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COMMENT: In the rush to judgement about the alleged chemical weapons attack by the Assad government in Syria, a number of important points have been eclipsed:
- Winning the war via conventional means, Assad had no motive to launch a chemical attack, inviting a military response by the U.S. and the West.
- Shortly before the alleged chemical warfare attack, Trump had indicated that he wished to terminate the U.S. military mission in Syria, bringing home the roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel.
- The alleged chemical weapons attack and the response was foreshadowed by Russian chief-of-staff Valery Gerasimov a month before the alleged attack!
- Veteran journalist Robert Fisk has written in The London Independent that there was no chemical weapons attack at all. Rather, Fisk wrote, a strong wind kicked up a dust storm in the ruins of the bombed city and that cloud caused respiratory problems in refugees sheltering in underground clinics. ” . . . . A few days ago, Fisk visited the Syrian town of Douma and spoke to a doctor, who works in a subterranean clinic, in which victims of the alleged April 7th gas attack were being treated. The doctor explained that on that day a strong wind blew a huge dust cloud into the city’s destroyed basements and cellars where numerous people were seeking refuge. Many were therefore suffering from acute oxygen loss and came for treatment to his clinic. ‘Then someone at the door, a ‘White Helmet,’ shouted ‘Gas!,’ and a panic began.’ This can be seen on a video being used in the West as ‘proof’ for the use of poison-gas.[1] . . . ”
- The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzah, destroyed in the Western retaliatory strike, does not appear to have been a chemical weapons production facility at all: ” . . . . It has also become known that the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzah, which was destroyed during Saturday’s air strikes, had been inspected last November by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). According to the OPCW, the SSRC had not served for research on chemical weapons, as has been alleged to justify the bombings. On the contrary, the Organization found no suspicious substances, nor did it observe any suspicious activities, according to its report that was published on March 23 — three weeks before the bombing.[2] . . . .”
- The White Helmets–at the center of the chemical weapons attack charges–have been financed by elements of Western intelligence: ” . . . . Reporter and author Max Blumenthal has tracked the role of the White Helmets in the Syrian conflict. He reported that the White Helmets were created in Turkey by James Le Mesurier, a former British MI5 agent. The group has received at least $55 million from the British Foreign Office and $23 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as millions from the Kingdom of Qatar, which has backed a variety of extremist groups in Syria including Al Qaeda. . . .”
1. “In the Wake of the Bombs;” German Foreign Policy; 4/18/2018.
Douma, April 7, 2018
. . . . A report by the renowned British Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk, published in London’s daily “The Independent,” raises questions about the legitimacy of Saturday’s air strikes. A few days ago, Fisk visited the Syrian town of Douma and spoke to a doctor, who works in a subterranean clinic, in which victims of the alleged April 7th gas attack were being treated. The doctor explained that on that day a strong wind blew a huge dust cloud into the city’s destroyed basements and cellars where numerous people were seeking refuge. Many were therefore suffering from acute oxygen loss and came for treatment to his clinic. “Then someone at the door, a ‘White Helmet,’ shouted ‘Gas!,’ and a panic began.” This can be seen on a video being used in the West as “proof” for the use of poison-gas.[1] The “White Helmets,” a “civil defense organization” of Syrian insurgents are being financed to a large degree by the British government.
No Suspicious Activities
It has also become known that the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzah, which was destroyed during Saturday’s air strikes, had been inspected last November by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). According to the OPCW, the SSRC had not served for research on chemical weapons, as has been alleged to justify the bombings. On the contrary, the Organization found no suspicious substances, nor did it observe any suspicious activities, according to its report that was published on March 23 — three weeks before the bombing.[2] . . . .
. . . . [1] Robert Fisk: The search for truth in the rubble of Douma – and one doctor’s doubts over the chemical attack. independent.co.uk 17.04.2018.
[2] Note by the Director-General: Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme. OPCW Executive Council. EC-88/DG.1. 23 March 2018. . . .
2. “Beware of White Helmets Bearing News” by Ann Wright; Consortium News; 4/21/2018.
. . . . Reporter and author Max Blumenthal has tracked the role of the White Helmets in the Syrian conflict. He reported that the White Helmets were created in Turkey by James Le Mesurier, a former British MI5 agent. The group has received at least $55 million from the British Foreign Office and $23 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as millions from the Kingdom of Qatar, which has backed a variety of extremist groups in Syria including Al Qaeda.
Blumenthal writes, “When Defense Secretary James Mattis cited ‘social media’ in place of scientific evidence of a chemical attack in Duma, he was referring to video shot by members of the White Helmets. Similarly, when State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert sought to explain why the US bombed Syria before inspectors from the OPCW could produce a report from the ground, she claimed, ‘We have our own intelligence.’ With little else to offer, she was likely referring to social media material published by members of the White Helmets.” . . . .
3. “Taking the World to the Brink” by Rick Sterling; Consortium News; 4/10/2018.
. . . . As reported at Tass, the Chief of Russia’s General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, predicted the alleged use of chemicals almost a month ago. The report from March 13 says, “Russia has hard facts about preparations for staging the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the government forces. After the provocation, the US plans to accuse Syria’s government forces of using chemical weapons … furnish the so-called ‘evidence’ … and Washington plans to deliver a missile and bomb strike against Damascus’ government districts.” . . . .
Here’s a set of articles that should raise an eyebrow or two regarding evidence of the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma. In addition to the articles by Robert Fisk and Rick Sterling referenced in the OP, we’re also going to look at an important piece by Max Blumenthal about the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), a group that, like the White Helmets, has close ties to both neoconservative forces is DC and Islamist forces within the rebellion pushing for regime change in Syria. As we’ll see, much of the initial evidence used to conclude a chemical attack took place was provided by SAMS and the White Helmets:
So as we should expect at this point, there were some significant gaps in the actual evidence. For instance, as we’re going to see in the first article, one reason the US air strikes against the Syrian government was less extensive than many in the West were expecting and demanding is that the US didn’t actually have conclusive evidence chemical weapons were used. And that lack of certainty appeared to play a major role in choosing the scope of the attack (relatively limited) and taking extra precautions to ensure no Russian forces were potentially going to be hit.
Yes, the US government is stating with certainty that chlorine gas was used, but the government is also not at all certain sarin gas was used. And as the first article makes clear, the US did receive physical samples it was told was from Douma, but there was no chain of custody for those sample and no access was given to the site. The physical samples were all given by allies operating in the area do to that lack of access and therefore there is no chain of custody and the US had to trust those allies operating in the area.
And as we’re going to see in the fifth and final article excerpt, that’s probably questionably placed trust in those allies on the ground because much of the evidence appears to have come from the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS). And SAMS isn’t just a big recipient of USAID funds (90 percent of its budget is from USAID at this point). SAMS is also a strong advocate for regime change, with ties to US lobbying efforts to see the US to militarily commit to overthrowing the Assad regime and has close ties to the Islamist extremist/al Qaeda element of the Syrian rebels. So the US government’s evidence was based on evidence provided by a pro-regime-change al Qaeda-friendly group with ties to al Qaeda. Hence the chain of custody issues.
And as we’re going to see in the second article excerpt, a representative from SAMS was expressing skepticism that any meaningful evidence for what was actually used in the attack will probably never come out because the vast majority of the witnesses left Douma for the al Nusra-controlled city of Idlib as part of the agreement with the Syrian government that the rebels and their supporters could leave for Idlib on buses.
As we’re also going to see in the second article excerpt, part of the reason there is so much suspicion that it was a chlorine and sarin attack is that people reported a heavy smell of chlorine but the symptoms were unusual for a chlorine attack and appeared to be consistent with some sort of nerve agent and the overall deadliness of the attack was much more severe than a chlorine attack. But as the second article points out, the most compelling evidence that a nerve agent was used come from video. Specifically, the images of dead bodies with foaming mouths.
And as the second article also points out, there were actually two separate alleged chemical attacks and they were qualitatively different. The first alleged chlorine attack happened at about 4 PM. But it was a second attack, several hours later, that resulted in the large numbers of people reporting unusual symptoms never seen before and not associated with chlorine. It’s only during that second attack that sarin or some other nerve agent is suspected and the nerve agent is suspected because the symptoms reported are not at all consistent with a chlorine-only attack. In other words, the videos the world has seen of dead bodies with foaming mouths is not consistent with a chlorine-only chemical attack. That’s why there is so much suspicion that sarin or another nerve agent was used.
But when you read the statement from the US intelligence assessment in the first article excerpt about the evidence the US based the missile strike on, it only mentions visual evidence and eyewitness reports. Physical evidence of a nerve agent is not cited: “this conclusion is based on descriptions of the attack in multiple media sources, the reported symptoms experienced by victims, videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack, and reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack. A significant body of information points to the regime using chlorine in its bombardment of Duma, while some additional information points to the regime also using the nerve agent sarin.”
So that evidence described in the US intelligence assessment statement was:
1. Descriptions of the attack in multiple media sources.
2. The reported symptoms experienced by victims.
3. Videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack.
4. Reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack.
Media reports, videos and “reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack.” No mention of analysis of physical specimens, which makes sense given chain of custody issue.
And if you think about it, video evidence and media reports also suffer from a chain of custody issue when we’re talking about reports from areas where the only people allowed to give the reports are more or less on the same side as the Islamist/al Qaeda factions of Syrian rebels or at risk of reprisals if they don’t follow orders. After all, the same skepticism that applies to local witnesses who potentially face reprisals from the Syrian government should most assuredly apply to the people who were, at the time of the attack, at risk of reprisals from the Islamist extremist rebels.
At the same time, the “reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack” the US intelligence assessment relied might be just that and indicate a real military attack by the Syrian government. As we’re going to see the third article, a report by Robert Fisk from Douma, the evidence and eyewitness reports do point towards a real Syrian helicopter bombing attack in Douma. But the people on the ground he talked to suggest what actually happened was a non-chemical bombing that immersed the people in the immediate surrounding in a deadly cloud of particles. In other words, under this scenario the video evidence of people choking is real. The people really did choke to death and respond to a chemical assault on their bodies. But that chemical assault was an indirect consequence of a non-chemical bomb explosion creating a deadly cloud. So the “reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack” might be legitimate intelligence indicating a Syrian government attack but not necessarily a chemical weapons attack.
Additionally, as we’re also going to see in the first article, one of the admissions the US has made is that, while witnesses reported seeing at least one helicopter overhead at the time of the Syrian attack, intelligence officials acknowledge that they didn’t have a full picture of the event, which would have included intercepts of conversations and verified paths that helicopters flew. We are told that this is because the US did not readily have electronic intelligence showing the track of the helicopters, as it would with fixed-wing jets. So the nature of that “reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack” remains ambiguous.
Adding to the confusion around this, as we’re going to see in the fourth article excerpt, is that the Chief of Russia’s General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, publicly stated on March 13th that, “Russia has hard facts about preparations for staging the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the government forces. After the provocation, the US plans to accuse Syria’s government forces of using chemical weapons … furnish the so-called ‘evidence’ … and Washington plans to deliver a missile and bomb strike against Damascus’ government districts.”
Now, obviously we have to take such predictions from the Russian government with a grain of salt. Who knows if there really was “hard facts about preparations”. But when you consider that the dominant rebel forces in Douma, Jaish el-Islam (the Army of Islam), are indeed hard core Islamist extremists who no one should trust, it’s hard to ignore the reality that this is the type of group that is more than willing to do exactly what the Russian government predicted slaughter innocent civilians if that helps them achieve their goals or just faking evidence if need be. It’s not as if this is the first time we’ve have an alleged chemical weapons attack on an area controlled by jihadists who are more than willing to slaughter civilians.
It’s one of the meta-issues with the Syrian conflict and war in general: the stakes are so high it’s hard to assume any side is above reproach. That’s why establishing conclusive evidence of a chemical attack is so important. And as the first article makes like, that conclusive evidence was not actually available when Trump ordered those airstrikes:
“This entire intelligence assessment formed the backbone of Friday’s White House statement, which said in part, “this conclusion is based on descriptions of the attack in multiple media sources, the reported symptoms experienced by victims, videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack, and reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack. A significant body of information points to the regime using chlorine in its bombardment of Duma, while some additional information points to the regime also using the nerve agent sarin.””
And that’s how the US government characterized its own intelligence assessment: It was primarily based on media reports of the symptoms. Symptoms that, as we’ll see in the following article, were unprecedented for a chlorine-only attack, hence the suspicion of a nerve agent.
The evidence also includes witness reports of at least one helicopter overhead, but it doesn’t appear to include intercepted conversations and verified paths. In other words, it’s also based on eye witness reports:
And while the US did have “an analysis of test samples that suggested the presence of chlorine and sarin,” these samples were not obtained directly and did not have a strict chain of custody. So the physical samples that were smuggled out could have come from anywhere:
Instead of physical evidence, the conclusion of chlorine and sarin is based on video evidence:
And based on that video evidence and the eyewitness testimonies the US has concluded with “absolute confidence” that some sort of chemical attack took place, and is “very confident” chlorine was used. But far less confident about sarin:
Recall that, as we’ll see in the next article, the rush of victims from the second attack did not exhibit symptoms or a level of lethality consistent with a chlorine-only attack.
And at the time of this report, there was no US update on the testing of the physical samples. Which appears to be a way of indicating that the videos and eye witness statements are primary evidence at this point:
And it’s critical to keep in mind that this ambiguity played a big role in why the US didn’t conduct a more extensive retaliatory bombing of Damascus:
This is a critical point because there is more or less a permanent din of advocacy for a deeper US military involvement in Syria and when President Trump doesn’t meet those expectations it’s widely assumed that it’s because he’s Putin’s puppet, which is a dangerously provocative assumption in this case.
Ok, now let’s take a look at the second article excerpt from just a few days after the attack. As the article also notes in an interview with a member from Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), he doubted whether any meaningful evidence would remain (recall that, as we’ll see if the fifth article below, SAMS is both heavily funded by USAID and a strong advocate of US military intervention in Syria). He said local staffers are afraid to give testimony and, “in the current situation,” an investigation “is too hard.” He also noted that many of the activists, medical staffers and rescue workers with information about the attacks have since scattered, with many leaving Douma on buses headed north to rebel-held territory under the terms of the surrender deal reached Sunday between the rebels and the Russians. So a large portion of the eye witnesses are either allied with the rebels or remain under their control after leaving Douma as part of the agreement with the Syrian government.
As the article also notes, there were two separate assumed chemical attacks. One alleged chemical weapons bomb attack at 4 PM that witnesses believe was chlorine only — and without reports of heavy casualties — and a second far more lethal attack a few hours later that with symptoms inconsistent with chlorine-only attacks:
“But when gasping, trembling people, some of them foaming at the mouth, began streaming into one of the town’s few functioning clinics that evening, staff instantly knew something was different. The victims emitted a powerful smell of chlorine, but there were more people affected than in previous chlorine attacks, said Mohammed Marhoum, a medical worker. He saw around 70 and said six of them died.”
And that’s the key part of the eye-witness testimony that has led many to conclude that sarin or some sort of nerve agent was used: witnesses claim the victims emitted a powerful smell of chorine, but this was far more deadly than previous chlorine attacks:
“The look of the bodies “is pretty much consistent with a nerve-agent-type exposure,” said Alastair W.M. Hay, a professor of toxicology at Leeds University who has been studying the human impact of chemical weapons since Saddam Hussein’s gas attack on Iraqi Kurds in the town of Halabja in 1989. “That’s suggestive of something that was very toxic, and people have pretty much died where they were when they inhaled the agent. They’ve just dropped dead.””
They just dropped dead. But it sounds like people didn’t start dropping dead until the second attack. There were reports of a chlorine bomb several hours earlier, but without the subsequent reports of heavy casualties:
And the groups that are providing these reports from on the ground appear to be the Syrian American Medical Socity (SAMS) and the White Helmets. But as Mohamad Katoub of the Syrian American Medical Society laments, he was doubtful that any meaningful evidence would remain and many of the witnesses with information had already fled to Idlib:
Understandably, many of the residents who remain in Douma fear reprisals if they talk now that the area is under Syrian government and Russian control. Of course, the same logic applies to those who were there when the rebels still controlled the area:
That leaves the video evidence as the strongest evidence of what happened. Video evidence that includes local activists reports the small of chlorine, but also video evidence that shows symptoms and a degree of lethality never before seen with chlorine attacks:
And it’s that video of symptoms not consistent with chlorine that forms the basis for the suspicion of some other nerve agent being used in the second 7:30 PM attack. And according to one chemical weapons expert, a combination of chlorine plus sarin in a single bomb has never been seen before and would be technically difficult, leading to speculation that two separate bombs were dropped. One with chlorine and one with sarin:
And that all highlights the extremely ambiguous nature of this attack: there is evidence, but it appears to be entirely video and eye witness evidence and that evidence is essentially unprecedented. It’s eye witnesses claiming to smell chlorine while they show bodies exhibiting the symptoms of a nerve agent.
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So if we assume these videos haven’t been heavily staged somehow, is some sort of sarin + chlorine dual attack the only plausible explanation what what was captured on video? Well, as we’re going to see in the following on the ground report by Robert Fisk, there might be another explanation. According to Dr Assim Rahaibani — a doctor in Douma who, it’s important to note, does not appear to be a fan of the local rebels who until recently controlled Douma — the evening of the attacks also included high winds. And those winds, when combined with the heavy government bombing, created a dust storm that effectively suffocated a large number of people living in underground shelters. Recall that the large numbers of dead found were indeed in the basements of buildings seeking shelter from the bombs.
As Dr Rahaibani describes it, “I was with my family in the basement of my home three hundred metres from here on the night but all the doctors know what happened. There was a lot of shelling [by government forces] and aircraft were always over Douma at night — but on this night, there was wind and huge dust clouds began to come into the basements and cellars where people lived. People began to arrive here suffering from hypoxia, oxygen loss. Then someone at the door, a ‘White Helmet’, shouted ‘Gas!”, and a panic began. People started throwing water over each other. Yes, the video was filmed here, it is genuine, but what you see are people suffering from hypoxia – not gas poisoning.”
Now, dust storms can indeed suffocate people. But in this case the people weren’t outside in a dust storm. They were in the basements of buildings and, according to Dr Rahaibani, the huge dust clouds began to come into the basements and cellars where people lived. So if a dust storm did indeed suffocate the people in the underground shelters we have to ask the question of whether or not a dust storm on the outside of an underground shelter could effectively suffocate the victims. And then there are the reports the victims who arrived at the hospitals exhibiting symptoms like foaming mouths and dilated pupils. Should we expect that from a dust storm? And where there reports a choking cloud from surviving eye witness? Those are the kinds of questions that would have to answered if the dust storm explanation is to be believed but that’s at least one explanation Fisk found during his report from Douma:
“War stories, however, have a habit of growing darker. For the same 58-year old senior Syrian doctor then adds something profoundly uncomfortable: the patients, he says, were overcome not by gas but by oxygen starvation in the rubbish-filled tunnels and basements in which they lived, on a night of wind and heavy shelling that stirred up a dust storm.”
That’s the explanation given by Dr Assim Rahaibani: It was death by oxygen starvation cause by high winds and heavy shelling. And that dust started seeping into the basements and cellars were people were living, effectively starving them of oxygen. A member of the White Helmets shouted “gas”, creating a panic, but it wasn’t poison gas but a lack of oxygen that killed the people. That’s the account Dr. Rahaibani relayed:
But as Fisk notes, Dr Rahaibani wasn’t an eye witness to this and also doesn’t appear to be a fan of Jaish el-Islam which is important to keep in mind:
“Which version of events are we to believe?” It’s the meta-question of the Syrian conflict for the outside world, which is why an understanding of the nature of different sides in this conflict is so important and why systematically ignoring the jihadist extremist nature of the dominant factions of the rebels is so outrageous.
And as Fisk also notes, it’s not just Dr Rahaibani who he ran into that questioned the gas attack. Many of the people he spoke to said they “never believed” it and assumed it was staged by Jaish el-Islam:
Now keep in mind that these are the people who chose not to leave for Idlib and presumably weren’t fans of the rebels. But that also highlights the fact that the jihadi forces operating in Syria really have been absolutely horrible and oppressive to the local civilians and a reminder of the character of these groups. It’s why staged attacks by the jihadists shouldn’t be ruled out.
As Fisk also observed, it appears that the White Helmets virtually all left Douma for the al Nusra stronghold of Idlib, highlighting the fact that the allegations of close ties between the White Helmets with jihadist militants and forces pushing for military regime change can’t be easily dismissed as Kremlin propaganda:
So that gives us a sense of one side of the story of what happened in Douma. It’s the story from the perspective of those who chose to stay in Douma instead of accepting to offer of safe transport to al Nusra-controlled Idlib, so it’s not particularly surprising that Fisk had such a hard time coming across people in Douma who were going to back up the ‘Syrian government chemical weapons attack’ version of events. But it’s not like we can just dismiss this version of events either simply because the people remaining in Douma tend not to support Jaish el-Islam, yet that’s largely what has happened thus far with the international community.
It’s also worth noting that the version of events put forward by Dr. Rahaibani, that it was all due to dust storm and the claims of a chemical attack are opportunism, is actually quite different from the alternate claim made by others in Douma and elsewhere that there was a chemical attack but it was a false flag carried out by Jaish el-Islam. The ‘fog of war’ is a disturbingly apt term for this situation.
It’s also important to recall what the White House told us the intelligence assessment was partially based on in the first article: :
“This entire intelligence assessment formed the backbone of Friday’s White House statement, which said in part, “this conclusion is based on descriptions of the attack in multiple media sources, the reported symptoms experienced by victims, videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack, and reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack. A significant body of information points to the regime using chlorine in its bombardment of Duma, while some additional information points to the regime also using the nerve agent sarin.””
“Videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack”. That was part of what the US intelligence assessment was based on. And that presumably includes the videos of two unexploded chemical weapon barrel bombs that were videoed in the following April 10th tweet by the White Helmets of a 38 second video from April 9 showing what appeared to be a chlorine canister:
So if Dr Rahaibani’s scenario of a suffocating dust storm, or any other scenario that didn’t involve the use of chemical weapons, is true, than we are clearly looking at manipulated video evidence.
Similarly, if chemical weapons were indeed used, we have to ask the question of who used them. Did the Syrian government actually use chemical weapons in the last phase for its siege on Douma (quite possibly the worst move it could have done) or did Jaish el-Islam or some other jihadist group opportunistically employ their own chemicals weapons for the purpose of provoking a response from the US and others?
Well, along those lines, the following article notes one of the other twists in this alleged chemical weapons attack: the Russian government claimed back in March that, “Russia has hard facts about preparations for staging the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the government forces. After the provocation, the US plans to accuse Syria’s government forces of using chemical weapons … furnish the so-called ‘evidence’ … and Washington plans to deliver a missile and bomb strike against Damascus’ government districts.”
Now, it’s obvious that the Russian government would have an incentive to make such a claim with or without any “hard facts” given the history alleged chemical weapons use in this conflict and the potential for military responses.
But it’s also pretty obvious that the jihadist rebels have both the means (i.e. the possession of chemical weapons) and the motive to carry out staged attacks as we’ve seen before.
And while the Russian government appeared to suggest the US government was part of orchestrating a hoax attack for the purpose of justifying air strikes against Damascus, it’s worth noting one of the important points in the following article: this alleged chemical attack on Douma and the alleged chemical attack in Idlib last year share something in common. They both took place shortly after the Trump administration expressed a desire to reduce the US’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.
On March 30, 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said U.S. policy was no longer focused on getting Assad out. Five days later the chemical incident at Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib happened. Then, on March 29 of this year, Trump declares that U.S. forces will withdraw from Syria “very soon.” And a little more than a week later we have this alleged chemical attack in Douma. In other words, both of those alleged chemical attack were happening in a context where the jihadist rebel factions alone had an incentive to actually carry out the attacks, which would predictably work to the benefit of those in the West advocating for a deeper military involvement.
And that’s why it’s not adequate to simply ask the question, “would the jihadist rebel factions actually attack their own local populations?” Because we should really be asking, “would the jihadist rebel factions actually attack their own local populations when faced with the prospect of the US pulling out of Syria?” And given the nature of these jihadist and the entire sordid history of these chemical attacks it seems like the obvious answer is, “yes, of course they would do that. We are talking about al Qaeda and other al Qaeda-like groups, after all.”
But the article makes another point that adds an additional context to this whole situation: Jaish el-Islam isn’t actually on good terms with al Nusra/al Qaeda at this point, and that was a big part of what was slowing down the evacuation of jihadist fighters from Douma after the Syrian government made the offer of giving them safe passage to Idlib. In other words, the offer of safe passage to Idlib wasn’t an offer to a safe destination for Jaish el-Islam.
And this conflict between Jaish el-Islam and al Nusra is a reminder of another key point that needs to be kept in mind: When we’re talking about governments that had an incentive to see a staged chemical attack, the Saudis are clearly at or near the top of the list. Jaish el-Islam was formed from merger of ~60 Islamist rebel groups with Saudi backing and was seen as a kind of ‘non-al Qaeda or ISIS’ rebranding of the Sunni extremist rebels factions. It’s supposed to be a militant jihadist force the international community will get behind. This is one of those jihadist groups operating in Syria: basically as crazy and vicious as al Qaeda, but marketed by its Gulf state backers as not al Qaeda and at war with al Qaeda and therefore supposedly acceptable. So the threat of sending Jaish el-Islam to al Nusra’s enclave in Idlib is potentially a much more significant event from a military standpoint than meets the eye.
In addition to conflicts with al Nusra, it’s also important to keep in mind that Jaish el-Isam’s founding leader was a Douma based cleric. Evacuating Douma is, for Jaish el-Islam, evacuating its home base, with the prospect of moving to its arch enemy’s current headquarters.
So while the Chief of Russia’s General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, suggested back in March that it had hard facts that there were preparations to stage an attack and the US was planning on using that as an excuse to bomb Damascus, don’t forget that the government with the biggest vested interest in the fate of Jaish el-Islam is the Saudi government:
“As reported at Tass, the Chief of Russia’s General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, predicted the alleged use of chemicals almost a month ago. The report from March 13 says, “Russia has hard facts about preparations for staging the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the government forces. After the provocation, the US plans to accuse Syria’s government forces of using chemical weapons … furnish the so-called ‘evidence’ … and Washington plans to deliver a missile and bomb strike against Damascus’ government districts.””
It’s quite a public statement from the Chief of Russia’s General Staff. At the same time, given the state of the current war of words and general relations between DC and Moscow, it’s not like this statement was all that surprising. Given all the evidence the Idlib chemical attacks last year were actually carried out by al Nusra, the “hard facts” Gerasimov referred to could simply be that recent history.
And as the article critically points out, the negotiations over the evacuation of Douma were drawn out because the Saudi-backed Jaish el-Islam didn’t want to go to Idlib because it’s dominated by al Nusra:
And as the article also points out, the timing of both this chemical attack and last year’s attack in Idlib happened to take place just days after announcements from the Trump administration that represented an existential threat to the rebellion: last year UN Ambassador Nikki Haley said U.S. policy was no longer focused on overthrowing Assad out. The chemical incident at Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib, happened 5 days later. And this year have have President Trump suddenly announcing that US forces will withdraw from Syria “very soon”, followed by the attack in Douma a little over a week later. So Jaish el-Islam wasn’t just faces the threat of expulsion to an area controlled by its rival, al Nusra. It was also facing the threat of losing the US involvement in this conflict:
Finally, as the article also points out, the initial evidence was based on videos and statements from members of the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) and the White Helmets:
So now let’s take a look at the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS). As the following article notes, SAMS claims to be a “non-political, non-profit medical organization,” and is cited as a credible authority by media reporting on the incident in Douma. But its origins is that of an exile arm of the Islamist-oriented Syrian opposition with a close relationship to both neoconservative elements in Washington and al Nusra.
And SAMS played a key role in the investigation of the sarin attack in Al Qaeda-controlled Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib last year. And that included SAMS providing biomedical samples to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which one again violated its stated protocol by accepting evidence without a verifiable chain of custody. That’s the background for one of the main groups providing video and eyewitness testimony to the chemical attack:
“Reports on unproven allegations of a chemical attack in Douma, the Syria city formerly occupied by the Army of Islam insurgent group, invariably rely on a key source: The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS). Together with the White Helmets, SAMS has been cited by the Washington Post, New York Times, CNN and virtually every Western media organization reporting on the incident. In Douma, SAMS staff have claimed that they treated more than 500 people for symptoms “indicative of exposure to a chemical agent.””
Yep, the rapid assessment that a chlorine attack took place in Douma was heavily based on evidence provided by SAMS. Similar to the key role SAMS played in providing the evidence of a sarin attack in Idlib last year (with evidence that broke the OPCW’s chain of custody):
And this group that played a critical role in providing evidence for both the Douma and Idlib attacks happens to have its roots in the Islamist-oriented faction of the Syrian opposition. Along with ties to neoconservatives. And al Nusra:
Al Nusra and neocons. It’s quite a combo and symbolic of the tragic nature of the Syrian conflict: and endless drum beat for overthrowing the Assad government with nary a mention of the reality that it will be al Qaeda and similar groups taking over.
The ties to Washington are no surprise given that SAMS was founded in 1998 by members of the Syrian American exile community. But it sounds like SAMS also experienced a radicalization of its own after the Syrian protests turned into an armed revolt, prompting a takeover of the group by sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood:
There’s also SAMS’s extenstive ties to USAID: funding for the group appears to almost entirely come from USAID, and the executive director and director of operations are both former USAID staffers:
Then there’s the MEK ties: SAMS operations have been overseen by Zaher Sahloul, an ardently anti-Iran operative focused on lobbying for a full scale war for regime change in Syrian. And in 2016, Sahloul participating in a rally organized by MEK:
And that’s the background for SAMS, one of the key sources of the evidence of the chemical attack in Douma and last year’s attack in Idlib.
So we’ll see what the OPCW concludes now that it has access to Douma and can collect evidence with a chain a custody.
But let’s not forget what a member of SAMS told reporters in the second article excerpt above from April 10th: He doubted whether any meaningful evidence would remain:
That article was from over two weeks ago. So we probably shouldn’t be too surprised if the OPCW’s final conclusion is ultimately inconclusive. And as we’ve seen, nor should we be surprised if an inconclusive conclusion is used to justify deeper US military involvement in Syria’s civil war.