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For The Record  

FTR#‘s 1172 & 1173 The Missing Chapter, Parts 2 and 3.

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FTR #1172 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR#1173 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: In numer­ous pro­grams and lec­tures, we have dis­cussed the impor­tant, dev­as­tat­ing­ly suc­ces­sive­ly mind con­trol pro­grams engaged in by the mil­i­tary and CIA. Those pro­grams were devel­oped in reac­tion to downed Amer­i­can air­men who–after captivity–gave tes­ti­mo­ny that they had been involved in bio­log­i­cal war­fare attacks against Chi­na and North Korea dur­ing the war.

A superb book about Unit 731–the Japan­ese bio­log­i­cal war­fare unit dur­ing World War II–had a chap­ter in the British edi­tion that was omit­ted in the Amer­i­can edi­tion. (Sad­ly, the books are out of print, although both the British and Amer­i­can edi­tions are avail­able through used-book ser­vices. Mr. Emory hearti­ly encour­ages lis­ten­ers to obtain the book. Even the Amer­i­can edition–missing this key chapter–is worth­while. Hope­ful­ly, a pub­lish­er will obtain the rights to the book and re-issue it. If so, we will enthu­si­as­ti­cal­ly pro­mote the work.)

The chap­ter in the UK edi­tion chron­i­cles the inves­ti­ga­tion into the alle­ga­tions of Amer­i­can BW use dur­ing the Kore­an War, includ­ing cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence that Unit 731 vet­er­ans and method­ol­o­gy may well have been used in the alleged cam­paign. That chap­ter is alto­geth­er objec­tive, avoid­ing ide­o­log­i­cal bias toward either side in the con­flict.

Because of that, we found the omis­sion of this chap­ter from the U.S. edi­tion to be sig­nif­i­cant. As the bril­liant Peter Dale Scott not­ed: “The cov­er-up obvi­ates the con­spir­a­cy.” It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

It is a mat­ter of pub­lic record that Unit 731’s files were incor­po­rat­ed into the U.S. bio­log­i­cal war­fare pro­gram, and vet­er­ans of the Unit bequeathed their exper­tise to the Amer­i­cans in exchange from immu­ni­ty from pros­e­cu­tion for war crimes.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis

  1. FTR#1172 begins with review of the sci­en­tif­ic cre­den­tials of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion inves­ti­gat­ing the alle­ga­tions of bio­log­i­cal war­fare. ” . . . . Dr. Andrea Andreen, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of the Hos­pi­tals Board of the City of Stock­holm; Jean Mal­terre, Inge­nieur-Agri­cole, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of Ani­mal Phys­i­ol­o­gy, Nation­al Col­lege of Agri­cul­ture, Grignon, France; Dr. Oliviero Oli­vo, pro­fes­sor of Human Anato­my in the Fac­ul­ty of Med­i­cine of the Uni­ver­si­ty of Bologna, Italy; Dr. Samuel Pes­soa, pro­fes­sor of Par­a­sitol­ogy at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Sao Pao­lo and for­mer­ly direc­tor of pub­lic Health for the State of Sao Pao­lo; Dr. Nico­lai Zhukov-Verezh­nikov, pro­fes­sor of Bac­te­ri­ol­o­gy at, and Vice-Pres­i­dent of, the Sovi­et Acad­e­my of Med­i­cine and for­mer­ly chief med­ical expert at the Khabarovsk tri­al, and final­ly, Dr. Joseph Need­ham, FRS, Sir William Dunn Read­er in Bio­chem­istry, Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty, for­mer­ly sci­en­tif­ic coun­sel­lor, Her Bri­tan­nic Majesty’s Embassy, Chungk­ing and lat­er direc­tor of the Depart­ment of Nat­ur­al Sci­ences, UNESCO, (He became in 1966, the Mas­ter of Gonville and Caius Col­lege, Cam­bridge, and is cur­rent­ly writ­ing a his­to­ry of sci­ence and civ­i­liza­tion in Chi­na.) . . . .”
  2. The sec­ond pro­gram then takes up the find­ings of the ISC, resum­ing from the where we left off in FTR #1172. Note that Dr. Wen-kwei Chen had inves­ti­gat­ed some of Unit 731’s plague attacks dur­ing the Sec­ond World War, work­ing for the Nation­al­ist Chi­nese.
  3. Pre­sent­ing the sci­en­tif­ic evi­dence exam­ined by the ISC, the authors note that numer­ous anom­alies in epi­demics and asso­ci­at­ed insect and mam­malian vec­tors led the sci­en­tists to con­clude that BW was the source of the patholo­gies.
  4. Appar­ent insect vec­tors appeared in unsea­son­ably cold envi­ron­ments, some as cold as -10 degrees centi­grade.
  5. Appar­ent mam­malian vec­tors were also anom­alous, with ful­ly devel­oped adults appear­ing exclu­sive­ly, when imma­ture rodents would be expect­ed.
  6. By the same token, appar­ent insect vec­tors were anom­alous, with ful­ly devel­oped adults, many ready to lay eggs appeared.
  7. Many of the insect and mam­malian vec­tors appeared at times of the year that were not con­sis­tent with nat­ur­al events.
  8. Infec­tious microor­gan­isms were also anom­alous, with types of bac­te­ria appear­ing at times of the year and areas not con­sis­tent with observed nat­ur­al pat­terns.
  9. Species of infec­tious organ­isms were anom­alous, as well, with some nev­er hav­ing occurred in the areas that were affect­ed.

The intro­duc­tion of FTR#1173 con­sists of read­ing and analy­sis of Tom O’Neil­l’s pre­sen­ta­tion of the career of one of the CIA’s most impor­tant MK-Ultra mind con­trol oper­a­tives, which occurred in the imme­di­ate after­math of the Kore­an War–1954.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and analy­sis include:

  1. Shaver’s unusu­al behav­ior and demeanor at the ini­tial scene of the crime: ” . . . . He was shirt­less, cov­ered in blood and scratch­es. Mak­ing no attempt to escape, he let the search par­ty walk him to the edge of the high­way. Bystanders described him as ‘dazed’ and ‘trance-like’ . . . .”
  2. Shaver’s appar­ent lack of aware­ness of the imme­di­ate cir­cum­stances of the crime: ” ‘What’s going on here?’ he asked. He did­n’t seem drunk, but he could­n’t say where he was, how he’d got­ten there, or whose blood was all over him. Mean­while, the search par­ty found Hor­ton’s body in the grav­el pit. Her neck was bro­ken, her legs had been torn open, and she’s been raped. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Around four that morn­ing, an Air Force mar­shal ques­tioned Shaver and two doc­tors exam­ined him, agree­ing he was­n’t drunk. One lat­er tes­ti­fied that he ‘was not nor­mal . . . . he was very com­posed out­side, which I did not expect him to be under these cir­cum­stances.’ . . .”
  4. Shaver did­n’t rec­og­nize his own wife when she came to vis­it him. ” . . . . When his wife came to vis­it, he did­n’t rec­og­nize her. . . .”
  5. Ini­tial­ly, he believed some­one else com­mit­ted the crime. ” . . . . He gave his first state­ment at 10:30 a.m., adamant that anoth­er man was respon­si­ble: he could sum­mon an image of a stranger with blond hair and tat­toos. . . .”
  6. Even­tu­al­ly, he signed a state­ment tak­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty: ” . . . . After the Air Force mar­shal returned to the jail­house, how­ev­er, Shaver signed a sec­ond state­ment tak­ing full respon­si­bil­i­ty. Though he still did­n’t remem­ber any­thing, he rea­soned that he must have done it. . . .”
  7. Enter Jol­ly West: ” . . . . Two months lat­er, in Sep­tem­ber, Shaver’s mem­o­ries still had­n’t returned. The base hos­pi­tal com­man­der told Jol­ly West to per­form an eval­u­a­tion: was he legal­ly sane at the time of the mur­der? Shaver spent the next two weeks under West­’s super­vi­sion . . . While Shaver was under–with West inject­ing more truth serum to ‘deep­en the trance’–Shaver recalled the events of that night. He con­fessed to killing Hor­ton. . . .”
  8. West was a defense wit­ness who, instead, appears to have aid­ed the pros­e­cu­tion: ” . . . . At the tri­al, West argued that Shaver’s truth-serum con­fes­sion was more valid than any oth­er. And West was tes­ti­fy­ing for the defense . . . .”
  9. Shaver’s behav­ior at the tri­al is fur­ther sug­ges­tive of mind con­trol: ” . . . . One news­pa­per account said he ‘sat through the stren­u­ous ses­sions like a man in a trance,’ say­ing noth­ing, nev­er ris­ing to stretch or smoke, though he was a known chain-smok­er. ‘Some believe it’s an act,’ the paper said, ‘oth­ers believe his demeanor is real. . . .”
  10. Shaver’s med­ical records at Lack­land Air Force base had van­ished. ” . . . . But, curi­ous­ly, all the records for patients in 1954 had been main­tained, with one excep­tion: the file for last names begin­ning with ‘Sa’ through ‘St’ had van­ished. . . .”
  11. West posed lead­ing ques­tions to Shaver, who denied hav­ing ever tak­en the vic­tim’s clothes off. ” . . . . West had used lead­ing ques­tions to walk the entranced Shaver through the crime. ‘Tell me about when you took your clothes off, Jim­my,’ he said. And try­ing to prove that Shaver had repressed mem­o­ries: ‘Jim­my, do you remem­ber when some­thing like this hap­pened before?’ Or: ‘After you took her clothes off, what did you do?’ ‘I nev­er did take her clothes off,’ Shaver said. . . .”
  12. The inter­view was divid­ed into thirds, the mid­dle third of which was not record­ed! ” . . . . The inter­view [with Shaver] was divid­ed into thirds. The mid­dle third, for some rea­son, was­n’t record­ed. When the record picked up, the man­u­script said, ‘Shaver is cry­ing. He has been con­front­ed with all the facts repeat­ed­ly.’ . . .”

1. FTR#1172 begins with pre­sen­ta­tion of the sci­en­tif­ic cre­den­tials of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion inves­ti­gat­ing the alle­ga­tions of bio­log­i­cal war­fare.

Unit 731: The Japan­ese Army’s Secret of Secrets by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; Hod­der & Stoughton [HC]; Copy­right 1989 by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; ISBN 0–340-39463–3; p. 240.

. . . . One source of infor­ma­tion, the Report of the Inter­na­tion­al Sci­en­tif­ic Com­mis­sion for the Facts Con­cern­ing Bac­te­r­i­al War­fare in Korea and Chi­na, which was pre­pared with Chi­nese and North Kore­an assis­tance, is gen­er­al­ly accept­ed today as being of high qual­i­ty . . . Dr. Andrea Andreen, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of the Hos­pi­tals Board of the City of Stock­holm; Jean Mal­terre, Inge­nieur-Agri­cole, direc­tor of the Cen­tral Lab­o­ra­to­ry of Ani­mal Phys­i­ol­o­gy, Nation­al Col­lege of Agri­cul­ture, Grignon, France; Dr. Oliviero Oli­vo, pro­fes­sor of Human Anato­my in the Fac­ul­ty of Med­i­cine of the Uni­ver­si­ty of Bologna, Italy; Dr. Samuel Pes­soa, pro­fes­sor of Par­a­sitol­ogy at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Sao Pao­lo and for­mer­ly direc­tor of pub­lic Health for the State of Sao Pao­lo; Dr. Nico­lai Zhukov-Verezh­nikov, pro­fes­sor of Bac­te­ri­ol­o­gy at, and Vice-Pres­i­dent of, the Sovi­et Acad­e­my of Med­i­cine and for­mer­ly chief med­ical expert at the Khabarovsk tri­al, and final­ly, Dr. Joseph Need­ham, FRS, Sir William Dunn Read­er in Bio­chem­istry, Cam­bridge Uni­ver­si­ty, for­mer­ly sci­en­tif­ic coun­sel­lor, Her Bri­tan­nic Majesty’s Embassy, Chungk­ing and lat­er direc­tor of the Depart­ment of Nat­ur­al Sci­ences, UNESCO, (He became in 1966, the Mas­ter of Gonville and Caius Col­lege, Cam­bridge, and is cur­rent­ly writ­ing a his­to­ry of sci­ence and civ­i­liza­tion in Chi­na.) . . . .

2.  Pre­sent­ing the sci­en­tif­ic evi­dence exam­ined by the ISC, the authors note that numer­ous anom­alies in epi­demics and asso­ci­at­ed insect and mam­malian vec­tors led the sci­en­tists to con­clude that BW was the source of the patholo­gies.

  1. Appar­ent insect vec­tors appeared in unsea­son­ably cold envi­ron­ments, some as cold as -10 degrees centi­grade.
  2. Appar­ent mam­malian vec­tors were also anom­alous, with ful­ly devel­oped adults appear­ing exclu­sive­ly, when imma­ture rodents would be expect­ed.
  3. By the same token, appar­ent insect vec­tors were anom­alous, with ful­ly devel­oped adults, many ready to lay eggs appeared.
  4. Many of the insect and mam­malian vec­tors appeared at times of the year that were not con­sis­tent with nat­ur­al events.
  5. Infec­tious microor­gan­isms were also anom­alous, with types of bac­te­ria appear­ing at times of the year and areas not con­sis­tent with observed nat­ur­al pat­terns.
  6. Species of infec­tious organ­isms were anom­alous, as well, with some nev­er hav­ing occurred in the areas that were affect­ed.
  7. The sec­ond pro­gram con­cludes with the pre­sen­ta­tion giv­en by Dr. Joseph Need­ham of the ISC and Cana­di­an Chris­t­ian preach­er Jim Endi­cott, who had not only worked for Chi­ang Kai-shek’s forces dur­ing World War II, but U.S. secret mil­i­tary intel­li­gence. They rein­forced the find­ings of the ISC.

Unit 731: The Japan­ese Army’s Secret of Secrets by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; Hod­der & Stoughton [HC]; Copy­right 1989 by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; ISBN 0–340-39463–3; pp. 240–247.

3. The intro­duc­tion of FTR#1173 con­sists of read­ing and analy­sis of Tom O’Neil­l’s pre­sen­ta­tion of the career of one of the CIA’s most impor­tant MK-Ultra mind con­trol oper­a­tives, which occurred in the imme­di­ate after­math of the Kore­an War–1954.

Louis Joly­on West was Jack Ruby’s psy­chi­a­trist, and pre­sent­ed the unten­able hypoth­e­sis that Ruby killed Oswald because he had a brief psy­chomo­tor epilep­tic event in the base­ment of the Dal­las jail. In fact, the evi­dence sug­gests strong­ly that West had helped to erase Ruby’s mem­o­ry of hav­ing killed Oswald.

The broad­cast sets forth the mur­der of Chere Jo Hor­ton, a three-year-old girl whose muti­la­tion, rape and mur­der were pinned on 29-year-old Jim­mie Shaver.

An obvi­ous vic­tim of mind con­trol, appar­ent­ly imple­ment­ed in con­sid­er­able mea­sure by Louis Joly­on West, Shaver was pro­grammed to take respon­si­bil­i­ty for the killing, despite enor­mous con­tra­dic­tions in the evi­dence.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and analy­sis include:

  1. Shaver’s unusu­al behav­ior and demeanor at the ini­tial scene of the crime: ” . . . . He was shirt­less, cov­ered in blood and scratch­es. Mak­ing no attempt to escape, he let the search par­ty walk him to the edge of the high­way. Bystanders described him as ‘dazed’ and ‘trance-like’ . . . .”
  2. Shaver’s appar­ent lack of aware­ness of the imme­di­ate cir­cum­stances of the crime: ” ‘What’s going on here?’ he asked. He did­n’t seem drunk, but he could­n’t say where he was, how he’d got­ten there, or whose blood was all over him. Mean­while, the search par­ty found Hor­ton’s body in the grav­el pit. Her neck was bro­ken, her legs had been torn open, and she’s been raped. . . .”
  3. ” . . . . Around four that morn­ing, an Air Force mar­shal ques­tioned Shaver and two doc­tors exam­ined him, agree­ing he was­n’t drunk. One lat­er tes­ti­fied that he ‘was not nor­mal . . . . he was very com­posed out­side, which I did not expect him to be under these cir­cum­stances.’ . . .”
  4. Shaver did­n’t rec­og­nize his own wife when she came to vis­it him. ” . . . . When his wife came to vis­it, he did­n’t rec­og­nize her. . . .”
  5. Ini­tial­ly, he believed some­one else com­mit­ted the crime. ” . . . . He gave his first state­ment at 10:30 a.m., adamant that anoth­er man was respon­si­ble: he could sum­mon an image of a stranger with blond hair and tat­toos. . . .”
  6. Even­tu­al­ly, he signed a state­ment tak­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty: ” . . . . After the Air Force mar­shal returned to the jail­house, how­ev­er, Shaver signed a sec­ond state­ment tak­ing full respon­si­bil­i­ty. Though he still did­n’t remem­ber any­thing, he rea­soned that he must have done it. . . .”
  7. Enter Jol­ly West: ” . . . . Two months lat­er, in Sep­tem­ber, Shaver’s mem­o­ries still had­n’t returned. The base hos­pi­tal com­man­der told Jol­ly West to per­form an eval­u­a­tion: was he legal­ly sane at the time of the mur­der? Shaver spent the next two weeks under West­’s super­vi­sion . . . While Shaver was under–with West inject­ing more truth serum to ‘deep­en the trance’–Shaver recalled the events of that night. He con­fessed to killing Hor­ton. . . .”
  8. West was a defense wit­ness who, instead, appears to have aid­ed the pros­e­cu­tion: ” . . . . At the tri­al, West argued that Shaver’s truth-serum con­fes­sion was more valid than any oth­er. And West was tes­ti­fy­ing for the defense . . . .”
  9. Shaver’s behav­ior at the tri­al is fur­ther sug­ges­tive of mind con­trol: ” . . . . One news­pa­per account said he ‘sat through the stren­u­ous ses­sions like a man in a trance,’ say­ing noth­ing, nev­er ris­ing to stretch or smoke, though he was a known chain-smok­er. ‘Some believe it’s an act,’ the paper said, ‘oth­ers believe his demeanor is real. . . .”
  10. Shaver’s med­ical records at Lack­land Air Force base had van­ished. ” . . . . But, curi­ous­ly, all the records for patients in 1954 had been main­tained, with one excep­tion: the file for last names begin­ning with ‘Sa’ through ‘St’ had van­ished. . . .”
  11. West posed lead­ing ques­tions to Shaver, who denied hav­ing ever tak­en the vic­tim’s clothes off. ” . . . . West had used lead­ing ques­tions to walk the entranced Shaver through the crime. ‘Tell me about when you took your clothes off, Jim­my,’ he said. And try­ing to prove that Shaver had repressed mem­o­ries: ‘Jim­my, do you remem­ber when some­thing like this hap­pened before?’ Or: ‘After you took her clothes off, what did you do?’ ‘I nev­er did take her clothes off,’ Shaver said. . . .”
  12. The inter­view was divid­ed into thirds, the mid­dle third of which was not record­ed! ” . . . . The inter­view [with Shaver] was divid­ed into thirds. The mid­dle third, for some rea­son, was­n’t record­ed. When the record picked up, the man­u­script said, ‘Shaver is cry­ing. He has been con­front­ed with all the facts repeat­ed­ly.’ . . .”

Chaos: Charles Man­son, the CIA, and the Secret His­to­ry of the Six­ties by Tom O’Neill; Lit­tle, Brown and Com­pa­ny [HC]; Copy­right 2019 by Tom O’Neill; 978–0‑316–47755‑0; pp.226–232; pp.370–374.

5. The sec­ond pro­gram then takes up the find­ings of the ISC, resum­ing from the where we left off in FTR #1172. Note that Dr. Wen-kwei Chen had inves­ti­gat­ed some of Unit 731’s plague attacks dur­ing the Sec­ond World War, work­ing for the Nation­al­ist Chi­nese.

Unit 731: The Japan­ese Army’s Secret of Secrets by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; Hod­der & Stoughton [HC]; Copy­right 1989 by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; ISBN 0–340-39463–3; pp. 247.

. . . . In P’yongyang the ISC met one of their most inter­est­ing wit­ness­es, Chi­nese plague spe­cial­ist Dr. Wen-kwei Chen. Chen, as we have seen, was the expert sent by the Nation­al­ist Chi­nese dur­ing the Sec­ond World War to inves­ti­gate ethe out­break of plague that had bro­ken out in Changteh in Novem­ber 1941 fol­low­ing Unit 731’s plague flea air raid. Since then, under the Com­mu­nist regime, Chen ha become Pres­i­dent of the South-West Branch of the Chi­nese Med­ical Asso­ci­a­tion, and was cur­rent­ly sec­ond­ed to the Min­istry of Health and then Epi­dem­ic Pre­ven­tion Ser­vice of Korea to help con­tain the numer­ous alleged out­breaks of plague dur­ing the Kore­an War. He out­lined from per­son­al expe­ri­ence the his­to­ry of the Japan­ese BW raids dur­ing the Pacif­ic War, and added that the tech­niques cur­rent­ly being used were remark­ably sim­i­lar, although on a larg­er scale.

Chen stat­ed that the same plague flea tech­nique had been con­firmed in Korea and that the “results attained today gave me much sat­is­fac­tion, because they explain the rea­son why the Amer­i­cans delib­er­ate­ly pro­tect­ed the Japan­ese bac­te­ri­o­log­i­cal war crim­i­nals.”

Since the begin­ning of 1952 (and even before) the Chi­nese and their North Kore­an allies alleged that numer­ous iso­lat­ed foci of plague had appeared, always asso­ci­at­ed with the sud­den appear­ance of Amer­i­can planes. In ear­ly all the inci­dents which had received study, plague bac­te­ria had been found on the fleas. How­ev­er, the vari­ety of flea dis­cov­ered was not the rat flea, the most com­mon car­ri­er of the dis­ease in nature, but human fleas (Pulex irri­tans). The Com­mis­sion obtained infor­ma­tion that for as long as the past five cen­turies there had been no record­ed out­break of plague in Korea, and that the near­est endem­ic cen­tres were 300 miles away in Manchuria or 1.000 miles to the south in China’s Fukien Province. More­over, February—the date of the first plague incident—was no less than three months ear­ly for the nor­mal appear­ance of human plague in sim­i­lar cli­mates to North Korea.

The ISC inves­ti­gat­ed two plague inci­dents in Korea. At Kang-Sou towards the mid­dle of March a farmer found numer­ous fleas float­ing on the sur­face of water in a jar near his well. A plane had cir­cled over his vil­lage the pre­vi­ous night. The man died three days lat­er of bubon­ic plague. The fleas were found upon exam­i­na­tion to b infect­ed with plague bac­te­ria. Prompt san­i­tary mea­sures had pre­vent­ed fur­ther cas­es. On July 31st, the ISC vis­it­ed the lab­o­ra­to­ries of the Kore­an epi­dem­ic Pre­ven­tion Ser­vice near P’yongyang, and were told by Dr. Chen that the strains iso­lat­ed from the Kang-Sou fleas and tis­sues from the vic­tim were of a par­tic­u­lar­ly vir­u­lent vari­ety. No more than 10–20 micro-organ­isms (cal­cu­lat­ed by dilu­tions) had been found suf­fi­cient to kill a guinea pig with cer­tain­ty in five days. Human cas­es, like that of the present vic­tim, had suc­cumbed rapid­ly some­times with­in twen­ty-four hours, with­out buboes.

In the sec­ond case, Chi­nese vol­un­teers in Korea had found mass­es of fleas on a bare hill­side near Hoi-Yang. Six hours ear­li­er an Amer­i­can plane had cir­cled low over the region for about ten min­utes with­out straf­ing or bomb­ing. The fleas were again dis­cov­ered to be human fleas, and infect­ed with plague.

The next course of action which the ISC took was per­haps in ret­ro­spect a mis­take. It was cer­tain­ly great­ly to reduce the “sci­en­tif­ic” accept­abil­i­ty of its report in the West. On August 3rd and 4th, the Com­mis­sion accept­ed an invi­ta­tion to vis­it a POW camp to inter­view cap­tured Amer­i­can air­men who alleged­ly had con­fessed that Amer­i­ca was using BW. . . .

6. The sec­ond pro­gram con­cludes with the pre­sen­ta­tion giv­en by Dr. Joseph Need­ham of the ISC and Cana­di­an Chris­t­ian preach­er Jim Endi­cott, who had not only worked for Chi­ang Kai-shek’s forces dur­ing World War II, but U.S. secret mil­i­tary intel­li­gence.

They rein­forced the find­ings of the ISC.

Unit 731: The Japan­ese Army’s Secret of Secrets by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; Hod­der & Stoughton [HC]; Copy­right 1989 by Peter Williams and David Wal­lace; ISBN 0–340-39463–3; pp. 249–257.

. . . . In 1952 [Joseph Need­ham says], when the ISC was being formed, my prin­ci­pal moti­va­tion was to go to the aid of the Chi­nese bac­te­ri­ol­o­gists and zool­o­gists in their need, many of whom I had known well dur­ing the Sec­ond World War. I think that all the evi­dence shows that BW, on an exper­i­men­tal scale and using unusu­al vec­tors, was engaged in dur­ing the Kore­an War. Of course, it is entire­ly true that the mem­bers of the Com­mis­sion nev­er actu­al­ly saw any inci­dent. What we did see were spec­i­mens of the con­tain­ers that had been used and of the vec­tors, as well as vic­tims of the attacks. . . . I think the Amer­i­cans just want­ed to see what degree of suc­cess could be obtained with the essen­tial­ly Japan­ese meth­ods. My judg­ment was nev­er based on any­thing which the downed air­men had said, but rather entire­ly on the cir­cum­stan­tial evi­dence. . . . 

. . . . In Feb­ru­ary 1952, Cana­di­an Chris­t­ian preach­er and peace cam­paign­er Jim Endi­cott and his wife were also invit­ed by the Chi­nese Com­mit­tee for World Peace to inves­ti­gate the Koran BW alle­ga­tions. . . .Endi­cott was a well known fig­ure in the coun­try. . . . he had been relief work­er dur­ing Japan­ese bomb­ing attacks on Chungk­ing dur­ing 1939–1940, a polit­i­cal advis­er to Chi­ang Kai-shek’s New Life Move­ment and, until 1946, a mem­ber of US secret mil­i­tary intel­li­gence in Chi­na in 1944–5, Endi­cott had become acquaint­ed with, and gained the mutu­al respect of, many Chi­nese Com­mu­nists, friend­ships which sur­vived the Com­mu­nists’ takeover and recon­struc­tion. . . .

Discussion

4 comments for “FTR#‘s 1172 & 1173 The Missing Chapter, Parts 2 and 3.”

  1. I recent­ly received my copy of the UK ver­sion of Unit 731 and did a quick perusal of the index as I am wont to do with his­tor­i­cal texts. I was very inter­est­ed to find a ref­er­ence to Jim Endi­cott the Cana­di­an min­is­ter born in Chi­na who end­ed up mov­ing to Cana­da in the 1950’s. I was a neigh­bour to his son, Stephen, who taught Chi­nese his­to­ry at a local uni­ver­si­ty where I took cours­es in the 1980’s. One of those cours­es was one on mod­ern Chi­nese his­to­ry with Stephen’s father-in-law. I got to know Stephen fair­ly well and end­ed up buy­ing a cou­ple of his books includ­ing 1998’s The Unit­ed States and Bac­te­ri­o­log­i­cal War­fare (Uni­ver­si­ty of Indi­ana Press). This book goes into great detail regard­ing the accu­sa­tions made by Chi­na and North Korea and gives inter­est­ing back­ground on Fort Det­rick and the co-oper­a­tion of Cana­di­an sci­en­tists includ­ing Guil­ford B. Reed. It’s dense with infor­ma­tion though quite read­able and cred­i­ble. It’s lit­tle won­der that Nobel prize win­ner Lester Pear­son went after Endi­cott so vehe­ment­ly. This book should­n’t be too dif­fi­cult to find. I read it 20 years ago and plan to read it again in the near future.

    Posted by Brad | April 29, 2021, 12:35 pm
  2. Excel­lent update on this sub­ject:

    https://jeff-kaye.medium.com/a‑real-flood-of-bacteria-and-germs-communications-intelligence-and-charges-of-u-s-4decafdc762

    “These doc­u­ments pro­vide strong cor­rob­o­rat­ing evi­dence that the germ war­fare charged by the Com­mu­nists, and by a num­ber of out­side observers, jour­nal­ists and inves­ti­ga­tors, did in fact occur. The con­silience of evi­dence includes the tes­ti­mo­ny of U.S. Air Force and Marine per­son­nel cap­tured by North Korea and Chi­na, though that evi­dence will only be exam­ined here in the con­text of how it aris­es in the rel­e­vant CIA doc­u­ments. Con­verse­ly, the evi­dence per­tain­ing to oth­er the­o­ries about the germ war­fare charges, e.g., that it was a “hoax,” lack such con­ver­gent evi­dence.”

    Posted by Mike | June 30, 2021, 10:18 am
  3. A new cli­mate study was just released that con­clud­ed the Earth could become effec­tive­ly an alien envi­ron­ment inhos­pitable to humans by the year 2500 if cur­rent cli­mate change trends con­tin­ue. And long before we hit that ‘alien Earth’ point, we’re going to see a dra­mat­ic change in what types of plants an ani­mals are capa­ble of liv­ing in a giv­en area. What used to be tem­per­ate zones are going to warm up and either dry out (like the death of the Ama­zon) or get drench and take on the char­ac­ter­is­tics of new trop­i­cal zones. It’s just the lat­est grim reminder of the human­i­ty’s sui­ci­dal tra­jec­to­ry.

    But we can’t for­get that the mega-threats fac­ing human­i­ty don’t just include cli­mate change. We’re only get­ting more and more capa­ble of unleash­ing a nuclear or bio­log­i­cal war­fare cat­a­stro­phe. So giv­en that we should expect an expan­sion of trop­i­cal zones, and just a gen­er­al shift in what types of plants and pests and bio­log­i­cal­ly capa­ble of liv­ing in dif­fer­ent areas of the earth, it’s worth tak­ing a look at how cli­mate change, and in par­tic­u­lar the growth of trop­i­cal-like cli­mate zones, could com­pli­cate biowar­fare in the future. Espe­cial­ly the kind of biowar­fare that involves releas­ing pests into tar­get coun­tries in the hopes of wreak­ing bio­log­i­cal hav­oc. Because as the fol­low 2002 arti­cle about then-recent­ly declas­si­fied Aus­tralian gov­ern­ment archives revealed, Aus­trali­a’s top post-WWII micro­bi­ol­o­gist, Sir Mac­far­lane Bur­net, actu­al­ly advo­cat­ed for the use of bio­log­i­cal war­fare on South­east Asian coun­tries. And the rea­son­ing he used for why it would be ‘safe’ for Aus­tralia to do so with­out risk­ing blow­back is the fact that Aus­trali­a’s cli­mate is tem­per­ate com­pared to its trop­i­cal neigh­bors. In oth­er words, the bugs Aus­tralia was going to drop on its neigh­bors can’t sur­vive in Aus­tralia any­way. It’s the kind of ratio­nale that makes bio­log­i­cal war­fare seem ‘safe’ to use.

    Mac­far­lane rec­om­mend­ed that bio­log­i­cal and chem­i­cal weapons should be devel­oped to tar­get food crops and spread infec­tious dis­eases in the secret 1947 report, cit­ing Aus­trali­a’s tem­per­ate cli­mate as giv­ing it a key mil­i­tary advan­tage. As Mac­far­lane wrote, “Specif­i­cal­ly to the Aus­tralian sit­u­a­tion, the most effec­tive counter-offen­sive to threat­ened inva­sion by over­pop­u­lat­ed Asi­at­ic coun­tries would be direct­ed towards the destruc­tion by bio­log­i­cal or chem­i­cal means of trop­i­cal food crops and the dis­sem­i­na­tion of infec­tious dis­ease capa­ble of spread­ing in trop­i­cal but not under Aus­tralian con­di­tions.” Mac­far­lane was report­ed­ly quite alarmed about the large South­east Asian pop­u­la­tions, so some sort of inflict­ed pop­u­la­tion con­trol appears to be part of the motive here.

    Mac­far­lane also wrote about how bio­log­i­cal war­fare could be used as a kind of coup de grace to a vir­tu­al­ly defeat­ed ene­my and com­pel sur­ren­der in the same way that the atom­ic bomb served in 1945, see­ing it as a psy­cho­log­i­cal war­fare method that can induce defeat with­out destroy the ene­my’s indus­tri­al poten­tial which can then be tak­en over intact. It’s a snap­shot of how biowar­fare was almost treat­ed as just anoth­er con­ven­tion­al war fight­ing tool. And Aus­trali­a’s rel­a­tive­ly dif­fer­ent cli­mate from its neigh­bors was a key part of Mac­far­lane’s rea­son­ing for why this type of war­fare was fea­si­bly ‘safe’. So that points to anoth­er weird com­pli­ca­tion from cli­mate change: the game the­o­ries of bio­log­i­cal war­fare based on rel­a­tive cli­mate dif­fer­ences are set to be scram­bled in real-time:

    The Age

    Bur­net’s solu­tion: The plan to poi­son S‑E Asia

    March 10, 2002 — 11.00am

    World-famous micro­bi­ol­o­gist Sir Mac­far­lane Bur­net, the Nobel prize win­ner revered as Aus­trali­a’s great­est med­ical research sci­en­tist, secret­ly urged the gov­ern­ment to devel­op bio­log­i­cal weapons for use against Indone­sia and oth­er “over­pop­u­lat­ed” coun­tries of South-East Asia.

    The rev­e­la­tion is con­tained in top-secret files declas­si­fied by the Nation­al Archives of Aus­tralia, despite resis­tance from the Depart­ment of For­eign Affairs and Trade.

    Sir Mac­far­lane rec­om­mend­ed in a secret report in 1947 that bio­log­i­cal and chem­i­cal weapons should be devel­oped to tar­get food crops and spread infec­tious dis­eases.

    His key advi­so­ry role on bio­log­i­cal war­fare was uncov­ered by Can­ber­ra his­to­ri­an Philip Dor­ling in the Nation­al Archives in 1998.

    The depart­ment ini­tial­ly blocked release of the mate­r­i­al on the basis it would dam­age Aus­trali­a’s inter­na­tion­al rela­tions. Dr Dor­ling sought a review and the mate­r­i­al was final­ly released to him late last year.

    The files include a com­pre­hen­sive memo Sir Mac­far­lane wrote for the Defence Depart­ment in 1947 in which he said Aus­tralia should devel­op bio­log­i­cal weapons that would work in trop­i­cal Asia with­out spread­ing to Aus­trali­a’s more tem­per­ate pop­u­la­tion cen­tres.

    “Specif­i­cal­ly to the Aus­tralian sit­u­a­tion, the most effec­tive counter-offen­sive to threat­ened inva­sion by over­pop­u­lat­ed Asi­at­ic coun­tries would be direct­ed towards the destruc­tion by bio­log­i­cal or chem­i­cal means of trop­i­cal food crops and the dis­sem­i­na­tion of infec­tious dis­ease capa­ble of spread­ing in trop­i­cal but not under Aus­tralian con­di­tions,” Sir Mac­far­lane said.

    The Vic­to­ri­an-born immu­nol­o­gist, who head­ed the Wal­ter and Eliza Hall Insti­tute of Med­ical Research, won the Nobel prize for med­i­cine in 1960. He died in 1985 but his the­o­ries on immu­ni­ty and “clon­al selec­tion” pro­vid­ed the basis for mod­ern biotech­nol­o­gy and genet­ic engi­neer­ing.

    On Decem­ber 24, 1946, the sec­re­tary of the Depart­ment of Defence, F.G. Shed­den, wrote to Mac­far­lane Bur­net say­ing Aus­tralia could not ignore the fact that many coun­tries were con­duct­ing intense research on bio­log­i­cal war­fare and invit­ing him to a meet­ing of top mil­i­tary offi­cers to dis­cuss the ques­tion.

    The min­utes of a meet­ing in Jan­u­ary, 1947, reveal that Sir Mac­far­lane argued that Aus­trali­a’s tem­per­ate cli­mate could give it a sig­nif­i­cant mil­i­tary advan­tage.

    “The main con­tri­bu­tion of local research so far as Aus­tralia is con­cerned might be to study inten­sive­ly the pos­si­bil­i­ties of bio­log­i­cal war­fare in the trop­ics against troops and civ­il pop­u­la­tions at a rel­a­tive­ly low lev­el of hygiene and with cor­re­spond­ing­ly high resis­tance to the com­mon infec­tious dis­eases,” he told the meet­ing.

    In Sep­tem­ber, 1947, Sir Mac­far­lane was invit­ed to join a chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal war­fare sub­com­mit­tee of the New Weapons and Equip­ment Devel­op­ment Com­mit­tee.

    He pre­pared a secret report titled Note on War from a Bio­log­i­cal Angle sug­gest­ing that bio­log­i­cal war­fare could be a pow­er­ful weapon to help defend a thin­ly pop­u­lat­ed Aus­tralia.

    Sir Mac­far­lane also urged the gov­ern­ment to encour­age uni­ver­si­ties to research those branch­es of bio­log­i­cal sci­ence that had a spe­cial bear­ing on bio­log­i­cal war­fare.

    A clin­i­cal­ly sci­en­tif­ic approach is evi­dent in a note he wrote in June, 1948.

    He said a suc­cess­ful attack with a micro­bi­o­log­i­cal agent on a large pop­u­la­tion would have such a dev­as­tat­ing impact that its use was extreme­ly unlike­ly while both sides were capa­ble of retal­i­a­tion.

    “The main strate­gic use of bio­log­i­cal war­fare may well be to admin­is­ter the coup de grace to a vir­tu­al­ly defeat­ed ene­my and com­pel sur­ren­der in the same way that the atom­ic bomb served in 1945.

    “Its use has the tremen­dous advan­tage of not destroy­ing the ene­my’s indus­tri­al poten­tial which can then be tak­en over intact.

    “Overt bio­log­i­cal war­fare might be used to enforce sur­ren­der by psy­cho­log­i­cal rather than direct destruc­tive mea­sures.”

    The min­utes of a meet­ing at Mel­bourne’s Vic­to­ria Bar­racks in 1948 not­ed that Sir Mac­far­lane “was of the opin­ion that if Aus­tralia under­takes work in this field it should be on the trop­i­cal offen­sive side rather than the defen­sive. There was very lit­tle known about bio­log­i­cal attack on trop­i­cal crops.”

    After vis­it­ing the UK in 1950 and exam­in­ing the British chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal war­fare research effort, Sir Mac­far­lane told the com­mit­tee that the ini­ti­a­tion of epi­demics among ene­my pop­u­la­tions had usu­al­ly been dis­card­ed as a means of wag­ing war because it was like­ly to rebound on the user.

    “In a coun­try of low san­i­ta­tion the intro­duc­tion of an exot­ic intesti­nal pathogen, e.g. by water con­t­a­m­i­na­tion, might ini­ti­ate wide­spread dis­sem­i­na­tion,” he said.

    “Intro­duc­tion of yel­low fever into a coun­try with appro­pri­ate mos­qui­to vec­tors might build up into a dis­abling epi­dem­ic before con­trol mea­sures were estab­lished.”

    The sub­com­mit­tee rec­om­mend­ed that “the pos­si­bil­i­ties of an attack on the food sup­plies of S‑E Asia and Indone­sia using B.W. agents should be con­sid­ered by a small study group”.

    It 1951 it rec­om­mend­ed that “a pan­el report­ing to the chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal war­fare sub­com­mit­tee should be autho­rised to report on the offen­sive poten­tial­i­ty of bio­log­i­cal agents like­ly to be effec­tive against the local food sup­plies of South-East Asia and Indone­sia”.

    Dr Dor­ling said that while Sir Mac­far­lane was a great Aus­tralian he was also a prod­uct of times when many Aus­tralians held deep fears about more pop­u­lous Asian coun­tries.

    He said the Men­zies gov­ern­ment was more inter­est­ed in try­ing to acquire nuclear weapons. “For­tu­nate­ly this also proved imprac­ti­ca­ble and Aus­tralia nev­er acquired a weapon of mass destruc­tion.”

    ...

    ————

    “Bur­net’s solu­tion: The plan to poi­son S‑E Asia” ; The Age; 03/10/2002

    The depart­ment ini­tial­ly blocked release of the mate­r­i­al on the basis it would dam­age Aus­trali­a’s inter­na­tion­al rela­tions. Dr Dor­ling sought a review and the mate­r­i­al was final­ly released to him late last year.”

    Ha! Yeah, reveal­ing how you planned pre­emp­tive bio­log­i­cal attacks on your neigh­bors decades ago prob­a­bly won’t help with your inter­na­tion­al rela­tions. But the files were even­tu­al­ly released and we got to learn about how Sir Mac­far­lane real­ly did rec­om­mend that Aus­tralia wage a kind of pre­emp­tive bio­log­i­cal war­fare on its high­ly pop­u­lat­ed neigh­bors. Thanks to Aus­trali­a’s tem­per­ate cli­mate this was seen as safe from blow­back:

    ...
    The files include a com­pre­hen­sive memo Sir Mac­far­lane wrote for the Defence Depart­ment in 1947 in which he said Aus­tralia should devel­op bio­log­i­cal weapons that would work in trop­i­cal Asia with­out spread­ing to Aus­trali­a’s more tem­per­ate pop­u­la­tion cen­tres.

    “Specif­i­cal­ly to the Aus­tralian sit­u­a­tion, the most effec­tive counter-offen­sive to threat­ened inva­sion by over­pop­u­lat­ed Asi­at­ic coun­tries would be direct­ed towards the destruc­tion by bio­log­i­cal or chem­i­cal means of trop­i­cal food crops and the dis­sem­i­na­tion of infec­tious dis­ease capa­ble of spread­ing in trop­i­cal but not under Aus­tralian con­di­tions,” Sir Mac­far­lane said.

    ...

    The min­utes of a meet­ing in Jan­u­ary, 1947, reveal that Sir Mac­far­lane argued that Aus­trali­a’s tem­per­ate cli­mate could give it a sig­nif­i­cant mil­i­tary advan­tage.

    “The main con­tri­bu­tion of local research so far as Aus­tralia is con­cerned might be to study inten­sive­ly the pos­si­bil­i­ties of bio­log­i­cal war­fare in the trop­ics against troops and civ­il pop­u­la­tions at a rel­a­tive­ly low lev­el of hygiene and with cor­re­spond­ing­ly high resis­tance to the com­mon infec­tious dis­eases,” he told the meet­ing.

    In Sep­tem­ber, 1947, Sir Mac­far­lane was invit­ed to join a chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal war­fare sub­com­mit­tee of the New Weapons and Equip­ment Devel­op­ment Com­mit­tee.

    He pre­pared a secret report titled Note on War from a Bio­log­i­cal Angle sug­gest­ing that bio­log­i­cal war­fare could be a pow­er­ful weapon to help defend a thin­ly pop­u­lat­ed Aus­tralia.
    ...

    And Mac­far­lane was quite explic­it about the nature of his rec­om­men­da­tions: these were to be offen­sive weapons. Not defen­sive. He was rec­om­mend­ing a plan to be put into motion, not a con­tin­gency:

    ...
    A clin­i­cal­ly sci­en­tif­ic approach is evi­dent in a note he wrote in June, 1948.

    He said a suc­cess­ful attack with a micro­bi­o­log­i­cal agent on a large pop­u­la­tion would have such a dev­as­tat­ing impact that its use was extreme­ly unlike­ly while both sides were capa­ble of retal­i­a­tion.

    “The main strate­gic use of bio­log­i­cal war­fare may well be to admin­is­ter the coup de grace to a vir­tu­al­ly defeat­ed ene­my and com­pel sur­ren­der in the same way that the atom­ic bomb served in 1945.

    “Its use has the tremen­dous advan­tage of not destroy­ing the ene­my’s indus­tri­al poten­tial which can then be tak­en over intact.

    “Overt bio­log­i­cal war­fare might be used to enforce sur­ren­der by psy­cho­log­i­cal rather than direct destruc­tive mea­sures.”

    The min­utes of a meet­ing at Mel­bourne’s Vic­to­ria Bar­racks in 1948 not­ed that Sir Mac­far­lane “was of the opin­ion that if Aus­tralia under­takes work in this field it should be on the trop­i­cal offen­sive side rather than the defen­sive. There was very lit­tle known about bio­log­i­cal attack on trop­i­cal crops.”
    ...

    Now, return­ing to the issue of expand­ing trop­i­cal zones, it’s worth ask­ing what the cli­mate prog­no­sis is for Aus­tralia. Did the gov­ern­ment end up releas­ing any of those trop­i­cal pest on its neigh­bors? If so, are they still there? Because based on cli­mate change pre­dic­tion for Aus­tralia, while much of the con­ti­nent is going to be dri­er and hot­ter than ever, the north­ern fringes could end up becom­ing trop­i­cal zones much its neigh­bors. It might take a while, but bio-blow­back will even­tu­al­ly hap­pen.

    As we can see from that old declas­si­fied Aus­tralian report, rel­a­tive cli­mate dif­fer­ences were seen as cre­at­ing mil­i­tary strate­gic oppor­tu­ni­ties. Or strate­gic vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties for the trop­i­cal coun­tries. This insight was already there in 1947. And we’re now in an era where rel­a­tive cli­mate dif­fer­ences are being thrown into a chaot­ic flux, but also with more of the world enter­ing into trop­i­cal-like cli­mates where pests thrive. More vul­ner­a­ble tar­gets but also more poten­tial for chaot­ic blow­back. So let’s hope the bio­log­i­cal war plan­ners of the future have a keen under­stand­ing of the role cli­mate change is going to play in the long-term impact of the super-bugs they release. Yes, we should ide­al­ly hope the bio­log­i­cal war plan­ners of the future don’t actu­al­ly exist. But if they do exist, it would prob­a­bly help if they rec­og­nize that bio­log­i­cal blow­back is just a mat­ter of time after you broke the cli­mate.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | October 2, 2021, 3:37 pm
  4. @Pterrafractyl–

    Jesus F*ing Christ!

    What a piece of work Bur­net was!

    The book “The Djakar­ta Method” by Vin­cent Blevins fills in what ulti­mate­ly became the West­’s “eco­log­i­cal” response to Indone­sia.

    https://spitfirelist.com/for-the-record/ftr1177-the-jakarta-method-in-latin-america/

    Adding depth to the con­sid­er­a­tions you have pre­sent­ed is the fact that envi­ron­men­tal mod­i­fi­ca­tion for mil­i­tary pur­pos­es has been a fact for decades.

    Stay Tuned!

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | October 2, 2021, 3:54 pm

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