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“Enthusiastic Hitlerite” Eleanor–The Third Side of The Dulles Iron Triangle

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COMMENT: We have chron­i­cled the deci­sive Nazi sym­pa­thies and actions of the Dulles broth­ers, John Fos­ter and Allen, from their posi­tions at Sul­li­van & Cromwell to their roles in the Eisen­how­er admin­is­tra­tion, in which they were, respec­tive­ly, Sec­re­tary of State and head of the CIA.

From help­ing to forge the Ger­man car­tels, such as I.G. Far­ben, to invest­ing Amer­i­can mon­ey in Hitler’s war machine, to sab­o­tag­ing attempts at inter­dict­ing the Third Reich’s flight cap­i­tal pro­gram to work­ing hand-in-glove with the Nazi spy appa­ra­tus of Rein­hard Gehlen, to engi­neer­ing the coa­les­cence of a Nazi infra­struc­ture in the GOP, the Dulles broth­ers were piv­otal in the rise and retrench­ment of Nazism.

As the key advis­er to Fos­ter in the Ger­man desk at the State Depart­ment, sis­ter Eleanor Dulles was an “enthu­si­as­tic Hit­lerite.” Aware­ness of her sym­pa­thy for Hitler flesh­es out under­stand­ing of the fas­cist “Iron Tri­an­gle” the Dulles fam­i­ly manifested–a dynam­ic that dom­i­nat­ed life (and death) in the 20th cen­tu­ry.

““Exit the Last Dulles” by Drew Pear­son [“On the Wash­ing­ton Mer­ry-Go-Round”]; Beaver Coun­ty Times; 1/26/62.

A bespec­taled, gray-haired lady bowed out of the State Depart­ment the oth­er day–almost unnoticed–though her influ­ence on for­eign pol­i­cy was great. She was Eleanor Dulles, last of the Dulles fam­i­ly to put its impact on the for­eign affairs of the Unit­ed States. Few peo­ple out­side of the Unit­ed States had heard of Miss Dulles since she won noto­ri­ety dur­ing the Roo­sevelt era as being pro-Hitler. But her qui­et, square-jawed per­son­al­i­ty, much like her two elder broth­ers, had a lot to do with build­ing up a strong, remil­i­ta­rized Ger­many.

The noto­ri­ety occurred when the diary of Ambas­sador William E. Dodd, Roo­sevelt’s ambas­sador to Ger­many dur­ing the rise of Hitler, was pub­lished. It con­tained this item for Jan. 24, 1936:

“John Fos­ter Dulles, who write for ‘The Amer­i­can Mag­a­zine’ on for­eign affairs, but who is con­nect­ed with a large bank­ing busi­ness in New York, report­ed . . . ‘My sis­ter lives here. She is an enthu­si­as­tic Hit­lerite, and anx­ious to show me the Ger­man atti­tude for peace. So we went to the movie  ”Unter Wehrma­cht,’ which she said is proof of the Ger­man desire for peace. I sat through the show, but the war planes, big guns, footage of attacks on civil­ians and the enthu­si­as­tic atti­tude of Hitler, Goer­ing and Goebbels as they stood look­ing at the dev­as­tat­ing work, took from my mind all thought of peace as an object of the show.’ . . .

. . . . Miss Dulles Gets a Job–That year, 1936, was when Hitler marched his new army into the Rhein­land.

In 1934, a year after Hitler came into pow­er, Miss Dulles’ hus­band, Prof. David Blondheim com­mit­ted sui­cide. He was Jew­ish.

Mrs. Blondheim resumed her maid­en name after that, taught in var­i­ous wom­en’s col­leges, and in the late fall of 1952, just after Eisen­how­er was elect­ed, turned up at the State Depart­ment at the office of Jim­my Rid­dle­berg­er, then in charge of the Ger­man desk, to ask for a job.

“My broth­er says that if I get a job while the Democ­rats are in, he can keep me on when he becomes Sec­re­tary of State,” she explained, “Oth­er­wise, he can’t hire me.”

Rid­dle­berg­er gave her a job as advi­sor on Ger­man affairs.  Short­ly there­after, he shot up the pro­mo­tion lad­der to become ambas­sador. Miss Dulles remained the key Ger­man advis­er to her broth­er dur­ing his career as Sec­re­tary of State. She was strong, per­sis­tent and per­sua­sive in her views.

With the res­ig­na­tion of Allen Dulles from Cen­tral Intel­li­gence last sum­mer and the qui­et depar­ture of Eleanor Dulles this month, the Dulles fam­i­ly is now out of gov­ern­ment. But, for bet­ter or worse, their poli­cies live after them.

The Broth­ers: John Fos­ter Dulls, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War by Stephen Kinz­er; St. Mar­tin Grif­fin [SC]; Copy­right 2013 by Stephen Kinz­er; ISBN 978–1‑250–05312‑1; pp. 49–52.

. . . . Fos­ter had helped design the Dawes Plan of 1924, which restruc­tured Ger­many’s repa­ra­tion pay­ments in ways that opened up huge new mar­kets for Amer­i­can banks, and lat­er that year he arranged for five of them to lend $100 mil­lion to Ger­man bor­row­ers. In the sev­en years that fol­lowed, he and his part­ners bro­kered anoth­er $900 mil­lion in loans to Germany–the equiv­a­lent of more than $15 bil­lion in ear­ly-twen­ty-first cen­tu­ry dol­lars. This made him the pre­em­i­nent sales­man of Ger­man bonds in the Unit­ed States, prob­a­bly the world. He sharply reject­ed crit­ics who argued that Amer­i­can banks should invest more inside the Unit­ed States and protest­ed when the State Depart­ment sought to restrict loans to Ger­many that were unre­lat­ed to repa­ra­tion pay­ments or that sup­port­ed car­tels or monop­o­lies.

Fos­ter made much mon­ey build­ing and advis­ing car­tels, which are based on agree­ments among com­pet­ing firms to con­trol sup­plies, fix prices, and close their sup­ply and dis­tri­b­u­tion net­works to out­siders. Reform­ers in many coun­tries railed against these car­tels, but Fos­ter defend­ed them as guar­an­tors of sta­bil­i­ty that ensured prof­its while pro­tect­ing economies from unpre­dictable swings. Two that he shaped became glob­al forces.

Among Fos­ter’s pre­mier clients was the New Jer­sey-based Inter­na­tion­al Nick­el Com­pa­ny, for which he was not only coun­sel but also a direc­tor and mem­ber of the exec­u­tive board. In the ear­ly 1930s, he steered it, along with its Cana­di­an affil­i­ate, into a car­tel with France’s two major nick­el pro­duc­ers. In 1934, he brought the biggest Ger­man nick­el pro­duc­er, I.G. Far­ben, into the car­tel. This gave Nazi Ger­many access to the cartel’s resources.

“With­out Dulles,” accord­ing to a study of Sul­li­van & Cromwell, “Ger­many would have lacked any nego­ti­at­ing strength with [Inter­na­tion­al Nick­el], which con­trolled the world’s sup­ply of nick­el, a cru­cial ingre­di­ent in stain­less steel and armor plate.”

I.G. Far­ben was also one of the world’s largest chem­i­cal companies–it would pro­duce the Zyk­lon B gas used at Nazi death camps–and as Fos­ter was bring­ing it into the nick­el car­tel, he also helped it estab­lish a glob­al chem­i­cal car­tel. He was a board mem­ber and legal coun­sel for anoth­er chem­i­cal pro­duc­er, the Solvay con­glom­er­ate, based in Bel­gium. Dur­ing the 1930s, he guid­ed Solvay, I. G. Far­ben, the Amer­i­can firm Allied Chem­i­cal & Dye, and sev­er­al oth­er com­pa­nies into a chem­i­cal car­tel just as potent as the one he had orga­nized for nick­el pro­duc­ers.

In mid-1931, a con­sor­tium of Amer­i­can banks, eager to safe­guard their invest­ments in Ger­many, per­suad­ed the Ger­man gov­ern­ment to accept a loan of near­ly $500 mil­lion to pre­vent default. Fos­ter was their agent. His ties to the Ger­man gov­ern­ment tight­ened after Hitler took pow­er at the begin­ning of 1933 and appoint­ed Fos­ter’s old friend Hjal­mar Schacht as min­is­ter of eco­nom­ics.

Allen [Dulles] had intro­duced the two men a decade ear­li­er, when he was a diplo­mat in Berlin and Fos­ter passed through reg­u­lar­ly on Sul­li­van & Cromwell busi­ness. They were imme­di­ate­ly drawn to each oth­er, Schacht spoke flu­ent Eng­lish and under­stood the Unit­ed States well. Like Dulles, he pro­ject­ed an air of brisk author­i­ty. He was tall, gaunt, and always erect, with close-cropped hair and high, tight col­lars. Both men had con­sid­ered enter­ing the cler­gy before turn­ing their pow­er­ful minds toward more remu­ner­a­tive pur­suits. Each admired the cul­ture that had pro­duced the oth­er. Both believed that a resur­gent Ger­many would stand against Bol­she­vism. Mobi­liz­ing Amer­i­can cap­i­tal to finance its rise was their com­mon inter­est.

Work­ing with Schacht, Fos­ter helped the Nation­al Social­ist state find rich sources of financ­ing in the Unit­ed States for its pub­lic agen­cies, banks, and indus­tries. The two men shaped com­plex restruc­tur­ings of Ger­man loan oblig­a­tions at sev­er­al “debt con­fer­ences” in Berlin–conferences that were offi­cial­ly among bankers, but were in fact close­ly guid­ed by the Ger­man and Amer­i­can governments–and came up with new for­mu­las that made it eas­i­er for the Ger­mans to bor­row mon­ey from Amer­i­can banks. Sul­li­van & Cromwell float­ed the first Amer­i­can bonds issued by the giant Ger­man steel­mak­er and arms man­u­fac­tur­er Krupp A.G., extend­ed I.G. Far­ben’s glob­al reach, and fought suc­cess­ful­ly to block Canada’s effort to restrict the export of steel to Ger­man arms mak­ers. Accord­ing to one his­to­ry, the firm “rep­re­sent­ed sev­er­al provin­cial gov­ern­ments, some large indus­tri­al com­bines, a num­ber of big Amer­i­can com­pa­nies with inter­ests in the Reich, and some rich indi­vid­u­als.” By anoth­er account it “thrived on its car­tels and col­lu­sion with the new Nazi regime.” The colum­nist Drew Pear­son glee­ful­ly list­ed the Ger­man clients of Sul­li­van & Cromwell who had con­tributed mon­ey to the Nazis, and described Fos­ter as chief agent for “the bank­ing cir­cles that res­cued Adolf Hitler from the finan­cial depths and set up his Nazi par­ty as a going con­cern.”

Although the rela­tion­ship between Fos­ter and Schacht began well and thrived for years, it end­ed bad­ly. Schacht con­tributed deci­sive­ly to Ger­man rear­ma­ment and pub­licly urged Jews to “real­ize that their influ­ence in Ger­many has dis­ap­peared for all time.” Although he lat­er broke with Hitler and left the gov­ern­ment, he would be tried at Nurem­berg for “crimes against peace.” He was acquit­ted, but the chief Amer­i­can pros­e­cu­tor, Robert Jack­son, called him “the facade of starched respon­si­bil­i­ty, who in the ear­ly days pro­vid­ed the win­dow dress­ing, the bait for the hes­i­tant.” He bait­ed no one more suc­cess­ful­ly than Fos­ter.

Dur­ing the mid-1930s, through a series of cur­ren­cy maneu­vers, dis­count­ed buy­backs, and oth­er forms of finan­cial war­fare, Ger­many effec­tive­ly default­ed on its debts to Amer­i­can investors. Fos­ter rep­re­sent­ed the investors in unsuc­cess­ful appeals to Ger­many, many of them addressed to his old friend Schacht. Clients who had fol­lowed Sul­li­van & Cromwell’s advice to buy Ger­man bonds lost for­tunes. That advice, accord­ing to one study, “cost Amer­i­cans a bil­lion dol­lars because Schacht seduced Dulles into sup­port­ing Ger­many for far too long.’ . . . .

. . . . Fos­ter had clear finan­cial rea­sons to col­lab­o­rate with the Nazi regime, and his ide­o­log­i­cal reason–Hitler was fierce­ly anti-Bolshevik–was equal­ly com­pelling. In lat­er years, schol­ars would ask about his actions in the world. Did he do it out of a desire to pro­tect eco­nom­ic priv­i­lege, or out of anti-Com­mu­nist fer­vor? The best answer may be that to him there was no dif­fer­ence. In his mind defend­ing multi­na­tion­al busi­ness and fight­ing Bol­she­vism were the same thing.

Since 1933, all let­ters writ­ten from the Ger­man offices of Sul­li­van & Cromwell had end­ed, as required by Ger­man reg­u­la­tions, with the salu­ta­tion Heil Hitler! That did not dis­turb Fos­ter. He churned out mag­a­zine and news­pa­per arti­cles assert­ing that the “dynam­ic” coun­tries of the world–Germany, Italy, and Japan–“feel with­in them­selves poten­tial­i­ties which are sup­pressed,” and that Hitler’s semi-secret rear­ma­ment project sim­ply showed that “Ger­many, by uni­lat­er­al action, has now tak­en back her free­dom of action.” . . . .

The Dev­il’s Chess­board: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of Amer­i­ca’s Secret Gov­ern­ment by David Tal­bot; Harp­er [HC]; 2015; Copy­right 2015 by The Tal­bot Play­ers LLC; ISBN 978–0‑06–227616‑2; pp. 27–29.

. . . . Dulles and [Thomas] McKit­trick [of the Bank of Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments] con­tin­ued to work close­ly togeth­er for the rest of the war. In the final months of the con­flict, the two men col­lab­o­rat­ed against a Roo­sevelt oper­a­tion called Project Safe­haven that sought to track down and con­fis­cate Nazi assets that were stashed in neu­tral coun­tries. Admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials feared that, by hid­ing their ill-got­ten wealth, mem­bers of the Ger­man elite planned to bide their time after the war and would then try to regain pow­er. Mor­gen­thau’s Trea­sury Depart­ment team, which spear­head­ed Project Safe­haven, reached out to the OSS and BIS for assis­tance. But Dulles and McKit­trick were more inclined to pro­tect their clients’ inter­ests. More­over, like many in the upper ech­e­lons of U.S. finance and nation­al secu­ri­ty, Dulles believed that a good num­ber of these pow­er­ful Ger­man fig­ures should be returned to pow­er, to ensure that Ger­many would be a strong bul­wark against the Sovi­et Union. And dur­ing the Cold War, he would be more intent on using Nazi loot to finance covert anti-Sovi­et oper­a­tions than on return­ing it to the fam­i­lies of Hitler’s vic­tims.

Dulles real­ized that none of his argu­ments against Project Safe­haven would be well received by Mor­gen­thau. So he resort­ed to time-hon­ored meth­ods of bureau­crat­ic stalling and sab­o­tage to help sink the oper­a­tion, explain­ing in a Decem­ber 1944 memo to his OSS supe­ri­ors that his Bern office lacked “ade­quate per­son­nel to do [an] effec­tive job in this field and meet oth­er demands.” . . . .

. . . . While Allen Dulles was using his OSS post in Switzer­land to pro­tect the inter­ests of Sul­li­van and Cromwell’s Ger­man clients, his broth­er was doing the same in New York. By play­ing an intri­cate cor­po­rate shell game, Fos­ter was able to hide the U.S. assets of major Ger­man car­tels like IG Far­ben and Mer­ck KGaA, the chem­i­cal and phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal giant, and pro­tect these sub­sidiaries from being con­fis­cat­ed by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment as alien prop­er­ty. Some of Fos­ter’s legal origa­mi allowed the Nazi regime to cre­ate bot­tle­necks in the pro­duc­tion of essen­tial war materials–such as diesel-fuel injec­tion motors that the U.S. mil­i­tary need­ed for trucks, sub­marines, and air­planes. By the end of the war, many of Fos­ter’s clients were under inves­ti­ga­tion by the Jus­tice Depart­men­t’s antitrust divi­sion. And Fos­ter him­self was under scruti­ny for col­lab­o­ra­tion with the ene­my.

But Fos­ter’s broth­er was guard­ing his back. From his front­line posi­tion in Europe, Allen was well-placed to destroy incrim­i­nat­ing evi­dence and to block any inves­ti­ga­tions that threat­ened the two broth­ers and their law firm. “Shred­ding of cap­tured Nazi records was the favorite tac­tic of Dulles and his [asso­ciates] who stayed behind to help run the occu­pa­tion of post­war Ger­many,” observed Nazi hunter John Lof­tus, who pored through numer­ous war doc­u­ments relat­ed to the Dulles broth­ers when he served as a U.S. pros­e­cu­tor in the Jus­tice Depart­ment under Pres­i­dent Jim­my Carter.

If their pow­er­ful ene­my in the White House had sur­vived the war, the Dulles broth­ers would like­ly have faced seri­ous crim­i­nal charges for their wartime activ­i­ties. Supreme Court Jus­tice Arthur Gold­berg, who as a young man served with Allen in the OSS, lat­er declared that both Dulle­ses were guilty of trea­son. . . .

The Secret War Against the Jews; by John Lof­tus and Mark Aarons; Copy­right 1994 by Mark Aarons; St. Martin’s Press; [HC] ISBN 0–312-11057‑X; pp. 122–123.

. . . . Frus­tra­tion over Truman’s 1948 elec­tion vic­to­ry over Dewey (which they blamed on the “Jew­ish vote”) impelled Dulles and his pro­tégé Richard Nixon to work toward the real­iza­tion of the fas­cist free­dom fight­er pres­ence in the Repub­li­can Party’s eth­nic out­reach orga­ni­za­tion. As a young con­gress­man, Nixon had been Allen Dulles’s con­fi­dant. They both blamed Gov­er­nor Dewey’s razor-thin loss to Tru­man in the 1948 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion on the Jew­ish vote. When he became Eisenhower’s vice pres­i­dent in 1952, Nixon was deter­mined to build his own eth­nic base. . . .

. . . . Vice Pres­i­dent Nixon’s secret polit­i­cal war of Nazis against Jews in Amer­i­can pol­i­tics was nev­er inves­ti­gat­ed at the time. The for­eign lan­guage-speak­ing Croa­t­ians and oth­er Fas­cist émi­gré groups had a ready-made net­work for con­tact­ing and mobi­liz­ing the East­ern Euro­pean eth­nic bloc. There is a very high cor­re­la­tion between CIA domes­tic sub­si­dies to Fas­cist ‘free­dom fight­ers’ dur­ing the 1950’s and the lead­er­ship of the Repub­li­can Party’s eth­nic cam­paign groups. The motive for the under-the-table financ­ing was clear: Nixon used Nazis to off­set the Jew­ish vote for the Democ­rats. . . .

. . . . In 1952, Nixon had formed an Eth­nic Divi­sion with­in the Repub­li­can Nation­al Com­mit­tee. Dis­placed fas­cists, hop­ing to be returned to pow­er by an Eisen­how­er-Nixon ‘lib­er­a­tion’ pol­i­cy signed on with the com­mit­tee. In 1953, when Repub­li­cans were in office, the immi­gra­tion laws were changed to admit Nazis, even mem­bers of the SS. They flood­ed into the coun­try. Nixon him­self over­saw the new immi­gra­tion pro­gram. As Vice Pres­i­dent, he even received East­ern Euro­pean Fas­cists in the White House. . .


One comment for ““Enthusiastic Hitlerite” Eleanor–The Third Side of The Dulles Iron Triangle”

  1. speak­ing of a “strong, remil­i­ta­rized Ger­many”...


    or the first time in a quar­ter-cen­tu­ry, the prospect of war—real war, war between the major powers—will be on the agen­da of West­ern lead­ers when they meet at the NATO Sum­mit in War­saw, Poland, on July 8 and 9. Dom­i­nat­ing the agen­da in War­saw (aside, of course, from the “Brex­it” vote in the UK) will be dis­cus­sion of plans to rein­force NATO’s “east­ern flank”—the arc of for­mer Sovi­et part­ners stretch­ing from the Baltic states to the Black Sea that are now allied with the West but fear mil­i­tary assault by Moscow. Until recent­ly, the prospect of such an attack was giv­en lit­tle cre­dence in strate­gic cir­cles, but now many in NATO believe a major war is pos­si­ble and that robust defen­sive mea­sures are required.

    In what is like­ly to be its most sig­nif­i­cant move, the War­saw sum­mit is expect­ed to give for­mal approval to a plan to deploy four multi­na­tion­al bat­tal­ions along the east­ern flank—one each in Poland, Lithua­nia, Latvia, and Esto­nia. Although not deemed suf­fi­cient to stop a deter­mined Russ­ian assault, the four bat­tal­ions would act as a “trip­wire,” thrust­ing sol­diers from numer­ous NATO coun­tries into the line of fire and so ensur­ing a full-scale, alliance-wide response. This, it is claimed, will deter Rus­sia from under­tak­ing such a move in the first place or ensure its defeat should it be fool­hardy enough to start a war.


    Ger­many to Affirm Stronger Role on World Stage

    By kirsten grieshaber and geir moul­son, asso­ci­at­ed press

    BERLIN — Jul 12, 2016, 7:35 AM ET


    Ger­many is affirm­ing its grow­ing role on the world stage in new secu­ri­ty guide­lines that mark anoth­er step away from its cau­tion after World War II.

    A draft defense pol­i­cy paper obtained by The Asso­ci­at­ed Press Tues­day and due to be pre­sent­ed on Wednes­day states that “Ger­many is a glob­al­ly high­ly con­nect­ed coun­try ... which has a respon­si­bil­i­ty to active­ly shape the glob­al order.”

    It for­mal­izes what lead­ing offi­cials have been say­ing for the past 2½ years — a peri­od in which Ger­many has played a lead­ing diplo­mat­ic role in Ukraine’s con­flict and joined a cam­paign to sup­port the fight against Islam­ic insur­gents in Mali, among oth­er things.

    Ger­many also sent weapons to Kur­dish fight­ers in north­ern Iraq, break­ing with a pre­vi­ous reluc­tance to send arms into con­flict sit­u­a­tions. But although it has stepped up its diplo­mat­ic and mil­i­tary role, there’s still lit­tle chance of the gov­ern­ment — which has to get all mil­i­tary mis­sions approved by Par­lia­ment — dis­patch­ing com­bat troops to glob­al hotspots in the same way as Euro­pean allies France and Britain, and still less uni­lat­er­al­ly.

    The so-called “white book,” the first such secu­ri­ty pol­i­cy review since 2006, stress­es that Ger­many has no inten­tion of act­ing alone and that all mil­i­tary action and diplo­mat­ic crises need to be tack­led and solved with the coun­try’s part­ners and allies.

    “The armed forces are focused on act­ing in a mul­ti­lat­er­al frame­work,” it says. “When it comes to tak­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty for inter­na­tion­al secu­ri­ty we are strong­ly depen­dent on the coor­di­nat­ed coop­er­a­tion with our part­ners.”

    How­ev­er, the gov­ern­ment also says that “Ger­many is ready to intro­duce itself as an ear­ly, deter­mined and sub­stan­tial source of inspi­ra­tion in the inter­na­tion­al debate, to live respon­si­bil­i­ty and take on lead­er­ship.”

    The paper also rais­es, albeit vague­ly, the pos­si­bil­i­ty of oth­er Euro­pean Union coun­tries’ cit­i­zens serv­ing in Ger­many’s mil­i­tary. “Open­ing the armed forces for cit­i­zens of the EU would offer not just far-reach­ing inte­gra­tion and regen­er­a­tion poten­tial for their per­son­nel robust­ness, but also would be a strong sig­nal for a Euro­pean per­spec­tive,” it says.

    Ger­many backs NATO nations’ pledge to spend 2 per­cent of their nation­al incomes on defense and is increas­ing defense spend­ing. Still, Chan­cel­lor Angela Merkel acknowl­edged last week that “a lot remains to be done” to reach that mark — offi­cials esti­mate that Ger­many’s defense spend­ing will increase from 1.19 per­cent of gross domes­tic prod­uct this year to 1.21 per­cent in 2017.

    Ger­many emerged slow­ly from its post-World War II diplo­mat­ic shell after reuni­fi­ca­tion in 1990. For­mer Chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Kohl broke a taboo against troops abroad by send­ing mil­i­tary medics to sup­port the U.N. mis­sion in Cam­bo­dia in 1992. But by the ear­ly 2000s, Ger­many had thou­sands of troops abroad — tak­ing sig­nif­i­cant roles in Afghanistan and Koso­vo, among oth­er places.

    Spon­sored Sto­ries

    Posted by Tiffany Sunderson | July 14, 2016, 1:33 pm

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