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FTR#1299 This program was recorded in one, 60-minute segment.
Introduction: A welcome return to our airwaves of Lucy Komisar features her characteristically incisive analysis of an Oscar-winning documentary about Alexei Navalny, the West’s “Baskin Robbins Flavor of the Month” in the Russian political domain.
Supported by characteristically selective coverage by Western journalistic and political elements, Alexei Navalny has demonstrated proto-fascistic tendencies and is more of a propaganda phenomenon than a real political leader.
In this program, we present Lucy’s analysis of the Navalny documentary, including her thoughts concerning possible intelligence connections to the documentary’s production and a quasi-McCarthyite response to her probing questions.
Q On March 12, the film “Navalny” won an Oscar. It previously won a Bafta award in the UK. But your story proves the film is a fake, disinformation. Give us the background to the making of the film. What is the film about? Who are its authors? Who really is Navalny?
A It is about Russian political activist Alexei Navalny, who the west charges, with no evidence, was poisoned with Novichok by Russian security agents, was allowed by Russia to fly to Germany for hospital care, and when he returned to Russia was arrested.
The three people credited as the production’s authors are
Canadian Daniel Roher; he admits he has never visited Russia nor speaks Russian.
Bulgarian Christo Grozev of Bellingcat; an organization openly hostile to Russia which acknowledges financing by governments of the U.S, UK and Europe.
And Russian Maria Pevchikh; who has worked for Navalny’s organization but has lived mostly outside Russia since 2006 and in 2019 obtained a British passport.
The investigation was done by Bellingcat, though Roher is claimed as the filmmaker.
Q Tell us more about Navalny.
He has strong Washington ties. Navalny was a 2009–2010 fellow of the Open Society Foundations financed by George Soros, which supported opposition NGOs in Russia before being banned in 2015. Then in 2010, he graduated from the Yale World Fellows which was called the White House Fellows under Bill Clinton’s presidency.
When Navalny returned from the U.S. to Russia he continued the “nationalist” ie. racist anti-migrant activities he had started in 2007, when he was a founder of the National Russian Liberation Movement . NAROD included the Movement Against Illegal Immigration , a far-right organization. In addition to opposing illegal immigration, it targeted Russians from ethnic, religious, and sexual minority backgrounds. It provided assistance to Nazi skinheads implicated in attacks on foreigners, representatives of sexual minorities, anti-fascists and adherents of “non-traditional religions.”
In a video, Navalny compares people from the Caucuses to cockroaches, and says that using a swatter or a shoe against them was no good. He said “I recommend a handgun.” My article includes a link to the video on YouTube.
Navalny’s NAROD stopped operating in 2011, the year the Supreme Court of Russia declared its partner an extremist organization and banned it. Navalny said NAROD “organizationally failed” but formulated a “very correct platform.”
Director Roher says in the film that, “he was known for having flirted with the extreme right.” “Flirted?” It looked like a pretty solid marriage! In the film, Navalny says we are creating coalition, broader coalition to fight their regime…And I consider it’s my political superpower, I can talk to everyone. Anyway, well, they are citizen of Russian Federation.”
When Navalny returned to Russia, he also started an anti-corruption campaign, which was endorsed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Q was he really an anti-corruption fighter?
A No, he had his own criminal fraud problem, along with his brother Oleg.
In 2008, when the state-owned Russian Post decided to end collecting parcels from clients’ distribution centers, Oleg Navalny, persuaded several companies to shift to the privately owned Chief Subscription Agency (GPA), not revealing it was a company he, Alexei and their parents had just set up in tax haven Cyprus. Later, Yves Rocher Vostok, part of the French cosmetics firm, sued that they were deprived of free choice and weren’t told GPA was using subcontractors which charged around half as much as they paid GPA and that the Navalny cut-out kept the difference as profit. A court gave Alexei a suspended sentence of 3 ½ years and his brother a prison sentence of the same term.
The European Court on Human Rights found, “By all accounts, GPA was set up for profit-making purposes and the applicants thus pursued the same goal as any other founder of a commercial entity.” So, in spite of questionable insider tricks, the European court deemed it no crime, because that is how business is done. But it was still an ethics problem for the “fighter against corruption,” because some people think that making money off such insider dealing is unethical.
Although the plaintiff Yves Rocher was part of a French company, which sued for damages in France, Western media depicted the trial as a sham instigated by President Vladimir Putin and didn’t report the full details of the case. Navalny’s violation of his conviction parole by failing to return to Russia as soon as he had recovered his health in Germany were the grounds for his arrest on January 17, 2021, and his subsequent court sentence to prison, where he remains. U.S. court rules for parole violations would not be different.
Q Navalny claimed to be an opposition leader. Was he?
A Washington was pumping Navalny as an opposition leader, but was not so popular in Russia. According to the respected Levada Poll, he was drawing no more than 2% among Russians countrywide – less in the regions, more among the young in Moscow.
Q How did this new poisoning drama start?
A On August 20th, winding up a campaign in southeastern Siberia, Navalny got on the flight from Tomsk to Moscow and fell ill. On the pilot’s decision, the aircraft made an unscheduled landing in Omsk, and Navalny was taken to a city hospital. The emergency ward staff treated his symptoms and stabilized his condition. A medical evacuation aircraft arrived from Germany the next day after Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, received Kremlin permission for his treatment in Germany, and he was flown from Omsk to Berlin August 22, with Navalnaya and Pevchikh accompanying him on the flight.
Q The west press immediately said “poisoning.” Were there other explanations for his illness.
A Navalny has had a history of medical conditions known to reflect the sudden reduction in blood sugar and cholinesterase levels – diabetes and allergies leading to anaphylactic shock. This information, which had been reported in Russia and by Navalny sources well before the Tomsk incident, was not make public after his arrival in Germany. According to IntelliNews, a business website published in Berlin, “Navalny said himself that he suffered from diabetes in 2019.”
Q Who invented the claims that Russian intelligence agents had poisoned Navalny?
That was Bellingcat, the US/UK/EU funded organization which writes articles that support their lines against their targeted adversaries. It was picked up by CNN and became the essence of the film.
Let’s get to the fabrications at the heart of the film. There’s a long section about how Christo Grozev, identified as working for Bellingcat, buys travel and contact data on the Darknet to find the names and phone numbers of Federal Security Service (FSB) agents who had been traveling on planes to Siberia in August of 2020. There is no way to verify that the charts and faces substantiate what Grozev and Bellingcat say they prove.In fact, CNN reported December 14, 2020, “CNN cannot confirm with certainty that it was the unit based at Akademika Vargi Street that (they say) poisoned Navalny with Novichok on the night of August 19.”
So that is already proved a fake charge.
Q What about the Great Phone Call Hoax?
A The real test of the veracity of the film, the “smoking gun” to which everything is leading, is the great telephone call hoax.
Those who made the film have understood the psychology of manipulating audiences. Slowly you bring them into a secret scam to be played on the bad guys. In this one, it starts with Navalny putting on a body mike. Why? He is not going somewhere to secretly record someone. Only his own team is in the room. The real recording microphone is off camera, where the film audience can’t see it.
But the body mike is a special effect, it’s a dramatist’s stage trick. My article links to the clip. Navalny speaks to the camera: “Now I’m totally feel like I’m an undercover agent, with the wired up.” Does the audience know they are the butt of a theatrical joke?
Q who does he call?
A First Navalny allegedly calls three “FSB” agents. He says to each of them, “I am Navalny; why do, you want to kill me?” And the fake people hang up. The voices are not real, they sound the same – either computer generated or acted by a professional mimic. What is the point of that? To get the audience in on the game.
But then there’s his famous call to the security services scientist.
Navalny declares (as translated), “Konstantin Borisovich, hello my name is Ustinov Maxim Sergeyevich. I am Nikolay Platonovich’s assistant.” He says, “I need ten minutes of your time …will probably ask you later for a report …but I am now making a report for Nikolay Platonovich … what went wrong with us in Tomsk…why did the Navalny operation fail?”
According to Bellingcat, (the real) Kudryavtsev worked at the Ministry of Defense biological security research center and is a specialist in chemical and biological weapons. Supposedly not stupid.
The talkative “Konstantin” says, “I would rate the job as well done. We did it just as planned, the way we rehearsed it many times. But when the flight made an emergency landing the situation changed, not in our favor….The medics on the ground acted right away. They injected him with an antidote of some sort. So, it seems the dose was underestimated. Our calculations were good, we even applied extra.”
Q Is there evidence such a call never took place.
A Pretty strong evidence Navalny was questioned by the Berlin Staatsanwaltschaft (District Attorney) on December 17, 2020. Did he tell them about the phone call to Konstantin Kudryavtsev, which allegedly took place 3 days earlier on December 14?
The office confirmed by email that it interrogated Navalny. But when I sent a link to Navalny’s claims about the December 14th “call” 3 days before and asked if he had told them about it, spokesman said they could not comment further.
Q what else suggests the film is a fake. You wrote about Novichok and conflicting dates and timing.
A First about the “poisoning.”
Yulia Navalnaya says in the film, “After a week I was unexpectedly called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” As the Navalny group arrived August 22, that would have been about August 29th. “They said we have discovered that your husband was poisoned with an agent from the Novichok group.”
But it was not the Charité lab that found this. The German Government announced not one week but two weeks after the group’s arrival that a laboratory of the German Armed Forces had identified a nerve agent from the Novichok group in blood samples collected after the patient’s admission to Charité.
Unlike the civilian doctors, who had not found Novichok, the military lab would not release details of its tests. There was no toxicology report, no name of the expert in charge of the testing and of the interpretation of the results, no name and formula of the chemical compound of the “Novichok group.” The Germans refused to send any medical or toxicological evidence they claimed to substantiate the attempted homicide to Moscow prosecutors investigating the crime. From then on, without evidence, the story became the West’s “Putin poisoned Navalny.”
Second, the story kept changing. First poison in poison in a tea cup at the airport café, then a water bottle in his hotel room, then underpants. In what form – powder, aerosolized spray, or gel? Was the FSB counting on Navalny not to notice or feel moisture as he dressed?
On the plane, Navalny fell ill, and the pilot diverted to Omsk, where he was transferred to a hospital. The calculated lethality of the dose should have been fatal after symptom onset. However, the first symptoms appeared only after several hours, and they remained non-lethal.
Q And what about the underpants?
A that gets to Kudryavtsev, who Navalny allegedly phoned.
CNN declares that “Kudryavtsev” flies from Moscow to Omsk on August 25, five days after the event, to take possession of Navalny’s clothes and “clean” them. But the FSB would have known of the diversion to Omsk August 20th. Would it have waited five days to send an agent there?
Were the underpants still considered dangerous? Did hospital workers who undressed Navalny get sick? Many people were exposed to Navalny and his deadly underpants, but not one has been reported to have fallen ill. The passengers who attended him in the plane and who flew on to Moscow have not reported medical problems.
The film “Kudryavtsev” voice says, “When we arrived [in Omsk], they gave [the underpants] to us, the local Omsk guys brought [them] with the police.” Did any police fall ill?
“Kudryavstev” says, “When we finished working on them everything was clean.” He explains that solutions were applied, “so that there were no traces left on the clothes. Navalny is shown in Berlin holding the underpants. Did the Omsk police ship the “decontaminated” item to Germany?
But there is conflicting information about whether Navalny’s underpants remained in Omsk.
Navalny’s press secretary Kira Yarmysh posted a tweet August 20, 2020 with the text: “Julia took Alexei’s things with her. She said that she did not allow them to be confiscated.” However, The Guardian reported September 21 that Navalny “demanded that Moscow return his clothes.” At any rate, the Charité Hospital said it did not test the water bottles or clothing.
Q This alleged poisoning took place August 20th. The phone call was December 14th. Is there a problem with that?
A of course there is. Most important is the date of the phone call.
Ronald Thomas West, who identifies as a U.S. Special Forces veteran working in Europe, writes,
West says, “ The poisoning happened on 20 August, the ‘hoax call’ is made on 14 December, and released by Bellingcat on 21 December. Now, wait a minute. The context of the call, a desperate demand for answers of what went wrong (Navalny didn’t die) for a report to higher up authority, is something you would expect within the first 48 hours, not nearly three months later. By the time this call was made, that dust should have settled and been vacuumed up by Russia’s intelligence services, everyone would have been debriefed by this time, including the target of the hoax call.”
This part can be cut out for time
The Trojan Horse
Maya Daisy Hawke, the film’s co-editor, makes an unusual admission on her website. She said “It’s the best thing I ever worked on; the highlight of my career,” and adds, “Navalny was a Trojan horse.” I emailed her and asked what she meant, pointing out that Merriam-Webster defines trojan horse as “someone or something intended to defeat or subvert from within usually by deceptive means.” She walked it back and said, “They were hastily chosen words on a personal social media post.” She declined further comment.
This part can be cut for time
The film supports an analysis of the Russian public that is fallacious.
An unidentified woman says, “What to do with Navalny presents a conundrum for the Kremlin, let him go and risk looking weak, or lock him up, knowing it could turn him into a political martyr.” A U.S. broadcast reporter says, “Unexpectedly, Vladimir Putin has a genuine challenger. More than any other opposition figure in Russia, Alexei Navalny gets ordinary people out to protest.”
However, Eric Kraus, a French financial strategist working in Moscow since 1997, explains, “Mr. Navalny was always a minor factor in Russia. He had a hard-core supporter base — Western-aspiring young people in Moscow and St. Petersburg — the ‘Facebook Generation.’ He was never much loved out in the sticks and could never have polled beyond 7% nationwide, even before the war. Ordinary Russians now increasingly see the West as the enemy. Navalny is seen as the agent of forces seeking to break or constrain Russia. Now, he would get closer to 2%.”
Kraus said, “He is the supreme political opportunist. In Moscow, speaking in English to an audience of Western fund managers and journalists, it is the squeaky clean, liberal Navalny. Full of free markets, diversity, and social justice. Hearing him a few months later out in Siberia, speaking in Russian, one encounters an entirely different animal – fiercely nationalistic, angry and somewhat racist – there, his slogan is “kick out the thieves” but especially “Russia for the ethnic Russians,” anyone without Slavic blood, especially immigrants from the Caucuses, are second-class citizens.”
This can be cut for time
Q You had a chance to go face to face with the filmmakers. What happened?
As a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, I was invited to a November 9, 2022 “Navalny” screening by CNN at 30 Hudson Yards in Manhattan.
In the talk-back, I asked a question. “My name is Lucy Komisar, and I’m an investigative journalist. I want to delve more into the Kudryavtsev story. Mr. Navalny was questioned by the prosecutor in Berlin on December 17th. And three days earlier was the phone call with Kudryavtsev. Did he tell the prosecutor about the phone call which I assume they would have to check the authenticity of, and what did they determine about him? He claims on the phone call he examined these things on August 25 …. But on August 20 ….” [In fact,“Kudryavtsev” didn’t give the August 25th date, Bellingcat did.]
LK: “[And] the press secretary said Alexei’s things were taken by Yulia before that, and she didn’t allow them to be seized. So how could they have been examined by this man after they were already taken away? And finally, the Berlin doctor said they didn’t detect any poisoning in Navalny’s blood, but two weeks later it was the German Armed Forces laboratory that said, yes[it did]
So, all these things I think are contradictory and I would like to know the facts of why these contradictions exist.”
Christo Grozev: replied: “Almost none of this was actually correct and including the sequence of events. I mean this was reactive and FSB officer on screen on recording that I made on my phone confessing to all of that.”
I said: “You said it’s him, but we don’t know it’s him.”
Grozev: “Well, I think the rest of the world knows and now okay. Be nice to know who you work for because….”
It was a Joe McCarthy question”
I went to the post-film reception and asked Roher if I could interview him. He screamed at me, Noooo! And accused me of working for the Russians.
I don’t think the Council on Foreign Relations part belongs. By now it’s already too long. And it’s a diversion.
And the winner is.....envelope to the deep state and its asset Bellingcat, with a shout out to Victoria Nuland and her acolyte Antony Blinken, plus the mainstream and soi-disant independent media for turning a blind eye to the film’s fabrications.
This film, feeding Russophobia, primes Americans to support Washington’s proxy war against Russia in Ukraine even with the danger of nuclear annihilation. That golden Oscar should be draped in black.
Regarding Lucy Komisar’s investigation into the alleged Novichok poisoning of Alexei Navalny and all of the evidence pointing towards a hoax (or a grossly misdiagnosed diabetes complication), it’s worth noting another highly anomalous detail we were given in all the coverage of Navalny’s poisoning: the whole poisoning experience was apparently pain-free. That’s literally what Navalny told reporters. Instead, as the poison took effect, he felt cold shivers initially and no pain, “but it felt like the end”. As he put it, “It doesn’t hurt at all, it’s not like a panic attack or some sort of upset. At the beginning you know something is wrong, and then really your only thought is: that’s it, I’m going to die.” Instead, the most negative symptom Navalny reports experiencing was powerful hallucinations later on in the hospital where he thought his legs were going to be amputated. Beyond that, Navalny was reporting difficulty sleeping but otherwise a quick recovery.
So is this ultra powerful nerve agent somehow pain free? Not according to the researchers actually familiar with Novichok’s effects. In fact, according to exiled Soviet chemical weapons expert Vil Mirzayanov, even small amounts of Novichok can induce extreme torturous pain that lasts for weeks. In one case recounted by Mirzayanov, a Soviet researcher exposed to Novichock did indeed experience hallucinations while in the hospital. And yet that researcher was left with permanent injuries after being critically ill for ten days and unable to walk for six months. A rather different symptom profile from what Navalny was reporting.
So what are the odds that Alexei Navalny had a pain-free Novichok poisoning experience? It’s a pretty glaring question in this story:
“He felt cold shivers initially and no pain, “but it felt like the end”.”
It felt like “the end”. But an end without pain apparently. At least that’s how Alexei Navalny described his experience to the BBC. And it’s not like he only described not feeling pain at first but extreme pain later. At no point in this interview is Navalny describing any pain at all. Instead, the “mst hellish period” were the hallucinations he experienced much later in the hospital when he thought his legs were going to be removed. Along with sleep issues. And he’s was also recovering quite quickly:
No pain, hallucinations, difficulty sleeping, and a quick recovery. That was the update we got about a month of the incident. So how do those symptoms square with the known effects of Novichok? Well, hallucinations have been reported. But so has extreme pain, even as small doses, and very long recovery periods. At least that’s the description we got from Vil Mirzayanov, an exiled former Soviet-era chemical warfare researcher who worked on Novichok’s development. As Mirzayanov describes it, even low doses can induce torturous pain that will last for weeks:
“ ‘It’s real torture, it’s impossible to imagine. Even in low doses the pain can go on for weeks. You cannot imagine the horror, it’s so bad.’ ”
Even at low doses the pain can go on for weeks. It’s real torture. That’s the description we got from Vil Mirzayanov, a now-exiled former Soviet chemical warfare researcher who helped develop Novichok in the first place. Hallucinations are indeed one of the symptoms Marzayanov recounted a fellow researcher experienced after they were accidentally exposed. And yet in that case, the researcher was left with permanent injuries and was unable to walk for six months. It’s quite a contrast to Navalny’s relatively painless and rapid recovery:
Did Alexei Navalny get such a tiny dose of Novichok that it just somehow didn’t create any pain symptoms at all? Or was there something about the delivery of the toxin that changed its symptoms? We have no answers. More importantly, we have no indication the these questions were ever really asked at all in this case. At least not publicly. Which is a big hint regarding the answers.
Did Vladimir Putin agree to release Alexei Navalny as part of a prisoner swap, only to order his assassination in a fit of blind rage at the last minute? Yes, according to Maria Pevchikh, one of Navalny’s close allies. According to Pevchikh, she received confirmation on February 15 that the swap was about to happen, one day before his death. Beyond that, Pevchikh claims these negotiations have been underway for many months and that, “by the spring of last year our plan was approved.” The proposed swap would have entailed the release of Vadim Krasikov, an FSB agent jailed in Germany for murdering a former Chechen commander in 2019, and “two American citizens,” who are presumably journalist Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan. Pevchikh also claims Roman Abramovich acted as a personal liaison between Western officials and Putin. In other words, Putin was personally involved in the negotiations, and then went mad after approval the deal and had him killed, according Pevchikh.
Do we have any other confirmation of Pevchikh’s story? Sort of. According to two unnamed Western officials, negotiations over Navalny’s release had indeed started. But both stressed that they were nowhere near as advanced as Pevchikh claims and that no formal offers had been made. No word yet from Abramovich.
So it sounds like there really were negotiations over Navalny’s release underway at the time of Navalny’s death. But then we have these wild claims by Pevchikh about an imminent release that was foiled at the last minute by Putin’s blind rage. How are we to interpret these stories? Why would a close ally of Navalny’s come out with a story about Putin going mad that even Western officials can’t stand by? What’s the motive here? Is this just amateurish propagandizing or something else? Either way, it’s a reminder that Alexei Navalny’s release from prison was something Russian could use as a bargaining chip with the West, which was something Russia was apparently entertaining according to the unnamed Western officials:
“In a YouTube video published Monday titled “Why did Putin kill Navalny now?” the opposition politician’s close ally Maria Pevchikh said that after months of lobbying for a prisoner swap involving Navalny, “by the spring of last year our plan was approved.””
By the spring of 2023, a plan for a prisoner swap involving Navalny was approved. Those are the claims of close Navalny ally Maria Pevchikh, who goes on to assert that Roman Abramovich was acting as the personal liaison between Western officials and Putin, implying Putin was directly involved with the negotiations, and that she got confirmation late on February 15 that the swap was going to happen and “in its final stages”. And then Putin apparently changed his mind and had Navalny killed. It was a done deal and then no deal. But Putin wasn’t content with saying no to those terms. He killed Navalny instead, on the eve of the planned swap. That’s her story:
And what was Putin’s motive to suddenly change his mind after apparently agreeing to a deal that had been worked on for many months and finalized just the day before? Why did he did it? Well, according to Pevchikh, “Putin has gone mad with hatred for Navalny.” That’s the motive. Blind rage on Putin’s part prompted the last minute assassination. That’s her story:
It’s not exactly a compelling story. And yet Pevchikh appears to be quite adamant. So is there anyone else backing up her story? Not exactly. As the following Politico report describes, there are two unnamed Western officials who are willing to confirm that negotiations over Navalny’s release had indeed been started. But as both caution, no formal offers had been made. It was just early discussions and nothing like the “confirmation” Pevchikh describes. So while Pevchikh appears to be just making up a story about Putin going mad and ordering Navalny’s murder after agreeing to his release, it does appear to be the case that some sort of prisoner swap negotiations had been ongoing at the time of Navalny’s death:
“The officials said that there was no plan so far advanced as Pevchikh claimed.”
Negotiations were underway, but nothing like what Pevchikh claims. No formal offers and certainly not any “confirmation” on Feb 15 that a deal was happening. We’re getting what sound like pretty definitive refutations of Pevchikh’s story from these unnamed Western officials:
Sure, there’s long been speculation that the US might ask to have Navalny included as part of some sort of three-way prisoner swap negotiation with Germany and Russia. And based on the statements from these unnamed officials it appears the US at least broached the topic. Under Pevchikh’s claimed scenario, the US asked for Navalny to be included in the swap and secured Russia’s approval, only to have Putin make a last minute madness-driven assassination order. In other words, an absurd scenario.
But dismissing Pevchikh’s wild claims, it’s still pretty notable that we have two Western officials acknowledging that some sort of negotiations for Navalny’s release were indeed underway. Would a Russian government that is planning on bumping off Navalny even bother entertaining the prospect of release? It would be an odd negotiation tactic. Which raises the interesting questions as to what’s going to happen with the Krasikov/Gershkovich/Whelanfor-swap. Are those negotiations still happening? And how will the death of Navalny impact those negotiations going forward? It’s going to be interesting to see how this plays out now that Pevchikh has injected this narrative into the whole swap negotiation process. It’s hard to see how this isn’t a complication.
Also keep in mind there’s no compelling reason the Russian government couldn’t have simply said “no” at the start of these negotiations over Navalny. Why engage in all these negotiations only to kill him off? Elaborate trolling? What’s the motive? Oh right, Putin went mad at the last minute.
It’s a mess of a story. But at the end, we do appear to have confirmation that Russia was at least signaling to Western governments that it was open to releasing Navalny. Which is presumably not the news Pevchikh was hoping to confirm with her wild story. Who knows, maybe she went mad at the last minute.