Spitfire List Web site and blog of anti-fascist researcher and radio personality Dave Emory.

For The Record  

FTR#‘s 1362 & 1363 The Truth About Pearl Harbor, Parts 1 and 2

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FTR#1362 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

FTR#1363 This pro­gram was record­ed in one, 60-minute seg­ment.

U.S.S. Ari­zona
Pho­to Cred­it: Wikipedia

Intro­duc­tion: With the GOP tar­get­ing Social Secu­ri­ty (imple­ment­ed by FDR), the his­tor­i­cal and cog­ni­tive dis­cred­it­ing of the New Deal has fea­tured a fascis­tic revi­sion­ist his­to­ry of Pearl Har­bor.

Main­tain­ing that Roo­sevelt delib­er­ate­ly let the attack pro­ceed to bring the U.S. into World War II, this revi­sion­ism paints FDR as a trai­tor.

In this metic­u­lous­ly-researched and doc­u­ment­ed pre­sen­ta­tion, we not only refute this his­tor­i­cal slan­der and revi­sion­ism, but demon­strate con­clu­sive­ly that Admi­ral Kim­mel [in charge of Naval forces in Hawaii] and (per­haps to a less­er extent) Gen­er­al Short [in charge of Army forces in Hawaii] bear respon­si­bil­i­ty for the fail­ure.

Destroy­er U.S. Shaw Explodes at Pearl Har­bor
Pho­to Cred­it: Wikipedia

Points of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis Include: The revi­sion­ist con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries about Pearl Har­bor, blam­ing FDR, Win­ston Churchill, Joseph Stal­in, Chief-of-Staff George C. Mar­shall among oth­ers for the fail­ure of the mil­i­tary high com­mand at Pearl Har­bor; Major Hen­ry Clausen’s pouch fea­tur­ing a mag­ne­sium bomb to car­ry the decrypt­ed mes­sages from the Japan­ese Pur­ple Code (a diplo­mat­ic code that was bro­ken by U.S. intel­li­gence per­son­nel); The secure office in which Hen­ry C. Clausen worked; The Army Board­’s self-serv­ing scape­goat­ing of Chief-of-Staff Mar­shall; Three of the offi­cers on the Army Board had been demot­ed by Gen­er­al Mar­shall; Among the shills attack­ing FDR was GOP Sen­a­tor (from Michi­gan) Homer Fer­gu­son, exposed as a pro­pa­gan­diz­ing fool by Major Clausen; 1944 GOP Pres­i­den­tial Can­di­date Thomas Dewey was among those who point­ed the accus­ing fin­ger at FDR for delib­er­ate­ly allow­ing the attack to pro­ceed; Warn­ing on 1/24/41 of “a sur­prise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Har­bor. The dan­gers envis­aged, in order of their impor­tance and prob­a­bil­i­ty, are con­sid­ered to be (1) air bomb­ing attack, (2) air tor­pe­do plane attack, (3) sab­o­tage, (4) sub­ma­rine attack . . . .’ ”; A mes­sage sent to Admi­ral Kim­mel and seen by Gen­er­al Short–“The dis­patch sent by the Chief of Naval Oper­a­tions to Kim­mel began with the fate­ful words ‘THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING . . . . “; After not­ing that the U.S. had bro­ken the Japan­ese Pur­ple Code (a diplo­mat­ic code) ” . . . . Wash­ing­ton knew from read­ing these mes­sages that war would have to break out, with Japan attack­ing some­where in the Pacif­ic. There­fore, the Navy in Wash­ing­ton alert­ed Kim­mel on Decem­ber 3 by send­ing two advi­so­ry mes­sages that para­phrased the inter­cepts . . . . War had to fol­low; it was inevitable. . . .”; GOP shill Fer­gu­son’s attempts to deflect blame toward Roo­sevelt: ” . . . . ‘But that was nev­er sent to Kim­mel and Short, was it?’ ‘It cer­tain­ly was,’ I [Clausen] replied. I had him stone cold dead. . . .”; The Hawai­ian news­pa­pers had ample warn­ing of the poten­tial attacks to come; FDR knew that the inter­cept­ed mes­sages meant that war was inevitable; Churchill and British intel­li­gence knew that the inter­cepts meant that war was com­ing and alert­ed the U.S.; The role of the Bletch­ley Park code­break­ers in com­mu­ni­cat­ing (to no avail) the Japan­ese immi­nent attack; The par­tic­i­pa­tion of one of those codebreakers–the late Colonel Har­ry Beckhough–on Mr. Emory’s web­site; Dis­cus­sion of the U.S.S. Antares, the destroy­er U.S.S. Ward and the warn­ing they pro­vid­ed to Admi­ral Kimmel–to no avail; The attack on Pearl Har­bor and the role in it played by Gen­er­al Minoru Gen­da, the even­tu­al head of the Japan­ese Air Self-Defense Force, and the recip­i­ent of a medal from the U.S. Air Force; The per­for­mance char­ac­ter­is­tics of the air­craft car­ri­ers in the Pacif­ic and the bat­tle­ships in Pearl Har­bor; The leak of the U.S. Navy’s code-break­ing secret to the Japan­ese via the Chica­go Tri­bune and its FDR-hat­ing pub­lish­er Robert McCormick; The com­mence­ment of the Gold­en Lily oper­a­tion with the Rape of Nanking in 1937; The fact that the break­ing of the Japan­ese code informed the U.S. of the nature of the car­go of their ships, pos­si­bly inform­ing today of the posi­tion of sunken Gold­en Lily trea­sure.

1. We begin by set­ting forth the revi­sion­ist con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries about Pearl Har­bor, blam­ing FDR, Win­ston Churchill, Joseph Stal­in, Chief-of-Staff George C. Mar­shall among oth­ers for the fail­ure of the mil­i­tary high com­mand at Pearl Har­bor.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 1–5.

2. Next, we chron­i­cle Major Hen­ry Clausen’s pouch fea­tur­ing a mag­ne­sium bomb to car­ry the decrypt­ed mes­sages from the Japan­ese Pur­ple Code (a diplo­mat­ic code that was bro­ken by U.S. intel­li­gence per­son­nel).

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 33–34.

3. We then high­light the secure office in which Hen­ry C. Clausen worked.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 24.

The Ari­zon­a’s for­ward mag­a­zines explode; 07/12/1941.
Pho­to Cred­it: Wikipedia

4. Next, we note the Army Board­’s self-serv­ing scape­goat­ing of Chief-of-Staff Mar­shall.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 58.

5. Three of the offi­cers on the Army Board had been demot­ed by Gen­er­al Mar­shall!

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 25–26.

6. Among the shills attack­ing FDR was GOP Sen­a­tor (from Michi­gan) Homer Fer­gu­son, exposed as a pro­pa­gan­diz­ing fool by Major Clausen.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 32.

7. 1944 GOP Pres­i­den­tial Can­di­date Thomas Dewey was among those who point­ed the accus­ing fin­ger at FDR for delib­er­ate­ly allow­ing the attack to pro­ceed.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 23.

8. ” . . . . The pri­ma­ry duty of Short and Kim­mel was to pro­tect the fleet. This was made clear by the Sec­re­tary of the Navy, Frank Knox, who wrote a let­ter to his coun­ter­part, the Sec­re­tary of War, Hen­ry Stim­son, on Jan­u­ary 24, 1941, which said: ‘If war even­tu­ates with Japan, it is believed eas­i­ly pos­si­ble that hos­til­i­ties would be ini­ti­at­ed by a sur­prise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Har­bor. The dan­gers envis­aged, in order of their impor­tance and prob­a­bil­i­ty, are con­sid­ered to be (1) air bomb­ing attack, (2) air tor­pe­do plane attack, (3) sab­o­tage, (4) sub­ma­rine attack . . . .’ ”

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 229.

9. ” . . . . On Novem­ber 27, 1941, both the Navy and the Army sent spe­cial warn­ings of war to their respec­tive com­man­ders at Pearl Har­bor. The dis­patch sent by the Chief of Naval Oper­a­tions to Kim­mel began with the fate­ful words ‘THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING . . . . ’ The mes­sage also instruct­ed Kim­mel to inform Short of the warn­ing, and Short acknowl­edged, after the Japan­ese attack, that he had, in fact, seen that mes­sage. . . .”

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 85–86.

10. ” . . . . These last three mes­sages were of extreme sig­nif­i­cance. When a nation pre­pares to launch an attack and go to war, one of the most indis­pens­able steps it takes to make sure that its codes and code machines can­not be cap­tured by the ene­my . . . . Wash­ing­ton knew from read­ing these mes­sages that war would have to break out, with Japan attack­ing some­where in the Pacif­ic. There­fore, the Navy in Wash­ing­ton alert­ed Kim­mel on Decem­ber 3 by send­ing two advi­so­ry mes­sages that para­phrased the inter­cepts . . . . War had to fol­low; it was inevitable. . . .” 

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 68–70.

11. Speak­ing of the break­ing of the codes and the alert sent to Kim­mel, GOP shill Fer­gu­son said ” . . . . ‘But that was nev­er sent to Kim­mel and Short, was it?’ ‘It cer­tain­ly was,’ I [Clausen] replied. I had him stone cold dead. . . .”

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 260–261.

12. The Hawai­ian news­pa­pers had ample warn­ing of the poten­tial attacks to come.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; pp. 155–156.

13. FDR knew that the inter­cept­ed mes­sages meant that war was inevitable.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 195.

14. Churchill and British intel­li­gence knew that the inter­cepts meant that war was com­ing and alert­ed the U.S.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 44.

15a. We note the par­tic­i­pa­tion of the late Colonel Har­ry Beckhough–one of the Bletch­ley Park codebreakers–on Mr. Emory’s web­site.

@Harry Beck­hough–

Once again, it is deeply grat­i­fy­ing to see one of the heroes of Bletch­ley Park using this web­site and con­tin­u­ing the strug­gle against fas­cism.

In a sup­ple­men­tal com­ment, per­haps you could pro­vide inter­est­ed readers/listeners with infor­ma­tion about order­ing your books.

In addi­tion, I, too, have been warn­ing about this and pre­dict­ing that the seeds sown in the lat­ter stages of the war and dur­ing the post­war peri­od would blos­som anew.

Those seeds are now sprout­ing. We must all be “con­stant gar­den­ers,” pulling the weeds wher­ev­er we find them.

Best,

Dave Emory

15b. 

Har­ry Beck­hough
harry.beckhough@gmail.com
83.216.149.234
all detailed in my books “Germany’s Four Reichs” 2002/3 and sequel “Germany’s FOURTH Reich” 2007/8 with accu­rate fore­casts now com­ing true

16. “A per­son­al appre­ci­a­tion of the life of Har­ry Beck­hough: how I will remem­ber prob­a­bly the most remark­able man I ever met” by Nigel Ker­ton; Marl­bor­ough News; 03/17/2015.

. . . . This cheery cen­te­nar­i­an could well have writ­ten his own epi­taph in the title of his auto­bi­og­ra­phy Thinker, Tai­lor, Sol­dier, Spy – a play on the words of the children’s pud­ding game with cher­ry or prune stones!

He was a thinker, a life­long philoso­pher; a tai­lor who start­ed his own cloth­ing com­pa­nies includ­ing the famous Dou­ble 2 shirt brand; a sol­dier who fought through World War Two with the Eighth Army achiev­ing the rank of colonel; and a spy because he was invit­ed to join Britain’s code-crack­ing team at Bletch­ley Park whose work in break­ing ene­my codes was cred­it­ed with end­ing the 1939–45 war years ear­li­er than it might have dragged on. . . .

16. The next two items dis­cuss the U.S.S. Antares, the destroy­er U.S.S. Ward and the warn­ing they pro­vid­ed to Admi­ral Kimmel–to no avail.

“U.S.S. Antares”; wikipedia.org

. . . . On 7 Decem­ber 1941, Antares stood toward the entrance to Pearl Har­bor at 06:30 with a 500 long tons (510 t) steel barge in tow, hav­ing arrived from Can­ton and Palmyra and expect­ing to trans­fer the barge to a tug and then pro­ceed into Pearl. Not sight­ing the tug at the appoint­ed time, Antares altered course, turn­ing slow­ly to the east, when her watch sud­den­ly spot­ted a sus­pi­cious object about 1,500 yd (1,400 m) on the aux­il­iary’s star­board quar­ter. Antares noti­fied the destroy­er Ward, on patrol off the har­bor entrance, and the lat­ter altered course toward the object which proved to be a midget sub­ma­rine. A PBY Catali­na from Patrol Squadron 14 showed up almost simul­ta­ne­ous­ly and dropped smoke floats in the vicin­i­ty; mean­while, Ward went to gen­er­al quar­ters and attacked, sink­ing the intrud­er. . . .

17. “U.S.S. Ward; wikipedia.org

. . . . Pearl Har­bor

On the morn­ing of 7 Decem­ber 1941, under the com­mand of LCDR William W. Out­er­bridgeWard was con­duct­ing a pre­cau­tion­ary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Har­bor when she was informed at 03:57 by visu­al sig­nals from the coastal minesweep­er Con­dor of a periscope sight­ing, where­upon Ward began search­ing for the con­tact.[4] At about 06:37, she sight­ed a periscope appar­ent­ly tail­ing the car­go ship Antares where­upon she attacked the tar­get.[4] Though uncon­firmed at the time, her guns holed a Japan­ese Ko-hyote­ki-class, two-man midget sub­ma­rine. The death of its two-man crew was the first Amer­i­can-caused casu­al­ties in the Pacif­ic The­atre of World War II, occur­ring a few hours before Japan­ese car­ri­er air­craft attacked Pearl Har­bor. The sub­ma­rine was attempt­ing to enter the har­bor by fol­low­ing Antares through the anti­sub­ma­rine nets at the har­bor entrance. By enter­ing ter­ri­to­r­i­al waters of a neu­tral coun­try with­out sig­nalling any intent to stop, the sub­ma­rine was not enti­tled to “inno­cent pas­sage” pro­tec­tions and the neu­tral par­ty had a right to use what­ev­er means to pro­tect its ter­ri­to­ry.[cita­tion need­ed] Ward fired sev­er­al rounds from its main guns, hit­ting the con­ning tow­er of the sub­ma­rine, and also dropped sev­er­al depth charges dur­ing the attack. . . .

18. A piv­otal role in the attack on Pearl Har­bor was played by Gen­er­al Minoru Gen­da, the even­tu­al head of the Japan­ese Air Self-Defense Force, and the recip­i­ent of a medal from the U.S. Air Force.

“Minoru Gen­da;” wikipedia.org.

Gen­er­al Minoru Gen­da (源田 実, Gen­da Minoru, 16 August 1904 – 15 August 1989) was a Impe­r­i­al Japan­ese Navy flight offi­cer, JASDF gen­er­al and politi­cian. He is best known for help­ing to plan the attack on Pearl Har­bor. After the war he became the third Chief of Staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. . . .

. . . . On his return to Japan, he was assigned to the First Car­ri­er Divi­sion and met with Yamamo­to in ear­ly Feb­ru­ary 1941, dur­ing which time Yamamo­to pre­sent­ed some ideas for attack­ing the U.S. Pacif­ic Fleet. Gen­da warmed to his ideas.[6] Gen­da had pre­vi­ous­ly con­sid­ered an attack on Pearl Har­bor in 1934 and had dis­cussed the pos­si­bil­i­ty then with Tak­i­jirō Onishi. Gen­da empha­sized to Yamamo­to that “secre­cy is the keynote and sur­prise the all-impor­tant fac­tor.”[7] Gen­da felt that the task was “dif­fi­cult, but not impos­si­ble”[8] and began work­ing on the details of the plan. Gen­da favored a three wave attack using six air­craft car­ri­ers for a suc­cess­ful air strike.[9] Gen­da was respon­si­ble for much of the train­ing, espe­cial­ly in the new tac­tics of shal­low-water tor­pe­do use, effec­tive use of lev­el-bomb­ing by tac­ti­cal air­craft, and coor­di­nat­ing sev­er­al air­craft car­ri­ers simul­ta­ne­ous­ly. He played a key role in per­suad­ing IJN lead­ers to name Mit­suo Fuchi­da, his class­mate at the Japan­ese Naval Acad­e­my, as the leader of the air attack.[10] . . . .

. . . . After the estab­lish­ment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in 1954, Gen­da was com­mis­sioned into the Japan Air Self-Defense Force as a Major Gen­er­al. He served as its Chief of Staff from 1959 to 1962.[15][16] As com­man­der of the Air Self-Defense Force, Gen­da suc­cess­ful­ly pushed for the acqui­si­tion of the F‑104 Starfight­er, of which Japan bought 230. This became part of the Lock­heed bribery scan­dals, as evi­dence emerged that Lock­heed had paid him a bribe.[17] Gen­da vis­it­ed Lock­heed’s head­quar­ters in Cal­i­for­nia and at his own request per­son­al­ly flew a Starfight­er. He was award­ed the Legion of Mer­it by the Unit­ed States Air Force a few months lat­er.[18]

After retir­ing from the mil­i­tary in 1962, he ran for and was elect­ed to the upper house of Japan’s leg­is­la­ture, the House of Coun­cil­lors, as a mem­ber of the Sato Fac­tion with­in the Lib­er­al Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty. He was the first of sev­er­al for­mer SDF offi­cers who entered pol­i­tics under the aus­pices of the Sato Fac­tion, most­ly at the far right end of the Japan­ese polit­i­cal spec­trum. He remained influ­en­tial in pol­i­tics for more than 20 years, as a lead­ing mem­ber of the Defense Divi­sion of the LDP’s Pol­i­cy Affairs Research Coun­cil, often rep­re­sent­ing the hard­line nation­al­ist posi­tion advo­cat­ing abro­ga­tion or cur­tail­ment of Arti­cle 9 of the post­war Japan­ese Con­sti­tu­tion and open remil­i­ta­riza­tion of the armed forces. . . .

19. We chron­i­cle the leak of the U.S. Navy’s code-break­ing secret to the Japan­ese via the Chica­go Tri­bune and its FDR-hat­ing pub­lish­er Robert McCormick.

“Echoes From a Past Leak Probe” by Jess Bravin; Wall Street Jour­nal; 8/7/2013.

New­ly released doc­u­ments pro­vide a road map of how the gov­ern­ment tried to mount a no-holds-barred legal attack against jour­nal­ists sus­pect­ed of leak­ing mil­i­tary secrets.

The Jus­tice Depart­men­t’s Office of Legal Coun­sel, which advis­es the exec­u­tive branch on the extent of its own pow­ers, pub­lished in late July a selec­tion of pre­vi­ous­ly secret legal opin­ions span­ning from 1933 to 1977. Among them were mem­os about a June 7, 1942, scoop in the Chica­go Tri­bune by cor­re­spon­dent Stan­ley John­ston, who saw a naval intel­li­gence file while trav­el­ing with the Pacif­ic Fleet.

Pen­ta­gon offi­cials were stunned by the head­line, “U.S. Navy Knew in Advance All About Jap Fleet,” when they saw the sto­ry, which also ran in the Wash­ing­ton Times-Her­ald. The arti­cle all but revealed one of the war’s great­est secrets: that the U.S. had cracked the Japan­ese navy’s code. It report­ed that Japan­ese fleet strength “was well known in Amer­i­can naval cir­cles,” that the U.S. Navy knew the Japan­ese were like­ly to stage a feint against the Aleut­ian Islands, and that “the advance infor­ma­tion enabled the Amer­i­can Navy to make full use of air attacks on the approach­ing Japan­ese ships.”
Navy Sec­re­tary Frank Knox wrote to Attor­ney Gen­er­al Fran­cis Bid­dle, demand­ing indict­ments. The head­line alone “dis­clos­es secret and con­fi­den­tial infor­ma­tion to the detri­ment of our nation­al defense,” Mr. Knox wrote. Mr. Bid­dle then asked staff for advice, result­ing in the just-released mem­os. . . .

. . . . The mem­os are notice­ably silent on one pos­si­bly per­ti­nent point: Tri­bune’s pub­lish­er, Col. Robert R. McCormick, was an incen­di­ary antag­o­nist of the New Deal and, before Pearl Har­bor at least, a vocif­er­ous oppo­nent of inter­ven­tion in World War II. . . .

20. The Rape of Nanking–the sub­ject of Iris Chang’s best-sell­ing, non­fic­tion book, saw the begin­ning of the Gold­en Lily oper­a­tion. Note that Prince Take­da, was in charge of Gold­en Lily oper­a­tions in the Philip­pines, as well as Prince Chichibu (in over­all charge of Gold­en Lily).

 Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; pp. 37–39.

. . . . In the Rape of Nanking that fol­lowed, some 300,000 defense­less civil­ians were slain by Japan­ese troops, between 20,000 and 80,000 women of all ages were raped repeat­ed­ly, includ­ing chil­dren, ado­les­cent girls, and grand­moth­ers, many of them dis­em­bow­eled in the process. Men, women and chil­dren were sub­ject­ed to acts of such bar­barism that the world recoiled in hor­ror. Thou­sands of men were roped togeth­er and machine-gunned, or doused with gaso­line and set afire. Oth­ers were used for bay­o­net prac­tice, or to prac­tice behead­ing, in a sport­ing com­pe­ti­tion to see which offi­cer could behead the great­est num­ber that day. Weeks passed while atroc­i­ties con­tin­ued, streets and alleys piled high with corpses. Unlike pre­vi­ous mass atroc­i­ties, done out of sight, these were wit­nessed by hun­dreds of West­ern­ers includ­ing diplo­mats, doc­tors and mis­sion­ar­ies, some of whom smug­gled out pho­to­graph­ic evi­dence.

It was at this point that Gold­en Lily came into exis­tence.

When the Japan­ese Army swarmed down the Chi­na Coast in 1937, crossed the Yangtze, and moved west­ward to Nanking, so many units were involved across such a broad front that there was dan­ger of Japan’s rul­ing elite los­ing con­trol of the finan­cial side of con­quest, as rival com­man­ders com­pet­ed for spoils. How could you keep army or navy offi­cers from side-track­ing gold bul­lion and price­less art works, not to men­tion small­er scale theft by sol­diers? At the same time, groups of yakuza were mov­ing through new­ly occu­pied areas, con­duct­ing their own reign of ter­ror. To keep every­thing under strict con­trol at the high­est lev­el, the Impe­r­i­al Gen­er­al Head­quar­ters cre­at­ed Gold­en Lily (kin no yuri) named after one of Hirohito’s poems. This was to be a palace orga­ni­za­tion of Japan’s top finan­cial minds and spe­cial­ists in all forms of trea­sure includ­ing cul­tur­al and reli­gious antiq­ui­ties, sup­port­ed by accoun­tants, book­keep­ers, ship­ping experts, and units of the army and navy, all over­seen by princes of the blood. When Chi­na was milked by Gold­en Lily, the army would hold the cow, while princes skimmed the cream. This orga­ni­za­tion was put direct­ly under the com­mand of the emperor’s broth­er, Prince Chichibu. We know the date because the Impe­r­i­al Gen­er­al Head­quar­ters itself was only set up in the impe­r­i­al palace in Tokyo in Novem­ber 1937, just as the Rape of Nanking was com­menc­ing. . . . The Impe­r­i­al Army already had a num­ber of Spe­cial Ser­vice Units, among them intel­li­gence teams spe­cial­iz­ing in dif­fer­ent kinds of cul­tur­al and finan­cial espi­onage, and secret ser­vice agents like Gen­er­al Doi­hara, out­side the ordi­nary com­mand struc­ture. These were reas­signed to Gold­en Lily, giv­ing it the resources need­ed to find trea­sure of all kinds, from the sub­lime to the most pro­sa­ic.

In Nanking, the first wave of Gold­en Lily helpers were kem­peitai [the Japan­ese intel­li­gence ser­vice]. Spe­cial kem­peitai units moved through the city seiz­ing all gov­ern­ment assets, blow­ing open bank vaults, break­ing into and emp­ty­ing homes of wealthy fam­i­lies of what­ev­er gold, gem­stones, jew­el­ry, art­works, and cur­ren­cy could be found. Nanking had been rich for over a thou­sand years. Many wealthy and promi­nent Chi­nese had man­sions in town, and estates in the sur­round­ing coun­try­side. This was not the only time Nanking was ran­sacked by con­querors, but it was by far the most delib­er­ate, metic­u­lous, and sys­tem­at­ic. At least 6,ooo met­ric tons of gold are report­ed to have been amassed by the kem­peitai dur­ing this first pass. His­tor­i­cal research into loot­ing shows that what is offi­cial­ly report­ed typ­i­cal­ly is only a tiny frac­tion of what is actu­al­ly stolen. Also loot­ed were many of the small bis­cuit bars that indi­vid­ual Chi­nese pre­fer to hoard, along with small plat­inum ingots, dia­monds, rubies and sap­phires, small works of art, and antiq­ui­ties. These were tak­en from pri­vate homes and from tombs van­dal­ized by the army in the coun­try­side. Remorse­less­ly thor­ough, the Japan­ese ham­mered the teeth out of corpses to extract gold fill­ings. . . .

. . . . A num­ber of oth­er princes joined Gold­en Lily at this stage, spend­ing the war enrich­ing Japan, rather than par­tic­i­pat­ing in less glam­orous and dan­ger­ous com­bat assign­ments. Aside from Prince Asa­ka [the Emperor’s uncle and in charge of the Rape of Nanking–D.E.], we know Prince Chichibu and Prince Take­da were at Nanking because both lat­er con­fid­ed to friends that they had hor­rif­ic night­mares from wit­ness­ing atroc­i­ties. . . .

 

21. The break­ing of the Japan­ese code informed the U.S. of the nature of the car­go of their ships, pos­si­bly inform­ing today of the posi­tion of sunken Gold­en Lily trea­sure.

Pearl Har­bor: Final Judge­ment by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; Leo Coop­er [HC], Lon­don; Copy­right 1992 & 1993 by Hen­ry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee; ISBN 0850523907; p. 48.

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