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Greek Privatization Proceeds for Anti-Poverty Policies? Probably Not, But We’ll See

With nego­ti­a­tions between Greece and the troi­ka over how to resolve the lat­est aus­ter­i­ty-impasse still ongo­ing, a rather intrigu­ing poten­tial source of both con­flict and com­pro­mise emerged between the Syriza-led Greek gov­ern­ment try­ing to find a way out Greece’s aus­ter­i­ty-trap and a “troi­ka” that would strong­ly pre­fer Greece stays in the aus­ter­i­ty-trap: Greece is offer­ing to con­tin­ue with the pri­va­ti­za­tion of state assets that the troi­ka demands but it would rather use the pro­ceeds to set up a fund ded­i­cat­ed to tack­ling Greece’s human­i­tar­i­an crises instead of imme­di­ate­ly pay­ing back Greece’s cred­i­tors. And while the troi­ka has yet to for­mal­ly rule out Greece’s pro­pos­al, Euro­pean Com­mis­sion pres­i­dent Jean-Claude Junck­er made a fas­ci­nat­ing­ly unchar­ac­ter­is­tic offer last week to let the 2 bil­lion euros in unspent EU “devel­op­ment funds” in order to “sup­port efforts to cre­ate growth and social cohe­sion in Greece”. Con­sid­er­ing vir­tu­al­ly all past atti­tudes by the troi­ka regard­ing Greece’s “growth and social cohe­sion”, it was an odd­ly gen­er­ous offer...except for the fact that the pro­ceeds from the pri­va­ti­za­tions are pro­ject­ed to be poten­tial­ly worth a lot more. So maybe it was­n’t so gen­er­ous.

Still, it’s a fas­ci­nat­ing pro­pos­al by the Greek gov­ern­ment that puts the troi­ka in a rather unusu­al posi­tion because when it comes to the troi­ka:
Pri­va­ti­za­tion = “Can’t get enough”.
Help­ing poor peo­ple = “Fine, as long as it does­n’t cost much, but they need to learn their les­son so maybe it’s not so good. And not if you’re too poor
Pay­ing back cred­i­tors = “The most pos­i­tive force in the uni­verse

So by mak­ing this “pri­va­ti­za­tion for human­i­tar­i­an aid” pro­pos­al Greece appears to have done the seem­ing­ly impos­si­ble: Greece may have forced the troi­ka to recon­sid­er some­thing and com­pro­mise in a way that’s actu­al­ly help­ful. Just a bit, which is still amaz­ing.

That said, it’s still all quite omi­nous since the troi­ka is still crazy.

—————————–

Well this should be inter­est­ing to watch: With the troi­ka demand­ing more “reforms” from Greece dur­ing the lat­est round of troi­ka-led nego­ti­a­tions over how much abuse and social degra­da­tion should take place as part of the Greek “bailout” and with the ECB restrict­ing emer­gency access to cred­it lines for Greece’s banks, it’s pret­ty clear that the troi­ka is intent on mak­ing it very clear to the Greeks that the screws can only get tighter.

Except now we get reports of Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Angela Merkel indi­cat­ing “flex­i­bil­i­ty” for Greece as the Greek gov­ern­ment scram­bles to put togeth­er a set of “reforms” that meet its troi­ka cred­i­tor demands. In addi­tion, on Fri­day EU Com­mis­sion Pres­i­dent Jean-Claude Junck­er made a rather sur­pris­ing offer to the Greeks: the EU has a spare 2 bil­lion euros lying around...and maybe it could use that mon­ey to help alle­vi­ate Greece’s human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis. Giv­en the troika’s past atti­tudes towards Greece’s human­i­tar­i­an crises this was some unchar­ac­ter­is­ti­cal­ly benev­o­lent behav­ior:

Merkel sets strict terms for Greek aid, Junck­er flags EU cash

By Renee Mal­te­zou and Alas­tair Mac­don­ald

BRUSSELS Fri Mar 20, 2015 3:42pm EDT

(Reuters) — Euro­pean Union lead­ers wel­comed a pledge on Fri­day from Greece to meet cred­i­tors’ demands for a broad pack­age of eco­nom­ic reform pro­pos­als with­in days to unlock the cash Athens needs to avoid stum­bling out of the euro zone.

After overnight cri­sis talks on the side­lines of an EU sum­mit in Brus­sels, new Greek Prime Min­is­ter Alex­is Tsipras and Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Angela Merkel, the bloc’s main pay­mas­ter, offered some­what diver­gent under­stand­ings of how much Athens must do and how quick­ly. But EU offi­cials insist­ed there was a broad agree­ment to act now on an accord struck a month ago.

Merkel said Greece, which faces a cash crunch with­in weeks, would receive fresh funds only once its cred­i­tors approve the com­pre­hen­sive list of reforms Tsipras promised to present soon.

But she sig­naled some flex­i­bil­i­ty on what reforms Tsipras would have to make — cru­cial­ly giv­ing his left­ist-led coali­tion the chance to offer alter­na­tive sav­ings strate­gies that will help it per­suade its vot­ers it is break­ing with what Tsipras calls the failed aus­ter­i­ty poli­cies of his defeat­ed pre­de­ces­sor.

And Euro­pean Com­mis­sion Pres­i­dent Jean-Claude Junck­er offered Tsipras a sweet­en­er by say­ing 2 bil­lion euros from the Euro­pean Union’s mod­est col­lec­tive bud­get were avail­able to ease the human­i­tar­i­an impact of five years of spend­ing cuts.

Tsipras said he would ful­ly respect a deal struck with euro zone finance min­is­ters on Feb. 20 that extend­ed an EU bailout deal until June. But he insist­ed that a con­di­tion in that pact requir­ing Athens to pass a final review of its efforts to bring its debts under con­trol before receiv­ing funds did not apply.

After two months of mount­ing frus­tra­tion on both sides, marked by pub­lic squab­bling, Tsipras held three hours of talks with the lead­ers of Ger­many, France and the main EU insti­tu­tions to try to break an impasse that risks depriv­ing Athens of the euros it needs to func­tion ful­ly with­in the cur­ren­cy area.

A joint state­ment by the EU insti­tu­tions spoke of a “spir­it of mutu­al trust”. But it remained uncer­tain Tsipras and Merkel were talk­ing about the same reforms, and how far Greece would have to start imple­ment­ing them before it receives any new cash.

DIVERGENT TAKES

The risk of a con­tin­ued stand­off, exact­ly a month after Greece secured a last-gasp four-month exten­sion of an EU/IMF bailout, was high­light­ed by com­ments from Merkel and Tsipras.

“The agree­ment of Feb. 20 is still valid in its entire­ty. Every para­graph of the agree­ment counts,” Merkel told Ger­man jour­nal­ists who ques­tioned whether she was now offer­ing cash for promis­es that many of her sup­port­ers have stopped believ­ing in.

Tsipras appeared to dif­fer. “It is clear that Greece is not oblig­ed to imple­ment reces­sion­ary mea­sures,” he said. “Greece will sub­mit its own struc­tur­al reforms which it will imple­ment.”

Merkel insist­ed only the com­ple­tion of approved mea­sures — in a final review by cred­i­tor insti­tu­tions — would sat­is­fy lenders includ­ing the Euro Group of euro zone finance min­is­ters.

“The Greek gov­ern­ment has the pos­si­bil­i­ty of replac­ing indi­vid­ual reforms out­stand­ing from Dec. 10 with oth­er reforms, if these ... have the same effect. The insti­tu­tions and then the Euro Group must decide whether they do have the same effect,” she said, not­ing Ire­land had made such changes with EU back­ing.

Tsipras, how­ev­er, insist­ed that while his gov­ern­ment would ful­ly respect a deal struck with the euro zone on Feb. 20 it would not have to com­plete a final bailout review process begun by the last gov­ern­ment to secure more aid: “We all have the same read­ing of the Feb. 20 accord... There is no such thing as a fifth review,” he told a news con­fer­ence after the sum­mit.

EU offi­cials, keen to play up the prospects the talks had raised of pre­vent­ing “Grex­it”, or an inad­ver­tent “Grex­i­dent” that pushed Greece out of the euro, said dif­fer­ences were mere­ly ones of empha­sis for audi­ences in their respec­tive coun­tries.

Sources aware of how the three hours of talks overnight had gone said Tsipras, aged 40 and only two months into his first ever gov­ern­ment job, had quick­ly appeared to accept that he was fac­ing a unit­ed front from cred­i­tors and would have no choice but to meet their impa­tient demands for cost-cut­ting mea­sures.

“He has seen ... that he can­not divide the Euro­peans,” one senior EU offi­cial said. “He can only work with them, not play them off against each oth­er. He has also seen that there is good­will if he sticks to his word and actu­al­ly deliv­ers.”

Anoth­er EU offi­cial said Tsipras, who will vis­it Merkel in Berlin on Mon­day after weeks of increas­ing­ly ran­corous rela­tions between min­is­ters in their two cab­i­nets, had indi­cat­ed he could offer a full pack­age of reforms with­in a week or 10 days.

Nonethe­less, with some Ger­man lead­ers say­ing they might pre­fer Greece out of the euro zone, and Tsipras try­ing to sat­is­fy a coali­tion of rad­i­cals unused to pow­er, senior EU offi­cials do not rule out a fur­ther col­lapse of the process.

Cru­cial for the Greek leader, EU offi­cials believe, is being able to present his pack­age as a break with his con­ser­v­a­tive pre­de­ces­sor — even if many of the mea­sures are broad­ly sim­i­lar.

...

Aha, well, as we can see, the offers of “flex­i­bil­i­ty” from Angela Merkel were actu­al­ly very char­ac­tis­tic of the troika’s gen­er­al atti­tude thus far:

Merkel insist­ed only the com­ple­tion of approved mea­sures — in a final review by cred­i­tor insti­tu­tions — would sat­is­fy lenders includ­ing the Euro Group of euro zone finance min­is­ters.

“The Greek gov­ern­ment has the pos­si­bil­i­ty of replac­ing indi­vid­ual reforms out­stand­ing from Dec. 10 with oth­er reforms, if these ... have the same effect. The insti­tu­tions and then the Euro Group must decide whether they do have the same effect,” she said, not­ing Ire­land had made such changes with EU back­ing.

How flex­i­ble! Greece is free to come up with its own reforms, as long as they have the same effect as the exist­ing reforms. And what’s been the effect of those reforms thus far? A human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis!

Still, that offer of two 2 bil­lion euros was a nice change of pace. Nor­mal­ly it’s just assumed in the new EU that the only way to escape a human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis is to some­how “reform” your way to rich­es via cri­sis-induc­ing aus­ter­i­ty. So you have to won­der what prompt­ed that change of atti­tude?

Reformed Can­ni­bal­ism
Well, there is one pos­si­ble motive for the EU’s 2 bil­lion euro “human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis” sur­prise, and it appeared just this week:

Greece already has a num­ber of reforms to the troika’s “reforms” in mind (yes, reform reforms) and it’s already start­ed imple­ment­ing some of them. And they are exact­ly the kind of reform the troi­ka is primed to hate. It’s a reform that cen­ters around pri­or­i­tiz­ing Greece’s human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis over pay­ing back the troi­ka that start­ed the cri­sis in the first place:

Greece says to use asset sales for social wel­fare, not to cut debt

ATHENS Tue Mar 17, 2015 7:27am EDT

(Reuters) — Greece will short­ly present a law to turn its pri­vati­sa­tion agency into a wealth fund that will use pro­ceeds to finance social wel­fare poli­cies instead of reduc­ing its pub­lic debt, the deputy finance min­is­ter said.

The move could fur­ther strain rela­tions between Prime Min­is­ter Alex­is Tsipras’ new left-wing gov­ern­ment and Greece’s inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors, who want Athens to use the rev­enues to cut its huge debt­load.

“There will be a new Sov­er­eign Wealth fund ... and the rev­enue will be used to fund the gov­ern­men­t’s social poli­cies and to sup­port the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem,” said Deputy Finance Min­is­ter Nadia Vala­vani.

Vala­vani told a par­lia­men­tary com­mit­tee she would present leg­is­la­tion in the com­ing weeks to merge the pri­vati­sa­tion agency (HRADF) with the coun­try’s state prop­er­ty com­pa­ny, ETAD, to set up the new body.

The left­ist gov­ern­ment is opposed to some key asset sales but has been forced to mod­er­ate some­what its stance as it nego­ti­ates with its Euro­pean part­ners over a new aid pack­age.

...

Pri­va­ti­za­tions for human­i­tar­i­an crises? Yeah, it’s kind of hard to see how the troi­ka is going to be enthu­si­as­tic about that idea. Using the pro­ceeds from cred­i­tor-man­dat­ed state assets sales for social social wel­fare poli­cies instead of pay­ing back Greece’s cred­i­tors isn’t exact­ly the cred­i­tor’s par­adise Europe’s elites have been work­ing to hard to build. Help­ing the poor is an “Old Europe” thing. The new troi­ka-led Europe is all about help­ing the cred­i­tors even if it means planned pover­ty for the mass­es. That’s the new nor­mal

So was Junck­er’s 2 bil­lion euro offer a sort of indi­rect response to the Greek gov­ern­men­t’s pro­pos­al? That’s unclear. Alex­is Tsipras declared that any spend­ing on Greece’s human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis would­n’t impact the Greek bud­get back in Feb­ru­ary, but that might still imply chang­ing the “bailout” repay­ment sched­ule to the troi­ka. And there has­n’t real­ly been an offi­cial troi­ka response to the idea so far. Although there prob­a­bly will be a response fair­ly soon since Greece’s par­lia­ment just turned that idea into law:

Greek par­lia­ment approves law to coax more tax pay­ments

ATHENS, March 21 Fri Mar 20, 2015 6:56pm EDT

(Reuters) — Greece’s par­lia­ment on Sat­ur­day approved a bill that offers hefty cuts in fines and long repay­ment plans to cit­i­zens owing bil­lions of euros in over­due tax­es in a bid to boost deplet­ed state cof­fers.

Shut out from debt mar­kets and with remain­ing inter­na­tion­al bailout aid on hold, Athens risks run­ning out of cash in the com­ing weeks and is scram­bling to secure ways to finance itself and meet pay­ment oblig­a­tions.

The leg­is­la­tion, dubbed “reg­u­la­tions to kick-start the econ­o­my,” is part of the new left-wing gov­ern­men­t’s first batch of reforms.

It fol­lows an anti-pover­ty law vot­ed on ear­li­er in the week, the first leg­is­la­tion the new gov­ern­ment passed since com­ing to pow­er in Jan­u­ary. More bills are in the pipeline in hopes inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors will release fresh aid after a loan review that needs to be wrapped up by April.

Greece is due to receive 7.2 bil­lion euros in remain­ing Euro­pean Union/International Mon­e­tary Fund bailout funds if it deliv­ers on its reforms.

...

Under the new leg­is­la­tion, Greece’s pri­vati­sa­tion agency will be turned into a wealth fund and will use pro­ceeds to finance social wel­fare poli­cies instead of pay­ing down pub­lic debt.

Giv­en that “more bills are in the pipeline in hopes inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors will release fresh aid after a loan review that needs to be wrapped up by April,” the con­tent of those upcom­ing bills is no doubt on the troika’s mind, as are the impli­ca­tions of show­ing any lenien­cy to the rab­ble.

No one wants to be a ‘troikan’ pro­tec­torate. Espe­cial­ly ‘troikan’ pro­tec­torates
So some sort of response from the troi­ka over this lat­est pri­va­ti­za­tion agency move seems like­ly. Maybe Junck­er’s offer was such a response or maybe not. But one thing is clear: When an out­side force demands that your coun­try sell off strate­gic assets to pay back that out­side force the rab­ble tends to get rest­less:

Greek gov­ern­ment ‘rad­i­cal­ly opposed’ to some pri­va­ti­za­tions as reforms talks under­way
Asso­ci­at­ed Press March 11, 2015 | 10:40 a.m. EDT

By ELENA BECATOROS, Asso­ci­at­ed Press

ATHENS, Greece (AP) — Greece’s new gov­ern­ment is “rad­i­cal­ly opposed” to the pri­va­ti­za­tion of cer­tain busi­ness­es, par­tic­u­lar­ly in the ener­gy and infra­struc­ture sec­tors, a senior cab­i­net min­is­ter said Wednes­day as reforms talks with cred­i­tors were due to begin.

Sell­ing state-owned enter­pris­es is one of the actions Greece has been asked to take to raise funds and reduce debt in exchange for res­cue loans from the euro­zone and Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund.

Talks between Greece and its cred­i­tors began on a tech­ni­cal lev­el in Brus­sels on Wednes­day to cement a series of reforms Athens must imple­ment in order to get the remain­ing bailout funds released and avoid bank­rupt­cy.

“We are rad­i­cal­ly opposed to the pri­va­ti­za­tion, par­tic­u­lar­ly of the strate­gic sec­tors and busi­ness­es of our econ­o­my, and pri­mar­i­ly in the sec­tor of infra­struc­ture and ener­gy,” said Pana­gi­o­tis Lafaza­nis, the ener­gy and envi­ron­ment min­is­ter and a gov­ern­ment hard­lin­er, at a con­fer­ence in Athens.

Lafaza­nis added that “hon­est­ly, I haven’t under­stood why for some schools of thought, pri­va­ti­za­tions have become syn­ony­mous with reforms.”

He argued that what he called the “neolib­er­al dereg­u­la­tion in the ener­gy mar­ket, which occurred par­tic­u­lar­ly dur­ing the recent (bailout) years with the insis­tence of the (Euro­pean) Com­mis­sion and the troi­ka” had pro­longed and exac­er­bat­ed Greece’s finan­cial cri­sis and ener­gy pover­ty in the coun­try.

“Troi­ka” refers to the Com­mis­sion, Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund and Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank, who togeth­er over­see the 240 bil­lion euro res­cue loans Greece began receiv­ing in 2010.

The word “troi­ka” got a bad name in Greece after mid-lev­el offi­cials from those insti­tu­tions would vis­it Greece to car­ry out debt inspec­tions. The new gov­ern­ment has refused to deal with those offi­cials, say­ing they are not wel­come in Greece. On Wednes­day, it said the team of low­er-lev­el tech­ni­cal experts with whom Greek offi­cials would be nego­ti­at­ing on reforms would now be known as the ‘Brus­sels Group.’

...

Lafaza­nis has fre­quent­ly repeat­ed his oppo­si­tion to pri­va­ti­za­tions. Last month, he said the pri­va­ti­za­tion of the coun­try’s pow­er grid and pow­er util­i­ty, DEH, would be halt­ed as final bind­ing bids had not yet been sub­mit­ted.

In his speech Wednes­day, Lafaza­nis said his coun­try want­ed diverse ener­gy sources but would not be depen­dent on “any large pow­er and of any coali­tion of coun­tries.”

“Greece is too small a coun­try to remain a type of depen­dent ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torate ... with the sta­tus of an ener­gy banana repub­lic.”

As Greece’s ener­gy and envi­ron­ment min­is­ter points out:

Greece is too small a coun­try to remain a type of depen­dent ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torate ... with the sta­tus of an ener­gy banana repub­lic.

And that’s cer­tain­ly true, although it would also apply to large ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torates. Gen­er­al­ly speak­ing, being a ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torate sucks regard­less of size

Still, being a small ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torate is cer­tain­ly a lot worse than being a small­er one. As the say­ing goes, “If you owe the bank $100 that’s your prob­lem. If you owe the bank $100 mil­lion, that’s the bank’s prob­lem.” And while a ‘Grex­it’ cer­tain­ly car­ries the risk of a finan­cial or polit­i­cal ‘con­ta­gion’, it’s also the case that a ‘Grex­it’ might be man­age­able for the rest of the EU in the sense that the finan­cial costs would most­ly hit nation­al bud­gets and not pri­vate banks since most of Greece’s debt at this point is owed to the IMF, ECB, and EU gov­ern­ments (although pri­vate banks would still be weak­ened). If Greece was the size of, say, France, the man­age­abil­i­ty of a ‘Grex­it’ would­n’t even be in ques­tion. A ‘Francex­it’ would be a com­plete and imme­di­ate dis­as­ter for all par­ties involved and no one would even be pon­der­ing the man­age­abil­i­ty of the event.

That’s part of what makes the con­tem­po­rary Greek tragedy so grip­ping: At this point, tiny Greece is the only Euro­pean coun­try that has real­ly put up a sig­nif­i­cant resis­tance to the Berlin-run troi­ka-regime. The only one.

So giv­en Greece’s over­all ‘troikan’ sit­u­a­tion the nations has to resist some­how and change the sit­u­a­tion, but it can’t real­ly resist alone. At least not very effec­tive­ly. And before the great col­lec­tive Greek beat down by the entire EU it was the rest of South­ern Europe (plus Ire­land) that was (and still large­ly is) basi­cal­ly in the same ‘troikan’ posi­tion of pow­er­less­ness in the face of of the EU’s new Ordolib­er­al ‘gold­en rule’ par­a­digm. So when you see the rest of Europe fall into line with the “Lazy Greeks, let’s kick them out” meme (which is the dom­i­nant atti­tude across the EU today), that’s basi­cal­ly a man­i­fes­ta­tion of the accep­tance of “depen­dent ‘troikan’ eco­nom­ic pro­tec­torate” sta­tus by the rest of EU periph­ery. It’s real­ly quite shock­ing and sad.

Still, at least there’s one gov­ern­ment left in Europe that isn’t casu­al­ly accept­ing its ‘troikan’ pro­tec­torate sta­tus. Whether or not the resis­tance ends up being suc­cess­ful or large­ly sym­bol­ic remains to be seen, but giv­en the mass capit­u­la­tion across Europe to far-right dog­ma in recent years, any attempt to pull Europe back from the abyss of soci­ety-destroy­ing eco­nom­ics is a lot bet­ter than noth­ing:

Greece appoints new man­age­ment at pri­vati­sa­tion agency

ATHENS, March 17
Mon Mar 16, 2015 7:07pm EDT

(Reuters) — Greece appoint­ed ear­ly on Tues­day new man­age­ment at the coun­try’s pri­vati­sa­tion agency (HRADF), which is expect­ed to play a key role in imple­ment­ing the left­ist gov­ern­men­t’s plans to lim­it fur­ther state asset sell-offs.

Aste­r­ios Pit­sior­las, a busi­ness­man involved in the tourism sec­tor, will become chair­man of the agency while Anto­nis Leous­sis, for­mer chief exec­u­tive at Greece’s fourth biggest lender Alpha Bank’s real estate arm, will be chief exec­u­tive.

Pit­sior­las and Leous­sis will replace Emmanuel Kondylis and Paschalis Bou­cho­ris, appoint­ed to the helm of the agency in July by the for­mer con­ser­v­a­tive gov­ern­ment.

...

Dur­ing a par­lia­men­tary com­mit­tee which ran over into the ear­ly hours of Tues­day, Vala­vani said she would present leg­is­la­tion to cre­ate a new body to man­age state assets, reit­er­at­ing a pre­vi­ous sug­ges­tion that the HRADF would even­tu­al­ly be replaced.

Syriza has long opposed sell-offs under­tak­en by the pre­vi­ous con­ser­v­a­tive-led gov­ern­ment but has been forced to some­what mod­er­ate its stance as Greece nego­ti­ates with its Euro­pean part­ners over a new aid pack­age.

Greek rep­re­sen­ta­tives start­ed talks with offi­cial inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors in Brus­sels last week in a bid to agree on a set of reforms and unlock much-need­ed funds.

Pri­vati­sa­tions had been meant to raise bil­lions for Greece’s deplet­ed state cof­fers under its 240-bil­lion-euro bailout with the Euro­pean Union and the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund since 2010.

Pro­ceeds have been dis­ap­point­ing so far, amount­ing to about 3 bil­lion euros, a frac­tion of an ini­tial­ly tar­get­ed 22 bil­lion euros.

Note that Greece replaced the head of the state pri­va­ti­za­tion agency just days before Junck­er’s “human­i­tar­i­an assis­tance” offer. Could that have prompt­ed Junck­er’s human­i­tar­i­an aid offer?

Also note how:

Pri­vati­sa­tions had been meant to raise bil­lions for Greece’s deplet­ed state cof­fers under its 240-bil­lion-euro bailout with the Euro­pean Union and the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund since 2010.

Pro­ceeds have been dis­ap­point­ing so far, amount­ing to about 3 bil­lion euros, a frac­tion of an ini­tial­ly tar­get­ed 22 bil­lion euros.

Yep, The whole pri­va­ti­za­tion idea has basi­cal­ly been a bust so far any­ways.

But with a large frac­tion of the troika’s desired pri­va­ti­za­tions yet to be done, there’s still quite a bit of poten­tial pri­va­ti­za­tions still on the chop­ping block. So the troi­ka may not take Greece’s “pri­va­ti­za­tions for the pub­lic good” pro­pos­als very light­ly despite the lack­lus­ter pri­va­ti­za­tion scheme thus far.

Still, on the sur­face the Greek gov­ern­men­t’s reformed pri­va­ti­za­tion plans may not seem like some­thing that should piss the troi­ka off too much. After all, the empir­i­cal evi­dence that pri­va­ti­za­tions help alle­vi­ate fis­cal crises isn’t real­ly there.

So if the pro­ceeds get spent on social wel­fare instead of pay­ing back cred­i­tors quite as quick­ly and it keeps the rab­ble from total­ly rebelling, who cares as long as Greece basi­cal­ly stays under the thumb of the troi­ka?

When is 2 bil­lion euros for human­i­tar­i­an aid not gen­er­ous? When it’s in place of 4 bil­lion euros for human­i­tar­i­an aid. And maybe a lot more
Giv­en that Junck­er just made the 2 bil­lion euro “human­i­tar­i­an aid” offer day, one might be tempt­ed to assume that this pri­va­ti­za­tion pro­pos­al isn’t any dif­fer­ent than just hav­ing Greece spend­ing the pri­va­ti­za­tions pro­ceeds on human­i­tar­i­an aid instead of pay­ing back its troi­ka cred­i­tors. The num­bers might not be quite the same, but still, if Greece pays back the troi­ka through pri­va­ti­za­tions and recieves 2 bil­lion in human­i­tar­i­an aid, is that real­ly all that dif­fer­ent from Greece obtain­ing that human­i­tar­i­an aid itself through pri­va­ti­za­tions and instead of pay­ing back the troi­ka entire­ly?

Well, the troi­ka might care, in part because the 2 bil­lion euros the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion offered to Greece for human­i­tar­i­an aid is half the amount the troi­ka is expect­ing pri­va­ti­za­tions to bring in this year alone:

Hard for Greece to avoid pri­va­ti­za­tion, pen­sion reform: EU offi­cials

By Jan Strupczews­ki

BRUSSELS Mon Mar 23, 2015 1:27pm EDT

(Reuters) — Greece can choose its own reforms to unblock the flow of loans from inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors and stave off bank­rupt­cy, but it will have a hard time avoid­ing pri­va­ti­za­tions and a pen­sion reform because of their bud­get impact, Euro­pean offi­cials said.

A new left-wing gov­ern­ment and euro zone cred­i­tors agreed last week that Athens would present with­in days a list of its own reforms that must achieve sim­i­lar fis­cal results to the mea­sures agreed by the pre­vi­ous con­ser­v­a­tive-led cab­i­net.

“The last gov­ern­ment did not com­plete the ‘pri­or actions’ nec­es­sary for the final dis­burse­ment. Noth­ing has changed, the pri­or actions are the same. But the mea­sures can be changed if they do not jeop­ar­dize debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty,” one euro zone offi­cial said.

Which reforms to choose is polit­i­cal­ly sen­si­tive because the Syriza par­ty of Prime Min­is­ter Alex­is Tsipras won a gen­er­al elec­tion in Jan­u­ary on a plat­form of end­ing the poli­cies of its pre­de­ces­sors, includ­ing bud­get aus­ter­i­ty and mea­sures it regards as reces­sion­ary.

If the cred­i­tors agree the sub­sti­tute plans will achieve an impact equiv­a­lent to the pre­vi­ous­ly agreed mea­sures, Greece would get more loans from the euro zone and the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund, avert­ing bank­rupt­cy and a pos­si­ble euro exit.

The start­ing point for talks with the IMF, the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank and the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion — “the insti­tu­tions” — is a long list agreed to by Tsipras’ pre­de­ces­sors.

“They need to per­suade the insti­tu­tions that some of the mea­sures should not be under­tak­en — to be either dropped, or sup­ple­ment­ed by oth­ers,” one senior euro zone offi­cial said.

Pri­va­ti­za­tion is like­ly to be one of the major hur­dles, offi­cials said, because it was due to con­tribute 4 bil­lion euros to the bud­get this year alone. The Tsipras gov­ern­ment does not want to sell state assets, although it has agreed in prin­ci­ple not to stop sales that had been ini­ti­at­ed already.

A reform of the pen­sion sys­tem is anoth­er stick­ing point, where the EU is con­cerned about ear­ly retire­ment priv­i­leges and the need to link ben­e­fits to the size of con­tri­bu­tions.

...

Once Athens agrees on the list with its cred­i­tors and starts imple­ment­ing the changes, more loans could start flow­ing grad­u­al­ly.

“This is where there can be flex­i­bil­i­ty, they can do it step by step and get step by step mon­ey,” the senior offi­cial said.

Yes, the troi­ka clear­ly isn’t keen on allow­ing Greece to waive the pri­va­ti­za­tions, with pri­va­ti­za­tions from this year alone expect­ed to con­tribute 4 bil­lion euros to Greece’s bud­get, a sig­nif­i­cant amount when you con­sid­er that only 3 bil­lion euros has been raised by all the pri­va­ti­za­tions up to now.

Also now that the 4 bil­lion euros the troi­ka is expect­ing the pri­va­ti­za­tions to con­tribute to Greece’s cof­fers is also dou­ble the 2 bil­lion euros that Jean-Claude Junck­er pledged for Greece’s “human­i­tar­i­an aid”? Dou­ble. Could that have been part of the moti­va­tion before the 2 bil­lion euro offer? After all, if the troi­ka can con­vince Greece to waive its “pri­va­ti­za­tions for human­i­tar­i­an needs” plan and just take the 2 bil­lion euros of aid instead, that poten­tial­ly gets the troi­ka 2 bil­lion in extra pro­ceeds this year since so much of what goes into Greece’s cof­fers goes right back out and into the troika’s cof­fers.

So, in that con­text, the EU’s 2 bil­lion euro human­i­tar­i­an aid offer is per­haps less a belat­ed­ly gen­er­ous offer of 2 bil­lion euros to the suf­fer­ing Greece and more an attempt to spend­ing 2 bil­lion in human­i­tar­i­an aid to pre­vent 4 bil­lion euros from get­ting spent humane­ly. At least that seems like a pos­si­ble expla­na­tion for the EU Com­mis­sions unusu­al behav­ior. And that’s just 4 bil­lion euros pro­ject­ed to be raised this this year...recall that the orig­i­nal plan was for 22 bil­lion euros to be raised through pri­va­ti­za­tions.

What’s the val­ue of a real­ly bad idea? More that 2 bil­lion euros?
But it may not sim­ply be about sav­ing bil­lions of euros for the troi­ka. Look at it this way: At this point, it’s abun­dant­ly clear that inter­twined economies of the EU, and espe­cial­ly in the euro­zone, are act­ing as both the glue that holds Europe togeth­er and the cud­gel that keeps mem­ber nations in line. And strict adher­ence to “the rules” and bal­anc­ing ledgers and trade imbal­ances is clear­ly intend­ed to be a top pri­or­i­ty in order to allow the mon­ey-glue-cud­gel to work its mag­ic (“mag­ic” being defined as get­ting the rab­ble to do what they’re told with­out ful­ly real­iz­ing they’re being told what to do). Mam­mon and tech­nocrats (and Berlin) run Europe now. Democ­ra­cy is sort of old school.

That’s all one of the rea­sons why rolling back of social and eco­nom­ic pro­grams that pro­tect the vul­ner­a­ble and make life bet­ter for every­one makes so much sense for Europe’s elites: The 20th cen­tu­ry wel­fare state that mid­dle class­es around the world have come to rely on is also one of the great­est polit­i­cal tools for empow­er­ing the rab­ble ever cre­at­ed. Non-eco­nom­i­cal­ly des­per­ate peo­ple are polit­i­cal empow­ered peo­ple, and you can’t have a mon­ey-glue-cud­gel if the rab­ble is polit­i­cal­ly empow­ered. And few things can more effec­tive polit­i­cal­ly dis­em­pow­er a soci­ety than rolling back eco­nom­ic safe­guards so much that no one has the time or finan­cial secu­ri­ty to tru­ly. Pro-pover­ty poli­cies are a no-brain­er for the troi­ka.

But it’s not just about dis­em­pow­er­ing the mass­es and tak­ing away their socioe­co­nom­ic pro­tec­tions. If you want to tran­si­tion to a sta­ble form of vas­sal state-tech­noc­ra­cy you also need to fill peo­ple’s heads with the kind of garbage ideas that pre­vent them from ever pre­sent­ing any mean­ing­ful form of resis­tance. And if you look at the ideas and jus­ti­fi­ca­tions behind what the troi­ka has been doing it’s pret­ty clear that ham­mer­ing hor­ri­ble eco­nom­ic ideas into the heads of Europe’s mass­es is a top pri­or­i­ty.

And it’s that dri­ve to teach the kinds of lessons that can be exploit­ed over and over As part of the process of explain­ing why Europe is inten­tion­al­ly implod­ing its soci­eties and aggres­sive­ly dis­man­tling the social safe­ty-net. Ideas like:

“High debt is the pri­ma­ry root of evil”

have been cou­pled with ideas like:

“Just keep cut­ting expens­es and pay­ing back that debt and you will become free and strong”

Those two core con­cepts are now dom­i­nat­ing not just EU pol­i­cy-mak­ing but the hearts and minds of the Euro­pean pub­lic. But the absolute­ly cru­cials com­ple­men­tary ideas like:

“Avoid­ing usury is a good idea”

and:

“If a nation simul­ta­ne­ous­ly cuts back on spend­ing it’s going to have a reces­sion or worse. And if many nations simul­ta­ne­ous­ly do this you might have a depres­sion

were inten­tion­al­ly unper­son­ed!

Even worse, ideas like:

“Pover­ty is a destruc­tive force that should not be tol­er­at­ed”

is not only not present in the pan-Euro­pean dis­course but that anti-pover­ty idea would derail the entire troi­ka agen­da.

As a result of this mix of bad ideas (and omit­ted good ideas), the over­rid­ing meme that’s come to dom­i­nate the EU’s rea­son­ing dur­ing this cri­sis is some­thing like:

“High debt is bad. Pover­ty is ok. There­fore, induc­ing pover­ty as a means of alle­vi­at­ing bad debt is not only fine but our only option since all of the oth­er (Key­ne­sian) options involve tem­porar­i­ly tak­ing on more debt

Bad ideas like that must reign supreme if the new cred­i­tor’s par­adise is going to be sus­tained. The rab­ble needs to tru­ly believe ideas like:

The whole of Europe can pros­per if only they all become export pow­er­hous­es with mas­sive trade sur­plus­es just like Ger­many. That won’t screw up the world econ­o­my or any­thing. Nope.

Total­ly crazy ideas like that have become the polit­i­cal­ly cor­rect offi­cial tru­isms for much of Europe.

But just imag­ine if 4 bil­lion euros got spent on help­ing Greece’s need­i­est instead of going right back into the troika’s cof­fers? And just imag­ine if that 4 bil­lion euros worked won­ders in lives across Greece and every­one got to com­pare those won­ders to a bunch of num­bers on the troika’s ledgers. That prob­a­bly would­n’t be a troi­ka-friend­ly com­par­i­son in many minds (on the oth­er hand...). So if the troi­ka lets Greece spend its pri­va­ti­za­tion pro­ceeds on human­i­tar­i­an aid instead of pay­ing back its cred­i­tors, and that aid is seen actu­al­ly help­ing peo­ple (just imag­ine 4 bil­lion euros in actu­al social wel­fare spend­ing), the seem­ing­ly end­less dri­ve towards cre­at­ing a new EU ‘cred­i­tor’s par­adise’ sud­den­ly hits a speed bump. Peo­ple might actu­al­ly start ask­ing them­selves what the hell they’re doing to them­selves.

A cred­i­tor’s par­adise is a pri­vate par­adise
So with Greece’s nego­ti­a­tions with the troi­ka yet to be con­clud­ed, keep an eye on the pri­va­ti­za­tion com­po­nent of the nego­ti­a­tions because that new “social wel­fare sov­er­eign wealth fund” pro­pos­al may not amount to very much in terms of the size of the fund rel­a­tive to the needs of Greece’s soci­ety, but the very ideas behind it are anti­thet­i­cal to the pro-mar­ket-suprema­cy/Or­dolib­er­al foun­da­tions that the new Europe is sup­posed to be based on. Human­i­tar­i­an aid to your peo­ple comes after you’ve devel­oped a strong export sec­tor in the new EU. Espe­cial­ly the euro­zone.

The new, per­ma­nent­ly right-wing Europe needs a pop­u­lace that thinks kitchen table eco­nom­ics makes for good nation-state eco­nom­ics because that’s a pop­u­lace that could can be crushed over and over. What’s that? There’s a tem­po­rary fis­cal cri­sis? Let’s slash pub­lic spend­ing on use­ful social pro­grams and dereg­u­late busi­ness! Once busi­ness explodes we can bring back the use­ful pro­grams. An eco­nom­i­cal­ly con­fused, eas­i­ly manip­u­lat­ed pop­u­lace that is per­pet­u­al­ly nav­i­gat­ing a socioe­co­nom­ic land­scape it can’t pos­si­bly under­stand because that land­scape does­n’t make any sense and the pub­lic dis­course about it is a bunch of non­sense intend­ed to keep the rab­ble con­fused and obliv­i­ous.

THAT’s the dream! That per­fect, spe­cial dream where elites use garbage socioe­co­nom­ic par­a­digms to some­how “prove” to the rubes that it’s real­ly in their best inter­ests to we give up on this whole “empow­er­ment and non-pover­ty for the mass­es” thing and instead divide and con­quer them­selves and let the big boys run things unchecked again. A return to the his­toric norm. It’s a clas­sic.

But it’s a dream so beau­ti­ful that some­thing like a pri­va­ti­za­tion fund intend­ed for social pro­grams would just spoil every­thing. Ok, not every­thing, but it would cer­tain­ly go against Europe’s new unof­fi­cial right-wing neolib­er­al ide­ol­o­gy.

Why? Because a pri­va­tion fund for social pro­grams isn’t part of the troika’s plan and the long-term plan for Europe is obvi­ous­ly to have a col­lec­tion of ‘troikan’ pro­tec­torates that duti­ful­ly fol­low what­ev­er plan Europe’s elites hand them, regard­less of the con­se­quences to their peo­ple. In oth­er words, human­i­tar­i­an aid from pri­va­ti­za­tion pro­ceeds isn’t just an attempt to alle­vi­ate a human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis. It’s an act of defi­ance, albeit mod­er­ate defi­ance since the Greek gov­ern­ment would pre­fer to not do any pri­va­ti­za­tions at all. And while there are cer­tain­ly instances when mem­ber states in a union can defy a fed­er­al pow­er in unjus­ti­fi­able ways that war­rant fed­er­al action (this of John F. Kennedy’s show­down with Gov­er­nor Wal­lace), in Greece’s case we’re talk­ing about an act of defi­ance that’s nec­es­sary to alle­vi­ate a human­i­tar­i­an cri­sis direct­ly caused by the actions of those rul­ing inter­na­tion­al insti­tu­tions that are being defied. And you can’t have that elite ‘cred­i­tor’s par­adise’ dream if gov­ern­ments are allowed to engage in acts of defi­ance even when they’re try­ing save their own peo­ple. That’s just not going to work.

All in all, we’re in a very strange place in the ever-evolv­ing new EU. It’s true that you have to have some sort of shar­ing of sov­er­eign­ty for the EU to work and that’s sig­nif­i­cant­ly more true for the euro­zone. And if mem­ber states are able just ignore past agree­ments that’s not going to work at all. But at the same time, you can’t just have a “rules”-based union that is com­plete­ly divorced from real­i­ty, espe­cial­ly when those rules pri­or­i­tize nation­al finances and oth­er macro­eco­nom­ic met­rics over basic human needs. This ten­sion should sounds famil­iar at this point since it’s very sim­i­lar to the ten­sion between cred­i­tor and debtor mem­ber states that EU lead­ers and elites have been usu­ri­ous­ly mis­un­der­stand­ing for years now.

And while that ten­sion between the need for adher­ence to the rules and the need for sane, humane rules has always exist­ed, what makes this sit­u­a­tion so strange for Europe is that large swathes of the con­tent seems to have col­lec­tive­ly for­got­ten that if you expect peo­ple to fol­low your rules those rules need to be sane rules in the first place. This should be obvi­ous, but it appar­ent­ly isn’t. And, sad­ly, the only rea­son the EU is try­ing to resolve this ten­sion at all is because a lone gov­ern­ment has decid­ed to point out that ten­sion by open­ly chal­leng­ing the inhu­mane rules and call­ing a bloody spade a bloody spade. Just one.

So we can expect to find out the troika’s offi­cial response to Greece’s ‘pri­va­ti­za­tion for human­i­tar­i­an aid’ pro­pos­al soon enough. But giv­en every­thing we’ve seen so far, we can real­ly expect it to be a rea­son­able or humane response. Pri­va­ti­za­tions are part of the elite vision for Europe and that vision will not be F***ed with, regard­less of cir­cum­stance. If you’re going to build a ‘cred­i­tor’s par­adise’, blind adher­ence to the rules is the first rule.

Discussion

103 comments for “Greek Privatization Proceeds for Anti-Poverty Policies? Probably Not, But We’ll See”

  1. House­keep­ing Note: Com­ments 1–50 avail­able here
    Com­ments 51–100 avail­able here

    ————————-

    It looks like we might be get­ting an answer to the lin­ger­ing ques­tion of how the IMF’s demands for sub­stan­tial Greek debt relief as a con­di­tion for the IMF’s con­tin­u­ing par­tic­i­pa­tion in the Greek ‘bailout’ scheme will be resolved in the face of implaca­ble oppo­si­tion in Berlin and oth­er hard­line eur­zone cap­i­tals to any mean­ing­ful debt relief: Angela Merkel’s CDU is drop­ping its long-stand­ing demands that the IMF be includ­ed in the Greek bailout pro­gram.

    In oth­er words, at the end of all this and after the years of bru­tal aus­ter­i­ty there’s most like­ly going to be no mean­ing­ful debt relief for Greece at all, thus guar­an­tee­ing that Greece will have to keep in place the mas­sive aus­ter­i­ty pro­gram and run mas­sive bud­get sur­plus­es for like­ly decades to come. Sur­prise!:

    Finan­cial Times

    Merkel’s par­ty drops insis­tence on IMF stay­ing in Greek bailout
    CDU/CSU group sug­gests deci­sive shift because of fund’s call for debt relief

    Guy Chaz­an in Berlin and Mehreen Khan in Brus­sels
    May 31, 2018, 10:00 PM

    Angela Merkel’s con­ser­v­a­tive par­ty no longer insists that the IMF con­tin­ues to par­tic­i­pate in Greece’s bailout pro­gramme, in a deci­sive change reflect­ing anx­i­ety about the fund’s calls for debt relief for Athens.

    Eck­hardt Rehberg, spokesman of the CDU/CSU par­lia­men­tary group for bud­getary pol­i­cy, told the Finan­cial Times that “with the IMF insist­ing on large-scale debt relief for Greece — they have been talk­ing about a three-dig­it num­ber — I have a prob­lem.”

    “The ques­tion is: Is the price of IMF par­tic­i­pa­tion in the next pro­gramme too high?” he said.

    The shift in the Ger­man posi­tion, at least in the influ­en­tial CDU/CSU par­lia­men­tary group, could help ease last-ditch talks between euro­zone gov­ern­ments and the IMF on the side­lines of the G7 meet­ing in Cana­da this week­end.

    Chris­tine Lagarde, IMF man­ag­ing direc­tor, will be attend­ing the meet­ing, which will also bring togeth­er the finance min­is­ters of Ger­many and France.

    Although the Greek econ­o­my returned to mod­est growth in the past year, the coun­try still lan­guish­es under the bur­den of the €248bn it owes to the euro­zone and the IMF.

    The fund had agreed in prin­ci­ple to pro­vide Greece with a small cred­it line of €1.6bn, but it want­ed euro­zone gov­ern­ments to pro­vide more clar­i­ty on debt relief before it made a finan­cial com­mit­ment. How­ev­er, Ger­many and its north­ern Euro­pean allies resist­ed such demands, fear­ing their tax­pay­ers would lose out.

    ...

    The Ger­man finance min­istry, how­ev­er, con­tin­ues to insist that IMF involve­ment is “indis­pens­able”, three months ahead of Greece’s planned exit from the bailout this sum­mer.

    If a deal is not thrashed out at the G7 finance min­is­ters’ meet­ing in Whistler, British Colum­bia, on Mon­day at the lat­est, IMF offi­cials have warned that the fund will not have enough time to acti­vate and then review its Greek pro­gramme. Hawk­ish euro­zone cap­i­tals, includ­ing Berlin and The Hague, are open to the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the IMF stay­ing involved with Greece but with­out pro­vid­ing any mon­ey to the bailout.

    Some offi­cials are wor­ried that mar­ket jit­ters trig­gered by Italy’s polit­i­cal cri­sis will ham­per Greece’s abil­i­ty to raise more debt once it exits the third bailout in August. That would make the IMF’s role even more cru­cial in con­vinc­ing ner­vous investors that Greece can stay sol­vent.

    Ger­man law­mak­ers have insist­ed on IMF par­tic­i­pa­tion in the Greek bailout since the country’s first res­cue pack­age in 2010. Wary of the Euro­pean Commission’s role in admin­is­ter­ing bailouts, Wolf­gang Schäu­ble, the for­mer Ger­man finance min­is­ter, con­vinced scep­ti­cal Ger­man MPs that the IMF’s stamp of approval would lend cred­i­bil­i­ty to a pro­gramme that involved bil­lions in Ger­man tax­pay­ers’ mon­ey.

    Germany’s par­lia­ment agreed to back the cur­rent €86bn bailout, nego­ti­at­ed by EU lead­ers in 2015, on con­di­tion the IMF would con­tin­ue its involve­ment.

    Part of the con­flict between some euro­zone mem­bers and the IMF is a dif­fer­ence of views on how sus­tain­able Greece’s debt is, with Ger­many and oth­er gov­ern­ments more opti­mistic about Greece’s growth prospects than the IMF.

    “We don’t agree with the fund’s debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty analy­sis,” Mr Rehberg said. “At the moment the IMF and the com­mis­sion are quite far apart in terms of their growth assump­tions for Greece.” He not­ed, how­ev­er, that nego­ti­a­tions between the IMF and Euro­pean insti­tu­tions “are still going on”.

    ———-

    “Merkel’s par­ty drops insis­tence on IMF stay­ing in Greek bailout” by Guy Chaz­an and Mehreen Khan; Finan­cial Times; 05/31/2018

    “Angela Merkel’s con­ser­v­a­tive par­ty no longer insists that the IMF con­tin­ues to par­tic­i­pate in Greece’s bailout pro­gramme, in a deci­sive change reflect­ing anx­i­ety about the fund’s calls for debt relief for Athens.

    Don’t for­get that it was Ger­man law­mak­ers were demand­ed the IMF be part of the ‘bailout’ pro­gram from the very begin­ning, due, in part, to fears that the EU would­n’t have the will to make the kinds of aus­ter­i­ty demands the IMF is known for:

    ...
    Ger­man law­mak­ers have insist­ed on IMF par­tic­i­pa­tion in the Greek bailout since the country’s first res­cue pack­age in 2010. Wary of the Euro­pean Commission’s role in admin­is­ter­ing bailouts, Wolf­gang Schäu­ble, the for­mer Ger­man finance min­is­ter, con­vinced scep­ti­cal Ger­man MPs that the IMF’s stamp of approval would lend cred­i­bil­i­ty to a pro­gramme that involved bil­lions in Ger­man tax­pay­ers’ mon­ey.

    Germany’s par­lia­ment agreed to back the cur­rent €86bn bailout, nego­ti­at­ed by EU lead­ers in 2015, on con­di­tion the IMF would con­tin­ue its involve­ment.
    ...

    And now the IMF is seen as too dovish. That’s how insane the EU is. Still:

    ...
    Eck­hardt Rehberg, spokesman of the CDU/CSU par­lia­men­tary group for bud­getary pol­i­cy, told the Finan­cial Times that “with the IMF insist­ing on large-scale debt relief for Greece — they have been talk­ing about a three-dig­it num­ber — I have a prob­lem.”

    “The ques­tion is: Is the price of IMF par­tic­i­pa­tion in the next pro­gramme too high?” he said.

    The shift in the Ger­man posi­tion, at least in the influ­en­tial CDU/CSU par­lia­men­tary group, could help ease last-ditch talks between euro­zone gov­ern­ments and the IMF on the side­lines of the G7 meet­ing in Cana­da this week­end.

    Chris­tine Lagarde, IMF man­ag­ing direc­tor, will be attend­ing the meet­ing, which will also bring togeth­er the finance min­is­ters of Ger­many and France.
    ...

    “Eck­hardt Rehberg, spokesman of the CDU/CSU par­lia­men­tary group for bud­getary pol­i­cy, told the Finan­cial Times that “with the IMF insist­ing on large-scale debt relief for Greece — they have been talk­ing about a three-dig­it num­ber — I have a prob­lem.””

    Keep in mind that when the CDU/CSU spokesman says he has “a prob­lem” with the IMF insist­ing on large-scale debt relief in the ‘three-dig­it num­ber’ range, the CDU has actu­al­ly con­sis­tent­ly had a prob­lem with any debt for­give­ness at all. The most they will con­sid­er is sim­ply extend­ing loans, thus ensur­ing even more decades of aus­ter­i­ty for Greece. As the arti­cle notes, Greece still owes its Troikan cred­i­tors 248 bil­lion euros:

    ...
    Although the Greek econ­o­my returned to mod­est growth in the past year, the coun­try still lan­guish­es under the bur­den of the €248bn it owes to the euro­zone and the IMF.

    The fund had agreed in prin­ci­ple to pro­vide Greece with a small cred­it line of €1.6bn, but it want­ed euro­zone gov­ern­ments to pro­vide more clar­i­ty on debt relief before it made a finan­cial com­mit­ment. How­ev­er, Ger­many and its north­ern Euro­pean allies resist­ed such demands, fear­ing their tax­pay­ers would lose­out.
    ...

    Inter­est­ing­ly, the Ger­man finance min­istry is still insist­ing on ongo­ing IMF involve­ment. And the most hawk­ish euro­zone cap­i­tals appear to be open to a sce­nario for the IMF remains involved with the pro­gram but with­out putting up any mon­ey. It will basi­cal­ly just be an aus­ter­i­ty enforcer at that point:

    ...
    The Ger­man finance min­istry, how­ev­er, con­tin­ues to insist that IMF involve­ment is “indis­pens­able”, three months ahead of Greece’s planned exit from the bailout this sum­mer.

    If a deal is not thrashed out at the G7 finance min­is­ters’ meet­ing in Whistler, British Colum­bia, on Mon­day at the lat­est, IMF offi­cials have warned that the fund will not have enough time to acti­vate and then review its Greek pro­gramme. Hawk­ish euro­zone cap­i­tals, includ­ing Berlin and The Hague, are open to the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the IMF stay­ing involved with Greece but with­out pro­vid­ing any mon­ey to the bailout.
    ...

    And note how this is all hap­pen­ing the con­text of the emerg­ing Ital­ian anti-aus­ter­i­ty show­down with the euro­zone. So right when Greece is sup­posed to return to the inter­na­tion­al debt mar­kets in August the euro­zone could be in the midst of a whole new Ital­ian cri­sis that’s prob­a­bly going to make Greek debt much more expen­sive to finance. And if the IMF pulls out of the pro­gram those mar­ket con­cerns over Greek debt are going to be even more exac­er­bat­ed. So if Greece has to pay high­er than expect­ed inter­est rates on its debt that means more aus­ter­i­ty and/or a slow­er pay­down of Greece’s debt load:

    ...
    Some offi­cials are wor­ried that mar­ket jit­ters trig­gered by Italy’s polit­i­cal cri­sis will ham­per Greece’s abil­i­ty to raise more debt once it exits the third bailout in August. That would make the IMF’s role even more cru­cial in con­vinc­ing ner­vous investors that Greece can stay sol­vent.
    ...

    Yep, it’s look­ing like there’s going to be no mean­ing­ful debt relief and high­er than expect­ed inter­est rates for Greece as this last round of ‘bailouts’ wind down in August. And don’t for­get, a big part of the jus­ti­fi­ca­tion by the EU’s part for these poli­cies is an implau­si­bly opti­mistic expec­ta­tion that Greece is going to have robust eco­nom­ic growth for years and decades to come thanks to all these aus­ter­i­ty poli­cies. The IMF, to its cred­it, is of the opin­ion that years of mas­sive bud­get sur­plus­es and aus­ter­i­ty can’t be sus­tained indef­i­nite­ly. The EU dis­agrees:

    ...
    Part of the con­flict between some euro­zone mem­bers and the IMF is a dif­fer­ence of views on how sus­tain­able Greece’s debt is, with Ger­many and oth­er gov­ern­ments more opti­mistic about Greece’s growth prospects than the IMF.

    “We don’t agree with the fund’s debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty analy­sis,” Mr Rehberg said. “At the moment the IMF and the com­mis­sion are quite far apart in terms of their growth assump­tions for Greece.” He not­ed, how­ev­er, that nego­ti­a­tions between the IMF and Euro­pean insti­tu­tions “are still going on”.

    So, along those lines, let’s take a look at some state­ments the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion Mis­sion Chief for Greece just made to Greece about the mod­er­ate eco­nom­ic growth the coun­try is final­ly expe­ri­enc­ing years into this aus­ter­i­ty night­mare. It’s a mes­sage that could be sum­ma­rized as, “the growth you’re expe­ri­ence now is due to the aus­ter­i­ty we imposed all these years and if you don’t keep these aus­ter­i­ty poli­cies in place expect the growth to end.” He did­n’t put it quite that way, but that’s more or less his mes­sage to Greece. It’s a reminder that the EU’s wild­ly opti­mistic assump­tions about Greece’s growth prospects are root­ed in its wild­ly opti­mist (and large­ly failed) assump­tions about the pow­er of aus­ter­i­ty:

    Reuters

    Greece can­not afford pol­i­cy rever­sal after bailout ends: EU offi­cial

    Reuters Staff
    May 31, 2018 / 3:54 AM / Updat­ed

    ATHENS (Reuters) — Greece is on course to com­plete its third inter­na­tion­al bailout pro­gram but can­not afford to back­track on adopt­ed reforms after its expi­ra­tion in August, the Euro­pean Commission’s mis­sion chief to Greece said on Thurs­day.
    Since its debt cri­sis broke out eight years ago, the coun­try has received 260 bil­lion euros in bailout loans from the Euro­pean Union and the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund in exchange for aus­ter­i­ty and reforms pre­scribed by its lenders.

    ...

    “Greece must ensure that reforms are on track, … and must avoid pol­i­cy rever­sal after the pro­gram ends,” Declan Costel­lo, one of the lenders’ rep­re­sen­ta­tives who super­vise the bailout imple­men­ta­tion, said dur­ing a con­fer­ence in Athens.

    Greece returned to growth last year and aims at mak­ing a full eco­nom­ic recov­ery in the com­ing years.

    But Costel­lo warned Greece not to get car­ried away by the pos­i­tive signs. “It should not be inter­pret­ed that all prob­lems have been solved. The struc­tur­al under­ly­ing prob­lems need to con­tin­ue to be addressed,” he said.

    “So, enjoy the growth bounce but don’t mis­in­ter­pret it.”

    ———-

    “Greece can­not afford pol­i­cy rever­sal after bailout ends: EU offi­cial” by Reuters Staff; Reuters; 05/31/2018

    ““Greece must ensure that reforms are on track, … and must avoid pol­i­cy rever­sal after the pro­gram ends,” Declan Costel­lo, one of the lenders’ rep­re­sen­ta­tives who super­vise the bailout imple­men­ta­tion, said dur­ing a con­fer­ence in Athens.”

    That was the warn­ing from the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion’s rep­re­sen­ta­tive to Greece now that Greece is approach­ing that point where it might actu­al­ly have the abil­i­ty to reverse the aus­ter­i­ty poli­cies: don’t do it even if you can.

    But Costel­lo’s com­ments weren’t couched as a mere threat to Greece. Instead, he appeared to be try­ing to make the case that Greece needs more aus­ter­i­ty in order to sus­tain its recent eco­nom­ic growth. Don’t for­get, the big fight between the IMF and EU is over the IMF’s con­clu­sion that Greece can’t keep this aus­ter­i­ty mad­ness up indef­i­nite­ly and the EU say­ing it can indeed do this indef­i­nite­ly:

    ...
    Greece returned to growth last year and aims at mak­ing a full eco­nom­ic recov­ery in the com­ing years.

    But Costel­lo warned Greece not to get car­ried away by the pos­i­tive signs. “It should not be inter­pret­ed that all prob­lems have been solved. The struc­tur­al under­ly­ing prob­lems need to con­tin­ue to be addressed,” he said.

    “So, enjoy the growth bounce but don’t mis­in­ter­pret it.”
    ...

    “So, enjoy the growth bounce but don’t mis­in­ter­pret it.” LOL! Yes, that’s good advice. Sad­ly, it’s the advice the EU should be giv­ing to itself.

    And when you read that Greece has received 260 bil­lion euros in loans from this bailout in exchange for these aus­ter­i­ty demands...

    ...
    Since its debt cri­sis broke out eight years ago, the coun­try has received 260 bil­lion euros in bailout loans from the Euro­pean Union and the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund in exchange for aus­ter­i­ty and reforms pre­scribed by its lenders.
    ...

    ...don’t for­get only 10 bil­lion of those euros went to stim­u­late Greece’s econ­o­my and the rest was used to pay back Greece’s pri­vate cred­i­tors, espe­cial­ly Ger­man banks. That’s the debt the EU refus­es to for­give.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | May 31, 2018, 10:17 pm
  2. Behold! The grand Greek debt relief pack­age has arrived! Just in time for Greece to return to the bond mar­kets after the cur­rent ‘bailout’ is offi­cial­ly com­plet­ed in August. And Klaus Regling, the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund, even called it “the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty that the world has ever seen.” Strong words. Strong insane words.

    So what makes this the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty the world has ever seen? Did Greece get the sub­stan­tial reduc­tion that would make Greece’s debt sit­u­a­tion sus­tain­able that IMF has long demand­ed in return for its con­tin­ued par­tic­i­pa­tion?

    Of course not. No, it’s exact­ly the kind of joke we should expect: Greece will get a 10 exten­sion and grace peri­od on 96bn euros in bailout loans com­ing due in 2022, which is about 40 per­cent of Greece’s total debt to the Troi­ka. Greece also gets 15bn euros from the cur­rent ‘bailout’ that will large­ly be used to boost Greece’s post-bailout cash reserves. That’s pret­ty much it. So Greece’s mas­sive debt load (still mas­sive after three ‘bailouts’) is going to remain mas­sive, but Greece will have more time to pay off that mas­sive debt. In oth­er words, its some­what less usu­ri­ous. Oh joy.

    And part of the rea­son it’s bare­ly bet­ter than noth­ing has to do with the strings attached: Greece is still expect­ed to main­tain a 3.5 per­cent bud­get sur­plus until 2022 as has pre­vi­ous­ly been demand­ed of it. But we now know what the Troi­ka is going to demand after 2022: a 2.2 per­cent bud­get sur­plus (which is still sub­stan­tial) until 2060. And don’t for­get that these bud­get sur­plus­es more or less demand aus­ter­i­ty to main­tain. Mon­ey that could be spent on edu­ca­tion and med­i­cine gets sent to the Troi­ka instead. And that’s going to be the case for Greece for the next 42 years under this plan.

    Part of the urgency in com­ing to a ‘debt relief’ agree­ment at this point is that the Troi­ka needs to assure the bond mar­kets that Greek debt is a safe invest­ment if anoth­er ‘bailout’ is going to be avoid­ed in the future. That’s also one of the rea­sons the EU is behav­ing as if this is actu­al­ly major debt relief. Because con­vinc­ing bond mar­kets that that this deal real­ly is putting Greece on sound foot­ing for decades to come is a key ele­ment of ensur­ing healthy demand for Greek bonds. At the same time, part of the rea­son this debt relief pack­age is so insub­stan­tial is that Ger­many report­ed­ly felt it was far to gen­er­ous and only grudg­ing­ly agreed to these terms. So a key ele­ment of the plan to assure bond mar­kets while still being stingy is for the EU to pre­dict that every­thing is going to be fine for Greece for decades to come.

    So has the IMF joined in on the opti­mistic enthu­si­asm? Not real­ly. The IMF wel­comed the deal but still held “reser­va­tions” about Greece’s longer-term debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty. Yep. The IMF just called the cen­tral aspect of this deal — whether or not it makes Greece’s debt sus­tain­able in the long run — a joke.

    And here’s the kick­er: one of the ideas used to jus­ti­fy the harsh terms of high bud­get sur­plus­es (basi­cal­ly indef­i­nite­ly) being imposed on Greece is the idea that the terms will be made more lenient if Greece goes into a reces­sion. Like, instead of a 3.5 per­cent sur­plus it might just be a 2 per­cent demand­ed sur­plus if Greece’s econ­o­my start­ed con­tract­ing again. And yes, a 2 per­cent sur­plus in a reces­sion would be insane, but that’s the kind of insan­i­ty the EU has nor­mal­ized for itself and talk of reduc­ing the repay­ment terms have been a key ele­ment of the nego­ti­a­tions over the future of Greece for months now.

    Well, guess what? There’s no talk of reduc­ing the terms in the face of hard eco­nom­ic times under this final agree­ment. In oth­er words, the exact same ‘expan­sion­ary aus­ter­i­ty’ dis­as­ter recipe of aus­ter­i­ty in the face of reces­sion — a pol­i­cy that inflict­ed a ‘lost decade’ across Europe — is still ful­ly in place in this final agree­ment. And that’s the deal the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund just called “the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty that the world has ever seen”:

    Finan­cial Times

    Euro­zone cred­i­tors reach ‘his­toric’ deal on Greek debt relief
    Repay­ment dead­lines on almost €100bn of bailout loans pushed back 10 years

    Mehreen Khan and Jim Bruns­den in Lux­em­bourg
    June 21, 2018 8:23 PM

    Euro­zone gov­ern­ments have bro­kered a long-await­ed debt relief deal for Greece, push­ing back repay­ment dead­lines on almost €100bn of bailout loans as the coun­try pre­pares to exit its era of finan­cial res­cue pro­grammes.

    Finance min­is­ters ham­mered out the final points of an agree­ment in more than six hours of talks that stretched into the night in Lux­em­bourg on Thurs­day. The deal was imme­di­ate­ly hailed by gov­ern­ments as a “his­toric” step after eight years in which Greece has under­gone three bailout pro­grammes and suf­fered the worst depres­sion of any Euro­pean econ­o­my in mod­ern times.

    “It is an excep­tion­al moment,” Pierre Moscovi­ci, the EU’s econ­o­my com­mis­sion­er, said after the meet­ing. “The Greek cri­sis ends here tonight in Lux­em­bourg.”

    The agree­ment means the repay­ment of €96bn of bailout loans, about 40 per cent of the total Greece needs to repay the euro­zone over the com­ing decades, will be pushed back 10 years. The ear­li­est repay­ment dead­lines shift from 2023 to 2033.

    Oth­er key part of the plan includes increas­ing the size of Greece’s final instal­ment of bailout mon­ey to help build up cash reserves that can sus­tain it over the months to come.

    A deal had become urgent giv­en the lit­tle time that remains until the end of Greece’s bailout pro­gramme on August 20, with the euro area keen to reas­sure investors that the country’s debt is sus­tain­able before Athens returns to rely­ing on the mar­kets to finance spend­ing.

    “Greece is turn­ing the page,” said Euclid Tsakalo­tos, the country’s finance min­is­ter. “We have all the build­ing blocks to leave the pro­gramme with con­fi­dence.”

    A com­pro­mise was reached after intense nego­ti­a­tions to resolve Ger­man reser­va­tions about parts of the debt relief pack­age. Hopes for quick agree­ment on Thurs­day evap­o­rat­ed when Olaf Scholz, Ger­man finance min­is­ter, set tough con­di­tions for accept­ing a sig­nif­i­cant matu­ri­ty exten­sion, prompt­ing fran­tic hours of talks that end­ed with calls to nation­al cap­i­tals ask­ing heads of state to give their bless­ing to the final com­pro­mise.

    Berlin was ret­i­cent about plans for a large increase in the size of Greece’s final tranche of bailout mon­ey from a planned €11.7bn, in the end accept­ing the amount could be raised to €15bn. This will leave Athens with cash reserves totalling €24.1bn, enough to sus­tain the coun­try for at least 22 months with­out it need­ing to go to the mar­kets.

    ...

    Berlin’s firm­ness reflects domes­tic pres­sure on Angela Merkel’s gov­ern­ment, notably from her Bavar­i­an con­ser­v­a­tive coali­tion part­ner, the CSU, which has crit­i­cised the chan­cel­lor for being too will­ing to use nation­al mon­ey to solve euro­zone prob­lems.

    Defer­ring repay­ment of the old­er bailout loans, includ­ing inter­est, by 10 years, and a par­al­lel deci­sion to extend their matu­ri­ties by the same amount of time, leaves Greece with very small debt repay­ments until after 2030, some­thing the euro area hopes will spur investors to buy the country’s bonds.

    The 10 year exten­sion was at the high­er end of EU offi­cials’ pre­dic­tions in the run-up to the meet­ing of what might be polit­i­cal­ly fea­si­ble. Euro­zone gov­ern­ments agreed last year that any exten­sion would be between zero and 15 years.

    Less sen­si­tive parts of the debt-relief deal, agreed just after the stroke of mid­night on Fri­day morn­ing, includ­ed return­ing to Greece about €1bn of annu­al prof­its that euro area cen­tral banks make on their hold­ings of the country’s debt.

    The final agree­ment leaves out plans worked on by gov­ern­ments to link fur­ther debt relief for Greece to the country’s eco­nom­ic per­for­mance, an idea that was once cen­tral to the pack­age but that had become mar­gin­alised in recent weeks in favour of focus­ing on the upfront matu­ri­ty exten­sion.

    A key pri­or­i­ty in the talks was to come up with a debt relief plan that could con­vince the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund that Greece’s debts are on a sus­tain­able path, after years of dis­agree­ments between the Wash­ing­ton-based fund and euro­zone gov­ern­ments, led by Berlin, over the state of the Greek econ­o­my.

    Chris­tine Lagarde, the IMF’s man­ag­ing direc­tor, wel­comed the deal but said the fund still held “reser­va­tions” about Greece’s longer-term debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty.

    As a con­di­tion for the relief, Athens will be required to main­tain a pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus, which excludes debt repay­ments, of 3.5 per cent of gross domes­tic prod­uct until 2022, with a tar­get that this will stay at 2.2 per cent on aver­age until 2060.

    Finance min­is­ters in their state­ment left the door open to poten­tial­ly grant Greece fur­ther relief in the long term, say­ing that they would return to the issue in 2032 — some­thing praised by Ms Lagarde and the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank.

    Mario Draghi, the ECB’s pres­i­dent, said that he wel­comed finance min­is­ters’ “readi­ness to con­sid­er fur­ther debt measures...in case adverse eco­nom­ic devel­op­ments were to mate­ri­alise”.

    ———–

    “Euro­zone cred­i­tors reach ‘his­toric’ deal on Greek debt relief” by Mehreen Khan and Jim Bruns­den; Finan­cial Times; 06/21/2018

    “It is an excep­tion­al moment,” Pierre Moscovi­ci, the EU’s econ­o­my com­mis­sion­er, said after the meet­ing. “The Greek cri­sis ends here tonight in Lux­em­bourg.”

    LOL! Did you hear? The Greek cri­sis just end­ed accord­ing to the EU’s econ­o­my com­mis­sion­er.

    But there is at least some debt relief: the night­mare gets deferred for a decade on 100 bil­lion in Greece’s loans, which is about 40 per­cent of Greece’s total debt to the Troi­ka:

    ...
    The agree­ment means the repay­ment of €96bn of bailout loans, about 40 per cent of the total Greece needs to repay the euro­zone over the com­ing decades, will be pushed back 10 years. The ear­li­est repay­ment dead­lines shift from 2023 to 2033.

    Oth­er key part of the plan includes increas­ing the size of Greece’s final instal­ment of bailout mon­ey to help build up cash reserves that can sus­tain it over the months to come.
    ...

    And we can’t for­get that this real­ly was close to the ‘last minute’ for such a deal to be worked out because Greece is return­ing to the bond mar­kets on August 20 and that makes the bond mar­ket’s opin­ion on the long term sus­tain­abil­i­ty of this debt deal an imme­di­ate major issue for the Troi­ka to offi­cial­ly wind up this :

    ...
    A deal had become urgent giv­en the lit­tle time that remains until the end of Greece’s bailout pro­gramme on August 20, with the euro area keen to reas­sure investors that the country’s debt is sus­tain­able before Athens returns to rely­ing on the mar­kets to finance spend­ing.

    “Greece is turn­ing the page,” said Euclid Tsakalo­tos, the country’s finance min­is­ter. “We have all the build­ing blocks to leave the pro­gramme with con­fi­dence.”
    ...

    And, of course, Berlin found this all too gen­er­ous to Greece, so this final deal is a ‘com­pro­mise’ between com­pas­sion­ate san­i­ty and some sort of aus­ter­i­ty night­mare terms. It sounds like one of the final stick­ing points was how Ger­many’s finance min­is­ter Olaf Scholz found the size of Greece’s planned 24 bil­lion euro cash reserves as a finan­cial sta­bil­i­ty rainy-day fund unrea­son­ably large:

    ...
    A com­pro­mise was reached after intense nego­ti­a­tions to resolve Ger­man reser­va­tions about parts of the debt relief pack­age. Hopes for quick agree­ment on Thurs­day evap­o­rat­ed when Olaf Scholz, Ger­man finance min­is­ter, set tough con­di­tions for accept­ing a sig­nif­i­cant matu­ri­ty exten­sion, prompt­ing fran­tic hours of talks that end­ed with calls to nation­al cap­i­tals ask­ing heads of state to give their bless­ing to the final com­pro­mise.

    Berlin was ret­i­cent about plans for a large increase in the size of Greece’s final tranche of bailout mon­ey from a planned €11.7bn, in the end accept­ing the amount could be raised to €15bn. This will leave Athens with cash reserves totalling €24.1bn, enough to sus­tain the coun­try for at least 22 months with­out it need­ing to go to the mar­kets.

    Berlin’s firm­ness reflects domes­tic pres­sure on Angela Merkel’s gov­ern­ment, notably from her Bavar­i­an con­ser­v­a­tive coali­tion part­ner, the CSU, which has crit­i­cised the chan­cel­lor for being too will­ing to use nation­al mon­ey to solve euro­zone prob­lems.
    ...

    Will Greek bond investors find this all reas­sur­ing? We’ll find out in August, but the 96 bil­lion euro defer­ment (40 per­cent of Greece’s Troikan debt) is pret­ty much the only thing mar­kets are allowed sup­posed to be reas­sured by because every­thing else is a pit­tance:

    ...
    Defer­ring repay­ment of the old­er bailout loans, includ­ing inter­est, by 10 years, and a par­al­lel deci­sion to extend their matu­ri­ties by the same amount of time, leaves Greece with very small debt repay­ments until after 2030, some­thing the euro area hopes will spur investors to buy the country’s bonds.

    The 10 year exten­sion was at the high­er end of EU offi­cials’ pre­dic­tions in the run-up to the meet­ing of what might be polit­i­cal­ly fea­si­ble. Euro­zone gov­ern­ments agreed last year that any exten­sion would be between zero and 15 years.

    Less sen­si­tive parts of the debt-relief deal, agreed just after the stroke of mid­night on Fri­day morn­ing, includ­ed return­ing to Greece about €1bn of annu­al prof­its that euro area cen­tral banks make on their hold­ings of the country’s debt.
    ...

    Crit­i­cal­ly, the final agree­ment leaves out plans to link fur­ther debt relief for Greece to the country’s eco­nom­ic per­for­mance, which was once cen­tral to the pro­pos­als dur­ing nego­ti­a­tions. Aus­ter­i­ty in the face of a reces­sion, which led to the euro­zone cat­a­stro­phe of the last decade, is expect­ed of Greece for decades to come under this ‘debt relief’ agree­ment:

    ...
    The final agree­ment leaves out plans worked on by gov­ern­ments to link fur­ther debt relief for Greece to the country’s eco­nom­ic per­for­mance, an idea that was once cen­tral to the pack­age but that had become mar­gin­alised in recent weeks in favour of focus­ing on the upfront matu­ri­ty exten­sion.
    ...

    And Greece is expect­ed to oper­ate under these terms until 2060. Let’s hope it does­n’t have a reces­sion between now and 2060. This is part of why even the IMF has “reser­va­tions” about the plan:

    ...
    A key pri­or­i­ty in the talks was to come up with a debt relief plan that could con­vince the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund that Greece’s debts are on a sus­tain­able path, after years of dis­agree­ments between the Wash­ing­ton-based fund and euro­zone gov­ern­ments, led by Berlin, over the state of the Greek econ­o­my.

    Chris­tine Lagarde, the IMF’s man­ag­ing direc­tor, wel­comed the deal but said the fund still held “reser­va­tions” about Greece’s longer-term debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty.

    As a con­di­tion for the relief, Athens will be required to main­tain a pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus, which excludes debt repay­ments, of 3.5 per cent of gross domes­tic prod­uct until 2022, with a tar­get that this will stay at 2.2 per cent on aver­age until 2060.
    ...

    But it real­ly isn’t an agree­ment that will be in place until 2060. At least not nec­es­sar­i­ly. Because they will review the terms in 2032. So it’s an agree­ment for the next 14 years with a pre­sumed option of the Troi­ka keep­ing it in place until 2060. Both the IMF and ECB praise this 2032 reassess­ment because it’s bet­ter than noth­ing and the IMF and ECB aren’t near­ly as crazy as the EU Com­mis­sion (which is real­ly the eurogroup of euro­zone finance min­sters in these mat­ters) when it comes to Troikan deci­sion-mak­ing. And yes, that means the IMF is a voice of rel­a­tive lenien­cy and san­i­ty. It’s both a ‘good cop/bad cop’ kabu­ki the­ater sit­u­a­tion and reflec­tion of the EU Com­mis­sion’s insan­i­ty:

    ...
    Finance min­is­ters in their state­ment left the door open to poten­tial­ly grant Greece fur­ther relief in the long term, say­ing that they would return to the issue in 2032 — some­thing praised by Ms Lagarde and the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank.

    Mario Draghi, the ECB’s pres­i­dent, said that he wel­comed finance min­is­ters’ “readi­ness to con­sid­er fur­ther debt measures...in case adverse eco­nom­ic devel­op­ments were to mate­ri­alise”.

    So Greece got thrown in the aus­ter­i­ty pit until 2032 at a min­i­mum and prob­a­bly 2060. And as the fol­low­ing arti­cle grim­ly points out at the end, Greece’s finance min­is­ter Euclid Tsakalo­tos declared it the end of the Greek cri­sis (which is under­stand­able giv­en the cir­cum­stance) and Klaus Regling, the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund, called it the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty that the world has ever seen (which was hope­ful­ly dark humor):

    Finan­cial Times

    Debt relief deal gives Greece hope after years of aus­ter­i­ty
    Agree­ment with bailout cred­i­tors sets terms for Athens that stretch over decades

    Mehreen Khan and Jim Bruns­den in Lux­em­bourg and Kerin Hope in Athens
    June 22, 2018 12:35 PM

    It was 2am on Fri­day in Lux­em­bourg — and Greece’s finance min­is­ter could final­ly hail the deliv­ery of a debt relief deal to help his coun­try “turn a page” on eight years of bailouts, aus­ter­i­ty and unprece­dent­ed eco­nom­ic tute­lage.

    “I think this is the end of the Greek cri­sis,” said Euclid Tsakalo­tos after fel­low euro­zone min­is­ters signed off on the sought-after mea­sures, which had been two years in the mak­ing.

    The agree­ment paves the way for Greece to end a series of high­ly con­tentious bailouts that took the coun­try to the brink of crash­ing out of the euro­zone and poi­soned rela­tions with Ger­many.

    But the stark real­i­ty of Greece’s €200bn stock­pile of loans bor­rowed from euro­zone gov­ern­ments means it will live with the lega­cy of the cri­sis for decades to come.

    Diplo­mats described this week’s deal as both a del­i­cate com­pro­mise and a grand bar­gain. Greece has been grant­ed debt relief mea­sures that bal­ance the need to make its finances sus­tain­able with a wari­ness in some cap­i­tals, espe­cial­ly Berlin, about giv­ing away too much.

    At the same time, the relief comes with clear strings attached — and they stretch far into the future.

    The state­ment agreed by finance min­is­ters con­tains some of the longest time­lines of any EU doc­u­ment. Greece will be expect­ed to main­tain a pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus — a mea­sure of its gov­ern­ment finances that excludes debt repay­ments — of 3.5 per cent of gross domes­tic prod­uct until 2022. Future gov­ern­ments will be expect­ed to hit an aver­age sur­plus of 2.2 per cent until the 2060s.

    Finance min­is­ters have also giv­en them­selves — or more like­ly their suc­ces­sors’ suc­ces­sors — an appoint­ment in 2032 to dis­cuss whether more relief is need­ed.

    The dizzy­ing time­lines reflect the sci­ence fic­tion involved in pro­ject­ing a country’s eco­nom­ic for­tunes over half a cen­tu­ry into the future — though Euro­pean offi­cials insist the cal­cu­la­tions are based on “real­is­tic and cau­tious assump­tions”.

    The pro­jec­tions may long out­live the careers of those who agreed them. Yet they mat­ter great­ly to investors who are con­sid­er­ing the cred­i­bil­i­ty of Greece’s exit from its bailout and con­sid­er­ing whether to buy the country’s bonds.

    The EU’s debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty analy­sis under­pins the Euro­peans’ insis­tence that Greece will not need a fourth bailout. It is also designed for the ben­e­fit of the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund, which has long had a less opti­mistic view of Greece’s growth prospects. Chris­tine Lagarde, the IMF’s man­ag­ing direc­tor, was one of the few senior offi­cials who expressed “reser­va­tions” about the state of Greece’s long-term debt pile.

    ...

    It was the art of the euro­zone deal — and it moved Klaus Regling, the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund, to a Trumpian flour­ish. “It is the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty that the world has ever seen,” said Mr Regling.

    ———-

    “Debt relief deal gives Greece hope after years of aus­ter­i­ty” by Mehreen Khan and Jim Bruns­den and Kerin Hope; Finan­cial Times; 06/22/2018

    “I think this is the end of the Greek cri­sis,” said Euclid Tsakalo­tos after fel­low euro­zone min­is­ters signed off on the sought-after mea­sures, which had been two years in the mak­ing.”

    It’s trag­ic that Greece’s finance min­is­ter called this state of aus­ter­i­ty pur­ga­to­ry the ‘end of Greek cri­sis’. But trag­i­cal­ly under­stand­able. He had to say that giv­en the cir­cum­stance.

    But less under­stand­able is the total­ly insane dec­la­ra­tion by Klaus Regling, the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund:

    It was the art of the euro­zone deal — and it moved Klaus Regling, the head of the eurozone’s bailout fund, to a Trumpian flour­ish. “It is the biggest act of sol­i­dar­i­ty that the world has ever seen,” said Mr Regling.

    42 years of aus­ter­i­ty is sol­i­dar­i­ty appar­ent­ly.

    But per­has Regling was refer­ring to the ‘great­ness’ of the time­line. Because as the arti­cle points out, the 2060 time­line is one of the longest time­lines of any EU doc­u­ment:

    ...
    The agree­ment paves the way for Greece to end a series of high­ly con­tentious bailouts that took the coun­try to the brink of crash­ing out of the euro­zone and poi­soned rela­tions with Ger­many.

    ...

    At the same time, the relief comes with clear strings attached — and they stretch far into the future.

    The state­ment agreed by finance min­is­ters con­tains some of the longest time­lines of any EU doc­u­ment. Greece will be expect­ed to main­tain a pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus — a mea­sure of its gov­ern­ment finances that excludes debt repay­ments — of 3.5 per cent of gross domes­tic prod­uct until 2022. Future gov­ern­ments will be expect­ed to hit an aver­age sur­plus of 2.2 per cent until the 2060s.
    ...

    And that unusu­al­ly long time­line is why it’s such a bizarre scheme for reas­sur­ing bond mar­kets: it’s pred­i­cat­ed on pre­dict­ing the sus­tain­abil­i­ty of Greece’s mas­sive debt load for decades to come. And that kind of time­frame is inher­ent­ly unre­as­sur­ing:

    ...
    But the stark real­i­ty of Greece’s €200bn stock­pile of loans bor­rowed from euro­zone gov­ern­ments means it will live with the lega­cy of the cri­sis for decades to come.

    Diplo­mats described this week’s deal as both a del­i­cate com­pro­mise and a grand bar­gain. Greece has been grant­ed debt relief mea­sures that bal­ance the need to make its finances sus­tain­able with a wari­ness in some cap­i­tals, espe­cial­ly Berlin, about giv­ing away too much.

    ...

    Finance min­is­ters have also giv­en them­selves — or more like­ly their suc­ces­sors’ suc­ces­sors — an appoint­ment in 2032 to dis­cuss whether more relief is need­ed.

    The dizzy­ing time­lines reflect the sci­ence fic­tion involved in pro­ject­ing a country’s eco­nom­ic for­tunes over half a cen­tu­ry into the future — though Euro­pean offi­cials insist the cal­cu­la­tions are based on “real­is­tic and cau­tious assump­tions”.

    The pro­jec­tions may long out­live the careers of those who agreed them. Yet they mat­ter great­ly to investors who are con­sid­er­ing the cred­i­bil­i­ty of Greece’s exit from its bailout and con­sid­er­ing whether to buy the country’s bonds.
    ...

    The dizzy­ing time­lines reflect the sci­ence fic­tion involved in pro­ject­ing a country’s eco­nom­ic for­tunes over half a cen­tu­ry into the future — though Euro­pean offi­cials insist the cal­cu­la­tions are based on “real­is­tic and cau­tious assump­tions”.”

    Sci­ence fic­tion is a good way to describe the plan. Dystopi­an sci­ence fic­tion.

    And note how the EU’s far­ci­cal debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty analy­sis that under­pins this is pred­i­cat­ed on the assump­tion that Greece won’t need anoth­er ‘bailout’. That’s the assump­tion until 2060 under the EU’s scheme that just got agreed to:

    ...
    The EU’s debt sus­tain­abil­i­ty analy­sis under­pins the Euro­peans’ insis­tence that Greece will not need a fourth bailout. It is also designed for the ben­e­fit of the Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund, which has long had a less opti­mistic view of Greece’s growth prospects. Chris­tine Lagarde, the IMF’s man­ag­ing direc­tor, was one of the few senior offi­cials who expressed “reser­va­tions” about the state of Greece’s long-term debt pile.
    ...

    So it turns out the great­est act of sol­i­dar­i­ty in his­to­ry is sci­ence fic­tion. And, yes, that’s depress­ing.

    This is turn­ing out to be a remark­ably far­ci­cal Greek tragedy.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | June 23, 2018, 9:07 pm
  3. The phrase ‘meet the new boss, same as the old boss’ isn’t inher­ent­ly a neg­a­tive phrase. It depends on the boss. But in the case of Greece today it’s an unam­bigu­ous­ly night­mar­ish thing to say. Case in point: we’re just three weeks into the post-‘bailout’ phase of Greece’s long-nation­al night­mare and Greece just expe­ri­enced the first demand that it con­tin­ue cut­ting pro­grams even when it’s run­ning a high­er-than-expect­ed/de­mand­ed sur­plus. Yep.

    The Greek gov­ern­ment was slat­ed to cut pen­sion spend­ing by 18 per­cent start­ing next year in order to main­tain the 3.5 per­cent bud­get sur­plus demand­ed of it. But its rev­enues are actu­al­ly com­ing in high­er than pro­ject­ed so the gov­ern­ment is look­ing into can­cel­ing the pen­sion cuts. But when it comes to things like reduc­ing aus­ter­i­ty, Greece has to run the idea past the Troi­ka first. And if there’s one cut the Troi­ka does­n’t approve of, it’s cuts in aus­ter­i­ty:

    Reuters

    No Greek pen­sions deal yet as cred­i­tors end first post-bailout review

    Sep­tem­ber 14, 2018 / 4:37 AM

    ATHENS, Sept 14 (Reuters) — Greece’s inter­na­tion­al cred­i­tors seemed like­ly on Fri­day to with­hold instant approval for its plan to put man­dat­ed pen­sion cuts on hold next year, as they wrapped up their first post-bailout inspec­tion of the country’s finances.

    The coun­try emerged from the biggest eco­nom­ic res­cue in his­to­ry in late August after almost nine years of aus­ter­i­ty. It still owes bil­lions, and is under post-bailout mon­i­tor­ing by the Euro­pean Union and Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund to ensure it does not devi­ate from fis­cal tar­gets.

    Athens argues it has enough fis­cal lee­way to unwind cuts in pen­sions of up to 18 per­cent that are sched­uled to kick in from Jan­u­ary, while main­tain­ing the healthy sur­plus its lenders say it needs in order to keep its finances on a sus­tain­able tra­jec­to­ry.

    One source said spec­u­la­tion that the inspec­tors agreed with Greece’s view was pre­ma­ture. “A good deal of work is still required,” the source from the lenders told Reuters.

    ...

    Athens has promised to achieve an annu­al pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus — which strips out debt ser­vic­ing costs — of 3.5 per­cent of GDP up to 2022.

    With that in mind it leg­is­lat­ed pen­sion cuts and tax hikes to take effect in 2019 and 2020, but said in recent days it con­sid­ered those mea­sures unnec­es­sary since it has been exceed­ing its fis­cal tar­gets.

    Greece’s pref­er­ence would be to ditch the pen­sion cuts, which Prime Min­is­ter Alex­is Tsipras said on Sept. 8 would also be con­tin­gent on a review of its bud­get by the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion in mid-Octo­ber.

    Ear­li­er Fri­day, the state-run Athens News Agency quot­ed Euro­pean sources say­ing lenders con­sid­ered Greece’s social secu­ri­ty sys­tem viable, and did not dis­count the pos­si­bil­i­ty of pen­sion cuts being aban­doned com­plete­ly.

    ———–

    :No Greek pen­sions deal yet as cred­i­tors end first post-bailout review” by Reuters; 09/14/2018

    “Athens argues it has enough fis­cal lee­way to unwind cuts in pen­sions of up to 18 per­cent that are sched­uled to kick in from Jan­u­ary, while main­tain­ing the healthy sur­plus its lenders say it needs in order to keep its finances on a sus­tain­able tra­jec­to­ry.”

    That’s how big Greece’s pre­vi­ous cuts have been: it’s got a sur­plus on top of the Tro­ka-man­dat­ed 3.5 per­cent sur­plus it has to run to 2022 (at which point the sur­plus man­dates con­tin­ue but are hope­ful­ly atten­u­at­ed a bit). It’s lit­er­al­ly a sur­plus sur­plus. And the Greek gov­ern­ment would like to use that sur­plus sur­plus on reduc­ing or avoid­ing entire­ly the sched­uled pen­sion cuts. But since the entire Greek bud­get is up for annu­al review by the Troi­ka, Greece has to ask for per­mis­sion first over how to spend its sur­plus sur­plus:

    ...
    Athens has promised to achieve an annu­al pri­ma­ry bud­get sur­plus — which strips out debt ser­vic­ing costs — of 3.5 per­cent of GDP up to 2022.

    With that in mind it leg­is­lat­ed pen­sion cuts and tax hikes to take effect in 2019 and 2020, but said in recent days it con­sid­ered those mea­sures unnec­es­sary since it has been exceed­ing its fis­cal tar­gets.

    Greece’s pref­er­ence would be to ditch the pen­sion cuts, which Prime Min­is­ter Alex­is Tsipras said on Sept. 8 would also be con­tin­gent on a review of its bud­get by the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion in mid-Octo­ber.
    ...

    And it did­n’t exact­ly sound like the Troi­ka was open to the idea:

    ...
    One source said spec­u­la­tion that the inspec­tors agreed with Greece’s view was pre­ma­ture. “A good deal of work is still required,” the source from the lenders told Reuters.
    ...

    So will the Troi­ka end up reward­ing Greece’s sur­plus sur­plus with cuts to the planned pen­sion cuts? Of course not. But the par­tic­u­lar rea­son giv­en is notable sim­ply because it can be used to jus­ti­fy any oth­er aus­ter­i­ty mea­sures if the issue of how to spend sur­plus sur­plus­es pops up again in the future: The IMF respond­ed that the pen­sion cuts are required for both fis­cal and struc­tur­al rea­sons, so even if the fis­cal jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for the cuts is no longer there the struc­tur­al rea­sons remain in place.

    The IMF made that argu­ment in response to claims a lit­tle ear­ly by Greece’s finance min­is­ter that the issue was­n’t a struc­tur­al issue but only a fis­cal issue because the pen­sion cuts that would be reversed were cuts for exist­ing elder­ly pen­sion­ers who are going to die off in the next cou­ple of decades. Greece’s min­is­ter also said the IMF did­n’t insist that the pen­sion cuts were a struc­tur­al issue. It was in response to those state­ments that the IMF assert­ed that the pen­sion cuts are indeed a struc­tur­al issue and there­fore required even if Greece could afford to avoid them. Plus, the IMF describes the pen­sion cuts as an investor-friend­ly sym­bol­ic com­mit­ment to ongo­ing reforms:

    ekathimeri­ni

    IMF to insist on pen­sion cuts

    EIRINI CHRYSOLORA
    21.09.2018 : 18:25

    The Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund on Thurs­day issued a flat denial to the government’s request to can­cel the imple­men­ta­tion of the planned pen­sion cut in Jan­u­ary 2019, while Finance Min­is­ter Euclid Tsakalo­tos appeared reserved about Berlin’s atti­tude as he respond­ed to investors’ ques­tions in Lon­don a day after meet­ing his Ger­man coun­ter­part.

    IMF spokesman Ger­ry Rice cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly told a press con­fer­ence that noth­ing has changed in the Fund’s posi­tions on the pen­sions since the sum­mer. The IMF con­sid­ers the mea­sure both struc­tur­al and fis­cal – unlike what the gov­ern­ment claims.

    The pen­sion cut is a struc­tur­al mea­sure in the IMF’s view because it will improve the long-term prospects of the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem. Also in fis­cal terms it will cre­ate the space required to intro­duce more poli­cies to sup­port vul­ner­a­ble social groups and ease tax­a­tion so as to bol­ster growth. Rice went on to stress the sym­bol­ism of the mea­sure, say­ing that its imple­men­ta­tion will send a clear sig­nal that Greece remains on the path of reforms.

    A lit­tle ear­li­er Tsakalo­tos had said the exact oppo­site in Lon­don. Reply­ing to investors’ ques­tions, he said that avert­ing the cuts would not affect the sus­tain­abil­i­ty of the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem because the old gen­er­a­tion of pen­sion­ers – affect­ed by the mea­sure – will not be around any­more after 2030–40, so the mea­sure is not struc­tur­al, he claimed. On the fis­cal aspect the min­is­ter said there is a mar­gin not only for not imple­ment­ing the cuts but also for cer­tain growth-friend­ly mea­sures, thanks to the exces­sive pri­ma­ry sur­plus. He added that the IMF does not insist that the mea­sure is struc­tur­al, but Rice refut­ed him a lit­tle lat­er.

    ...

    ———-

    “IMF to insist on pen­sion cuts” by EIRINI CHRYSOLORA; ekathimerini.com; 09/21/2018

    “The Inter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund on Thurs­day issued a flat denial to the government’s request to can­cel the imple­men­ta­tion of the planned pen­sion cut in Jan­u­ary 2019, while Finance Min­is­ter Euclid Tsakalo­tos appeared reserved about Berlin’s atti­tude as he respond­ed to investors’ ques­tions in Lon­don a day after meet­ing his Ger­man coun­ter­part.”

    The IMF responds with a flat denial. Of course. Along with an expla­na­tion about how the need for those pen­sion cuts isn’t just fis­cal, but also struc­tur­al in nature, because it will improve the long-term prospects Greece’s social secu­ri­ty sys­tem and so a sur­plus sur­plus is no excuse for not mak­ing the cuts. Plus, the cuts will send a clear sig­nal that Greece remains on the path of reforms:

    ...
    IMF spokesman Ger­ry Rice cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly told a press con­fer­ence that noth­ing has changed in the Fund’s posi­tions on the pen­sions since the sum­mer. The IMF con­sid­ers the mea­sure both struc­tur­al and fis­cal – unlike what the gov­ern­ment claims.

    The pen­sion cut is a struc­tur­al mea­sure in the IMF’s view because it will improve the long-term prospects of the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem. Also in fis­cal terms it will cre­ate the space required to intro­duce more poli­cies to sup­port vul­ner­a­ble social groups and ease tax­a­tion so as to bol­ster growth. Rice went on to stress the sym­bol­ism of the mea­sure, say­ing that its imple­men­ta­tion will send a clear sig­nal that Greece remains on the path of reforms.
    ...

    That was the IMF’s response to Greece’s finance min­is­ter point­ing out that the cuts to be reversed were cuts for the old gen­er­a­tion of pen­sion­ers who are going to die off, mean­ing this can’t be a struc­tur­al issue. It’s a ‘tak­ing it a bit easy on the old pen­sion­ers’ issue:

    ...
    A lit­tle ear­li­er Tsakalo­tos had said the exact oppo­site in Lon­don. Reply­ing to investors’ ques­tions, he said that avert­ing the cuts would not affect the sus­tain­abil­i­ty of the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem because the old gen­er­a­tion of pen­sion­ers – affect­ed by the mea­sure – will not be around any­more after 2030–40, so the mea­sure is not struc­tur­al, he claimed. On the fis­cal aspect the min­is­ter said there is a mar­gin not only for not imple­ment­ing the cuts but also for cer­tain growth-friend­ly mea­sures, thanks to the exces­sive pri­ma­ry sur­plus. He added that the IMF does not insist that the mea­sure is struc­tur­al, but Rice refut­ed him a lit­tle lat­er.
    ...

    And that’s how things are slat­ed to go for Greece for years to come: When Greece over­does it on the aus­ter­i­ty and gen­er­ates a larg­er sur­plus than pro­ject­ed there’s no eas­ing up on the aus­ter­i­ty. Even when it’s easy up on the sched­uled cuts for elder­ly pen­sion­ers. Save the social secu­ri­ty sys­tem by cut­ting it. That’s the under­ly­ing log­ic employed by the IMF and the same scam used by bil­lion­aires like Pete Peter­son the GOP and right-wing par­ties around the globe to jus­ti­fy cut­ting the social safe­ty-net under the guise of sav­ing it. Greece has to imple­ment that ‘cut the safe­ty-net to save it because there’s no oth­er choice’ scam agen­da and there’s noth­ing Greece can do about it.

    So we’re see­ing ear­ly indi­ca­tions that the Troikan mer­ci­less­ness, one of the defin­ing aspects of the Greek ‘bailout’ night­mare’, will remain unre­lent­ing. Don’t foeget that this is the sys­tem that Greece is going to be under until 2060 accord­ing to the ‘bailout’ agree­ment. So the Troikan mer­ci­less­ness might relent around 2060. That’s the post-‘bailout’ real­i­ty for Greece. The beat­ings will con­tin­ue, sur­plus sur­plus­es or not.

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | September 23, 2018, 9:38 pm

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