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FTR#1351 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR#1352 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

Intro­duc­tion: These pro­grams con­tin­ue (from FTR#‘s 1349 & 1350)  explo­ration of the his­to­ry of U.S. involve­ment with Asian fas­cism from the pre-World War II peri­od until the present.

Crit­i­cal back­ground infor­ma­tion on U.S. cap­i­tal sup­port for Japan­ese fas­cism and Japan’s cen­turies-long sub­ju­ga­tion of Korea may be found in FTR#‘s 905 and 1141.

1. The first pro­gram begins with a read­ing of the intro­duc­tion to the books for down­load sec­tion of this web­site.

In the decades since the end of the Sec­ond World War, much has been writ­ten about the war and fas­cism, the dri­ving force behind the aggres­sion that pre­cip­i­tat­ed that con­flict. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, much of what has been said and writ­ten has failed to iden­ti­fy and ana­lyze the caus­es, nature and method­ol­o­gy of fascism—German Nation­al Social­ism or “Nazism” in par­tic­u­lar. A deep­er, more accu­rate analy­sis was pre­sent­ed in lit­er­a­ture pub­lished before, dur­ing and imme­di­ate­ly after World War II.

SpitfireList.com is pleased to present a num­ber of books pub­lished dur­ing that peri­od. Almost all more than 50 years old, these works embody a more com­plete, pro­found analy­sis of the his­tor­i­cal forces that dom­i­nat­ed the events of that time and, more impor­tant­ly, our own. Where­as much con­tem­po­rary lit­er­a­ture on the sub­ject presents fas­cism (and Nazism in par­tic­u­lar) as an aber­ra­tion, the phe­nom­e­non was an out­growth of major polit­i­cal forces and dynam­ics that dom­i­nate and con­trol con­tem­po­rary events and process­es.

Some of the books pre­sent­ed here illus­trate the extent to which fas­cism (Nazism in par­tic­u­lar) was an out­growth of glob­al­iza­tion and the con­struc­tion of inter­na­tion­al monop­o­lies (car­tels). Key to under­stand­ing this phe­nom­e­non is analy­sis of the Webb-Pomerene act, leg­is­lat­ed near the end of the First World War. A loop­hole in the Anti-trust leg­is­la­tion of 1914, it effec­tive­ly legal­ized the for­ma­tion of cartels—international monopolies—for firms that were barred from domes­tic monop­o­lis­tic prac­tices.

Decry­ing what they viewed as exces­sive and restric­tive “reg­u­la­tion” here in the Unit­ed States, U.S.-based transna­tion­al cor­po­ra­tions invest­ed their prof­its from the indus­tri­al boom of the 1920’s abroad, pri­mar­i­ly in Japan and Ger­many. This process might well be viewed as the real begin­ning of what is now known as “glob­al­iza­tion.” [FTR#’s 99, 361, 426, 511 and 532 present an overview of the rein­vest­ment of the wealth gen­er­at­ed by the Amer­i­can indus­tri­al boom of the 1920’s in Ger­man and Japan­ese strate­gic heavy indus­try. It was this cap­i­tal that drove the engines of con­quest that sub­dued both Europe and Asia dur­ing the con­flict.]

We also note that the fail­ure of Amer­i­can indus­tri­al and finan­cial firms to invest their cap­i­tal in U.S. infra­struc­ture con­tributed sig­nif­i­cant­ly to the onset of the Great Depres­sion, depriv­ing Amer­i­can indus­try of the monies need­ed to sus­tain the engines of indus­try and com­merce. . . .

2a. The “Piv­ot to Asia” pre­sent­ed in these pro­grams has as a foun­da­tion­al ele­ment a pro­found Japan­ese par­tic­i­pa­tion in Oper­a­tion Sun­rise. (More infor­ma­tion about Sun­rise is to be found in FTR#‘s 1147, 1148 & 1149.)

Of pri­ma­ry sig­nif­i­cance in this dynam­ic is the fun­da­men­tal role in these machi­na­tions of pow­er­ful insti­tu­tions includ­ing the new­ly-mint­ed IMF, World Bank and the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments.

NB: The key dis­cus­sions unpacked by Monte took place in the mid-sum­mer of 1945.

CORRECTION: In the time peri­od under dis­cus­sion, Per Jacob­s­son was a key mem­ber of the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments, how­ev­er he was not head of the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund, which he assumed con­trol of in 1956.

CORRECTION: Per Jacob­sson’s name is not spelled with an “e.”

For­eign Rela­tions of the Unit­ed States: Diplo­mat­ic Papers, 1945, The British Com­mon­wealth, The Far East, Vol­ume VI; 740.00119 PW/8–245; Mem­o­ran­dum by the Direc­tor of the Office of Strate­gic Ser­vices (Dono­van) to the Sec­re­tary of State.

The fol­low­ing infor­ma­tion, a sequel to a mem­o­ran­dum dat­ed 13 July con­cern­ing a new Japan­ese attempt to approach Allied author­i­ties through OSS rep­re­sen­ta­tives in Switzer­land, has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wies­baden. The infor­ma­tion was sup­plied by the source of the ref­er­ence mem­o­ran­dum, Per Jacob­s­son, a Swedish nation­al and eco­nom­ic advis­er to the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments in Basel. Jacob­s­son had asked to see Mr. Dulles and was brought to Wies­baden for that pur­pose on 15 July, return­ing imme­di­ate­ly to Basel.

Jacob­s­son reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of con­fer­ences with Yoshimu­ra, a Japan­ese offi­cial attached to the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments, and Kojiro Kita­mu­ra, a direc­tor of the Bank, rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Yoko­hama Specie Bank, and for­mer finan­cial attaché in Berlin. Yoshimu­ra and Kita­mu­ra claim to be act­ing in con­sul­ta­tion with the Japan­ese Min­is­ter to Switzer­land, Shu­nichi Kase, and Brigadier Gen­er­al Kiy­oto­mi Okamo­to, for­mer Japan­ese mil­i­tary attaché in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japan­ese Intel­li­gence in Europe. Yoshimu­ra and Kita­mu­ra claim fur­ther that Kase and Okamo­to have direct and secret means of com­mu­ni­cat­ing with the Japan­ese Chief of Staff.17 Yoshimu­ra also claims that the peace group which he rep­re­sents includes Gen­er­al [Page 490]Yoshi­jiro TJmezu, Army Chief of Staff; Admi­ral Mit­sumasa Yon­ai, Min­is­ter of Navy; and Shigenori Togo, For­eign Min­is­ter.

Yoshimu­ra and Kita­mu­ra appeared to Jacob­s­son no longer to ques­tion the prin­ci­ple of uncon­di­tion­al sur­ren­der, though at one point they asked whether uncon­di­tion­al mil­i­tary and naval sur­ren­der might not be suf­fi­cient. On his own ini­tia­tive, Jacob­s­son replied that such a pro­pos­al would not be accept­able to the Allies but would be con­sid­ered mere­ly a quib­ble. Both Japan­ese offi­cials raised the ques­tion of main­tain­ing Japan­ese ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty, but they appar­ent­ly did not mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or For­mosa.

Through­out dis­cus­sions with Jacob­s­son, the Japan­ese offi­cials stressed only two points: (a) the preser­va­tion of the Emper­or, and (b) the pos­si­bil­i­ty of return­ing to the con­sti­tu­tion pro­mul­gat­ed in 1889. Kita­mu­ra pre­pared and pre­sent­ed to Jacob­s­son a mem­o­ran­dum ask­ing him to sound out Mr. Dulles’ opin­ion on the two points.

(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japan­ese are insist­ing on the reten­tion of the Emper­or because they feel that he alone can take effec­tive action with respect to sur­ren­der and that some hope of sur­vival must be held out to him in order to gain his sup­port for uncon­di­tion­al sur­ren­der.)

Lat­er Yoshimu­ra and Kita­mu­ra pre­pared a sec­ond mem­o­ran­dum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to pro­ceed, con­ver­sa­tions could be arranged with Allied rep­re­sen­ta­tives and what form of autho­riza­tion would be required.

Jacob­s­son is per­son­al­ly con­vinced that these approach­es are seri­ous and that the Japan­ese group in Switzer­land is in con­stant cable con­tact with Tokyo. This con­vic­tion appears to be based on impres­sions only, since his two Japan­ese con­tacts nev­er stat­ed pre­cise­ly that they had received instruc­tions from any autho­rized agency in Tokyo. . . .

2b. More about the Dulles/Jacobsson/Japanese nego­ti­a­tions:

For­eign Rela­tions of the Unit­ed States: Diplo­mat­ic Papers, 1945, The British Com­mon­wealth, The Far East, Vol­ume VI; 740.00119 PW/8–245; Mem­o­ran­dum by the Act­ing Direc­tor of the Office of Strate­gic Ser­vices (Che­ston) to the Sec­re­tary of State

The fol­low­ing is the sub­stance of a mes­sage, dat­ed 1 August, received from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mis­sion in Wies­baden. The infor­ma­tion con­tained in this mes­sage is a sequel to mem­o­ran­da dat­ed 13, 16 and 18 July con­cern­ing a Japan­ese attempt to approach Allied author­i­ties through OSS rep­re­sen­ta­tives.

Imme­di­ate­ly fol­low­ing is a sum­ma­ry of a report by Per Jacob­s­son, a Swedish nation­al and eco­nom­ic advis­er to the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments, trans­mit­ted to Mr. Dulles through an inter­me­di­ary:

The Japan­ese Chief of Staff has acknowl­edged with­out com­ment a long cable which Brigadier Gen­er­al Kiy­oto­mi Okamo­to sent from Switzer­land on 19 July. Okamoto’s telegram report­ed­ly stat­ed that Japan has lost the war and must prompt­ly accept the con­se­quences. [Okamo­to is believed to be the head of Japan­ese Intel­li­gence in Europe.]20

The Japan­ese For­eign Min­is­ter has also acknowl­edged a detailed report from Shu­nichi Kase, Japan­ese Min­is­ter in Bern. Kase’s report, sent on or about 21 July, includ­ed (a) Mr. Grew’s state­ment of 10 July, (b) a mem­o­ran­dum from Kojiro Kita­mu­ra, direc­tor of the Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments and for­mer finan­cial attaché in Berlin, who has been active in the cur­rent Japan­ese approach­es to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a state­ment of Kase’s own posi­tion. The For­eign Minister’s reply to Kase’s mes­sage con­tained the fol­low­ing query: “Is that all you have to say?” Kase inter­prets this query as an invi­ta­tion to con­tin­ue peace approach­es.

[Page 493]

The recent tri­par­tite ulti­ma­tum to Japan21 has been the chief top­ic of dis­cus­sion among Japan­ese groups in Switzer­land. Their first reac­tion, on the basis of excerpts pub­lished in the Swiss press, was that (a) the procla­ma­tion showed a lack of under­stand­ing of Japan­ese char­ac­ter, (b) the doc­u­ment should have not been framed on a basis of “take it or leave it”, (c) the inclu­sion of Chi­na as a sig­na­to­ry rep­re­sent­ed an “added ele­ment of humil­i­a­tion”, and (d) the doc­u­ment should have been sent through pri­vate chan­nels rather than pub­licly. After receiv­ing the full Eng­lish text through Jacob­s­son, and after fur­ther study, the atti­tude of the group changed, and the procla­ma­tion was accept­ed as an “astute doc­u­ment which left a pos­si­ble way out”. The group was par­tic­u­lar­ly impressed by “uncon­di­tion­al sur­ren­der” in con­nec­tion with the “Japan­ese armed forces” and to the ref­er­ence to revival and strength­en­ing of demo­c­ra­t­ic ten­den­cies among the Japan­ese peo­ple. As a result, a telegram stress­ing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The fol­low­ing is a sum­ma­ry of a mem­o­ran­dum to Mr. Dulles from the Japan­ese group in con­tact with Per Jacob­s­son. Jacob­s­son trans­mit­ted this memo along with his own report sum­ma­rized above.

The Japan­ese group empha­sizes that it is hop­ing for some deci­sion with­in a week unless “resis­tance is too great”. The Allies should not take “too seri­ous­ly” what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tri­par­tite procla­ma­tion. This radio com­ment was mere­ly “pro­pa­gan­da to main­tain morale in Japan”. The real reply will be giv­en through some “offi­cial chan­nel”, pos­si­bly by Min­is­ter Kase or Gen­er­al Okamo­to, if an offi­cial Gov­ern­ment reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a Ger­man author­i­ty on the Far East liv­ing in Switzer­land who is one of his reg­u­lar con­tacts, that Yosikazu Fujimu­ra, a Japan­ese Navy rep­re­sen­ta­tive in Bern, has sent sev­en long cables to his supe­ri­ors in Tokyo dur­ing the past two months urg­ing imme­di­ate ces­sa­tion of hos­til­i­ties. His supe­ri­ors cabled in reply that the Japan­ese Navy no longer is able to “act alone”, and instruct­ed Fujimu­ra not to take the ini­tia­tive with­out orders from Tokyo, but to main­tain his “most valu­able con­tacts”.

[Fujimu­ra, a for­mer Japan­ese Assis­tant Naval Attaché in Bern, report­ed­ly has direct radio con­tact with the Navy Min­istry and Navy [Page 494]Chief of Staff22 in Tokyo. To this same Ger­man source Fujimu­ra pre­vi­ous­ly had indi­cat­ed an inter­est in the part which Mr. Dulles played in arrang­ing for the Ger­man capit­u­la­tion in North Italy and in ascer­tain­ing what terms short of uncon­di­tion­al sur­ren­der might have been grant­ed these Ger­mans. He sug­gest­ed that Japan­ese naval cir­cles in Tokyo would be will­ing to sur­ren­der pro­vid­ed they were giv­en assur­ances (a) that the Emper­or would be retained and (b) if pos­si­ble, that they could save some face from the present wreck­age. Fujimura’s approach­es were the sub­ject of mem­o­ran­da dat­ed 2 and 4 June.]23

The Ger­man source reports and Jacob­s­son con­firms that Fujimu­ra and Kita­mu­ra have estab­lished close con­tact with each oth­er. The two men, Jacob­s­son con­firms, are agreed that joint action by all Japan­ese ser­vices in Switzer­land might make some impres­sion on the Japan­ese Gov­ern­ment, since Bern now “is prob­a­bly next to Moscow the most impor­tant Japan­ese for­eign post.” . . . .