Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR#1378 Team Trump Takes the Field, Part 4

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FTR#1378 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: High­light­ing the rise of what many call “Tech­no-Fas­cism,” this broad­cast begins with dis­cus­sion of fas­cism in Manchuria and Japan under Nobusuke Kishi. Kishi’s “Manchuri­an lega­cy” is a dom­i­nant con­sid­er­a­tion in Korea and should be reflect­ed on against the back­ground of what is hap­pen­ing in both Korea and the U.S.

Sup­ple­ment­ing dis­cus­sion of Kishi, we detail analy­sis of anoth­er form of “Tech­no-Fas­cism,” root­ed in the Sil­i­con Val­ley and fea­tur­ing the ide­o­log­i­cal pre­cepts of Cur­tis Yarvin, aka “Men­scius Mold­bug.”

For all its appar­ent nov­el­ty, this ide­ol­o­gy is a high-tech ver­sion of Mus­solin­i’s Cor­po­rate State.

” . . . . Instead of advo­cat­ing for a con­sti­tu­tion­al repub­lic with min­i­mal gov­ern­ment, this new strain of thought push­es for a pri­vate, post-demo­c­ra­t­ic order, where those with the most resources and tech­no­log­i­cal con­trol dic­tate the rules. In this vision, pow­er doesn’t rest with the people—it belongs to the most com­pe­tent ‘exec­u­tives’ run­ning soci­ety like a CEO would run a com­pa­ny. . . .”

1.“Tech­no-Fas­cism Comes to Amer­i­ca” by Kyle Chay­ka; The New York­er; Feb­ru­ary 26, 2025.

. . . . The his­to­ri­an Janis Mimu­ra saw some­thing more omi­nous: a new, proac­tive union of indus­try and gov­ern­men­tal pow­er, where­in the state would dri­ve aggres­sive indus­tri­al pol­i­cy at the expense of lib­er­al norms. In the sec­ond Trump Admin­is­tra­tion, a class of Sil­i­con Val­ley lead­ers was insin­u­at­ing itself into pol­i­tics in a way that recalled one of Mimura’s pri­ma­ry sub­jects of study: the élite bureau­crats who seized polit­i­cal pow­er and drove Japan into the Sec­ond World War. “These are experts with a tech­no­log­i­cal mind-set and back­ground, often engi­neers, who now have a spe­cial role in the gov­ern­ment,” Mimu­ra told me. The result is what, in her book “Plan­ning for Empire” (2011), she labelled “tech­no-fas­cism”: author­i­tar­i­an­ism dri­ven by tech­nocrats. Tech­nol­o­gy “is con­sid­ered the dri­ving force” of such a regime, Mimu­ra said. “There’s a sort of tech­ni­ciza­tion of all aspects of gov­ern­ment and soci­ety.”

In the nine­teen-thir­ties, Japan col­o­nized Manchuria, in north­east­ern Chi­na, and the region became a test ground for tech­no-fas­cism. Nobusuke Kishi, a Japan­ese com­merce-min­istry bureau­crat, was appoint­ed to head the indus­tri­al pro­gram in Manchuria, in 1936, and, with the col­lab­o­ra­tion of a new crop of the Japan­ese con­glom­er­ates known as zaibat­su, he insti­tut­ed a pol­i­cy of forced indus­tri­al devel­op­ment based on the exploita­tion of the local pop­u­la­tion. When Kishi returned to nation­al pol­i­tics in Japan, in 1939, along with a clique of oth­er Japan­ese tech­nocrats who had worked in Manchuria, he pur­sued sim­i­lar strate­gies of state-dic­tat­ed indus­tri­al­iza­tion, at the expense of pri­vate inter­ests and labor rights. This fascis­tic regime would not be struc­tured the same way as Mussolini’s or Hitler’s, with pow­er con­cen­trat­ed in the hands of a sin­gle charis­mat­ic leader, although Kishi had trav­elled to Ger­many in the nine­teen-twen­ties, as the Nazi move­ment expand­ed, and drew inspi­ra­tion from Ger­man indus­tri­al­iza­tion for his Manchuri­an project. Instead, Mimu­ra said, Japan “kind of slid into fas­cism” as bureau­crats exer­cised their author­i­ty behind the scenes, under the aegis of the Japan­ese emper­or. As she explained, tech­no-fas­cist offi­cials “acquire pow­er by cre­at­ing these supra-min­is­te­r­i­al organs and agen­cies, sub­groups with­in the bureau­cra­cy that are unac­count­able.” Today, Elon Musk’s DOGE is the Trumpian equiv­a­lent. . . .

2.“The Plot Against Amer­i­ca” by Mike Brock; Notes From The Cir­cus; Feb. 08, 2025.

How a Dan­ger­ous Ide­ol­o­gy Born From the Lib­er­tar­i­an Move­ment Stands Ready to Seize Amer­i­ca

As I write this in ear­ly 2025, a qui­et rev­o­lu­tion is unfold­ing with­in the U.S. gov­ern­ment. Inside the new­ly cre­at­ed Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy (DOGE), teams of young tech oper­a­tives are sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly dis­man­tling demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions and replac­ing them with pro­pri­etary arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence sys­tems. Civ­il ser­vants who raise legal objec­tions are being removed. Gov­ern­ment data­bas­es are being migrat­ed to pri­vate servers. Deci­sion-mak­ing pow­er is being trans­ferred from elect­ed offi­cials and career bureau­crats to algo­rithms con­trolled by a small net­work of Sil­i­con Val­ley elites. This isn’t a spon­ta­neous coup—it’s the cul­mi­na­tion of a dan­ger­ous ide­ol­o­gy that has been metic­u­lous­ly devel­oped since the 2008 finan­cial cri­sis, one that sees democ­ra­cy itself as obso­lete tech­nol­o­gy ready to be “dis­rupt­ed.” To under­stand how we reached this crit­i­cal moment, and why it threat­ens the very foun­da­tion of demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance, we need to trace the evo­lu­tion of an idea: that democ­ra­cy is not just inef­fi­cient, but fun­da­men­tal­ly incom­pat­i­ble with tech­no­log­i­cal progress.

DOGE is not about effi­cien­cy. It is about era­sure. Democ­ra­cy is being delet­ed in slow motion, replaced by pro­pri­etary tech­nol­o­gy and AI mod­els. It is a coup, exe­cut­ed not with guns, but with back­end migra­tions and data­base wipes.

What fol­lows is not spec­u­la­tion or dystopi­an fic­tion. It is a care­ful­ly doc­u­ment­ed account of how a dan­ger­ous ide­ol­o­gy, born in the after­math of the 2008 finan­cial cri­sis, has moved from the fringes of tech cul­ture to the heart of Amer­i­can gov­er­nance.

The sto­ry of how it begins starts six­teen years ago.

On Sep­tem­ber 15, 2008, Lehman Broth­ers filed for bank­rupt­cy, mark­ing the largest fail­ure of an invest­ment bank since the Great Depres­sion. This event cat­alyzed the glob­al finan­cial cri­sis, lead­ing to wide­spread eco­nom­ic hard­ship and a pro­found loss of faith in estab­lished insti­tu­tions.

In the after­math of the cri­sis, sev­er­al key fig­ures emerged who would go on to shape a new move­ment in Amer­i­can pol­i­tics.

Cur­tis Yarvin, writ­ing under the pseu­do­nym Men­cius Mold­bug, had been devel­op­ing a cri­tique of mod­ern democ­ra­cy on his blog Unqual­i­fied Reser­va­tions since 2007. As the finan­cial cri­sis unfold­ed, Yarvin applied his uncon­ven­tion­al analy­sis to the eco­nom­ic tur­moil.

In a 2008 post, “The Mis­esian expla­na­tion of the bank cri­sis,” Yarvin wrote:

Briefly: the fun­da­men­tal cause of the bank cri­sis is not evil Repub­li­cans, lying Democ­rats, ‘dereg­u­la­tion,’ ‘affir­ma­tive-action lend­ing,’ or even ‘ludi­crous lev­els of lever­age.’ A bank­ing sys­tem is like a nuclear reac­tor: a com­pli­cat­ed piece of engi­neer­ing. If it’s engi­neered right, it works 100% of the time. If it’s engi­neered wrong, it works 99.99% of the time, and the oth­er 0.01% it coats the entire tri-state area in radioac­tive stron­tium.

Yarvin argued that the cri­sis was fun­da­men­tal­ly an engi­neer­ing fail­ure caused by a devi­a­tion from what he called “Mis­esian bank­ing,” based on prin­ci­ples out­lined by econ­o­mist Lud­wig von Mis­es. This approach advo­cates for a strict free-mar­ket sys­tem with min­i­mal gov­ern­ment inter­ven­tion in bank­ing. He con­trast­ed this with the pre­vail­ing “Bage­hot­ian” sys­tem, named after Wal­ter Bage­hot, which sup­ports cen­tral bank inter­ven­tion dur­ing finan­cial crises. Yarvin argued that this inter­ven­tion­ist approach was inher­ent­ly unsta­ble and prone to col­lapse.

Yarv­in’s writ­ings dur­ing the cri­sis peri­od con­tin­ued to devel­op his broad­er cri­tique of mod­ern polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic sys­tems. His ideas, while not main­stream, began to res­onate with a grow­ing audi­ence dis­il­lu­sioned with tra­di­tion­al insti­tu­tions and seek­ing alter­na­tive expla­na­tions for the eco­nom­ic tur­moil.

For decades, lib­er­tar­i­an thinkers had argued that free mar­kets, left unre­strained, would nat­u­ral­ly out­per­form any sys­tem of gov­ern­ment. But what if the prob­lem wasn’t just gov­ern­ment inter­fer­ence in markets—what if the very con­cept of democ­ra­cy itself was flawed?

This was the argu­ment put for­ward by Hans-Her­mann Hoppe, a stu­dent of Mis­es’s pro­tégé Mur­ray Roth­bard, who took lib­er­tar­i­an skep­ti­cism of the state to its extreme con­clu­sion. His 2001 book Democ­ra­cy: The God That Failed land­ed like a bomb­shell in lib­er­tar­i­an cir­cles. Pub­lished at a moment when many Amer­i­cans still saw democ­ra­cy as the “end of his­to­ry,” Hoppe argued that democ­ra­cy was an inher­ent­ly unsta­ble sys­tem, one that incen­tivized short-term deci­sion-mak­ing and mob rule rather than ratio­nal gov­er­nance. His alter­na­tive? A return to monar­chy.

But this wasn’t the monar­chy of old. Hoppe envi­sioned a new order—one where gov­er­nance was pri­va­tized, where soci­eties func­tioned as “covenant com­mu­ni­ties” owned and oper­at­ed by prop­er­ty-hold­ers rather than elect­ed offi­cials. In this world, cit­i­zen­ship was a mat­ter of con­tract, not birthright. Vot­ing was unnec­es­sary. Rule was left to those with the most cap­i­tal at stake. It was lib­er­tar­i­an thought tak­en to its most extreme con­clu­sion: a soci­ety gov­erned not by polit­i­cal equal­i­ty, but by prop­er­ty rights alone.

By the 2010s, Hoppe’s rad­i­cal skep­ti­cism of democ­ra­cy had found an eager audi­ence beyond the usu­al lib­er­tar­i­an cir­cles, but through a dif­fer­ent mech­a­nism than sim­ple mar­ket dis­rup­tion. While Sil­i­con Val­ley had long embraced Clay­ton Chris­tensen’s the­o­ry of dis­rup­tive inno­va­tion—where nim­bler com­pa­nies could out­com­pete estab­lished play­ers by serv­ing over­looked markets—a more extreme form of tech­no-solu­tion­ism had begun to take hold. This mind­set held that any soci­etal prob­lem, includ­ing gov­er­nance itself, could be “solved” through suf­fi­cient appli­ca­tion of engi­neer­ing prin­ci­ples. Sil­i­con Val­ley elites who had built suc­cess­ful com­pa­nies began to view demo­c­ra­t­ic process­es not just as inef­fi­cient, but as fun­da­men­tal­ly irrational—the prod­uct of what they saw as emo­tion­al deci­sion-mak­ing by non-tech­ni­cal peo­ple. This merged per­fect­ly with Hoppe’s cri­tique: if democ­ra­cy was sim­ply a col­lec­tion of “feel­ing-based” choic­es made by the unin­formed mass­es, sure­ly it could be replaced by some­thing more “rational”—specifically, the kind of data-dri­ven, engi­neer­ing-focused gov­er­nance these tech lead­ers prac­ticed in their own com­pa­nies.

Peter Thiel, one of the most out­spo­ken erst­while lib­er­tar­i­ans in Sil­i­con Val­ley, put this sen­ti­ment in stark terms in his 2009 essay The Edu­ca­tion of a Lib­er­tar­i­an: “I no longer believe that free­dom and democ­ra­cy are com­pat­i­ble.” Thiel had already begun fund­ing projects aimed at escap­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic nation-states entire­ly, includ­ing seasteading—floating cities in inter­na­tion­al waters beyond gov­ern­ment control—and exper­i­men­tal gov­er­nance mod­els that would replace elec­toral democ­ra­cy with pri­vate, cor­po­rate-style rule. Hoppe’s vision of covenant communities—private enclaves owned and gov­erned by elites—provided an intel­lec­tu­al jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for what Thiel and his allies were try­ing to build: not just alter­na­tives to spe­cif­ic gov­ern­ment poli­cies, but com­plete replace­ments for demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance itself. If democ­ra­cy is too inef­fi­cient to keep up with tech­no­log­i­cal change, why not replace it entire­ly with pri­vate, con­trac­tu­al forms of rule?

The notion that tra­di­tion­al demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance was inef­fi­cient or out­dat­ed res­onat­ed with those who saw them­selves as dis­rup­tors and inno­va­tors.

This intel­lec­tu­al throughline—from Mis­es to Hoppe to fig­ures like Yarvin and Thiel—helps explain the emer­gence of what some have called “tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism.” It rep­re­sents a dan­ger­ous align­ment of anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic thought with immense tech­no­log­i­cal and finan­cial resources, pos­ing sig­nif­i­cant chal­lenges to tra­di­tion­al con­cep­tions of demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance and civic respon­si­bil­i­ty.

From Sil­i­con Val­ley to Main Street: The Spread of Tech­no-Lib­er­tar­i­an Ideas

2008 did not just destroy the economy—it shat­tered faith in demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions them­selves. Lib­er­tar­i­ans saw an oppor­tu­ni­ty. And in Sil­i­con Val­ley, a new belief took hold: democ­ra­cy wasn’t just inefficient—it was obso­lete. Over the next decade, the ideas incu­bat­ed in this peri­od would evolve into a coher­ent chal­lenge to the foun­da­tions of lib­er­al democ­ra­cy, backed by some of the most pow­er­ful fig­ures in tech­nol­o­gy and finance.

As mil­lions of Amer­i­cans lost their homes and jobs in the years fol­low­ing the cri­sis, these ideas began to gain momen­tum. The Tea Par­ty move­ment emerged in 2009, chan­nel­ing pop­ulist anger against gov­ern­ment bailouts and the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion’s response to the cri­sis.

As the Tea Par­ty gained momen­tum, it fos­tered a broad­er cul­tur­al shift that primed many Amer­i­cans to be recep­tive to alter­na­tive polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic the­o­ries. This shift extend­ed beyond tra­di­tion­al con­ser­vatism, cre­at­ing an open­ing for the tech-lib­er­tar­i­an ideas emerg­ing from Sil­i­con Val­ley.

The movement’s empha­sis on indi­vid­ual lib­er­ty and skep­ti­cism of cen­tral­ized author­i­ty res­onat­ed with the anti-gov­ern­ment sen­ti­ment grow­ing in tech cir­cles. As a result, con­cepts like cryp­tocur­ren­cy and decen­tral­ized gov­er­nance, once con­sid­ered fringe, began to find a more main­stream audi­ence among those dis­il­lu­sioned with tra­di­tion­al polit­i­cal and finan­cial sys­tems.

The con­ver­gence of pop­ulist anger and tech­no-utopi­anism set the stage for more rad­i­cal anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ideas that would emerge in the fol­low­ing years. The Tea Par­ty, while not direct­ly advo­cat­ing for these ideas, inad­ver­tent­ly pre­pared a seg­ment of the pop­u­la­tion to be more open to the notion that tra­di­tion­al demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions might be fun­da­men­tal­ly flawed or obso­lete.

How­ev­er, the ide­o­log­i­cal impact of Sil­i­con Val­ley’s eco­nom­ic per­for­mance on move­ments like the “New Right” was not imme­di­ate or direct. The tech indus­try’s grow­ing eco­nom­ic and cul­tur­al influ­ence grad­u­al­ly became more pro­nounced in the 2010s as tech lead­ers like Peter Thiel began to more active­ly engage in polit­i­cal dis­course and fund­ing.

The finan­cial cri­sis did­n’t just cre­ate polit­i­cal move­ments like the Tea Party—it spawned entire­ly new media plat­forms that would help spread these anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ideas far beyond their orig­i­nal cir­cles. One of the most influ­en­tial was Zero Hedge, found­ed in 2009 by Daniel Ivand­ji­is­ki. The site, which adopt­ed the pseu­do­nym “Tyler Dur­den” for all its authors—a ref­er­ence to the anti-estab­lish­ment char­ac­ter from Fight Club—ini­tial­ly focused on finan­cial news and analy­sis from a bear­ish per­spec­tive root­ed in Aus­tri­an eco­nom­ics.

Zero Hedge’s evo­lu­tion from a finan­cial blog to a polit­i­cal pow­er­house exem­pli­fied how anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ideas could be laun­dered through tech­ni­cal exper­tise. The site gained ini­tial cred­i­bil­i­ty through sophis­ti­cat­ed cri­tiques of high-fre­quen­cy trad­ing and mar­ket struc­ture, estab­lish­ing itself as a legit­i­mate voice in finan­cial cir­cles. But this tech­ni­cal author­i­ty became a vehi­cle for some­thing more rad­i­cal: the idea that demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions them­selves were as bro­ken as the mar­kets they reg­u­lat­ed.

By 2015, Zero Hedge was advanc­ing a com­pre­hen­sive cri­tique of demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance that par­al­leled Yarv­in’s, but pack­aged for a main­stream audi­ence. Its tech­ni­cal analy­sis of mar­ket fail­ures seam­less­ly evolved into broad­er argu­ments about the fail­ure of demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions. When the site argued that cen­tral banks were rig­ging mar­kets, it was­n’t just mak­ing a finan­cial claim—it was sug­gest­ing that demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions them­selves were inher­ent­ly cor­rupt and need­ed to be replaced with more “effi­cient” mech­a­nisms.

This methodology—using tech­ni­cal finan­cial analy­sis to jus­ti­fy increas­ing­ly rad­i­cal polit­i­cal conclusions—provided a blue­print that oth­ers would fol­low. The site demon­strat­ed how exper­tise in one domain (finan­cial mar­kets) could be lever­aged to advo­cate for sweep­ing polit­i­cal change. When Zero Hedge declared that mar­kets were manip­u­lat­ed, it was­n’t just crit­i­ciz­ing policy—it was build­ing the case that democ­ra­cy itself was a failed sys­tem that need­ed to be replaced by tech­ni­cal, algo­rith­mic gov­er­nance.

What made Zero Hedge par­tic­u­lar­ly effec­tive was how it strad­dled mul­ti­ple worlds. As Bloomberg not­ed in 2016, it remained an “Inter­net pow­er­house” with real influ­ence in finan­cial cir­cles even as The New Repub­lic char­ac­ter­ized it as “a forum for the hate­ful, con­spir­a­cy-dri­ven voic­es of the angry white men of the alt-right.” This dual identity—technically sophis­ti­cat­ed yet polit­i­cal­ly radical—made it a cru­cial bridge between main­stream finan­cial dis­course and emerg­ing anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ide­olo­gies.

The site’s true inno­va­tion was­n’t just in mix­ing finance and politics—it was in sug­gest­ing that tech­ni­cal, mar­ket-based solu­tions could replace demo­c­ra­t­ic process­es entire­ly. This aligned per­fect­ly with Sil­i­con Val­ley’s emerg­ing world­view: if mar­kets were more effi­cient than gov­ern­ments at allo­cat­ing resources, why not let them allo­cate polit­i­cal pow­er as well?

While InfoWars would lat­er adopt some of Zero Hedge’s anti-estab­lish­ment posi­tion­ing, it aban­doned the pre­tense of tech­ni­cal exper­tise entire­ly. But Zero Hedge’s more sophis­ti­cat­ed approach—using finan­cial exper­tise to jus­ti­fy anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic conclusions—proved more influ­en­tial in tech cir­cles, where it rein­forced the grow­ing belief that democ­ra­cy was sim­ply an inef­fi­cient way to make deci­sions com­pared to mar­kets and algo­rithms.

Zero Hedge’s trans­for­ma­tion from finan­cial analy­sis to anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ide­ol­o­gy pre­viewed a broad­er pat­tern that would define the next decade: how tech­ni­cal exper­tise could be weaponized against democ­ra­cy itself. While Zero Hedge used finan­cial analy­sis to under­mine faith in demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, InfoWars would take a crud­er but arguably more effec­tive approach: pure epis­temic chaos.

As media schol­ar Yochai Ben­kler not­ed in a 2018 study, this peri­od saw the emer­gence of a “pro­pa­gan­da feed­back loop,” where audi­ences, media out­lets, and polit­i­cal elites rein­force each oth­er’s views, regard­less of the verac­i­ty of the infor­ma­tion. Zero Hedge was an ear­ly exam­ple of this dynam­ic in action, demon­strat­ing how tra­di­tion­al gate­keep­ers of infor­ma­tion were los­ing their influ­ence. This ero­sion of trust in estab­lished insti­tu­tions, com­bined with the pro­lif­er­a­tion of alter­na­tive infor­ma­tion sources, set the stage for what social psy­chol­o­gist Jonathan Haidt would lat­er describe as “a kind of frag­men­ta­tion of real­i­ty.”

As we moved into the 2010s, this frag­men­ta­tion accel­er­at­ed. Social media algo­rithms, designed to max­i­mize engage­ment, ampli­fied sen­sa­tion­al and divi­sive con­tent. The result­ing flood of com­pet­ing nar­ra­tives made it increas­ing­ly dif­fi­cult for cit­i­zens to dis­cern truth from fic­tion, with pro­found impli­ca­tions for demo­c­ra­t­ic dis­course and deci­sion-mak­ing.

The Zero Hedge model—mixing expert analy­sis with spec­u­la­tive polit­i­cal commentary—became a tem­plate for numer­ous oth­er out­lets, con­tribut­ing to insu­lar infor­ma­tion ecosys­tems where nar­ra­tive con­sis­ten­cy trumped fac­tu­al accu­ra­cy. This pre­saged how infor­ma­tion would be pro­duced, con­sumed, and weaponized in the age of social media and algo­rith­mic con­tent dis­tri­b­u­tion.

While Zero Hedge pio­neered this approach, InfoWars took it to the extreme. Found­ed by Alex Jones in 1999, InfoWars gained sig­nif­i­cant trac­tion after the 2008 finan­cial cri­sis, aban­don­ing any pre­tense of con­ven­tion­al exper­tise in favor of sen­sa­tion­al­ism and con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries.

“The finan­cial cri­sis cre­at­ed a per­fect storm for out­lets like InfoWars,” explains media schol­ar Whit­ney Phillips. “Peo­ple were look­ing for expla­na­tions, and InfoWars offered sim­ple, if out­landish, answers to com­plex prob­lems.”

By 2015, InfoWars was gen­er­at­ing an esti­mat­ed $80 mil­lion annu­al­ly, mon­e­tiz­ing its audi­ence direct­ly through the sale of sup­ple­ments and sur­vival gear. This busi­ness mod­el, which saw sales spike dur­ing crises, demon­strat­ed how post-truth nar­ra­tives could be con­vert­ed into prof­it.

InfoWars’ impact extend­ed beyond its imme­di­ate audi­ence, pro­vid­ing a play­book for a new gen­er­a­tion of alter­na­tive media out­lets. How­ev­er, its pro­mo­tion of base­less con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries had real-world con­se­quences, from harass­ment of Sandy Hook vic­tims’ fam­i­lies to the spread of health mis­in­for­ma­tion dur­ing the COVID-19 pan­dem­ic. As these tac­tics were adopt­ed by a wide range of actors, the post-truth era posed unprece­dent­ed chal­lenges to demo­c­ra­t­ic dis­course.

The par­al­lel evo­lu­tion of Zero Hedge and InfoWars revealed two com­ple­men­tary strate­gies for under­min­ing democ­ra­cy. Zero Hedge showed how tech­ni­cal exper­tise could be used to dele­git­imize demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions from with­in, while InfoWars demon­strat­ed how raw chaos could make demo­c­ra­t­ic delib­er­a­tion impos­si­ble. But it was Sil­i­con Val­ley that would com­bine these insights into some­thing even more dan­ger­ous: the argu­ment that democ­ra­cy’s replace­ment by tech­ni­cal sys­tems was­n’t just desirable—it was inevitable.

This epis­temic chaos was­n’t an accident—it was a cru­cial tac­tic in under­min­ing democ­ra­cy itself. As Cur­tis Yarvin and his neo­re­ac­tionary allies saw it, polit­i­cal legit­i­ma­cy depend­ed on the exis­tence of a shared real­i­ty. Break that con­sen­sus, and democ­ra­cy becomes impos­si­ble. Steve Ban­non called it “flood­ing the zone with shit.” And by the time Trump entered office, the full strat­e­gy was in motion: desta­bi­lize pub­lic trust, replace expert analy­sis with end­less counter-nar­ra­tives, and ensure that the only peo­ple who could wield pow­er were those who con­trolled the flow of infor­ma­tion itself.

Fig­ures like Yarvin didn’t just cri­tique democracy—they sought to under­mine the very con­di­tions in which demo­c­ra­t­ic delib­er­a­tion is pos­si­ble. By weaponiz­ing media frag­men­ta­tion, they hacked the cog­ni­tive foun­da­tions of democ­ra­cy itself, ensur­ing that polit­i­cal pow­er would no longer rest on rea­soned debate but on the abil­i­ty to manip­u­late infor­ma­tion flows.

The Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­ual: Blue­print for a Post-Demo­c­ra­t­ic World

But destroy­ing con­sen­sus was only the first step. The true rev­o­lu­tion would come through tech­nol­o­gy itself. In 1999, James Dale David­son and William Rees-Mogg pub­lished a book that would become the blue­print for this tech­no­log­i­cal coup: The Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­ual. Pub­lished at the height of the dot­com boom, the book read like sci­ence fic­tion to many at the time: it pre­dict­ed the rise of cryp­tocur­ren­cy, the decline of tra­di­tion­al nation-states, and the emer­gence of a new dig­i­tal aris­toc­ra­cy. Tax­es will become vol­un­tary. Reg­u­la­tions will dis­ap­pear. The most suc­cess­ful peo­ple will form their own pri­vate, self-gov­ern­ing com­mu­ni­ties, while the rest of the world is left behind.

Lib­er­tar­i­an­ism, when fused with this kind of tech­no­log­i­cal deter­min­ism, takes a sharp turn away from clas­si­cal lib­er­al thought. If you assume that gov­ern­ment will inevitably be out­com­pet­ed by pri­vate net­works, decen­tral­ized finance, and AI-dri­ven gov­er­nance, then try­ing to reform democ­ra­cy becomes point­less. The more rad­i­cal con­clu­sion, embraced by the fig­ures at the fore­front of this move­ment, is that gov­ern­ment should be active­ly dis­man­tled and replaced with a more “effi­cient” form of rule—one mod­eled on cor­po­rate gov­er­nance rather than demo­c­ra­t­ic par­tic­i­pa­tion.

This is pre­cise­ly where lib­er­tar­i­an­ism morphs into neo­re­ac­tion. Instead of advo­cat­ing for a con­sti­tu­tion­al repub­lic with min­i­mal gov­ern­ment, this new strain of thought push­es for a pri­vatepost-demo­c­ra­t­ic order, where those with the most resources and tech­no­log­i­cal con­trol dic­tate the rules. In this vision, pow­er doesn’t rest with the people—it belongs to the most com­pe­tent “exec­u­tives” run­ning soci­ety like a CEO would run a com­pa­ny.

This is how Cur­tis Yarvin’s argu­ment that democ­ra­cy is an out­dat­ed, inef­fi­cient sys­tem became so appeal­ing to Sil­i­con Val­ley elites. It wasn’t just a philo­soph­i­cal argu­ment; it aligned with the way many in the tech indus­try already thought about dis­rup­tion, effi­cien­cy, and con­trol. If inno­va­tion con­stant­ly ren­ders old sys­tems obso­lete, then why should gov­er­nance be any dif­fer­ent?

Fig­ures like Peter Thiel and Bal­a­ji Srini­vasan took this log­ic a step fur­ther, argu­ing that rather than resist­ing the decline of demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, elites should accel­er­ate the tran­si­tion to a new order—one where gov­er­nance is vol­un­tary, pri­va­tized, and large­ly detached from pub­lic account­abil­i­ty. The rhetoric of “exit” and “net­work states” became the lib­er­tar­i­an jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for aban­don­ing democ­ra­cy alto­geth­er.

This was­n’t just theoretical—there were actu­al attempts to imple­ment these ideas, like the Peter Thiel-backed “net­work state” project called Prax­is in Green­land.

This mind­set is deeply ingrained in Sil­i­con Val­ley, where dis­rup­tion is seen as not just a busi­ness mod­el, but a law of his­to­ry. Entre­pre­neurs are taught that old insti­tu­tions are inef­fi­cient relics wait­ing to be dis­placed by some­thing bet­ter. When applied to gov­ern­ment, this log­ic leads direct­ly to Yarvin’s argu­ment: democ­ra­cy is out­dat­ed “lega­cy code” that can’t keep up with mod­ern com­plex­i­ty. The future, he and oth­ers argue, will belong to those who design and imple­ment a supe­ri­or system—one that runs more like a cor­po­ra­tion, where lead­ers are cho­sen based on com­pe­tence rather than elec­tions.

This is why neo­re­ac­tionary ideas have found such a recep­tive audi­ence among tech elites. If you believe that tech­nol­o­gy inevitably ren­ders old sys­tems obso­lete, then why should democ­ra­cy be any dif­fer­ent? Why both­er fix­ing the gov­ern­ment if it’s doomed to be replaced by some­thing more advanced?

This is where the tran­si­tion from lib­er­tar­i­an­ism to neo­re­ac­tion becomes clear. Clas­si­cal lib­er­tar­i­ans at least paid lip ser­vice to democ­ra­cy, argu­ing that mar­kets should exist with­in a lim­it­ed but func­tion­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic sys­tem. But the Sil­i­con Val­ley ver­sion of lib­er­tar­i­an­ism, shaped by The Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­ual and rein­forced by the rise of cryp­tocur­ren­cy, start­ed to see demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance itself as an obsta­cle. The ques­tion was no longer “How do we make gov­ern­ment small­er?” but rather How do we escape gov­ern­ment alto­geth­er?”

The answer, for peo­ple like Yarvin, Peter Thiel, and Bal­a­ji Srini­vasan, was to replace democ­ra­cy with a new system—one where pow­er belongs to those with the resources to exit and build some­thing bet­ter. And as we are now see­ing, they aren’t wait­ing for that tran­si­tion to hap­pen nat­u­ral­ly.

Srini­vasan, like oth­ers in this move­ment, had under­gone an ide­o­log­i­cal evo­lu­tion that exem­pli­fies a broad­er trend in Sil­i­con Val­ley. As a for­mer CTO of Coin­base and gen­er­al part­ner at Andreessen Horowitz, he ini­tial­ly approached cryp­tocur­ren­cy from a tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an per­spec­tive, view­ing it as a tool for indi­vid­ual empow­er­ment and mar­ket effi­cien­cy.

How­ev­er, his think­ing increas­ing­ly aligned with neo-reac­tionary ideas, par­tic­u­lar­ly around the con­cept of “exit”—the abil­i­ty to opt out of exist­ing polit­i­cal struc­tures entire­ly. This shift from tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism to neo-reac­tionary thought isn’t as large a leap as it might seem. Both ide­olo­gies share a deep skep­ti­cism of cen­tral­ized author­i­ty and a belief in the pow­er of tech­nol­o­gy to reshape soci­ety.

The pipeline from tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism to neo-reac­tion often fol­lows a pre­dictable path: It begins with a lib­er­tar­i­an cri­tique of gov­ern­ment inef­fi­cien­cy and over­reach. This evolves into a broad­er skep­ti­cism of all demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, seen as slow and irra­tional com­pared to the speed and log­ic of tech­nol­o­gy. Even­tu­al­ly, this leads to the con­clu­sion that democ­ra­cy itself is an out­dat­ed sys­tem, incom­pat­i­ble with rapid tech­no­log­i­cal progress. The final step is embrac­ing the idea that democ­ra­cy should be replaced entire­ly with more “effi­cient” forms of gov­er­nance, often mod­eled on cor­po­rate struc­tures or tech­no­log­i­cal sys­tems.

Srini­vasan’s jour­ney along this ide­o­log­i­cal pipeline is reflect­ed in his evolv­ing views on cryp­tocur­ren­cy. What start­ed as a tool for finan­cial free­dom became, in his vision, the foun­da­tion for entire­ly new forms of gov­er­nance out­side tra­di­tion­al state struc­tures. This transformation—from see­ing cryp­to as a means of indi­vid­ual empow­er­ment with­in exist­ing sys­tems to view­ing it as a way to build entire­ly new polit­i­cal entities—mirrors the broad­er shift from tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism to neo-reac­tion in Sil­i­con Val­ley.

As I wrote last year, what makes the Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­u­als’s influ­ence par­tic­u­lar­ly con­cern­ing is its epis­tem­i­cal­ly author­i­tar­i­an nature. By pre­sent­ing tech­no­log­i­cal change as an unstop­pable force that would inevitably dis­solve tra­di­tion­al demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, the book pro­vid­ed Sil­i­con Val­ley with a deter­min­is­tic nar­ra­tive that jus­ti­fied the con­cen­tra­tion of pow­er in the hands of tech elites as his­tor­i­cal­ly inevitable rather than a choice that deserved demo­c­ra­t­ic delib­er­a­tion.

This is what makes the con­ver­gence of cryp­to, AI, and neo-reac­tionary ide­ol­o­gy so dan­ger­ous. If peo­ple can’t agree on basic facts, who gets to decide what’s true? The answer, in Yarvin’s world, is the sov­er­eign executive—a sin­gu­lar, unchal­lenged ruler whose legit­i­ma­cy derives not from elec­tions, but from sheer con­trol over the infor­ma­tion land­scape.

James Pogue’s remark­able piece of inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ism—Inside the New Right, Where Peter Thiel Is Plac­ing His Biggest Bets—traces the move­ment of these ideas fringes into a sophis­ti­cat­ed polit­i­cal move­ment backed by some of the most pow­er­ful fig­ures in tech­nol­o­gy.

Report­ing from the 2022 Nation­al Con­ser­vatism Con­fer­ence in Orlan­do, Pogue encoun­ters every­one from “fusty pale­o­con pro­fes­sors” to main­stream Repub­li­can sen­a­tors, but his focus on the younger cohort is par­tic­u­lar­ly illu­mi­nat­ing. They are high­ly edu­cat­ed young elites who have absorbed Yarv­in’s cri­tique of democ­ra­cy and are work­ing to make it polit­i­cal real­i­ty.

As Pogue doc­u­ments, Yarv­in’s writ­ings dur­ing the cri­sis peri­od did­n’t just diag­nose eco­nom­ic problems—they offered a com­pre­hen­sive cri­tique of what he called “the Cathe­dral,” an inter­lock­ing sys­tem of media, acad­e­mia, and bureau­cra­cy that he argued main­tained ide­o­log­i­cal con­trol while mask­ing its own pow­er.

The fusion of Aus­tri­an eco­nom­ics, tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism, and Yarv­in’s cri­tique of democ­ra­cy found its per­fect vehi­cle in cryp­tocur­ren­cy and blockchain tech­nol­o­gy. As Pogue doc­u­ments in Van­i­ty Fair, Bal­a­ji Srini­vasan emerged as a key fig­ure who helped trans­late these abstract ideas into a con­crete vision for restruc­tur­ing soci­ety.

This vision res­onat­ed deeply with Sil­i­con Val­ley elites who had been influ­enced by Yarv­in’s cri­tique of democ­ra­cy but were seek­ing con­crete mech­a­nisms to imple­ment alter­na­tive gov­er­nance struc­tures. Cryp­tocur­ren­cy offered not just a way to cir­cum­vent state mon­e­tary con­trol, but also a mod­el for how dig­i­tal tech­nol­o­gy could enable new forms of sov­er­eign­ty.

As Pogue doc­u­ments, fig­ures like Peter Thiel began to see cryp­tocur­ren­cy not just as a new finan­cial instru­ment, but as a tool for fun­da­men­tal­ly restruc­tur­ing soci­ety. The tech­nol­o­gy offered a way to make the abstract ideas of Yarvin and The Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­ual con­crete. If tra­di­tion­al democ­ra­cy was hope­less­ly cor­rupt, as Yarvin argued, then per­haps blockchain could enable new forms of gov­er­nance built on immutable code rather than fal­li­ble human judg­ment.

This vision found its per­fect tech­no­log­i­cal expres­sion in Bit­coin. Launched in the after­math of the 2008 cri­sis by an anony­mous cre­ator using the pseu­do­nym Satoshi Nakamo­to, Bit­coin seemed to val­i­date The Sov­er­eign Indi­vid­u­al’s core thesis—that tech­nol­o­gy could enable indi­vid­u­als to opt out of state mon­e­tary con­trol. The tim­ing was per­fect: just as faith in tra­di­tion­al finan­cial insti­tu­tions had been shat­tered, here was a sys­tem that promised to replace human judg­ment with math­e­mat­i­cal cer­tain­ty.

Bit­coin’s philo­soph­i­cal under­pin­nings drew heav­i­ly from Aus­tri­an eco­nom­ics and lib­er­tar­i­an thought, but it was Saifedean Ammous who most explic­it­ly merged these ideas with reac­tionary pol­i­tics in his 2018 book The Bit­coin Stan­dard. What began as an eco­nom­ic argu­ment for Bit­coin based on Aus­tri­an mon­e­tary the­o­ry evolved into some­thing far more rad­i­cal in its lat­er chap­ters. Par­tic­u­lar­ly telling was Ammous’s cri­tique of mod­ern art and archi­tec­ture, which mir­rors almost pre­cise­ly the fas­cist aes­thet­ic the­o­ry of the ear­ly 20th cen­tu­ry. When he rails against “degen­er­ate” mod­ern art and archi­tec­ture in favor of clas­si­cal forms, he’s invoking—whether inten­tion­al­ly or not—the exact lan­guage and argu­ments used by fas­cists in the 1930s. One Ger­man friend’s obser­va­tion to me is that it is “far more strik­ing in the orig­i­nal Ger­man.”

The Bit­coin com­mu­ni­ty’s embrace of fig­ures like Ammous reveals how cryp­tocur­ren­cy became not just a tech­nol­o­gy or an invest­ment, but a vehi­cle for reac­tionary polit­i­cal thought. The idea that Bit­coin would restore some lost gold­en age of sound mon­ey merged seam­less­ly with broad­er reac­tionary nar­ra­tives about soci­etal decline and the need for restora­tion of tra­di­tion­al hier­ar­chies.

While fig­ures like Ammous attempt­ed to claim Bit­coin for a reac­tionary world­view, the tech­nol­o­gy itself—as Bai­ley, Ret­tler and their co-authors argue in Resis­tance Mon­ey—can equal­ly serve lib­er­al and demo­c­ra­t­ic val­ues. The key dis­tinc­tion lies in how we under­stand Bit­coin’s rela­tion­ship to polit­i­cal insti­tu­tions.

Where reac­tionar­ies see Bit­coin as a tool for replac­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance entire­ly, the lib­er­al per­spec­tive pre­sent­ed in Resis­tance Mon­ey under­stands it as a check against over­reach and a means of pre­serv­ing indi­vid­ual auton­o­my with­in demo­c­ra­t­ic sys­tems. This frames Bit­coin not as a replace­ment for demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, but as a tech­no­log­i­cal inno­va­tion that can help pro­tect civ­il lib­er­ties and human rights—particularly in con­texts where tra­di­tion­al finan­cial sys­tems are used as tools of sur­veil­lance or oppres­sion.

This ten­sion between reac­tionary and lib­er­al inter­pre­ta­tions of Bit­coin reflects a broad­er pat­tern we’ve seen through­out our nar­ra­tive: tech­no­log­i­cal inno­va­tions that could enhance human free­dom being co-opt­ed into anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic frame­works. Just as Yarvin and oth­ers attempt­ed to claim the entire tra­jec­to­ry of tech­no­log­i­cal devel­op­ment as inevitably lead­ing to the dis­so­lu­tion of democ­ra­cy, fig­ures like Ammous tried to present Bit­coin’s mon­e­tary prop­er­ties as nec­es­sar­i­ly imply­ing a broad­er reac­tionary world­view.

From The­o­ry to Prac­tice: The Imple­men­ta­tion of Anti-Demo­c­ra­t­ic Ideas

From Yarv­in’s ear­ly writ­ings dur­ing the finan­cial cri­sis to today’s con­sti­tu­tion­al cri­sis, we can trace a clear intel­lec­tu­al evo­lu­tion. What began as abstract crit­i­cism of demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions has become a con­crete blue­print for dis­man­tling them. But the key accel­er­ant in this process was cryptocurrency—it pro­vid­ed both a tech­no­log­i­cal frame­work and a psy­cho­log­i­cal mod­el for opt­ing out of demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance entire­ly.

But what makes this vision dan­ger­ous is not just its hos­til­i­ty to democracy—it’s the way it frames the col­lapse of demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance as an inevitabil­i­ty rather than a choice. This is pre­cise­ly what I have described as epis­temic author­i­tar­i­an­ism. Rather than acknowl­edg­ing that tech­nol­o­gy is shaped by human agency and polit­i­cal deci­sions, the Net­work State vision assumes that tech­no­log­i­cal change has a fixed tra­jec­to­ry, one that will nat­u­ral­ly dis­solve nation-states and replace them with dig­i­tal­ly medi­at­ed gov­er­nance struc­tures. This deter­min­is­tic think­ing leaves no room for pub­lic debate, demo­c­ra­t­ic deci­sion-mak­ing, or alter­na­tive paths for tech­no­log­i­cal devel­op­ment. It tells us that the future has already been decid­ed, and the only choice is whether to embrace it or be left behind.

This deter­min­is­tic fram­ing also explains why so many lib­er­tar­i­ans found them­selves drift­ing toward reac­tionary pol­i­tics. If democ­ra­cy is doomed, then why both­er defend­ing it? If tech­nol­o­gy is going to replace gov­er­nance, then why not accel­er­ate the process? This is how tech­no-lib­er­tar­i­an­ism became a gate­way to neoreaction—it replaced the clas­si­cal lib­er­al com­mit­ment to open debate and incre­men­tal progress with an abso­lutist vision of his­to­ry that jus­ti­fied aban­don­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic ideals entire­ly.

When Musk gains con­trol of Trea­sury pay­ment sys­tems, or Trump declares he won’t enforce laws he dis­likes, they’re imple­ment­ing ideas incu­bat­ed in the cryp­to world. The notion that code can replace demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, that tech­ni­cal com­pe­tence should over­ride demo­c­ra­t­ic nego­ti­a­tion, and that pri­vate pow­er should super­sede pub­lic authority—these ideas moved from cryp­to the­o­ry to polit­i­cal prac­tice.

Both Srini­vasan’s “net­work state” and Yarv­in’s cri­tique of democ­ra­cy see tech­nol­o­gy as a means of escap­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic con­straints, but they approach it dif­fer­ent­ly. Yarvin advo­cates for cap­tur­ing and dis­man­tling demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions from with­in, while Srini­vasan pro­pos­es build­ing par­al­lel struc­tures to make them irrel­e­vant. We’re now wit­ness­ing the con­ver­gence of these approaches—using tech­no­log­i­cal con­trol to simul­ta­ne­ous­ly cap­ture and bypass demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance.

These ide­o­log­i­cal frame­works might have remained abstract the­o­riz­ing if not for a unique con­ver­gence of fac­tors that made their imple­men­ta­tion sud­den­ly pos­si­ble. The rise of Trump—a fig­ure simul­ta­ne­ous­ly hos­tile to demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions and eager to embrace tech oligarchs—presented an unprece­dent­ed oppor­tu­ni­ty. Here was a poten­tial auto­crat who did­n’t just accept Sil­i­con Val­ley’s cri­tique of democ­ra­cy, but embod­ied it. His con­tempt for con­sti­tu­tion­al con­straints, his belief that per­son­al loy­al­ty should over­ride insti­tu­tion­al inde­pen­dence, and his view that gov­ern­ment should serve pri­vate inter­ests aligned per­fect­ly with Sil­i­con Val­ley’s emerg­ing anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic world­view. When com­bined with unprece­dent­ed tech­no­log­i­cal con­trol over infor­ma­tion flows, finan­cial sys­tems, and social net­works, this cre­at­ed a per­fect storm: the ide­ol­o­gy that jus­ti­fied dis­man­tling democ­ra­cy, the polit­i­cal vehi­cle will­ing to do it, and the tech­no­log­i­cal capa­bil­i­ty to make it hap­pen.

The finan­cial cri­sis cre­at­ed the con­di­tions for anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic thought to take root in Sil­i­con Val­ley, but the actu­al trans­for­ma­tion occurred through a series of dis­tinct phas­es, each build­ing on the last. Let’s trace this evo­lu­tion care­ful­ly:

The insti­tu­tion­al con­text for this trans­for­ma­tion is cru­cial. Gallup polls show trust in the media fell from 72% to 31% between 1976 to 2024, while dis­trust in gov­ern­ment hit 85% post-2008, accord­ing to Pew Research. This ero­sion of insti­tu­tion­al trust cre­at­ed fer­tile ground for alter­na­tive pow­er struc­tures. As the Brook­ings Insti­tu­tion not­ed in a 2023 analy­sis: “Tech lead­ers increas­ing­ly adopt neo-feu­dal fram­ing of users-as-serfs, reflect­ing a broad­er shift away from demo­c­ra­t­ic con­cep­tions of cit­i­zen­ship.”

The dan­ger lies not just in what these oper­a­tives are doing, but in how their actions sys­tem­i­cal­ly dis­man­tle their capac­i­ty for demo­c­ra­t­ic resis­tance. What we are see­ing is an exact imple­men­ta­tion of Cur­tis Yarvin’s “RAGE” doc­trine—Retire All Gov­ern­ment Employ­ees—that he first pro­posed in 2012. But what makes this moment par­tic­u­lar­ly sig­nif­i­cant is how it com­bines mul­ti­ple strands of neo­re­ac­tionary thought into coor­di­nat­ed action. When Yarvin wrote about replac­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions with cor­po­rate gov­er­nance struc­tures, when he argues that tech­ni­cal com­pe­tence should over­ride demo­c­ra­t­ic process, he is describ­ing pre­cise­ly what we’re now watch­ing unfold.

Con­sid­er how this maps to Yarvin’s blue­print: First, remove career offi­cials who might resist on legal or con­sti­tu­tion­al grounds. Then, install pri­vate tech­ni­cal infra­struc­ture that makes over­sight impos­si­ble.

The goal isn’t just to change who runs gov­ern­ment agencies—it’s to fun­da­men­tal­ly trans­form how pow­er oper­ates, shift­ing it from demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions to tech­ni­cal sys­tems con­trolled by a small elite.

But what makes this imple­men­ta­tion par­tic­u­lar­ly dan­ger­ous is how it com­bines Yarvin’s insti­tu­tion­al cri­tique with Bal­a­ji Srinivasan’s tech­no­log­i­cal vision. Where Yarvin pro­vid­ed the the­o­ret­i­cal frame­work for dis­man­tling the demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, Srinivasan’s “net­work state” con­cept pro­vid­ed prac­ti­cal tools and train­ing. Many of these young oper­a­tives came through pro­grams explic­it­ly designed to build par­al­lel gov­er­nance struc­tures out­side of demo­c­ra­t­ic con­trol, oper­at­ed by Srini­vasan.

What we’re wit­ness­ing isn’t just a pow­er grab—it’s the cul­mi­na­tion of an ide­ol­o­gy that has been incu­bat­ed, test­ed, and refined for over a decade.

First, these thinkers argued that democ­ra­cy was inef­fi­cient. Then, they cre­at­ed tech­no­log­i­cal tools—cryptocurrency, blockchain gov­er­nance, and AI-dri­ven decision-making—to bypass demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions entire­ly. Now, they’re no longer exper­i­ment­ing. They are seiz­ing con­trol of gov­ern­ment infra­struc­ture itself, repro­gram­ming it in real-time to func­tion accord­ing to their vision.

This is why focus­ing sole­ly on the tech­ni­cal aspects of what’s hap­pen­ing inside agen­cies miss­es the deep­er trans­for­ma­tion under­way. Every unau­tho­rized serv­er, every AI mod­el, every removed civ­il ser­vant rep­re­sents anoth­er step in con­vert­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance into what Yarvin called “neocameralism”—a sys­tem where soci­ety is run like a cor­po­ra­tion, with clear own­er­ship and con­trol rather than demo­c­ra­t­ic delib­er­a­tion. The infra­struc­ture being built isn’t meant to serve demo­c­ra­t­ic ends—it’s meant to make democ­ra­cy itself obso­lete.

The strat­e­gy of “flood­ing the zone with shit” was nev­er just about con­trol­ling the news cycle—it was about reshap­ing the con­di­tions of gov­er­nance itself. The goal was not just to mis­lead, but to cre­ate an envi­ron­ment so chaot­ic that tra­di­tion­al demo­c­ra­t­ic deci­sion-mak­ing would become impos­si­ble.

First, they dis­rupt­ed jour­nal­ism, replac­ing truth with engage­ment-opti­mized feeds. Now, they are dis­rupt­ing gov­er­nance itself. Your news, your pol­i­tics, your very reality—automated, pri­va­tized, and con­trolled by those who own the net­work.

And then, once the pub­lic lost trust in gov­ern­ment, the tech elite could present the solu­tion: a new, AI-dri­ven, algo­rith­mi­cal­ly opti­mized form of gov­er­nance. One that wouldn’t be sub­ject to human irra­tional­i­ty, demo­c­ra­t­ic inef­fi­cien­cy, or the unpre­dictabil­i­ty of elec­tions. Just like social media com­pa­nies replaced tra­di­tion­al news with algo­rith­mic feeds, these tech­nocrats sought to replace demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance with auto­mat­ed deci­sion-mak­ing.

What’s hap­pen­ing inside the Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy is the final phase of this plan. The old demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, weak­ened by years of delib­er­ate desta­bi­liza­tion, are being replaced in real-time by pro­pri­etary AI sys­tems con­trolled not by elect­ed offi­cials, but by the same net­work of Sil­i­con Val­ley oper­a­tives who engi­neered the cri­sis in the first place.

We are not head­ing toward this future—we are already liv­ing in it.

Gov­ern­ment func­tions that once belonged to demo­c­ra­t­i­cal­ly account­able insti­tu­tions are already being trans­ferred to pro­pri­etary AI sys­tems, opti­mized not for jus­tice or equal­i­ty, but for effi­cien­cy and con­trol. Already, deci­sions about finan­cial reg­u­la­tion, law enforce­ment pri­or­i­ties, and polit­i­cal dis­sent are being made by algo­rithms that no cit­i­zen can vote against and no court can over­see. Your rights are no longer deter­mined by a legal frame­work you can appeal—they are dic­tat­ed by a set of terms of ser­vice, change­able at the whim of those who con­trol the net­work.

Resis­tance and Alter­na­tives

Despite the grow­ing influ­ence of these anti-demo­c­ra­t­ic ideas, they have not gone unchal­lenged. Schol­ars like Evge­ny Moro­zov have cri­tiqued the “tech­no­log­i­cal solu­tion­ism” that under­pins much of this think­ing. Grass­roots move­ments advo­cat­ing for dig­i­tal rights and demo­c­ra­t­ic con­trol of tech­nol­o­gy have gained trac­tion. Some tech work­ers them­selves have begun orga­niz­ing against the more extreme visions of their employ­ers.

How­ev­er, these resis­tance efforts face an uphill bat­tle against the immense resources and influ­ence of those push­ing for a post-demo­c­ra­t­ic future.

And if we do not act now, we may wake up one day to find that democ­ra­cy was not over­thrown in a dra­mat­ic coup—but sim­ply delet­ed, line by line, from the code that gov­erns our lives.

And yet, the most ter­ri­fy­ing part? Don­ald Trump, the sup­posed strong­man at the heart of it all, is obliv­i­ous. He has no grand ide­o­log­i­cal project beyond his own pow­er. He does not under­stand the sys­tem being built around him, nor the fact that his own pres­i­den­cy is mere­ly a vehi­cle for forces that see him as a use­ful, tem­po­rary bat­ter­ing ram against democ­ra­cy.

But those around him? They under­stand per­fect­ly.

J.D. Vance, the Vice Pres­i­dent in wait­ing, has stud­ied Cur­tis Yarvin’s work. Peter Thiel, his long­time patron, has been fund­ing this vision for over a decade. Bal­a­ji Srini­vasan is writ­ing the blue­print. Elon Musk is lay­ing the infra­struc­ture. And the young oper­a­tives now wiring AI mod­els into the Trea­sury Department—disbanding civ­il ser­vice, bypass­ing tra­di­tion­al gov­ern­ment, and replac­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic account­abil­i­ty with tech­no­log­i­cal sovereignty—are work­ing toward a future that will long out­last Trump him­self.

This is not about Trump. This is about what comes after him.

Actu­ar­i­al real­i­ties do not favor an aging leader with a declin­ing grasp on pol­i­cy. But they favor the thir­ty- and forty-some­things lay­ing the foun­da­tion for the post-demo­c­ra­t­ic order. The men who have spent the past decade engi­neer­ing an exit from democ­ra­cy are no longer whis­per­ing in the dark cor­ners of the inter­net. They are in pow­er, with mon­ey, AI, and a plan. And democ­ra­cy, in its cur­rent form, has nev­er been clos­er to the brink.

Vox Pop­uli, Vox Dei, Elon Musk declares from his dig­i­tal throne—the voice of the peo­ple is the voice of God.

But in the world they are build­ing, the peo­ple have no voice. The algo­rithms speak for them. The exec­u­tives decide for them. The future is opti­mized, effi­cient, and entire­ly out of their hands.

Vox Pop­uli, Vox Dei. They whis­per it, as they lock the gates.

Discussion

7 comments for “FTR#1378 Team Trump Takes the Field, Part 4”

  1. Here’s a pair of pieces about the DOGE sur­veil­lance state cur­rent­ly under con­struc­tion. Or rather, the DOGE/Palan­tir sur­veil­lance state. Yes, as we’re going to see, not only is DOGE seem­ing­ly attempt­ing to build some sort of ‘mas­ter data­base’ on every­one in the US but Palan­tir appears to be the firm that has been tapped to actu­al­ly con­struct it. Which is more or less what we should have expect­ed.

    First, the New York Times just had an op-ed by inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ist Julia Angwin warn­ing about the grow­ing evi­dence that DOGE has­n’t just been tasked with ‘dis­man­tling the admin­is­tra­tive state’, a core goal of Project 2025. It’s not just destruc­tion. DOGE is build­ing things too. Build­ing some­thing awful: the “data­base of ruin”.

    That’s the term coined back in 2009 by George­town law pro­fes­sor Paul Ohm who envi­sioned the impli­ca­tions of the merg­er of all of the dif­fer­ent data­bas­es of the US fed­er­al gov­ern­ment into a sin­gle mas­ter data­base. A data­base that would con­tain the most sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion on every­one in on loca­tion. “Almost every per­son in the devel­oped world can be linked to at least one fact in a com­put­er data­base that an adver­sary could use for black­mail, dis­crim­i­na­tion, harass­ment or finan­cial or iden­ti­ty theft,” as Ohm put it. That was 16 years ago. Here we are.

    And as Angwin also warns, while the con­struc­tion of such a ‘data­base of ruin’ would most like­ly vio­late fed­er­al pri­va­cy laws, those laws don’t actu­al­ly include any forms of pun­ish­ment for break­ing them. Judges lack the abil­i­ty to levy mean­ing­ful fines or eas­i­ly halt ille­gal actions and no enforce­ment agency exists to inves­ti­gate vio­la­tions. It’s a law in name only. That’s what pro­tect­ing the US pub­lic from wild abus­es of pri­va­cy with their fed­er­al data.

    And that warn­ing by Angwin bring us to anoth­er recent sto­ry from last week about DOGE’s big immi­gra­tion plans. An immi­gra­tion plan that just hap­pens to involve fus­ing a num­ber of fed­er­al data­bas­es into one mas­ter data­base that can be used for rapid­ly gen­er­at­ing immi­grant “tar­get­ing lists”. But while whistle­blow­ers have already come for­ward warn­ing about DOGE employ­ees show­ing up with back­packs of lap­tops — each one con­tain­ing a data­base from a dif­fer­ent fed­er­al agency — for the pur­pose of merg­ing them, it does­n’t sound like it’s the DOGE employ­ees who will be build­ing and main­tain­ing this mas­ter data­base. That job will be going to Palan­tir. Which is hard­ly a sur­prise giv­en the role Palan­tir played dur­ing Pres­i­dent Trump’s first term pro­vid­ing immi­gra­tion data­base ser­vices. Except, of course, there’s no rea­son to assume this mas­ter data­base is going to be lim­it­ed to immi­grants or immi­gra­tion-relat­ed activ­i­ties. What that arti­cle is describ­ing is effec­tive­ly the use of immi­gra­tion enforce­ment as the pre­text for build­ing the “data­base of ruin”. Built and man­aged by Palan­tir.

    Ok, first, here’s Julia Angwin warn­ing. A warn­ing that DOGE isn’t just build­ing a sur­veil­lance state that will be watch­ing all of us going for­ward. It’s build­ing a tool that can be used to look back in time and find some, any­thing, com­pro­mis­ing on vir­tu­al­ly any­one:

    The New York Times

    ‘This Is What We Were Always Scared of’: DOGE Is Build­ing a Sur­veil­lance State

    By Julia Angwin
    Ms. Angwin, a con­tribut­ing Opin­ion writer, is an inves­tiga­tive jour­nal­ist.
    April 30, 2025

    Elon Musk may be step­ping back from run­ning the so-called Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy, but his lega­cy there is already secured. DOGE is assem­bling a sprawl­ing domes­tic sur­veil­lance sys­tem for the Trump admin­is­tra­tion — the likes of which we have nev­er seen in the Unit­ed States.

    Pres­i­dent Trump could soon have the tools to sat­is­fy his many griev­ances by swift­ly locat­ing com­pro­mis­ing infor­ma­tion about his polit­i­cal oppo­nents or any­one who sim­ply annoys him. The admin­is­tra­tion has already declared that it plans to comb through tax records to find the address­es of immi­grants it is inves­ti­gat­ing — a plan so moral­ly and legal­ly chal­lenged, it prompt­ed sev­er­al top I.R.S. offi­cials to quit in protest. Some fed­er­al work­ers have been told that DOGE is using arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence to sift through their com­mu­ni­ca­tions to iden­ti­fy peo­ple who har­bor anti-Musk or ‑Trump sen­ti­ment (and pre­sum­ably pun­ish or fire them).

    What this amounts to is a stun­ning­ly fast rever­sal of our long his­to­ry of silo­ing gov­ern­ment data to pre­vent its mis­use. In their first 100 days, Mr. Musk and Mr. Trump have knocked down the bar­ri­ers that were intend­ed to pre­vent them from cre­at­ing dossiers on every U.S. res­i­dent. Now they seem to be build­ing a defin­ing fea­ture of many author­i­tar­i­an regimes: com­pre­hen­sive files on every­one so they can pun­ish those who protest.

    Over the past 100 days, DOGE teams have grabbed per­son­al data about U.S. res­i­dents from dozens of fed­er­al data­bas­es and are report­ed­ly merg­ing it all into a mas­ter data­base at the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty. This month House Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers report­ed that a whis­tle-blow­er had come for­ward to reveal that the mas­ter data­base will com­bine data from such fed­er­al agen­cies as the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion, the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice and the Depart­ment of Health and Human Ser­vices. The whis­tle-blow­er also alleged that DOGE work­ers are fill­ing back­packs with mul­ti­ple lap­tops, each one loaded with pur­loined agency data.

    ...

    In 2009 the George­town law pro­fes­sor Paul Ohm envi­sioned the assem­blage of a DOGE-like amount of data and called it the “data­base of ruin.” “Almost every per­son in the devel­oped world can be linked to at least one fact in a com­put­er data­base that an adver­sary could use for black­mail, dis­crim­i­na­tion, harass­ment or finan­cial or iden­ti­ty theft,” he wrote.

    We are not all the way down the rab­bit hole yet. It appears that DOGE has not yet tried to scoop up data from the intel­li­gence agen­cies, such as the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency, which col­lect vast amounts of com­mu­ni­ca­tions between for­eign­ers — and often catch Amer­i­cans’ com­mu­ni­ca­tions in their net. (That said, it is not encour­ag­ing that the head of the N.S.A. was recent­ly fired, appar­ent­ly at the behest of an online influ­encer who is friends with the pres­i­dent.)

    Even so, the cre­ation of a huge gov­ern­ment data­base of per­son­al infor­ma­tion about U.S. res­i­dents is dan­ger­ous and very like­ly against the law. In the 1960s, the John­son admin­is­tra­tion pro­posed com­bin­ing all of its fed­er­al dossiers togeth­er into a new nation­al data­bank.

    The admin­is­tra­tion said it just want­ed to elim­i­nate dupli­cate records and per­form sta­tis­ti­cal analy­sis, but the pub­lic was out­raged. The data­bank was scut­tled, and Con­gress passed the Fed­er­al Pri­va­cy Act of 1974, which requires fed­er­al agen­cies to obtain con­sent before dis­clos­ing indi­vid­u­als’ data across agen­cies.

    Of the more than 30 law­suits that involve DOGE, sev­er­al allege that its data incur­sions vio­late the Pri­va­cy Act. So far, courts have ruled in plain­tiffs’ favor in two of those cas­es, issu­ing orders lim­it­ing DOGE’s access to data at the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and Depart­ment of Trea­sury. Both cas­es are ongo­ing. While the orders restrict­ed DOGE from obtain­ing per­son­al­ly iden­ti­fi­able data, it remains unclear what hap­pens with data that has been already col­lect­ed.

    But the deep­er prob­lem is that the Pri­va­cy Act lacks real teeth. It did not give judges the abil­i­ty to levy mean­ing­ful fines or eas­i­ly halt ille­gal actions. It failed to estab­lish an enforce­ment arm to inves­ti­gate pri­va­cy vio­la­tions in ways that courts can’t. And since then, Con­gress hasn’t been able to pass com­pre­hen­sive pri­va­cy laws or cre­ate stronger enforce­ment mech­a­nisms.

    ...

    With­out a pri­va­cy cop on the beat, Amer­i­cans can sub­mit a Pri­va­cy Act request to try to find out what data DOGE is hold­ing about them or hope that judges side with them in one of the dozens of law­suits wind­ing their way through court. Still, DOGE con­tin­ues going from agency to agency grab­bing data.

    To pick just two recent exam­ples: Last month DOGE bul­lied its way into the fed­er­al pay­roll records for about 276,000 fed­er­al work­ers, plac­ing the offi­cials who object­ed on admin­is­tra­tive leave, and this month a sep­a­rate whis­tle-blow­er at the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board came for­ward with evi­dence show­ing that after DOGE work­ers arrived, there was a spike in data being siphoned out of the agency.

    ...

    We urgent­ly need to mod­ern­ize our approach to pri­va­cy by cre­at­ing a fed­er­al data pro­tec­tion agency with robust inves­tiga­tive pow­ers.

    But short of that, we still have time to stop the cre­ation of the data­base of ruin. Con­gress could defund DOGE or repeal Mr. Trump’s exec­u­tive order estab­lish­ing it or sup­port leg­is­la­tion that the Demo­c­ra­t­ic sen­a­tors Ed Markey and Ron Wyden have intro­duced to update the Pri­va­cy Act to pro­vide more mean­ing­ful fines and crim­i­nal penal­ties.

    ...

    ———–

    “‘This Is What We Were Always Scared of’: DOGE Is Build­ing a Sur­veil­lance State” By Julia Angwin; The New York Times; 04/30/2025

    Pres­i­dent Trump could soon have the tools to sat­is­fy his many griev­ances by swift­ly locat­ing com­pro­mis­ing infor­ma­tion about his polit­i­cal oppo­nents or any­one who sim­ply annoys him. The admin­is­tra­tion has already declared that it plans to comb through tax records to find the address­es of immi­grants it is inves­ti­gat­ing — a plan so moral­ly and legal­ly chal­lenged, it prompt­ed sev­er­al top I.R.S. offi­cials to quit in protest. Some fed­er­al work­ers have been told that DOGE is using arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence to sift through their com­mu­ni­ca­tions to iden­ti­fy peo­ple who har­bor anti-Musk or ‑Trump sen­ti­ment (and pre­sum­ably pun­ish or fire them).

    An AI-pow­ered fed­er­al sur­veil­lance state. That’s the night­mare sit­u­a­tion that appears to be emerg­ing out of all this DOGE mad­ness. Or as George­town law pro­fes­sor Paul Ohm described such a data­base back in 2009, a “data­base of ruin”, which also hap­pens to be an author­i­tar­i­an dream:

    ...
    What this amounts to is a stun­ning­ly fast rever­sal of our long his­to­ry of silo­ing gov­ern­ment data to pre­vent its mis­use. In their first 100 days, Mr. Musk and Mr. Trump have knocked down the bar­ri­ers that were intend­ed to pre­vent them from cre­at­ing dossiers on every U.S. res­i­dent. Now they seem to be build­ing a defin­ing fea­ture of many author­i­tar­i­an regimes: com­pre­hen­sive files on every­one so they can pun­ish those who protest.

    Over the past 100 days, DOGE teams have grabbed per­son­al data about U.S. res­i­dents from dozens of fed­er­al data­bas­es and are report­ed­ly merg­ing it all into a mas­ter data­base at the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty. This month House Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers report­ed that a whis­tle-blow­er had come for­ward to reveal that the mas­ter data­base will com­bine data from such fed­er­al agen­cies as the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion, the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice and the Depart­ment of Health and Human Ser­vices. The whis­tle-blow­er also alleged that DOGE work­ers are fill­ing back­packs with mul­ti­ple lap­tops, each one loaded with pur­loined agency data.

    ...

    In 2009 the George­town law pro­fes­sor Paul Ohm envi­sioned the assem­blage of a DOGE-like amount of data and called it the “data­base of ruin.” “Almost every per­son in the devel­oped world can be linked to at least one fact in a com­put­er data­base that an adver­sary could use for black­mail, dis­crim­i­na­tion, harass­ment or finan­cial or iden­ti­ty theft,” he wrote.
    ...

    And as the arti­cle sad­ly reminds us, while the cre­ation of such a ‘mas­ter data­base’ would like­ly be ille­gal and in vio­la­tion of the Fed­er­al Pri­va­cy Act of 1974, there’s no real enforce­ment mech­a­nism for the pri­va­cy law. Judges can’t impose fines or eas­i­ly halt ille­gal actions. So yeah, it’s like­ly against the law and also going to hap­pen any­way:

    ...
    We are not all the way down the rab­bit hole yet. It appears that DOGE has not yet tried to scoop up data from the intel­li­gence agen­cies, such as the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency, which col­lect vast amounts of com­mu­ni­ca­tions between for­eign­ers — and often catch Amer­i­cans’ com­mu­ni­ca­tions in their net. (That said, it is not encour­ag­ing that the head of the N.S.A. was recent­ly fired, appar­ent­ly at the behest of an online influ­encer who is friends with the pres­i­dent.)

    Even so, the cre­ation of a huge gov­ern­ment data­base of per­son­al infor­ma­tion about U.S. res­i­dents is dan­ger­ous and very like­ly against the law. In the 1960s, the John­son admin­is­tra­tion pro­posed com­bin­ing all of its fed­er­al dossiers togeth­er into a new nation­al data­bank.

    The admin­is­tra­tion said it just want­ed to elim­i­nate dupli­cate records and per­form sta­tis­ti­cal analy­sis, but the pub­lic was out­raged. The data­bank was scut­tled, and Con­gress passed the Fed­er­al Pri­va­cy Act of 1974, which requires fed­er­al agen­cies to obtain con­sent before dis­clos­ing indi­vid­u­als’ data across agen­cies.

    Of the more than 30 law­suits that involve DOGE, sev­er­al allege that its data incur­sions vio­late the Pri­va­cy Act. So far, courts have ruled in plain­tiffs’ favor in two of those cas­es, issu­ing orders lim­it­ing DOGE’s access to data at the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and Depart­ment of Trea­sury. Both cas­es are ongo­ing. While the orders restrict­ed DOGE from obtain­ing per­son­al­ly iden­ti­fi­able data, it remains unclear what hap­pens with data that has been already col­lect­ed.

    But the deep­er prob­lem is that the Pri­va­cy Act lacks real teeth. It did not give judges the abil­i­ty to levy mean­ing­ful fines or eas­i­ly halt ille­gal actions. It failed to estab­lish an enforce­ment arm to inves­ti­gate pri­va­cy vio­la­tions in ways that courts can’t. And since then, Con­gress hasn’t been able to pass com­pre­hen­sive pri­va­cy laws or cre­ate stronger enforce­ment mech­a­nisms.
    ...

    And that alarm­ing op-ed brings us to the fol­low­ing piece about the “mas­ter data­base” cur­rent­ly being con­struct­ed by DOGE. Well, DOGE and Palan­tir. As we’re going to see, it appears that Palan­tir has been tapped as the go to enti­ty for build­ing these DOGE data­bas­es, osten­si­bly for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment pur­pos­es much like the role Palan­tir played dur­ing Trump’s first term. And while the gen­er­a­tion of “tar­get­ed lists” of indi­vid­ual immi­grants appears to be the cur­rent plan, there’s obvi­ous­ly noth­ing stop­ping DOGE (and Palan­tir) from gen­er­at­ing what­ev­er “tar­get­ed lists” they choose once this “mas­ter data­base” is con­struct­ed. Sure, there are already whistle­blow­ers warn­ing about DOGE employ­ees reck­less­ly work­ing to com­bine sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion from Social Secu­ri­ty, IRS, HHS and oth­er depart­ments into a sin­gle, cross-agency data­base, it’s not like there’s real­is­ti­cal­ly going to be any repercussions...unless we’re talk­ing about reper­cus­sions for the whistle­blow­ers:

    CNN

    DOGE is build­ing a mas­ter data­base for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment, sources say

    By Priscil­la Alvarez, Sunlen Ser­faty, Mar­shall Cohen and Tami Luh­by, CNN
    Updat­ed 2:32 PM EDT, Fri April 25, 2025

    CNN — Staffers from Elon Musk’s Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy are build­ing a mas­ter data­base to speed-up immi­gra­tion enforce­ment and depor­ta­tions by com­bin­ing sen­si­tive data from across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment, mul­ti­ple sources famil­iar with the plans tell CNN.

    The goal is to cre­ate a mas­sive repos­i­to­ry of data pulled from var­i­ous agen­cies, accord­ing to sources famil­iar with the project who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because they aren’t autho­rized to talk about it. The admin­is­tra­tion has pre­vi­ous­ly sought to cen­tral­ize infor­ma­tion from a num­ber of agen­cies, includ­ing the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice, the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and Health and Human Ser­vices, among oth­ers.

    Palan­tir, a Sil­i­con Val­ley data-ana­lyt­ics com­pa­ny co-found­ed by a Musk ally that has been used by immi­gra­tion offi­cials before for crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions, is involved in build­ing out the data­base. The com­pa­ny has long been ingest­ing and pro­cess­ing data from mul­ti­ple ICE and DHS sources. The lat­est endeav­or, how­ev­er, is expect­ed to go fur­ther by iden­ti­fy­ing peo­ple with civ­il immi­gra­tion vio­la­tions.

    “If they are design­ing a depor­ta­tion machine, they will be able to do that,” a for­mer senior IRS employ­ee with knowl­edge of the plans told CNN.

    Allow­ing stream­lined access to high­ly pro­tect­ed infor­ma­tion – for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment pur­pos­es – has been the sub­ject of ongo­ing legal chal­lenges. Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers have slammed the plan, with one claim­ing DOGE is “rapid­ly, hap­haz­ard­ly, and unlaw­ful­ly” exploit­ing Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al data.

    Trump offi­cials see the project as a way to over­come a major hur­dle: quick­ly build­ing “tar­get­ing lists” that Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment can use to find, detain and deport migrants in the US. It’s part of a con­cert­ed effort, under pres­sure from the White House, to ramp up enforce­ment and increase depor­ta­tions.

    ...

    Palan­tir is already a well-known gov­ern­ment con­trac­tor, includ­ing at the IRS, so it would be a “log­i­cal choice” for the DOGE teams to uti­lize it, a senior IRS offi­cial said, adding that, “it would be easy to change the scope of exist­ing con­tracts and pay Palan­tir to do this stuff.”

    “They’re going to take the infor­ma­tion we already have and put it into a sys­tem,” a Trump admin­is­tra­tion offi­cial told CNN about DOGE’s plans. “It will be able to rapid­ly queue infor­ma­tion. Every­one is con­vert­ing to Palan­tir.”

    The DHS con­tract with Palan­tir includes “stream­lin­ing selec­tion and appre­hen­sion oper­a­tions of ille­gal aliens,” and self-depor­ta­tion track­ing, accord­ing to pub­lic records on a fed­er­al con­tract­ing site. ICE cur­rent­ly uses Palantir’s soft­ware for Home­land Secu­ri­ty inves­ti­ga­tions.

    A big dataset would help immi­gra­tion offi­cials more quick­ly iden­ti­fy who is undoc­u­ment­ed in the US and poten­tial­ly eli­gi­ble for depor­ta­tion. So far, a chal­lenge for offi­cials has been build­ing what they call “tar­get­ing lists” to arrest peo­ple with­out sta­tus. Some exist­ing lists, sources say, have been rid­dled with errors, cre­at­ing addi­tion­al work for agents in the field to ver­i­fy and vet infor­ma­tion.

    But for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cials have expressed con­cern over Palantir’s capa­bil­i­ty to serve ICE Enforce­ment and Removal Oper­a­tions because those oper­a­tions also require an enor­mous amount of logis­tics plan­ning. While Palan­tir has been use­ful for spe­cif­ic data sets, one for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cial argued it’s large­ly viewed as a “gen­er­al pur­pose tool.”

    “It’s still only as good as the data,” said the for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cial, stress­ing that while a data­base may be able to help iden­ti­fy who’s undoc­u­ment­ed in the US, it would also need to include infor­ma­tion on where that indi­vid­ual is in the immi­gra­tion process. Not all peo­ple who are in the US undoc­u­ment­ed are imme­di­ate­ly remov­able.

    The descrip­tion for the ser­vices ICE is seek­ing from Palan­tir includes “stream­lined end to end immi­gra­tion Life­cyle from iden­ti­fi­ca­tion to removal,” includ­ing depor­ta­tion logis­tics, accord­ing to a doc­u­ment post­ed on the Fed­er­al Reg­is­ter.

    ...

    In an inter­view with Time Mag­a­zine pub­lished on Fri­day, Trump said DOGE was assem­bling a data­base with Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion “because we want to find waste, fraud, and abuse, and want to cut our costs.” Asked if any of the data would be used to round up migrants for depor­ta­tions, Trump said, “not that I know of, no.”

    Zero­ing in on the IRS

    With­in days of Trump tak­ing office, DOGE allies start­ed clash­ing with career IRS offi­cials as they tried to access close­ly guard­ed tax­pay­er data­bas­es. Over the objec­tions of top IRS offi­cials, they pushed through a data-shar­ing deal with ICE ear­li­er this month. One for­mer IRS employ­ee pre­vi­ous­ly told CNN it felt like a “hos­tile takeover” of the tax-col­lec­tion agency.

    There has been no pub­lic indi­ca­tion that IRS data has yet begun to flow to DHS since the data-shar­ing deal was signed on April 7.

    A Trea­sury Depart­ment spokesper­son in a state­ment to CNN denied that any tax­pay­er data was being used beyond the terms of the deal IRS signed with ICE.

    “Con­gress has been very clear about the lim­it­ed excep­tions in which tax­pay­er infor­ma­tion can be shared,” the spokesper­son said in a state­ment to CNN. “The impli­ca­tion that tax­pay­er infor­ma­tion is being inap­pro­pri­ate­ly shared across gov­ern­ment agen­cies is not only incor­rect but dan­ger­ous.”

    When DOGE staffers par­tic­i­pat­ed in a strat­e­gy ses­sion in Wash­ing­ton, DC, ear­li­er this month, with the goal to stream­line IRS tech­nol­o­gy, Palan­tir rep­re­sen­ta­tives were there too, accord­ing to the for­mer senior IRS offi­cial with knowl­edge of the event.

    The Trea­sury spokesper­son described the event in state­ment to CNN as “a sem­i­nar of var­i­ous strat­e­gy ses­sions” that includ­ed “long-time IRS engi­neers who have been iden­ti­fied as the most tal­ent­ed tech­ni­cal per­son­nel,” with an over­ar­ch­ing goal to “work dili­gent­ly to cre­ate effi­cient sys­tems” for the IRS.

    The admin­is­tra­tion has made data-shar­ing across fed­er­al agen­cies an ear­ly pri­or­i­ty. A March 20 exec­u­tive order signed by Trump directs agency heads to remove “unnec­es­sary bar­ri­ers to Fed­er­al employ­ees access­ing Gov­ern­ment data and pro­mot­ing inter‑agency data shar­ing.”

    Still, some of DOGE’s data-col­lec­tion efforts have drawn law­suits from var­i­ous employ­ee unions, immi­grant-rights groups, and oth­ers who argued that pri­va­cy laws were being vio­lat­ed. A court fil­ing from one of those cas­es, filed by sev­er­al unions, shows that DOGE rep­re­sen­ta­tives were access­ing data across agen­cies with a focus on immi­gra­tion sta­tus.

    ...

    But some Democ­rats are rais­ing red flags about DOGE staffers “infil­trat­ing mul­ti­ple agen­cies at once,” and “reck­less­ly and hap­haz­ard­ly com­bin­ing data with­out any ver­i­fi­ca­tion or val­i­da­tion,” as one senior House Over­sight Com­mit­tee Demo­c­ra­t­ic staffer put it to CNN.

    “The Trump Administration’s trou­bling track record of mis­han­dling sen­si­tive data, includ­ing repeat­ed breach­es, improp­er dis­clo­sures, and polit­i­cal­ly dri­ven data manip­u­la­tion proves they can­not be trust­ed to con­sol­i­date vast stores of per­son­al, finan­cial, and bio­met­ric infor­ma­tion into a cen­tral­ized repos­i­to­ry that can be more eas­i­ly exploit­ed for polit­i­cal ends,” the aide told CNN.

    ...

    A senior IRS offi­cial said career employ­ees inside the agency are con­cerned about the Trump admin­is­tra­tion bring­ing in Palan­tir to exploit troves of tax­pay­er data as part of their push to speed up depor­ta­tions.

    Trump appointees and DOGE allies who amassed sub­stan­tial pow­er with­in the IRS over­came a major hur­dle toward cre­at­ing their own mas­ter data­base when they pushed through a con­tro­ver­sial data-shar­ing deal this month between the IRS and ICE.

    The IRS-ICE arrange­ment was craft­ed, accord­ing to the Trump admin­is­tra­tion, to com­ply with strict pri­va­cy laws gov­ern­ing when tax­pay­er data can be shared across agen­cies. Among oth­er “safe­guards” men­tioned in the doc­u­ment, DHS will only ask for infor­ma­tion on undoc­u­ment­ed immi­grants sus­pect­ed of defy­ing an exist­ing depor­ta­tion order.

    Still, sev­er­al career IRS exec­u­tives raised alarms about the legal­i­ty of the planned coop­er­a­tion with ICE, and some even quit in protest.

    But if the shar­ing of sen­si­tive tax­pay­er data ulti­mate­ly ends up hap­pen­ing, Palan­tir is a decent choice, the senior IRS offi­cial said, because “they are one of the more tech­no­log­i­cal­ly apt com­pa­nies.”

    Legal con­cerns and Demo­c­ra­t­ic push­back

    A fed­er­al judge in DC is expect­ed to rule in May on whether to block the IRS from shar­ing tax­pay­er data with ICE. Anoth­er fed­er­al judge in Mary­land decid­ed last week to extend restric­tions on DOGE get­ting sweep­ing access to per­son­al Social Secu­ri­ty data.

    “The Pri­va­cy Act is not tooth­less. Defen­dants can­not flout the law,” US Dis­trict Judge Ellen Hol­lan­der wrote. “They are not exempt from a statute that Con­gress enact­ed to pro­tect Amer­i­can cit­i­zens from over­broad and unnec­es­sary access to their (per­son­al­ly iden­ti­fi­able infor­ma­tion.)”

    Vir­ginia Rep. Ger­ry Con­nol­ly, the top Demo­c­rat on the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee, has tout­ed whistle­blow­ers that he claims have damn­ing infor­ma­tion about the DOGE plan.

    These whistle­blow­ers recent­ly told Connolly’s office that DOGE is work­ing to com­bine sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion from Social Secu­ri­ty, IRS, HHS and oth­er depart­ments into a sin­gle, cross-agency data­base, he wrote last week in a let­ter to Social Security’s act­ing inspec­tor gen­er­al.

    The Social Secu­ri­ty Administration’s Office of the Inspec­tor Gen­er­al is review­ing the let­ter, said Rebec­ca Rose, spokesper­son for the office.

    “In an appar­ent attempt to side­step net­work secu­ri­ty con­trols, the Com­mit­tee has learned that DOGE engi­neers have tried to cre­ate spe­cial­ized com­put­ers for them­selves that simul­ta­ne­ous­ly give full access to net­works and data­bas­es across dif­fer­ent agen­cies,” Con­nol­ly wrote.

    “DOGE have assem­bled back­packs full of lap­tops, each with access to dif­fer­ent agency sys­tems, that DOGE staff is using to com­bine data­bas­es that are cur­rent­ly main­tained sep­a­rate­ly,” Con­nol­ly con­tin­ued, not­ing that such a data­base would “pose unprece­dent­ed oper­a­tional secu­ri­ty risks” by allow­ing a breach at one agency from spread­ing wide­ly.

    Con­nol­ly said he’s “con­cerned that DOGE is mov­ing per­son­al infor­ma­tion across agen­cies with­out the noti­fi­ca­tion required under the Pri­va­cy Act or relat­ed laws, such that the Amer­i­can peo­ple are whol­ly unaware their data is being manip­u­lat­ed in this way.”

    Tanya Broder, a top attor­ney at the Nation­al Immi­gra­tion Law Cen­ter said she is wor­ried that errors in the mas­ter data­base could harm every­one, not just poten­tial depor­tees.

    “Even if the pre­tense is to tar­get a small sub­set of peo­ple for removal, the effort will inevitably harm US cit­i­zens and peo­ple here legal­ly,” she said. “All of us risk hav­ing pri­va­cy com­pro­mised. Cit­i­zens and immi­grants live togeth­er – there’s no way to tar­get a sub­set of undoc­u­ment­ed peo­ple with­out harm­ing cit­i­zens and law­ful per­ma­nent res­i­dents.”

    This sto­ry has been updat­ed with addi­tion­al report­ing.

    —————

    “DOGE is build­ing a mas­ter data­base for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment, sources say” By Priscil­la Alvarez, Sunlen Ser­faty, Mar­shall Cohen and Tami Luh­by; CNN; 04/25/2025

    The goal is to cre­ate a mas­sive repos­i­to­ry of data pulled from var­i­ous agen­cies, accord­ing to sources famil­iar with the project who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty because they aren’t autho­rized to talk about it. The admin­is­tra­tion has pre­vi­ous­ly sought to cen­tral­ize infor­ma­tion from a num­ber of agen­cies, includ­ing the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice, the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and Health and Human Ser­vices, among oth­ers.”

    A mas­sive repos­i­to­ry of data pulled from var­i­ous agen­cies. That sure sounds a lot like the foun­da­tions for “data­base of ruin”. And look who hap­pens to be tasked with actu­al­ly con­struct­ing this data­base of ruin: Palan­tir. It’s more or less what we should have expect­ed. And as we can see, one of the offi­cial plans for this mas­ter data­base Palan­tir is con­struct­ing is the rapid build­ing of “tar­get­ing lists”. Osten­si­bly just for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment pur­pos­es. But, of course, there’s going to be noth­ing stop­ping pre­vent­ing “tar­get­ing lists” of pret­ty much any vari­ety desired. As long as the data is capa­ble of gen­er­at­ing a list, those lists will like­ly be gen­er­at­ed. At least when a law­less admin­is­tra­tion is doing the gen­er­at­ing. And that ignores all the tar­get­ing lists Palan­tir will be able to gen­er­ate for its own pur­pos­es:

    ...
    Palan­tir, a Sil­i­con Val­ley data-ana­lyt­ics com­pa­ny co-found­ed by a Musk ally that has been used by immi­gra­tion offi­cials before for crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions, is involved in build­ing out the data­base. The com­pa­ny has long been ingest­ing and pro­cess­ing data from mul­ti­ple ICE and DHS sources. The lat­est endeav­or, how­ev­er, is expect­ed to go fur­ther by iden­ti­fy­ing peo­ple with civ­il immi­gra­tion vio­la­tions.

    “If they are design­ing a depor­ta­tion machine, they will be able to do that,” a for­mer senior IRS employ­ee with knowl­edge of the plans told CNN.

    Allow­ing stream­lined access to high­ly pro­tect­ed infor­ma­tion – for immi­gra­tion enforce­ment pur­pos­es – has been the sub­ject of ongo­ing legal chal­lenges. Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers have slammed the plan, with one claim­ing DOGE is “rapid­ly, hap­haz­ard­ly, and unlaw­ful­ly” exploit­ing Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al data.

    Trump offi­cials see the project as a way to over­come a major hur­dle: quick­ly build­ing “tar­get­ing lists” that Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforce­ment can use to find, detain and deport migrants in the US. It’s part of a con­cert­ed effort, under pres­sure from the White House, to ramp up enforce­ment and increase depor­ta­tions.

    ...

    Palan­tir is already a well-known gov­ern­ment con­trac­tor, includ­ing at the IRS, so it would be a “log­i­cal choice” for the DOGE teams to uti­lize it, a senior IRS offi­cial said, adding that, “it would be easy to change the scope of exist­ing con­tracts and pay Palan­tir to do this stuff.”

    “They’re going to take the infor­ma­tion we already have and put it into a sys­tem,” a Trump admin­is­tra­tion offi­cial told CNN about DOGE’s plans. “It will be able to rapid­ly queue infor­ma­tion. Every­one is con­vert­ing to Palan­tir.”
    ...

    And as we can see can, despite all the focus on immi­gra­tion enforce­ment, Pres­i­dent Trump him­self “because we want to find waste, fraud, and abuse, and want to cut our costs.” And then he went on to dis­miss the pos­si­bil­i­ty that this data­base would be used for depor­ta­tions. Which only under­scores the real­i­ty that this ‘tar­get­ing list’ capa­bil­i­ty will poten­tial­ly be weaponiz­able against any­one in the US, cit­i­zen or not:

    ...
    The DHS con­tract with Palan­tir includes “stream­lin­ing selec­tion and appre­hen­sion oper­a­tions of ille­gal aliens,” and self-depor­ta­tion track­ing, accord­ing to pub­lic records on a fed­er­al con­tract­ing site. ICE cur­rent­ly uses Palantir’s soft­ware for Home­land Secu­ri­ty inves­ti­ga­tions.

    A big dataset would help immi­gra­tion offi­cials more quick­ly iden­ti­fy who is undoc­u­ment­ed in the US and poten­tial­ly eli­gi­ble for depor­ta­tion. So far, a chal­lenge for offi­cials has been build­ing what they call “tar­get­ing lists” to arrest peo­ple with­out sta­tus. Some exist­ing lists, sources say, have been rid­dled with errors, cre­at­ing addi­tion­al work for agents in the field to ver­i­fy and vet infor­ma­tion.

    But for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cials have expressed con­cern over Palantir’s capa­bil­i­ty to serve ICE Enforce­ment and Removal Oper­a­tions because those oper­a­tions also require an enor­mous amount of logis­tics plan­ning. While Palan­tir has been use­ful for spe­cif­ic data sets, one for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cial argued it’s large­ly viewed as a “gen­er­al pur­pose tool.”

    “It’s still only as good as the data,” said the for­mer Home­land Secu­ri­ty offi­cial, stress­ing that while a data­base may be able to help iden­ti­fy who’s undoc­u­ment­ed in the US, it would also need to include infor­ma­tion on where that indi­vid­ual is in the immi­gra­tion process. Not all peo­ple who are in the US undoc­u­ment­ed are imme­di­ate­ly remov­able.

    The descrip­tion for the ser­vices ICE is seek­ing from Palan­tir includes “stream­lined end to end immi­gra­tion Life­cyle from iden­ti­fi­ca­tion to removal,” includ­ing depor­ta­tion logis­tics, accord­ing to a doc­u­ment post­ed on the Fed­er­al Reg­is­ter.

    ...

    In an inter­view with Time Mag­a­zine pub­lished on Fri­day, Trump said DOGE was assem­bling a data­base with Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion “because we want to find waste, fraud, and abuse, and want to cut our costs.” Asked if any of the data would be used to round up migrants for depor­ta­tions, Trump said, “not that I know of, no.”
    ...

    And then we get to the report­ing on DOGE’s ‘hos­tile takeover’ of the IRS. And, oh look, it’s Palan­tir right there, ready to help facil­i­tate this hos­tile takeover:

    ...
    With­in days of Trump tak­ing office, DOGE allies start­ed clash­ing with career IRS offi­cials as they tried to access close­ly guard­ed tax­pay­er data­bas­es. Over the objec­tions of top IRS offi­cials, they pushed through a data-shar­ing deal with ICE ear­li­er this month. One for­mer IRS employ­ee pre­vi­ous­ly told CNN it felt like a “hos­tile takeover” of the tax-col­lec­tion agency.

    There has been no pub­lic indi­ca­tion that IRS data has yet begun to flow to DHS since the data-shar­ing deal was signed on April 7.

    A Trea­sury Depart­ment spokesper­son in a state­ment to CNN denied that any tax­pay­er data was being used beyond the terms of the deal IRS signed with ICE.

    “Con­gress has been very clear about the lim­it­ed excep­tions in which tax­pay­er infor­ma­tion can be shared,” the spokesper­son said in a state­ment to CNN. “The impli­ca­tion that tax­pay­er infor­ma­tion is being inap­pro­pri­ate­ly shared across gov­ern­ment agen­cies is not only incor­rect but dan­ger­ous.”

    When DOGE staffers par­tic­i­pat­ed in a strat­e­gy ses­sion in Wash­ing­ton, DC, ear­li­er this month, with the goal to stream­line IRS tech­nol­o­gy, Palan­tir rep­re­sen­ta­tives were there too, accord­ing to the for­mer senior IRS offi­cial with knowl­edge of the event.

    The Trea­sury spokesper­son described the event in state­ment to CNN as “a sem­i­nar of var­i­ous strat­e­gy ses­sions” that includ­ed “long-time IRS engi­neers who have been iden­ti­fied as the most tal­ent­ed tech­ni­cal per­son­nel,” with an over­ar­ch­ing goal to “work dili­gent­ly to cre­ate effi­cient sys­tems” for the IRS.
    ...

    And that hos­tile takeover of the IRS brings us to the high­ly alarm­ing whistle­blow­er alle­ga­tions by gov­ern­ment employ­ees that, again, sure sound like attempt to build a data­base of ruin. Infor­ma­tion from Social Secu­ri­ty, the IRS, HHS, and oth­er depart­ments are being merged into a sin­gle, cross-agency data­base, with DOGE staffers lit­er­al­ly show­ing up with back­packs full of lap­tops, each con­tain­ing a sep­a­rate agen­cy’s data­bas­es. And basi­cal­ly no one is over­see­ing this:

    ...
    A fed­er­al judge in DC is expect­ed to rule in May on whether to block the IRS from shar­ing tax­pay­er data with ICE. Anoth­er fed­er­al judge in Mary­land decid­ed last week to extend restric­tions on DOGE get­ting sweep­ing access to per­son­al Social Secu­ri­ty data.

    “The Pri­va­cy Act is not tooth­less. Defen­dants can­not flout the law,” US Dis­trict Judge Ellen Hol­lan­der wrote. “They are not exempt from a statute that Con­gress enact­ed to pro­tect Amer­i­can cit­i­zens from over­broad and unnec­es­sary access to their (per­son­al­ly iden­ti­fi­able infor­ma­tion.)”

    Vir­ginia Rep. Ger­ry Con­nol­ly, the top Demo­c­rat on the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee, has tout­ed whistle­blow­ers that he claims have damn­ing infor­ma­tion about the DOGE plan.

    These whistle­blow­ers recent­ly told Connolly’s office that DOGE is work­ing to com­bine sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion from Social Secu­ri­ty, IRS, HHS and oth­er depart­ments into a sin­gle, cross-agency data­base, he wrote last week in a let­ter to Social Security’s act­ing inspec­tor gen­er­al.

    ...

    “In an appar­ent attempt to side­step net­work secu­ri­ty con­trols, the Com­mit­tee has learned that DOGE engi­neers have tried to cre­ate spe­cial­ized com­put­ers for them­selves that simul­ta­ne­ous­ly give full access to net­works and data­bas­es across dif­fer­ent agen­cies,” Con­nol­ly wrote.

    “DOGE have assem­bled back­packs full of lap­tops, each with access to dif­fer­ent agency sys­tems, that DOGE staff is using to com­bine data­bas­es that are cur­rent­ly main­tained sep­a­rate­ly,” Con­nol­ly con­tin­ued, not­ing that such a data­base would “pose unprece­dent­ed oper­a­tional secu­ri­ty risks” by allow­ing a breach at one agency from spread­ing wide­ly.

    Con­nol­ly said he’s “con­cerned that DOGE is mov­ing per­son­al infor­ma­tion across agen­cies with­out the noti­fi­ca­tion required under the Pri­va­cy Act or relat­ed laws, such that the Amer­i­can peo­ple are whol­ly unaware their data is being manip­u­lat­ed in this way.”
    ...

    Tak­ing back­packs full of lap­tops filled with high­ly sen­si­tive fed­er­al data­bas­es and merg­ing them sure sounds like a mas­sive vio­la­tion of the Fed­er­al Pri­va­cy Act of 1974. It would be nice if some­one enforced it. Oh well. Data­base of ruin here we come.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 1, 2025, 10:45 pm
  2. We got anoth­er dis­turb­ing DOGE update. A high­ly pre­dictable dis­turb­ing update since we were already warned this was com­ing: First, recall those reports we got back in April warn­ing that the Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy (DOGE) was merg­ing gov­ern­ment data­bas­es and build­ing the kind of mas­ter data­base that could eas­i­ly be weaponized into a tool for tar­get­ing and sur­veilling polit­i­cal ene­mies. A ‘Data­base of Ruin’, as one expert called it. And as we also saw, Palan­tir has already been exploit­ing these new DOGE-built mas­ter data­bas­es for the pur­pose of gen­er­at­ing “tar­get lists” of immi­grants for depor­ta­tion. Well, it appears Palan­tir is going to be play­ing a much big­ger role in build­ing that data­base of ruin. And its appli­ca­tions won’t be restrict­ed to immi­gra­tion.

    That’s the DOGE update we got from a recent New York Times report describ­ing plans by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion to sig­nif­i­cant­ly expand Palan­tir’s pres­ence in many of the fed­er­al agen­cies hous­ing the high­ly sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion on the US pub­lic, with Palan­tir’s Foundry plat­form already in use in the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion, the IRS, DHS, and HHS. In fact, the IRS is report­ed­ly look­ing into per­ma­nent­ly incor­po­rat­ing Palan­tir into its oper­a­tions. In oth­er words, if the ‘data­base of ruin’ is built, it’s going to be Palan­tir build­ing and man­ag­ing it. And all indi­ca­tions are that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion real­ly is very inter­est­ed in build­ing it. Data­base of ruin here we come. Brought to you by Palan­tir.

    Inter­est­ing­ly, these lat­est DOGE-relat­ed con­tracts have trig­gered some­thing we rarely see from Palan­tir: employ­ees speak­ing out about their eth­i­cal con­cerns. In fact, last month, 13 for­mer employ­ees signed a let­ter urg­ing Palan­tir to stop its work for the Trump admin­is­tra­tion. “Data that is col­lect­ed for one rea­son should not be repur­posed for oth­er uses,” as one signee put it. “Com­bin­ing all that data, even with the noblest of inten­tions, sig­nif­i­cant­ly increas­es the risk of mis­use.” It’s going to be grim­ly inter­est­ing to see how a com­pa­ny like Palan­tir deals with poten­tial whistle­blow­ers.

    But when it comes to the role Palan­tir is play­ing with the con­struc­tion and main­te­nance of a ‘data­base of ruin’ that enables the rapid cre­ation of ‘tar­get­ing lists’ for all sorts of nefar­i­ous rea­sons, it’s impor­tant to keep in mind that Palan­tir’s DOGE work is just one in a slew of high­ly lucra­tive and trou­bling con­tracts the com­pa­ny has with the US gov­ern­ment. In oth­er words, if Palan­tir does end up build­ing the tech­nol­o­gy pow­er­ing a next-gen­er­a­tion fas­cist state, that effort will prob­a­bly involve the merg­er of a num­ber of dif­fer­ent gov­ern­ment projects that Palan­tir has been work­ing on.

    Which brings us to a sec­ond high­ly dis­turb­ing update about Palan­tir’s con­tracts with the US gov­ern­ment: Project Maven — a con­tract to build AI-pow­ered autonomous tar­get­ing sys­tems for the Pen­ta­gon — has been sub­stan­tial­ly expand­ed. A $480 mil­lion con­tract with Palan­tir signed in 2024 just got a $795 mil­lion addi­tion. And that’s just one exam­ple of Palan­tir’s grow­ing pres­ence in the defense sec­tor. Recall how, back in 2020, Pres­i­dent Trump installed Michael Krat­sios, a close asso­ciate of Peter Thiel, as the Under­sec­re­tary of Defense for Research and Engi­neer­ing in a move that was described as good news for “the Peter Thiel por­tion of Sil­i­con Val­ley.”

    And, of course, if we’re talk­ing about a com­pa­ny assem­bling both autonomous tar­get­ing AI tech­nol­o­gy for the mil­i­tary AND a ‘data­base of ruin’ that will allow Pres­i­dent Trump to rapid­ly gen­er­ate ‘tar­get lists’ of Amer­i­cans for all sorts of rea­sons includ­ing just being polit­i­cal oppo­nents, there’s the obvi­ous ques­tion about whether or not we should expect drone-based lethal tar­get­ing of the peo­ple on those ‘tar­get lists’. Because these drones would­n’t just have weapons. They would have access to Palan­tir’s panop­tic streams of data that like­ly makes track­ing almost any­one down triv­ial. Imag­ine if Trump could just press a but­ton and an army of drones swarms the coun­try, hunt­ing down all of his per­ceived ene­mies. How many times would he have pressed that but­ton by now?

    And that drone army night­mare sce­nario brings us to anoth­er recent update about Palan­tir’s role in the US gov­ern­ment: Back in Decem­ber, Palan­tir and Anduril announced they would work­ing on form­ing a coali­tion of Sil­i­con Val­ley firms that would joint­ly bid on Pen­ta­gon defense con­tracts. Thiel is a sig­nif­i­cant investor in Anduril, a com­pa­ny that spe­cial­izes in build­ing autonomous weapons sys­tems and announced plans to build a “hyper­scale” drone plant in Ohio back in Jan­u­ary. Vice Pres­i­dent JD Vance also hap­pens to be an Anduril investor. The stat­ed goal of this new con­sor­tium is to sup­plant tra­di­tion­al defense con­trac­tors like Lock­heed Mar­tin in the bid­ding wars for the next-gen­er­a­tion defense plat­forms like AI-pow­ered autonomous mil­i­tary drones. The oth­er firms they were plan­ning on incor­po­rat­ing into the con­sor­tium include Elon Musk’s SpaceX, Chat­G­PT mak­er Ope­nAI, autonomous-ship builder Saron­ic and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence data group Scale AI.

    We’ll see how this con­sor­tium does in their quest to build to the next gen­er­a­tion of mil­i­tary autonomous drones. But it’s pret­ty clear that Palan­tir is bet­ting big on play­ing a cen­tral role in future of autonomous war­fare. And the stars just keep align­ing for Palan­tir so it’s hard­ly a fan­ci­ful goal. We have every rea­son to assume Palatir will be man­ag­ing autonomous mil­i­tary drones some­where around the plan­et soon­er or lat­er. The big ques­tion is whether or not that drone army will be in place and ready to go while Pres­i­dent Trump is still in office and still intent on ‘leav­ing his mark’ through esca­lat­ing vin­dic­tive­ness. We don’t know if all of these pieces will be assem­bled and ready to go while Trump is still kick­ing. They are ter­ri­fy­ing­ly close but build­ing an autonomous killer drone army capa­ble of dis­pos­ing of a large por­tion of the US pop­u­la­tion is still going to take some time. So time will tell if Trump gets his Palan­tir-built killer drone army in time to push that but­ton. But they are work­ing on it. And in the mean time, Trump can tar­get his ene­mies the old fash­ioned way after Palan­tir is done built its DOGE-enabled ‘data­base of ruin’:

    The New York Times

    Trump Taps Palan­tir to Com­pile Data on Amer­i­cans

    The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has expand­ed Palantir’s work with the gov­ern­ment, spread­ing the company’s tech­nol­o­gy — which could eas­i­ly merge data on Amer­i­cans — through­out agen­cies.

    By Sheera Frenkel and Aaron Kro­lik
    Sheera Frenkel report­ed from Wash­ing­ton and San Fran­cis­co, and Aaron Kro­lik from New York.
    May 30, 2025

    In March, Pres­i­dent Trump signed an exec­u­tive order call­ing for the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment to share data across agen­cies, rais­ing ques­tions over whether he might com­pile a mas­ter list of per­son­al infor­ma­tion on Amer­i­cans that could give him untold sur­veil­lance pow­er.

    Mr. Trump has not pub­licly talked about the effort since. But behind the scenes, offi­cials have qui­et­ly put tech­no­log­i­cal build­ing blocks into place to enable his plan. In par­tic­u­lar, they have turned to one com­pa­ny: Palan­tir, the data analy­sis and tech­nol­o­gy firm.

    The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has expand­ed Palantir’s work across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment in recent months. The com­pa­ny has received more than $113 mil­lion in fed­er­al gov­ern­ment spend­ing since Mr. Trump took office, accord­ing to pub­lic records, includ­ing addi­tion­al funds from exist­ing con­tracts as well as new con­tracts with the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty and the Pen­ta­gon. (This does not include a $795 mil­lion con­tract that the Depart­ment of Defense award­ed the com­pa­ny last week, which has not been spent.)

    Rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Palan­tir are also speak­ing to at least two oth­er agen­cies — the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice — about buy­ing its tech­nol­o­gy, accord­ing to six gov­ern­ment offi­cials and Palan­tir employ­ees with knowl­edge of the dis­cus­sions.

    The push has put a key Palan­tir prod­uct called Foundry into at least four fed­er­al agen­cies, includ­ing D.H.S. and the Health and Human Ser­vices Depart­ment. Wide­ly adopt­ing Foundry, which orga­nizes and ana­lyzes data, paves the way for Mr. Trump to eas­i­ly merge infor­ma­tion from dif­fer­ent agen­cies, the gov­ern­ment offi­cials said.

    Cre­at­ing detailed por­traits of Amer­i­cans based on gov­ern­ment data is not just a pipe dream. The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has already sought access to hun­dreds of data points on cit­i­zens and oth­ers through gov­ern­ment data­bas­es, includ­ing their bank account num­bers, the amount of their stu­dent debt, their med­ical claims and any dis­abil­i­ty sta­tus.

    Mr. Trump could poten­tial­ly use such infor­ma­tion to advance his polit­i­cal agen­da by polic­ing immi­grants and pun­ish­ing crit­ics, Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers and crit­ics have said. Pri­va­cy advo­cates, stu­dent unions and labor rights orga­ni­za­tions have filed law­suits to block data access, ques­tion­ing whether the gov­ern­ment could weaponize people’s per­son­al infor­ma­tion.

    Palantir’s selec­tion as a chief ven­dor for the project was dri­ven by Elon Musk’s Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy, accord­ing to the gov­ern­ment offi­cials. At least three DOGE mem­bers for­mer­ly worked at Palan­tir, while two oth­ers had worked at com­pa­nies fund­ed by Peter Thiel, an investor and a founder of Palan­tir.

    Some cur­rent and for­mer Palan­tir employ­ees have been unnerved by the work. The com­pa­ny risks becom­ing the face of Mr. Trump’s polit­i­cal agen­da, four employ­ees said, and could be vul­ner­a­ble if data on Amer­i­cans is breached or hacked. Sev­er­al tried to dis­tance the com­pa­ny from the efforts, say­ing any deci­sions about a merged data­base of per­son­al infor­ma­tion rest with Mr. Trump and not the firm.

    This month, 13 for­mer employ­ees signed a let­ter urg­ing Palan­tir to stop its endeav­ors with Mr. Trump. Lin­da Xia, a signee who was a Palan­tir engi­neer until last year, said the prob­lem was not with the company’s tech­nol­o­gy but with how the Trump admin­is­tra­tion intend­ed to use it.

    “Data that is col­lect­ed for one rea­son should not be repur­posed for oth­er uses,” Ms. Xia said. “Com­bin­ing all that data, even with the noblest of inten­tions, sig­nif­i­cant­ly increas­es the risk of mis­use.”

    Mario Tru­jil­lo, a lawyer with the Elec­tron­ic Fron­tier Foun­da­tion, a dig­i­tal rights group, said the gov­ern­ment typ­i­cal­ly col­lect­ed data for good rea­sons, such as to accu­rate­ly levy tax­es. But “if peo­ple can’t trust that the data they are giv­ing the gov­ern­ment will be pro­tect­ed, that it will be used for things oth­er than what they gave it for, it will lead to a cri­sis of trust,” he said.

    ...

    Some details of Palantir’s gov­ern­ment con­tracts and DOGE’s work to com­pile data were pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed by Wired and CNN.

    Palan­tir, which was found­ed in 2003 by Alex Karp and Mr. Thiel and went pub­lic in 2020, spe­cial­izes in find­ing pat­terns in data and pre­sent­ing the infor­ma­tion in ways that are easy to process and nav­i­gate, such as charts and maps. Its main prod­ucts include Foundry, a data ana­lyt­ics plat­form, and Gotham, which helps orga­nize and draw con­clu­sions from data and is tai­lored for secu­ri­ty and defense pur­pos­es.

    In an inter­view last year, Mr. Karp, Palantir’s chief exec­u­tive, said the company’s role was “the find­ing of hid­den things” by sift­ing through data.

    Palan­tir has long worked with the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. Its gov­ern­ment con­tracts span the Defense Depart­ment and Cen­ters for Dis­ease Con­trol and Pre­ven­tion. Dur­ing the pan­dem­ic, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion signed a con­tract with Palan­tir to man­age the dis­tri­b­u­tion of vac­cines through the C.D.C.

    Mr. Trump’s elec­tion in Novem­ber boost­ed Palantir’s stock, which has risen more than 140 per­cent since then. Mr. Karp, who donat­ed to the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty last year, has wel­comed Mr. Trump’s win and called Mr. Musk the most “qual­i­fied per­son in the world” to remake the U.S. gov­ern­ment.

    At the I.R.S., Palan­tir engi­neers joined in April to use Foundry to orga­nize data gath­ered on Amer­i­can tax­pay­ers, two gov­ern­ment offi­cials said. Their work began as a way to cre­ate a sin­gle, search­able data­base for the I.R.S., but has since expand­ed, they said. Palan­tir is in talks for a per­ma­nent con­tract with the I.R.S., they said.

    A Trea­sury Depart­ment rep­re­sen­ta­tive said that the I.R.S. was updat­ing its sys­tems to serve Amer­i­can tax­pay­ers, and that Palan­tir was con­tract­ed to com­plete the work with I.R.S. engi­neers.

    Palan­tir also recent­ly began help­ing Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforcement’s enforce­ment and removal oper­a­tions team, accord­ing to two Palan­tir employ­ees and two cur­rent and for­mer D.H.S. offi­cials. The work is part of a $30 mil­lion con­tract that ICE signed with Palan­tir in April to build a plat­form to track migrant move­ments in real time.

    Some D.H.S. offi­cials exchanged emails with DOGE offi­cials in Feb­ru­ary about merg­ing some Social Secu­ri­ty infor­ma­tion with records kept by immi­gra­tion offi­cials, accord­ing to screen­shots of the mes­sages viewed by The New York Times.

    In a state­ment, Tri­cia McLaugh­lin, a D.H.S. spokes­woman, did not address Palantir’s new work with the agency and said the com­pa­ny “has had con­tracts with the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment for 14 years.”

    Palan­tir rep­re­sen­ta­tives have also held talks with the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and the Depart­ment of Edu­ca­tion to use the company’s tech­nol­o­gy to orga­nize the agen­cies’ data, accord­ing to two Palan­tir employ­ees and offi­cials in those agen­cies.

    ...

    The goal of unit­ing data on Amer­i­cans has been qui­et­ly dis­cussed by Palan­tir engi­neers, employ­ees said, adding that they were wor­ried about col­lect­ing so much sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion in one place. The company’s secu­ri­ty prac­tices are only as good as the peo­ple using them, they said. They char­ac­ter­ized some DOGE employ­ees as slop­py on secu­ri­ty, such as not fol­low­ing pro­to­cols in how per­son­al devices were used.

    Ms. Xia said Palan­tir employ­ees were increas­ing­ly wor­ried about rep­u­ta­tion­al dam­age to the com­pa­ny because of its work with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion. There is grow­ing debate with­in the com­pa­ny about its fed­er­al con­tracts, she said.

    “Cur­rent employ­ees are dis­cussing the impli­ca­tions of their work and rais­ing ques­tions inter­nal­ly,” she said, adding that some employ­ees have left after dis­agree­ments over the company’s work with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

    Last week, a Palan­tir strate­gist, Bri­an­na Kather­ine Mar­tin, post­ed on LinkedIn that she was depart­ing the com­pa­ny because of its expand­ed work with ICE.

    “For most of my time here, I found the way that Palan­tir grap­pled with the weight of our capa­bil­i­ties to be refresh­ing, trans­par­ent and con­scionable,” she wrote. “This has changed for me over the past few months. For me, this is a red line I won’t redraw.”

    —————

    “Trump Taps Palan­tir to Com­pile Data on Amer­i­cans” By Sheera Frenkel and Aaron Kro­lik; The New York Times; 05/30/2025

    “Mr. Trump has not pub­licly talked about the effort since. But behind the scenes, offi­cials have qui­et­ly put tech­no­log­i­cal build­ing blocks into place to enable his plan. In par­tic­u­lar, they have turned to one com­pa­ny: Palan­tir, the data analy­sis and tech­nol­o­gy firm.

    There’s a lot of dis­turb­ing ele­ments of this plan that we’re learn­ing but per­haps the most dis­turb­ing part is how the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is being so qui­et about it. This is an admin­is­tra­tion that has almost defined itself on the open author­i­tar­i­an and cor­rup­tion. It’s as if they’ve adopt­ed a strat­e­gy of just over­whelm­ing every­one with an avalanche of abus­es of pow­er. But not when it comes to these plans for Palan­tir. It’s as if the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is build­ing a giant data­base on all Amer­i­cans but does­n’t want the pub­lic to know about it. At least not yet.

    Adding to the alarm is the fact that Palan­tir was report­ed­ly ini­tial­ly tasked with cre­at­ing a sin­gle search­able data­base for the IRS but now that con­tract has expand­ed, with talks of a per­ma­nent Palan­tir con­tract with the IRS. What are the odds the IRS is the only agency that ends up with a per­ma­nent Palan­tir con­tract in com­ing months?

    ...
    Rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Palan­tir are also speak­ing to at least two oth­er agen­cies — the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion and the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice — about buy­ing its tech­nol­o­gy, accord­ing to six gov­ern­ment offi­cials and Palan­tir employ­ees with knowl­edge of the dis­cus­sions.

    The push has put a key Palan­tir prod­uct called Foundry into at least four fed­er­al agen­cies, includ­ing D.H.S. and the Health and Human Ser­vices Depart­ment. Wide­ly adopt­ing Foundry, which orga­nizes and ana­lyzes data, paves the way for Mr. Trump to eas­i­ly merge infor­ma­tion from dif­fer­ent agen­cies, the gov­ern­ment offi­cials said.

    Cre­at­ing detailed por­traits of Amer­i­cans based on gov­ern­ment data is not just a pipe dream. The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has already sought access to hun­dreds of data points on cit­i­zens and oth­ers through gov­ern­ment data­bas­es, includ­ing their bank account num­bers, the amount of their stu­dent debt, their med­ical claims and any dis­abil­i­ty sta­tus.

    ...

    At the I.R.S., Palan­tir engi­neers joined in April to use Foundry to orga­nize data gath­ered on Amer­i­can tax­pay­ers, two gov­ern­ment offi­cials said. Their work began as a way to cre­ate a sin­gle, search­able data­base for the I.R.S., but has since expand­ed, they said. Palan­tir is in talks for a per­ma­nent con­tract with the I.R.S., they said.

    A Trea­sury Depart­ment rep­re­sen­ta­tive said that the I.R.S. was updat­ing its sys­tems to serve Amer­i­can tax­pay­ers, and that Palan­tir was con­tract­ed to com­plete the work with I.R.S. engi­neers.

    Palan­tir also recent­ly began help­ing Immi­gra­tion and Cus­toms Enforcement’s enforce­ment and removal oper­a­tions team, accord­ing to two Palan­tir employ­ees and two cur­rent and for­mer D.H.S. offi­cials. The work is part of a $30 mil­lion con­tract that ICE signed with Palan­tir in April to build a plat­form to track migrant move­ments in real time.
    ...

    And, of course, as we’ve already seen, one of the oth­er major projects that has includ­ed as huge Palan­tir com­po­nent hap­pens to be DOGE. We’ve already got a warn­ing back in April about the poten­tial for Palan­tir to build a ‘data­base of ruin’ mas­ter data­base on all Amer­i­cans using DOGE data. Now we’re get­ting con­fir­ma­tion that the ‘data­base or ruin’ is actu­al­ly hap­pen­ing. That did­n’t take long:

    ...
    Mr. Trump could poten­tial­ly use such infor­ma­tion to advance his polit­i­cal agen­da by polic­ing immi­grants and pun­ish­ing crit­ics, Demo­c­ra­t­ic law­mak­ers and crit­ics have said. Pri­va­cy advo­cates, stu­dent unions and labor rights orga­ni­za­tions have filed law­suits to block data access, ques­tion­ing whether the gov­ern­ment could weaponize people’s per­son­al infor­ma­tion.

    Palantir’s selec­tion as a chief ven­dor for the project was dri­ven by Elon Musk’s Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy, accord­ing to the gov­ern­ment offi­cials. At least three DOGE mem­bers for­mer­ly worked at Palan­tir, while two oth­ers had worked at com­pa­nies fund­ed by Peter Thiel, an investor and a founder of Palan­tir.

    ...

    Mr. Trump’s elec­tion in Novem­ber boost­ed Palantir’s stock, which has risen more than 140 per­cent since then. Mr. Karp, who donat­ed to the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty last year, has wel­comed Mr. Trump’s win and called Mr. Musk the most “qual­i­fied per­son in the world” to remake the U.S. gov­ern­ment.
    ...

    And we get to anoth­er major red flag in this sto­ry: Palan­tir employ­ees are already speak­ing up about the poten­tial for abus­es. This isn’t exact­ly a com­pa­ny known for whistle­blow­ing inci­dents. Some­thing about this new Trump pro­pos­al has Palan­tir employ­ees freak­ing out:

    ...
    Some cur­rent and for­mer Palan­tir employ­ees have been unnerved by the work. The com­pa­ny risks becom­ing the face of Mr. Trump’s polit­i­cal agen­da, four employ­ees said, and could be vul­ner­a­ble if data on Amer­i­cans is breached or hacked. Sev­er­al tried to dis­tance the com­pa­ny from the efforts, say­ing any deci­sions about a merged data­base of per­son­al infor­ma­tion rest with Mr. Trump and not the firm.

    This month, 13 for­mer employ­ees signed a let­ter urg­ing Palan­tir to stop its endeav­ors with Mr. Trump. Lin­da Xia, a signee who was a Palan­tir engi­neer until last year, said the prob­lem was not with the company’s tech­nol­o­gy but with how the Trump admin­is­tra­tion intend­ed to use it.

    “Data that is col­lect­ed for one rea­son should not be repur­posed for oth­er uses,” Ms. Xia said. “Com­bin­ing all that data, even with the noblest of inten­tions, sig­nif­i­cant­ly increas­es the risk of mis­use.”

    ...

    The goal of unit­ing data on Amer­i­cans has been qui­et­ly dis­cussed by Palan­tir engi­neers, employ­ees said, adding that they were wor­ried about col­lect­ing so much sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion in one place. The company’s secu­ri­ty prac­tices are only as good as the peo­ple using them, they said. They char­ac­ter­ized some DOGE employ­ees as slop­py on secu­ri­ty, such as not fol­low­ing pro­to­cols in how per­son­al devices were used.

    Ms. Xia said Palan­tir employ­ees were increas­ing­ly wor­ried about rep­u­ta­tion­al dam­age to the com­pa­ny because of its work with the Trump admin­is­tra­tion. There is grow­ing debate with­in the com­pa­ny about its fed­er­al con­tracts, she said.
    ...

    And then we get this detail: the $113 mil­lion Palan­tir has receive in fed­er­al con­tracts in recent months does­n’t include the $795 mil­lion con­tract just signed with the Pen­ta­gon recent weeks:

    ...
    The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has expand­ed Palantir’s work across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment in recent months. The com­pa­ny has received more than $113 mil­lion in fed­er­al gov­ern­ment spend­ing since Mr. Trump took office, accord­ing to pub­lic records, includ­ing addi­tion­al funds from exist­ing con­tracts as well as new con­tracts with the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty and the Pen­ta­gon. (This does not include a $795 mil­lion con­tract that the Depart­ment of Defense award­ed the com­pa­ny last week, which has not been spent.)
    ...

    And as the fol­low­ing report in Defense Scoop points out, that new $795 mil­lion con­tract with the Pen­ta­gon is on top of an exist­ing $480 mil­lion con­tract signed last year. This is actu­al­ly a $1.3 bil­lion con­tract with the Pen­ta­gon. A con­tract to incor­po­rate AI into mod­ern war­fare, with a focus on autonomous sys­tems:

    Defense Scoop

    ‘Grow­ing demand’ sparks DOD to raise Palantir’s Maven con­tract to more than $1B

    Despite the high price tag, ques­tions linger about the Defense Depart­men­t’s plan for the AI-pow­ered Maven Smart Sys­tem.

    By Bran­di Vin­cent
    May 23, 2025

    Pen­ta­gon lead­ers opt­ed to boost the exist­ing con­tract ceil­ing for Palan­tir Tech­nolo­gies’ Maven Smart Sys­tem by $795 mil­lion to pre­pare for what they expect will be a sig­nif­i­cant influx in demand from mil­i­tary users for the AI-pow­ered soft­ware capa­bil­i­ties over the next four years, offi­cials famil­iar with the deci­sion told Defens­eScoop this week.

    “Com­bat­ant com­mands, in par­tic­u­lar, have increased their use of MSS to com­mand and con­trol dynam­ic oper­a­tions and activ­i­ties in their the­aters. In response to this grow­ing demand, the [Chief Dig­i­tal and AI Office] and Army increased capac­i­ty to sup­port emerg­ing com­bat­ant com­mand oper­a­tions and oth­er DOD com­po­nent needs,” a defense offi­cial said Thurs­day.

    Ques­tions linger, how­ev­er, regard­ing the MSS deploy­ment plan — and who is part of the expand­ed user base set to gain addi­tion­al soft­ware licens­es through this huge con­tract increase in the near term.

    The Pen­ta­gon orig­i­nal­ly launched Project Maven in 2017 to pave the way for wider use of AI-enabled tech­nolo­gies that can autonomous­ly detect, tag and track objects or humans of inter­est from still images or videos cap­tured by sur­veil­lance air­craft, satel­lites and oth­er means.

    In 2022, Project Maven matured into Maven via the start of a major tran­si­tion. At that time, respon­si­bil­i­ties for most of the program’s ele­ments were split between the Nation­al Geospa­tial-Intel­li­gence Agency and the Pentagon’s Chief Dig­i­tal and AI Office, while send­ing cer­tain duties to the Office of the Under­sec­re­tary of Defense for Intel­li­gence and Secu­ri­ty.

    All three orga­ni­za­tions run­ning the pro­gram have been large­ly tight-lipped about Maven — and the asso­ci­at­ed indus­try-made MSS capa­bil­i­ties — since the tran­si­tion.

    The Defense Depart­ment inked the ini­tial $480 mil­lion, five-year IDIQ con­tract with Palan­tir for the pro­gram in May 2024. The Army’s Aberdeen Prov­ing Ground was list­ed as the award­ing agency, and the Office of the Sec­re­tary of Defense as the fund­ing agency. Around that time, exec­u­tives at Palan­tir told reporters that the work under that con­tract would ini­tial­ly cov­er five U.S. com­bat­ant com­mands: Cen­tral Com­mand, Euro­pean Com­mand, Indo-Pacif­ic Com­mand, North­ern Command/NORAD, and Trans­porta­tion Com­mand. The tech was also expect­ed to be deployed as part of the Defense Department’s Glob­al Infor­ma­tion Dom­i­nance Exper­i­ments (GIDE).

    In a one-para­graph announce­ment on Wednes­day, DOD revealed its deci­sion to increase that con­tract ceil­ing for Palantir’s MSS to near­ly $1.3 bil­lion through 2029.

    ...

    “We raised the ceil­ing of the con­tract in antic­i­pa­tion of future demand to sup­port Army readi­ness. Hav­ing the ground­work for the con­tract in place ahead of time, increas­es effi­cien­cies and decreas­es time­lines to get the licens­es. No acqui­si­tion deci­sions have been made,” an Army offi­cial said.

    That offi­cial referred ques­tions regard­ing the oper­a­tional use of MSS — and specif­i­cal­ly, which Army units or com­bat­ant com­mands would be front of line to gain new licens­es — back to the Pen­ta­gon.

    ...

    NGA Direc­tor Vice Adm. Frank Whit­worth con­firmed this week that there are cur­rent­ly more than 20,000 active Maven users across more than 35 mil­i­tary ser­vice and com­bat­ant com­mand soft­ware tools in three secu­ri­ty domains — and that the user base has more than dou­bled since Jan­u­ary.

    Palan­tir also recent­ly signed a deal with NATO for a ver­sion of the tech­nol­o­gy — Maven Smart Sys­tem NATO — that will sup­port the transat­lantic mil­i­tary organization’s Allied Com­mand Oper­a­tions strate­gic com­mand.

    ————

    “‘Grow­ing demand’ sparks DOD to raise Palantir’s Maven con­tract to more than $1B” By Bran­di Vin­cent; Defense Scoop; 05/23/2025

    “The Pen­ta­gon orig­i­nal­ly launched Project Maven in 2017 to pave the way for wider use of AI-enabled tech­nolo­gies that can autonomous­ly detect, tag and track objects or humans of inter­est from still images or videos cap­tured by sur­veil­lance air­craft, satel­lites and oth­er means.”

    AI-enabled plat­forms for the Pen­ta­gon. It’s not hard to see why the mil­i­tary might be extreme­ly eager to incor­po­rate AI despite the glar­ing risks. But it’s also not hard to see this going far beyond just AI for autonomous tag­ging and tar­get­ing of inter­est. It’s not going to take much of a tech­no­log­i­cal leap to trans­late that autonomous tar­get­ing into autonomous fir­ing. That’s the chill­ing con­text of this now rapid­ly grow­ing Pen­ta­gon con­tract with Palan­tir. We are watch­ing the cre­ation of autonomous weapons plat­forms, with Palan­tir behind all that ‘autonomous’ AI:

    ...
    The Defense Depart­ment inked the ini­tial $480 mil­lion, five-year IDIQ con­tract with Palan­tir for the pro­gram in May 2024. The Army’s Aberdeen Prov­ing Ground was list­ed as the award­ing agency, and the Office of the Sec­re­tary of Defense as the fund­ing agency. Around that time, exec­u­tives at Palan­tir told reporters that the work under that con­tract would ini­tial­ly cov­er five U.S. com­bat­ant com­mands: Cen­tral Com­mand, Euro­pean Com­mand, Indo-Pacif­ic Com­mand, North­ern Command/NORAD, and Trans­porta­tion Com­mand. The tech was also expect­ed to be deployed as part of the Defense Department’s Glob­al Infor­ma­tion Dom­i­nance Exper­i­ments (GIDE).

    In a one-para­graph announce­ment on Wednes­day, DOD revealed its deci­sion to increase that con­tract ceil­ing for Palantir’s MSS to near­ly $1.3 bil­lion through 2029.
    ...

    And then we get this lit­tle detail: it’s not just the Pen­ta­gon. A con­tract to build “Maven Smart Sys­tem NATO” has already been inked:

    ...
    Palan­tir also recent­ly signed a deal with NATO for a ver­sion of the tech­nol­o­gy — Maven Smart Sys­tem NATO — that will sup­port the transat­lantic mil­i­tary organization’s Allied Com­mand Oper­a­tions strate­gic com­mand.
    ...

    And that recent­ly update on Palan­tir’s lat­est Pen­ta­gon con­tract brings us to the fol­low­ing Finan­cial Times piece from back in Decem­ber about Palan­tir’s strat­e­gy for not just win­ning more Pen­ta­gon con­tracts but lit­er­al­ly replac­ing the tra­di­tion­al defense con­trac­tor’s like Lock­heed Mar­tin, Raytheon and Boe­ing: Palan­tir and Anduril — the AI firm found­ed by Palmer Luck­ey with Thiel as a major investor — announced a joint effort to form a joint bid­ding con­sor­tium for win­ning Pen­ta­gon con­tracts. But this con­sor­tium would­n’t just be Palan­tir and Anduril. The com­pa­nies claimed they were in talks with about a dozen com­pa­nies to form this con­sor­tium. Com­pa­nies that include Elon Musk’s SpaceX, along with Chat­G­PT mak­er Ope­nAI, autonomous-ship builder Saron­ic and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence data group Scale AI. Palan­tir isn’t just angling to increase it’s con­tracts pro­vide AI ser­vices to Pen­ta­gon. The com­pa­ny is plan­ning on lead­ing a defense con­trac­tor con­sor­tium that will build the Pen­tagon’s autonomous army of the future:

    Finan­cial Times

    Palan­tir and Anduril join forces with tech groups to bid for Pen­ta­gon con­tracts

    Con­sor­tium like­ly to include Elon Musk’s SpaceX in move to grab a big­ger slice of $850bn US defence bud­get
    Palmer Luck­ey, founder of Anduril Indus­tries, is seen dis­as­sem­bling the Anduril Ghost autonomous drone

    Tab­by Kinder and George Ham­mond in San Fran­cis­co
    Pub­lished Dec 22 2024

    Palan­tir and Anduril, two of the largest US defence tech­nol­o­gy com­pa­nies, are in talks with about a dozen com­peti­tors to form a con­sor­tium that will joint­ly bid for US gov­ern­ment work in an effort to dis­rupt the country’s oli­gop­oly of “prime” con­trac­tors.

    The con­sor­tium is plan­ning to announce as ear­ly as Jan­u­ary that it has reached agree­ments with a num­ber of tech groups. Com­pa­nies in talks to join include Elon Musk’s SpaceX, Chat­G­PT mak­er Ope­nAI, autonomous-ship builder Saron­ic and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence data group Scale AI, accord­ing to sev­er­al peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter.

    ...

    The move comes as tech com­pa­nies seek to grab a big­ger slice of the US government’s huge $850bn defence bud­get from tra­di­tion­al prime con­trac­tors such as Lock­heed Mar­tin, Raytheon and Boe­ing.

    The con­sor­tium will bring togeth­er the heft of some of Sil­i­con Valley’s most valu­able com­pa­nies and will lever­age their prod­ucts to pro­vide a more effi­cient way of sup­ply­ing the US gov­ern­ment with cut­ting-edge defence and weapons capa­bil­i­ties, accord­ing to a sec­ond per­son involved.

    It comes as defence tech start-ups have attract­ed record amounts of fund­ing this year, as investors bet they will be among the win­ners of high­er fed­er­al spend­ing on nation­al secu­ri­ty, immi­gra­tion and space explo­ration under Don­ald Trump’s incom­ing gov­ern­ment.

    Wars in Ukraine and the Mid­dle East and geopo­lit­i­cal ten­sions between the US and Chi­na have height­ened the government’s reliance on tech com­pa­nies devel­op­ing advanced AI prod­ucts that can be used for mil­i­tary pur­pos­es, and encour­aged investors to the sec­tor.

    Palantir’s share price has sky­rock­et­ed by 300 per cent in the past year, giv­ing the com­pa­ny a mar­ket cap­i­tal­i­sa­tion of $169bn — larg­er than Lock­heed Mar­tin. The data intel­li­gence group was co-found­ed by tech investor Peter Thiel, who also pro­vid­ed the ini­tial back­ing for Anduril, which launched in 2017 and was this year val­ued at $14bn.
    Mean­while, SpaceX was val­ued at $350bn this month, mak­ing it the world’s largest pri­vate start-up, and Ope­nAI has soared to a val­u­a­tion of $157bn since it was found­ed in 2015.

    Each of the com­pa­nies has attempt­ed to grab a slice of the government’s defence bud­get. While SpaceX and Palan­tir have won large pub­lic con­tracts going back two decades, some are new­er to gov­ern­ment pro­cure­ment. Ope­nAI updat­ed its terms of ser­vice this year to no longer explic­it­ly pro­hib­it the use of its AI tools for mil­i­tary pur­pos­es.

    US defence pro­cure­ment has long been crit­i­cised as slow and anti-com­pet­i­tive, favour­ing a small num­ber of decades-old primes, such as Lock­heed Mar­tin, Raytheon and Boe­ing. These vast con­glom­er­ates typ­i­cal­ly pro­duce ships, tanks and air­craft that are cost­ly and take years to design and man­u­fac­ture.

    Sil­i­con Valley’s bur­geon­ing defence indus­try has pri­ori­tised pro­duc­ing small­er, cheap­er, autonomous weapons that they claim will bet­ter pro­tect the US and its allies in a mod­ern con­flict.

    ...

    Some tie-ups between the tech groups expect­ed to be in the con­sor­tium have already been agreed and inte­gra­tion work will begin imme­di­ate­ly.

    Palantir’s “AI Plat­form”, which deliv­ers cloud-based data pro­cess­ing, was this month inte­grat­ed with Anduril’s autonomous soft­ware, “Lat­tice”, to deliv­er AI for nation­al secu­ri­ty pur­pos­es.

    Sim­i­lar­ly, Anduril com­bined its counter-drone defence sys­tems with OpenAI’s advanced AI mod­els to joint­ly work on US gov­ern­ment con­tracts relat­ed to “aer­i­al threats”.

    A joint state­ment from Anduril and Ope­nAI about that part­ner­ship said it “aims to ensure that the US Depart­ment of Defense and intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty have access to the most advanced, effec­tive, and safe AI-dri­ven tech­nolo­gies avail­able in the world”.

    Anduril, Ope­nAI and Scale AI declined to com­ment on the devel­op­ment of the con­sor­tium. Palan­tir, SpaceX and Saron­ic did not respond to requests for com­ment.

    ———–

    “Palan­tir and Anduril join forces with tech groups to bid for Pen­ta­gon con­tracts” by Tab­by Kinder and George Ham­mond; Finan­cial Times; 12/22/2024

    “US defence pro­cure­ment has long been crit­i­cised as slow and anti-com­pet­i­tive, favour­ing a small num­ber of decades-old primes, such as Lock­heed Mar­tin, Raytheon and Boe­ing. These vast con­glom­er­ates typ­i­cal­ly pro­duce ships, tanks and air­craft that are cost­ly and take years to design and man­u­fac­ture.”

    Yes, Pen­ta­gon con­tract­ing is noto­ri­ous for a lot of rea­sons, includ­ing being anti-com­pet­i­tive and favor­ing a small num­ber of estab­lished con­trac­tors. So it appears the plan to ‘dis­rupt’ that sys­tem is the cre­ation of a new con­sor­tium of Sil­i­con Val­ley giants that won’t be com­pet­ing with each oth­er:

    ...
    Palan­tir and Anduril, two of the largest US defence tech­nol­o­gy com­pa­nies, are in talks with about a dozen com­peti­tors to form a con­sor­tium that will joint­ly bid for US gov­ern­ment work in an effort to dis­rupt the country’s oli­gop­oly of “prime” con­trac­tors.

    The con­sor­tium is plan­ning to announce as ear­ly as Jan­u­ary that it has reached agree­ments with a num­ber of tech groups. Com­pa­nies in talks to join include Elon Musk’s SpaceX, Chat­G­PT mak­er Ope­nAI, autonomous-ship builder Saron­ic and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence data group Scale AI, accord­ing to sev­er­al peo­ple with knowl­edge of the mat­ter.

    ...

    Palantir’s share price has sky­rock­et­ed by 300 per cent in the past year, giv­ing the com­pa­ny a mar­ket cap­i­tal­i­sa­tion of $169bn — larg­er than Lock­heed Mar­tin. The data intel­li­gence group was co-found­ed by tech investor Peter Thiel, who also pro­vid­ed the ini­tial back­ing for Anduril, which launched in 2017 and was this year val­ued at $14bn.
    Mean­while, SpaceX was val­ued at $350bn this month, mak­ing it the world’s largest pri­vate start-up, and Ope­nAI has soared to a val­u­a­tion of $157bn since it was found­ed in 2015.

    Each of the com­pa­nies has attempt­ed to grab a slice of the government’s defence bud­get. While SpaceX and Palan­tir have won large pub­lic con­tracts going back two decades, some are new­er to gov­ern­ment pro­cure­ment. Ope­nAI updat­ed its terms of ser­vice this year to no longer explic­it­ly pro­hib­it the use of its AI tools for mil­i­tary pur­pos­es.
    ...

    And as we can see, there are already exam­ples of not just Palan­tir inte­grat­ing its “AI Plat­form” into Anduril’s autonomous soft­ware, but Anduril also also merged its counter-drone defense sys­tems with Ope­nAI’s AI mod­els. Which is a reminder that this future of war­fare based on cheap autonomous drone is like­ly to include high­ly mod­u­lar designs that allow for the rel­a­tive­ly easy swap­ping out of one AI for anoth­er. In oth­er words, while we might hear all sorts of assur­ances from the Pen­ta­gon about the safe­ty of all the upcom­ing autonomous drone armies its plan­ning on build­ing, keep in mind that it’s prob­a­bly not going to be very dif­fi­cult to swap those ‘safe’ autonomous AIs for much more lethal autonomous AIs that include a capac­i­ty to autonomous­ly ‘neu­tral­ize’ iden­ti­fied tar­gets:

    ...
    Palantir’s “AI Plat­form”, which deliv­ers cloud-based data pro­cess­ing, was this month inte­grat­ed with Anduril’s autonomous soft­ware, “Lat­tice”, to deliv­er AI for nation­al secu­ri­ty pur­pos­es.

    Sim­i­lar­ly, Anduril com­bined its counter-drone defence sys­tems with OpenAI’s advanced AI mod­els to joint­ly work on US gov­ern­ment con­tracts relat­ed to “aer­i­al threats”.

    A joint state­ment from Anduril and Ope­nAI about that part­ner­ship said it “aims to ensure that the US Depart­ment of Defense and intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty have access to the most advanced, effec­tive, and safe AI-dri­ven tech­nolo­gies avail­able in the world”.

    Anduril, Ope­nAI and Scale AI declined to com­ment on the devel­op­ment of the con­sor­tium. Palan­tir, SpaceX and Saron­ic did not respond to requests for com­ment.
    ...

    And while it’s unclear when Anduril’s recent­ly announced “hyper­scale” drone plant in Ohio will be ready for pro­duc­tion, keep in mind that the plan is to cre­ate a infra­struc­ture capac­i­ty to rapid­ly build swarms of autonomous mil­i­tary drones. So when that capac­i­ty is final­ly there, it’s not going to take long before we go from “wow, there’s a brand new autonomous mil­i­tary drone plant”, to “wow, there’s swarms and swarms of mil­i­tary drones ready to be deployed at the push of a but­ton”. Even­tu­al­ly to be fol­lowed up with, “there a drone out­side my home ask­ing to inter­view me about my love of Dear Leader.” What hap­pens next will be up to the drones.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 4, 2025, 1:45 pm
  3. Is this kay­fabe? Just pro-wrestling-style the­atrics? Or are Pres­i­dent Trump and Elon Musk tru­ly feud­ing? It’s a ques­tion that has cap­ti­vat­ed polit­i­cal audi­ences this week as the Trump/Musk melt­down has played out across social media in a spat that sure feels real. Musk did accuse just pub­licly Trump of direct­ly inter­ven­ing in the release of the Jef­frey Epstein files, after all. That’s not the kind of accu­sa­tion one does dur­ing a fake fight.

    But that’s what Musk just tweet­ed: a dec­la­ra­tion that Trump “is in the Epstein files,” adding, “That is the real rea­son they have not been made pub­lic.” And while Musk has since delet­ed that tweet, we all saw it. There’s no tak­ing it back. Democ­rats are already pounc­ing on the polit­i­cal oppor­tu­ni­ty and call­ing for a clar­i­fi­ca­tion of Trump’s role in the Epstein dis­clo­sures, which makes this a good time to remind our­selves of the fact that Trump was already pres­i­dent for four years and had plen­ty of time to qui­et­ly address which files are avail­able for even­tu­al pub­lic release.

    But that high pro­file spat brings us to anoth­er major set of Epstein-relat­ed updates: we’re now learn­ing that Epstein invest­ed in Peter Thiel’s Valar Ven­tures fund back in 2015 and 2016.

    On one lev­el, this is exact­ly the kind of update we should have been expect­ing all along. As we’ve seen, Thiel and Epstein have an enor­mous over­lap in inter­est, espe­cial­ly when in comes to the tech­nol­o­gy sec­tor. Epstein was serv­ing as a kind of tech­nol­o­gy phil­an­thropist pri­or to his 2008 pros­e­cu­tion. Phil­an­thropic activ­i­ty that con­tin­ued even after that con­vic­tion. Epstein was also remark­ably close to Bill Gates. Both Thiel and Epstein long served as lead­ing financiers for ‘tran­shu­man­ist’ projects like longevi­ty and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence. Both have a his­to­ry of spon­sor­ing sci­en­tists work­ing in these areas. Both appeared to have very sim­i­lar inter­ests and moved in the same cir­cles and yet there has still been rel­a­tive­ly lit­tle report­ing on Thiel and Epstein’s rela­tion­ship.

    At the same time, it’s not like there’s been no pri­or report­ing on Epstein’s ties to Thiel. Recall how Epstein was get­ting intro­duced to major Sil­i­con Val­ley titans back in 2015, includ­ing a din­ner par­ty in August of 2015 where Epstein was a guest along­side Elon Musk, Mark Zucker­berg, and Peter Thiel. Reid Hoff­man orga­nized the din­ner. Also recall how 2015–16 was around the time when Epstein was involved with a vari­ety of tech­nol­o­gy invest­ments includ­ing a tech­nol­o­gy com­pa­ny, Car­byne, found­ed by for­mer Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Ehud Barack. And as we also saw, one of the oth­er investors in Car­byne was Peter Thiel. In fact, Car­byne’s board of advi­sors includ­ed Palan­tir employ­ee Trae Stephens, who was a mem­ber of the Trump tran­si­tion team. Report­ing on Thiel’s ties to Epstein or Epstein’s inter­est in tech­nol­o­gy aren’t new. And yet this rela­tion­ship has been under-report­ed and remains large­ly opaque. That’s part of the con­text of this new report­ing on Epstein’s invest­ments with Thiel: there is like­ly a lot more under this rock and we’re now get­ting anoth­er peek. We’re also learn­ing that Thiel and Epstein report­ed­ly first with a Valar rep­re­sen­ta­tive in 2014. So when Thiel had that 2015 din­ner with Epstein, the year Epstein first start­ed invest­ing in Valar, that rela­tion­ship had start­ed the pri­or year, at least on a busi­ness lev­el.

    But the new report on Epstein’s invest­ment in Thiel’s tech­nol­o­gy fund includ­ed anoth­er major update in this sto­ry. The kind of shock­ing update that we should have expect­ed all along: it turns out hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars is being left to Epstein’s estate instead of being pur­sued by pros­e­cu­tors to dis­burse to Epstein’s vic­tims. Yep. It turns out Epstein’s death effec­tive­ly end­ed his fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion. And while fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors had the option of con­tin­u­ing to pur­sue Epstein’s assets under a civ­il for­fei­ture claim, they chose to just drop the pros­e­cu­tion and leave the remain­ing assets to Epstein’s estate. Those remain­ing assets include the invest­ments in Valar.

    Now, why did fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors decide to just end the case entire­ly and leave all of that mon­ey with Epstein’s estate? Well, we are told that fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors made that deci­sion because civ­il for­fei­ture might have delayed set­tle­ment pay­ments to vic­tims. It’s a rather con­fus­ing expla­na­tion giv­en that we are also told the bulk of the vic­tim set­tle­ments have already been paid out and those set­tle­ments includ­ed the sign­ing of broad releas­es that gave up the right to bring future claims. Plus, the only remain­ing law­suit is a poten­tial class action filed on behalf vic­tims who haven’t yet set­tled with the estate. “While we are grate­ful for the government’s pros­e­cu­tion of Epstein and Maxwell, the truth is that, both before and after­wards, the gov­ern­ment was large­ly asleep at the switch,” accord­ing to the lawyer behind that suit, David Boies.

    So what’s going to hap­pen to all those remain­ing assets? That will be up to the secret trust that will be man­ag­ing all of these assets. A secret trust estab­lished in the will signed by Epstein just days before his ‘sui­cide’. Lit­tle is known about the trust oth­er than the fact that it was named Trust 1953, after the year Epstein was born. Two of Epstein’s long-time advis­ers, Dar­ren Indyke and Richard Kahn, will serve as the co-execu­tors of the estate. Ben­e­fi­cia­ries of the trust are expect­ed to include Epstein’s for­mer girl­friend, Kary­na Shu­li­ak, along with Indyke and Kahn. As of March 31, the total val­ue of the remain­ing assets was list­ed at $131 mil­lion, but that is like­ly a sig­nif­i­cant under­es­ti­mate due to the fact that the val­ue for the invest­ment in Valar is list­ed at what it was at in 2019 at the time of Epstein’s death. So all indi­ca­tions are that the secret trust set up by Epstein days before his death and man­aged by his long-time advi­sors will ulti­mate­ly have much more than $131 mil­lion to use in a man­ner of their choos­ing. Which makes this a good time to recall the exten­sive evi­dence that Epstein is an intel­li­gence asset. How many intel­li­gence oper­a­tion will this secret trust be financ­ing in the decades to come?

    Oh, but there’s one more part of this sto­ry that is worth cov­er­ing at this point: it turns out Peter Thiel wrote an opin­ion piece for the Finan­cial Times back in Jan­u­ary, short­ly before the start of the sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion, where Thiel calls for exact­ly the kind of mass declas­si­fi­ca­tion task force that was sub­se­quent­ly estab­lished in the open­ing days of the sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion. In that piece, Thiel argues for an “apoká­lyp­sis”: a reveal­ing of gov­ern­ment secrets. Thiel argues that such an apoká­lyp­sis could serve as the most peace­ful means of ‘resolv­ing the old guard’s war on the inter­net’. A war waged by the Dis­trib­uted Idea Sup­pres­sion Com­plex (DISC) — the media orga­ni­za­tions, bureau­cra­cies, uni­ver­si­ties and gov­ern­ment-fund­ed NGOs that tra­di­tion­al­ly delim­it­ed pub­lic con­ver­sa­tion.

    That’s the fram­ing Thiel is tak­ing with this call for an apoc­a­lypse of state secrets. It’s not about reveal­ing the ‘deep state’. It’s about fight­ing media orga­ni­za­tions, bureau­cra­cies, uni­ver­si­ties and gov­ern­ment-fund­ed NGOs. In fact, Thiel argues that Pres­i­dent Trump shied away from declas­si­fi­ca­tion dur­ing his first term “because it still believed in the rightwing deep state of an Oliv­er Stone movie. This belief has fad­ed.” Think about what Thiel is writ­ing there. He’s either argu­ing that a rightwing deep state does­n’t actu­al­ly exist, or that it does exist but Trump is no longer fear­ful of it. It’s the kind of asser­tion that becomes all the more inter­est­ing in light of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s now-estab­lished track record of declas­si­fi­ca­tion dis­ap­point­ments. After all, what could a rightwing deep state have to fear from a sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion? It’s just more coverups, except now with the fig-leaf of some sort of mass declas­si­fi­ca­tion. And let’s not for­get that if any­one alive today is a mem­ber of the ‘deep state’, it’s Peter Thiel. He’s like the liv­ing embod­i­ment of the deep state.

    Oh, and one last detail about Thiel’s piece: He includes the state­ment, “It may be too ear­ly to answer the internet’s ques­tions about the late Mr Epstein,” while also call­ing for the full declas­si­fi­ca­tion of the ori­gins of COVID-19. Epstein died months before the COVID-19 pan­dem­ic. All that said, it’s hard to argue with Thiel’s gen­er­al asser­tion that some sort of truth and rec­on­cil­i­a­tion real­ly is the best path for­ward. Includ­ing all the truth about Jef­frey Epstein and his many deep state friends:

    Axios

    Scoop: Democ­rats probe whether Trump is in the Epstein files

    Andrew Solen­der
    06/06/2025 Updat­ed

    House Democ­rats are ask­ing the Depart­ment of Jus­tice and FBI whether it is true, as Elon Musk now claims, that Pres­i­dent Trump is in the Epstein files, Axios has learned.

    Why it mat­ters: It’s the stark­est exam­ple to date of how the high­ly pub­lic feud between the pres­i­dent and his one­time lieu­tenant is play­ing right into the hands of the Trump’s polit­i­cal oppo­nents.

    * Trump “is in the Epstein files,” Musk wrote Thurs­day in a post on X, adding, “That is the real rea­son they have not been made pub­lic.”

    * The Tes­la CEO also called for Trump to be impeached, a posi­tion that even many Democ­rats are reluc­tant to take.

    Dri­ving the news: In a let­ter to Attor­ney Gen­er­al Pam Bon­di and FBI Direc­tor Kash Patel first obtained by Axios, Reps. Stephen Lynch (D‑Mass.) and Robert Gar­cia (D‑Calif.) asked that they “imme­di­ate­ly clar­i­fy whether this alle­ga­tion is true.”

    * The law­mak­ers asked for a time­line of the DOJ’s declas­si­fi­ca­tion and pub­li­ca­tion of the Epstein files, an expla­na­tion for why they haven’t turned over any new doc­u­ments since Feb­ru­ary.

    * And they request­ed a descrip­tion of Trump’s role in review­ing the files, a list of per­son­nel involved in their release and an answer for why files pre­vi­ous­ly released to Con­gress con­tained “sig­nif­i­cant redac­tions.”

    * Lynch is the act­ing rank­ing mem­ber of the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee and Gar­cia is the top Demo­c­rat on the Task Force on the Declas­si­fi­ca­tion of Fed­er­al Secrets.

    ...

    State of play: Bon­di released more than 100 pages of doc­u­ments relat­ed to the Epstein case in Feb­ru­ary as part of a Trump admin­is­tra­tion push to pro­vide more trans­paren­cy into a wide array of high-pro­file cas­es.

    * The files were sub­stan­tial­ly redact­ed, how­ev­er, and Rep. Anna Pauli­na Luna (R‑Fla.), the chair of the declas­si­fi­ca­tion task force, has accused Bon­di of “stonewalling” her demands for more files.

    * “We agree with their con­clu­sion that the release of these doc­u­ments is long over­due,” Lynch and Gar­cia wrote.

    What they’re say­ing: Musk’s alle­ga­tion “implies that the Pres­i­dent may be involved in deter­min­ing which files should be released and whether files will be with­held from the pub­lic if he per­son­al­ly choos­es,” the two Democ­rats wrote.

    ...

    * “Any attempts to pre­vent the appro­pri­ate release of the Epstein files to shield the Pres­i­dent from truth and account­abil­i­ty mer­its intense scruti­ny by Con­gress and by the Depart­ment of Jus­tice,” they added.

    ————

    “Scoop: Democ­rats probe whether Trump is in the Epstein files” by Andrew Solen­der; Axios; 06/06/2025

    “* Trump “is in the Epstein files,” Musk wrote Thurs­day in a post on X, adding, “That is the real rea­son they have not been made pub­lic.””

    If this is kay­fabe that’s some pret­ty intense kay­fabe. Kay­fabe does­n’t typ­i­cal­ly include accu­sa­tions with weight behind them, like Trump being “in the Epstein files”. Plus, it real­ly would be kind of shock­ing of Pres­i­dent Trump did­n’t show up repeat­ed­ly in any seri­ous inves­ti­ga­tion of Epstein’s his­to­ry of sex traf­fick­ing. Epstein did refer to Trump as his best friend for a decade, after all. And then there’s the sud­den mys­te­ri­ous recent death of Vir­ginia Giuf­fre. Giuf­fre was­n’t just the star wit­ness in the case against Epstein. She was recruit­ed by Epstein while she was work­ing at Mar-a-Lago. And now we are being told by the FBI that Epstein real­ly did com­mit sui­cide. The Trump admin­is­tra­tion was always going to have to tip­toe around this sto­ry but there’s no deny­ing that Musk chose a par­tic­u­lar­ly sen­si­tive time to pub­licly lev­el this charge. And now the top Demo­c­rat on the Task Force on the Declas­si­fi­ca­tion of Fed­er­al Secrets are fol­low­ing Musk’s cue and demand­ing to know why the Trump admin­is­tra­tion still has­n’t release the Epstein files as promised:

    ...
    * The Tes­la CEO also called for Trump to be impeached, a posi­tion that even many Democ­rats are reluc­tant to take.

    Dri­ving the news: In a let­ter to Attor­ney Gen­er­al Pam Bon­di and FBI Direc­tor Kash Patel first obtained by Axios, Reps. Stephen Lynch (D‑Mass.) and Robert Gar­cia (D‑Calif.) asked that they “imme­di­ate­ly clar­i­fy whether this alle­ga­tion is true.”

    * The law­mak­ers asked for a time­line of the DOJ’s declas­si­fi­ca­tion and pub­li­ca­tion of the Epstein files, an expla­na­tion for why they haven’t turned over any new doc­u­ments since Feb­ru­ary.

    ...

    * Lynch is the act­ing rank­ing mem­ber of the House Over­sight Com­mit­tee and Gar­cia is the top Demo­c­rat on the Task Force on the Declas­si­fi­ca­tion of Fed­er­al Secrets.
    ...

    But the Democ­rats aren’t just ask­ing for an expla­na­tion regard­ing the admin­is­tra­tion’s stonewalling of the Epstein files. They are ask­ing for infor­ma­tion on what role Trump him­self might be per­son­al­ly play­ing in that whole process:

    ...
    * And they request­ed a descrip­tion of Trump’s role in review­ing the files, a list of per­son­nel involved in their release and an answer for why files pre­vi­ous­ly released to Con­gress con­tained “sig­nif­i­cant redac­tions.”

    ...

    State of play: Bon­di released more than 100 pages of doc­u­ments relat­ed to the Epstein case in Feb­ru­ary as part of a Trump admin­is­tra­tion push to pro­vide more trans­paren­cy into a wide array of high-pro­file cas­es.

    * The files were sub­stan­tial­ly redact­ed, how­ev­er, and Rep. Anna Pauli­na Luna (R‑Fla.), the chair of the declas­si­fi­ca­tion task force, has accused Bon­di of “stonewalling” her demands for more files.

    * “We agree with their con­clu­sion that the release of these doc­u­ments is long over­due,” Lynch and Gar­cia wrote.

    What they’re say­ing: Musk’s alle­ga­tion “implies that the Pres­i­dent may be involved in deter­min­ing which files should be released and whether files will be with­held from the pub­lic if he per­son­al­ly choos­es,” the two Democ­rats wrote.
    ...

    Those now-glar­ing ques­tions about what role Pres­i­dent Trump has been play­ing in the declas­si­fi­ca­tion of the Epstein brings us to the oth­er major Epstein sto­ry to break in recent days: Epstein had been an investor with Peter Thiel’s Valar Ven­tures tech­nol­o­gy fund since 2015. Invest­ments still held by the Epstein estate to this day. But don’t assume that the invest­ment will even­tu­al­ly go to Epstein’s vic­tims. Those pay­outs appear to be over. No, the remain­ing assets in Epstein’s estate, which includes the Valar invest­ments, will be han­dled accord­ing to the terms of the will Epstein signed just days before his high­ly sus­pi­cious death in a fed­er­al prison. A will that estab­lished a secret trust to be run by Epstein’s long-term advis­ers. So how did Epstein’s estate end up with all of this wealth despite the abun­dance of vic­tims? Well, it appears Epstein’s death pre­sent­ed the fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion with the option of fur­ther pur­su­ing Epstein’s assets via civ­il for­fei­ture. Or they could just drop the case entire­ly and leave the remain­ing assets to Epstein’s estate and the secret trust, which is the option fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors chose. Because of course:

    The New York Times

    Jef­frey Epstein Invest­ed With Peter Thiel, and His Estate Is Reap­ing Mil­lions

    Mr. Epstein, the late financier and sex offend­er, start­ed by putting $40 mil­lion into Valar Ven­tures, a firm backed by Mr. Thiel. Today that invest­ment is worth about $170 mil­lion.

    By Matthew Gold­stein
    June 4, 2025

    Jef­frey Epstein, the reg­is­tered sex offend­er, met with many pow­er­ful peo­ple in finance and busi­ness dur­ing his career, but the financier invest­ed with only a few of them.

    One of those peo­ple was Peter Thiel, the Sil­i­con Val­ley bil­lion­aire.

    In 2015 and 2016, Mr. Epstein put $40 mil­lion into two funds man­aged by Valar Ven­tures, a New York firm that was co-found­ed by Mr. Thiel. Today that invest­ment is worth near­ly $170 mil­lion, accord­ing to a con­fi­den­tial finan­cial analy­sis of the late Mr. Epstein’s estate reviewed by The New York Times and a state­ment pro­vid­ed by a Valar spokesman.

    The invest­ment in Valar, which spe­cial­izes in pro­vid­ing start-up cap­i­tal to finan­cial ser­vices tech com­pa­nies, is the largest asset still held by Mr. Epstein’s estate, some six years after he died by sui­cide in fed­er­al cus­tody while await­ing tri­al on sex-traf­fick­ing charges.

    ...

    There’s a good chance much of the wind­fall will not go to any of the rough­ly 200 vic­tims whom the dis­graced financier abused when they were teenagers or young women. Those vic­tims have already received mon­e­tary set­tle­ments from the estate, which required them to sign broad releas­es that gave up the right to bring future claims against it or indi­vid­u­als asso­ci­at­ed with it.

    The mon­ey is more like­ly to be dis­trib­uted to one of Mr. Epstein’s for­mer girl­friends and two of his long-term advis­ers, who have been named the ben­e­fi­cia­ries of his estate.

    That out­come doesn’t sit well with one of the lawyers who fought for years to help the women receive resti­tu­tion. David Boies, who rep­re­sent­ed sev­er­al of Mr. Epstein’s vic­tims, said fed­er­al author­i­ties seemed to lose inter­est after Mr. Epstein’s death and the suc­cess­ful con­vic­tion of Ghis­laine Maxwell, his for­mer com­pan­ion, on sex-traf­fick­ing charges.

    He said pros­e­cu­tors in New York had made a mis­take in not going for civ­il for­fei­ture after Mr. Epstein killed him­self, which would have allowed the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment to poten­tial­ly seize the remain­ing assets.

    “While we are grate­ful for the government’s pros­e­cu­tion of Epstein and Maxwell, the truth is that, both before and after­wards, the gov­ern­ment was large­ly asleep at the switch,” Mr. Boies said.

    Civ­il for­fei­ture allows the gov­ern­ment to seize assets sus­pect­ed of being involved in an ille­gal action. In the­o­ry, some of the seized assets could have been used to com­pen­sate vic­tims.

    After Mr. Epstein’s death, fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors con­sid­ered bring­ing a civ­il for­fei­ture action against his estate. But the author­i­ties reject­ed the idea because the process may have delayed set­tle­ment pay­ments to vic­tims, said a per­son who was briefed on the mat­ter but not autho­rized to speak pub­licly.

    ...

    A col­lege dropout, Mr. Epstein amassed much of his wealth by charg­ing hefty fees for pro­vid­ing tax and estate ser­vices to a few bil­lion­aires like Leslie Wexn­er, the retail mag­nate, and Leon Black, the pri­vate equi­ty investor. Mr. Black, for instance, paid Mr. Epstein more than $158 mil­lion in fees, and Mr. Epstein’s man­sion in Man­hat­tan once belonged to Mr. Wexn­er.

    Mr. Thiel, whose meet­ings with Mr. Epstein were first report­ed by The Times two years ago, is just one more in a long list of famous and wealthy men who met with Mr. Epstein over the years.

    Aaron Cur­tis, a Valar spokesman, said in state­ment that when a firm rep­re­sen­ta­tive met with Mr. Epstein in 2014, he was con­sid­ered a “well-known advis­er to world lead­ers, top uni­ver­si­ties and phil­an­thropic orga­ni­za­tions.”

    He said the firm, which is led by Andrew McCor­ma­ck and James Fitzger­ald, “hopes that the even­tu­al dis­tri­b­u­tion of these invest­ments can be put to pos­i­tive use by help­ing vic­tims move for­ward with their lives.”

    ...

    At the moment, the estate’s invest­ment with Valar remains locked up, mean­ing it can­not be paid out in cash. Invest­ments with ven­ture cap­i­tal firms are nor­mal­ly sub­ject to long peri­ods of lock­up to give the com­pa­nies that are being fund­ed time to grow.

    Based on the esti­mat­ed val­ue of the Valar invest­ment, Mr. Epstein’s estate is worth more than $200 mil­lion in all, accord­ing the con­fi­den­tial report and estate records. When he died, Mr. Epstein had about $600 mil­lion in assets, which includ­ed invest­ments, his lav­ish homes, art­work and jew­el­ry. Over the past six years, the estate has paid out hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars in set­tle­ments to vic­tims and the U.S. Vir­gin Islands, where Mr. Epstein main­tained a res­i­dence. The estate has also had to pay fed­er­al tax­es and hefty fees to lawyers work­ing for the estate.

    Years after his death, Mr. Epstein’s sto­ry, espe­cial­ly the cir­cum­stances of his pass­ing, has remained fod­der for con­spir­a­cy the­o­rists.

    Mr. Thiel him­self has dis­cussed the impor­tance of the fed­er­al government’s air­ing facts sur­round­ing cer­tain con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries, includ­ing those involv­ing Mr. Epstein. In an opin­ion piece he wrote in Jan­u­ary for The Finan­cial Times, Mr. Thiel said the con­spir­a­cy the­o­ry sur­round­ing Mr. Epstein’s death was one of many that might be dealt with dur­ing the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

    The direc­tor of the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion, Kash Patel, recent­ly reaf­firmed the agency’s deter­mi­na­tion in 2019 that Mr. Epstein died by sui­cide.

    Just one major fed­er­al civ­il law­suit remains pend­ing against the execu­tors of the estate, a poten­tial class action filed on behalf vic­tims who haven’t yet set­tled with the estate. The law­suit was brought by Mr. Boies’s firm, but it’s not known how many women would even qual­i­ty for a set­tle­ment.

    In the past, vic­tims have received set­tle­ments rang­ing from $500,000 to $2 mil­lion.

    Once that law­suit is resolved, the estate will be close to begin dis­trib­ut­ing mon­ey accord­ing to terms of the will Mr. Epstein signed short­ly before he died. The will calls for the assets remain­ing in his estate to be dis­trib­uted accord­ing to a secret trust he set up called the 1953 Trust, which was named for the year he was born.

    Estate law nor­mal­ly does not give execu­tors much lat­i­tude to devi­ate from how a per­son want­ed his or her assets dis­trib­uted.

    The known ben­e­fi­cia­ries of the trust are a for­mer girl­friend, Kary­na Shu­li­ak, and the co-execu­tors of the estate, Dar­ren Indyke and Richard Kahn, both long­time advis­ers to Mr. Epstein. The 1953 Trust has nev­er been made pub­lic. Ms. Shuliak’s lawyer declined to com­ment.

    Accord­ing to a con­fi­den­tial finan­cial doc­u­ment describ­ing some details of the 1953 Trust, it was also Mr. Epstein’s intent for some $19 mil­lion in loans he had made to be for­giv­en, includ­ing some loans to enti­ties that Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn are “close­ly asso­ci­at­ed” with. The con­fi­den­tial doc­u­ment, which was reviewed by The Times, was pre­pared by a spe­cial mas­ter work­ing for the judge over­see­ing the pro­bate of Mr. Epstein’s will in the U.S. Vir­gin Islands. It was pub­licly filed on the court dock­et before it was lat­er sealed.

    At one point, one of the execu­tors had pre­dict­ed the estate would be worth less than $40 mil­lion after claims were paid.

    But the estate’s assets began to swell last fall, after received a large $111.6 mil­lion tax refund from the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice. Some of that mon­ey has since gone to pay off a loan and legal fees.

    In its most recent pub­lic court fil­ing, the estate, as of March 31, list­ed its total assets at a lit­tle over $131 mil­lion, of which about $50 mil­lion is cash. But that doc­u­ment notes it still records invest­ments, such as the Valar invest­ment, at their val­ue when Mr. Epstein died near­ly six years ago.

    ————

    “Jef­frey Epstein Invest­ed With Peter Thiel, and His Estate Is Reap­ing Mil­lions” By Matthew Gold­stein; The New York Times; 06/04/2025

    In 2015 and 2016, Mr. Epstein put $40 mil­lion into two funds man­aged by Valar Ven­tures, a New York firm that was co-found­ed by Mr. Thiel. Today that invest­ment is worth near­ly $170 mil­lion, accord­ing to a con­fi­den­tial finan­cial analy­sis of the late Mr. Epstein’s estate reviewed by The New York Times and a state­ment pro­vid­ed by a Valar spokesman.”

    A $40 mil­lion invest­ment with Peter Thiel’s Valar Ven­tures in 2015 and 2016 now worth $170 mil­lion. That’s quite a return. It would appear Epstein’s rela­tion­ship with Thiel is a lot deep­er than pre­vi­ous­ly known. And yet, hard­ly a sur­prise. As we also saw, Epstein’s role as a kind of tech­nol­o­gy phil­an­thropist was exten­sive pri­or to his 2008 pros­e­cu­tion and yet that phil­an­thropic activ­i­ty con­tin­ued even after that con­vic­tion. Epstein was also remark­ably close to Bill Gates. And as we’ve seen, 2015–16 was around the time when Epstein was involved with a vari­ety of tech­nol­o­gy invest­ments includ­ing a tech­nol­o­gy com­pa­ny, Car­byne, found­ed by for­mer Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Ehud Barack. And as we also saw, one of the oth­er investors in Car­byne was Peter Thiel. In fact, Car­byne’s board of advi­sors includ­ed Palan­tir employ­ee Trae Stephens, who was a mem­ber of the Trump tran­si­tion team, and for­mer Sec­re­tary of Home­land Secu­ri­ty Michael Chertoff. And then we got reports on how Epstein was get­ting intro­duced to major Sil­i­con Val­ley titans back in 2015, includ­ing a din­ner par­ty in August of 2015 where Epstein was a guest along­side Elon Musk, Mark Zucker­berg, and Peter Thiel. Reid Hoff­man orga­nized the din­ner. Report­ing on Thiel’s ties to Epstein or Epstein’s inter­est in tech­nol­o­gy aren’t new. And yet, as we also saw both Thiel and Epstein appear to have been lead­ing financiers for ‘tran­shu­man­ist’ projects like longevi­ty and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence. Both have a his­to­ry of spon­sor­ing sci­en­tists work­ing in these areas. Both appeared to have very sim­i­lar inter­ests and moved in the same cir­cles and yet there has still been rel­a­tive­ly lit­tle report­ing on Thiel and Epstein’s rela­tion­ship. That’s all part of the con­text of this new report on Epstein’s Valar invest­ments. We’ve heard about Epstein’s ties to Thiel before but it’s still an under-report­ed sto­ry:

    ...

    The invest­ment in Valar, which spe­cial­izes in pro­vid­ing start-up cap­i­tal to finan­cial ser­vices tech com­pa­nies, is the largest asset still held by Mr. Epstein’s estate, some six years after he died by sui­cide in fed­er­al cus­tody while await­ing tri­al on sex-traf­fick­ing charges.

    ...

    Aaron Cur­tis, a Valar spokesman, said in state­ment that when a firm rep­re­sen­ta­tive met with Mr. Epstein in 2014, he was con­sid­ered a “well-known advis­er to world lead­ers, top uni­ver­si­ties and phil­an­thropic orga­ni­za­tions.”

    He said the firm, which is led by Andrew McCor­ma­ck and James Fitzger­ald, “hopes that the even­tu­al dis­tri­b­u­tion of these invest­ments can be put to pos­i­tive use by help­ing vic­tims move for­ward with their lives.”
    ...

    And then we get to the lat­est out­ra­geous rev­e­la­tion about the fed­er­al gov­ern­men­t’s per­sis­tent kid-glove treat­ment of the Epstein case: fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors chose to leave Epstein’s estate with a large pool of cash when they declined to pur­sue civ­il for­fei­ture after Epstein killed him­self. And as a result, the Epstein estate will like­ly end up dis­burs­ing tens of mil­lions of dol­lars, per­haps hun­dreds of mil­lions, accord­ing to peo­ple like Epstein’s for­mer girl­friends or long-term advis­ers. We are told author­i­ties decid­ed against pur­su­ing fur­ther charges in order to expe­dite set­tle­ment pay­ments to vic­tims. And yet, accord­ing to David Boies, who rep­re­sent­ed sev­er­al of Mr. Epstein’s vic­tims, “while we are grate­ful for the government’s pros­e­cu­tion of Epstein and Maxwell, the truth is that, both before and after­wards, the gov­ern­ment was large­ly asleep at the switch.” So Epstein’s death end­ed the crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion of Epstein and gave pros­e­cu­tors the oppor­tu­ni­ty to drop the whole thing, let­ting a will Epstein signed days before his death guide the fate of that wealth, and fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors took that oppor­tu­ni­ty. It’s anoth­er wrin­kle in Epstein’s sui­cide. He did­n’t die until this very impor­tant loose end — a new will — was ready to go:

    ...
    There’s a good chance much of the wind­fall will not go to any of the rough­ly 200 vic­tims whom the dis­graced financier abused when they were teenagers or young women. Those vic­tims have already received mon­e­tary set­tle­ments from the estate, which required them to sign broad releas­es that gave up the right to bring future claims against it or indi­vid­u­als asso­ci­at­ed with it.

    The mon­ey is more like­ly to be dis­trib­uted to one of Mr. Epstein’s for­mer girl­friends and two of his long-term advis­ers, who have been named the ben­e­fi­cia­ries of his estate.

    That out­come doesn’t sit well with one of the lawyers who fought for years to help the women receive resti­tu­tion. David Boies, who rep­re­sent­ed sev­er­al of Mr. Epstein’s vic­tims, said fed­er­al author­i­ties seemed to lose inter­est after Mr. Epstein’s death and the suc­cess­ful con­vic­tion of Ghis­laine Maxwell, his for­mer com­pan­ion, on sex-traf­fick­ing charges.

    He said pros­e­cu­tors in New York had made a mis­take in not going for civ­il for­fei­ture after Mr. Epstein killed him­self, which would have allowed the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment to poten­tial­ly seize the remain­ing assets.

    “While we are grate­ful for the government’s pros­e­cu­tion of Epstein and Maxwell, the truth is that, both before and after­wards, the gov­ern­ment was large­ly asleep at the switch,” Mr. Boies said.

    Civ­il for­fei­ture allows the gov­ern­ment to seize assets sus­pect­ed of being involved in an ille­gal action. In the­o­ry, some of the seized assets could have been used to com­pen­sate vic­tims.

    After Mr. Epstein’s death, fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors con­sid­ered bring­ing a civ­il for­fei­ture action against his estate. But the author­i­ties reject­ed the idea because the process may have delayed set­tle­ment pay­ments to vic­tims, said a per­son who was briefed on the mat­ter but not autho­rized to speak pub­licly.
    ...

    And then we get to this detail regard­ing the val­ue of the assets held by the Epstein estate: it was worth $131 as of March 31, 2025, but that val­u­a­tion only val­ues the Valar invest­ment at the 2019 val­ue when Epstein died. Which is a reminder that Epstein’s estate is still invest­ed in Valar and when the estate is final­ly allowed to cash out of that invest­ment odds are the over­all val­ue of the Epstein estate will be sub­stan­tial­ly high­er. Epstein’s Valar invest­ments are a sub­stan­tial por­tion of the remain­ing Epstein estate. It’s also worth recall­ing how the New Zealand cit­i­zen­ship Thiel secret­ly acquired was only revealed after New Zealand jour­nal­ists dis­cov­ered that Valar — the chief invest­ment vehi­cle for Thiel’s New Zealand invest­ments — had engaged in local invest­ments that were effec­tive­ly fleec­ing the New Zealand tax­pay­ers. So that fleec­ing of the New Zealand tax pay­ers is poten­tial­ly inflat­ing the val­ue of the Epstein estate. It’s a small detail in this sto­ry but emblem­at­ic of the over­all sleazi­ness here. High­ly prof­itable sleazi­ness:

    ...
    At the moment, the estate’s invest­ment with Valar remains locked up, mean­ing it can­not be paid out in cash. Invest­ments with ven­ture cap­i­tal firms are nor­mal­ly sub­ject to long peri­ods of lock­up to give the com­pa­nies that are being fund­ed time to grow.

    Based on the esti­mat­ed val­ue of the Valar invest­ment, Mr. Epstein’s estate is worth more than $200 mil­lion in all, accord­ing the con­fi­den­tial report and estate records. When he died, Mr. Epstein had about $600 mil­lion in assets, which includ­ed invest­ments, his lav­ish homes, art­work and jew­el­ry. Over the past six years, the estate has paid out hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars in set­tle­ments to vic­tims and the U.S. Vir­gin Islands, where Mr. Epstein main­tained a res­i­dence. The estate has also had to pay fed­er­al tax­es and hefty fees to lawyers work­ing for the estate.

    ...

    At one point, one of the execu­tors had pre­dict­ed the estate would be worth less than $40 mil­lion after claims were paid.

    But the estate’s assets began to swell last fall, after received a large $111.6 mil­lion tax refund from the Inter­nal Rev­enue Ser­vice. Some of that mon­ey has since gone to pay off a loan and legal fees.

    In its most recent pub­lic court fil­ing, the estate, as of March 31, list­ed its total assets at a lit­tle over $131 mil­lion, of which about $50 mil­lion is cash. But that doc­u­ment notes it still records invest­ments, such as the Valar invest­ment, at their val­ue when Mr. Epstein died near­ly six years ago.
    ...

    But it’s not only the case that this for­tune is being left to the Epstein estate. It also turns out that estate con­sists of a secret trust set up in the will Epstein signed days before his death. The 1953 Trust, which will be man­aged by Epstein’s long-term advis­ers Dar­ren Indyke and Richard Kahn. What will this secret trust be doing with all that mon­ey? We don’t get to know. That’s the incred­i­ble state of affairs thanks, in large part, to the deci­sion by fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors to not pur­sue civ­il for­fei­ture. Which also makes this a good time to recall the exten­sive evi­dence that Epstein has deep intel­li­gence ties. What are the odds some of that left over secret trust cash ends up get­ting used for intel­li­gence pur­pos­es?

    ...
    Just one major fed­er­al civ­il law­suit remains pend­ing against the execu­tors of the estate, a poten­tial class action filed on behalf vic­tims who haven’t yet set­tled with the estate. The law­suit was brought by Mr. Boies’s firm, but it’s not known how many women would even qual­i­ty for a set­tle­ment.

    In the past, vic­tims have received set­tle­ments rang­ing from $500,000 to $2 mil­lion.

    Once that law­suit is resolved, the estate will be close to begin dis­trib­ut­ing mon­ey accord­ing to terms of the will Mr. Epstein signed short­ly before he died. The will calls for the assets remain­ing in his estate to be dis­trib­uted accord­ing to a secret trust he set up called the 1953 Trust, which was named for the year he was born.

    Estate law nor­mal­ly does not give execu­tors much lat­i­tude to devi­ate from how a per­son want­ed his or her assets dis­trib­uted.

    The known ben­e­fi­cia­ries of the trust are a for­mer girl­friend, Kary­na Shu­li­ak, and the co-execu­tors of the estate, Dar­ren Indyke and Richard Kahn, both long­time advis­ers to Mr. Epstein. The 1953 Trust has nev­er been made pub­lic. Ms. Shuliak’s lawyer declined to com­ment.

    Accord­ing to a con­fi­den­tial finan­cial doc­u­ment describ­ing some details of the 1953 Trust, it was also Mr. Epstein’s intent for some $19 mil­lion in loans he had made to be for­giv­en, includ­ing some loans to enti­ties that Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn are “close­ly asso­ci­at­ed” with. The con­fi­den­tial doc­u­ment, which was reviewed by The Times, was pre­pared by a spe­cial mas­ter work­ing for the judge over­see­ing the pro­bate of Mr. Epstein’s will in the U.S. Vir­gin Islands. It was pub­licly filed on the court dock­et before it was lat­er sealed.
    ...

    And then we get to this remark­able fact: It was just back in Jan­u­ary, days before the start of the sec­ond Trump term, when the Finan­cial Times pub­lished an opin­ion piece by Thiel where he called for the Trump admin­is­tra­tion to final­ly pub­licly deal with a range of state secrets, includ­ing all the ques­tions sur­round­ing Jef­frey Epstein:

    ...
    Years after his death, Mr. Epstein’s sto­ry, espe­cial­ly the cir­cum­stances of his pass­ing, has remained fod­der for con­spir­a­cy the­o­rists.

    Mr. Thiel him­self has dis­cussed the impor­tance of the fed­er­al government’s air­ing facts sur­round­ing cer­tain con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries, includ­ing those involv­ing Mr. Epstein. In an opin­ion piece he wrote in Jan­u­ary for The Finan­cial Times, Mr. Thiel said the con­spir­a­cy the­o­ry sur­round­ing Mr. Epstein’s death was one of many that might be dealt with dur­ing the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

    The direc­tor of the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion, Kash Patel, recent­ly reaf­firmed the agency’s deter­mi­na­tion in 2019 that Mr. Epstein died by sui­cide.
    ...

    Now let’s take a look at that opin­ion piece, where the bil­lion­aire pined for a kind of “apoc­a­lypse” in the form of the reveal­ing of major state secrets. And as Thiel explains, the rea­son Pres­i­dent Trump neglect­ed to fol­low through on his declas­si­fi­ca­tion pledges dur­ing his first term is that Trump feared a “rightwing deep state of an Oliv­er Stone movie”. But that is no longer the case:

    Finan­cial Times

    A time for truth and rec­on­cil­i­a­tion

    Trump’s return to the White House augurs the ‘apoká­lyp­sis’ of the ancien regime’s secrets

    Peter Thiel
    Pub­lished Jan 10 2025

    The writer is a tech­nol­o­gy entre­pre­neur and investor.

    In 2016, Pres­i­dent Barack Oba­ma told his staff that Don­ald Trump’s elec­tion vic­to­ry was “not the apoc­a­lypse”. By any def­i­n­i­tion, he was cor­rect. But under­stood in the orig­i­nal sense of the Greek word apoká­lyp­sis, mean­ing “unveil­ing”, Oba­ma could not give the same reas­sur­ance in 2025. Trump’s return to the White House augurs the apoká­lyp­sis of the ancien regime’s secrets. The new administration’s rev­e­la­tions need not jus­ti­fy vengeance — recon­struc­tion can go hand in hand with rec­on­cil­i­a­tion. But for rec­on­cil­i­a­tion to take place, there must first be truth.

    The apoká­lyp­sis is the most peace­ful means of resolv­ing the old guard’s war on the inter­net, a war the inter­net won. My friend and col­league Eric Wein­stein calls the pre-inter­net cus­to­di­ans of secrets the Dis­trib­uted Idea Sup­pres­sion Com­plex (DISC) — the media organ­i­sa­tions, bureau­cra­cies, uni­ver­si­ties and gov­ern­ment-fund­ed NGOs that tra­di­tion­al­ly delim­it­ed pub­lic con­ver­sa­tion. In hind­sight, the inter­net had already begun our lib­er­a­tion from the DISC prison upon the prison death of financier and child sex offend­er Jef­frey Epstein in 2019. Almost half of Amer­i­cans polled that year mis­trust­ed the offi­cial sto­ry that he died by sui­cide, sug­gest­ing that DISC had lost total con­trol of the nar­ra­tive.

    It may be too ear­ly to answer the internet’s ques­tions about the late Mr Epstein. But one can­not say the same of the assas­si­na­tion of John F Kennedy. Six­ty-five per cent of Amer­i­cans still doubt that Lee Har­vey Oswald act­ed alone. Like an out­landish­ly post­mod­ern detec­tive sto­ry, we have wait­ed 61 years for a denoue­ment while the sus­pects — Fidel Cas­tro, 1960s mafiosi, the CIA’s Allen Dulles — grad­u­al­ly die. The thou­sands of clas­si­fied gov­ern­ment files on Oswald may or may not be red her­rings, but open­ing them up for pub­lic inspec­tion will give Amer­i­ca some clo­sure.

    We can­not wait six decades, how­ev­er, to end the lock­down on a free dis­cus­sion about Covid-19. In sub­poe­naed emails from Antho­ny Fauci’s senior advis­er David Morens, we learnt that Nation­al Insti­tutes of Health appa­ratchiks hid their cor­re­spon­dence from Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion Act scruti­ny. “Noth­ing,” wrote Boc­cac­cio in his medieval plague epic The Decameron, “is so inde­cent that it can­not be said to anoth­er per­son if the prop­er words are used to con­vey it.”

    In that spir­it, Morens and for­mer chief US med­ical advis­er Fau­ci will have the chance to share some inde­cent facts about our own recent plague. Did they sus­pect that Covid spawned from US tax­pay­er-fund­ed research, or an adja­cent Chi­nese mil­i­tary pro­gramme? Why did we fund the work of Eco­Health Alliance, which sent researchers into remote Chi­nese caves to extract nov­el coro­n­avirus­es? Is “gain of func­tion” research a byword for a bioweapons pro­gramme? And how did our gov­ern­ment stop the spread of such ques­tions on social media?

    ...

    Dark­er ques­tions still emerge in these dusky final weeks of our inter­reg­num. Ven­ture cap­i­tal­ist Marc Andreessen recent­ly sug­gest­ed on Joe Rogan’s pod­cast that the Biden admin­is­tra­tion debanked cryp­to entre­pre­neurs. How close­ly does our finan­cial sys­tem resem­ble a social cred­it sys­tem? Were an IRS contractor’s ille­gal leaks of Trump’s tax records anom­alous, or should Amer­i­cans assume their right to finan­cial pri­va­cy hinges on their pol­i­tics? And can one speak of a right to pri­va­cy at all when Con­gress con­serves Sec­tion 702 of the For­eign Intel­li­gence Sur­veil­lance Act, under which the FBI con­ducts tens of thou­sands of war­rant­less search­es of Amer­i­cans’ com­mu­ni­ca­tions?

    South Africa con­front­ed its apartheid his­to­ry with a for­mal com­mis­sion, but answer­ing the ques­tions above with piece­meal declas­si­fi­ca­tions would befit both Trump’s chaot­ic style and our inter­net world, which process­es and prop­a­gates short pack­ets of infor­ma­tion. The first Trump admin­is­tra­tion shied away from declas­si­fi­ca­tions because it still believed in the rightwing deep state of an Oliv­er Stone movie. This belief has fad­ed.

    Our ancien regime, like the aris­toc­ra­cy of pre-rev­o­lu­tion­ary France, thought the par­ty would nev­er end. 2016 shook their his­tori­cist faith in the arc of the moral uni­verse but by 2020 they hoped to write Trump off as an aber­ra­tion. In ret­ro­spect, 2020 was the aber­ra­tion, the rear­guard action of a strug­gling regime and its struld­brugg ruler. There will be no reac­tionary restora­tion of the pre-inter­net past.

    The future demands fresh and strange ideas. New ideas might have saved the old regime, which bare­ly acknowl­edged, let alone answered, our deep­est ques­tions — the caus­es of the 50-year slow­down in sci­en­tif­ic and tech­no­log­i­cal progress in the US, the rack­et of crescen­do­ing real estate prices, and the explo­sion of pub­lic debt.

    ...

    Iden­ti­ty pol­i­tics end­less­ly relit­i­gates ancient his­to­ry. The study of recent his­to­ry, to which the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is now called, is more treach­er­ous — and more impor­tant. The apoká­lyp­sis can­not resolve our fights over 1619, but it can resolve our fights over Covid-19; it will not adju­di­cate the sins of our first rulers, but the sins of those who gov­ern us today. The inter­net will not allow us to for­get those sins — but with the truth, it will not pre­vent us from for­giv­ing.

    ————

    “A time for truth and rec­on­cil­i­a­tion” by Peter Thiel; Finan­cial Times; 01/10/2025

    “South Africa con­front­ed its apartheid his­to­ry with a for­mal com­mis­sion, but answer­ing the ques­tions above with piece­meal declas­si­fi­ca­tions would befit both Trump’s chaot­ic style and our inter­net world, which process­es and prop­a­gates short pack­ets of infor­ma­tion. The first Trump admin­is­tra­tion shied away from declas­si­fi­ca­tions because it still believed in the rightwing deep state of an Oliv­er Stone movie. This belief has fad­ed.

    The first Trump admin­is­tra­tion shied away from declas­si­fi­ca­tions because it still believed in the rightwing deep state of an Oliv­er Stone movie — an obvi­ous ref­er­ence to Stone’s JFK — but now that belief has fad­ed. That was Peter Thiel’s mes­sage to the world back in Jan­u­ary, just a cou­ple of weeks before Trump launched the con­gres­sion­al declas­si­fi­ca­tion task force led by Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Anna Pauli­na Luna. It’s a remark­able admis­sion: the Trump admin­is­tra­tion no longer fears a right-wing deep state and the asso­ci­at­ed con­se­quences of piss­ing it off through the declas­si­fi­ca­tion process. Instead, Thiel frames the chal­lenges of declas­si­fi­ca­tion as a kind of bat­tle with the Dis­trib­uted Idea Sup­pres­sion Com­plex (DISC) — the media orga­ni­za­tions, bureau­cra­cies, uni­ver­si­ties and gov­ern­ment-fund­ed NGOs that tra­di­tion­al­ly delim­it­ed pub­lic con­ver­sa­tion. Thiel is fram­ing this entire declas­si­fi­ca­tion process — which promised to deliv­er rev­e­la­tions on top­ics rang­ing from JFK to Epstein to COVID-19 — as a bat­tle against Dis­trib­uted Idea Sup­pres­sion Com­plex because a right-wing deep state does­n’t exist. That’s the fram­ing here. And note this amus­ing detail: Thiel sug­gests that “It may be too ear­ly to answer the internet’s ques­tions about the late Mr Epstein”, before sug­gest­ing that it’s not too ear­ly for the range of oth­er issues, like COVID-19 (which unfold­ing after Epstein’s death):

    ...
    In 2016, Pres­i­dent Barack Oba­ma told his staff that Don­ald Trump’s elec­tion vic­to­ry was “not the apoc­a­lypse”. By any def­i­n­i­tion, he was cor­rect. But under­stood in the orig­i­nal sense of the Greek word apoká­lyp­sis, mean­ing “unveil­ing”, Oba­ma could not give the same reas­sur­ance in 2025. Trump’s return to the White House augurs the apoká­lyp­sis of the ancien regime’s secrets. The new administration’s rev­e­la­tions need not jus­ti­fy vengeance — recon­struc­tion can go hand in hand with rec­on­cil­i­a­tion. But for rec­on­cil­i­a­tion to take place, there must first be truth.

    The apoká­lyp­sis is the most peace­ful means of resolv­ing the old guard’s war on the inter­net, a war the inter­net won. My friend and col­league Eric Wein­stein calls the pre-inter­net cus­to­di­ans of secrets the Dis­trib­uted Idea Sup­pres­sion Com­plex (DISC) — the media organ­i­sa­tions, bureau­cra­cies, uni­ver­si­ties and gov­ern­ment-fund­ed NGOs that tra­di­tion­al­ly delim­it­ed pub­lic con­ver­sa­tion. In hind­sight, the inter­net had already begun our lib­er­a­tion from the DISC prison upon the prison death of financier and child sex offend­er Jef­frey Epstein in 2019. Almost half of Amer­i­cans polled that year mis­trust­ed the offi­cial sto­ry that he died by sui­cide, sug­gest­ing that DISC had lost total con­trol of the nar­ra­tive.

    It may be too ear­ly to answer the internet’s ques­tions about the late Mr Epstein. But one can­not say the same of the assas­si­na­tion of John F Kennedy. Six­ty-five per cent of Amer­i­cans still doubt that Lee Har­vey Oswald act­ed alone. Like an out­landish­ly post­mod­ern detec­tive sto­ry, we have wait­ed 61 years for a denoue­ment while the sus­pects — Fidel Cas­tro, 1960s mafiosi, the CIA’s Allen Dulles — grad­u­al­ly die. The thou­sands of clas­si­fied gov­ern­ment files on Oswald may or may not be red her­rings, but open­ing them up for pub­lic inspec­tion will give Amer­i­ca some clo­sure.

    We can­not wait six decades, how­ev­er, to end the lock­down on a free dis­cus­sion about Covid-19. In sub­poe­naed emails from Antho­ny Fauci’s senior advis­er David Morens, we learnt that Nation­al Insti­tutes of Health appa­ratchiks hid their cor­re­spon­dence from Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion Act scruti­ny. “Noth­ing,” wrote Boc­cac­cio in his medieval plague epic The Decameron, “is so inde­cent that it can­not be said to anoth­er per­son if the prop­er words are used to con­vey it.”

    In that spir­it, Morens and for­mer chief US med­ical advis­er Fau­ci will have the chance to share some inde­cent facts about our own recent plague. Did they sus­pect that Covid spawned from US tax­pay­er-fund­ed research, or an adja­cent Chi­nese mil­i­tary pro­gramme? Why did we fund the work of Eco­Health Alliance, which sent researchers into remote Chi­nese caves to extract nov­el coro­n­avirus­es? Is “gain of func­tion” research a byword for a bioweapons pro­gramme? And how did our gov­ern­ment stop the spread of such ques­tions on social media?
    ...

    Peter Thiel was call­ing for apoc­a­lyp­tic rev­e­la­tions just five months ago. Maybe not rev­e­la­tions about Epstein but rev­e­la­tions about a host of oth­er top­ics, includ­ing the JFK assas­si­na­tion. And accord­ing to Thiel, Pres­i­dent Trump has no fear of a rightwing deep state stand­ing in his way. He had that fear before, but not any­more. And here we are, with one dis­clo­sure dis­ap­point­ment after anoth­er and no real rev­e­la­tions. In that sense, it real­ly has been rev­e­la­to­ry, albeit exact­ly the kind of rev­e­la­tions we should have expect­ed all along. There’s plen­ty to be learned from apoc­a­lyp­tic kay­fabe.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 7, 2025, 6:16 pm
  4. @Pterrafractyl–

    Guess who is the head of Palan­tir’s UK unit?

    https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/military-technology-database-palantir-royal-navy-war-fn0gb9rjb

    I doubt this is with­out sig­nif­i­cance.

    Best,

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | June 12, 2025, 8:19 pm
  5. Are Don­ald Trump and Elon Musk mak­ing nice again? Time will tell, but it appears the Trump/Musk pub­lic squab­ble was­n’t a com­plete rift: Pres­i­dent Trump decid­ed to keep in place the Star­link ter­mi­nal that was installed at the White House. It’s a move that, if noth­ing else, sig­ni­fies a degree of trust Trump must still have in Musk. After all, he’s effec­tive­ly grant­ed Musk ongo­ing access to the com­mu­ni­ca­tions flow­ing into and out of White House. It appears it’s going to take a lot more than a pub­lic spat to end this his­toric bro­mance.

    Of course, it’s impor­tant to keep in mind that gen­uine affect for each oth­er is hard­ly a required ingre­di­ent for the Trump/Musk alliance to con­tin­ue. They have been co-con­spir­a­tor in numer­ous DOGE-relat­ed high crimes, after all. This is a mutu­al­ly assured destruc­tion kind of rela­tion­ship. Which brings us back to that very inter­est­ing deci­sion by Trump to retain a Star­link con­nec­tion that was set up just months ago as part of DOGE. Because as we’re going to see, those Star­link con­nec­tions after been pop­ping up across the fed­er­al bureau­cra­cy. Specif­i­cal­ly, it appears Star­link has played a crit­i­cal role in the cov­er exfil­tra­tion of data from gov­ern­ment agen­cies, bypass­ing the stan­dard data-trans­fer con­trols. Includ­ing at the White House, where IT experts have grown increas­ing­ly alarmed over the mas­sive secu­ri­ty risks cre­at­ing by a Star­link ter­mi­nal that was installed over the objec­tion of White House IT staffers, ini­tial­ly with­out even alert­ing the staffers that it was hap­pen­ing at all. And this arrange­ment does­n’t just pre­vent IT staff from keep­ing track of data mov­ing out of White House net­works. Data enter­ing the net­works, includ­ing mal­ware, can also trav­el through this giant secu­ri­ty hole too.

    And it’s not just White House, of course. All sorts of gov­ern­ment agen­cies have report­ed a sim­i­lar expe­ri­ence, includ­ing the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board (NLRB), the gov­ern­ment agency filled with all sorts of high­ly sen­si­tive data involv­ing labor-relat­ed whistle­blow­ers and gov­ern­ment inves­ti­ga­tions into pri­vate com­pa­nies. Includ­ing com­pa­nies like SpaceX and Tes­la.

    Which brings us to a report from back in April about the appar­ent mass exfil­tra­tion of data by DOGE staffers at the NLRB. As we’re going to see, while this report did­n’t men­tion Star­link, it turns out Star­link was indeed installed at the NLRB.

    The warn­ings about the mass data theft at the NLRB comes to us thanks to an IT staff whistle­blow­er, Daniel Berulis, who was hired last year to help the agency get up to speed with imple­ment­ing “zero trust” prin­ci­ples of data man­age­ment. One only gets access to the data they absolute­ly need to do their job, accord­ing to “zero trust”. As we can imag­ine, the DOGE ran­sack­ing of the NLRB was a com­plete vio­la­tion of this prin­ci­ple. Berulis describes how DOGE staffers not only had track­ing and audit­ing soft­ware turned off but they appar­ent­ly even delet­ed event logs when they were done. That’s cov­er up behav­ior.

    Anoth­er very intrigu­ing secu­ri­ty event took place with­in min­utes after DOGE first accessed the NLR­B’s sys­tems: some­one with an IP address in Rus­sia start­ed try­ing to log into the sys­tem using one of the new­ly cre­at­ed DOGE accounts. With the cor­rect user­name and pass­word. The login attempts were auto­mat­i­cal­ly blocked but the fact that we don’t have an expla­na­tion for what hap­pened just adds to the crim­i­nal-seem­ing nature of this DOGE activ­i­ty. Per­haps a DOGE staffer had already had their per­son­al devices pen­e­trat­ed by a third par­ty, which was mon­i­tor­ing their activ­i­ty and able to quick­ly make a login attempt in real-time. Although if that’s the case, it’s curi­ous that this third par­ty would make the login attempt appear to come from Rus­sia and not, say, a serv­er in Wash­ing­ton DC. That’s just hap­less. Or per­haps this DOGE employ­ee, who was tasked with exfil­trat­ing all of this data with­out telling any­one, made an ini­tial thwart­ed attempt to log in from a serv­er in Rus­sia, only to find that logins from that loca­tion aren’t pos­si­ble. We don’t know, but the fact that this hap­pened and we have no expla­na­tion is a sign of just how per­ilous the cyber­se­cu­ri­ty sit­u­a­tion real­ly is through­out the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment right now. Also keep in mind that this report was from back in April so this per­ilous sit­u­a­tion has been ongo­ing for months now.

    One DOGE staffer at the NLRB, Jor­dan Wick, even cre­at­ed an account at the pop­u­lar GitHub web­site — a por­tal for soft­ware code repos­i­to­ries — for a soft­ware tool they were mak­ing called “NxGenBdoorEx­tract”, which is an incred­i­bly provoca­tive name for the tool. The in-house data­base at the NLRB is called “NxGen”, so Wick was lit­er­al­ly using a tool seem­ing­ly named after the back­door extrac­tion of data from NxGen. Even more remark­able is the fact that Wick left this GitHub code repos­i­to­ry pub­lic, which is how some­one even­tu­al­ly spot­ted it and post­ed about it. It’s the kind of detail that sug­gests Wick we either very incom­pe­tent at cov­er his tracks or was oper­at­ing with such con­fi­dence that he would­n’t face any con­se­quences that he was hav­ing fun just trolling the world. And, of course, Berulis did indeed find that 10 giga­bytes of NxGen data had been removed, but he could­n’t deter­mine what that data was or who did it because of all the destroyed evi­dence.

    Inter­est­ing­ly, Berulis also observed evi­dence that data was exfil­trat­ed from the NLRB using a tech­nique hack­ers deploy for covert­ly remov­ing data called “DNS tun­nel­ing”. The tech­nique involves cor­rupt­ing the serv­er hous­ing the data you want to remove so that it sends a lit­tle chunk of the data every time a dif­fer­ent serv­er imple­ments a domain name sys­tem (DNS) request with the cor­rupt serv­er. DNS requests are nor­mal­ly very com­mon and innocu­ous, thus allow­ing the tar­get data to be removed covert­ly through a series of DNS requests. Some­one deployed that tech­nique at the NLRB dur­ing DOGE’s peri­od there. We don’t know who exact­ly, although it seems like Jor­dan Wick is an obvi­ous sus­pect.

    Notably, DOGE seem­ing­ly com­plet­ed its work after about a just week. And all of the spe­cial high-access accounts cre­at­ed for these employ­ees were delet­ed. It was only at that point that Berulis and the oth­er NLRB IT staffers were allowed to inves­ti­gate the dam­age. That’s when he dis­cov­ered that the logs track­ing what data was sent and by whom were all delet­ed. And the account that delet­ed them was, itself, delet­ed. There was no record of what was removed and who removed it. The NLRB staff end­ed up launch­ing a for­mal breach inves­ti­ga­tion which includ­ed a request for assis­tance from the Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and Infra­struc­ture Secu­ri­ty Agency (CISA). That inves­ti­ga­tion was thwart­ed for unknown rea­sons. Days lat­er, Berulis dis­cov­ered a threat­en­ing anony­mous let­ter taped to his door. The let­ter includ­ed per­son­al infor­ma­tion and over­head videos of him walk­ing his dog that appeared to have been tak­en from a drone. That’s mob­ster behav­ior. And also not the first instance of DOGE-relat­ed whistle­blow­er intim­i­da­tion we’ve heard of in recent months.

    So what was the offi­cial NLRB response to these whistle­blow­er alle­ga­tions? Well, accord­ing to Tim Bear­ese, the NLR­B’s act­ing press sec­re­tary, the agency con­duct­ed an inves­ti­ga­tion in response to Berulis’s alle­ga­tions and “deter­mined that no breach of agency sys­tems occurred.” Berulis also denied that the NLRB grant­ed DOGE access to his sys­tems and even assert­ed that DOGE had­n’t even request­ed access in the first place. That gross denial of the avail­able facts is also part of the this sto­ry. This isn’t just a cov­er up. It’s a troll­ish ‘in your face’ cov­er up. In keep­ing with the Trump brand.

    It’s that weird ‘in your face’ cov­er up that also serves as part of the con­text for these reports sug­gest­ing a thaw­ing a warm­ing of rela­tions between Trump and Musk. All indi­ca­tions are that Trump and Musk have been joint­ly engaged in one of the largest acts of data theft in his­to­ry. Per­haps the largest. And it’s still ongo­ing. Again, this is a rela­tion­ship built on mutu­al­ly assured destruc­tion. These are mob boss­es in busi­ness with each oth­er. That’s what made the pub­lic fight­ing so sur­pris­ing. And why the deci­sion to keep Star­link at the White House after all the fight­ing is so unsur­pris­ing under the cir­cum­stances. This is an ongo­ing joint crime that remains very depen­dent on Star­link pro­vid­ing back­door access into and out of gov­ern­ment net­works. And the White House and NLRB are just two of the many agen­cies where this is undoubt­ed­ly hap­pen­ing. The rela­tion­ship has to con­tin­ue whether Trump and Musk like each oth­er or not. Crim­ing takes pri­or­i­ty:

    Reuters

    Trump to keep Star­link at White House despite break with Elon Musk

    By Steve Hol­land and Nan­di­ta Bose
    June 9, 2025 5:09 PM CDT
    Updat­ed June 9, 2025

    WASHINGTON, June 9 (Reuters) — Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump said on Mon­day he has no plans to dis­con­tin­ue Star­link at the White House but might move his Tes­la off-site, fol­low­ing his announce­ment over the week­end that his rela­tion­ship with Elon Musk, the bil­lion­aire CEO of both com­pa­nies, was over.

    “I may move the Tes­la around a lit­tle bit, but I don’t think we’ll be doing that with Star­link. It’s a good ser­vice,” Trump told reporters, refer­ring to the satel­lite inter­net com­pa­ny that pro­vides high-speed broad­band access. It is a unit of Musk’s SpaceX.

    ...

    Last week, a White House offi­cial said Trump might get rid of it after a pub­lic feud erupt­ed between the two men. The Tes­la was seen parked at the White House over the week­end.

    On Sat­ur­day, Trump said he had no inten­tion of repair­ing ties with Musk. On Mon­day, the pres­i­dent said he would not have a prob­lem if Musk called.

    “We had a good rela­tion­ship, and I just wish him well,” Trump said. Musk respond­ed with a heart emo­ji to a video on X show­ing Trump’s remarks.

    ...

    ————-

    “Trump to keep Star­link at White House despite break with Elon Musk” By Steve Hol­land and Nan­di­ta Bose; Reuters; 06/09/2025

    ““I may move the Tes­la around a lit­tle bit, but I don’t think we’ll be doing that with Star­link. It’s a good ser­vice,” Trump told reporters, refer­ring to the satel­lite inter­net com­pa­ny that pro­vides high-speed broad­band access. It is a unit of Musk’s SpaceX.”

    Boy, Trump sure seems to love Star­link. Why is that? It’s not as if the White House lacked inter­net ser­vice. What is it about Star­link that makes it so cov­et­ed by this White House? That’s the alarm­ing ques­tion loom­ing over this sto­ry. An alarm­ing ques­tion with very alarm­ing obvi­ous answers, like the fact that Star­link’s many secu­ri­ty con­cerns might be exact­ly what you are look­ing for if the secret exfil­tra­tion of mas­sive amounts of gov­ern­ment data is one of the pri­ma­ry goals:

    The Wash­ing­ton Post

    White House secu­ri­ty staff warned Musk’s Star­link is a secu­ri­ty risk

    Star­link satel­lite con­nec­tions in the White House bypass con­trols meant to stop leaks and hack­ing.

    By Joseph Menn
    June 7, 2025 at 7:00 a.m. EDT

    Elon Musk’s team at the U.S. DOGE Ser­vice and allies in the Trump admin­is­tra­tion ignored White House com­mu­ni­ca­tions experts wor­ried about poten­tial secu­ri­ty breach­es when DOGE per­son­nel installed Musk’s Star­link inter­net ser­vice in the com­plex this year, three peo­ple famil­iar with the mat­ter told The Wash­ing­ton Post.

    The peo­ple, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to dis­cuss sen­si­tive issues, said those who were man­ag­ing White House com­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tems were not informed in advance when DOGE rep­re­sen­ta­tives went to the roof of the adja­cent Eisen­how­er Exec­u­tive Office Build­ing in Feb­ru­ary to install a ter­mi­nal con­nect­ing users in the com­plex to Star­link satel­lites, which are owned by Musk’s pri­vate SpaceX rock­et com­pa­ny.

    The peo­ple said those man­ag­ing the sys­tems weren’t able to mon­i­tor such con­nec­tions to stop sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion from leav­ing the com­plex or hack­ers from break­ing in.

    It could not be ver­i­fied whether the rooftop ter­mi­nal remains installed or if any­thing would change now that Musk has reced­ed from the gov­ern­ment. A “Star­link Guest” WiFi net­work appeared on White House phones in Feb­ru­ary, prompt­ing users only for a pass­word, not a user­name or a sec­ond form of authen­ti­ca­tion, accord­ing to the peo­ple. That WiFi net­work was still appear­ing on White House vis­i­tors’ phones this week.

    ...

    “We were aware of DOGE’s inten­tions to improve inter­net access on the cam­pus and did not con­sid­er this mat­ter a secu­ri­ty inci­dent or secu­ri­ty breach,” Secret Ser­vice spokesman Antho­ny Gugliel­mi said.

    Tra­di­tion­al­ly at the White House, per­son­al phones on guest WiFi net­works need names and pass­words that are tracked and expire after a week, the peo­ple said. Work com­put­ers are locked down with secu­ri­ty pro­grams and staffers’ inter­ac­tions with the out­side world are “very thor­ough­ly tracked,” with the device iden­ti­fiers and times of all trans­mis­sions record­ed, said one of the peo­ple, who left the gov­ern­ment after the Star­link instal­la­tion.

    “Star­link doesn’t require any­thing. It allows you to trans­mit data with­out any kind of record or track­ing,” this per­son told The Post. “White House IT sys­tems had very strong con­trols on net­work access. You had to be on a full-tun­nel VPN at all times. If you are not on the VPN, White House-issued devices can’t con­nect to the out­side.”

    A full-tun­nel VPN con­nec­tion pro­tects all data that’s sent and received and can also mon­i­tor or block any con­tent.

    “With a Star­link con­nec­tion, that means White House devices could leave the net­work and go out through gate­ways. … It’s going to help you bypass secu­ri­ty,” anoth­er per­son said.

    ...

    The Star­link roof instal­la­tion, ini­tial­ly report­ed by the New York Times, trig­gered a con­fronta­tion between DOGE employ­ees and the Secret Ser­vice. The oppo­si­tion by White House staff has not been pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed.

    Star­link is alleged­ly being used at oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies as well. A whistle­blow­er from the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board said that Star­link was installed there, and a for­mer senior employ­ee at the Gen­er­al Ser­vices Admin­is­tra­tion told The Post that DOGE employ­ees used it on-site at least through last month.

    Starlink’s satel­lite con­nec­tions are hard­er to hack than con­ven­tion­al U.S. telecom­mu­ni­ca­tion net­works, which were thor­ough­ly pen­e­trat­ed by Chi­na in a cam­paign revealed last year. But end-to-end encrypt­ed phone com­mu­ni­ca­tions, such as those over the Sig­nal app, are not read­able by hack­ers unless the devices them­selves are hacked — or they are backed up by oth­er soft­ware that gets hacked, as was recent­ly found to be the case with TeleMes­sage.

    Any added secu­ri­ty from satel­lite con­nec­tions does not solve the inabil­i­ty to mon­i­tor for restrict­ed data leav­ing the premis­es, the peo­ple said.

    Such mon­i­tor­ing could also catch mali­cious soft­ware com­ing into the build­ing to poten­tial­ly hack White House machines, an even big­ger fear among staffers, secu­ri­ty experts said.

    It is unclear why DOGE was so insis­tent on Star­link. But at oth­er agen­cies, DOGE staffers have demand­ed deep access to data and dis­abled log­ging that tracked what they did with it. DOGE employ­ees have also been report­ed using arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence pro­grams to plow through mas­sive amounts of gov­ern­ment data.

    ———–

    “White House secu­ri­ty staff warned Musk’s Star­link is a secu­ri­ty risk” By Joseph Menn; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 06/07/2025

    “The Star­link roof instal­la­tion, ini­tial­ly report­ed by the New York Times, trig­gered a con­fronta­tion between DOGE employ­ees and the Secret Ser­vice. The oppo­si­tion by White House staff has not been pre­vi­ous­ly report­ed.”

    A con­fronta­tion between White House staff and DOGE employ­ees over the instal­la­tion of Star­link that the DOGE employ­ees clear­ly won. And that was appar­ent­ly after the DOGE employ­ees uni­lat­er­al­ly installed the Star­link ter­mi­nal at the White House with­out even inform­ing the staff who were man­ag­ing White House com­mu­ni­ca­tions:

    ...
    The peo­ple, who spoke on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to dis­cuss sen­si­tive issues, said those who were man­ag­ing White House com­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tems were not informed in advance when DOGE rep­re­sen­ta­tives went to the roof of the adja­cent Eisen­how­er Exec­u­tive Office Build­ing in Feb­ru­ary to install a ter­mi­nal con­nect­ing users in the com­plex to Star­link satel­lites, which are owned by Musk’s pri­vate SpaceX rock­et com­pa­ny.

    The peo­ple said those man­ag­ing the sys­tems weren’t able to mon­i­tor such con­nec­tions to stop sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion from leav­ing the com­plex or hack­ers from break­ing in.
    ...

    And then there’s the fact that the accounts used to con­nect to this White House Star­link ter­mi­nal involve zero track­ing of what’s been trans­ferred and who did the trans­fer­ring, com­plete­ly bypass­ing the White House­’s con­trols. It’s as if the Trump White House was arrang­ing for the unde­tect­ed theft of its own data:

    ...
    Tra­di­tion­al­ly at the White House, per­son­al phones on guest WiFi net­works need names and pass­words that are tracked and expire after a week, the peo­ple said. Work com­put­ers are locked down with secu­ri­ty pro­grams and staffers’ inter­ac­tions with the out­side world are “very thor­ough­ly tracked,” with the device iden­ti­fiers and times of all trans­mis­sions record­ed, said one of the peo­ple, who left the gov­ern­ment after the Star­link instal­la­tion.

    Star­link doesn’t require any­thing. It allows you to trans­mit data with­out any kind of record or track­ing,” this per­son told The Post. “White House IT sys­tems had very strong con­trols on net­work access. You had to be on a full-tun­nel VPN at all times. If you are not on the VPN, White House-issued devices can’t con­nect to the out­side.”
    ...

    And then there’s the reminder that this secu­ri­ty cat­a­stro­phe in the mak­ing isn’t just hap­pen­ing at the White House. Star­link ter­mi­nals are being installed all over the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment at agen­cies brim­ming with high­ly sen­si­tive con­fi­den­tial infor­ma­tion. Agen­cies like the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board (NLRB):

    ...
    Star­link is alleged­ly being used at oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies as well. A whistle­blow­er from the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board said that Star­link was installed there, and a for­mer senior employ­ee at the Gen­er­al Ser­vices Admin­is­tra­tion told The Post that DOGE employ­ees used it on-site at least through last month.
    ...

    And that warn­ing about the Star­link instal­la­tions at oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies, includ­ing the NLRB, serves as a reminder of a sto­ry we got back in April about a tru­ly alarm­ing account of mass data theft at the agency. A sto­ry that did­n’t men­tion Star­link. But now we know Star­link was part of this sto­ry too:

    Nation­al Pub­lic Radio

    A whistle­blow­er’s dis­clo­sure details how DOGE may have tak­en sen­si­tive labor data

    Heard on All Things Con­sid­ered

    Jen­na McLaugh­lin
    April 15, 2025 5:00 AM ET

    In the first days of March, a team of advis­ers from Pres­i­dent Trump’s new Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy ini­tia­tive arrived at the South­east Wash­ing­ton, D.C., head­quar­ters of the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board.

    The small, inde­pen­dent fed­er­al agency inves­ti­gates and adju­di­cates com­plaints about unfair labor prac­tices. It stores reams of poten­tial­ly sen­si­tive data, from con­fi­den­tial infor­ma­tion about employ­ees who want to form unions to pro­pri­etary busi­ness infor­ma­tion.

    ...

    But accord­ing to an offi­cial whistle­blow­er dis­clo­sure shared with Con­gress and oth­er fed­er­al over­seers that was obtained by NPR, sub­se­quent inter­views with the whistle­blow­er and records of inter­nal com­mu­ni­ca­tions, tech­ni­cal staff mem­bers were alarmed about what DOGE engi­neers did when they were grant­ed access, par­tic­u­lar­ly when those staffers noticed a spike in data leav­ing the agency. It’s pos­si­ble that the data includ­ed sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion on unions, ongo­ing legal cas­es and cor­po­rate secrets — data that four labor law experts tell NPR should almost nev­er leave the NLRB and that has noth­ing to do with mak­ing the gov­ern­ment more effi­cient or cut­ting spend­ing.

    Mean­while, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure and records of inter­nal com­mu­ni­ca­tions, mem­bers of the DOGE team asked that their activ­i­ties not be logged on the sys­tem and then appeared to try to cov­er their tracks behind them, turn­ing off mon­i­tor­ing tools and man­u­al­ly delet­ing records of their access — eva­sive behav­ior that sev­er­al cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts inter­viewed by NPR com­pared to what crim­i­nal or state-spon­sored hack­ers might do.

    ...

    The new rev­e­la­tions about DOGE’s activ­i­ties at the labor agency come from a whistle­blow­er in the IT depart­ment of the NLRB, who dis­closed his con­cerns to Con­gress and the U.S. Office of Spe­cial Coun­sel in a detailed report that was then pro­vid­ed to NPR. Mean­while, his attempts to raise con­cerns inter­nal­ly with­in the NLRB pre­ced­ed some­one “phys­i­cal­ly tap­ing a threat­en­ing note” to his door that includ­ed sen­si­tive per­son­al infor­ma­tion and over­head pho­tos of him walk­ing his dog that appeared to be tak­en with a drone, accord­ing to a cov­er let­ter attached to his dis­clo­sure filed by his attor­ney, Andrew Bakaj of the non­prof­it Whistle­blow­er Aid.

    The whistle­blow­er’s account is cor­rob­o­rat­ed by inter­nal doc­u­men­ta­tion and was reviewed by 11 tech­ni­cal experts across oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies and the pri­vate sec­tor. In total, NPR spoke to over 30 sources across the gov­ern­ment, the pri­vate sec­tor, the labor move­ment, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and law enforce­ment who spoke to their own con­cerns about how DOGE and the Trump admin­is­tra­tion might be han­dling sen­si­tive data, and the impli­ca­tions for its expo­sure. Much of the fol­low­ing account comes from the whistle­blow­er’s offi­cial dis­clo­sure and inter­views with NPR.

    “I can’t attest to what their end goal was or what they’re doing with the data,” said the whistle­blow­er, Daniel Berulis, in an inter­view with NPR. “But I can tell you that the bits of the puz­zle that I can quan­ti­fy are scary. ... This is a very bad pic­ture we’re look­ing at.”

    ...

    Tim Bear­ese, the NLR­B’s act­ing press sec­re­tary, denied that the agency grant­ed DOGE access to its sys­tems and said DOGE had not request­ed access to the agen­cy’s sys­tems. Bear­ese said the agency con­duct­ed an inves­ti­ga­tion after Berulis raised his con­cerns but “deter­mined that no breach of agency sys­tems occurred.”

    Notwith­stand­ing the NLR­B’s denial, the whistle­blow­er’s dis­clo­sure to Con­gress and oth­er fed­er­al over­seers includes foren­sic data and records of con­ver­sa­tions with col­leagues that pro­vide evi­dence of DOGE’s access and activ­i­ties. Mean­while, NPR’s exten­sive report­ing makes clear that DOGE’s access to data is a wide­spread con­cern. Across the gov­ern­ment, 11 sources direct­ly famil­iar with inter­nal oper­a­tions in fed­er­al agen­cies and in Con­gress told NPR that they share Berulis’ con­cerns, and some have seen oth­er evi­dence that DOGE is exfil­trat­ing sen­si­tive data for unknown rea­sons.

    ...

    Tak­ing apart com­put­ers to pro­tect­ing gov­ern­ment data

    ...

    He start­ed about six months before Pres­i­dent Trump was inau­gu­rat­ed for his sec­ond term this past Jan­u­ary. Berulis said he hit the ground run­ning, secur­ing the NLR­B’s cloud-based data servers and rein­forc­ing what’s called “zero trust” prin­ci­ples, which means that users can get access only to the parts of the sys­tem they need in order to do their jobs — no more, no less. That way, if an attack­er gets hold of a sin­gle user­name and pass­word, the attack­er can’t access the whole sys­tem.

    ...

    DOGE arrives

    ...

    Berulis says he was told by col­leagues that DOGE employ­ees demand­ed the high­est lev­el of access, what are called “ten­ant own­er lev­el” accounts inside the inde­pen­dent agen­cy’s com­put­er sys­tems, with essen­tial­ly unre­strict­ed per­mis­sion to read, copy and alter data, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure.

    When an IT staffer sug­gest­ed a stream­lined process to acti­vate those accounts in a way that would let their activ­i­ties be tracked, in accor­dance with NLRB secu­ri­ty poli­cies, the IT staffers were told to stay out of DOGE’s way, the dis­clo­sure con­tin­ues.

    For cyber­se­cu­ri­ty pro­fes­sion­als, a fail­ure to log activ­i­ty is a car­di­nal sin and con­tra­dicts best prac­tices as rec­om­mend­ed by the Nation­al Insti­tute of Stan­dards and Tech­nol­o­gy and the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty’s Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and Infra­struc­ture Secu­ri­ty Agency, as well as the FBI and the Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency.

    “That was a huge red flag,” said Berulis. “That’s some­thing that you just don’t do. It vio­lates every core con­cept of secu­ri­ty and best prac­tice.”

    Those foren­sic dig­i­tal records are impor­tant for record-keep­ing require­ments and they allow for trou­bleshoot­ing, but they also allow experts to inves­ti­gate poten­tial breach­es, some­times even trac­ing the attack­er’s path back to the vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty that let them inside a net­work. The records can also help experts see what data might have been removed. Basic logs would like­ly not be enough to demon­strate the extent of a bad actor’s activ­i­ties, but it would be a start. There’s no rea­son for any legit­i­mate user to turn off log­ging or oth­er secu­ri­ty tools, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts say.

    ...

    How­ev­er, the NLR­B’s bud­get has­n’t had the mon­ey to pay for tools like that for years, Berulis said.

    A back­door to gov­ern­ment sys­tems?

    A cou­ple of days after DOGE arrived, Berulis saw some­thing else that alarmed him while brows­ing the inter­net over the week­end.

    Mass­a­chu­setts Insti­tute of Tech­nol­o­gy grad­u­ate and DOGE engi­neer Jor­dan Wick had been shar­ing infor­ma­tion about cod­ing projects he was work­ing on to his pub­lic account with GitHub, a web­site that allows devel­op­ers to cre­ate, store and col­lab­o­rate on code.

    After jour­nal­ist Roger Sol­len­berg­er start­ed post­ing on X about the account, Berulis noticed some­thing Wick was work­ing on: a project, or repos­i­to­ry, titled “NxGenBdoorEx­tract.”

    Wick made it pri­vate before Berulis could inves­ti­gate fur­ther, he told NPR. But to Berulis, the title itself was reveal­ing.

    “So when I saw this tool, I imme­di­ate­ly pan­icked, just for lack of a bet­ter term,” he said. “I kind of had a con­nip­tion and said, ‘Whoa, whoa, whoa.’ ” He imme­di­ate­ly alert­ed his whole team.

    While NPR was unable to recov­er the code for that project, the name itself sug­gests that Wick could have been design­ing a back­door, or “Bdoor,” to extract files from the NLR­B’s inter­nal case man­age­ment sys­tem, known as NxGen, accord­ing to sev­er­al cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts who reviewed Berulis’ con­clu­sions.

    ...

    “It def­i­nite­ly seems rather odd to name it that,” said one of the engi­neers who built NxGen and asked for anonymi­ty so as not to jeop­ar­dize their abil­i­ty to work with the gov­ern­ment again. “Or brazen, if you’re not wor­ried about con­se­quences.”

    ...

    NxGen is an inter­nal sys­tem that was designed specif­i­cal­ly for the NLRB in-house, accord­ing to sev­er­al of the engi­neers who cre­at­ed the tool and who all spoke to NPR on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to avoid retal­i­a­tion or adverse con­se­quences for any future gov­ern­ment work.

    The engi­neers explained that while many of the NLR­B’s records are even­tu­al­ly made pub­lic, the NxGen case man­age­ment sys­tem hosts pro­pri­etary data from cor­po­rate com­peti­tors, per­son­al infor­ma­tion about union mem­bers or employ­ees vot­ing to join a union, and wit­ness tes­ti­mo­ny in ongo­ing cas­es. Access to that data is pro­tect­ed by numer­ous fed­er­al laws, includ­ing the Pri­va­cy Act.

    Those engi­neers were also con­cerned by DOGE staffers’ insis­tence that their activ­i­ties not be logged, allow­ing them to probe the NLR­B’s sys­tems and dis­cov­er infor­ma­tion about poten­tial secu­ri­ty flaws or vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties with­out being detect­ed.

    ...

    Putting the puz­zle pieces togeth­er

    About a week after arriv­ing, the DOGE engi­neers had left the NLRB and delet­ed their accounts, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure to Con­gress.

    In the office, Berulis had had lim­it­ed vis­i­bil­i­ty into what the DOGE team was up to in real time.

    That’s part­ly because, he said, the NLRB isn’t advanced when it comes to detect­ing insid­er threats or poten­tial­ly mali­cious actors inside the agency itself. “We as an agency have not evolved to account for those,” he explained. “We were look­ing for [bad actors] out­side,” he said.

    But he count­ed on DOGE leav­ing at least a few traces of its activ­i­ty behind, puz­zle pieces he could assem­ble to try to put togeth­er a pic­ture of what hap­pened — details he includ­ed in his offi­cial dis­clo­sure.

    First, at least one DOGE account was cre­at­ed and lat­er delet­ed for use in the NLR­B’s cloud sys­tems, host­ed by Microsoft: “DogeSA_2d5c3e0446f9@nlrb.microsoft.com.”

    Then, DOGE engi­neers installed what’s called a “con­tain­er,” a kind of opaque vir­tu­al com­put­er that can run pro­grams on a machine with­out reveal­ing its activ­i­ties to the rest of the net­work. On its own, that would­n’t be sus­pi­cious, though it did allow the engi­neers to work invis­i­bly and left no trace of its activ­i­ties once it was removed.

    Then, Berulis start­ed track­ing sen­si­tive data leav­ing the places it’s meant to live, accord­ing to his offi­cial dis­clo­sure. First, he saw a chunk of data exit­ing the NxGen case man­age­ment sys­tem’s “nucle­us,” inside the NLRB sys­tem, Berulis explained. Then, he saw a large spike in out­bound traf­fic leav­ing the net­work itself.

    From what he could see, the data leav­ing, almost all text files, added up to around 10 giga­bytes — or the equiv­a­lent of a full stack of ency­clo­pe­dias if some­one print­ed them, he explained. It’s a siz­able chunk of the total data in the NLRB sys­tem, though the agency itself hosts over 10 ter­abytes in his­tor­i­cal data. It’s unclear which files were copied and removed or whether they were con­sol­i­dat­ed and com­pressed, which could mean even more data was exfil­trat­ed. It’s also pos­si­ble that DOGE ran queries look­ing for spe­cif­ic files in the NLR­B’s sys­tem and took only what it was look­ing for, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure.

    ...

    “We are under assault right now”

    For cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts, that spike in data leav­ing the sys­tem is a key indi­ca­tor of a breach, Berulis explained.

    ...

    When Berulis asked his IT col­leagues whether they knew why the data was exfil­trat­ed or whether any­one else had been using con­tain­ers to run code on the sys­tem in recent weeks, no one knew any­thing about it or the oth­er unusu­al activ­i­ties on the net­work, accord­ing to his dis­clo­sure. In fact, when they looked into the spike, they found that logs that were used to mon­i­tor out­bound traf­fic from the sys­tem were absent. Some actions tak­en on the net­work, includ­ing data exfil­tra­tion, had no attri­bu­tion — except to a “delet­ed account,” he con­tin­ued. “Nobody knows who delet­ed the logs or how they could have gone miss­ing,” Berulis said.

    ...

    They even­tu­al­ly launched a for­mal breach inves­ti­ga­tion, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure, and pre­pared a request for assis­tance from the Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and Infra­struc­ture Secu­ri­ty Agency (CISA). How­ev­er, those efforts were dis­rupt­ed with­out an expla­na­tion, Berulis said. That was deeply trou­bling to Berulis, who felt he need­ed help to try to get to the bot­tom of what hap­pened and deter­mine what new vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties might be exploit­ed as a result.

    In the days after Berulis and his col­leagues pre­pared a request for CISA’s help inves­ti­gat­ing the breach, Berulis found a print­ed let­ter in an enve­lope taped to his door, which includ­ed threat­en­ing lan­guage, sen­si­tive per­son­al infor­ma­tion and over­head pic­tures of him walk­ing his dog, accord­ing to the cov­er let­ter attached to his offi­cial dis­clo­sure. It’s unclear who sent it, but the let­ter made spe­cif­ic ref­er­ence to his deci­sion to report the breach. Law enforce­ment is inves­ti­gat­ing the let­ter.

    ...

    Unknown users also gave them­selves a high-lev­el access key, what’s called a SAS token, mean­ing “shared access sig­na­ture,” to access stor­age accounts, before delet­ing it. Berulis said there was no way to track what they did with it.

    Some­one had dis­abled con­trols that would pre­vent inse­cure or unau­tho­rized mobile devices from log­ging on to the sys­tem with­out the prop­er secu­ri­ty set­tings. There was an inter­face exposed to the pub­lic inter­net, poten­tial­ly allow­ing mali­cious actors access to the NLR­B’s sys­tems. Inter­nal alert­ing and mon­i­tor­ing sys­tems were found to be man­u­al­ly turned off. Mul­ti­fac­tor authen­ti­ca­tion was dis­abled. And Berulis noticed that an unknown user had export­ed a “user ros­ter,” a file with con­tact infor­ma­tion for out­side lawyers who have worked with the NLRB.

    Berulis said he noticed five Pow­er­Shell down­loads on the sys­tem, a task automa­tion pro­gram that would allow engi­neers to run auto­mat­ed com­mands. There were sev­er­al code libraries that got his atten­tion — tools that he said appeared to be designed to auto­mate and mask data exfil­tra­tion. There was a tool to gen­er­ate a seem­ing­ly end­less num­ber of IP address­es called “requests-ip-rota­tor,” and a com­mon­ly used automa­tion tool for web devel­op­ers called “browser­less” — both repos­i­to­ries starred or favor­it­ed by Wick, the DOGE engi­neer, accord­ing to an archive of his GitHub account reviewed by NPR.

    While inves­ti­gat­ing the data tak­en from the agency, Berulis tried to deter­mine its ulti­mate des­ti­na­tion. But who­ev­er had exfil­trat­ed it had dis­guised its des­ti­na­tion too, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure.

    ...

    Berulis says some­one appeared to be doing some­thing called DNS tun­nel­ing to pre­vent the data exfil­tra­tion from being detect­ed. He came to that con­clu­sion, out­lined in his dis­clo­sure, after he saw a traf­fic spike in DNS requests par­al­lel to the data being exfil­trat­ed, a spike 1,000 times the nor­mal num­ber of requests.

    When some­one uses this kind of tech­nique, they set up a domain name that pings the tar­get sys­tem with ques­tions or queries. But they con­fig­ure the com­pro­mised serv­er so that it answers those DNS queries by send­ing out pack­ets of data, allow­ing the attack­er to steal infor­ma­tion that has been bro­ken down into small­er chunks.

    “We’ve seen Russ­ian threat actors do things like this on U.S. gov­ern­ment sys­tems,” said one threat intel­li­gence researcher who request­ed anonymi­ty because they weren’t autho­rized to speak pub­licly by their employ­er. That ana­lyst, who has exten­sive expe­ri­ence hunt­ing nation-state-spon­sored hack­ers, reviewed the whistle­blow­er’s tech­ni­cal claims.

    “The dif­fer­ence is, they were giv­en the keys to the front door,” the researcher con­tin­ued. While the researcher clar­i­fied that it would be dif­fi­cult to ful­ly ver­i­fy what hap­pened with­out full access to the NLRB sys­tem, they said Berulis’ con­clu­sions and accom­pa­ny­ing evi­dence were a cause for con­cern. “None of this is stan­dard,” they said.

    ...

    “No rea­son what­so­ev­er for access­ing the infor­ma­tion”

    DOGE’s inten­tions with regard to the NLRB data remain unclear. Many of the sys­tems that DOGE embed­ded itself in across the rest of the gov­ern­ment have pay­ment or employ­ment data, infor­ma­tion that it could use to eval­u­ate which grants and pro­grams to halt and whom to fire.

    But the case man­age­ment sys­tem is very dif­fer­ent.

    It hous­es infor­ma­tion about ongo­ing con­test­ed labor cas­es, lists of union activists, inter­nal case notes, per­son­al infor­ma­tion from Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers to home address­es, pro­pri­etary cor­po­rate data and more infor­ma­tion that nev­er gets pub­lished open­ly.

    Experts inter­viewed by NPR acknowl­edge that there are inef­fi­cien­cies across gov­ern­ment that war­rant fur­ther review, but they say they don’t see a sin­gle legit­i­mate rea­son that DOGE staffers would need to remove the data from the case man­age­ment sys­tem to resolve those prob­lems.

    “There is no rea­son what­so­ev­er for access­ing the infor­ma­tion. Now, could any agency be more effi­cient? More effec­tive? Pos­i­tive­ly. But what you need for that is peo­ple who under­stand what the agency does. That is not by min­ing data, putting algo­rithms in and cre­at­ing a breach of secu­ri­ty,” said Harley Shaiken, a pro­fes­sor emer­i­tus at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Cal­i­for­nia, Berke­ley who spe­cial­izes in labor and infor­ma­tion tech­nol­o­gy.

    “There is noth­ing that I can see about what DOGE is doing that fol­lows any of the stan­dard pro­ce­dures for how you do an audit that has integri­ty and that’s mean­ing­ful and will actu­al­ly pro­duce results that serve the nor­mal audit­ing func­tion, which is to look for fraud, waste and abuse,” said Sharon Block, the exec­u­tive direc­tor of Har­vard Law School’s Cen­ter for Labor and a Just Econ­o­my and a for­mer NLRB board mem­ber.

    “The mis­match between what they’re doing and the estab­lished, pro­fes­sion­al way to do what they say they’re doing ... that just kind of gives away the store, that they are not actu­al­ly about find­ing more effi­cient ways for the gov­ern­ment to oper­ate,” Block said.

    For labor law experts, the mere pos­si­bil­i­ty that sen­si­tive records were copied is a seri­ous dan­ger that could cre­ate a chill­ing effect for employ­ees every­where who turn to the Nation­al Labor Rela­tions Board for pro­tec­tion.

    “Just say­ing that they have access to the data is intim­i­dat­ing,” said Kate Bron­fen­bren­ner, the direc­tor of labor edu­ca­tion research at Cor­nell Uni­ver­si­ty and co-direc­tor of the Work­er Empow­er­ment Research Net­work. “Peo­ple are going to go, ‘I’m not going to tes­ti­fy before the board because, you know, my employ­er might get access.’ ”

    Bron­fen­bren­ner, the child of immi­grant par­ents who fled the Sovi­et Union and Nazi-con­trolled Ger­many, said she spends a lot of time think­ing about how sys­tems can crum­ble under the right cir­cum­stances. “You know, there’s this belief that we have these checks and bal­ances … but any­one who’s part of the labor move­ment should know that’s not true,” she told NPR.

    With access to the data, it would make it eas­i­er for com­pa­nies to fire employ­ees for union orga­niz­ing or keep black­lists of orga­niz­ers — ille­gal activ­i­ties under fed­er­al labor laws enforced by the NLRB. But “peo­ple get fired in this coun­try all the time for the law­ful act of try­ing to orga­nize a union,” said Block.

    Hav­ing a copy of the oppos­ing coun­sel’s notes as com­pa­nies pre­pare for legal chal­lenges would also be an attrac­tive pos­si­bil­i­ty, she con­tin­ued.

    It’s not just employ­ees who might suf­fer if this data got out. Com­pa­nies also some­times pro­vide detailed state­ments on inter­nal busi­ness plan­ning and cor­po­rate struc­ture in the midst of unfair-labor-prac­tice com­plaint pro­ceed­ings. If a com­pa­ny was attempt­ing to fire some­one who it alleged had dis­closed trade secrets and was fight­ing an unfair-labor-prac­tice com­plaint based around that deci­sion, those trade secrets might come up in the board­’s inves­ti­ga­tion too. That infor­ma­tion would be valu­able to com­peti­tors, reg­u­la­tors and oth­ers.

    ...

    A con­flict of inter­est and the dan­gers of expo­sure

    Labor law experts were par­tic­u­lar­ly con­cerned about what they described as clear con­flicts of inter­est, par­tic­u­lar­ly when it comes to Elon Musk, his com­pa­nies and his vast net­work of for­mer employ­ees and allies who are now get­ting access to gov­ern­ment jobs and data.

    Trump and Musk, dur­ing an inter­view with Fox News’s Sean Han­ni­ty, said Musk would recuse him­self from any­thing involv­ing his com­pa­nies. “I haven’t asked the pres­i­dent for any­thing ever,” Musk said. “I’m get­ting a sort of a dai­ly proc­tol­ogy exam here. You know, it’s not like I’ll be get­ting away [with] some­thing in the dead of night.” How­ev­er, DOGE has been grant­ed high-lev­el access to a lot of data that could ben­e­fit Musk, and there has been no evi­dence of a fire­wall pre­vent­ing mis­use of that data.

    There are mul­ti­ple ongo­ing cas­es involv­ing Musk and the NLRB. For one, after a group of for­mer SpaceX employ­ees lodged a com­plaint with the NLRB, lawyers rep­re­sent­ing SpaceX, some of whom were recent­ly hired into gov­ern­ment jobs, filed suit against the NLRB. They argued that the agen­cy’s struc­ture is uncon­sti­tu­tion­al.

    Sen. Chris Mur­phy, D‑Conn. raised his con­cerns about Musk access­ing sen­si­tive labor inves­ti­ga­tion data on cas­es against his com­pa­nies or com­peti­tors dur­ing the con­fir­ma­tion hear­ing for Trump’s labor sec­re­tary, Lori Chavez-DeRe­mer, in mid-Feb­ru­ary. He pressed her to answer whether she believed the NLRB is con­sti­tu­tion­al and to com­mit to keep­ing sen­si­tive data con­fi­den­tial. While she said she was com­mit­ted to “pri­va­cy” and said she respects the NLR­B’s “author­i­ty,” she insist­ed that Trump “has the exec­u­tive pow­er to exer­cise it as he sees fit.”

    All this is hap­pen­ing in the con­text of a broad­er attempt by the White House to ham­string labor agen­cies.

    The NLRB was cre­at­ed “to guar­an­tee work­ers’ rights to orga­nize and to address prob­lems that work­ers have in the work­place,” said Shaiken, of UC Berke­ley. Under Pres­i­dent Joe Biden, he recalled, the labor move­ment enjoyed an unusu­al amount of sup­port from Wash­ing­ton. “But what we have seen is a sharp slam­ming of the brakes to that and putting the vehi­cle in reverse in terms of what Trump has done so far,” he con­tin­ued.

    In addi­tion to send­ing DOGE to the NLRB, the Trump admin­is­tra­tion tried to neu­tral­ize the board­’s pow­er to enforce labor law by remov­ing its mem­ber Gwynne Wilcox. Courts have gone back and forth on whether Wilcox’s removal was ille­gal, as pres­i­dents are meant to demon­strate cause for dis­missal of inde­pen­dent board mem­bers.

    Rep­re­sen­ta­tives of DOGE and for­mer col­leagues of Musk’s who have been installed across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment have failed to reas­sure the pub­lic or the courts that they have tak­en the prop­er pre­cau­tions to pro­tect the data they’re ingest­ing and that pri­vate busi­ness inter­ests won’t influ­ence how that data is used or what pol­i­cy deci­sions are made, Block and the oth­er labor law experts inter­viewed by NPR say.

    “It’s not that he’s a ran­dom per­son who’s get­ting infor­ma­tion that a ran­dom per­son should­n’t have access to,” said Har­vard Law’s Block. “But if they real­ly did get every­thing, then he has infor­ma­tion about the cas­es the gov­ern­ment is build­ing against him,” she said.

    “DOGE is, whether they admit it or not, head­ed by some­body who is the sub­ject of active inves­ti­ga­tion and pros­e­cu­tion of cas­es. It is incred­i­bly trou­bling,” she said.

    Musk’s com­pa­ny xAI could also ben­e­fit from suck­ing up all the data DOGE has col­lect­ed to train its algo­rithms. Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts like Bruce Schneier, a well-known cryp­tog­ra­ph­er and adjunct lec­tur­er at the Har­vard Kennedy School, have point­ed to this con­cern at length in inter­views and writ­ten pieces.

    Accord­ing to two fed­er­al gov­ern­ment sources who were not autho­rized to speak pub­licly about their work­places and who shared email doc­u­men­ta­tion with NPR, man­agers have con­sis­tent­ly been warn­ing employ­ees that their data could be sub­ject to AI review, par­tic­u­lar­ly their email respons­es to the Musk-led cam­paign to get fed­er­al employ­ees to detail “what they did last week” in five bul­let points every Mon­day.

    “It’s not a flight of imag­i­na­tion to see sev­er­al DOGE staffers release some of that [data] sur­rep­ti­tious­ly to Musk or peo­ple close to him,” said Shaiken.

    Access for adver­saries

    If the data isn’t prop­er­ly pro­tect­ed after it leaves the agency or if DOGE left a dig­i­tal door open to the agency itself, data could also be exposed to poten­tial sale or theft by crim­i­nals or for­eign adver­saries. An attack­er could also try to take advan­tage of the con­nec­tions between the NLR­B’s cloud account and oth­er gov­ern­ment cloud envi­ron­ments, using their access to the NLRB as a foothold to move to oth­er net­works.

    ...

    With­in min­utes after DOGE accessed the NLR­B’s sys­tems, some­one with an IP address in Rus­sia start­ed try­ing to log in, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure. The attempts were “near real-time,” accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure. Those attempts were blocked, but they were espe­cial­ly alarm­ing. Who­ev­er was attempt­ing to log in was using one of the new­ly cre­at­ed DOGE accounts — and the per­son had the cor­rect user­name and pass­word, accord­ing to Berulis. While it’s pos­si­ble the user was dis­guis­ing their loca­tion, it’s high­ly unlike­ly they’d appear to be com­ing from Rus­sia if they want­ed to avoid sus­pi­cion, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts inter­viewed by NPR explained.

    On their own, a few failed login attempts from a Russ­ian IP address aren’t a smok­ing gun, those cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts inter­viewed by NPR said. But giv­en the over­all pic­ture of activ­i­ty, it’s a con­cern­ing sign that for­eign adver­saries may already be search­ing for ways into gov­ern­ment sys­tems that DOGE engi­neers may have left exposed.

    ...

    A trou­bling pat­tern

    ...

    One of the first peo­ple to speak out about DOGE’s access to sen­si­tive data was Erie Mey­er, who resigned as the chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer at the Con­sumer Finan­cial Pro­tec­tion Bureau (CFPB) in Feb­ru­ary. She has pro­vid­ed tes­ti­mo­ny in ongo­ing court cas­es sur­round­ing DOGE’s access and also spoke to NPR in an inter­view. The CFPB has sen­si­tive and poten­tial­ly mar­ket-mov­ing data. Mey­er said DOGE employ­ees grant­ed them­selves “God-tier” access to the CFP­B’s sys­tems, turned off audit­ing and event logs and put the cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts respon­si­ble for insid­er threat detec­tion on admin­is­tra­tive leave. When IT experts at the CFPB planned to con­duct an “after action” report on DOGE’s activ­i­ties, they were stonewalled, she con­tin­ued.

    ...

    “I am trem­bling,” she said upon hear­ing about the poten­tial expo­sure of data from the NLRB. “They can get every piece of whistle­blow­er tes­ti­mo­ny, every report, every­thing. This is not good.”

    ...

    “Our cyber teams are pissed because they have to sit on their hands when every sin­gle alarm sys­tem we have regard­ing insid­er threats is going off,” said one employ­ee at an agency of the Inte­ri­or Depart­ment who request­ed anonymi­ty, fear­ing ret­ri­bu­tion. Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty teams want­ed to shut off new users’ access to the sys­tem, the employ­ee con­tin­ued, but were ordered to stand down.

    Mean­while, in a let­ter pub­lished on March 13 on Fed­er­al News Net­work, 46 for­mer senior offi­cials from the Gen­er­al Ser­vices Admin­is­tra­tion, one of the gov­ern­ment agen­cies hard­est hit by DOGE’s cost-cut­ting efforts and that over­sees near­ly all fed­er­al build­ings and pur­chas­ing, wrote that they believed “high­ly-sen­si­tive IT sys­tems are being put at risk and sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion is being down­loaded to unknown, unvet­ted exter­nal sources in clear vio­la­tion of pri­va­cy and data-pro­tec­tion rules.”

    ...

    ———————

    “A whistle­blow­er’s dis­clo­sure details how DOGE may have tak­en sen­si­tive labor data” by Jen­na McLaugh­lin; Nation­al Pub­lic Radio; 04/15/2025

    “But accord­ing to an offi­cial whistle­blow­er dis­clo­sure shared with Con­gress and oth­er fed­er­al over­seers that was obtained by NPR, sub­se­quent inter­views with the whistle­blow­er and records of inter­nal com­mu­ni­ca­tions, tech­ni­cal staff mem­bers were alarmed about what DOGE engi­neers did when they were grant­ed access, par­tic­u­lar­ly when those staffers noticed a spike in data leav­ing the agency. It’s pos­si­ble that the data includ­ed sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion on unions, ongo­ing legal cas­es and cor­po­rate secrets — data that four labor law experts tell NPR should almost nev­er leave the NLRB and that has noth­ing to do with mak­ing the gov­ern­ment more effi­cient or cut­ting spend­ing.

    Mass data exfil­tra­tion was detect­ed. We don’t know what they took. We don’t know who took it. And we don’t know where it was sent and what it was being used for. We just know it was tak­en. And accord­ing to experts, there is no plau­si­ble valid rea­son from that data removal. It’s theft. Oh, and it’s pret­ty clear at this point that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion has zero inter­est in inves­ti­gat­ing this data theft. As we can see, the offi­cial line from the NLRB is that an inves­ti­ga­tion was con­duct­ed and “deter­mined that no breach of agency sys­tems occurred.” That deter­mi­na­tion is obvi­ous­ly a lie. Which makes this a sto­ry about both the theft of data by DOGE and the sub­se­quent cov­er-up by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion:

    ...
    The whistle­blow­er’s account is cor­rob­o­rat­ed by inter­nal doc­u­men­ta­tion and was reviewed by 11 tech­ni­cal experts across oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies and the pri­vate sec­tor. In total, NPR spoke to over 30 sources across the gov­ern­ment, the pri­vate sec­tor, the labor move­ment, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and law enforce­ment who spoke to their own con­cerns about how DOGE and the Trump admin­is­tra­tion might be han­dling sen­si­tive data, and the impli­ca­tions for its expo­sure. Much of the fol­low­ing account comes from the whistle­blow­er’s offi­cial dis­clo­sure and inter­views with NPR.

    ...

    Tim Bear­ese, the NLR­B’s act­ing press sec­re­tary, denied that the agency grant­ed DOGE access to its sys­tems and said DOGE had not request­ed access to the agen­cy’s sys­tems. Bear­ese said the agency con­duct­ed an inves­ti­ga­tion after Berulis raised his con­cerns but “deter­mined that no breach of agency sys­tems occurred.”
    ...

    But that offi­cial deter­mi­na­tion that “no breach of agency sys­tems occurred” also flies in the face of the fact that the DOGE staffers demand­ed the kind of access that would­n’t leave a trail of their activ­i­ties. In oth­er words, they pre­emp­tive­ly destroyed the evi­dence that would have been nec­es­sary to deter­mine whether or not a breach had occurred. The Trump team cur­rent­ly man­ag­ing the NLRB is effec­tive­ly in on what­ev­er crime tran­spired. Or at least help­ing to cov­er it up:

    ...
    He start­ed about six months before Pres­i­dent Trump was inau­gu­rat­ed for his sec­ond term this past Jan­u­ary. Berulis said he hit the ground run­ning, secur­ing the NLR­B’s cloud-based data servers and rein­forc­ing what’s called “zero trust” prin­ci­ples, which means that users can get access only to the parts of the sys­tem they need in order to do their jobs — no more, no less. That way, if an attack­er gets hold of a sin­gle user­name and pass­word, the attack­er can’t access the whole sys­tem.

    ...

    Berulis says he was told by col­leagues that DOGE employ­ees demand­ed the high­est lev­el of access, what are called “ten­ant own­er lev­el” accounts inside the inde­pen­dent agen­cy’s com­put­er sys­tems, with essen­tial­ly unre­strict­ed per­mis­sion to read, copy and alter data, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure.

    When an IT staffer sug­gest­ed a stream­lined process to acti­vate those accounts in a way that would let their activ­i­ties be tracked, in accor­dance with NLRB secu­ri­ty poli­cies, the IT staffers were told to stay out of DOGE’s way, the dis­clo­sure con­tin­ues.
    ...

    And then there’s the ‘in your face’ behav­ior by DOGE staffer Jor­dan Wick, who lit­er­al­ly cre­at­ed a pub­licly view­able soft­ware project on the GitHub code repos­i­to­ry called “NxGenBdoorEx­tract”, a name that lit­er­al­ly refers to cre­at­ing a “back­door” for extract­ing the “NxGen” in-house data stored at the NLRB. It’s the kind of behav­ior that begs the ques­tion of whether or not Wick and the oth­er DOGE staffers were already offered pre-emp­tive pres­i­den­tial par­dons. The whole DOGE oper­a­tion cer­tain­ly behaves that way:

    ...
    After jour­nal­ist Roger Sol­len­berg­er start­ed post­ing on X about the account, Berulis noticed some­thing Wick was work­ing on: a project, or repos­i­to­ry, titled “NxGenBdoorEx­tract.”

    ...

    While NPR was unable to recov­er the code for that project, the name itself sug­gests that Wick could have been design­ing a back­door, or “Bdoor,” to extract files from the NLR­B’s inter­nal case man­age­ment sys­tem, known as NxGen, accord­ing to sev­er­al cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts who reviewed Berulis’ con­clu­sions.

    ...

    NxGen is an inter­nal sys­tem that was designed specif­i­cal­ly for the NLRB in-house, accord­ing to sev­er­al of the engi­neers who cre­at­ed the tool and who all spoke to NPR on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty to avoid retal­i­a­tion or adverse con­se­quences for any future gov­ern­ment work.

    The engi­neers explained that while many of the NLR­B’s records are even­tu­al­ly made pub­lic, the NxGen case man­age­ment sys­tem hosts pro­pri­etary data from cor­po­rate com­peti­tors, per­son­al infor­ma­tion about union mem­bers or employ­ees vot­ing to join a union, and wit­ness tes­ti­mo­ny in ongo­ing cas­es. Access to that data is pro­tect­ed by numer­ous fed­er­al laws, includ­ing the Pri­va­cy Act.
    ...

    Also note the speed with which this all took place: after just a week of work, the DOGE staffers left the NLRB and delet­ed their accounts. This was like a smash and grab rob­bery. And it was only then that agency staffers like Berulis could attempt to assess the dam­age. And he found around 10 giga­bytes of data had left the NxGen in-house data repos­i­to­ry. But, again, we don’t know which files. That’s all a mys­tery thanks to all the steps DOGE took to cov­er their tracks:

    ...
    About a week after arriv­ing, the DOGE engi­neers had left the NLRB and delet­ed their accounts, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure to Con­gress.

    ...

    Then, Berulis start­ed track­ing sen­si­tive data leav­ing the places it’s meant to live, accord­ing to his offi­cial dis­clo­sure. First, he saw a chunk of data exit­ing the NxGen case man­age­ment sys­tem’s “nucle­us,” inside the NLRB sys­tem, Berulis explained. Then, he saw a large spike in out­bound traf­fic leav­ing the net­work itself.

    From what he could see, the data leav­ing, almost all text files, added up to around 10 giga­bytes — or the equiv­a­lent of a full stack of ency­clo­pe­dias if some­one print­ed them, he explained. It’s a siz­able chunk of the total data in the NLRB sys­tem, though the agency itself hosts over 10 ter­abytes in his­tor­i­cal data. It’s unclear which files were copied and removed or whether they were con­sol­i­dat­ed and com­pressed, which could mean even more data was exfil­trat­ed. It’s also pos­si­ble that DOGE ran queries look­ing for spe­cif­ic files in the NLR­B’s sys­tem and took only what it was look­ing for, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure.
    ...

    Worse, when Berulis and the oth­er staffers made an attempt to deduce which files had been exfil­trat­ed, they found that the logs had been delet­ed by a now-delet­ed account. They launched a for­mal inves­ti­ga­tion that would include CISA, but that got thwart­ed. Instead, days after Berulis and his col­leauges pre­pared a request for CISA help, Berulis found the threat­en­ing note pinned to his door:

    ...
    When Berulis asked his IT col­leagues whether they knew why the data was exfil­trat­ed or whether any­one else had been using con­tain­ers to run code on the sys­tem in recent weeks, no one knew any­thing about it or the oth­er unusu­al activ­i­ties on the net­work, accord­ing to his dis­clo­sure. In fact, when they looked into the spike, they found that logs that were used to mon­i­tor out­bound traf­fic from the sys­tem were absent. Some actions tak­en on the net­work, includ­ing data exfil­tra­tion, had no attri­bu­tion — except to a “delet­ed account,” he con­tin­ued. “Nobody knows who delet­ed the logs or how they could have gone miss­ing,” Berulis said.

    ...

    They even­tu­al­ly launched a for­mal breach inves­ti­ga­tion, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure, and pre­pared a request for assis­tance from the Cyber­se­cu­ri­ty and Infra­struc­ture Secu­ri­ty Agency (CISA). How­ev­er, those efforts were dis­rupt­ed with­out an expla­na­tion, Berulis said. That was deeply trou­bling to Berulis, who felt he need­ed help to try to get to the bot­tom of what hap­pened and deter­mine what new vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties might be exploit­ed as a result.

    In the days after Berulis and his col­leagues pre­pared a request for CISA’s help inves­ti­gat­ing the breach, Berulis found a print­ed let­ter in an enve­lope taped to his door, which includ­ed threat­en­ing lan­guage, sen­si­tive per­son­al infor­ma­tion and over­head pic­tures of him walk­ing his dog, accord­ing to the cov­er let­ter attached to his offi­cial dis­clo­sure. It’s unclear who sent it, but the let­ter made spe­cif­ic ref­er­ence to his deci­sion to report the breach. Law enforce­ment is inves­ti­gat­ing the let­ter.
    ...

    And then we get this evi­dence of a “DNS tun­nel­ing” approach to exfil­trat­ing data sur­rep­ti­tious­ly. A tech­nique that requires com­pro­mis­ing the NLRB servers so data can be qui­et­ly sent out in small chunks at a time. Which is an indi­ca­tion that the peo­ple car­ry­ing out this data exfil­tra­tion oper­a­tion had knowl­edge of hack­er tech­niques:

    ...
    Berulis says some­one appeared to be doing some­thing called DNS tun­nel­ing to pre­vent the data exfil­tra­tion from being detect­ed. He came to that con­clu­sion, out­lined in his dis­clo­sure, after he saw a traf­fic spike in DNS requests par­al­lel to the data being exfil­trat­ed, a spike 1,000 times the nor­mal num­ber of requests.

    When some­one uses this kind of tech­nique, they set up a domain name that pings the tar­get sys­tem with ques­tions or queries. But they con­fig­ure the com­pro­mised serv­er so that it answers those DNS queries by send­ing out pack­ets of data, allow­ing the attack­er to steal infor­ma­tion that has been bro­ken down into small­er chunks.
    ...

    Now, obvi­ous­ly, the Star­link ter­mi­nal that was report­ed­ly installed the NLRB played a role in this untrack­able data exfil­tra­tion oper­a­tion. So it’s notable that some­one appar­ent­ly also dis­abled con­trols that would pre­vent inse­cure or unau­tho­rized mobile devices from log­ging on to the sys­tem with­out the prop­er secu­ri­ty set­tings along with an inter­face exposed to the pub­lic inter­net. Were those inse­cure devices all con­nect­ed to Star­link by chance?

    ...
    Some­one had dis­abled con­trols that would pre­vent inse­cure or unau­tho­rized mobile devices from log­ging on to the sys­tem with­out the prop­er secu­ri­ty set­tings. There was an inter­face exposed to the pub­lic inter­net, poten­tial­ly allow­ing mali­cious actors access to the NLR­B’s sys­tems. Inter­nal alert­ing and mon­i­tor­ing sys­tems were found to be man­u­al­ly turned off. Mul­ti­fac­tor authen­ti­ca­tion was dis­abled. And Berulis noticed that an unknown user had export­ed a “user ros­ter,” a file with con­tact infor­ma­tion for out­side lawyers who have worked with the NLRB.

    ...

    While inves­ti­gat­ing the data tak­en from the agency, Berulis tried to deter­mine its ulti­mate des­ti­na­tion. But who­ev­er had exfil­trat­ed it had dis­guised its des­ti­na­tion too, accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure.
    ...

    And then we get to this fas­ci­nat­ing col­lec­tion of evi­dence: with­in min­utes after DOGE accessed the NLR­B’s sys­tems, some­one with an IP address in Rus­sia start­ed try­ing to log into the sys­tem using one of the new­ly cre­at­ed DOGE accounts. With the cor­rect user­name and pass­word. While these attempts were blocked, it’s the kind of inci­dent that sug­gests either the DOGE team has already been com­pro­mised or the DOGE team ini­tial­ly had plans on mak­ing it looks like some sort of Russ­ian hack took place. But also keep in mind that when we read how “while it’s pos­si­ble the user was dis­guis­ing their loca­tion, it’s high­ly unlike­ly they’d appear to be com­ing from Rus­sia if they want­ed to avoid sus­pi­cion,” that same log­ic would apply to Russ­ian hack­ers who could also dis­guise their own tracks. And as we saw above, who­ev­er was exfil­trat­ing this data was dis­guis­ing the des­ti­na­tion of the data too. The DOGE team knew how to spoof loca­tions. Also keep in mind that, with all of the evi­dence of the active destruc­tion of evi­dence in order to cov­er their tracks, the DOGE team may have sim­ply got­ten slop­py and neglect­ed to delete the logs of these login attempts because they were nev­er suc­cess­ful:

    ...
    With­in min­utes after DOGE accessed the NLR­B’s sys­tems, some­one with an IP address in Rus­sia start­ed try­ing to log in, accord­ing to Berulis’ dis­clo­sure. The attempts were “near real-time,” accord­ing to the dis­clo­sure. Those attempts were blocked, but they were espe­cial­ly alarm­ing. Who­ev­er was attempt­ing to log in was using one of the new­ly cre­at­ed DOGE accounts — and the per­son had the cor­rect user­name and pass­word, accord­ing to Berulis. While it’s pos­si­ble the user was dis­guis­ing their loca­tion, it’s high­ly unlike­ly they’d appear to be com­ing from Rus­sia if they want­ed to avoid sus­pi­cion, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts inter­viewed by NPR explained.
    ...

    And that warn­ing about the com­pro­mise of oth­er agen­cies brings us to warn­ing we got from anoth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies tasked with hous­ing the kind of high­ly sen­si­tive data pri­vate com­pa­nies might be very inter­est­ed in get­ting their hands on: the for­mer chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer at the Con­sumer Finan­cial Pro­tec­tion Bureau (CFPB) has already warned that the same expe­ri­ence of DOGE employ­ees turn­ing off audit­ing and event logs hap­pened there too. The cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts were even put on admin­is­tra­tive leave:

    ...
    One of the first peo­ple to speak out about DOGE’s access to sen­si­tive data was Erie Mey­er, who resigned as the chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer at the Con­sumer Finan­cial Pro­tec­tion Bureau (CFPB) in Feb­ru­ary. She has pro­vid­ed tes­ti­mo­ny in ongo­ing court cas­es sur­round­ing DOGE’s access and also spoke to NPR in an inter­view. The CFPB has sen­si­tive and poten­tial­ly mar­ket-mov­ing data. Mey­er said DOGE employ­ees grant­ed them­selves “God-tier” access to the CFP­B’s sys­tems, turned off audit­ing and event logs and put the cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts respon­si­ble for insid­er threat detec­tion on admin­is­tra­tive leave. When IT experts at the CFPB planned to con­duct an “after action” report on DOGE’s activ­i­ties, they were stonewalled, she con­tin­ued.
    ...

    And, again, this sto­ry is from back in April. And, if any­thing, it’s only got­ten worse. With more time to destroy evi­dence of stolen data and more time to threat­en and intim­i­date any­one who dares expose the crime. And more time for Trump and Musk to make up and play nice while they plot their next grand crime togeth­er.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 19, 2025, 1:57 am
  6. Welp, he said it: MIGA. Less than a day after order­ing US strikes against Iran­ian nuclear sites, Pres­i­dent Trump is already talk­ing about regime change in Iran and ‘Mak­ing Iran Great Again’. We don’t know where exact­ly this is head­ed, but we can be con­fi­dent that a much larg­er and more sus­tained con­flict is on the way. And while this might be dire now for the over­all glob­al state of affairs and a pos­si­ble pre­lude to a WWI­II-like sce­nario, it’s also unam­bigu­ous­ly won­der­ful news for US defense sec­tor. A sec­tor that, we’ve seen, is increas­ing­ly incor­po­rat­ing the AI tech­nolo­gies under devel­op­ment by Sil­i­con Val­ley, hence the new Palan­tir-led efforts to cre­ate a new AI-cen­tric defense con­tract­ing con­sor­tium.

    And those increas­ing­ly lucra­tive prospects for Sil­i­con Val­ley, and Palan­tir in par­tic­u­lar, brings us to the fol­low­ing set of sto­ries about the deep­en­ing mutu­al reliance between Sil­i­con Val­ley and the Pen­ta­gon. Well, not just the Pen­ta­gon. As we’ve seen, the UK Navy has even begun embed­ded Palan­tir employ­ees on ships as part of a tri­al “for­ward deploy­ment” pro­gram. The Palan­tir employ­ees won’t just be assist­ing with the Navy’s direct logis­ti­cal needs in terms of staffing and equip­ment. It sounds like part of the mis­sion for the Palan­tir employ­ees will be long-term mod­el­ing of the UK’s per­son­nel for the pur­pose of ensur­ing the kind of skills and lead­ers need­ed for the future of naval war­fare. A future that will pre­sum­ably increas­ing­ly revolve around the imple­men­ta­tion of Palan­tir’s ser­vices across the UK Navy.

    Oh, and guess who heads of Palan­tir’s Lon­don office: Louis Mosley, grand­son of Oswald Mosley, the founder of the British Union of Fas­cists. Yes, Palan­tir is going to be mod­el­ing who gets pri­or­i­tized for retain­ment by the UK Navy, with Louis Mosley pre­sum­ably play­ing a lead­ing role. As the arti­cle also notes, the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary also uses Palan­tir’s sys­tems, so don’t be shocked if this kind of “for­ward deploy­ment” of Palan­tir employ­ees ends up get­ting applied to Ukraine’s mil­i­tary too. Although that would obvi­ous­ly be a much more dan­ger­ous for­ward deploy­ment.

    But as far as the embed­ding of tech employ­ees in the mil­i­tary goes, that for­ward deploy­ment of Palan­tir employ­ees isn’t even the most aggres­sive new pro­gram. It turns out the Pen­ta­gon has a pro­gram of its own for embed­ding tech staff direct­ly in mil­i­tary oper­a­tions: Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives are being draft­ed into a new “Detach­ment 201” pro­gram that turns them into mil­i­tary reserve offi­cers. In fact, they will be sworn in as lieu­tenant colonels, but them in imme­di­ate senior lead­er­ship roles. No basic train­ing will be required. Instead, they will be expect­ed to spend 120 hours a year in mil­i­tary ser­vice, where they will be advis­ing on AI-pow­ered sys­tems and assist­ing the Defense Depart­ment in recruit­ing oth­er high-tech spe­cial­ists. In oth­er words, Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives are going to be recruit­ing their staff into the mil­i­tary. Which is the kind of goal that sug­gests we’re going to be see­ing a lot more “for­ward deploy­ment” type of arrange­ments between Sil­i­con Val­ley firms in branch­es of the mil­i­tary. Meta’s chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer, Andrew “Boz” Bosworth, Palan­tir’s CTO, Shyam Sankar, and Ope­nAI exec­u­tives Kevin Weil and Bob McGrew are all set to join the Detache­ment 201 pro­gram.

    We’re also told that these tech exec­u­tives will have direct input on mil­i­tary strate­gies. So what about the mas­sive con­flicts of inter­est in hav­ing Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives play­ing senior lead­er­ship roles in craft­ing mil­i­tary strate­gies that will poten­tial­ly rely on hard­ware and ser­vices pro­vid­ed by their own firms? Well, we are told the exec­u­tives won’t work on any projects direct­ly involv­ing their own com­pa­nies. Keep in mind that tech­nolo­gies like AI are going to be hard to com­part­men­tal­ize into spe­cif­ic projects. Also keep in mind that hav­ing these exec­u­tives advis­ing on projects that involves their com­peti­tors’ prod­ucts and ser­vices also con­sti­tutes a pret­ty obvi­ous con­flict of inter­est. Oh well, appar­ent­ly.

    And that blasé atti­tude about the glar­ing con­flicts of inter­est — and the real world risks cre­at­ed by those con­flicts of inter­est — bring us to the final update on mil­i­tary pro­cure­ment affairs: the Office of the Direc­tor of Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion just had its bud­get gut­ted and staff rough­ly cut in half. An office ded­i­cat­ed to pro­vid­ing a final mea­sure of qual­i­ty con­trol on new mil­i­tary hard­ware and that has report­ed­ly fre­quent­ly found issues defense con­trac­tors had­n’t caught. In fact, the office was estab­lished in the 1980s in response to com­plaints about defense con­trac­tors pro­vid­ed hard­ware that did­n’t live up to the adver­tise­ments. Over­all, the office has long a means of com­bat­ing the dread­ed ‘waste, fraud, and abuse’, and been seen as being high­ly effec­tive at it. That’s the office that just saw its staff gut­ted. At the same time tech exec­u­tives are get­ting sworn in a senior offi­cers so they can advise on the best strate­gies for the next gen­er­a­tion of AI-assist­ed war­fare. What could pos­si­bly go wrong?

    Ok, first, here’s that report from back in Sep­tem­ber about the new for­ward deploy­ments of the Palan­tir employ­ees in the UK Navy. A project that puts Palan­tir not only at the heart of the UK’s day-to-day Naval logis­tics but also pro­vid­ing the vision for who should be lead­ing the UK Navy of the future. Led by Oswald Mosley’s grand­son:

    The Times

    How tech giant Palan­tir is secret­ly chang­ing the face of war­fare

    The sys­tem used by com­man­ders in Ukraine will allow UK top brass to strength­en the ser­vice by bring­ing ‘rot­ten old data­bas­es’ up to date

    Lar­isa Brown
    , Defence Edi­tor

    Sun­day Sep­tem­ber 22 2024, 11.54pm BST, The Times

    At a swish office in the heart of Soho, tech experts armed with Apple Mac­Books and Lego for cof­fee breaks are chang­ing the way coun­tries con­duct war.

    By crunch­ing huge amounts of data, the US tech giant Palan­tir has become renowned for help­ing Ukrain­ian com­man­ders to iden­ti­fy and effi­cient­ly elim­i­nate Russ­ian tar­gets on the bat­tle­field. But it is Palantir’s mul­ti­mil­lion-pound work with the Min­istry of Defence in Britain that remains some of its most hush-hush.

    The Times can now reveal that Palantir’s soft­ware engi­neers, many of them young­sters with degrees in com­put­er sci­ence or math­e­mat­ics, have been “for­ward deployed” into the Roy­al Navy as part of a three-year con­tract that began in 2022. They are help­ing the navy ensure it has both the man­pow­er and the ships in place for a con­flict of the future.

    Palan­tir, a CIA-linked data-min­ing com­pa­ny, was co-found­ed by a group of Sil­i­con Val­ley entre­pre­neurs includ­ing Peter Thiel, a for­mer donor to Don­ald Trump and men­tor to JD Vance, Trump’s nom­i­nee for vice-pres­i­dent. The con­ser­v­a­tive tech bil­lion­aire named his com­pa­ny after the crys­tal balls used as “see­ing stones” in The Lord of the Rings. Louis Mosley, grand­son of Oswald Mosley and nephew of the late For­mu­la 1 boss Max Mosley, is the head of Palantir’s Lon­don office.

    ...

    The Roy­al Navy uses the same soft­ware as the Ukraini­ans, although it is opti­mised for the navy’s pur­pos­es. As part of Project Krak­en, Palan­tir pro­vides naval com­man­ders with a com­plete view of the ser­vice, from short­falls in man­pow­er to the ships sail­ing in the Chan­nel.

    It is able to col­late infor­ma­tion from decades-old data­bas­es includ­ing med­ical records, pay­roll and com­plet­ed train­ing doc­u­ments, and iden­ti­fy recruit­ment gaps and whether some­one is fit for deploy­ment on the high seas. In addi­tion, the sys­tem can iden­ti­fy upcom­ing needs for ship parts, main­te­nance peri­ods and which ships will be ready at future dates as required by the gov­ern­ment.

    The mod­el­ling aims to stop ships being delayed from going to sea by prob­lems such as crew short­ages. “In the old world you were hav­ing to man­u­al­ly mar­ry togeth­er all of that, and it was extreme­ly long-wind­ed and inef­fi­cient. They are rot­ten old data­bas­es that have been around 30 to 40 years … you have now got one clean, har­monised view of all these indi­vid­u­als and every­thing you need to know about them,” Mosley said.

    He added that the mod­el­ling Palan­tir pro­vid­ed could be used for more sophis­ti­cat­ed tasks, includ­ing help­ing to solve “sys­temic strate­gic prob­lems” such as career man­age­ment to ensure the navy has enough skilled sailors ris­ing up the chain of com­mand. “There are cer­tain indi­vid­u­als who it takes years to get qual­i­fied, and if you lose one of them you are in big trou­ble,” he said.

    ...

    Mosley said navy chiefs could use the data to under­stand every­thing about the organ­i­sa­tion and “then start to lever­age that to map the future”. Senior offi­cers could ask ques­tions such as “What does my force need to look like in 2030?” and then work back­wards to ensure there were enough sailors in the pipeline and ships under con­struc­tion to meet the goal.

    The sys­tem could answer ques­tions such as “Are there spot bonus­es or ways I need to address gaps in pay?” Mosley said, adding that it could reduce the like­li­hood of sailors leav­ing at “crit­i­cal moments”.

    Describ­ing it as a “vir­tu­al rep­re­sen­ta­tion of your phys­i­cal real­i­ty”, Mosley revealed that once the sys­tem added AI to the mix, it could map out future “what if” sce­nar­ios in which the UK is under threat and ships need to be deployed in the most effec­tive loca­tions.

    Palan­tir expects its work with the MoD to grow fur­ther. Senior UK mil­i­tary fig­ures will be watch­ing how effec­tive it has already been in Ukraine, where com­man­ders are using it to make quick and effi­cient deci­sions on the bat­tle­field.

    ——————

    “How tech giant Palan­tir is secret­ly chang­ing the face of war­fare” by Lar­isa Brown; The Times; 09/22/2024

    The Times can now reveal that Palantir’s soft­ware engi­neers, many of them young­sters with degrees in com­put­er sci­ence or math­e­mat­ics, have been “for­ward deployed” into the Roy­al Navy as part of a three-year con­tract that began in 2022. They are help­ing the navy ensure it has both the man­pow­er and the ships in place for a con­flict of the future.”

    Palan­tir employ­ees have been “for­ward deployed” with the UK Navy since 2022. Palan­tir is man­ag­ing to make itself even more embed­ded in West­ern mil­i­tary affairs. And look who hap­pens to be serv­ing as the head of Palan­tir’s Lon­don office: Louis Mosley, grand­son of British fas­cist leader Oswald Mose­ly. Yes, the grand­son of the founder of Britain’s fas­cist par­ty is now lead­ing the office that’s embed­ding Palan­tir staff on UK Naval ships:

    ...
    Palan­tir, a CIA-linked data-min­ing com­pa­ny, was co-found­ed by a group of Sil­i­con Val­ley entre­pre­neurs includ­ing Peter Thiel, a for­mer donor to Don­ald Trump and men­tor to JD Vance, Trump’s nom­i­nee for vice-pres­i­dent. The con­ser­v­a­tive tech bil­lion­aire named his com­pa­ny after the crys­tal balls used as “see­ing stones” in The Lord of the Rings. Louis Mosley, grand­son of Oswald Mosley and nephew of the late For­mu­la 1 boss Max Mosley, is the head of Palantir’s Lon­don office.
    ...

    Inter­est­ing­ly, it does­n’t sound like the embed­ding of Palan­tir’s soft­ware in the UK mil­i­tary is being used for the exe­cu­tion of bat­tle­field logis­tics and analy­sis. Instead, Palan­tir is engag­ing in some sort of mod­el­ing of Naval oper­a­tions for the pur­pose of ensur­ing a steady flow of not just parts and main­te­nance but also per­son­nel. So if you have long-term career ambi­tions with the UK Navy, now is the time to become extreme­ly overt with some pro-Palan­tir sen­ti­ments:

    ...
    It is able to col­late infor­ma­tion from decades-old data­bas­es includ­ing med­ical records, pay­roll and com­plet­ed train­ing doc­u­ments, and iden­ti­fy recruit­ment gaps and whether some­one is fit for deploy­ment on the high seas. In addi­tion, the sys­tem can iden­ti­fy upcom­ing needs for ship parts, main­te­nance peri­ods and which ships will be ready at future dates as required by the gov­ern­ment.

    The mod­el­ling aims to stop ships being delayed from going to sea by prob­lems such as crew short­ages. “In the old world you were hav­ing to man­u­al­ly mar­ry togeth­er all of that, and it was extreme­ly long-wind­ed and inef­fi­cient. They are rot­ten old data­bas­es that have been around 30 to 40 years … you have now got one clean, har­monised view of all these indi­vid­u­als and every­thing you need to know about them,” Mosley said.

    He added that the mod­el­ling Palan­tir pro­vid­ed could be used for more sophis­ti­cat­ed tasks, includ­ing help­ing to solve “sys­temic strate­gic prob­lems” such as career man­age­ment to ensure the navy has enough skilled sailors ris­ing up the chain of com­mand. “There are cer­tain indi­vid­u­als who it takes years to get qual­i­fied, and if you lose one of them you are in big trou­ble,” he said.

    ...

    Mosley said navy chiefs could use the data to under­stand every­thing about the organ­i­sa­tion and “then start to lever­age that to map the future”. Senior offi­cers could ask ques­tions such as “What does my force need to look like in 2030?” and then work back­wards to ensure there were enough sailors in the pipeline and ships under con­struc­tion to meet the goal.

    ...

    Describ­ing it as a “vir­tu­al rep­re­sen­ta­tion of your phys­i­cal real­i­ty”, Mosley revealed that once the sys­tem added AI to the mix, it could map out future “what if” sce­nar­ios in which the UK is under threat and ships need to be deployed in the most effec­tive loca­tions.
    ...

    Also note how the soft­ware the Roy­al Navy uses is the same as the Ukraini­ans. Which sug­gests that sim­i­lar “for­ward deploy­ment” of Palan­tir staff with the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary is also be some­thing would could see in the future if this becomes a trend. Although that would prob­a­bly require some extra­or­di­nary haz­ard pay:

    ...
    The Roy­al Navy uses the same soft­ware as the Ukraini­ans, although it is opti­mised for the navy’s pur­pos­es. As part of Project Krak­en, Palan­tir pro­vides naval com­man­ders with a com­plete view of the ser­vice, from short­falls in man­pow­er to the ships sail­ing in the Chan­nel.

    ...

    Palan­tir expects its work with the MoD to grow fur­ther. Senior UK mil­i­tary fig­ures will be watch­ing how effec­tive it has already been in Ukraine, where com­man­ders are using it to make quick and effi­cient deci­sions on the bat­tle­field.
    ...

    Bu as we’re going to see in the fol­low­ing piece, the embed­ding of Palan­tir employ­ees in the UK Navy was just the start of this trend. The US mil­i­tary has tak­en it to the next lev­el: Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives are being made lieu­tenant colonels in the Army’s inau­gur­al “Detach­ment 201” pro­gram. Yes, tech exec­u­tives are being made senior mil­i­tary offi­cers in the US mil­i­tary. They won’t be going through basic train­ing, but they will be par­tic­i­pat­ing in mil­i­tary strate­gic plan­ning. The pro­gram sim­ply requires they spend 120 hours a year, advis­ing on AI-pow­ered sys­tems and assist­ing the Defense Depart­ment in recruit­ing oth­er high-tech spe­cial­ists. So it sounds like recruit­ing AI spe­cial­ists into the mil­i­tary will be a big part of their role as senior mil­i­tary offi­cers.

    And what about the clear con­flicts of inter­est? Well, we are also being assured that the exec­u­tives won’t be work­ing on any pro­grams that direct­ly involved their employ­ers. Which seems like an increas­ing­ly impos­si­ble lim­it to impose on their roles when you con­sid­er how wide­spread tech­nolo­gies like AI are like­ly to become in the mil­i­tary’s oper­a­tions. But those are the assur­ances we are get­ting. The kind of assur­ance that should have us con­fi­dent that Sil­i­con Val­ley will become even Pen­ta­gon-cen­tric in com­ing decades. And vice ver­sa:

    Quartz

    How Big Tech learned to love Amer­i­ca’s mil­i­tary

    Sil­i­con Val­ley com­pa­nies are aban­don­ing safe­ty poli­cies to win Pen­ta­gon con­tracts, turn­ing every­day AI into weapons sys­tems

    By Jack­ie Snow
    Pub­lished 06/20/2025
    Updat­ed

    Since Don­ald Trump’s pres­i­den­tial elec­tion vic­to­ry, major tech com­pa­nies have aban­doned years of poli­cies restrict­ing mil­i­tary work and sought out lucra­tive defense con­tracts and deep­er con­nec­tions with the Pen­ta­gon.

    Exec­u­tives from Meta, Ope­nAI, and Palan­tir will be sworn in Fri­day as Army Reserve offi­cers. Ope­nAI signed a $200 mil­lion defense con­tract this week. Meta is part­ner­ing with defense start­up Anduril to build AI-pow­ered com­bat gog­gles for sol­diers.

    All while Trump is push­ing a $1 tril­lion defense bud­get — the largest in U.S. his­to­ry.

    ...

    A rever­sal for Sil­i­con Val­ley

    The rela­tion­ship between Sil­i­con Val­ley and the mil­i­tary isn’t new. DARPA fund­ing helped cre­ate the inter­net, GPS, and even Siri. For decades, mil­i­tary research has flowed into civil­ian appli­ca­tions: The Pen­ta­gon has devel­oped the tech­nol­o­gy, and com­pa­nies have com­mer­cial­ized it for every­day use.

    But for years, the reverse flow bare­ly exist­ed. When tech com­pa­nies attempt­ed to col­lab­o­rate with the mil­i­tary, their employ­ees revolt­ed. Google employ­ees staged unprece­dent­ed protests over Project Maven, a Pen­ta­gon pro­gram that used AI to ana­lyze drone footage. Almost 5,000 work­ers signed peti­tions demand­ing that the com­pa­ny can­cel the con­tract, and dozens resigned.

    The back­lash worked. Google did­n’t renew the Maven con­tract, and it estab­lished AI prin­ci­ples that restrict­ed mil­i­tary appli­ca­tions. For years after­ward, major tech com­pa­nies main­tained poli­cies against weapons devel­op­ment, with employ­ees suc­cess­ful­ly push­ing back against mil­i­tary part­ner­ships.

    That resis­tance crum­bled as the eco­nom­ics of AI became unsus­tain­able. Train­ing and run­ning large lan­guage mod­els costs hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars, and con­sumer rev­enue alone can’t cov­er the bills. For many com­pa­nies, work­ing with the mil­i­tary isn’t just an oppor­tu­ni­ty — it may be essen­tial for sur­vival.

    The most strik­ing sym­bol of this part­ner­ship will take place Fri­day, when Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives will lit­er­al­ly put on Army uni­forms. Meta’s chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer, Andrew “Boz” Bosworth, Palan­tir’s CTO, Shyam Sankar, and Ope­nAI exec­u­tives Kevin Weil and Bob McGrew will be sworn in as lieu­tenant colonels in the Army’s inau­gur­al “Detach­ment 201” pro­gram.

    The tech reservists will serve about 120 hours a year, advis­ing on AI-pow­ered sys­tems and assist­ing the Defense Depart­ment in recruit­ing oth­er high-tech spe­cial­ists. They’ll be spared basic train­ing and giv­en more flex­i­bil­i­ty than typ­i­cal reservists to work remote­ly. Due to their pri­vate-sec­tor sta­tus, each will hold the rank of lieu­tenant colonel, plac­ing them imme­di­ate­ly in senior lead­er­ship roles.

    “We need to go faster, and that’s exact­ly what we are doing here,” Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, told The Wall Street Jour­nal.

    The arrange­ment cre­ates an unprece­dent­ed lev­el of inte­gra­tion between pri­vate com­pa­nies and mil­i­tary plan­ning. The exec­u­tives won’t work on projects involv­ing their own employ­ers, but they’ll have direct input into mil­i­tary strat­e­gy while their com­pa­nies com­pete for mas­sive defense con­tracts.

    The cor­po­rate part­ner­ships are mov­ing just as fast. Last month, Meta and Anduril announced they’re col­lab­o­rat­ing to build aug­ment­ed real­i­ty head­sets for U.S. sol­diers, start­ing with tech­nol­o­gy that pro­vides real-time bat­tle­field intel­li­gence through heads-up dis­plays.

    ...

    Safe­ty guardrails come down

    As com­pa­nies embrace mil­i­tary con­tracts, they’re qui­et­ly aban­don­ing safe­ty com­mit­ments. The Midas Project, a non­prof­it that tracks pol­i­cy changes at major AI com­pa­nies, has doc­u­ment­ed about 30 sig­nif­i­cant mod­i­fi­ca­tions to eth­i­cal guide­lines since 2023.

    Ope­nAI removed val­ues such as “impact-dri­ven,” which empha­sized that employ­ees “care deeply about real-world impli­ca­tions,” replac­ing them with “AGI focus.” Google mod­i­fied its safe­ty frame­work to sug­gest it would only fol­low guide­lines if com­peti­tors adopt­ed sim­i­lar mea­sures. Ope­nAI and oth­ers have explic­it­ly reversed pre­vi­ous bans on mil­i­tary appli­ca­tions.

    Mean­while, over­sight is actu­al­ly weak­en­ing. In May, Defense Sec­re­tary Pete Hegseth cut the Pen­tagon’s inde­pen­dent weapons test­ing office in half, reduc­ing staff from 94 to 45 peo­ple. The office, estab­lished in the 1980s after weapons per­formed poor­ly in com­bat, now has few­er resources to eval­u­ate AI sys­tems just as they become cen­tral to war­fare.

    ...

    ———–

    “How Big Tech learned to love Amer­i­ca’s mil­i­tary” By Jack­ie Snow; Quartz; 06/20/2025

    Exec­u­tives from Meta, Ope­nAI, and Palan­tir will be sworn in Fri­day as Army Reserve offi­cers. Ope­nAI signed a $200 mil­lion defense con­tract this week. Meta is part­ner­ing with defense start­up Anduril to build AI-pow­ered com­bat gog­gles for sol­diers. ”

    This isn’t just Palan­tir employ­ees get­ting for­ward deployed inside mil­i­tary units. Tech exec­u­tives are being made into mil­i­tary offi­cers. Lieu­tenant colonels, specif­i­cal­ly. They won’t have to under­go­ing basic train­ing. Instead, they’ll just have to serve 120 hours a year (rough­ly 2 1/2 hours a week on aver­age). So what about the the obvi­ous con­flicts of inter­est for these tech exec­u­tives and their grow­ing num­ber of defense con­tracts? Well, we are assured that these new­ly mint­ed Sil­i­con Val­ley senior offi­cers won’t be work­ing on projects involv­ing their own employ­ers, which seems like a rather absurd assur­ance when con­sid­er­ing on wide­ly uti­lized some of these tech­nolo­gies are like­ly to be, like arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence. And at the same time, we are told they’ll have direct input on mil­i­tary strat­e­gy, some­thing will obvi­ous­ly have an impact on the mil­i­tary’s pro­cure­ment pri­or­i­ties. It’s not hard to see­ing these exec­u­tives ‘strate­gi­cal­ly’ pre­fer­ring meth­ods of war­fare that ben­e­fit their firms:

    ...
    The most strik­ing sym­bol of this part­ner­ship will take place Fri­day, when Sil­i­con Val­ley exec­u­tives will lit­er­al­ly put on Army uni­forms. Meta’s chief tech­nol­o­gy offi­cer, Andrew “Boz” Bosworth, Palan­tir’s CTO, Shyam Sankar, and Ope­nAI exec­u­tives Kevin Weil and Bob McGrew will be sworn in as lieu­tenant colonels in the Army’s inau­gur­al “Detach­ment 201” pro­gram.

    The tech reservists will serve about 120 hours a year, advis­ing on AI-pow­ered sys­tems and assist­ing the Defense Depart­ment in recruit­ing oth­er high-tech spe­cial­ists. They’ll be spared basic train­ing and giv­en more flex­i­bil­i­ty than typ­i­cal reservists to work remote­ly. Due to their pri­vate-sec­tor sta­tus, each will hold the rank of lieu­tenant colonel, plac­ing them imme­di­ate­ly in senior lead­er­ship roles.

    “We need to go faster, and that’s exact­ly what we are doing here,” Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, told The Wall Street Jour­nal.

    The arrange­ment cre­ates an unprece­dent­ed lev­el of inte­gra­tion between pri­vate com­pa­nies and mil­i­tary plan­ning. The exec­u­tives won’t work on projects involv­ing their own employ­ers, but they’ll have direct input into mil­i­tary strat­e­gy while their com­pa­nies com­pete for mas­sive defense con­tracts.
    ...

    And then we get to this tru­ly omi­nous devel­op­ment: we are told that part of the under­ly­ing eco­nom­ic ratio­nale behind this Sil­i­con Val­ley embrace of defense con­tract­ing is the grow­ing cost of AI-relat­ed research and devel­op­ment. Sim­ply put, the cost of devel­op­ing next gen­er­a­tion AI mod­els has grown so much, con­sumer rev­enue can no longer viably finance it. In oth­er words, future gen­er­a­tions of AI will have to be built for mil­i­tary pur­pos­es first and fore­most. The eco­nom­ics demand it. Con­sumer appli­ca­tions will be sec­ondary con­sid­er­a­tions:

    ...
    The rela­tion­ship between Sil­i­con Val­ley and the mil­i­tary isn’t new. DARPA fund­ing helped cre­ate the inter­net, GPS, and even Siri. For decades, mil­i­tary research has flowed into civil­ian appli­ca­tions: The Pen­ta­gon has devel­oped the tech­nol­o­gy, and com­pa­nies have com­mer­cial­ized it for every­day use.

    But for years, the reverse flow bare­ly exist­ed. When tech com­pa­nies attempt­ed to col­lab­o­rate with the mil­i­tary, their employ­ees revolt­ed. Google employ­ees staged unprece­dent­ed protests over Project Maven, a Pen­ta­gon pro­gram that used AI to ana­lyze drone footage. Almost 5,000 work­ers signed peti­tions demand­ing that the com­pa­ny can­cel the con­tract, and dozens resigned.

    The back­lash worked. Google did­n’t renew the Maven con­tract, and it estab­lished AI prin­ci­ples that restrict­ed mil­i­tary appli­ca­tions. For years after­ward, major tech com­pa­nies main­tained poli­cies against weapons devel­op­ment, with employ­ees suc­cess­ful­ly push­ing back against mil­i­tary part­ner­ships.

    That resis­tance crum­bled as the eco­nom­ics of AI became unsus­tain­able. Train­ing and run­ning large lan­guage mod­els costs hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars, and con­sumer rev­enue alone can’t cov­er the bills. For many com­pa­nies, work­ing with the mil­i­tary isn’t just an oppor­tu­ni­ty — it may be essen­tial for sur­vival.

    ...

    As com­pa­nies embrace mil­i­tary con­tracts, they’re qui­et­ly aban­don­ing safe­ty com­mit­ments. The Midas Project, a non­prof­it that tracks pol­i­cy changes at major AI com­pa­nies, has doc­u­ment­ed about 30 sig­nif­i­cant mod­i­fi­ca­tions to eth­i­cal guide­lines since 2023.

    Ope­nAI removed val­ues such as “impact-dri­ven,” which empha­sized that employ­ees “care deeply about real-world impli­ca­tions,” replac­ing them with “AGI focus.” Google mod­i­fied its safe­ty frame­work to sug­gest it would only fol­low guide­lines if com­peti­tors adopt­ed sim­i­lar mea­sures. Ope­nAI and oth­ers have explic­it­ly reversed pre­vi­ous bans on mil­i­tary appli­ca­tions.
    ...

    And then we get this reminder: the incor­po­ra­tion of tech exec­u­tives direct­ly into senior mil­i­tary lead­er­ship posi­tions coin­cides with the gut­ting of the Pen­tagon’s inde­pen­dent test­ing office. Which pre­sum­ably means the Pen­ta­gon will be even more reliant on the assur­ances of the com­pa­nies build­ing the weapons:

    ...
    Mean­while, over­sight is actu­al­ly weak­en­ing. In May, Defense Sec­re­tary Pete Hegseth cut the Pen­tagon’s inde­pen­dent weapons test­ing office in half, reduc­ing staff from 94 to 45 peo­ple. The office, estab­lished in the 1980s after weapons per­formed poor­ly in com­bat, now has few­er resources to eval­u­ate AI sys­tems just as they become cen­tral to war­fare.
    ...

    So what was the pre­text for the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s deci­sion to gut the Office of the Direc­tor of Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion? Reduc­ing a “reduc­ing bloat­ed bureau­cra­cy and waste­ful spend­ing in favor of increased lethal­i­ty.” Of course, as we should have prob­a­bly expect­ed, it turns out this office was lit­er­al­ly formed for the pur­pose of reduc­ing “waste, fraud, and abuse”. Specif­i­cal­ly, the waste, fraud, and abuse found in defense con­tract­ing that results in weapons not per­form­ing as adver­tised. That’s the review process that has just been gut­ted:

    MIT Tech­nol­o­gy Review

    The Pen­ta­gon is gut­ting the team that tests AI and weapons sys­tems

    The move is a boon to ‘AI for defense’ com­pa­nies that want an even faster road to adop­tion.

    By James O’Don­nell
    June 10, 2025

    The Trump administration’s chain­saw approach to fed­er­al spend­ing lives on, even as Elon Musk turns on the pres­i­dent. On May 28, Sec­re­tary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he’d be gut­ting a key office at the Depart­ment of Defense respon­si­ble for test­ing and eval­u­at­ing the safe­ty of weapons and AI sys­tems.

    As part of a string of moves aimed at “reduc­ing bloat­ed bureau­cra­cy and waste­ful spend­ing in favor of increased lethal­i­ty,” Hegseth cut the size of the Office of the Direc­tor of Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion in half. The group was estab­lished in the 1980s—following orders from Congress—after crit­i­cisms that the Pen­ta­gon was field­ing weapons and sys­tems that didn’t per­form as safe­ly or effec­tive­ly as adver­tised. Hegseth is reduc­ing the agency’s staff to about 45, down from 94, and fir­ing and replac­ing its direc­tor. He gave the office just sev­en days to imple­ment the changes.

    ...

    The Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion office is “the last gate before a tech­nol­o­gy gets to the field,” says Mis­sy Cum­mings, a for­mer fight­er pilot for the US Navy who is now a pro­fes­sor of engi­neer­ing and com­put­er sci­ence at George Mason Uni­ver­si­ty. Though the mil­i­tary can do small exper­i­ments with new sys­tems with­out run­ning it by the office, it has to test any­thing that gets field­ed at scale.

    “In a bipar­ti­san way—up until now—everybody has seen it’s work­ing to help reduce waste, fraud, and abuse,” she says. That’s because it pro­vides an inde­pen­dent check on com­pa­nies’ and con­trac­tors’ claims about how well their tech­nol­o­gy works. It also aims to expose the sys­tems to more rig­or­ous safe­ty test­ing.

    The gut­ting comes at a par­tic­u­lar­ly piv­otal time for AI and mil­i­tary adop­tion: The Pen­ta­gon is exper­i­ment­ing with putting AI into every­thing, main­stream com­pa­nies like Ope­nAI are now more com­fort­able work­ing with the mil­i­tary, and defense giants like Anduril are win­ning big con­tracts to launch AI sys­tems (last Thurs­day, Anduril announced a whop­ping $2.5 bil­lion fund­ing round, dou­bling its val­u­a­tion to over $30 bil­lion).

    Hegseth claims his cuts will “make test­ing and field­ing weapons more effi­cient,” sav­ing $300 mil­lion. But Cum­mings is con­cerned that they are paving a way to faster adop­tion while increas­ing the chances that new sys­tems won’t be as safe or effec­tive as promised. “The fir­ings in DOTE send a clear mes­sage that all per­ceived obsta­cles for com­pa­nies favored by Trump are going to be removed,” she says.

    Anduril and Anthrop­ic, which have launched AI appli­ca­tions for mil­i­tary use, did not respond to my ques­tions about whether they pushed for or approve of the cuts. A rep­re­sen­ta­tive for Ope­nAI said that the com­pa­ny was not involved in lob­by­ing for the restruc­tur­ing.

    “The cuts make me ner­vous,” says Mark Can­cian, a senior advi­sor at the Cen­ter for Strate­gic and Inter­na­tion­al Stud­ies who pre­vi­ous­ly worked at the Pen­ta­gon in col­lab­o­ra­tion with the test­ing office. “It’s not that we’ll go from effec­tive to inef­fec­tive, but you might not catch some of the prob­lems that would sur­face in com­bat with­out this test­ing step.”

    It’s hard to say pre­cise­ly how the cuts will affect the office’s abil­i­ty to test sys­tems, and Can­cian admits that those respon­si­ble for get­ting new tech­nolo­gies out onto the bat­tle­field some­times com­plain that it can real­ly slow down adop­tion. But still, he says, the office fre­quent­ly uncov­ers errors that weren’t pre­vi­ous­ly caught.

    ...

    ———–

    “The Pen­ta­gon is gut­ting the team that tests AI and weapons sys­tems” By James O’Don­nell; MIT Tech­nol­o­gy Review; 06/10/2025

    “As part of a string of moves aimed at “reduc­ing bloat­ed bureau­cra­cy and waste­ful spend­ing in favor of increased lethal­i­ty,” Hegseth cut the size of the Office of the Direc­tor of Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion in half. The group was estab­lished in the 1980s—following orders from Congress—after crit­i­cisms that the Pen­ta­gon was field­ing weapons and sys­tems that didn’t per­form as safe­ly or effec­tive­ly as adver­tised. Hegseth is reduc­ing the agency’s staff to about 45, down from 94, and fir­ing and replac­ing its direc­tor. He gave the office just sev­en days to imple­ment the changes.”

    The Office of the Direc­tor of Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion was cre­at­ed for no rea­son. It was formed into response to weapons sys­tems not per­form­ing as adver­tised. An office lit­er­al­ly formed to pre­vent “waste, fraud, and abuse”. That’s the office that just had its staff gut­ted:

    ...
    The Oper­a­tional Test and Eval­u­a­tion office is “the last gate before a tech­nol­o­gy gets to the field,” says Mis­sy Cum­mings, a for­mer fight­er pilot for the US Navy who is now a pro­fes­sor of engi­neer­ing and com­put­er sci­ence at George Mason Uni­ver­si­ty. Though the mil­i­tary can do small exper­i­ments with new sys­tems with­out run­ning it by the office, it has to test any­thing that gets field­ed at scale.

    “In a bipar­ti­san way—up until now—everybody has seen it’s work­ing to help reduce waste, fraud, and abuse,” she says. That’s because it pro­vides an inde­pen­dent check on com­pa­nies’ and con­trac­tors’ claims about how well their tech­nol­o­gy works. It also aims to expose the sys­tems to more rig­or­ous safe­ty test­ing.

    The gut­ting comes at a par­tic­u­lar­ly piv­otal time for AI and mil­i­tary adop­tion: The Pen­ta­gon is exper­i­ment­ing with putting AI into every­thing, main­stream com­pa­nies like Ope­nAI are now more com­fort­able work­ing with the mil­i­tary, and defense giants like Anduril are win­ning big con­tracts to launch AI sys­tems (last Thurs­day, Anduril announced a whop­ping $2.5 bil­lion fund­ing round, dou­bling its val­u­a­tion to over $30 bil­lion).

    Hegseth claims his cuts will “make test­ing and field­ing weapons more effi­cient,” sav­ing $300 mil­lion. But Cum­mings is con­cerned that they are paving a way to faster adop­tion while increas­ing the chances that new sys­tems won’t be as safe or effec­tive as promised. “The fir­ings in DOTE send a clear mes­sage that all per­ceived obsta­cles for com­pa­nies favored by Trump are going to be removed,” she says.

    ...

    It’s hard to say pre­cise­ly how the cuts will affect the office’s abil­i­ty to test sys­tems, and Can­cian admits that those respon­si­ble for get­ting new tech­nolo­gies out onto the bat­tle­field some­times com­plain that it can real­ly slow down adop­tion. But still, he says, the office fre­quent­ly uncov­ers errors that weren’t pre­vi­ous­ly caught.
    ...

    Yes, the sig­nal being sent to Sil­i­con Val­ley is pret­ty clear at this point between the gut­ted of this office and the direct recruit­ing of tech exec­u­tives. A sig­nal to get ready for the great­est defense con­tract­ing ‘bust out’ in his­to­ry. A guardrails-free splurge of mil­i­tary spend­ing on any­thing AI-relat­ed. And don’t for­get that AIs aren’t just going to be guid­ing these com­pa­nies in pro­vid­ing ser­vices like long-term per­son­nel man­age­ment. The increas­ing­ly sophis­ti­cat­ed AIs will pre­sum­ably also be avail­able to assist these com­pa­nies in gen­er­at­ing even more Pen­ta­gon-relat­ed con­tracts and oth­er mil­i­tary con­tracts around the world. Like devices prod­ucts and ser­vices that will, even­tu­al­ly, lead to an even greater mil­i­tary reliance on the com­pa­ny. All sorts of AI-pow­ered prof­it-ori­ent­ed long-term mod­el­ing and strate­giz­ing is undoubt­ed­ly already under­way. It’s going to be an AI-pow­ered defense sec­tor bust out. Which is sort of what pass­es for progress these days.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 22, 2025, 8:13 pm
  7. The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has a new word of the day: denat­u­ral­iza­tion. It sounds like the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is going to start pri­or­i­tiz­ing the revo­ca­tion of US cit­i­zen­ship for nat­u­ral­ized cit­i­zens found to have com­mit­ted a now expand­ed list of crimes or vio­la­tions. The new focus appears to be a response to the strong pri­ma­ry win in the Demo­c­ra­t­ic pri­ma­ry for New York City’s may­oral race by nat­u­ral­ized cit­i­zen Zohran Mam­dani, with Pres­i­dent Trump now explic­it­ly threat­en­ing to have Mam­dani’s cit­i­zen­ship revokes over argu­ments that Mam­dani is a com­mu­nist who sup­ports ter­ror­ism. The long-expec­ta­tion threat of mass denat­u­ral­iza­tion under a sec­ond Trump admin­is­tra­tion is already here. A threat that, as we saw, had been long cham­pi­oned by key Trump advi­sor Stephen Miller, under the term “rem­i­gra­tion”. Stephen Miller’s “rem­i­gra­tion” plans are already tak­ing shape.

    But as we’re going to see in the fol­low­ing pair of arti­cles, the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s embrace of the pol­i­tics of rem­i­gra­tion isn’t lim­it­ed to loos­en­ing the con­di­tions for hav­ing some­one’s cit­i­zen­ship revoked. There are much larg­er plans. The kind of plans that, in years past, would have like­ly sparked some sort of lib­er­tar­i­an out­cry among con­ser­v­a­tive Amer­i­cans: the Depart­ment of Gov­ern­ment Effi­cien­cy (DOGE) is build­ing a cen­tral­ized list of Amer­i­can cit­i­zens.

    While many might assume such a list already exists, but that’s not the case. The US has long resist­ed the cre­ation of such a list for a vari­ety of rea­sons includ­ing pri­va­cy con­cerns. But as we’ve seen, those con­cerns appear to have large­ly evap­o­rat­ed among con­ser­v­a­tives as DOGE has pro­ceed­ed to build what has been terms the ‘data­base of ruin’: a high­ly detailed mas­ter data­base filled with high­ly sen­si­tive data, rife for tar­get­ed abus­es by an author­i­tar­i­an regime. The data­base of ruin is now being built and run by Palan­tir.

    And now we’re learn­ing about a new nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data­base that will like­ly play a very com­ple­men­tary role when it comes to the appli­ca­tion of big data for author­i­tar­i­an pur­pos­es: Sys­tem­at­ic Alien Ver­i­fi­ca­tion for Enti­tle­ments (SAVE). The new SAVE sys­tem is effec­tive­ly a major upgrade of a sys­tem that has exist­ed since the 1980s. The orig­i­nal sys­tem allowed for check­ing the cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus of an indi­vid­ual, which is often nec­es­sary for nat­u­ral­ized cit­i­zens when vot­ing because the vot­er rolls at depart­ments of motor vehi­cles don’t always get updat­ed in a time­ly man­ner. And while some states had been using that lega­cy sys­tem to check vot­er rolls for non-cit­i­zen vot­ers, they found it to be a labo­ri­ous process for each indi­vid­ual. In oth­er words, the lega­cy sys­tem could­n’t be used to just mass-check all of the peo­ple on a state’s vot­er rolls. Sev­er­al Repub­li­can-led states sued the Biden admin­is­tra­tion in 2024 over the inad­e­qua­cies of the sys­tem, argu­ing that the Biden admin­is­tra­tion was fail­ing to help states ver­i­fy their vot­ers’ cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus. The Unit­ed States Cit­i­zen­ship and Immi­gra­tion Ser­vices (USCIS), the agency that man­ages this sys­tem, began work­ing on the upgrades at the end of the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. DOGE got involved with that upgrade after Trump took office, and at this point it appears the SAVE sys­tem is going to be ready for mass cit­i­zen­ship checks of vot­er rolls.

    As experts warn, sys­tems like this are only going to work as well as the data that it con­tains and the accu­rate of SAVE’s data remains unclear. Beyond that, it’s also unclear what oth­er pur­pos­es the data will be used for, with immi­gra­tion-relat­ed raids being an obvi­ous pos­si­ble appli­ca­tion. And it will be up to indi­vid­ual states to pro­vide that vot­er roll data. That ambi­gu­i­ty has experts won­der if we’re going to see a kind of par­ti­san divide on which states end up using the new sys­tem, with Repub­li­can-led states embrac­ing it while Demo­c­ra­t­ic-led states take a much slow­er, more cau­tious approach.

    But let’s not for­get one of the biggest pos­si­ble impacts of this new sys­tem: it could poten­tial prove, or dis­prove, long-stand­ing Repub­li­can claims about mass non-cit­i­zen vot­ing in favor of Democ­rats. Claims that were a lot eas­i­er to make when there was no means of actu­al­ly answer­ing that ques­tion. And giv­en the real­i­ty that the evi­dence for mass non-cit­i­zen vot­ing is non-exis­tent, we have to ask how the con­ser­v­a­tive move­ment han­dle this rather cru­cial detail.

    And while it remains to be seen how exact­ly the Repub­li­can Par­ty is plan­ning on han­dling what should be a very del­i­cate issue, we’re already see­ing signs that some sort of bad faithed scheme is in the works. Because it turns out the Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work host­ed a vir­tu­al event on June 12 with David Jen­nings, the gov­ern­ment employ­ee who over­sees the SAVE sys­tem. And the Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work is, of course, the out­fit run by key Coun­cil for Nation­al Pol­i­cy (CNP) oper­a­tive Cle­ta Mitchell that spe­cial­izes in mak­ing claims of Demo­c­ra­t­ic elec­tion fraud. As we’ve seen, it was Mitchell who laid much of the ground­work for the elec­tion denial­ism that led up to the Jan­u­ary 6 Capi­tol insur­rec­tion. So when we learn about the head of SAVE meet­ing with Mitchel­l’s out­fit, that should be seen as a very big red flag regard­ing the actu­al­ly integri­ty of SAVE. In fact, Mitchell her­self is report­ed to have spo­ken about Jen­nings at an Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work event back in May. “He is in charge of the SAVE data­base that has the cit­i­zen­ship data for, you know, every­body,” accord­ing to Mitchell. “And he is in the process of recon­fig­ur­ing the entire [thing] so that we can actu­al­ly deter­mine who on the vot­er rolls is and is not a cit­i­zen.” On the one hand, it’s poten­tial­ly great if the US can final­ly address these decades-old claims of mass vot­er fraud by non-cit­i­zen vot­ers. But not if that ‘reveal’ is ulti­mate­ly cor­rupt. What is Mitchell plan­ning? It can’t sim­ply be

    Adding to the alarm over Cle­ta Mitchel­l’s appar­ent embrace of SAVE is the praise giv­en to SAVE by con­ser­v­a­tive activist Cather­ine Engel­brecht, founder of True the Vote, an orga­ni­za­tion that emerged dur­ing the Tea Par­ty era focused on pro­mot­ing nar­ra­tives about mass Demo­c­ra­t­ic vot­er fraud, includ­ing claims the 2020 elec­tion was stolen. As we’ve seen, Cle­ta Mitchell has served as True the Vote’s legal coun­sel. Engel­brecht recent­ly praised SAVE in a group newslet­ter. Although, inter­est­ing­ly, she also pre­vi­ous­ly warned about Palan­tir’s ‘data­base of ruin’, so there does appear to be at least some remain­ing con­ser­v­a­tive dis­com­fort over the unprece­dent­ed con­sol­i­da­tion of data on vir­tu­al­ly every­one in the US. But it’s pret­ty tepid dis­com­fort at this point.

    That’s all part of the con­text of Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s new obses­sion with revok­ing cit­i­zen­ship: with the unfurl­ing of a new sys­tem that could effec­tive­ly dis­prove Repub­li­can claims about non-cit­i­zen vot­ing, it’s not hard to imag­ine Repub­li­cans using mass denat­u­ral­iza­tion as a means of effec­tive­ly chang­ing the nar­ra­tive and mak­ing all sorts of claims about ‘improp­er cit­i­zens’ or ‘fake cit­i­zens’ vot­ing for Democ­rats. Instead of a ‘non-cit­i­zens are vot­ing for Democ­rats!’ nar­ra­tive, it will be a ‘Democ­rats are giv­ing bad peo­ple cit­i­zen­ship!’ nar­ra­tive. In oth­er words, we could see the lack of evi­dence for non-cit­i­zen vot­ing used as an excuse for mass denat­u­ral­iza­tion. And the more this new SAVE sys­tem has the poten­tial to reveal the big lie about non-cit­i­zen vot­ing, the more aggres­sive­ly we should expect the con­ver­sa­tion to shift to ‘fake cit­i­zens’ and denat­u­ral­iza­tion. This is where we are head­ing.

    Ok, first, here’s a report from back in ear­ly June, before we got the news about this big new SAVE upgrade, describ­ing the con­ser­v­a­tive out­cry over reports on DOGE’s con­struc­tion of the ‘data­base of ruin’ to be man­aged by Palan­tir. Out­cry from online influ­encers like Nick Fuentes, the reac­tionary Catholic neo-Nazi who infa­mous­ly had din­ner with Don­ald Trump and Kanye West at Mar-a-Lago back in Novem­ber 2022 and held a still-unex­plained day of meet­ings in Octo­ber 2023 at the office of a top Texas Repub­li­can strate­gist who serves as the top oper­a­tive for Texas theo­crat­ic bil­lion­aire Tim Dunn. Nick Fuentes, sad­ly, has real clout in the MAGA move­ment. And he was­n’t hap­py about Palan­tir, a com­pa­ny Fuentes char­ac­ter­ized as a CIA/Mossad cutout. As Fuentes put it, “Seri­ous­ly, if Palan­tir isn’t the deep state, then what is?” Even MAGA diehards like Fuentes are start­ing to get uncom­fort­able with the unprece­dent­ed con­sol­i­da­tion of pow­er at the fed­er­al lev­el. Which is going to make the unveil­ing of the new SAVE sys­tem a poten­tial­ly volatile phe­nom­e­na. Because, on the one hand, if SAVE ends up some­one prov­ing Repub­li­can claims of mass vot­er fraud, it’s not hard to imag­ine crit­ics like Fuentes com­ing around to the idea of cen­tral­ized fed­er­al data­bas­es on the pop­u­la­tion. And quite a betray­al if that ‘proof’ does­n’t appear:

    Newsweek

    ‘Trump Flipped On Us’: MAGA Reacts to Poten­tial Nation­al Cit­i­zen Data­base

    By Nick Mor­dowanec
    Staff Writer
    Pub­lished Jun 02, 2025 at 1:41 PM EDT
    Updat­ed Jun 04, 2025 at 3:05 PM EDT

    Sup­port­ers of Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump expressed anger and dis­be­lief online fol­low­ing reports that his admin­is­tra­tion had advanced plans to cre­ate a nation­al cit­i­zen data­base with tech­nol­o­gy firm Palan­tir.

    ...

    Why It Mat­ters

    The White House has con­tract­ed Palan­tir, a Col­orado-based ana­lyt­ics com­pa­ny co-found­ed by Trump sup­port­er Peter Thiel, to assist in com­pil­ing a data­base of per­son­al infor­ma­tion on Amer­i­can cit­i­zens, accord­ing to unnamed gov­ern­ment offi­cials and Palan­tir employ­ees who spoke with The New York Times. The pur­port­ed deal fol­lows project talks Palan­tir had with the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion (SSA) and the Depart­ment of Edu­ca­tion.

    ...

    What To Know

    The Palan­tir deal marks a sig­nif­i­cant devel­op­ment in gov­ern­ment data col­lec­tion, draw­ing sharp con­cern from pri­va­cy advo­cates and Trump’s own core base, oth­er­wise known as “MAGA.” Detrac­tors com­pared the cen­tral­ized data­base effort to sur­veil­lance ini­tia­tives in author­i­tar­i­an regimes.

    Numer­ous pro-Trump voic­es expressed dis­may and feel­ings of betray­al across social media plat­forms like X.

    “Peo­ple are so quick to sug­gest that I flipped on Trump...No, no, no...I did­n’t flip on Trump. TRUMP FLIPPED ON US. I’m just not will­ing to con­tin­ue liv­ing in a LIE, and I will tell you the unfor­tu­nate TRUTH about it,” The Patri­ot Voice wrote on X to his 158,000 fol­low­ers.

    The Hod­getwins, pop­u­lar con­ser­v­a­tives and Trump sup­port­ers, have more than 3.3 mil­lion fol­low­ers on X. In response to The New York Times report, they wrote on May 30, “Hope this ain’t true y’all.”

    Anoth­er post that same day reads: “Don’t know if this is true but I did not vote for this.”

    Nick Fuentes, a far-right Trump sup­port­er described as an “Amer­i­ca First” white nation­al­ist, called the asso­ci­a­tion between the Trump admin­is­tra­tion and Palan­tir “the ulti­mate betray­al of his own peo­ple.”

    “Feed­ing every ‘MAGA extrem­ist’ into an AI data­base con­trolled by a CIA/Mossad cutout,” Fuentes said on X, where he has rough­ly 561,000 fol­low­ers. “Seri­ous­ly, if Palan­tir isn’t the deep state, then what is?”

    In a video record­ed by Fuentes, who also has a Rum­ble chan­nel viewed over 31 mil­lion times, he said the fol­low­ing: “They are track­ing every­body that crit­i­cized Israel, every­body that inter­acts with some­body that’s crit­i­ciz­ing Israel, and whether you’re on a visa or not, whether you’re a cit­i­zen or not, whether you’re brown or not, Chris­t­ian or Mus­lim, they’re putting you in the Palan­tir data­base. They’re putting you on the ene­mies list. If you don’t see a prob­lem with that...”

    “I’m begin­ning to think it start­ed when DJT walked down that esca­la­tor, before 2016,” wrote an X user with the moniker “Red­neck Com­mon Sense.”

    X user Jack Max­ey won­dered: “Was MAGA a giant psy­op?”

    X user @D10Cat wrote: “Is Trump the same man that he was in 2016? Or did I just not see it back then?”

    “The cope is unre­al,” wrote Ash­ton Nichols on X. “I vot­ed for Trump but this is just unac­cept­able.”

    Palan­tir secured more than $113 mil­lion in fed­er­al con­tracts since Trump took office, includ­ing a recent $795 mil­lion agree­ment with the Depart­ment of Defense, accord­ing to The New Repub­lic. Its data ana­lyt­ics plat­form, Foundry, has already been deployed at the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty and Depart­ment of Health and Human Ser­vices, poten­tial­ly enabling cross-agency infor­ma­tion shar­ing.

    ...

    Oth­er crit­ics, includ­ing activist Jason Bassler, com­pared the plan to Chi­na’s “Social Cred­it Sys­tem,” warn­ing of the dan­gers of cen­tral­ized per­son­al dossiers.

    “No, this Palan­tir data­base isn’t like the oth­ers,” Bassler wrote on X on June 1. “It will com­bine:

    -Tax fil­ings
    ‑Stu­dent debt
    ‑Social Secu­ri­ty
    ‑Bank accounts
    ‑Med­ical claims
    ‑Immi­gra­tion sta­tus

    “No pre­vi­ous data­base sys­tem has ever cen­tral­ized this much per­son­al info across var­i­ous fed­er­al agen­cies.”

    ...

    ———–

    “ ‘Trump Flipped On Us’: MAGA Reacts to Poten­tial Nation­al Cit­i­zen Data­base” By Nick Mor­dowanec; Newsweek; 06/02/2025

    “Numer­ous pro-Trump voic­es expressed dis­may and feel­ings of betray­al across social media plat­forms like X.”

    It’s a betray­al. At least for a sub­set of the the MAGA base, which includes Nick Fuentes, the reac­tionary Catholic neo-Nazi who infa­mous­ly had din­ner with Don­ald Trump and Kanye West at Mar-a-Lago back in Novem­ber 2022 and who held a day of meet­ings at the office of a top Texas Repub­li­can strate­gist in Octo­ber 2023. Nick Fuentes is an online leader of the con­tem­po­rary MAGA move­ment, whether that move­ment wants to admit it or not. And even he’s pissed about this nation­al ‘data­base of ruin’. And the fact that it’s Palan­tir tasked with build­ing and man­ag­ing it. As Fuentes ask, “Seri­ous­ly, if Palan­tir isn’t the deep state, then what is?” It’s a long over­due ques­tion for the sup­pos­ed­ly anti-‘deep state’ MAGA base. If only it was being asked by more than just a dis­grun­tled Nazi influ­encer:

    ...
    Nick Fuentes, a far-right Trump sup­port­er described as an “Amer­i­ca First” white nation­al­ist, called the asso­ci­a­tion between the Trump admin­is­tra­tion and Palan­tir “the ulti­mate betray­al of his own peo­ple.”

    “Feed­ing every ‘MAGA extrem­ist’ into an AI data­base con­trolled by a CIA/Mossad cutout,” Fuentes said on X, where he has rough­ly 561,000 fol­low­ers. “Seri­ous­ly, if Palan­tir isn’t the deep state, then what is?”

    In a video record­ed by Fuentes, who also has a Rum­ble chan­nel viewed over 31 mil­lion times, he said the fol­low­ing: “They are track­ing every­body that crit­i­cized Israel, every­body that inter­acts with some­body that’s crit­i­ciz­ing Israel, and whether you’re on a visa or not, whether you’re a cit­i­zen or not, whether you’re brown or not, Chris­t­ian or Mus­lim, they’re putting you in the Palan­tir data­base. They’re putting you on the ene­mies list. If you don’t see a prob­lem with that...”
    ...

    And that report from a month ago on the pal­pa­ble sense of betray­al among the MAGA base brings us to the fol­low­ing NPR report about the ongo­ing efforts to build cen­tral­ized nation­al data­bas­es of every­one in the US: DOGE is build­ing a nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data­base. The Sys­tem­at­ic Alien Ver­i­fi­ca­tion for Enti­tle­ments (SAVE) sys­tem. But SAVE isn’t just built for check­ing whether or not an indi­vid­ual has cit­i­zen­ship. Such a sys­tem for indi­vid­ual queries has exist­ed for decades. SAVE, on the oth­er hand, is build for check­ing entire vot­er roles. And as we’re going to see, while such a sys­tem has experts wor­ried about the pos­si­ble abus­es that could arise should this data­base not con­tain accu­rate infor­ma­tion, there’s anoth­er group who should pos­si­bly be wor­ried this sys­tem: right-wing pur­vey­ors of myths about mass non-cit­i­zen vot­ing, a core belief among the MAGA die-hards. So the fact that one of the peo­ple man­ag­ing this new sys­tem report­ed­ly held a pri­vate brief­ing about it with none oth­er than Cle­ta Mitchell, the CNP’s lead­ing elec­tion denier and a key fig­ure in the efforts to over­turn the 2020. And as experts also warn, while this cen­tral­ized mass cit­i­zen­ship data­base will have obvi­ous appli­ca­tions for rou­tine elec­tion tasks like clean­ing vot­er rolls, that does­n’t mean its appli­ca­tions will end there. A cen­tral­ized cit­i­zen­ship data­base is being built with lit­tle over­sight and for uses yet to be deter­mined (or yet to be revealed):

    Nation­al Pub­lic Radio

    The Trump admin­is­tra­tion is build­ing a nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data sys­tem

    Heard on All Things Con­sid­ered

    By Jude Joffe-Block, Miles Parks
    June 29, 2025 5:00 AM ET

    The Trump admin­is­tra­tion has, for the first time ever, built a search­able nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data sys­tem.

    The tool, which is being rolled out in phas­es, is designed to be used by state and local elec­tion offi­cials to give them an eas­i­er way to ensure only cit­i­zens are vot­ing. But it was devel­oped rapid­ly with­out a pub­lic process, and some of those offi­cials are already wor­ry­ing about what else it could be used for.

    ...

    For decades, vot­ing offi­cials have not­ed that there was no nation­al cit­i­zen­ship list to com­pare their state lists to, so to ver­i­fy cit­i­zen­ship for their vot­ers, they either need­ed to ask peo­ple to pro­vide a birth cer­tifi­cate or a pass­port — some­thing that could dis­en­fran­chise mil­lions — or use a com­plex patch­work of dis­parate data sources.

    Now, the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty is offer­ing anoth­er way.

    DHS, in part­ner­ship with the White House­’s Depart­ment of Gov­ern­men­tal Effi­cien­cy (DOGE) team, has recent­ly rolled out a series of upgrades to a net­work of fed­er­al data­bas­es to allow state and coun­ty elec­tion offi­cials to quick­ly check the cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus of their entire vot­er lists — both U.S.-born and nat­u­ral­ized cit­i­zens — using data from the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion as well as immi­gra­tion data­bas­es.

    Such inte­gra­tion has nev­er exist­ed before, and experts call it a sea change that inch­es the U.S. clos­er to hav­ing a ros­ter of cit­i­zens — some­thing the coun­try has nev­er embraced. A cen­tral­ized nation­al data­base of Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion has long been con­sid­ered a third rail — espe­cial­ly to pri­va­cy advo­cates as well as polit­i­cal con­ser­v­a­tives, who have tra­di­tion­al­ly opposed mass data con­sol­i­da­tion by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment.

    ...

    When fed­er­al agen­cies plan to col­lect or use Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al data in new ways, there are pro­ce­dures they are required to fol­low before­hand, includ­ing giv­ing pub­lic notice.

    Anoth­er pri­va­cy expert, Uni­ver­si­ty of Vir­ginia School of Law pro­fes­sor Danielle Cit­ron, called this data aggre­ga­tion effort a “hair on fire” devel­op­ment. She told NPR she has ques­tions if the project itself is law­ful.

    Many oth­er ques­tions about the new sys­tem remain, includ­ing which states plan to use it and how, what sort of data secu­ri­ty mea­sures are being tak­en and how trust­wor­thy the data the tool pro­vides will be. It’s also unknown what the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment plans to do with the vot­er records after they’ve been run through the sys­tem.

    The recent his­to­ry of elec­tions is lit­tered with failed data match­ing efforts, often dri­ven by false fraud nar­ra­tives, which have entan­gled eli­gi­ble vot­ers. The first Trump admin­is­tra­tion attempt­ed the begin­nings of a sim­i­lar data project, though the effort shut­tered after most states balked at shar­ing their vot­er data.

    The fact that the devel­op­ment and roll­out fol­low Pres­i­dent Trump’s false­hoods about wide­spread nonci­t­i­zen vot­ing makes elec­tion experts wary of how this new tool will work.

    “We’ve nev­er had a list of U.S. cit­i­zens to com­pare our vot­er reg­is­tra­tion lists to,” said Kim Wyman, the for­mer Repub­li­can sec­re­tary of state of Wash­ing­ton who is now a senior fel­low at the Bipar­ti­san Pol­i­cy Cen­ter. “It seems like it takes the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment more than just [a few] months to be able to make a com­pre­hen­sive nation­al data­base of infor­ma­tion that’s going to be accu­rate … That’s what my con­cern is, just first and fore­most, that the list is accu­rate.”

    Every­one reg­is­ter­ing to vote must swear, under penal­ty of per­jury, that they are a U.S. cit­i­zen. The con­se­quences for nonci­t­i­zens who try to vote include fines, prison time and depor­ta­tion. Offi­cials say that deter­rent is why cas­es of inel­i­gi­ble peo­ple cast­ing bal­lots are incred­i­bly rare — a fact that’s become increas­ing­ly appar­ent as more and more states devote resources to uncov­er­ing the few peo­ple that slip through the cracks every elec­tion. Research has also shown that when nonci­t­i­zens do vote, it’s often not to com­mit fraud but rather because they mis­un­der­stood eli­gi­bil­i­ty rules.

    Trump and his allies have con­tin­ued to empha­size the issue. The Jus­tice Depart­ment has pri­or­i­tized its pros­e­cu­tion and Repub­li­can law­mak­ers are push­ing new leg­is­la­tion at both the nation­al and state lev­el to require peo­ple show proof of cit­i­zen­ship in order to reg­is­ter to vote.

    If this new tool is suc­cess­ful, it could pro­vide local and state gov­ern­ments a pow­er­ful method to check the cit­i­zen­ship of almost all Amer­i­cans with­out addi­tion­al doc­u­men­ta­tion require­ments.

    “Tak­ing that bur­den of proof, if you will, off the vot­er … is a good thing,” said Wyman, who also worked for the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty on elec­tion secu­ri­ty issues in the Biden admin­is­tra­tion.

    But she not­ed that a nation­al cit­i­zen­ship list and any­thing resem­bling a nation­al vot­er reg­is­tra­tion list have been con­tro­ver­sial ideas for a long time, so the Trump admin­is­tra­tion is wad­ing into unchart­ed waters.

    ...

    The U.S. Cit­i­zen­ship and Immi­gra­tion Ser­vice, which is under the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty, is man­ag­ing the tool. The agency did not pro­vide more infor­ma­tion about how it will work when con­tact­ed by NPR. In a state­ment, spokesman Matthew Tragess­er called the devel­op­ment a “game chang­er” and said the agency looks for­ward to “imple­ment­ing more updates.”

    ...

    What SAVE did and what it does now

    This new cit­i­zen­ship check capa­bil­i­ty comes from a mas­sive expan­sion of a tool vot­ing offi­cials only used spar­ing­ly in the past.

    The tool, known as the Sys­tem­at­ic Alien Ver­i­fi­ca­tion for Enti­tle­ments, or SAVE, is a sys­tem of DHS data­bas­es that state and fed­er­al agen­cies have queried since the 1980s to check the immi­gra­tion sta­tus of nonci­t­i­zens liv­ing in the U.S. legal­ly. Agen­cies can then decide if the appli­cants are eli­gi­ble for dif­fer­ent gov­ern­ment ben­e­fits.

    For rough­ly the past decade, some vot­ing offi­cials have also used SAVE to check the cit­i­zen­ship of vot­ers on their rolls, usu­al­ly in instances where depart­ment of motor vehi­cle records indi­cat­ed a vot­er is a nonci­t­i­zen, since those records often aren’t updat­ed when a per­son nat­u­ral­izes. Elec­tion offi­cials could use SAVE to get a more recent immi­gra­tion snap­shot, which would either ver­i­fy that a per­son had become a cit­i­zen and was indeed eli­gi­ble to vote, or if no nat­u­ral­iza­tion record was found, indi­cate to the offi­cial that they should reach out to the vot­er about whether they are a cit­i­zen.

    ...

    Elec­tion offi­cials across the polit­i­cal spec­trum com­plained they did not have the spe­cif­ic immi­gra­tion iden­ti­fi­ca­tion num­bers need­ed to query the sys­tem, and in cas­es where they did, it was expen­sive and labor inten­sive to sub­mit one query at a time. Ahead of the 2024 elec­tion, some Repub­li­can-led states ramped up their com­plaints about the inad­e­qua­cies of the tool. Just weeks before the elec­tion, Texas, Flori­da and Ohio sued DHS, argu­ing the Biden admin­is­tra­tion was fail­ing to help states ver­i­fy their vot­ers’ cit­i­zen­ship.

    USCIS began plan­ning upgrades to the sys­tem at the end of the Biden admin­is­tra­tion, accord­ing to a per­son who attend­ed a brief­ing where it was dis­cussed but was not autho­rized to speak to the media. After Trump took office, DHS began a series of reg­u­lar calls with some state elec­tion staffers to talk through poten­tial updates.

    A key turn­ing point came in March, when Trump signed an exec­u­tive order that made sweep­ing changes to vot­ing and elec­tion pro­to­cols, includ­ing requir­ing DHS to allow states “access to appro­pri­ate sys­tems” for ver­i­fy­ing the cit­i­zen­ship of vot­ers on their rolls with­out a cost, and instruct­ing DOGE to assist the agency in comb­ing vot­er rolls for nonci­t­i­zens.

    The order also instruct­ed the attor­ney gen­er­al to pri­or­i­tize pros­e­cut­ing nonci­t­i­zens who reg­is­ter to vote, whether they actu­al­ly vot­ed or not, using “data­bas­es or infor­ma­tion main­tained by the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty.”

    With­in weeks, USCIS began announc­ing rolling upgrades to SAVE, cred­it­ing DOGE with the changes. On April 22, the agency revealed SAVE was now free for non-fed­er­al agen­cies, and could han­dle mass checks. Then, a May 22 news release announced SAVE had inte­grat­ed data from the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion so elec­tion offi­cials could query it with a nine-dig­it Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber.

    Though the May news release did­n’t men­tion it explic­it­ly, the Social Secu­ri­ty change meant for the first time SAVE could ver­i­fy the cit­i­zen­ship of U.S.-born Amer­i­cans with a valid Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber, which near­ly every Amer­i­can cit­i­zen has.

    That devel­op­ment is a major move that turned SAVE from a tool that only respond­ed to queries about for­eign-born cit­i­zens or nonci­t­i­zens into some­thing that could comb through entire vot­er lists. But numer­ous state vot­ing offi­cials NPR spoke with were not aware that capa­bil­i­ty was part of the updates.

    As recent­ly as late April, a USCIS fact sheet about using SAVE for vot­ing records said the oppo­site. “SAVE does not ver­i­fy U.S. born cit­i­zens under any cir­cum­stances. SAVE does not access data­bas­es that con­tain U.S.-born cit­i­zen infor­ma­tion,” the web page read, accord­ing to a snap­shot cap­tured by the Inter­net Archive.

    That has now been changed. In a ver­sion that was last updat­ed in June, the fact sheet now says that look­ing up U.S.-born cit­i­zens is pos­si­ble with a Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber. “SAVE is able in many cas­es to ver­i­fy U.S.-born U.S. cit­i­zens for vot­er ver­i­fi­ca­tion pur­pos­es, through infor­ma­tion accessed through the SSA,” it reads. NPR has not yet spo­ken to a state vot­ing offi­cial who has looked up a U.S.-born cit­i­zen on the new SAVE plat­form.

    Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion data sys­tems can show whether an appli­cant was a cit­i­zen or a nonci­t­i­zen at the time they received their num­ber, said Kath­leen Romig, a for­mer SSA offi­cial who works at the lib­er­al-lean­ing pol­i­cy non­prof­it Cen­ter on Bud­get and Pol­i­cy Pri­or­i­ties.

    The Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty has com­bined that point-in-time cit­i­zen­ship infor­ma­tion with SAVE’s abil­i­ty to more thor­ough­ly tell whether a per­son has nat­u­ral­ized to cre­ate a sys­tem that vot­ing offi­cials can use to the­o­ret­i­cal­ly nail down cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus for vot­ers they have Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers for.

    Upon hear­ing the details, numer­ous vot­ing data experts told NPR it sound­ed like a sys­tem that could work. The ques­tion, they say, is whether qual­i­ty con­trol sys­tems are in place to catch the inevitable mis­takes that will come from com­par­ing hun­dreds of mil­lions of records, espe­cial­ly when the stakes are as high as ques­tion­ing some­one’s cit­i­zen­ship.

    There are some known data chal­lenges with SAVE. For instance, there can be a lag time between when a per­son nat­u­ral­izes and when that infor­ma­tion is entered into the sys­tem, which can lead to the ini­tial appear­ance that a per­son is a nonci­t­i­zen on the vot­er rolls if they reg­is­tered to vote imme­di­ate­ly after nat­u­ral­iz­ing. SAVE mate­ri­als also make clear there are some for­eign-born cit­i­zens who can­not be ver­i­fied by the sys­tem.

    USCIS acknowl­edges these short­falls and tells users that if the sys­tem returns an answer oth­er than con­firm­ing cit­i­zen­ship, then it must also be man­u­al­ly reviewed by USCIS staff, and the elec­tions office must con­tact the vot­er to give them a chance to pro­vide proof of cit­i­zen­ship.

    It’s also unclear how reli­able or com­plete the data com­ing from the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion is, because as MIT elec­tion expert Charles Stew­art notes, that data as well as the data with­in SAVE and on the vot­er rolls was col­lect­ed inde­pen­dent­ly and with­out this sort of inte­gra­tion in mind. A report from the Insti­tute for Respon­sive Gov­ern­ment not­ed recent­ly that the SSA only began adding cit­i­zen­ship tags to records rough­ly 40 years ago, so the agen­cy’s data on nat­ur­al-born cit­i­zens may be incom­plete.

    “The con­cern with any of these data-based match­ing pro­ce­dures is that peo­ple who don’t know much about vot­er reg­is­tra­tion datasets just assume that the data are clean on [all] sides,” said Stew­art.

    The most notable elec­tion data match­ing suc­cess sto­ry, a pro­gram called the Elec­tron­ic Reg­is­tra­tion Infor­ma­tion Cen­ter (ERIC), took mul­ti­ple years to devel­op and roll out. The sys­tem allows its more than two dozen mem­ber states to share gov­ern­ment data across state lines, to elim­i­nate dead vot­ers from the rolls, find the few peo­ple in every fed­er­al elec­tion who ille­gal­ly vote twice, and also reg­is­ter eli­gi­ble vot­ers when they move to a new place.

    Nine Repub­li­can-led states have since pulled out of the orga­ni­za­tion due to viral false­hoods that spread on the far-right and gen­er­al uneasi­ness about hav­ing a third par­ty comb­ing through state vot­er rolls. At least two of those states, Louisiana and Texas, are ear­ly pilot­ers of this new data tool run by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. The states have not dis­closed many details and declined NPR’s inter­view requests.

    DHS says so far it has run more than 9 mil­lion vot­er records through the upgrad­ed SAVE sys­tem, accord­ing to a per­son who attend­ed a brief­ing about the new capa­bil­i­ties who was not autho­rized to speak to the media, and that ear­ly analy­sis found those records to con­tain 99.99% U.S. cit­i­zens. That analy­sis has not been inde­pen­dent­ly ver­i­fied, and it’s not clear if any of the few nonci­t­i­zens they did find ever actu­al­ly vot­ed.

    “If this rolls out and it turns out that our vot­er rolls are pret­ty darn accu­rate … and it is shout­ed from the moun­tain­tops and peo­ple believe it, then that would be big,” said Tam­my Patrick, an elec­tion expert at the non­prof­it Elec­tion Cen­ter and for­mer Ari­zona vot­ing offi­cial. She not­ed how­ev­er that there are large finan­cial incen­tives, both for can­di­dates and for grass­roots elec­tion denial groups and influ­encers, to keep push­ing mis­lead­ing claims about nonci­t­i­zen vot­ing.

    “My con­cern is that I’m not so sure that there will be those who will believe it, that there will be those who will stop rais­ing dona­tions and cam­paign funds on the nar­ra­tive of fear-mon­ger­ing and the ille­git­i­ma­cy of our sys­tems,” Patrick said.

    Most states can’t use the new SAVE capa­bil­i­ties yet because they don’t col­lect full Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers as part of the vot­er reg­is­tra­tion process.

    But the next SAVE upgrade will allow elec­tion offi­cials to query with just the last four dig­its of a Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber, in addi­tion to a full name and birth­date, accord­ing to two peo­ple who were on calls where such plans were dis­cussed but asked not to be named because they were not autho­rized to speak pub­licly about the plan. Such an expan­sion will make the cit­i­zen­ship search­es avail­able for all vot­ing offi­cials, although there is a wide range across the coun­try when it comes to how much of a state’s vot­er records have even par­tial Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers asso­ci­at­ed with them.

    Future plans also include inte­grat­ing state DMV data, accord­ing to the same sources, and Home­land Secu­ri­ty Sec­re­tary Kristi Noem is expect­ed to reach out to every state’s chief elec­tion offi­cial soon encour­ag­ing them to run their rolls through the sys­tem.

    Some Repub­li­can elec­tion offi­cials have been hap­py that DHS is tak­ing their con­cerns about SAVE seri­ous­ly. Ida­ho’s Repub­li­can Sec­re­tary of State Phil McGrane used SAVE exten­sive­ly ahead of the 2024 elec­tion, but found it dif­fi­cult to use.

    “This was­n’t what the data­base was meant for and we were ask­ing some­thing of it that it real­ly was­n’t designed for,” McGrane told NPR in ear­ly June. “Now there is atten­tion being put to it to make it work that way.”

    ...

    Who gets to know what’s being built

    While USCIS denied NPR’s inter­view request about the changes and has spo­rad­i­cal­ly shared updates with some state vot­ing offi­cials, a DHS staffer gave a full brief­ing about the tool to an influ­en­tial group known for push­ing false and mis­lead­ing elec­tion fraud nar­ra­tives.

    On June 12, the Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work, a grass­roots group led by con­ser­v­a­tive attor­ney Cle­ta Mitchell, who worked with Trump to try to over­turn the 2020 elec­tion, host­ed a vir­tu­al event with David Jen­nings, who over­sees the SAVE sys­tem. Democ­ra­cy Dock­et first report­ed the brief­ing.

    NPR also acquired audio of Mitchell seem­ing­ly speak­ing about Jen­nings at an ear­li­er Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work event in May. The non­prof­it inves­tiga­tive group Doc­u­ment­ed, which often acquires audio of Mitchel­l’s events, pro­vid­ed a record­ing to NPR.

    “He is in charge of the SAVE data­base that has the cit­i­zen­ship data for, you know, every­body,” Mitchell said at the May event. “And he is in the process of recon­fig­ur­ing the entire [thing] so that we can actu­al­ly deter­mine who on the vot­er rolls is and is not a cit­i­zen.”

    Vot­ing experts NPR spoke with expressed con­cern that the agency over­see­ing the cre­ation of the vot­er data tool was shar­ing details with a group involved with deny­ing the 2020 elec­tion results, but not the Amer­i­can pub­lic.

    “Before the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment just up and cre­ates a mas­sive data sys­tem that pur­ports to be a record on all of us — that’s a pub­lic con­ver­sa­tion that we’re owed,” said Justin Levitt, a Loy­ola Law School pro­fes­sor and for­mer Biden White House advis­er on vot­ing rights. “And not just as a pub­lic pol­i­cy mat­ter, as a moral mat­ter, as a legal mat­ter.”

    Under the Pri­va­cy Act of 1974, there is a for­mal process known as a sys­tem of records notice, for fed­er­al agen­cies to give pub­lic notice about new ways they intend to col­lect or use Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion. No such notice appears to have been pub­lished for the upgrade to SAVE that inte­grates Social Secu­ri­ty data, and nei­ther USCIS or SSA respond­ed to an NPR inquiry ask­ing if a new one had been issued.

    Data unknowns

    The SAVE upgrade is part of a larg­er trend, led by DOGE, of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion tak­ing unprece­dent­ed steps to amass and con­nect data across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. The effort has sparked over a dozen law­suits and cyber­se­cu­ri­ty con­cerns.

    The pub­lic offi­cials con­demn­ing the data con­sol­i­da­tion have most­ly been Democ­rats, how­ev­er, which is a depar­ture from past pri­va­cy debates in Amer­i­can his­to­ry.

    One thing that’s rather strik­ing about these moves around data in the present is that there has been so lit­tle out­cry actu­al­ly on the right, who have been sort of the stan­dard bear­ers of wor­ry about big gov­ern­ment and data merg­ing and data col­lec­tion to begin with,” said Sarah Igo, a his­to­ry pro­fes­sor at Van­der­bilt Uni­ver­si­ty.

    One con­ser­v­a­tive voice who is express­ing such con­cerns is Cather­ine Engel­brecht, the founder of the non­prof­it True the Vote, which has pushed numer­ous elec­tion con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries over the past decade.

    Engel­brecht praised the SAVE effort in a recent newslet­ter, but expressed dis­com­fort about the admin­is­tra­tion’s efforts to cen­tral­ize var­i­ous fed­er­al data­bas­es and give access to the con­trac­tor Palan­tir.

    “Such cen­tral­iza­tion of data pos­es a threat to indi­vid­ual free­doms and pri­va­cy,” she wrote. “Sur­ren­der­ing our data to unchecked pow­er isn’t just a tech­ni­cal risk — it’s a moral fail­ure.”

    One of the biggest ques­tions about the new SAVE is what hap­pens to the vot­er data that states and coun­ties upload to the sys­tem, par­tic­u­lar­ly since it is now designed to ver­i­fy entire state vot­er rolls.

    USCIS spec­i­fies that it retains records of SAVE queries for 10 years. The agency did not respond to NPR’s ques­tions about whether it will keep copies of state vot­er rolls uploaded to SAVE, or whether it will use infor­ma­tion states pro­vide through the sys­tem as a basis for crim­i­nal or immi­gra­tion inves­ti­ga­tions.

    A state elec­tion offi­cial who was not autho­rized to speak pub­licly about the devel­op­ment told NPR they were specif­i­cal­ly wor­ried about how the admin­is­tra­tion would use infor­ma­tion pro­vid­ed by states in immi­gra­tion crack­down efforts. For that rea­son, the offi­cial, who has worked in both Repub­li­can and Demo­c­ra­t­ic admin­is­tra­tions, said they expect­ed there to be a clear par­ti­san divi­sion in which states use it, even if all elec­tion offi­cials have the same goal of accu­rate vot­er rolls.

    “If I believed this data­base was accu­rate, and that I was going to get good usable infor­ma­tion from it, you’re damn right I would use it,” the offi­cial said. “The ques­tion is, is the data usable? And [usable] in a way that I’m not going to jeop­ar­dize peo­ple who live in my juris­dic­tion?”

    ————-

    “The Trump admin­is­tra­tion is build­ing a nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data sys­tem” By Jude Joffe-Block, Miles Parks; Nation­al Pub­lic Radio; 06/29/2025

    Such inte­gra­tion has nev­er exist­ed before, and experts call it a sea change that inch­es the U.S. clos­er to hav­ing a ros­ter of cit­i­zens — some­thing the coun­try has nev­er embraced. A cen­tral­ized nation­al data­base of Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion has long been con­sid­ered a third rail — espe­cial­ly to pri­va­cy advo­cates as well as polit­i­cal con­ser­v­a­tives, who have tra­di­tion­al­ly opposed mass data con­sol­i­da­tion by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment.”

    An unprece­dent­ed cen­tral­iza­tion of fed­er­al data­bas­es allow­ing for the cre­ation of the kind of nation­al cit­i­zen data­base. This isn’t the first time we’ve heard about a new unprece­dent­ed data­base emerg­ing from the ‘DOGE’ efforts. We’ve already been warned about the ‘data­base of ruin’ — an inte­grat­ed fed­er­al data­base com­prised of high­ly sen­si­tive data on vir­tu­al­ly every­one in the US — that Palan­tir is report­ed­ly cre­at­ing. But this the first we’ve heard of a nation­al cit­i­zen­ship data­base, some­thing that the immi­gra­tion-obsessed Trump admin­is­tra­tion will undoubt­ed­ly find many uses for. Whether those uses are tech­ni­cal­ly legal or not. As the arti­cle notes, no pub­lic notice has been issued regard­ing this new cit­i­zen­ship-appli­ca­tion of Social Secu­ri­ty data, con­trary to the Pri­va­cy Act of 1974. But, oh well, it’s hap­pen­ing any­way:

    ...
    When fed­er­al agen­cies plan to col­lect or use Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al data in new ways, there are pro­ce­dures they are required to fol­low before­hand, includ­ing giv­ing pub­lic notice.

    Anoth­er pri­va­cy expert, Uni­ver­si­ty of Vir­ginia School of Law pro­fes­sor Danielle Cit­ron, called this data aggre­ga­tion effort a “hair on fire” devel­op­ment. She told NPR she has ques­tions if the project itself is law­ful.

    ...

    Under the Pri­va­cy Act of 1974, there is a for­mal process known as a sys­tem of records notice, for fed­er­al agen­cies to give pub­lic notice about new ways they intend to col­lect or use Amer­i­cans’ per­son­al infor­ma­tion. No such notice appears to have been pub­lished for the upgrade to SAVE that inte­grates Social Secu­ri­ty data, and nei­ther USCIS or SSA respond­ed to an NPR inquiry ask­ing if a new one had been issued.
    ...

    It sounds like the Trump admin­is­tra­tion has built this new tool by effec­tive­ly ramp­ing up the usabil­i­ty of the Sys­tem­at­ic Alien Ver­i­fi­ca­tion for Enti­tle­ment (SAVE) sys­tem of data­bas­es have used for the ver­i­fi­ca­tion of immi­gra­tion sta­tus since the 1980s. Over the last decade some states have been using the sys­tem to ver­i­fy vot­er rolls, typ­i­cal­ly for peo­ple with depart­ment of motor vehi­cle records indi­cat­ing they’re a non-cit­i­zen who vot­ed. It was a rel­a­tive­ly spar­ing­ly used sys­tem designed for tar­get­ed search­es of indi­vid­u­als. Not mass vot­er roll scrub­bing:

    ...
    The U.S. Cit­i­zen­ship and Immi­gra­tion Ser­vice, which is under the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty, is man­ag­ing the tool. The agency did not pro­vide more infor­ma­tion about how it will work when con­tact­ed by NPR. In a state­ment, spokesman Matthew Tragess­er called the devel­op­ment a “game chang­er” and said the agency looks for­ward to “imple­ment­ing more updates.”

    ...

    The tool, known as the Sys­tem­at­ic Alien Ver­i­fi­ca­tion for Enti­tle­ments, or SAVE, is a sys­tem of DHS data­bas­es that state and fed­er­al agen­cies have queried since the 1980s to check the immi­gra­tion sta­tus of nonci­t­i­zens liv­ing in the U.S. legal­ly. Agen­cies can then decide if the appli­cants are eli­gi­ble for dif­fer­ent gov­ern­ment ben­e­fits.

    For rough­ly the past decade, some vot­ing offi­cials have also used SAVE to check the cit­i­zen­ship of vot­ers on their rolls, usu­al­ly in instances where depart­ment of motor vehi­cle records indi­cat­ed a vot­er is a nonci­t­i­zen, since those records often aren’t updat­ed when a per­son nat­u­ral­izes. Elec­tion offi­cials could use SAVE to get a more recent immi­gra­tion snap­shot, which would either ver­i­fy that a per­son had become a cit­i­zen and was indeed eli­gi­ble to vote, or if no nat­u­ral­iza­tion record was found, indi­cate to the offi­cial that they should reach out to the vot­er about whether they are a cit­i­zen.
    ...

    Then, in 2024, the Repub­li­can-led states of Texas, Ohio, and Flori­da sued the Biden admin­is­tra­tion argu­ing the admin­is­tra­tion was fail­ing to help states ver­i­fy their vot­er rolls. Plans for such an upgrade start­ed at the end of the Biden admin­is­tra­tion. Then, in March, Pres­i­dent Trump signed an exec­u­tive order requir­ing DHS to give states access to the sys­tem at no cost. DOGE was fur­ther ordered to assist in the process. By May, SAVE has been upgrad­ed to allow for the ver­i­fi­ca­tion of cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus for every­one on the vot­er lists, not just for­eign-born cit­i­zens or non-cit­i­zens:

    ...
    USCIS began plan­ning upgrades to the sys­tem at the end of the Biden admin­is­tra­tion, accord­ing to a per­son who attend­ed a brief­ing where it was dis­cussed but was not autho­rized to speak to the media. After Trump took office, DHS began a series of reg­u­lar calls with some state elec­tion staffers to talk through poten­tial updates.

    A key turn­ing point came in March, when Trump signed an exec­u­tive order that made sweep­ing changes to vot­ing and elec­tion pro­to­cols, includ­ing requir­ing DHS to allow states “access to appro­pri­ate sys­tems” for ver­i­fy­ing the cit­i­zen­ship of vot­ers on their rolls with­out a cost, and instruct­ing DOGE to assist the agency in comb­ing vot­er rolls for nonci­t­i­zens.

    ...

    With­in weeks, USCIS began announc­ing rolling upgrades to SAVE, cred­it­ing DOGE with the changes. On April 22, the agency revealed SAVE was now free for non-fed­er­al agen­cies, and could han­dle mass checks. Then, a May 22 news release announced SAVE had inte­grat­ed data from the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion so elec­tion offi­cials could query it with a nine-dig­it Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber.

    Though the May news release did­n’t men­tion it explic­it­ly, the Social Secu­ri­ty change meant for the first time SAVE could ver­i­fy the cit­i­zen­ship of U.S.-born Amer­i­cans with a valid Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber, which near­ly every Amer­i­can cit­i­zen has.

    That devel­op­ment is a major move that turned SAVE from a tool that only respond­ed to queries about for­eign-born cit­i­zens or nonci­t­i­zens into some­thing that could comb through entire vot­er lists. But numer­ous state vot­ing offi­cials NPR spoke with were not aware that capa­bil­i­ty was part of the updates.
    ...

    And the upgrades to the SAVE sys­tem aren’t done yet. The abil­i­ty to query using just the last 4 dig­its of a Social Secu­ri­ty Num­ber com­bined with a name and birth­day is com­ing too, mak­ing full cit­i­zen­ship checks of all vot­er rolls avail­able to vir­tu­al­ly every vot­ing offi­cials. In oth­er words, we should expect the impact of this new sys­tem by the next round of elec­tions:

    ...
    Most states can’t use the new SAVE capa­bil­i­ties yet because they don’t col­lect full Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers as part of the vot­er reg­is­tra­tion process.

    But the next SAVE upgrade will allow elec­tion offi­cials to query with just the last four dig­its of a Social Secu­ri­ty num­ber, in addi­tion to a full name and birth­date, accord­ing to two peo­ple who were on calls where such plans were dis­cussed but asked not to be named because they were not autho­rized to speak pub­licly about the plan. Such an expan­sion will make the cit­i­zen­ship search­es avail­able for all vot­ing offi­cials, although there is a wide range across the coun­try when it comes to how much of a state’s vot­er records have even par­tial Social Secu­ri­ty num­bers asso­ci­at­ed with them.

    Future plans also include inte­grat­ing state DMV data, accord­ing to the same sources, and Home­land Secu­ri­ty Sec­re­tary Kristi Noem is expect­ed to reach out to every state’s chief elec­tion offi­cial soon encour­ag­ing them to run their rolls through the sys­tem.
    ...

    Of course, a sys­tem for ver­i­fy­ing vot­er cit­i­zen­ship sta­tus can be used for a lot more than just ver­i­fy­ing vot­ers. Like mass depor­ta­tion. Which experts point out is one of the rea­sons we might expect Demo­c­ra­t­ic-led states to approach this new sys­tem with a degree of cau­tion. Because the data that gets input into this sys­tem could be the key ingre­di­ent need­ed for mass fed­er­al depor­ta­tion raids:

    ...
    One of the biggest ques­tions about the new SAVE is what hap­pens to the vot­er data that states and coun­ties upload to the sys­tem, par­tic­u­lar­ly since it is now designed to ver­i­fy entire state vot­er rolls.

    USCIS spec­i­fies that it retains records of SAVE queries for 10 years. The agency did not respond to NPR’s ques­tions about whether it will keep copies of state vot­er rolls uploaded to SAVE, or whether it will use infor­ma­tion states pro­vide through the sys­tem as a basis for crim­i­nal or immi­gra­tion inves­ti­ga­tions.

    A state elec­tion offi­cial who was not autho­rized to speak pub­licly about the devel­op­ment told NPR they were specif­i­cal­ly wor­ried about how the admin­is­tra­tion would use infor­ma­tion pro­vid­ed by states in immi­gra­tion crack­down efforts. For that rea­son, the offi­cial, who has worked in both Repub­li­can and Demo­c­ra­t­ic admin­is­tra­tions, said they expect­ed there to be a clear par­ti­san divi­sion in which states use it, even if all elec­tion offi­cials have the same goal of accu­rate vot­er rolls.

    “If I believed this data­base was accu­rate, and that I was going to get good usable infor­ma­tion from it, you’re damn right I would use it,” the offi­cial said. “The ques­tion is, is the data usable? And [usable] in a way that I’m not going to jeop­ar­dize peo­ple who live in my juris­dic­tion?”
    ...

    At the same time, while this upgrad­ed SAVE sys­tem has obvi­ous appeal to immi­gra­tion-obsessed Repub­li­can offi­cials, there is one glar­ing dan­ger for Repub­li­cans under this sys­tem: it threat­ens to expose the long-stand­ing Repub­li­can myth about mass vot­ing by non-cit­i­zens for Democ­rats. So while Demo­c­ra­t­ic-led states are like­ly to be wary about import­ing infor­ma­tion into this sys­tem that could be weaponized for mass depor­ta­tion pur­pos­es, there’s also going to be quite an incen­tive to have this fed­er­al sys­tem effec­tive­ly ver­i­fy for the world that non-cit­i­zens aren’t vot­ing in their state:

    ...
    If this new tool is suc­cess­ful, it could pro­vide local and state gov­ern­ments a pow­er­ful method to check the cit­i­zen­ship of almost all Amer­i­cans with­out addi­tion­al doc­u­men­ta­tion require­ments.

    “Tak­ing that bur­den of proof, if you will, off the vot­er … is a good thing,” said Wyman, who also worked for the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­ri­ty on elec­tion secu­ri­ty issues in the Biden admin­is­tra­tion.
    ...

    At the same time, it’s pret­ty notable that it was nine Repub­li­can-led states that pre­vi­ous­ly reject­ed the use of a sys­tem pre­vi­ous­ly built for check­ing vot­er rolls, the Elec­tron­ic Reg­is­tra­tion Infor­ma­tion Cen­ter (ERIC), over viral false claims ema­nat­ing from the far right about the dan­gers of such of sys­tem. And two of those states, Texas and Louisiana, appear quite eager to use SAVE. Which is a huge warn­ing sign. What is it about the sys­tem cur­rent­ly being con­struct­ed by DOGE that has these states assured?

    ...
    The recent his­to­ry of elec­tions is lit­tered with failed data match­ing efforts, often dri­ven by false fraud nar­ra­tives, which have entan­gled eli­gi­ble vot­ers. The first Trump admin­is­tra­tion attempt­ed the begin­nings of a sim­i­lar data project, though the effort shut­tered after most states balked at shar­ing their vot­er data.

    The fact that the devel­op­ment and roll­out fol­low Pres­i­dent Trump’s false­hoods about wide­spread nonci­t­i­zen vot­ing makes elec­tion experts wary of how this new tool will work.

    ...

    The most notable elec­tion data match­ing suc­cess sto­ry, a pro­gram called the Elec­tron­ic Reg­is­tra­tion Infor­ma­tion Cen­ter (ERIC), took mul­ti­ple years to devel­op and roll out. The sys­tem allows its more than two dozen mem­ber states to share gov­ern­ment data across state lines, to elim­i­nate dead vot­ers from the rolls, find the few peo­ple in every fed­er­al elec­tion who ille­gal­ly vote twice, and also reg­is­ter eli­gi­ble vot­ers when they move to a new place.

    Nine Repub­li­can-led states have since pulled out of the orga­ni­za­tion due to viral false­hoods that spread on the far-right and gen­er­al uneasi­ness about hav­ing a third par­ty comb­ing through state vot­er rolls. At least two of those states, Louisiana and Texas, are ear­ly pilot­ers of this new data tool run by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. The states have not dis­closed many details and declined NPR’s inter­view requests.
    ...

    And that dis­turb­ing ques­tion about what it is that is assur­ing Repub­li­can states about SAVE when they reject­ed the ERIC sys­tem brings us to the con­cerns voiced by experts: can we actu­al­ly trust this sys­tem? Will it have up to date data? Or will it be flag­ging erro­neous­ly high lev­els of ‘non-cit­i­zen’ for valid vot­ers? And what about the poten­tial depor­ta­tion abus­es? Is this a recipe for an ‘oops, we acci­den­tal­ly deport­ed mil­lions of peo­ple who should not have been, too late now’ kind of scheme? Will par­ti­san audi­ences even believe it?

    ...
    Upon hear­ing the details, numer­ous vot­ing data experts told NPR it sound­ed like a sys­tem that could work. The ques­tion, they say, is whether qual­i­ty con­trol sys­tems are in place to catch the inevitable mis­takes that will come from com­par­ing hun­dreds of mil­lions of records, espe­cial­ly when the stakes are as high as ques­tion­ing some­one’s cit­i­zen­ship.

    ...

    It’s also unclear how reli­able or com­plete the data com­ing from the Social Secu­ri­ty Admin­is­tra­tion is, because as MIT elec­tion expert Charles Stew­art notes, that data as well as the data with­in SAVE and on the vot­er rolls was col­lect­ed inde­pen­dent­ly and with­out this sort of inte­gra­tion in mind. A report from the Insti­tute for Respon­sive Gov­ern­ment not­ed recent­ly that the SSA only began adding cit­i­zen­ship tags to records rough­ly 40 years ago, so the agen­cy’s data on nat­ur­al-born cit­i­zens may be incom­plete.

    ...

    DHS says so far it has run more than 9 mil­lion vot­er records through the upgrad­ed SAVE sys­tem, accord­ing to a per­son who attend­ed a brief­ing about the new capa­bil­i­ties who was not autho­rized to speak to the media, and that ear­ly analy­sis found those records to con­tain 99.99% U.S. cit­i­zens. That analy­sis has not been inde­pen­dent­ly ver­i­fied, and it’s not clear if any of the few nonci­t­i­zens they did find ever actu­al­ly vot­ed.

    “If this rolls out and it turns out that our vot­er rolls are pret­ty darn accu­rate … and it is shout­ed from the moun­tain­tops and peo­ple believe it, then that would be big,” said Tam­my Patrick, an elec­tion expert at the non­prof­it Elec­tion Cen­ter and for­mer Ari­zona vot­ing offi­cial. She not­ed how­ev­er that there are large finan­cial incen­tives, both for can­di­dates and for grass­roots elec­tion denial groups and influ­encers, to keep push­ing mis­lead­ing claims about nonci­t­i­zen vot­ing.
    ...

    And that obvi­ous appli­ca­tion of the upgrad­ed SAVE sys­tem to effec­tive­ly debunk long-stand­ing Repub­li­can claims about non-cit­i­zen vot­ers brings us to one of the more remark­able, and omi­nous, details in this sto­ry: a DHS staffer gave a pri­vate full brief­ing on the new SAVE sys­tem to none oth­er than Cle­ta Mitchell, the CNP’s lead­ing elec­tion denier and one of the key fig­ures behind the efforts to over­turn the 2020 elec­tion. Mitchel­l’s Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work host­ed a vir­tu­al event with David Jen­nings, the per­son over­see­ing the SAVE sys­tem. The con­ser­v­a­tive move­men­t’s lead­ing elec­tion denier appears to be on board with SAVE, a sys­tem that, if work­ing prop­er­ly, is high­ly like­ly to debunk pre­cise­ly the kind of claims Mitchell has long made. That’s a red flag:

    ...
    On June 12, the Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work, a grass­roots group led by con­ser­v­a­tive attor­ney Cle­ta Mitchell, who worked with Trump to try to over­turn the 2020 elec­tion, host­ed a vir­tu­al event with David Jen­nings, who over­sees the SAVE sys­tem. Democ­ra­cy Dock­et first report­ed the brief­ing.

    NPR also acquired audio of Mitchell seem­ing­ly speak­ing about Jen­nings at an ear­li­er Elec­tion Integri­ty Net­work event in May. The non­prof­it inves­tiga­tive group Doc­u­ment­ed, which often acquires audio of Mitchel­l’s events, pro­vid­ed a record­ing to NPR.

    “He is in charge of the SAVE data­base that has the cit­i­zen­ship data for, you know, every­body,” Mitchell said at the May event. “And he is in the process of recon­fig­ur­ing the entire [thing] so that we can actu­al­ly deter­mine who on the vot­er rolls is and is not a cit­i­zen.”
    ...

    Final­ly, we get to the fact loud silence com­ing from con­ser­v­a­tives over the SAVE pro­gram. Silence made all the more remark­able giv­en the oppo­si­tion to ERIC. Inter­est­ing­ly, the arti­cle was able to find one con­ser­v­a­tive activist who was­n’t com­fort­able with the idea behind Palan­tir’s ‘data­base of ruin’ but who was also sup­port­ive of SAVE: Cather­ine Engel­brecht, the founder of the non­prof­it True the Vote. As we’ve seen, True the Vote — an orga­ni­za­tion that got start­ed in the Tea Par­ty move­ment — not only aggres­sive­ly pushed the ‘2020 elec­tion was stolen’ mem­ber but has retained Cle­ta Mitchell as its legal coun­sel. True the Vote has a long track record of oper­at­ing in bad faith. And it’s sup­port­ive of SAVE. That’s a red flag:

    ...
    The SAVE upgrade is part of a larg­er trend, led by DOGE, of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion tak­ing unprece­dent­ed steps to amass and con­nect data across the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. The effort has sparked over a dozen law­suits and cyber­se­cu­ri­ty con­cerns.

    The pub­lic offi­cials con­demn­ing the data con­sol­i­da­tion have most­ly been Democ­rats, how­ev­er, which is a depar­ture from past pri­va­cy debates in Amer­i­can his­to­ry.

    One thing that’s rather strik­ing about these moves around data in the present is that there has been so lit­tle out­cry actu­al­ly on the right, who have been sort of the stan­dard bear­ers of wor­ry about big gov­ern­ment and data merg­ing and data col­lec­tion to begin with,” said Sarah Igo, a his­to­ry pro­fes­sor at Van­der­bilt Uni­ver­si­ty.

    One con­ser­v­a­tive voice who is express­ing such con­cerns is Cather­ine Engel­brecht, the founder of the non­prof­it True the Vote, which has pushed numer­ous elec­tion con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries over the past decade.

    Engel­brecht praised the SAVE effort in a recent newslet­ter, but expressed dis­com­fort about the admin­is­tra­tion’s efforts to cen­tral­ize var­i­ous fed­er­al data­bas­es and give access to the con­trac­tor Palan­tir.
    ...

    Engel­brecht is all onboard with SAVE, a sys­tem that promis­es to answer the kind of mass non-cit­i­zen vot­er fraud claims her group has been mak­ing for over a decade now. Claims that have nev­er had sub­stan­tive evi­dence behind them. What is it about this sys­tem that has Engel­brecht excit­ed? Grifters don’t gen­er­al­ly enjoy watch­ing their grifts revealed. What’s the real sto­ry here? Time will tell. But try not be shocked when the ‘non-cit­i­zen vot­ing’ nar­ra­tive is sud­den­ly all about a ‘fake cit­i­zens’ epi­dem­ic. And a ‘rem­i­gra­tion’ solu­tion.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | July 2, 2025, 7:10 pm

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