Influenza Centre in Rotterdam. . . .”
- ” . . . . Kawaoka and Fouchier are of post-Biological Weapons Convention era where the weaponization of pathogens is euphemistically called ‘gain-of-function’ research, but their older colleagues, De Jong, Shortridge and Webster came of age prior to 1972 and their mentors were of the pre-Biological Weapons Convention era when virologists knowingly and openly engineered viruses for military purposes. . . .”
- ” . . . . Shortridge and Webster were trained by Frank Macfarlane Burnet who served on the Australian Department of Defence’s New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee in the 1940s and 50s. The Federation of American Scientists lists some of the most chilling things Burnet recommended: Burnet … said Australia should develop biological weapons that would work in tropical Asia without spreading to Australia’s more temperate population centres. . . .”
- Burnet’s observations: ” . . . . ‘Specifically to the Australian situation, the most effective counter-offensive to threatened invasion by overpopulated Asiatic countries would be directed towards the destruction by biological or chemical means of tropical food crops and the dissemination of infectious disease capable of spreading in tropical but not under Australian conditions.’ . . .”
- The broadcast notes a frightening relationship between Metabiota and the selection of Philip Zelikow to head a commission to determine the origin of Covid-19: ” . . . . In 2008, Google.org committed $30 million to virus hunting and gain-of-function research on potential pandemic pathogens through a project it called Predict and Prevent. At least $5.5 million of that went to Dr. Nathan Wolfe’s non-profit Global Viral Forecasting Initiative, which was soon to become the for-profit Metabiota. Other GVFI funders at the time included the Skoll Foundation, which also gave $5.5 million, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Merck Research Laboratories and the US Department of Defense. . . .”
- ” . . . . When the GVFI became the for-profit Metabiota, Google Ventures continued to invest. In addition, it created a business partnership with Metabiota, ‘offering its big-data expertise to help the company serve its customers–insurers, government agencies and other organizations–by offering them forecasting and risk-management tools.’ In other words, they sell pandemic insurance. . . .”
- “. . . . Now that Metabiota has gotten caught up in the COVID origins scandal, its original investors, Eric Schmidt of Google, Jeffrey Skoll of EBay, Rajiv Shah of The Rockefeller Foundation (formerly USAID director, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) chipped in to fund the COVID Commission Planning Group, a white-wash led by Philip Zelikow who gave us the 9–11 Commission cover-up. . . .”
- In past programs, we have noted that David Franz, former head of the U.S.A.M.R.I.I.D at Fort Detrick was a key advisor to EcoHealthAlliance. Franz helped produce the encapsulated, weapons-grade anthrax used in the 2001 anthrax attacks: ” . . . . One of Metabiota’s PREDICT partners is EcoHealth Alliance, whose science and policy advisor, David Franz, produced the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks while working for Southern Research and partnering with scientists at Battelle. . . .”
The program concludes with discussion of Munich Re’s deep political association with the Third Reich, both in its initial, above-ground phase and in its role as a critical element of the remarkable, lethal Bormann capital association.
1. We note that Andrew C. Weber–a key executive of Metabiota–had an interesting background: ” . . . . He joined Metabiota in February 2016 as Head of Global Partnerships in the Government Business Unit. . . . He served until October 2014 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs. . . .”
Weber was in that post at Metabiota when, in October of 2016, Metabiota initiated its projects in Ukraine.
. . . . The Honorable Andrew C. Weber is a non-resident senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He joined Metabiota in February 2016 as Head of Global Partnerships in the Government Business Unit. Mr. Weber served thirty years in the US Government, most recently as the Deputy Coordinator for Ebola Response at the U.S. Department of State. He served until October 2014 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs. . . .
2. Next, the program reviews an excerpting of a Wired Magazine article about the Metabiota/Munich Reinsurance project.
Bear in mind that In-Q-Tel, the venture capital arm of the CIA and the intelligence community, is greasing the wheels of this project with financing.
We highlight two key points of information:
- The business success of the pandemic insurance would necessarily incorporate analysis of the “fear factor” of potential pandemic pathogens: ” . . . . As sophisticated as Metabiota’s system was, however, it would need to be even more refined to incorporate into an insurance policy. The model would need to capture something much more difficult to quantify than historical deaths and medical stockpiles: fear. The economic consequences of a scourge, the historical data showed, were as much a result of society’s response as they were to the virus itself. . . . The Sentiment Index was built to be, as Oppenheim put it, ‘a catalog of dread.’ For any given pathogen, it could spit out a score from 0 to 100 according to how frightening the public would find it. . . . Madhav and her team, along with Wolfe and Oppenheim, also researched the broader economic consequences of disease outbreaks, measured in the ‘cost per death prevented’ incurred by societal interventions. ‘Measures that decreased person-to-person contact, including social distancing, quarantine, and school closures, had the greatest cost per death prevented, most likely because of the amount of economic disruption caused by those measures,’ they wrote in a 2018 paper. . . .”
- More sinister, still, is the fact that Metabiota had analyzed the scenario of a novel coronavirus pandemic two years before it happened. This appears to be the 2018 paper referred to above. Do not fail to note that, at the time that Metabiota was running this scenario, they were partnered with EcoHealth Alliance, which was using Pentagon and USAID money to research and perform gain-of-function on these types of coronaviruses!! ” . . . . As the human and economic devastation multiplied in tandem across the globe, Metabiota’s employees suddenly found themselves living inside their own model’s projections. Just two years earlier, the company had run a large set of scenarios forecasting the consequences of a novel coronavirus spreading around the globe. . . .”
“We Can Protect the Economy From Pandemics. Why Didn’t We?” by Evan Ratliff; Wired; 06/16/2020
3. Next, we review aspects of important article presents depth on a number of overlapping considerations about biological warfare, the Covid “op” and the Ukraine war.
Of particular importance, here, is H5N1’s potential significance of the In-Q-Tel, Metabiota, Munich Re pandemic insurance consortium.
In addition to the H5N1’s real or potential impact on businesses involved with one aspect or another of commercial poultry, the possibility that a weaponized/zoonotic mutation of the virus could spawn a devastating human pandemic could be a major driver of “fear” and the willingness of businesses to purchase pandemic insurance.
Key Points of Analysis and Discussion Include:
- ” . . . . The emergence of the virus in 1997 in Hong Kong was eerily predicted by Kennedy Shortridge, the scientist who would discover it. H5N1 didn’t infect humans until Shortridge and his colleagues had been studying its human infection potential in their labs for several years. At the time, the natural leap of a flu directly from poultry to humans was so improbable that scientists first suspected that it was the result of contamination from Shortridge’s lab. . . .”
- Normally, H5N1 human infections are extremely rare: ” . . . . H5N1 hardly ever infects people. News about highly pathogenic avian influenza usually leads with how deadly it is. Rarely is it mentioned that the disease hardly ever infects people. H5N1 kills more than half of the people who get it, but H5N1 has circled the globe for decades and there have only ever been 860 human infections worldwide. . . .”
- More about how rare human infections are and the rise of avian infections in 2022: ” . . . . There has never been an H5N1 pandemic and no human infectionwith H5N1 bird flu has ever been identified in the U.S. That’s an extraordinary safety record, given how filthy U.S. factory farms and slaughterhouses are and how fast the infection spreads among crowded birds. So far in 2022, 29 states have reported outbreaks of bird flu in 213 flocks resulting in the culling of nearly 31 million birds, including almost 5 percent of egg-laying hens. In 2015, it was even worse with 50 million birds culled, but there wasn’t a single human case. . . .”
- ” . . . . Anthony Fauci has made significant investments in gain-of-function research to give H5N1 pandemic potential, making it easily transmissible from person to person—and Bill Gates chipped in, too! . . .”
- ” . . . . In February 2006, Fauci convened a one-day in-house ‘NIAID Influenza Research Summit’ to identify influenza research priorities. In September, he opened up the topic to a 35-member ‘Blue Ribbon Panel on Influenza Research’ that included Fouchier and Kawaoka. The Blue Ribbon panel’s report doesn’t mention gain-of-function experiments, but Fauci gave them grants to do just that. [Ron] Fouchier and [Yoshihiro] Kawaoka’s now infamous gain-of-function research showed that, through lab manipulation, H5N1 could be altered to become highly transmissible among humans via airborne infection. . . .”
- ” . . . . The first human H5N1 outbreak occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, the year of what the British call the ‘Hong Kong handover,’ when sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred from the U.K. to China. It was during this ‘politically sensitive’ year that Kennedy Shortridge, an Australian scientist who was the director of the World Health Organization’s reference laboratory at the University of Hong Kong, confirmed human cases of highly pathogenic bird flu. . . .”
- ” . . . .The 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 virus was unique in every respect. Time magazine reported, ‘On the H gene at a point called the cleavage site, [was] found a telltale mutation, the same kind of mutation found in other highly pathogenic avian viruses. …The virus … had regions that were identical to portions of [an] avian virus that struck Pennsylvania [chickens] in 1983.” The L.A. Times reported, ‘The H5 piece came from a virus in a goose. The N1 piece came from a second virus in a quail. The remaining flu genes came from a third virus, also in quail.’ . . . .”
- ” . . . . Shortridge had been studying how avian influenza viruses spread to humans since 1975. Prior to discovering H5N1, Shortridge eerily predicted its emergence. As Frank Ching reported in ‘Bird Flu, SARS and Beyond’: As early as 1982, Shortridge had labeled southern China, where humans and domestic animals lived in close proximity, ‘an epicenter for the origin of pandemics.’ Ten years later, he called southern China a ‘virus soup’ and warned that pandemic influenza was a zoonosis, that is, it could be transmitted from animals to humans and, in 1995, he warned that influenza in southern China could not properly be called an ’emerging’ infection because it was constantly lurking. ‘Elusive might be more apt,’ he wrote. . . .”
- ” . . . . An example of Shortridge’s penchant for such predictions is his 1995 Lancet article “The next pandemic influenza virus?” Curiously, H5N1 emerged two years later, in 1997, in the same city where Shortridge worked, Hong Kong. . . .”
- ” . . . . At the time, the natural leap of a flu directly from poultry to humans was thought to be so unlikely that scientists first suspected contamination from Shortridge’s lab was the cause of the highly improbable H5N1 diagnosis. How would that contamination happen unless Shortridge hadn’t already been working with H5N1 in the lab? . . .”
- ” . . . . H5N1 didn’t cause disease in humans until this potential had been studied in a lab for several years. Fauci had been funding Kawaoka and Fouchier’s efforts to get bird flu to leap to humans since 1990 and their work was connected to what Shortridge was doing in Hong Kong. For seven years prior to the first human H5N1 outbreak in 1997, Fauci had been funding Kawaoka’s gain-of-function bird flu research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and Kawaoka’s mentor there, Robert G. Webster, was working and publishing with Shortridge. Every year, Webster spent three months working with Shortridge at the University of Hong Kong, according to this profile of Webster which mentions Kawaoka as his protege. . . .”
- ” . . . . The most eerie connection between Shortridge and Webster’s labs is that the closest known relative of the 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 was the avian virus that struck Pennsylvania chickens in 1983—that Yoshihiro Kawaoka had studied. According to Time magazine: Webster assigned a young scientist, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, to try to figure out how the [1983] virus transformed itself into such a ‘hot’ pathogen. Kawaoka, now a professor of virology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, compared the genetic structure of viruses from the first and second waves and found only a single, extremely subtle change in the H gene. The two viruses differed by just one nucleotide–one of 1,700 nucleotides that made up the gene. . . .”
- “. . . . There’s also a connection to Fouchier, through his mentor at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Jan De Jong, also a colleague and collaborator of Shortridge and Webster’s. . . .”
- ” . . . . Kawaoka’s colleague and mentor Robert G. Webster and Fouchier’s colleague and mentor Jan De Jong were the first scientists outside of Hong Kong to receive samples of the 1997 H5N1 flu from Shortridge’s lab. . . .”
- ” . . . . De Jong is often credited with being the one who identified the 1997 Hong Kong flu as H5N1, but he did so with ‘a panel of reagents to every type of flu strain yet known’ that had been brought from Webster’s lab in Memphis to the National Influenza Centre in Rotterdam. . . .”
- ” . . . . Kawaoka and Fouchier are of post-Biological Weapons Convention era where the weaponization of pathogens is euphemistically called ‘gain-of-function’ research, but their older colleagues, De Jong, Shortridge and Webster came of age prior to 1972 and their mentors were of the pre-Biological Weapons Convention era when virologists knowingly and openly engineered viruses for military purposes. . . .”
- ” . . . . Shortridge and Webster were trained by Frank Macfarlane Burnet who served on the Australian Department of Defence’s New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee in the 1940s and 50s. The Federation of American Scientists lists some of the most chilling things Burnet recommended: Burnet … said Australia should develop biological weapons that would work in tropical Asia without spreading to Australia’s more temperate population centres. . . .”
- Burnet’s observations: ” . . . . ‘Specifically to the Australian situation, the most effective counter-offensive to threatened invasion by overpopulated Asiatic countries would be directed towards the destruction by biological or chemical means of tropical food crops and the dissemination of infectious disease capable of spreading in tropical but not under Australian conditions.’ . . .”
- The broadcast notes a frightening relationship between Metabiota and the selection of Philip Zelikow to head a commission to determine the origin of Covid-19: ” . . . . In 2008, Google.org committed $30 million to virus hunting and gain-of-function research on potential pandemic pathogens through a project it called Predict and Prevent. At least $5.5 million of that went to Dr. Nathan Wolfe’s non-profit Global Viral Forecasting Initiative, which was soon to become the for-profit Metabiota. Other GVFI funders at the time included the Skoll Foundation, which also gave $5.5 million, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Merck Research Laboratories and the US Department of Defense. . . .”
- ” . . . . When the GVFI became the for-profit Metabiota, Google Ventures continued to invest. In addition, it created a business partnership with Metabiota, ‘offering its big-data expertise to help the company serve its customers–insurers, government agencies and other organizations–by offering them forecasting and risk-management tools.’ In other words, they sell pandemic insurance. . . .”
- “. . . . Now that Metabiota has gotten caught up in the COVID origins scandal, its original investors, Eric Schmidt of Google, Jeffrey Skoll of EBay, Rajiv Shah of The Rockefeller Foundation (formerly USAID director, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) chipped in to fund the COVID Commission Planning Group, a white-wash led by Philip Zelikow who gave us the 9–11 Commission cover-up. . . .”
- In past programs, we have noted that David Franz, former head of the U.S.A.M.R.I.I.D at Fort Detrick was a key advisor to EcoHealthAlliance. Franz helped produce the encapsulated, weapons-grade anthrax used in the 2001 anthrax attacks: ” . . . . One of Metabiota’s PREDICT partners is EcoHealth Alliance, whose science and policy advisor, David Franz, produced the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks while working for Southern Research and partnering with scientists at Battelle. . . .”
4a. The program concludes with discussion of Munich Re’s deep political association with the Third Reich, both in its initial, above-ground phase and in its role as a critical element of the remarkable, lethal Bormann capital association.
. . . . The Munich Reinsurance Company had already penetrated France before 1939 through the Societe Anonyme de Reassurance de Paris. . . .
. . . . There was also the important German reinsurance firm of El Fenix Sudamericano Cia. de Reaseguros S.A., an affiliate of the Munich Reinsurance Company. All South American big business came to depend on El Fenix as the principal reinsurers of commerce and industry in Latin America. . . .
4b. In FTR#511, we highlighted the role of Munich Re in the devastating espionage that cost the lives of a large percentage of the Merchant Marine seamen sailing the North Atlantic during World War II.
. . . . On a bleak night in February 1945 I found myself standing with my small party of investigators in the mist at the Washington airport, waiting to take off. As I stood in the gloom, observing all the security measures that shrouded our routine departure-the blackout of the field and plane, the silence, the sudden orders — I remembered our discovery earlier in the war of how easily the “secrecy” of ship sailings had been penetrated by the Germans.
In 1940, 1941 and 1942, ships leaving American seaports had had the same security measures to protect their departure. Yet many of their broken hulls and water-soaked cargoes had washed up onto the beaches of New Jersey, Virginia and the Carolinas, where German submarines had spotted them within sight of shore. In case after case, every man on board had been marked before the captain opened his orders. Though they may not have known it, the cargoes they carried were reinsured with Munich. The routine system of placing insurance had put precise information on their sailing date and destination in the hands of the Germans before the ship left port.
In the summer of 1941, before there was any Economic Warfare Section, several trust busters discovered that while the American public was looking more and more askance at German business connections, insurance companies doing an international business seemed to have no such doubts about their foreign commitments. Insurers of large risks, such as ships, cargoes, and industrial plants, customarily spread the risk among other companies willing to take fractional shares. The big insurance and reinsurance companies in the United States which handle the largest risks have such treaties on an international basis, through arrangements with the Lloyd’s group in England, or with the Zurich group in Switzerland. It had long been the custom of the American companies to place the reinsurance on ships and cargoes with the Zurich group by cabling information to them so that they could accept responsibility for a share of the American insurer’s risk.
The information cabled would include the name of the ship, the sailing date, the cargo carried, the destination, and the value of the insured property. One detail that should have raised someone’s eyebrow, but did not until the government stepped in, was the fact that the Zurich group in turn had a reinsurance treaty with the Munich reinsurance pool in Germany. The result was that during 1940 and early 1941, by the time a ship had cleared New York or Baltimore harbor headed for a European port, the German intelligence service already had the sailing data in hand.
When men from the Department of Justice called a conference of insurance representatives, the companies agreed to stop sending such information by cable. But even then no one realized what an efficient pipeline the Germans had set up. It appeared later that everyone concerned, both government officials and insurance men, assumed that sending the information by mail to Switzerland would be perfectly all right. Nothing was said about stopping completely the transmission of reinsurance information. In the spring of 1942, after we had started to set up the Economic Warfare Section, we found that reinsurance information sheets, or “bordereaux,” were still going to Switzerland by mail.
We also discovered that the reinsurance business, far from being confined to ships and cargoes, also covered industrial plants, and more especially those very large new plants being built for war production, the ones with security guards at the gates to see that no unauthorized eyes got inside. In the case of industrial plants, we found that the reinsurance bordereaux did not account for the full extent of the leakage. The usual reinsurance treaty on such risks provides that the reinsurance group has the right to demand copies of a full report by the insurance inspector. This includes blueprints of the installation, description of the fire hazards and risks, and inventory of the contents of the buildings, room by room. We found that, before 1938, the Zurich group had asked for the full insurance inspector’s report in only 5 or 6 per cent of the cases. After 1938, the full report was requested with increasing frequency, until the percentage was closer to 8o.
It had seemed obvious to us that the government ought to stop this transmission of shipping and industrial information through Switzerland to the Reich. Unlike the United States, the German government as early as 1936 had closed off such information about Germany. As soon as the Germans occupied France, Belgium, and Holland in 1940 they put a stop to all such transmissions from those countries. We proposed to have the Attorney General send a letter to each company warning that transmission of marine and industrial plant information of this type came within the scope of the Espionage Act. Issuance of such a letter in the name of the Attorney General, however, required approval by the Solicitor General, Charles Fahy. Mr. Fahy would not take this responsibility without consulting the other interested departments of the government. At first, no one could believe that Americans were handing the German intelligence service information on a silver platter. At one of Mr. Fahy’s interdepartmental meetings, Joseph Borkin, then of the Antitrust Division, slapped down on the table a stack of insurance inspectors’ reports on various prominent buildings. He had purchased these from sources open to anyone in the insurance business without any special “security” clearance. For fifty-five cents he had the plans of the White House, showing the location of fire extinguishers and other protective apparatus. For seventy-five cents he had the plans of a large new magnesium plant. One of the blueprints had an arrow pointing at a valve, with the legend: “Under no circumstances must this valve be closed while the plant is in operation, as an explosion would result.” To complete our case, we had obtained from the Office of Censorship copies of insurance bordereaux photographed from the current week’s mail destined for Switzerland. . . .
Uncle Sam and Il Duce
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